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Buddhism and Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka Politicization, tensions and de-politicization of Buddhism

ARM ImtiyazTemple University, USA

AbstractOrganized religions often play a significant role in the political affairs of any country when political actors carefully employ them to pursue power. Buddhism is the major religion on the island of Sri Lanka, and often it becomes a powerful symbol for Sinhala-Buddhist politicians. This study examines the interaction between Buddhism and politics in Sri Lanka, and will attempt to examine the religious factors in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict between the two nations; namely, Tamil and Sinhala. It will examine how the politicization of Buddhism helped Sinhala political elites and leaders in their quest for power, reinforcing religious and ethnic tensions, and finally will discuss some solutions to de-religionize the state structure to help Sri Lanka enjoy the fruits of modernization and democracy.

KeywordsSymbols, electoral politics, democracy, politicization, extremism and violence

Introduction

The electoral system and elections in Sri Lanka are very competitive. To win elections, politicians not only invest attractive money, but also use carefully planned religio-ethnic symbols. Sinhala-Buddhist politicians are mainly divided between the two major political parties to win the votes of the Sinhalese (74% of the population in 1981); the United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP). These parties also promise or formulate some policies to attract the minori-ties, mainly Hindu Tamils (12.6% of the population in 1981) as well as the Moors (over 7% of the population). However, this study is confined to analyzing the behavior (vis-à-vis the use of reli-gion) of Sinhala politicians and their political parties in their quest for political power. The ethnic civil war that has ravaged post-independence Sri Lanka for decades is generally identified beyond the religious dimension as a struggle rooted in ethno-linguistic symbols and discrimination (De Silva, 1998; De Votta, 2004; Imtiyaz and Stavis, 2008). The enmity between the Sinhala majority and the minorities, particularly the ethnic Tamils, originated not because most Tamils embrace Hinduism; indeed, the degree of mutual tolerance and respect demonstrated by Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka is evident through long traditions of religious syncretism and cohabitation.

Corresponding author:ARM Imtiyaz, Asian Studies, Temple University, Room 830, Anderson Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA. Email: imtiyaz@temple.edu

486087 JAS49310.1177/0021909613486087Journal of Asian and African StudiesImtiyaz2013

Article

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However, it is also indisputably true that specific religious beliefs, texts, legends, and symbols, whether Buddhist, Hindu or Moors, have been used by politicians and elites to initiate intolerance and promote violence against the other for electoral gain.

General remarks on Sinhalese, Buddhism minorities, and Sinhala-Buddhist movements and political parties

The Sinhalese people, who are predominantly Theravada Buddhist, are the major ethnic group in Sri Lanka. They constitute some 82% of the population (Department of Census and Statistics – Sri Lanka, 2008) and were originally migrants who arrived from North India as early as around 500BC. The Sinhalese identity in Sri Lanka derives from two factors: (1) the Sinhala language, and (2) the Buddhist religion. These factors have, in recent decades, been enthusiastically promoted in the development of a Sinhalese Buddhist identity in Sri Lanka.

Of the Sinhalese, 70% are associated with (the Theravada school of) Buddhism, which was introduced to Sri Lanka in the 2nd century BCE by the Venerable Mahinda, the son of the Emperor Ashoka, during the reign of Sri Lanka’s King Devanampiyatissa (The World Fact Book, 2008).

Buddhist bhikkhus, or monks, play a leading part in the socio-political life in Sri Lanka (Houtart, 1974). They argue that anyone can live in Sri Lanka as long as Sinhala-Buddhists can enjoy cul-tural, religious, economic, political, and linguistic hegemony (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998: 3; Roberts, 1980). However, the diversity in the religious composition of Sri Lankan society neces-sitated that the state remains neutral in religious affairs.

The Sri Lankan Tamils, who are mainly Hindus, were, until 2000, the largest ethnic minority in the country. According to a statistical abstract of the government of Sri Lanka, published in 1981, the Tamils composed 12.7% of the population (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998; Census of Population and Housing, 1981; Roberts, 1980). Sri Lankan Tamils immigrated to the island from South India. The Tamil population in Sri Lanka was reinforced with the arrival of the Indian Tamils or up-country Tamils largely in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to work in the British-owned estates as work-ers: first for coffee and then later for tea and rubber estates in the highlands. By 1921, Indian Tamils comprised 13.4% of the total Tamil population, which in turn represented 24.8% of the inhabitants of Sri Lanka (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998; Census of Population and Housing, 1981; Roberts, 1980). The Indian Tamils, however, as a result of the Ceylon Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949, which was engineered by the UNP government led by DS Senanayake, lost their large share in the country’s population charts. By 1981, Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka only accounted for 5.5% of the total population (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998; Census of Population and Housing, 1981; Roberts, 1980). The rest of the Tamils were reclassified as non-citizens.

Moors, most of whom speak Tamil, are another significant minority group in Sri Lanka. Moors, who trace their ancestral roots to seafaring Arab merchants, appeal to their religious and cultural identity to form their ethnic identity formation (Ross and Matles Savada, 1988). They constituted 7.9% of the island’s total population in 2001. The Malay community, whose ancestors include laborers brought by the Dutch and British, as well as soldiers in the Dutch garrison, now constitute 0.3% of the population, and share Islam as religion with the Moor population of the island (Ross and Matles Savada, 1988). By and large, Moors in Sri Lanka have tended to oppose the Tamil sepa-ratism advanced by the Tamil nationalists including the Tamil Tigers, and cooperated with the successive government dominated by the majority Sinhalese in order to claim a stake in Sri Lanka’s deeply divided polity (Imtiyaz, 2009a).

Finally, the Burgers, a small minority group, need to be discussed. Burgers, who are descen-dants of European settlers, appear to be western European in their physical appearance. At the time

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of independence in 1948, Burgers comprised 0.6% of the total population. However, since inde-pendence, the Burger population in Sri Lanka has declined as a result of migration to Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, only accounting for 0.2% of the island’s total population in 2001 (Department of Census and Statistics – Sri Lanka, 2008).

