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Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism
Annalisa Coliva & Sebastiano Moruzzi
(forthcoming in Iride)
n
Introduction
In recent years there has been a surge of interest in the philosophy language over the merits, limits
and future perspectives of various approaches to the problem of meaning and communication that
focus on the role of linguistic context. However, a noticeable problem that has been pivotal in
motivating some developments of this trend has been so far under-explored. The problem in a
nutshell is: what’s the nature of disagreement? Given that linguistic disagreement data has been
recently advanced as one of the main motivations for some of these contextual approaches in
relation to the so-called phenomenon of “faultless disagreement” (more on this phenomenon later),
the intellectual pressure to answer this question has accordingly increased.
The aim of this paper is to show that a very natural and intuitive notion of disagreement
cannot but lead to criticizing these proposals as positive philosophical explanations of faultless
disagreement (more on this notion later). “So much the worse for the ‘natural and intuitive view’ of
disagreement” some would say; “so much the worse for these approaches” others would say. As
often happens in philosophy, one person’s modus tollens is another person’s modus ponens. Though
we are in this case more sympathetic with the modus ponens reaction, we are content to shed light
on the difference between different philosophical projects that, we think, in the current debate on
faultless disagreement have not been properly kept distinct. We also wish to establish the
conditional conclusion that if the natural and intuitive view of disagreement is correct, then
mainstream approaches to semantic content (i.e. contextualist and relativist approaches) that make
use of the notion of context cannot offer a positive philosophical explanation of faultless
disagreement and are ultimately committed to a revisionary approach with respect to semantics tout
court.
In §1 we introduce two distinctions (normative vs empirical and revisonary vs descriptive)
that are useful for characterizing a philosophical project. These distinctions give rise to four
different possible projects on the problem of faultless disagreement. In §2 we lay out a basic and
intuitive view of doxastic disagreement and we show why this view poses a problem to any basic
form of contextualism and relativism for any descriptive approach to faultless disagreement. We
then argue (§3) that a revisionary approach to faultless disagreement is a natural option by means of
a semantic blindness hypothesis, but that such an approach sits badly with the methodology usually
adopted by supporters of these semantic outlooks.
§1 Normative vs empirical and revisonary vs descriptive philosophical projects
§1.1 Two distinctions: normative/empirical and descriptive/revisionary
So, before moving on, let’s make clear which projects we are targeting. We do not want to criticize
contextualist or relativist proposals because they are inadequate qua empirical semantic theories; on
this fact we want to remain neutral – though we will raise some doubts on this. Our aim is different:
we want to criticize these proposals as philosophical explanations of certain types of disagreement,
namely those disagreements that have been called “faultless disagreements” (Kölbel 2003). So,
before entering the details of our critique, it is necessary to provide an elucidation of what we take a
“philosophical explanation” to be.
We can distinguish two different projects: one that aims to investigate the normative
connections that underlie our use of language; and another one that means to discover general
principles which can be employed to account for some linguistic data. Contemporary empirical
semantics clearly falls into the second category: the aim is to explain some linguistic data by means
of a compositional formal semantics together with pragmatic principles that connect the formal
apparatus to our linguistic activity. Take for example the case of taste discourse (which will be our
leading example). Philosophers of language and linguists have pointed out that we have linguistic
data like:
(Omelettes)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages.
Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!
A moment reflection on the scenario depicted by this example suffices to realize that these disputes
have the appearance of faultless disagreement: when it comes to disputes of inclination it seems that
it is possible that both opinions are in good standing and subjects aren’t at fault. The business of
empirical semantics is to explain why exchanges of this type are felicitous by means of the
resources of formal semantics and pragmatics. Now, how is this connected to the former project of
investigating the normative connections that underlie our use of language? Of course, the whole
point is to clarify the phrase “investigating the normative connections”. It is not the purpose of this
paper to hold that there is a univocal reading of that phrase; rather, we want to advance our own
interpretation that we believe is firmly entrenched in the philosophical tradition. When it comes to
disagreement, we inquire into the nature of disagreement in a given area of discourse because we
want to understand how we deploy our concepts in these disputes and whether this deployment is
rational: whether the engagement in the dispute is characterized by a stance that is justified by the
relevant information. This latter question involves a normative dimension that is absent in the
empirical semantic project. Like the empirical semantic project also the “normative project” pays
attention to the linguistic use because to do so is a useful strategy to get a grip on how we deploy
our concepts. However, the normative project, as opposed to the empirical project, aims at
explaining why we disagree in a certain way and what the justification of our attitudes is.1
Given this understanding of the normative project, there is no principled reason why the two
