Between Admiration and Fear — The Construction of Japanese Otherness in the German Empire (1870—1918)

IMAGE OF JAPAN IN EUROPE

VDU LEIDYKLA2008

Editor:

Dr. Kyoko KOMA, Vytautas Magnus University

Editorial Board:

Assoc. Prof., Dr. Sigita Barniškienė, Vytautas Magnus University Prof. Emeritus Keiki Fujita, Obirin University, Japan Assoc. Prof., Dr. Arūnas Gelūnas, Vilnius Academy of Arts Assoc. Prof., Dr. Jean-Paul Honoré, University of Paris-Est, France Assoc. Prof., Dr. Noriko Onohara, University of Hyogo, Japan Assoc. Prof., Dr. Maik Hendrik Sprotte, University of Heidelberg, Germany Publications coordinator: Kristina Barancovaitė, Vytautas Magnus University

© Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, 2008ISBN 978-9955-12-347-7

UDK 327(520:4)(06) Im-01

Tarptautinės mokslinės konferencijos „Image of Japan in Europe” („Japonijos įvaizdis Europo-je”), vykusios Vytauto Didžiojo universiteto Japonistikos centre 2007 m. spalio 13–14 d., medžiaga.

Material of international conference “Image of Japan in Europe” held on 13–14 October 2007 at Vytautas Magnus University Japanese Studies Centre.

Apsvarstyta Vytauto Didžiojo universiteto Japonistikos centro 2007–11-06 d. posėdyje ir rekomenduota spausdinti.

Discussed in Vytautas Magnus University Japanese Studies Centre during the meeting of 2007–11-06 and recommended for publication.

BETWEEN ADMIRATION AND FEAR - THE CONSTRUCTION OF JAPANESE OTHERNESS IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1871–1918)

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Between Admiration and Fear – the Construction of Japanese Otherness in the German Empire (1871–1918)

Maik Hendrik Sprotte

University of Heidelberg

It was the British writer Oscar Wilde (1891), who already dealt visionary with cultural construction of otherness and who, in doing so, anticipated a scientific discussion at the end of the 20th Century. In his short story“The Decay of Lying”, which was published in the anthology “Intention”, Wilde has one of his protagonists, Vivian, say the following about the antagonism of nature as a synonym for “reality”, which appears fortunately to “be so imperfect”, and about art, which reveals the “nature’s lack of design, her curious crudities, her extraordinary monotony, her absolutely unfinished condition”:

HISTORICAL FORMATION OF JAPAN’S IMAGE IN EUROPE30

Now, do you really imagine that the Japanese people, as they are presented to us in art, have any existence? If you do, you have never understood Japanese art at all. The Japanese people are the deliberate self-conscious creation of certain individual artists. If you set a picture by Hokusai, or Hokkei, or any of the great native painters, beside a real Japanese gentleman or lady, you will see that there is not the slightest resemblance between them. (…) In fact the whole of Japan is a pure invention. There is no such coun-try, there are no such people.

The analysis of the instruments, methods and intentions of this „creation“, or – in order to adapt the term to the present scientific terminology – ofthe “construction” or “representation” of otherness has received impor-tant impulses not least by Edward Said’s book “Orientalism” since the late 1970s. His approach was inspired by the idea of Europe reaffirming itsown culture by designing a feminine and backward Orient in order to support Europe’s own imperialistic goals. Said’s interpretations inspired the critical evaluation of cultural analysis and methods in different fieldsof research. Even if it is difficult to trace all different stages of the discus-sion in the context of the “interpretive turn” or the “literary turn” briefly, itappears to be necessary to clarify some central assumptions in the process of constructing cultural otherness at first.

In the context of a semiotic concept of culture, culture itself is to be interpreted as “an ensemble of collective standardisations that is habits and norms”. An amplification of this rather conservative concept of cul-ture attributes to these standards the capacity of determining social and cultural environment of a certain collective in general. “Standardisations of thinking interpret the reality and create thereby sense, which is con-verted into social and physical reality through appropriate standardisa-tions of acting” (Hansen 1999: 55). Standardisations of thinking in turn are vitally characterised by stereotypes, if it comes to an encounter with “other” cultures. In this context, stereotypes are accepted and common prejudices, “which exist in one collective to another”. These prejudices are emerging from emotionality (Hansen 1999: 59). Otherness is experienced on the stable foundation of standards, the own culture internalised in a more or less long-lasting process. The subject of this investigation about


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the image of Japan in the German Empire accordingly represents the stage, in which an individual experience of otherness becomes the col-lective experience of a community through communication by means of semiotic systems (Titzmann 1999: 89). Various methodical difficultiesare arising in the historical perspective of this process. Assumptions about the standards of the observing culture are similarly generaliza-tions, as they are for the standards of the “other” culture. Stereotypes do not consider the incongruent or contradictory elements of a certain community or culture. A cultural coherency is postulated, which exists neither with the subject nor with the object during the process of cul-turally constructing otherness (Bachmann-Medick 2006: 150). “,Cultures do not hold still for their portraits.”, as James Clifford (1986: 6) arguesconsequentially.