The Sinhala-Buddhist religio-political parties and groups

In the early 20th century, Sinhala-Buddhist organizations such as the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) and Sinhala nationalist politicians pressed for the elevation of Buddhism to the status of state religion (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998). Neither the Ceylon National Congress, founded in 1919 to pressure the colonial rulers for “long-postponed constitutional reforms” (Roberts, 1980: 858–860) nor, more importantly, the Ceylonese political elites, particularly DS Senanayake, expressed willingness at this stage to identify the island with the concept of a Sinhalese-Buddhist state. After independence, Sinhala nationalism based on Buddhism continued to impact upon Sri Lankan politics. The Sinhala Buddhist organizations continuously called for the state protection of Buddhism. In the mid 1950s Mr Bandaranayake joined these forces for political gain and came to power in 1956 (Phadnis, 1976).

Although Buddhist monks have long enjoyed a prominent position with the society, Sinhala-Buddhist leaders such as Anagarika Dharmapala, who led the Buddhist Renaissance Movement in Sri Lanka, played a significant role mobilizing the Sinhala-Buddhists, and state policies were being eschewed towards Buddhism from the early days of independent Sri Lanka, political parties solely based on religious identity is a relatively new phenomenon. To date, only one major political party can be exclusively categorized as a political party that employs Sinhala-Buddhist concerns and demands for electoral gains. That is: the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).

The major goals of the JHU, which was founded in 2004, are politically simple: to uphold Buddhism and establish a link between the state and religion, to consolidate deep Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony over the non-Sinhala-Buddhists and to oppose all form of devolution to the minorities, particularly the Tamils.

The JHU was founded by Buddhist monks to promote the interests of the Sinhala-Buddhists and to make Buddhism a guiding principal of state affairs, as well as to wipe out Tamil violence by force. The JHU shuns non-violence as a means to seek political alternatives for the Tamil national question, and urged young Sinhala-Buddhists to sign up for the army (Wax, 2008). As a result, “as many as 30,000 Sinhalese young men have signed up for the army in the past few months” (Wax, 2008).

The JHU, in its first parliamentary elections held on April 2, 2004, won nine seats out of 225, or 6% of the popular vote. The JHU, on July 21 2004, submitted a bill to Parliament seeking to outlaw religious conversions based on offers of cash or other incentives (Shah and Imtiyaz). The legisla-tion, which won the blessing of the government in Sri Lanka, raised profound concerns, especially among Christians, a small minority of the population (Page, 2003).1 In 2005 Mr Rajapaksha, who formulated anti-Tamil propaganda to outbid the UNP in the presidential elections, sealed an elec-toral deal with the JHU. The political cooperation between Mr Rajapaksha, President of Sri Lanka, and the JHU is still gradually and progressively increasing.

Elections in Sri Lanka and religious symbolism

The introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1931 laid the foundation for a party system in Sri Lanka and has served as the point of departure of democratic practices (Kearney, 1983). The coun-try has enjoyed uninterrupted democracy in the sense that the elections have been held at regular

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intervals. Since independence, the UNP and the SLFP have dominated the island’s political system. These parties generally represent a secular political position, but have resorted to symbolic emo-tional agendas to outbid their opponents.

Though both parties enjoy some support from the minorities, they generally focus on the pre-dicaments of the Sinhalese, who view the island of Sri Lanka as the Buddhist Promised Land. The Sinhalese increasingly feel that they are an economically disadvantaged and socially underprivi-leged group. This helps the Sinhala political parties to focus on symbolic policies to win the votes of the majority Sinhalese.

Almost all elections in Sri Lanka between 1948 (parliamentary election) and 2010 (presidential election) have made use of religio-ethnic symbols. Although symbolic slogans were not clearly associated with the agendas of politicians to win the very first general elections, the ruling UNP elites enacted the Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949 to deprive Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka of voting rights soon after the party came to power. These two bills, actively supported by All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the major ethnic party of the Sri Lankan Tamils, de-citizenised thousands of Plantation Tamils (Shastri, 1999). Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayakam, one of the chief lieutenants of the ACTC, and a Christian Tamil from the Jaffna peninsula, split from the party and formed the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK, literally “Ceylon Tamil State Party,” commonly known as the Tamil Federal Party, FP) (Ram, 1989).

Soon after independence, the ACBC2 lobbied for stern measures to protect and promote the interests of Buddhists and Buddhism. The ACBC also demanded a Commission of Inquiry to “report on the state of Buddhism” (De Silva, 1993: 316). However, the UNP government, led by DS Senanayake, resisted growing demands for special concessions to Buddhists (Smith, 1966). It is important to point out that the Senanayake administration’s decision to divorce the state from the religion (Buddhism) goaded the Sinhala-Buddhist extremists to revolt against the leadership of the UNP, and SWRD Bandaranayake exploited the situation for his political gains.

1956: religio-linguistic symbolism

Symbolic politics based on ethnic outbidding first appeared in the early 1950s with the formation of the SLFP, the main opposition party to the UNP in 1952, and practiced by the British-educated Bandaranaike, who was described by Manor (1985) as a “complex, inconstant, visionary” leader of Sri Lanka. The SLFP, the splinter group of the UNP, lost to the UNP in the 1952 general elections (Jayasuriya, 2005: 11). The defeat inherently pushed the SLFP to seek straightforward alternatives to win Sinhalese votes in the crucial 1956 general elections: Bandaranaike espoused competitive Sinhala chauvinism and economic nationalism to outbid his electoral enemies, particularly the liberal-leaning ruling UNP. It is also important to note that the SLFP customarily relied upon socially and politically influential groups including the Buddhist clergy or bhikkus, the Sangha (the highest Buddhist order) to carry its message to the Sinhalese villages where representatives of the Sinhalese rural middle class, such as village teachers, indigenous physicians, and petty landowners played a major role in the political decisions of villagers. The economically disadvantaged Sinhalese, who believed Tamils enjoyed privileged positions and benefits under the British colo-nial administration, became an ardent audience of the SLFP’s religio-ethnic symbolic sentiments, which promised to safeguard the interests of the Buddhists and offered egalitarian social reforms such as the introduction of the Sinhala-Only official language policy, land reform measures and subsidized agricultural policies and social reforms to institutionalize equity for the rural sector. The significant point is that Bandaranayke vigorously attempted to prove that he was the only voice of

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the oppressed Sinhalese, who would lose their rights and centuries-old Buddhist traditions if the UNP were elected to power. Thus, the SLFP found an easy passage to public office, and gave up Bandaranayke’s early policy of language parity between Sinhala and Tamil. In fact, Bandaranayke’s only aim was to exploit the social and cultural conditions of disadvantaged Sinhalese to win votes.