1 Wright (2012) adopts a similar distinction.
projects should be in opposition or mutually exclusive. An inquiry into the semantics of an area of
discourse aimed at making sense of the linguistic data for disagreement could provide valuable, if
not decisive, insights into the normative question of the nature and rational basis of disagreement.
Moreover if we believe in a close relationship between linguistic questions and normative questions
– i.e. if we believe (as for example Dummett thought) that an explanation of the meaning of
expressions in a given area of discourse can solve some traditional philosophical questions related
to that area – then the connection between the empirical project and the normative one is not only
possible, but actually to be expected. One aim of this paper is to show that current contextualist and
relativist semantics aren’t of help when the purpose of inquiry is that of providing a normative
explanation of disagreement. This conclusion is of course consistent with drawing different morals:
either further work has to be done for linking these empirical projects to the normative project, or
the project of linking the empirical with the normative is in fact doomed to fail, or else, current
contextualist and relativist empirical semantics have to be rejected as solutions to the philosophical
problem of faultless disagreement.
A final distinction. The empirical/normative opposition is orthogonal to another opposition
that is the descriptive/revisionary. A philosophical project is descriptive when it delivers just a
description of a targeted area of investigation that matches with our ordinary representation of it.
Alternatively, a philosophical project is revisionary when it delivers a description of the area of
investigation that does not match with our ordinary representation of it.2
With respect to the problem of faultless disagreement, a descriptive project must deliver a
description of the relevant area of discourse where disputes are taken at face value as real and2 Dummett (1976: 66) has famously argued, for example, that part of our inferential practice must be revised: some
classically valid inferential principles (double negation elimination, excluded middle and classical reductio) cannot be
redeemed on a semantics grounded on the central aspects of our use, aspects that are constitutive of the meaning of
logical expressions. According to Dummett, these principles cannot be justified if we assume a molecular theory of
meaning, which rests on a connection between meaning and knowledge of meaning. Hence, our acceptance of these
principles can be subject to legitimate philosophical criticism.
rationally sustainable and not to be imputed to error or ignorance or other deficiencies on subjects’
part. By contrast, a revisionary project on the problem of faultless disagreement calls for a revision
of some traits of the relevant area of discourse; disputes are approached with the intent of resolving
or, in effect, dissolving them.
§1.2 Four projects
From the previous distinctions it follows that both empirical and normative projects could either be
descriptive or revisionary. There are, in the history of philosophy, plenty of instances of these type
of projects. To illustrate how an empirical project could be revisionary just think of how epistemic
contextualists3 such as DeRose (2012) have advanced the semantic blindness hypothesis: according
to some epistemic contextualist we, qua ordinary speakers, feel that the skeptical argument based on
closure4 poses a threat to knowledge because we are blind to the fact that its conclusion does not
contradict our ordinary claims to knowledge. Semantics advanced by these epistemic contextualists
are thus revisionary because they impute an error to ordinary speakers.
As an instance of normative revisionism take for example Richard Rorty’s discussion of
progress (Rorty’s 1979, esp. Ch. 7). Rorty holds that our ordinary idea of progress with respect to,
for example, ethical questions, is just a retrospective projection of our categories. Although he
wouldn’t endorse the claim that such a projection is erroneous, he thinks there is no fact of the
matter that could sanction the superiority of our perspective over any other one, contrary to what we
usually think about political or ethical progress.5
3 For a minimal definition of the contextualist position see infra §2.1.
4 A skeptical argument based on closure runs as follows:
P1. I don’t know that that I’m not a bodiless brain in a vat (BIV), being stimulated to have just those
experiences I would be having if I weren’t a BIV.
P2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, being stimulated to have just those experiences I would be having if I
weren’t a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.