The transformation of experiences, made during the encounter with “other” cultures into “text” represents a further problem, which can be described with the keyword of “epistemological criticism”. Investigations of the last decades showed that historical descriptions and representations of culture are inevitably characterised by an asymmetry in power relations on the one hand, and on the other hand by Eurocentric demands on a monopoly of representation, since they must be based on “own” semiotic systems. Power becomes the most important category of cultural experience in the age of imperialism (Bachmann-Medick 2006: 153). In this context a statement that is attributed to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein gains recognition namely that the limits of a certain language represent the limits of the world. The impression of reality is shaped by the kind of its description. Accordingly, the experience of otherness proves itself to be multilayered. It is important to distinguish the experience of otherness made within the other culture on the basis of its own semiotic systems and a certain educational background, the process of communicating these experiences through “text” and finally the reception of these texts asthe experience of otherness at home. For the German empire a combina-tion of both types of experiences of otherness, those within the “other” culture and those at home, is of special importance for the overall image of Japan in this period.


It is to be examined which participants led the formation of opinion within the process of constructing Japanese otherness in Germany and which particular aspects shaped the image of Japan in the German Empire. In view of the complexity of the Japanese image, the analysis is limited to general statements on Japan and the Japanese as well as to aspects of political history and its meaning for the bilateral relationship. The domain of art will be ignored completely. In addition, it seems to make sense to describe the position of the German Reich within the European power structure of this time briefly, because European policyhad a surprisingly large influence above all on the changing Germanconstruction of Japanese otherness in the course of the period to be examined. Historical developments in the East Asian region likewise made their contribution.

1. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1871–1918)

It required the military confrontation with the so-called “hereditary en-emy” France in form of her Second Empire in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, in order to carry out the German unification in a feeling ofnationalistic resentment and patriotic fervour. Until 1890 the “iron chan-cellor” Otto von Bismarck determined the fate of the empire with regard to interior as well as to foreign policy and was able to stabilize the bal-ance of power in Europe by a complicated system of alliances – from the (European) Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy (1879/1882) and the League of the Three Emperors of 1882 with Russia and Austria-Hungary up to the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 as a neutrality agreement between Germany and Russia. With the accession to the Prussian and German throne by William II in 1888 and the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 the system of alliances became imbalanced. Chancellors rather weak in comparison to Bismarck, the requirement of the young Kaiser on “a personal regiment”, and ignorance with regard to foreign policy led to an increasing isolation of Germany in Europe. The non-renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 resulted in a Russian-French rapprochement. Through the requirements of a German Weltpolitk in combination with


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the building of a German fleet for the support of her imperialistic ambi-tions, starting from the middle of the 1890s, Germany got into strong op-position to Great Britain, which gave up in consequence of these German threats her “splendid isolation” and, finally, provided a shift of power inEurope with the Entente Cordiale with France starting from 1904 and the Triple Entente with France and Russia in 1907. In 1897, the German state secretary in the Foreign Office at that time, and later Reichskanzler Bernhard von Bülow (1931: 1: 224) formulated the future goals of German foreign policy in a speech in the Reichstag, the German parliament, on December 6th:

We do not want to put anyone into the shade, but we demand a place for ourselves in the sun.

Despite “the place in the sun”, which Germany finally found in China, in theSouth Seas and in the southwest of Africa, the sense of inferiority, and the feelings of being a „delayed nation” within the German people remained strong. Even the famous political economist and sociologist Max Weber (1971: 23) described the German unification in this period as a “youthfulescapade, the nation committed in her dotage”, and “which would have better been omitted”, if the German unification “should be the conclusionand not the starting point of German world power politics”, as he stated in his inaugural address as professor of Freiburg University in 1895 on “The Nation-State and Economic Policy”.

A contrast of strong industrialization and social conservativism charac-terised the period up to the outbreak of the First World War in Germany. In this epoch, which is called “Wilhelminism” in German historiography, the military applied to the “school of the nation”, which penetrated all social ranges. The policy of alliances from the initial years of the rule of William II, whose omissions could not be compensated in the following decades any more, led after the murder of the Austrian heir apparent in Sarajevo haphazardly to the entry into the war by Germany on the side of Austria-Hungary. As one important result of the First World War, the monarchy in Germany could not be preserved. William II fled thecountry.


2. OPINION LEADERS IN THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTING JAPANESE OTHERNESS:

The so-called “Meiji Germans” had crucial influence on the constructionof the image of Japan in the German Empire. These Germans had their domicile in Japan for a longer period of time, or stayed at least several months in Japan. Freitag (1939: 3) mentioned here especially “serious re-searchers”. They happened to be persons, who were in Japan in the pe-riod between approximately 1870 and 1895. Even if they did not get to know the important political, economic and social changes in the Japanese community after 1895 through individual experiences, their judgements regarding the country and its population remained relevant until far into the First World War (Mathias-Pauer 1984: 117–118). First a distinction of the participants during the construction process of Japanese otherness in diplomats, scientists and missionaries seems to be appropriate. The diplo-mats contributed substantially to the rather adverse attitude of the German government against Japan, with Kaiser William as front man. Scientists of most diverse fields of activity, which were in the country for longer timeeither on behalf of the Prussian government or as foreign advisors of the Japanese government during the modernization process (oyatoi gaikoku-jin), corresponded to the increasing needs of the German population with respect to information about important world regions in the context of German world power politics. These experts published a lot of studies on the geography, history and institutions of Japan. Their books were mainly of acceptable quality. Missionaries, who tried to promote the spreading of the Christian faith after the opening of the country, presented their point of view on pagan Japan as well.