To win the general elections of 1956, Bandaranayke formed an electoral alliance with the pro-Sinhala nationalist parties. An election coalition called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), or People’s United Front, was formed between Bandaranayke’s SLFP, Philip Gunawardena’s Viplavakari Lanka Samasamaja Party (VLSSP) or Revolutionary Equal Party, and W Dahanayaka’s newly formed Sinhala Bhasa Peramuna (SBP), or Sinhala Language Front. The election coalition manifesto declared “Sinhala only within 24 hours” with “reasonable use of Tamil.” The newly formed, monks-only party the Eksath Bhikku Peramina (EBP) played a critical role in this election as a major political pressure group. The EBP, fiercely anti-UNP, anti-West and anti-Catholic, pre-sented a 10-point agenda (the Dasa Panatha) to Bandaranayake at a massive rally in Colombo. The 10-point agenda included making Sinhala the only official language and giving Buddhism its “rightful” place (Tambiah, 1992: 42–44).

Bandaranayke, with the total support of Sinhala-Buddhists, strongly campaigned in the villages of the south and west of the island, while his anti-West and anti-Catholic groups largely concen-trated on the urban areas of the south and west with pro-Buddhism voices. One of the EBP’s slo-gans was “A vote for the UNP is a vote for the Catholics; a vote for the MEP is a vote for the Buddhists” (Tambiah, 1992). The EBP succeeded in organizing a strong structure that would pro-vide a militant basis for the purpose of attracting disgruntled Sinhalese in urban areas.

The election results sent the message that Bandaranayke’s religio-ethnic symbolic policies had swayed the Sinhalese, particularly the rural voters. The MEP polled 39.5% of the votes and won 51 of the 95 seats in Parliament, and hence formed the government. The UNP, which campaigned on a secular platform, was decimated, gaining a mere eight seats although it polled 27% of the votes. Leftist parties, both the Lanka Samasamaja Party (LSSP) and Community Party (CP), opposed to the Sinhala-Only language agenda, secured 14 and three seats respectively. In the Tamil minority-dominated northeast, the Federal Party (FP), led by Tamil politician SJV Chelvanayakam, won 10 seats, polling 5.4 % of the votes (Department of Elections, 2002a). The FP, the major Tamil moderate party, campaigned on the federalist alternative for the territorially-based Tamils and attempted to win Tamil rights from the Sinhalese-dominated state through avail-able democratic channels.

On 5 June 1956, Bandaranayke introduced in the House of Representatives a bill to make Sinhala the only official language of Sri Lanka. The purpose of the legislation was to terminate the English language influence in Sri Lanka. Due to the English language policy, the English language had occupied a superior place in pre-independence Sri Lanka. Minorities in Sri Lanka, particularly ethnic Tamils and Christians, enjoyed better opportunities due to the British way of implementa-tion, and ordinary Sinhala-Buddhists’ hesitation to adopt English as their medium of instruction/communication.

The bill was passed on the same day with the main opposition UNP voting with the government and opposed by the Tamil parties (FP and ACTC) and leftist parties (LSSP and CP).

The 1956 election, which successfully mobilized the extremist Sinhala-Buddhists, radically changed the shape of the island’s politics for years to come: the major Sinhala parties, including the left parties,3 switched to religio-ethnic symbolic politics sandwiching religious emotions and ethnic hostile politics as a way to garner popular Sinhalese support (Jayewardene, 1985: 74–79). The LSSP, the major left party, is a case in point. The party, which used to claim that it fights for the oppressed marginalized segments of the society, demanded that the state provide special

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assurance to the Sinhalese people so that a national unity can be forged (Jeyaratnam Wilson, 1988: 39). Notably, since then, the UNP has changed its secular policies and rhetoric to balance the Sinhala nationalists. The UNP’s support of the MEP’s Sinhala-Only Act of 1956, its violent oppo-sition to the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam pact of 1957,4 enthusiastic involvement in the anti-Tamil campaign in March 1960 and after the 1977 general elections, and its abrogation of the power-sharing pact with the FP leader Selvanayagam in 1965,5 otherwise known as the Dudley–Selva Pact, to allay the Sinhalese opposition, were a few demonstrations of the UNP’s radical changes in adopting anti-Tamil outbidding strategies to challenge the SLFP and left parties, in order to seek Sinhalese votes.

Post–1956: toward the Sinhala-Buddhasization

The growth of Sinhala-Buddhist extremism helped weaken the secular structure of the Sri Lankan state. There were no serious efforts made by politicians to discourage the extremist forces; rather, they promoted these forces to win power. Politicians’ tolerance of the behavior of the Sinhala-extremists and Bhikkhus affected political modernity and rational choices in politics such as the de-emotionalization of politics and group reconciliation to ease tensions between different groups.

In 1966, Bhikkhus opposed concessions to the minority Tamils. The government, to satisfy the Sinhala-Buddhists and Bhikkhus, retracted the concessions. In 1967, in a bid to mollify the Sinhala-Buddhists and Bhikkhus, the UNP government introduced “the poya holiday under which the weekly holiday was based on the phases of the moon while the traditional Sabbath holiday was abandoned” (De Silva, 1993: 333). However, the UNP was not able to win the elections of 1970.