C. So, I don’t know that I have hands.
5 We have analyzed the problem of ethical progress in connection with contemporary relativist proposals in
As for the descriptive empirical project, most present-day relativist semantics are a luminous
examples of such kind of project: they intend to deliver a description of the truth-conditions that
underlie our actual linguistic use. So, for example, Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) and
MacFarlane (forthcoming) are examples of descriptive empirical projects for the semantics of
English expressions for epistemic modality.
Finally, the descriptive normative case. We understand this category simply as the traditional
philosophical task of saying what we ought to think with respect to a certain philosophical notion.
Take for example the notion of knowledge: a descriptive normative project lays down the principles
that are constitutive of knowledge and claims that these principles are the ones we ought rationally
to deem as correct and abide by.
Our focus will be on philosophical projects on faultless disagreement, namely those disputes
of inclination (in ethics, aesthetics or taste discourse for example) where it appears that “when two
thinkers disagree on a non-objective matter of opinion it is possible that neither of them has made a
mistake or is at fault” (Kölbel 2003: 53). In such cases we have linguistic data like (Omelettes)
together with, after reflection, the appearance of faultless disagreement. Faced with these, obviously
different kinds of data, one can pursue four different projects6:
P1) Empirical revisionary project: to revise the appearance of faultless disagreement, by
appealing only to further linguistic data and hypotheses;7
P2) Empirical descriptive project : to maintain that the appearance of faultless disagreement
is correct, by appealing only to further linguistic data and hypotheses;8
Coliva&Moruzzi 2012.
6 Each project is relativized to an area of discourse.
7 Cappelen (2008) is a clear example of revisionary empirical project: by appealing to the semantic blindness hypothesis
the author holds that the appearance of faultless disagreement is an illusion.
8 Kölbel (2007) illustrates how truth-relativism or a sophisticated form of contextualism can be seen as cases of
descriptive projects.
P3) Normative revisionary project : by appealing to conceptual reflections, to revise the
appearance of faultless disagreement, and to deem the dispute as not rationally sustainable;9
P4) Normative descriptive project : by appealing to conceptual reflections, to maintain that
the appearance of faultless disagreement is correct and that the dispute is rationally
sustainable.10
Normative projects could be undertaken with the help of empirical ones, so P1 and P3, and P2 and
P4 aren’t respectively mutually exclusive; while P1 and P2, and P3 and P4 are.
So let’s go back to the accounts mentioned before that focus on the role of linguistic context.
Some philosophers have advanced these accounts as ways to explain the phenomenon of faultless
disagreement. The question we want to address is: which one of the four projects mentioned before
can these accounts successfully pursue? To answer this question we will lay down in the next
section (§2) what we take to be the constitutive conditions for having a disagreement and, after
introducing the barebones of these accounts, we will present an argument that threatens the
possibility for these accounts to successfully engage in a descriptive project regarding faultless
disagreement. In section 3, we also cast doubt on the idea that these accounts can provide a
satisfactory revisionary explanation of faultless disagreement, consistent with their underlying
methodology.
9 Rovane (2012) exemplifies a conceptual revisionary project: by claiming that there is no coherent account of faultless
disagreement, she argues that we should rationally give up the idea that in disputes of inclination opposite views are
incompatible..
10 Wright (2006) can be read as case of normative descriptive project: by appealing to the notion of super-assertibility,
Wright tries to offer an anti-realist framework that can accommodate the idea that a dispute can be faultless and
rationally sustainable.
§2 Basic disagreement and the lost disagreement problem
In this section we formulate a simple and intuitive view on disagreement (§2.1) and present two
basic forms of semantic theories that make use of the notion of context: one where the context plays
a content-determining role (which we label “basic contextualism”, see infra §2.2); and one where
the context plays a circumstance-determining role (which we label “basic relativism”, see infra
§2.3). We then formulate a problem (the “lost disagreement problem”) for both positions. We will
then consider some possible replies to the problem in the following section.
§2.1 Basic disagreement
Though we do not want to provide a full analysis of the notion of disagreement, we submit that a
genuine disagreement must meet two conditions. Two subjects disagree only if:
Basic Disagreement
i) (Incompatibility condition) they accept incompatible contents,11 i.e. their truth-values are
mutually exclusive12, and
ii) (Aboutness condition) the acceptance of these contents concern the same circumstances,
i.e. they are meant to be true at the same circumstances.