2.1 DIPLOMATS, GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE KAISER

As is well known, the lack of interest in Japanese affairs outside the do-main of arts had a smaller impact due to the large influence Germany


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exerted up to 1895 on the Japanese military and constitutional law. That changed however after the (Asiatic) Triple Intervention in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war (1894/95, Nisshin sensô), which lead particularly to an anti-German resentment in the Japanese press, and which met partially with its response in German publications. Above all, the German envoy to Tôkyô between 1892 and 1897, Felix von Gutschmid (1843–1905), had a substantial stake in this development. Not only that he tried to discipline two Japanese pupils with a whip, who did not avoid hitting his carriage, and which had a parliamentary sequel, he tightened also the tone of already strict German diplomatic telegrams to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the framework of the intervention of Germany, Franceand Russia after the peace treaty of Shimonoseki. It took the German Foreign Office until February 1st, 1908 for an investigation of the causes of the Japanese antipathies against Germany:

Baron Gutschmid, who, as generally known under Japanese and Germans in Japan, had a true hate on the Japanese, understood the thing [= the Triple Intervention] in this way, as if he should become quite rough, what he did with delight. (Lepsius 1924: 333)

On an official level one person however proved still to be more fatal for theGerman-Japanese relationship than Gutschmid. That was one of his pred-ecessors, Max von Brandt (1835–1920), who represented Prussia, the North German Confederation and later the German Reich between 1862 and 1875 in Japan. By his following appointment as German envoy to China (1875–1893) and his publications after his retirement he drew a picture of Japan that fitted smoothly “into the tendencious, and distorted imageof the ‘yellow peril’, that is affected by xenophobia and fear of economiccompetition” (Wippich 1995: 5). The Meiji restoration did not present it-self to him as a serious reform process, but he saw it as “constitutional sauce” (Brandt 1897: 27) old Japan, which was still caught in feudal cor-relations, was poured over with. For Brandt, the Japanese appeared to be sluggard, unreliable, disingenuous, cringing and unmanly (Wippich 1995: 123). They had a “mental defect”, which made logical thinking impossible for them, and which prevented them from reaching a level of Western modernity (Wippich 1995: 124). Brandt communicated his Japanophobia


not only through his publications, but also as an advisor of the Foreign Office after his retirement. His influence on the image of East Asia in theGerman diplomacy, in addition, with respect to the Kaiser personally, was substantial. William II had in 1895 carried out one of his own sketches by the quite famous painter of that time, Hermann Knackfuß (1848–1915). The notorious picture “Peoples of Europe, defend your holiest posses-sions” came into existence. The picture depicts a meeting of the French Marianne, the German Germania and other European national figures forthe defense of Christianity against a Buddha, ascending on the horizon. Reproductions of this picture were handed over to important European rulers and politicians as personal gifts of the Kaiser. Bernhard von Bülow (1931: 57), from whom William II parted in anger in 1909, used this picture as a reason of a more general criticism on German East Asia politics, even if he assigned the responsibility for the Triple Intervention to the foreign secretary of state of that time, Fritz von Holstein (1837–1909):

Since the dismissal of Prince Bismarck our foreign position had been seriously injured with regard to Japan, whom we had gravely of-fended by Holstein’s unlucky experiment of an Eastern Triple Alli-ance and still more perhaps by that most unfortunate picture of the Kaiser ’s to which he had given the title “Peoples of Europe! Defend your Holiest Possessions.” No one understood how the holiest pos-sessions of Europe could be threatened by the mild teachings of Buddha. But William II, with all the stubbornness that was his on oc-casion, was so full of this mad idea, the product of his own wayward perversity, that even the individual Japanese had become antipa-thetic to him. In spite of my representations and those of others, he treated Japanese diplomats and soldiers discourteously (…).

Through his entire reign William II showed up as a follower of the mind game, which was very popular around the turn of the century in Europe and the USA about the „yellow peril“, and in which the own sphere of influence seemed to be endangered by “the Mongolian race”, the Chineseand Japanese people (Gollwitzer 1962: 163). The scenario of the “yellow peril” appears on the one hand as a result of racial thoughts itself, “the survival of the fittest”, and a feeling of own superiority, intensified bySocial Darwinism as the philosophy in vogue at the beginning of the


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20th century. On the other hand the “yellow peril” as a concept was most welcome, and served the development of a European group identity and Western self-affirmation. William II did not omit an opportunity to stressthe correctness of this concept, although he also used the system of an Asiatic threat to Europe, in order to influence the European balance ofpower. Later he attempted to use the term in order to keep Russia busy in Eastern Asia as defender of the presumably threatened Christianity at the Yellow Sea. In his position as a sovereign prince and, at the same time, the highest Bishop of the Evangelist regional church of Prussia in personal union (Summus Episcopus), and with his personal faible for religious lec-tures, William II’s public addresses were filled with Christian terminology.In respect to the picture already mentioned, which William ordered to decorate German ships with, Bülow (1931: 506) writes in addition:

Finally I made particular effort to have the picture which adorned the walls of our Eastern Asiatic steamships removed, for this pic-ture depicted Germany preaching to the European Nations a Holy War against poor Buddha, and was very sinister and insulting to the Japanese. But my efforts were futile because of the Kaiser ’s stubbornness, which became more pronounced in connection with relatively unimportant matters than it did in vital questions. He continued to talk about the “yellow peril” and to say fantastic things about a “crusade” of the white peoples against the yellow races.