In 1970, the SLFP formed a “no-contest” electoral alliance with traditional pro-Sinhalese left parties to defeat the UNP. The alliance promised nationalist social and economic policies and opposed the Tamil demand for autonomy. The alliance also promised to replace the British-introduced Constitution, with its article 29(2), which sought to protect the rights of minorities.6 The UNP did not adopt any pro-minority programs, but refrained from adopting what Tamils consid-ered anti-Tamil programs. The SLFP allies who fought on the symbolic pro-Sinhala agenda recorded a massive win: the SLFP won 91 out of 108 seats, while its key allies the LSSP and the CP won 19 and six seats respectively. The UNP only secured 17 seats out of 130 it contested. The Tamil moderate party the FP, which contested in the Tamil dominated northeast on Tamil autonomy and security, won 13 out of 19 seats where it fielded candidates (Department of Elections, 2002b).

The return to power of the center-left alliance, led by the SLFP, further contributed to the decline of the secular state structure of Sri Lanka. In April 1971, the Sinhala nationalist JVP launched a violent revolt against the state (for a detailed analysis of the JVP insurgency, see Alles, 1977). The JVP’s campaign successfully attracted the unemployed and economically disadvantaged Sinhalese youth and farmers. The growing influence of the JVP among the Sinhalese who lived in southern Sri Lanka increased the pressure on Mrs Bandaranayake’s government. Hence, the SLFP allies executed pro-Sinhalese policies to mollify the disgruntled rural poor Sinhalese youth and farmers. The net result was the Republican Constitution of 1972, which replaced the British-introduced 1948 Constitution. A leading Trotskyite, Dr Colvin R de Silva, was appointed as Minister of Constitutional Affairs and granted authority to design a new constitution. Dr de Silva understood the Sinhalese need, and according to notable Tamil scholar AJ Wilson “compromised his Trotskyist principles” to consolidate his party among the Sinhalese masses (Tigers celebrate Heroes Day, 2009). Thus, he framed a constitution that included articles entrenching state patronage for Buddhism, which re-affirmed the pre-eminence of the Sinhalese language in all aspects of public life, and anti-Tamil education policies.7 Notably, the new constitution (The Constitution of the

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Republic of Sri Lanka, 1972) removed the formal safeguards for minorities that had been incorpo-rated into the British Soulbury Constitution under article 29(2). Chapter II of the 1972 Constitution reads as follows:

The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism while assuring to all religions the right guaranteed by section 18 (1) (d) (The Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka, 1972).

When the ruling party presented the proposal for the Constitution, there was no formidable opposition from the UNP. On the other hand, the 1972 Constitution that guaranteed state patronage to Buddhism obviously provoked alienation among the non-Sinhala-Buddhists, particularly the Tamil youths whose chances to gain admission to the universities were marginalized due to the ethnic standardization policy, which was now characterized by the government as positive dis-crimination (Ministry of Defence an Urban Development, Sri Lanka, 2010). According to Tamil opinion, the 1972 Constitution:

…was changed to set up a permanent racial hierarchy that posits the Sinhala-Buddhist majority as having a ‘first and foremost’ place in the island with the other minorities as subordinate. In short, Sri Lanka is deemed a Sinhala country in which the minorities – Tamils, Upcountry Tamils and Muslims – are allowed to stay, provided they understand their place in this hierarchy (Tamils seek liberation, 2008).

Thus, the Tamils practically described the First Republican Constitution of 1972, which in many ways embarrassed symbolic Sinhalese nationalism as a charter of Sinhalese Buddhist supremacy.

Though the SLFP and its Sinhala left allies succeeded in arousing Sinhalese nationalism with its symbolic political appeals, it obviously disappointed the same masses economically at a later period. The government’s socio-economic policies burdened the masses with economic difficul-ties. The government urged the people to exercise patience, but the general masses who were concerned about their stomachs had their own say on the government: The SLFP alliance suffered a huge defeat in the 1977 general elections which brought the liberal UNP back to power.

The UNP secured 140 seats out of 225. The SLFP campaigning independently of the left parties and with few pro-Sinhala policies won only eight seats out of 147, while its former allies the LSSP and CP were left without a single seat (Department of Elections, 2002c). The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a newly born umbrella organization of moderate Tamil parties, openly campaigned for the establishment of a separate sovereign Tamil state in the northern and eastern regions of the island at the General Elections. In these Tamil areas, the TULF won all 18 seats and thus became the main opposition party in the Parliament (for a detailed analysis of the votes polled by the TULF in the northern and eastern Provinces, see Balasooriya, 1977a, 1977b; The Mandate of Tamil Eelam, 1977).

Prior to the election one significant development took place: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged. The lack of power sharing, the decisive shifts toward Sinhala dominance in state and institutionalization of these tendencies through constitutional provisions, encouraged some Tamils to adopt violence to seek a separate state. Tamil politicians, in turn, were pressured to openly support the Tamil extremists and their programs. On May 5, 1976 Vellupillai Prabakaran formed the LTTE.

The UNP administration, led by JR Jayewardene, introduced the new constitution commonly known as the second republic, or 1978 Constitution. Jayewardene initiated some programs to bring the Sinhala constituency to his side. One of them was to retain the same status for Buddhism in the new Constitution, and thus Article 9 of the constitution guarantees Buddhism the foremost place.

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Accordingly, the Constitution casts a duty upon the State to protect and foster Buddhism, while retaining the clause which assures freedom of conscience to all religions. The ruling party’s inter-ests and promise to protect and promote Buddhism inspired Sinhala-Buddhist extremists inside Parliament to progressively strengthen the community’s efforts to politicize the religion. For exam-ple in a leaflet published in 1982 Cyril Mathew, a Senior Minister in President Jayawardene’s Cabinet, made explicit reference to the relationship between the Sinhala race and Buddhism, and reminded the rulers of their duty to Buddhism:

The link between the Sinhala race and Buddhism is so close and inseparable that it had led to the maxim, “There is no Buddhism without the Sinhalese and no Sinhalese without Buddhism.” This is an undeniable fact…It is a Buddhist country. Nobody can deny this fact. No rulers can forget this fact. If they do I do not think such a ruler will last for more than twenty four hours (Tamilnation, 2005).