The Incompatibility condition and the Aboutness condition constitute together what we call “Basic
disagreement”. Basic disagreement is, in our opinion, a necessary feature of every genuine semantic
disagreement. Our formulation of the lost disagreement problem depends on the acceptance of
Basic disagreement. We know that Basic disagreement has been challenged (MacFarlane 2007;
MacFarlane ms, ch.6; Lopez De Sa 2008; Sundell 2011; Marques forthcoming-a). However, we
submit that Basic disagreement is a fundamental feature of a genuine conflict of opinions.
11 The relevant attitude here is full belief – we leave aside cases of degrees of belief.
12 We limit ourselves to acceptance and denial of the same content, though matters can get complicated when a
different content is accepted and rejected.
Following Baker (forthcoming) we can distinguish three disagreement-based strategies for arguing
against relativism and contextualism: i) a strategy starting from loaded principles (i.e. principles
that are neutral towards the theories on the market); ii) a strategy based on minimal principles that
should supposedly be acceptable for any theory; iii) a strategy challenging the very possibility that
any other candidate relativist principle regarding disagreement can adequately fulfill the required
role and underwrite the correct verdicts in paradigm cases of faultless disagreement. Whereas
Baker follows strategy (ii) – the one with the minimalist notion of disagreement - we follow
strategy (i). Our challenge to contextualism can be thus methodologically represented as follows:
contextualist and relativist approaches cannot successfully pursue a descriptive project on faultless
disagreement by appealing to an intuitive and simple view of disagreement (Basic disagreement).13
One final remark: we are assuming a notion of disagreement that is doxastic. That is to say, the
conflict that Basic disagreement captures is analyzed in terms of an incompatibility between belief
attitudes. In contrast to this assumption, some recent literature (Dreier 2009; Huevenes 2011,
forthcoming; Marques forthcoming-a) suggests that it might be promising to account for the
appearance of disagreement (at least in some cases) by means of a non-doxastic notion, for example
in terms of preference instead of belief. Let us then state a few points on these proposals. First, none
of these proposals articulates precisely what non-doxastic disagreement would amount to. So, until
a clear characterization is given, it is difficult to assess the interest of a non-doxastic account of
13 Baker (forthcoming) formulates a dilemma for strategy (i): either it is a problem for accounting disagreement in
itself for relativism and contextualism or these theories can provide an alternative notion of disagreement. Hence he
argues that any challenge to contextualism and relativism based on strategy (i) is dialectically ineffective since
either presupposes a notion of disagreement unfriendly to these theories or it leads to a more general problem for
these theories that is conceptually antecedent to the problem of accounting for some linguistic data. Our response is
simple and straightforward: we employ strategy (i) because we do think that contextualism and relativism do have a
general problem for accounting of disagreement. Moreover in Coliva&Moruzzi ms we argue that it is not
dialectically ineffective to use our loaded Basic disagreement principle since we argue against alternative construals
of disagreement that might be sympathetic to relativism and contextualism.
faultless disagreement. Second, the main motivation for these proposals is that it seems difficult for
relativism and contextualism to stabilize a doxastic notion of disagreement. However, it is
dialectically ad hoc to argue that it follows that we must replace a doxastic notion with a
non-doxastic one. For our orthodox notion of Basic disagreement is intuitive and simple whereas no
clear non-doxastic account is available as yet. Until we lack a decently articulated proposal
regarding non-doxastic disagreement, it is much more plausible to infer that relativism and
contextualism fail to account for the notion of disagreement. Finally, a doxastic notion of
disagreement fits more naturally areas of discourse that are taken to be truth-apt; for, if discourse is
truth-apt, it is plausible to assume that utterances express propositions (whether classical or
non-classical) with truth-conditions and thus that the correct attitude underscored by these
utterances is one pointing to the truth of the proposition expressed, namely the attitude of belief.14
So, if one’s proposed account of disputes of inclination doesn’t meet requirements (i) and (ii)
of Basic disagreement, it incurs in what we will call the “Lost disagreement problem”. Obviously
such a problem is a powerful challenge to all descriptive projects mentioned so far. For, trivially, if
they can’t solve it, they won’t be able to fulfill their advertised task – that is to say, the task of
respecting the appearance of faultless disagreement.