Certainly, everyday politics strengthened the trend to use events in East Asia for political discussions at home. Sometimes, a clear differentiationbetween Japanese and Chinese developments remained undone. Both countries, Qing-China as well as the modernizing Japan, were not taken seriously as future participants in world politics up to the Sino-Japanese war, which marked the turning point of Japan’s perception in Europe as a political and military power in East Asia. In consequence of a direct German commitment in China with the leasing of Kiaochow (Jiaozhou Bay) by force from China as punishment and compensation for the murder of two Catholic German missionaries, this region moved in 1897 stronger into the field of vision of the German public. In the understanding thatfree trade besides other means of power politics could be an important


component of imperialistic politics, it was mainly economic interest in Asia, either as supplier of raw material or as sales market of German products, which led to a feeling of competition with Japan that began slowly to prosper due to the Chinese reparations. In the long term the German sphere of influence in China could become the cause of bilateral ten-sions, not to mention the “open door policy” in China as another potential reason for controversy.

On the occasion of the send-off of a part of the German contingentof soldiers, which should be added as the German contribution to the multinational punitive expedition forces after the murder of the German and Japanese diplomats in Beijing, Klemens August von Ketteler and Sugiyama Akira, in the so-called boxer rebellion, William II gave a speech, which gained notoriety and which again Bülow (1931: 418) judged as the “worst speech in this period, and perhaps the most harmful that William II ever made”. In this so called “Hun speech”, held on July 27th, 1900 in Bremerhaven, the Kaiser defined the tasks of the German military in EastAsia as follows:

There will be no quarter, no prisoners will be taken! As, a thousand years ago, the Huns, under King Attila, gained for themselves a name which still stands for a terror in tradition and story, so may the name of Germany be impressed by you for a thousand years on China, so thoroughly that never again shall a Chinese dare so much as to look askance at a German.

Despite the efforts to limit reports of the media, the speech reached thepublic. It caused equally praise and criticism, and, finally, was used inWorld War One for propaganda purposes against the “barbarous” German military. Nevertheless, many statements of the Kaiser in reference to de-velopments in the East Asian region were rather ambiguous. Despite his unquestionable distrust against Japan, William II exploited a Christian-Buddhist contrast or Japanese interests in Eastern Asia in order to use it in the European context. Addressing the Tsar Nicholas II (“Dear Nicky”), he emphasised an anti-Russian threat, posed by Japan, and suggested a divi-sion of world domination between himself as „admiral of the Atlantic“, and the rather alienated Tsar as „admiral of the Pacific“. The Kaiser intended to


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keep Russia away from European policy by a task in the Far East, as William II openly admitted in 1895 addressing the under-secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Baron von Rothan. A fight of Orthodox Russia as repre-sentative of the Christian occident against “Chinese masses, mobilized by Japan”, could possibly lead to a discharge of the German eastern border, what would be highly appreciated by the German monarch (Gollwitzer 1962: 212 – 213).

Even if the official attitude with regard to Japan within the domain offoreign policy did not change to a large extent until 1918, it seems mean-ingful to hear another voice, which belonged to a German official, whorather admired the Japanese achievements. The brother of the Kaiser, Prince Henry of Prussia (1862–1929), represented a rather differentiatedopinion towards Japan. The prince visited Japan for the first time in 1879/80 and stayed there for almost one year. Later, in 1899, he again paid a state visit to Japan in his position as commander-in-chief of the East Asia Squadron of the German fleet. Even if he had close relations with theTsar as brother-in-law to the Empress consort of Nicholas II, Alexandra Feodorovna (1872–1918), he was more sympathetic to Great Britain, which connected herself in 1902 with Japan in an alliance. Under the impression of his second visit to Japan, Prince Henry analyzed the achievements of the Japanese modernization process completely differently than his brotherand proposed a reorientation of German foreign policy. One of his letters to Bülow (1931: 504–505) shows a completely different attitude towardsJapan, although Prince Henry appeared only as a representative of the minority within the German government:

It is astonishing what this country has done in the last twenty years to achieve the position it now undoubtedly holds, Japan wants to be treated and regarded as a great power and I can only add that it has a right to both. (…) The courtesy, politeness, and considera-tion with which I was treated in this country are beyond praise. (…) England with her wise, well-trained, and far-seeing attitude towards the world did well when she helped Japan to organize her own administration of justice; and England was wise, furthermore, to have been the leader among those who were trying to estab-lish this independence in Japan. To-day no unprejudiced observer


can help but see that Japan is no longer the harmless country of Geishas, lacquer ware, and so forth, but that, on the contrary, the country consists of a patriotic and very nationalistically minded people who are already the leading and the most respect-inspir-ing Power in Eastern Asia. It would be a wise step, politically, to cultivate good relations with this country.