The growth of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka significantly increased the influence of Sinhala-Buddhist extremists and Bhikkhus in the Sri Lanka polity. Escalating Tamil violence in the north and east prompted the government, led by JR Jayewardene, to expand military activities against the Tamil resistance movement and gained some success in marginalizing them. In 1983, a no-separa-tion amendment to the constitution was passed in Parliament. The amendment urged citizens of Sri Lanka to safeguard the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Thus, it prohibited any activities that infringed upon the sovereignty of the island and provided punishments for any violations. This led those openly in favor of separation to lose their civic rights. The TULF members of Parliament lost their seats when they refused to swear a loyalty oath.

The movement for the Sinhalization of the island run by extremist Sinhala forces won state legitimacy in July 1983. The ethnic riot in 1983, known as Black July, mobilized the Sinhala-Buddhist forces against the Tamils. The riot is well documented. Approximately 2000 Tamils were killed in July/August 1983 by Sinhalese mobs in an attempt to begin an operation of ethnic cleans-ing of the Tamils. Human Rights Watch documented the cruelty of the 1983 “state sponsored” Sinhalese riots. “Many neighborhoods were destroyed and nearly 100,000 Tamils in Colombo were displaced. Evidence suggested government collusion in the riots” (Becker, 2006) as well as the involvement of a certain section of Bhikkhus in Colombo and its surrounding areas.8

The government neither condemned the violence that killed approximately 2000 Tamils, nor took any meaningful measures to punish the perpetrators of the violence. Instead JR Jayewardene, then President of Sri Lanka, praised the mobs as heroes of the Sinhalese people.

The UNP’s pro-Sinhala fundamental policies continued to shape the Sri Lanka polity and its institutions up to the 1990s. In 1989, President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1988–1993) established a Ministry of Buddha Sasana (religion) to provide a strong link between the state and Buddhism (De Silva, 1993: 34). Moreover, Premadasa carefully exploited the legacy of Emperor Asoka, a con-summate ancient Buddhist ruler, for his own political gains (Van Der Horst). He also attempted to be a good Buddhist: he often visited Buddhists Temples and urged the Sinhala-Buddhists to strictly adhere to the teachings of the Lord Buddha (Van Der Horst, Josine, p. 85, 1996). More to the point, to prove devotion to the revival of Buddhist culture and tradition, President Premadasa appointed a Cabinet of 22 members who shared his rural and traditional Buddhist background.

The UNP regime’s concessions to the Sinhala-Buddhist extremists and Buddhism made the state very vulnerable to extremist pressures, and thus closed the door on a policy of political mod-eration that could have opened a channel to meaningful reform in the state structure.

The SLFP-led People’s Alliance (PA) has ruled the island since 1994, except for a brief period when the UNP took over in 2001. The PA won both the 1994 and 1999 Presidential elections under

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the leadership of Chandrika Bandaranayke Kumaratunga, daughter of SWRD Bandaranayke and Mrs Bandaranayke.

In 1997, the Kumaratunga administration drafted a new constitution to promote a federalist solu-tion as a way to ease ethnic tensions.9 This was a progressive step from the Sinhala political class based in Colombo; however, the proposed constitution did not seek any measures to depoliticize Buddhism. The proposed Constitution not only made provisions to protect Buddhism, but also authorized the State to consult the “Supreme Council” in all matters pertaining to the protection and fostering of the Buddha Sasana, recognized by the Minister in charge of the subject of Buddha Sasana. Accordingly, it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while guaranteeing to all religions the rights granted by Articles 15 (1) and 15 (3). (2) The State shall con-sult the Supreme Council in all matters pertaining to the protection and fostering of the Buddha Sasana. (3) For the purpose of this Article “Supreme Council” means a Council established by law in consultation with the Maha Sangha. Clause 7 of the proposed constitution – The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and the Supreme Council – was the product of the Premadesa administration. It was established in September 1990 to administer Buddhist affairs. The Council members were appointed and governed by the Ministry of Buddha Sasana (Bartholomeusz, 1999: 188). Also, according to DeVotta, Kumaratunga’s draft constitution proposed a Ministry of Buddhist affairs and “government support for Buddhist education by providing textbooks, build-ings, and Buddhist educational centers, allocating land for Buddhist activities, and renovating Buddhist temples” (DeVotta, 2004: 21). By then the conflict between the Tamil separatists and the government had become a full-scale civil war, the LTTE had established a strong base in the north, and the government forces has lost vast areas in the east to the guerillas. On July 24 2001, the LTTE attacked Sri Lanka’s only international airport, Katunayake. The attack near the capital of Colombo damaged or destroyed five Sri Lankan Airlines Airbus planes and eight military planes (Raman, 2008). Subsequently, the government, led by Mr. Wickramasinghe of the UNP, signed a no-war treaty with the LTTE in February 2002 (Clarance W, 2002).

Kumaratunga, who subscribed to ideas of secularism, made an alliance with the JVP, Sinhala’s ultra-nationalist party, and formed the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) in 2004 to fur-ther consolidate her political position.

Unsurprisingly, the Kumaratunga administration did not authorize any practical measures to either contain or dissuade the JHU bhikkus from submitting the anti-conversion bill to Parliament on July 21 2004. The legislation had raised profound concerns especially among Christians, a small minority of the population. The JHU believed that the bill was consistent with the Constitution, which guarantees Buddhism the foremost place and requires the State to protect and foster Buddhism. Moreover, the Supreme Court has assured the President and the Speaker of the House that the bill, entitled “Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Act” published in the Gazette of 28 May 2004, does not contravene the Constitution (Imtiyaz and Shah, 2004).