§2.2 Basic contextualism
Call “basic contextualism for E” the view according to which the semantic content of the expression
E is sensitive to the context of use.15 Basic indexical contextualism seems the right semantic theory
for certain uses of some expressions, consider for example:
14 Of course, this latter point is ineffective against those who have sympathy for expressivist analyses of the relevant
area of discourse (e.g. Dreier 2009). Yet, we are concerned with contextualists and relativists who take it for granted
that the targeted area of discourse is truth-apt.
15 We use the expression “basic” because the position can be enriched with other principles. The position is equivalent
to what is also known, following MacFarlane (2009), as “indexical contextualism”. We consider more complex variants
of contextualism in Coliva-Moruzzi ms.
(Italian)
Mario: I am Italian
Nicholas: I am not Italian
It is clear that in these cases the semantic content of “I” is the speaker of the context.16 Kaplan
(1989) has famously taught us how to treat these cases.
Moreover there are cases of expressions belonging to areas of discourse of taste, aesthetics
and ethics where such an analysis has been considered as a live option. As we have mentioned in
the former section, the pressure for this position is to account for faultless disagreement. Let’s go
back to our example:
(Omelettes)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages.
Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!
Basic contextualism analyses “better” as indexed to the some contextual parameter of the context of
use. A natural candidate is the standard of taste of the speaker. A well-known problem for this
proposal is that it seems unable to account for the feeling of disagreement since the latter exchange
is interpreted as equivalent in content to:
(Omelettes-contextualist)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better w.r.t. my standards than sausages.
Angela: No. Sausages are better w.r.t. my standards than omelettes!
The propositions expressed in (Omelettes-contextualist) explain the appearance of faultlessness
16 The rule needs some qualifications that are not relevant for the present discussion – see Predelli (1998).
since, presumably, the idea is that in normal circumstances each speaker judges correctly relatively
to his/her own standards.17 However, the problem with (Omelettes-contextualist) is that Nicholas
and Angela seem to talk past each other since they are expressing two different comparative
properties that give rise to compatible propositions: Nicholas is expressing the property “being
better w.r.t. Nicholas’ standards” whereas Angela is expressing the property “being better w.r.t.
Angela’s standards”. Basic contextualism thus faces the Lost disagreement problem, because it
cannot account for (i) the Incompatibility condition of Basic disagreement.18
The Lost disagreement problem for contextualism has been invoked by relativist semanticists
as the master argument against contextualism (Kölbel 2004, MacFarlane 2007, Lasershon 2005,
Stephenson 2007).
§2.3 Basic relativism
Call “basic relativism for E” the view according to which the extension (but not the semantic
content19) of the expression E is sensitive to the context – where the context can be the context of
17 This assumption is by no means obvious. It could be held that the appearance of faultless disagreement is systemically
connected to an opacity condition with respect to the question of which standards are salient in the context. However,
contextualists seem to assume that even in the presence of an appearance of faultless disagreement the salient standards
are always transparent to the speaker.
18 The problem is not avoided if we switch from individualistic to communitarian basic contextualism: if both
propositions expressed by the speakers involve the same standard (i.e. the standard of the conversation) then the
incompatibility condition is met but faultlessness is lost.
19 Basic semantic relativism constitutes, so to say, the semantic barebones of two theories: non-indexical contextualism
and truth relativism (see MacFarlane 2005 for the distinction - content relativism is here left out of the picture).
Whereas MacFarlane’s taxonomy is based on the opposition between context of use sensitivity and context of
assessment sensitivity, our taxonomy is orthogonal to that opposition since it is based on the alternative between context
dependence without preservation of content and context dependence with preservation of content. We use the label
“basic” not because the position is itself entrenched in the literature, but because it provides the barebones of theories
that are well entrenched in the literature. One prominent way to put some flesh on these barebones is MacFarlane's
use of the expression or also the context from which an utterance is assessed (context of
assessment). In other words, the context plays the role of determining the circumstances of
evaluation for determining the extension of the expression. The distinctive feature of basic
relativism is that it ascribes to the context a circumstance-determining role, whereas basic
contextualism ascribes to the context a content-determining role. According to basic relativism an
utterance can express a proposition that can correctly receive different assessments. Another way of
expressing the same thought is to say that the extension of the truth-property is relative to contexts.