2.2 THE IMAGE OF THE SCIENTISTS AND MISSIONARIES

The period from the beginning of the Meiji reforms up to the Triple Intervention is called the “golden age” in the German-Japanese relations. Numerous Germans, first merchants, later scientists, researchers, and mis-sionaries established themselves for a shorter or longer period of time in Japan, in order to pursue their business. Physicians such as Erwin Bälz (1849–1913), historians such as Ludwig Rieß (1861–1928), geographers such as Johannes Justus Rein (1835–1918), and missionaries such as Carl Munzinger (1864–1937) wrote essays and books about their stays in Japan (cf. Mathias-Pauer 1984: 117), which shaped the image of Japan until 1918 crucially.

They presented a picture of Japan and the Japanese, which affected thegeneral opinion over Japan in the subsequent years, although important events, which took place after the years of their stay, added a further accent to their image. Studies submitted by these “Meiji Germans” were quite critical to Japan. As the missionary Carl Munzinger (1904: 53–54), who had been active from 1890 to 1896 in Japan, wrote, it was a differ-ence whether someone looked from Europe or America with admiration on Japan, while the foreigners living in Japan only could judge their host country with contempt. Even if the appearance of the Japanese people as a whole was quite impressive, the individual Japanese in particular seemed to be short of moral maturity.

A large dark side of Japanese nature however is the system of mis-representation, or to be clear: the lie. It is a peculiar phenomenon, how the lie passes through all pagan people as the most char-acteristic trait, and one can call it only a profound insight, if the


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Bible calls the Satan as the mental dominator of heathendom the spirit of the lie.

A certain talent is not to be denied to the individual Japanese, because he quite understands to work speedy with instruments, offered to him.What is missing to him completely is genius, because “he does not under-stand how to expand to the core and the nature of things”. The Japanese is not inventive at all, but he understands to enhance ideas of others. It is a characteristic in the criticism of Japanese that they tend to copy, to skillfully imitate (Munzinger 1904: 70–71). The argument of imitation is a central aspect in the construction of the Japanese image to a large extent. For Munzinger (1904: 159–162) there is a further element, which is of central importance for the understanding of the Japanese people: the element of blind patriotism:

For the sake of the fatherland everything is permitted. What makes the fatherland powerful is permitted. (…)

The love for the fatherland becomes obsessive enthusiasm, almost craziness. Sometimes in the Sino-Japanese war, it occurred that some committed suicide, because they were not granted to par-ticipate in the fight. (…)

The Japanese are inclined not only to political chauvinism, but to political fanatism. Political assassination attempts are therefore not rare.

It almost seems usual in a non-Christian context that attributes such as patriotism and readiness to make sacrifices become elements of criticism,although they could not be estimated highly enough in Germany itself, even if occasionally accents of admiration appear. Beside all criticism, it had to be taken into account that the Japanese people were acting very cautiously, although they were convinced to be the leader of the Mongolian race.

They do not work through decades, in order to destroy the luck, which they built for themselves, in infatuation. They have huge plans; but these plans are built within reality, within the limits of the attainable. They want to have influence in East Asia and want


to create a place in the sun for the Mongols. They will pursue this goal with the intelligence and energy, which are hers. They will not be scrupulous in achieving their goal. (Munzinger 1904: 170–171)

This view on Japanese patriotism, which commanded respect from the contemporary observer despite its impulsive elements, was supplemented with another, a knightly element, the element of defiance of death. Riess(1905: 54–55) attaches the Japanese to those heroic people, whose patriot-ism, esprit de corps and ambition established defiance of death.

One aspires the success of the common cause more than the pres-ervation of the own life. It is part of Japanese edginess that there is more fame and honour (…) in death before the enemy than in obtaining success.

3. “WAR IS THE FATHER AND KING OF ALL”

“War is the father and king of all”, Heraclitus of Ephesus said. At least, it was for Japan. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05 caused a huge admiration for the country in Europe, since one interpreted both wars rather as fights of an Asiatic David against aChinese and Russian Goliath.

In Germany importance was attributed to the degree of patriotism and the intensity of military education of the people in the process of con-structing and evaluating otherness. To that extent Japan succeeded also to inspire the German public with each victory that was reported in the media. In a very early analysis of the first Sino-Japanese War for example,a German officer identified the reasons of Japanese success in an uncon-ditional Westernisation and Europeanisation of the Japanese Empire.

We saw the Japanese David (…) fighting in the struggle with the Chinese Goliath for his powerful position in the East. Not the in-dependence of Korea was the highest victory price, no, Japan as pioneer of European culture in the East fought for the equality with the European great powers (…).


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Not the firebrand of the war, but the light of civilisation and hu-manity, Japan carries her victorious army in China ahead (…).

Japan (…) today is a people in arms, like us, and accordingly army is a school, in Japan as well the seed of European culture is carried into the people by the army.