Sri Lanka’s fifth Presidential elections, held in November 2005, provided a means to reinforce the tradition that linked the state with religion. Politicization of Buddhism was one of the key agen-das of the ruling UPFA in a bid to outmaneuver the UNP, which presented liberal agendas including proposed peace talks with the Tamil Tigers (Manifesto of Ranil Wickramasinghe, 2007). The UPFA, led by the former President Mrs Kumaratunga, fielded the Sinhala nationalist Premier Mahinda Rajapaksa (who hails from the Sinhalese dominated south of the country) as its candidate, while the UNP was represented by opposition leader Ranil Wickramasinghe.

To win the southern Sinhalese vote, Rajapaksa sought to praise Buddhist history, promised war on the LTTE, blamed the West, particularly Norway, for the country’s current peace crisis, and waved flags (Mahinda Rajapakse: A man of the masses, 2007). Most importantly, Premier

324 Journal of Asian and African Studies 49(3)

Rajapaksa struck deals with the Sinhla nationalist JVP (BBC, 2005) and JHU (Senaratne, 2005), both of which want the unitary character of the Sri Lankan state to be preserved.

Rajapakse secured a little over 50% of the popular vote against his main opposition rival Ranil Wickramasinghe, who won 48.43% votes (Presidential Election 2005 – Final Result, 2008). The vote statistics indicate that Mr Rajapakse secured the majority votes of the majority Sinhalese who predominantly live in the southern, western and northwestern Provinces, while Wickramasinghe won the majority of votes of the minorities who are concentrated in the north and east, central and part of the western provinces (Presidential Election 2005 – Final Result, 2008). Soon after the elec-tions, Rajapakse appointed Ratnasiri Wickramanayke as Premier of the island. Wickramanayake is well known for his pro-war and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalistic stand.

Furthermore, the Rajapakshe administration drafted the anti-conversion Bill to appease its Sinhala Buddhist supporters such as the JHU (Satyapalan, 2008). The draft, which was approved in January 2009, expected to be passed in March 2009 (Imtiyaz, 2009b). The Buddha Sasana Act would be more of a code of ethics to streamline Buddhist education and the Sasana. This was a further measure by the ruling Sinhala elite in the long tradition of expediting state commitments to protect and foster the interests of Buddhism and Sinhala-Buddhists.

However, the Rajapakshe regime had to postpone a final vote on the bill due to its preoccupation with the war against the LTTE: the government of Sri Lanka has spent a vast amount of financial and political resources to militarily defeat the violent Tamil nationalist movement led by the LTTE, and urged the Sinhala extremists among its ranks and its allies such as the JHU to actively support the war. The ethnic war ended officially on May 20 2009 with the total demise of “almost the entire LTTE leadership” (UTHR, 2009).

Moreover, on May 17 2009 the LTTE, the major Tamil resistant movement, admitted defeat in the war that was waged without any witness, and vowed to silence guns against the Sinhala-Buddhist state (Wax, 2009a). On May 18, Sri Lankan security forces announced that Tamil Tiger chief Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed by “Sri Lanka’s military in a firefight that signaled the effective end to one of Asia’s longest-running military conflicts” (Wax, 2009b).

Presidential election in 2010

As expected, the ruling party led by Mr Rajapakshe decided to seek an early presidential election in 2010 (prior to the expiration of his term in 2011). The election was held on 26 January 2010.

The major candidates: two Sinhala actors

There were 22 candidates in the field. However, the major competitors of the elections are incumbent Rajapaksa who came to power on November 17 2005 on an anti-peace and anti-Tamil agenda, and Fonseka who was carefully recruited to Sri Lanka’s Army by the ruling Sinhala political establishment led by Rajapaksa to defeat the violent form of the Tamil resistance movement, led by the LTTE.

Rajapaksa represents the UPFA, the combined political vehicle of Sinhala extremists and the traditional Marxist parties as well as some minority parties, while Fonseka portrays himself as a common candidate and contests the elections, using the swan symbol. The major opposition par-ties, including the UNP and the JVP, endorsed the candidacy of Fonseka. Also, Fonseka won the endorsements of the major parties, representing minorities such as the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka were able to win the support of the minority political establish-ment, but the election polices and promises of these candidates did not recognize the special

Imtiyaz 325

problems of the Muslims, existence of the ethnic conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, or for that matter the Tamil national question. The major reason for their unwillingness to accommodate the major needs and aspirations of the minorities and the Tamil nation was risk of losing votes from the Sinhala community. Actually, it is unreasonable to expect such progres-sive attitudes and polices from the major candidates since they were the different representa-tives of the Sinhala mind set and hegemony, which aimed to consolidate the identities of primordial rights of the Sinhalese.

Rajapaksa: the brutal face of Sinhala hegemony

For Rajapaksa, the major problem of the island was the LTTE, which had successfully challenged state terrorism since 1983. The LTTE had been militarily defeated, and Rajapaksa had been capital-izing on the victory to secure a second term to further fill his family and friends’ pockets in the name of narrow Sinhala patriotism and nation building. In 2005, Rajapaksa employed the anti-peace and anti-Tamil policies to win elections. In 2010, Rajapaksa aggressively used war victory against the LTTE to maximize the Sinhala votes. During his tenure, Rajapaksa did not seek any serious political actions to ease ethnic tensions.

Mr Fonseka: neo-Dutugemunu

On the other hand, Fonseka, the atrocious Sinhala warrior, attempted to deny a second term for his former commander Rajapaksa. Fonseka, who was freed on May 21 2012 “after stand-ing against Mr Rajapaksa for the presidency when the two men fell out” (Havilland, 2012) during the election period, wanted the people of Sri Lanka to believe in him as an agent for change. Also, he is assertively trying to represent himself as a human face of Sinhala compassion.

It was reported in the media that Fonseka strongly believes that Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese. According to an interview in Canada’s National Post newspaper in 2008, Fonseka said that:

We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things…In any democratic country the majority should rule the country. This country will be ruled by the Sinhalese community which is the majority representing 74% of the population.