It has been argued that basic relativism can provide the basis for formulating the right
semantic theory for certain uses of some linguistic expressions. Consider for example:
(Italian debt)
Mario: Italian debt is under control
Angela: Italian debt is not under control.
Temporalists, such as Prior (1957, 2003) and Kaplan (1989), have argued that the content
semantically expressed in the utterances of (Italian debt) does not include reference to times. To
exemplify: if Mario utters on September 9 2013 at 10am “Italian debt is under control” he
expresses the proposition that Italian debt is under control, and not the proposition that Italian debt
is under control at 10am of September 9 2013 – or so the temporalists argue.
In particular, there are cases of expressions belonging to areas of discourse of taste,
aesthetics and ethics where such an analysis has been considered an open option to account for
faultless disagreement. Let’s go back to our example:
(Omelettes)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages
Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!
(2005) truth-relativism that we discuss in Coliva&Moruzzi ms.
Like basic contextualism, basic relativism holds that “better” has to be relativized to some
contextual parameter of the context of utterance or of assessment (e.g. the taste standard of the
speaker); but whereas the basic contextualist relativization involves a change of semantic content,
basic relativism predicts a change in extension without a change in semantic content. The advantage
of this analysis is that it explains that appearance of disagreement by attributing to speakers the
expression of incompatible propositional contents (condition (i) of Basic disagreement). The
appearance of faultlessness is also accounted for because, like in the contextualist case, the idea is
that in normal circumstances each speaker judges correctly relatively to his/her own standards.
However, the basic relativist proposal suffers from a problem analogous to the one
underlined for basic contextualism. According to basic relativism, in (Omelettes) the exchange has
to be interpreted as equivalent to:
(Omelettes-relativist)Nicholas [using his standards as part of the circumstances]: Omelettes
are better than sausages.
Angela [using her standards as part of the circumstances]: No. Sausages are better than
omelettes!
Basic relativism analyses “better” as pointing to the circumstances that include the judge’s
standards. In (Omelettes-relativist) Nicholas and Angela are taking different circumstances as
relevant for evaluating the (common) propositional content involved in the dispute and the assertion
made. This latter fact prevents the satisfaction of condition (ii) (the Aboutness condition) of Basic
disagreement (cf. Francén 2010). To see the point, take the following example:
Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and June, her counterpart in
another possible world. Jane asserts that Mars has two moons, and June denies this very
proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any real way. Jane’s assertion concerns our world,
while June’s concerns hers. If June lives in a world where Mars has three moons, her denial
may be just as correct as Jane’s assertion. (MacFarlane 2007: 23)
Just as there is no disagreement between two speakers in two different worlds accepting and
rejecting the same proposition, disagreement is lost also in the (Omelettes-relativist) scenario.20
§3 Semantic Blindness
At this point both basic contextualism and basic relativism could invoke the semantic blindness
hypothesis: speakers ignore the real workings of the semantics of their utterances and therefore take
themselves to disagree even if they are, as a matter of fact, just talking past each other. In fact both
basic contextualism and basic relativism predict that one of the conditions of Basic Disagreement is
not satisfied in the Omelettes scenario: according to basic contextualism speakers express contents
whose truth-values are not mutually exclusive, whereas basic relativism holds that speakers'
acceptances of the content express concern different circumstances. It thus then follows that in such
a scenario any expression of disagreement is at fault since at least one necessary condition for the
existence of a disagreement is not satisfied. The semantic blindness hypothesis explains this mistake
in the linguistic performance (e.g. Angela's utterance of “No” to express her rejection of what
Nicholas has asserted) by positing a misunderstanding of what has been actually expressed in the
20 It may seem ironic that we mention MacFarlane for supporting our lost disagreement objection, since it implies that
MacFarlane would then be portrayed as arguing against his own view. Of course, MacFarlane does not argue
against his own view nor do we intend to suggest this. Rather, his example is meant to show that an appropriate
account of disagreement must not appeal only to the propositional contents of the speech acts but must be
connected to the notion of context. Or so he argues. We discuss his proposal in Coliva&Moruzzi ms. We quoted
MacFarlane because we think he has underlined an intuitive difficulty that any relativist treatment faces in relation
to the notion of basic disagreement. Of course the relativist can revise the notion of basic disagreement, but then it
becomes controversial whether the new relativistic notion of disagreement is acceptable.