Because of an army organisation and constitution, which is nearly similar to ours, the Japanese are probably called the Prussians of the East. (Mülmann 1895: 6, 10, 28)

Even this conviction that the Japanese are the Prussian counterpart in East Asia, and Germany could be able to develop almost relational feel-ings for the nature of the Japanese created a large enthusiasm before the turn of the century, with which the German-Japanese relations – not only because of the British-Japanese alliance of 1902 – cooled down. The Japanese victory over the run down Chinese Empire was seen as victory of civilization over barbarism. Only a few years later this thought, at that time by German social democrats, was taken up again, when they interpreted the Japanese victories against Russia either as point of origin of a revolutionary process with open end or equally to a cultural achievement. In 1895 one still stressed nevertheless rather the German-Japanese similarities. In this context, a letter of congratulations to the Japanese high command of a Swabian watchmaker could be called rep-resentative:

In this campaign, Japan will gain for herself the same laurels, as my glorious fatherland in the years 1870–1871. ( Wippich 1997: 58)

When Japan decided in 1904 in favour of a passage at arms with Russia for the defense of her own static sphere of influence on the Asiatic continent,Germany was once again surprised. Just as the reservations of officialGermany against Japan further existed, the German John Doe was very much in favour of the Japanese. It is surprising, that even the opinions of representatives of the strongest political power in Germany since 1906, the German social-democracy, differed only insignificantly with those ofconservative circles. They were also partially affected of the feelings ofEuropean cultural superiority. The social-democratic theoretical analysis


dealt especially with the question, how Japan could catch up with the European Great Powers within a period of time less than 30 years. In doing so, the social democrats noticed very quickly that the theoretical presumptions of the historical materialism appeared to be rather useless due to its ignorance of Japanese developments, which did not fit intothe theoretical Marxist concept. The influential social democrat Max Beer(1864–1943) attempted in 1903 from his British exile an analysis on the theoretical basis of Marxism – and resignated:

What enabled Japan to approach with unparalleled speed the European type of culture is one of the most difficult historical problems. (…) We will probably experience details and more thorough matters only if our Japanese comrades find leisure and understanding in handling the Marxist historical method. Today we are looking upon the Japanese overthrow as a miracle. The extent of mental and moral energy, an oriental people needed in order to break up with thousand-year old historical traditions only in one generation, exceeds our imagination. Provisionally we must be content with the fact that Japan is a modern state, rest-ing on the capitalistic way to conduct economy and disclosing its tendencies: the drive to foreign expansion and labour movement. (Beer 1903: 427–433)

The more frequently news about Japanese victories reached Europe, the more the admiration for the Japanese development increased in circles of the German social-democracy, too. They very quickly accepted a Japanese dominance in the East Asian region, only because China proved to be too ponderous to go through a modernization process in similar speed as Japan did.

Japan’s culture mission consists in awakening China for capitalistic civilization. This task Japan must accomplish, if she wants to lead an independent national existence. And this is, what she wants, and she also has provisionally the power, to implement her will. (…) It is not megalomania, nor vanity, which prompts Japan to reach for the role of an East Asian supreme power. Her whole de-velopment is rather in such a manner that she was left the choice to be effective in Asia or to perish. (Beer 1905: 91–97)


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Apart from military discipline it was the hygiene, which won favour of the German public with the Japanese military. In numerous publications the culture founding function of the toothbrush was appreciated:

Here I would like to say also a word about the toothbrushes, which were found in the satchels of Japanese soldiers and which were cor-rectly praised as a culture barometer. I permit myself the question whether the German soldier knows generally a toothbrush? The answer reads: No. The people must clean everything, but brushing the teeth is not instructed to them. If only the buttons are clean, the soldier may have green teeth and smell from the mouth like a hunting dog. (Krafft 1904: 241–246)

The physician Erwin Bälz (1930: 204) observed in the morning of September 19th, 1904 the morning toilet of some Japanese soldiers in Kusatsu and asked himself: “Do swains in our country also wash their mouths every morning, and brush their teeth?” The Kaiser appeared par-ticularly impressed as well by the will of the simple Japanese soldier to fight, while he despised the Russian. For a speech on March 9th, 1905 it is reported, that he said in front of naval recruits in Wilhelmshaven the following:

The emperor alluded among other things to the heroic acts of the Japanese and elaborated that they were born out of Japa-nese patriotism and filial love (…). One may however from the Japanese victories – victories of a pagan over a Christian people – not draw the conclusion that Buddha is superior to our Lord Christ. The reason, that Russia had been beaten, is (…) due to the fact that it is not as its best with Russian Christianity, the Japa-nese exhibited however many Christian virtues. A good Christian, a good soldier.

It was reported in the Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, that the Kaiser called the Japanese the “scourge of God” like once Attila and Napoleon. Later on he expressed his wish, that the Germans should never be punished by God with this scourge (Johann 1966: 149). The Japanese broadly received world-wide acknowledgment. For example, the Japanese envoys in foreign countries were promoted to the rank of ambassadors. The Japanese vic-


tory over Russia was accompanied by a change in the structure of world politics. In his book concerning the meaning of the Russo-Japanese War, Gustav Höcker (1832–1911) predominantly foresaw the following changes. Höcker himself was a non-ficton writer, who already had published partlyfictitious, partly descriptive studies on famous composers and actors, inaddition with studies on historical events (e.g. the battle of Jena and Auerstedt 1806 or the Franco-Prussian War 1870/71).

[Japan] will have the right to join in the conversation not only in Asiatic, not only in European affairs, but also to raise objection against the foreign policy of America. All of a sudden all politi-cal constellations are shifted. (…) In the next decades we have to expect a policy of surprises! In the next decades we will be in Europe, Asia and America in an always increasing development, a development, whose consequences are not to be foreseen at all. (Höcker 1904: 3)

The more frequently the media reported Japanese victories, the bigger the surprise about the Japanese achievements became, one did not exactly know, how to evaluate. “The amazing speed”, with which Japan could achieve for herself “a considered position in the world”, however was for some observers only possible through imitation of the West, whereby Japan however understood “to combine speed with thoroughness” (Erdmann 1905: 5).