Fonseka’s above statement represented his desire to transform the island of Sri Lanka into a country only for the Sinhalese. His election manifesto, which he described as believable change for Sri Lanka, did not recognize the existence of the Tamil problem nor did it come close to seeking ethnic reconciliation and peace by reforming Sri Lanka’s unitary state structure and its Sinhalanised political institutions. The military campaigns, led by Fonseka, are what Tamils considered as an accelerated agenda of genocide led to dehumanize the Tamil life, and thus the war uprooted people from a normal life of peace and reduced them to wartime refugees.

President Rajapaksa proceeded to win a re-election, over 57% of all votes cast. Fonseka received over 40%. Interestingly Fonseka, who failed to offer any substantial concessions to the Tamils and Muslims, carried the Tamil dominated northern province and Muslim dominated eastern province. The remaining 20 candidates all garnered less than 0.5% of the popular vote (Sri Lanka 2010 Presidential Election Results Online, 2010).

326 Journal of Asian and African Studies 49(3)

Concluding remarks

The practice of using religious symbols to gain power is not an invention of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Buddhist politicians. It has mirrored the developments elsewhere in the world, including in the West, over the past few decades (Haynes, 1994).

In Sri Lanka, since independence in 1948, Buddhism, which teaches tolerance and non-vio-lence, became a great means to gain political position. As discussed, such political exercises pres-sured the Sinhala political class to make disproportionate concessions to the Sinhala-Buddhists who make up a large percentage of the country’s electoral map. The results of the politicization were twofold: the erosion of the secular nature of the state and its institutions such as the legisla-ture, bureaucracy, judicial system, public education system and the police and defense forces; and the deepening distrust of marginalized minorities, particularly the Tamils both in the state and its institutions.

There is still interest at the Sinhala elite level in meeting the demand of the extremist Sinhala-Buddhist organizations who have long been attempting to introduce a 19th amendment to the constitution, and by this means firmly establish a link between the state and Buddhism (Wickramanayake, 2005). However, explanations for the growth of forms of political Buddhism frequently, and necessarily, highlight two developments. The first is Sri Lanka’s highly com-petitive and emotionalized electoral structure, in which political parties outbid their opponents either on the pro-Sinhala-Buddhist or anti-Tamil polices. In Downs’ language (1957: 30), poli-ticians are motivated by the desire for power, and their primary objective is to be elected [to public office]. For that reason, to maximize the Sinhalese votes and outbid their opponents, the Sinhala politicians offered pro-Buddhist concessions. This eventually opened a channel for the growth and increasing political prominence of political Buddhism in Sri Lanka polity.

The second development is popular frustration among the Sinhala-Buddhists at increasing eco-nomic difficulties.10 The Enlightenment ideology of the 18th century, which inspired American independence and the French Revolution, did much to liberate Europe from the clutches of emo-tional agendas (the separation of church and state), whereas countries like Sri Lanka are still strug-gling to embrace economic democracy, which is capable of producing a strong middle class who can, consecutively, pursue political reform. The existence of such a vacuum in the Third World has inaudibly created comfortable space for illiberal and irrational forces to employ political democ-racy to gain power.

The failure to pursue economic modernity based on equality and fair distribution by successive governments in Sri Lanka left the majority of Sri Lankans with frustrations and anxiety, including the Sinhala-Buddhists who live in the southern rural community of the island. The net result is the absence of a healthy urban-oriented middle class (including among the Sinhala-Buddhists) who can act against destructive forces. These policies, on the other hand, have widened the gap between poor and rich, and thus triggered deep social and political frustrations among the poor. The chau-vinistic Sinhala politicians exploit the unhealthy condition of the Sinhala-Buddhist masses for their political agendas and even hire them to kill political opponents and the minorities. The evidence, associated with the 1983 violence against the Tamils, suggests that the Sinhalese who were hired by local Sinhala politicians to kill the Tamils are from deprived social classes and acted as they did for economic benefits.11 These factors can be cited for explanations for the phenomenal growth of political Buddhism in Sri Lanka.

There is a belief that a democratic system will liberate masses from the burden of ethnic, religious, and gender discrimination. But experiences from Sri Lanka would contradict such an understanding. Sri Lankan experiences suggest that a highly competitive electoral system, due to politicians’ desire

Imtiyaz 327

to win power at any cost, helped increase religious and ethnic tensions and hostility among different groups. Also, Sri Lanka’s experience suggests that the opening-up of political modernity in the absence of economic democracy has created destructive religious and ethnic forces that are able to manipulate sensitive emotions for political gain, and thus pave the way for instability. However, the future offers three formulas to gain stability and progress, and to strengthen democracy.

They are: 1. The de-politicization of religion. This inevitably involves politicians’ commitments to non-emotional issues to win elections, and the political class needs to demonstrate some strong will-ingness to withdraw state patronage for Buddhism. 2. Measures to promote negotiated religious and ethnic reconciliation and compromise. This requires genuine efforts to build power-sharing measures with the minorities. The demise of the LTTE provides opportunities to commence serious discussions on power-sharing with the Tamil nationalists. In actual fact, power-sharing could strengthen Sri Lanka’s democracy, its war-ridden economy, and religious and ethnic harmony. 3. Democratization of economic policies to ease the sufferings of disadvantaged people. This study suggests that economi-cally weakened masses become easy targets for irrational political slogans, employed by narrow-minded politicians and community forces. Greater economic opportunities and “interaction among people, coupled with widespread education and mass communication networks, would breakdown parochial identities of ethnic and religious groups” (Imtiyaz and Stavis, 2008: 135–152).

Sri Lanka’s Sinhala political class and politicians need to adopt progressive steps to extricate Buddhism from politics and to take measures to ease the concerns of the ethnic and religious minorities. Such positive developments are likely to generate trust and loyalty among the ethnic and religious minorities both at the masses and elite, though it is likely Buddhism will continue to play a significant role in Sri Lanka’s politics.