linguistic exchange (basic contextualism) or of what circumstances are relevant for assessing the
correctness of the assertions (basic relativism).
Notice that such a move is compatible only with the empirical revisionary project. In fact the
descriptive projects (normative and empirical) are ruled out because they presuppose that the theory
does not contradict speakers' representation of the relevant area of discourse; normative revisionism
is ruled out too because the semantic blindness hypothesis is used to explain a pattern of use of
linguistic expressions, whereas a normative revisionist project aims to criticize this pattern as not
rationally sustainable. The semantic blindness hypothesis entails that disputes on taste are in fact
mistaken: were the speakers aware of the workings of the semantics for their utterances, they would
stop arguing and the dispute would no longer be rationally sustainable since they would realize that
they are just mistaken in thinking of disagreeing with each other.
Notice also the methodologically problematic consequence of turning to an empirical
revisionary project. For if we opt for this move, it becomes dubious that we can trust those semantic
intuitions that are usually appealed to in order to motivate contextualism and relativism. So either
these theories can be independently motivated (for example by arguing in favor of the metaphysics
underwritten by contextualist semantics), or the semantic blindness hypothesis cuts the ground
underneath the very philosophical positions it is meant to be a defense of (cf. Baker 2012: 112-15).21
It might be replied that the data supporting contextualism and relativism come from a set of
intuitions that is distinct from the set for which semantic blindness is invoked. Contextualism, for
example, has been typically motivated by intuitions about the variability of truth-values of
utterances across different contexts (see Cappelen&Lepore 2005:17-38). The contextualist might
then argue that this set of intuitions provides evidence for a contextualist semantics for, say, taste
vocabulary independently of the disagreement data. As for the intuitions about disagreement the
contextualist might then hold that these are so hopelessly muddled to prevent ordinary speakers
from understanding properly the correct semantics for these expressions. To this objection we have
21 In fact Cappelen (2008) argues that semantics should not be based on intuitions about content because they are
unreliable.
two replies. First, the semanticist who defends these theories should explain why intuitions about
disagreement are confused: do ordinary speakers have a cognitive shortcoming when they employ
the concept of disagreement? Or is the concept of disagreement itself ambiguous or, perhaps, even
incoherent? More has to be said to motivate the confusion hypothesis. Second, though it is a
common practice for linguists to hold similar semantic blindness hypothesis, contextualists and
relativists have nonetheless the burden of proof of showing that the unreliability of intuitions about
disagreement does not cast doubt on the reliability of the other set of intuitions that are supposed to
independently motivate the theory (such as intuitions about the variability in truth-value of
utterances in the case of contextualism).
However, the crucial question is another one: granting the semantic blindness hypothesis, is a
revisionary explanation of the disputes a palatable solution to the problem of faultless
disagreement? The price to pay (assuming the notion of Basic disagreement), to account for the
appearance of faultlessness, is to explain away the appearance of disagreement. Contextualists and
relativists could, of course, reject Basic disagreement by claiming that the appearance of
disagreement could be explained by some kind of disagreement other than Basic disagreement (see
supra fn 16). It then becomes an open question which one is more worthy. However, if we grant
Basic disagreement there is no longer any clear advantage in an approach that focuses on the role of
context since the advertised advantage of vindicating a genuine sense of faultless disagreement
would be lost.