An element that seemed to be a result of the increasing Japanese suc-cess in a world political context was the assumption regarding increasing Japanese-American tensions, which could lead sooner or later into a war. The German monarch did not omit an opportunity to refer to this danger as Bülow writes, and as it is shown in the correspondence of the Kaiser with Tsar Nicholas II:

His Majesty ’s fatal prejudice against the Land of the Rising Sun was also visible in his correspondence with Roosevelt. The Kaiser was everlastingly warning Roosevelt against the scheming plans of the Japanese. He was convinced that war between Japan and the United States was unavoidable and imminent. (Bülow 1931: 658)


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In a very detailed letter to the Tsar, written on December 28th, 1907, the emperor took up these conceptions again and connected them with the “pipe dreams” of a Japanese army waiting in Mexico for the signal in order to attack the United States. Ten years later, in the midst of the World War, a telegram of the undersecretary of state in the Foreign Office to the Germanambassador to Mexico, the so called Zimmermann Telegram, suggested an alliance with Japan and a united attack against the USA, which played a major role in the entry into the war of the USA.

London is afraid of an encounter between Japan and America, because they must take sides with one of them, as it will be a question of Race, not of Politiks [sic!], only Yellow versus White. The dropping of Japan would immediately entail the loss of India (…). The Japanese have foreseen this development and are prepar-ing for it. Perhaps they will first attack India and leave Philippines alone. (…) Now their newspapers have for the first time used the term “Yellow Peril” from my picture, which is coming true. A German Gentleman just back from Mexico reported to me having himself counted 10,000 Japanese men in the plantations in South Mexico, all in Military Jackets with brass buttons. After work at sundown they all assemble under sergeants and officers who are disguised as simple labourers, in squads and detachments and drill and ex-ercise with staffs of wood, which he observed very often, when they thought they were unobserved. They are Japanese reservists who have hidden arms with them, and intended as army corps to seize the Panama Canal and to cut off communication on land with America. (…) It is imposing to observe how well the Japanese pre-pare themselves for an emergency! They are going in for the whole of Asia, carefully preparing their blows and against the white Race in general! Remember my picture, its coming true! If France sides with England in this affair, Saigon and Annam are gone! (Letters from the Kaiser)

The fact, that the conceptions of an Japanese-American war in the near future were not only chimeras of the emperor, but rather a quite popu-lar idea at that time, may show exemplary the popularity of an adven-ture novel, which Friedrich Grauthoff published under his pen nameParabellum in 1908. Although still unsuccessfully, in this novel, entitled


“Bansai!”, the Japanese tried first an attack on the Philippines, in orderto turn later against the American motherland. After the German de-feat in the World War, studies in Germany, which also tried to justify the unavoidability of a Japanese-American confrontation scientifically, werepublished (Wencker 1921).

The Germans did not expect at any time a Japanese ultimatum with respect to the unconditional German retreat from China and the Japanese declara-tion of war in August 1914 against Germany. Within weeks, the admiration in the German public changed into true hatred. The disappointment by this Japanese “betrayal” was immense. The Japanese declaration of war led to a turn in the German view on Japan, which was to be justified only with anoverestimation of Japan due to a lack of “historical knowledge”.

One had hoped in Germany, Japan would now clear off a debt of gratitude towards Germany, to which she nevertheless owed all successes of the last decades. At least one counted on benevolent neutrality. Japan repaid Germany with the same ingratitude, which she had shown in former times against China. (Erkes 1915: 39)

Ingratitude was the general element of the German criticism after the al-liance of Japan with the enemies of the Central Powers. The well-known German sinologist Otto Franke (1914: 14) pointed out, that Japan was bribed by the British, and that the 160 million dollars, Great Britain prom-ised to support Japan with, were blood money (“Judaslohn”) Japan sold her reputation for and betrayed her German teacher. The famous japa-nologist Karl Florenz (1914: 5–6) argued similarly.

If however the unprovoked swinging in of Japan into the ranks of our enemies already provoked with us painfull surprise, the hostile swinging in of a country, with which we had normal and friendly re-lations, against which we had no bad intentions whatsoever, whose interests we did not threaten anywhere, to whose welfare and pros-perity we generously contributed like nobody else in the world, by degrading ourselves almost to cultural fertilizer, then particular the impolite and insulting form, in which Japan advanced towards us, caused a general storm of protest.


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CLOSING REMARKS

As initially already pointed out, the view of a culture on another culture is determined by stereotypes. At the beginning of the bilateral relations be-tween Germany and Japan a teacher- pupil relationship was established, to whose abrupt end Germany obviously contributed substantially by her participation in the (Asiatic) Triple Intervention. The disturbed bilateral relationship however had no larger influence on the opinion of the com-mon German experiencing Japanese otherness. Japan as a German pupil was a quite popular interpretation of the guidance, Germany granted to Japan in the beginning of the Meiji reforms, and which led finally to twovictorious wars for Japan. Due to its similar national development as a “delayed nation” Germany took pride in calling the Japanese the “Prussians of Asia”, although the presumably undeserved declaration of war in 1914 caused great disappointment. All things considered, the image of Japan in the German empire seems to be quite similar to the image of Japan in present Germany. An improved flow of information and world-widetourism had only limited influence on the overall image of Japan, whichis still characterised by stereotypes, which were partially already used in the German empire up to 1918. In short, regarding the process of con-structing Japanese otherness in the Reich and still today, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was correct, when he puts into the Merryman’s mouth the following insight in „the prelude on the theatre“ as part of his famous poetic drama “Faust”:

Bright pictures, but obscure their meaning:

A ray of truth through error gleaming,

Thus you the best elixir brew,

To charm mankind, and edify them too.