It is, therefore, safe to assume that Sri Lanka, which once aspired to be the Switzerland of Asia, may face serious instability and disharmony between the different religious and ethnic groups, if accommodative approaches to de-politicize Buddhism and to win political and economic moder-nity are not attempted or do not succeed.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. “In November 2002, Mr. Maheshwaran, former Hindu Cultural Affairs Minister, made a visit to Tamil Nadu, one of five states in India with anti-conversion laws. On his return to Sri Lanka, Maheswaran made a public statement vowing to introduce a bill in parliament to curb religious conversions. In subsequent months, Maheshwaran repeated his intentions to introduce the bill to parliament. A draft bill closely modeled on the Tamil Nadu anti-conversion law has now been prepared, according to the EASL, leading to increased attacks on Christian churches in recent months” (Page, 2003; see also Wijewardena, 2004). The proposed anti-conversion laws were drafted by a special multi-religious committee appointed by for-mer Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe in agreement with former President Chandrika Banaranaike Kumaratunga. Prior to the dissolution of the Sri Lankan parliament in February 2004, Minister of Justice, Legal Reforms, National Integration and Buddha Sasana WJM Lokubandara stated that the act would come into effect within the next 60 days.

2. Sri Lanka witnessed several Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist organizations in the early 20th century. Among the most important of these was an organization of lay Buddhists, the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, whose goal was totally dedicated to promote, protect and foster the interests of the Buddhists.

3. The left parties realized that their pro-minority policies would alienate them from the majority Sinhalese, who are demographically and electorally superior. Meanwhile the LSSP, at its annual conference in June

328 Journal of Asian and African Studies 49(3)

1964, accepted “Sinhala-Only” and joined the SLFP and other Sinhala chauvinistic groups’ demonstra-tion to protest the Dudley–Selva pact of 1965, a power-sharing accord signed by the then Premier Dudley Senanayake of the UNP and Tamil leader Selvanayakam of the FP.

4. The pact could have resolved the ethnic conflict in a way acceptable to both the Tamils and the Sinhalese as it paved the way for the wide-ranging decentralization of administration and devolution of powers to the Tamil areas of the north and east. The pact also proposed that the Tamil northern Province would constitute a single regional authority, while the predominantly Tamil but demographically more complex eastern province would be divided into two or more such units. However, all these units would be free to amalgamate, if they so desired. Moreover, it was agreed that Parliament would devolve all powers to the regional bodies on the following subjects: agriculture, cooperatives, lands and land development, colonization, education, health, industries, fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, irrigation schemes and roads. Most important of all, the pact stipulated that Tamil should be used as the official language for all administrative work in the northern and eastern provinces.

5. The new pact proposed a moderate degree of devolution of power through the mechanism of district councils in the Tamil areas. It also underscored, in the granting of land under colonization schemes, the following priorities to be observed in the northern and eastern provinces: land in the two provinces to be granted in the first instance to landless persons in the district concerned, secondly to Tamil-speaking persons resident in the northern and eastern provinces, and thirdly to other citizens of Sri Lanka, prefer-ence being given to Tamil residents in the rest of the island.

6. To prevent discriminatory laws being enacted, the British provided a safeguard prohibiting the enactment of any law which would make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions were not made liable, or confer advantages or privi-leges on persons of any community or religion which were not conferred on persons of all communities or religions. This provision, which became Section 29(2) of the Soulbury Constitution (1947), proved to be totally ineffectual in preventing either individual discrimination or outright deprivation of existing collective rights of franchise, citizenship, language, etc.

7. After 1956, the Tamils’ percentage in the state sector suffered continuous decline because of the govern-ment policy on the official language. However, in certain professional fields like medicine, engineering and accountancy, Tamil dominance was more or less unchanging or slightly higher than before. The reason for this was that Sri Lankan Tamils who appeared with higher academic qualifications had now begun to concentrate on the sciences, especially medicine and engineering. Their efforts led to success because of their advanced teaching facilities for science at the high-school level in Jaffna. This encour-aged Tamils to enter universities for professional courses of study. This was a common tendency until the SLFP returned to power.

8. The author conducted an interview by phone with three Sinhalese who declined to disclose their names. They acknowledged their role in violence against the Tamils in Colombo on July 24 1983. An interview was held on July 25 2004 for the author’s research on ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka (see Imtiyaz and Stavis, 2008).

9. She promised the Buddhist High Priests in Kandy that the “Devolution” package will not be finalized until the “war is won.” She added that the package will not “erode the powers of the centre” and declared that there would be “no merger of the North and East” (Tamil Nation, 2000). It was later announced that the “Devolution” package would be further watered down.

10. The Sinhala-dominated southern region of the island largely pockets the Central, Uva, Sabaragamuwa and southern provinces. These provinces experience only reasonable agricultural growth. A significant lack of infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and irrigation and communication facilities reduces peo-ple’s hope to gain a decent life-style and restricts opportunities to earn profits through non-traditional economic activities. “Malnutrition among children is common. In some areas in six of the seven prov-inces, seven out of ten people have no access to electricity, and almost half of the population does not have access to safe drinking water” (Rural Poverty in Sri Lanka, 2008).

11. This information arose from an interview with three Sinhalese who declined to disclose their names. They acknowledged their role in violence against the Tamils in Colombo on July 24 1983. According

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to them, they were asked by the local Sinhala politician (who offered some bottles of local alcohol and 500/=SLR each) to loot and burn the Tamils shops with others, who were on the same mission on the same day. The interview was held on July 25 2004 (Imtiyaz and Stavis, 2008).

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Author biography

Dr ARM Imtiyaz teaches courses on ethnic conflict and modern India and contemporary China at the Department of Political Science/Asian Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, USA and is affiliated as a research fellow at Global Vision: Center for Knowledge Advancement Kandy, Sri Lanka. He has published extensively on ethnic conflict in Asia, and his most recent research examines issues pertaining to Muslims in Sri Lanka and the Xinjiang Province, and elsewhere in Asia.