§4 Conclusions
The upshot is then that both contextualism and relativism in their basic forms cannot redeem as
genuine the many disputes we continuously face in the subjective domains such as taste discourse
since these theories are committed to a revisonary stance. We want to be clear, though, that our
conclusion is not meant to be an unconditional and unqualified rejection of contextualism and
relativism. These theories might be supported by considerations that are different from the
phenomenon of faultless disagreement. Rather, the conclusion of our argument is conditional and
qualified: if we accept Basic disagreement, then both (basic) contextualism and (basic) relativism
can’t make sense of it and hence they should end up being revisionary with respect to the
appearance of faultless disagreement. This conclusion justifies a thesis of explanatory limitation for
(basic) contextualism and (basic) relativism: unless further work is done in the contextualist and
relativist field, these theories do not seem to be able to pursue a descriptive project with respect to
faultless disagreement.
We started this paper by delineating the possible philosophical projects that can be pursed in
relation to the problem of faultless disagreement. We can now draw some conclusions with respect
to contextualism and relativism (in their basic forms). The (basic) contextualist and the (basic)
relativist have then two options for clarifying what philosophical project there are engaged in: either
they chose to pursue an empirical revisionary project or a normative revisionary one. If the former,
we have argued that they have a methodological problem. In fact if (basic) contextualism and
(basic) relativism have problems in making sense of disagreement (at least in relation to the
phenomenon of faultless disagreement), this outcome would sit badly with their usual
methodological stance, which consists in taking semantic intuitions at face value. We thus think that
contextualists and relativists can either argue that the unreliability of disagreement intuitions does
not cast doubt on the intuitions that can independently support their theories, or their revisionary
stance over faultless disagreement threatens the very reliability of the data that should provide
empirical support for their very theories. If, on the other hand, (basic) contextualists and (basic)
relativists opt for a normative revisionary project, they are committed to the view that disputes in
the subjective areas of discourse are not rationally sustainable. As a consequence speakers should
give up the idea that in disputes of inclination opposite views are incompatible and they should stop
arguing.22 The empirical and normative revisionary project could also be conjoined: empirical
semantics could then be used, along the lines of Dummettian project, to call for a revision of a trait
of our subjective discourse that concerns our mode of reasoning and disputing. This is a line of
22This view fits Rovane (2012) stance towards disputes on morality. However it is not clear what background semantic
theory Rovane would accept (though her view seems very much in line with some sort of subvaluationism).
research that could be interestingly pursued but that is, so far, alien to current debates on
contextualism and relativism.
To sum up, we think that there is a challenge to be met by (basic) contextualists and (basic)
relativists who are prone to be engaged in a descriptive project on faultless disagreement, but that
there also new prospects for those theorists who are persuaded to move to a revisionary project on
faultless disagreement.
The prospect for the converted revisionists are, if the converted subscribe to an empirical
credo, to clarify the role that disagreement intuitions have with respect the evidential basis for their
theory and, if they subscribe to a normative credo, to assess the consequences for reasoning and
rationality in the targeted subjective domains.
The challenge for the obstinate descripitivists is the following. Either a different notion of
disagreement is canvassed – perhaps one merely non-doxastic in character, related to the different
attitudes and commitments that people judging P and not-P from different contexts of evaluation
would have –; or else, pending further work for contextualists and relativists on the rationality of
the targeted disputes and on the status of the semantic intuitions taken to provide an evidential basis
for these theories, the prospects for a contextualist or a relativist descriptive account of faultless
disagreement look bleak. An inquiry into a different notion of disagreement would, no doubt, be
reasonable, but Basic disagreement too is definitely a legitimate notion. With respect to that, the
relativist and the contextualist (at least when engaged in a descriptive project) seem to have very
little credible to say.23
23Do we have to conclude then that the right theory of faultless disagreement is a form of invariantism? Not necessarily.
Our result is compatible with the idea that the concept of faultless disagreement is accounted for by a relativist
normative revisionary project. It might be insisted that we are nonetheless committed to invariantism with respect to the
descriptive project on faultless disagreement. We do not think so. Even granting that the logical space is exhausted by
invariantism, contextualism and relativism (a non-trivial question), nothing dictates that a descriptive project can be
somehow successfully pursued; it might be the case that not even an invariantist theory would be successful in pursuing
a descriptive project. This would suggest that the concept of faultless disagreement cannot be coherently systematized,
or that Basic disagreement must be ultimately abandoned. To conclude, much is still open, and further work is needed
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