LIST OF LITERATURE

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Bälz, Erwin (1930): Das Leben eines deutschen Arztes im erwachenden Japan. Herausgege-ben von Toku Bälz. Stuttgart.

Beer, Max (1903): Der russisch-japanische Konflikt. In: Die Neue Zeit XXII:1:13, pp. 427–433.Beer, Max (1905): Der Friede in Asien. In: Die Neue Zeit Teil 1: XXIV:1:3, pp. 91–97.Brandt, Max A. von (1897): Ostasiatische Fragen. Berlin.Bülow, Bernhard von (1931): Memoirs of Prince von Bülow. 4 volumes. Boston.Clifford, James (1986): Introduction. Partial Truth, in: Clifford, James und George E. Marcus:

(ed.): Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley, pp. 1–26.Erdmann von Kalinowski, Walter (1905): Der Krieg zwischen Rußland und Japan. Berlin.Erkes, Eduard (1915): Japan und die Japaner. Leipzig.Florenz, Karl (1914): Deutschland und Japan. Hamburg.Franke, Otto (1914): Deutschland und England in Ostasien. Hamburg.Freitag, Adolf (1939): Die Japaner im Urteil der Meiji-Deutschen. Mitteilungen der Deut-

schen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens. Volume 39, part C. Tôkyô.Gollwitzer, Heinz (1962): Die Gelbe Gefahr. Geschichte eines Schlagworts. Studien zum impe-

rialistischen Denken. Göttingen.Hansen, Klaus P. (1999): Erkennen, Verstehen und Beurteilen des kulturell Fremden, in:

Lenz, Bernd et al.: Fremdheitserfahrung und Fremdheitsdarstellung in okzidentalen Kul-turen. Passau, pp. 55–70.

Höcker, Gustav (1904): Japan und Rußland im Kampf um Ostasien. Leipzig/Kattowitz, 2 volumes.

Johann, Ernst (1966): Reden des Kaisers. Ansprachen, Predigten und Trinksprüche Wilhelms II München.

Krafft, Rudolf (1904): Etwas von der Kriegskunst. In: Die Neue Zeit XXII:2:34, pp. 241–246.Lepsius, Johannes et al. (1924): Der nahe und der ferne Osten. Die Große Politik der Eu-

ropäischen Kabinette, Volume 9, Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswär-tigen Amtes. Berlin.

Letters from the Kaiser to the Tsar, August 22nd, 1905 – March 26th, 1914, in: http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1914m/willnick/wilnicke.htm, 8.25 2007.

Mathias-Pauer, Regine (1984): Deutsche Meinungen zu Japan – Von der Reichsgründung bis zum dritten Reich, in: KREINER, Josef (ed.): Deutschland – Japan. Historische Kon-takte. Bonn, pp. 115–140.

Mülmann, F. von (1895). Der Chinesisch-Japanische Krieg 1894/95. Berlin.Munzinger, Carl (1904): Japan und die Japaner. Stuttgart.Parabellum [= Friedrich Grautoff ] (1908) Bansai! Leipzig.


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Rein, Johannes Julius (1881/86): Japan, nach Reisen und Studien im Auftrag der Königlich-Preußischen Regierung dargestellt. 2 volumes. Leipzig.

Riess, Ludwig (1905): Allerlei aus Japan. 2 volumes. Berlin.Titzmann, Michael (1999): Aspekte der Fremdheitserfahrung. Die logisch-semiotische

Konstruktion des ,Fremden’ und des ,Selbst’, in: Lenz, Bernd et al.: Fremdheitserfahrung und Fremdheitsdarstellung in okzidentalen Kulturen. Passau, pp. 89–114.

Weber, Max: (1971): Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, in: WEBER, Max: Ge-sammelte Schriften, Tübingen.

Wencker, Friedrich (1921): Der unvermeidliche Krieg zwischen Amerika und Japan. Stutt-gart.

Wilde, Oscar (1891): The Decay of Lying, in: Intentions. [http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext97/ntntn10h.htm, 06.21, 2007].

Wippich, Rolf-Harald (1995): „Strich mit Mütze“: Max von Brandt und Japan – Diplomat, Pub-lizist, Propagandist. Tôkyô.

Wippich, Rolf-Harald (1997): „Haut Sie, daß die Lappen fliegen!“ Briefe von Deutschenan das japanische Kriegsministerium während des Chinesisch-Japanischen Krieges 1894/95. Tôkyô.

Wippich, Rolf-Harald (2006): Japan-enthusiasm in Wilhelmine Germany. The case of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–5, in SPANG, Christian W. et al.: Japanese-German Relations, 1895–1945. War, diplomacy and public opinion. London et al., pp. 61–79.

Documents

Between Admiration and Fear — The Construction of Japanese Otherness in the German Empire (1870—1918)