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Tokikake Ii

HIST 642

August 21, 2013

Historical Memory Analysis: The Change of the Atomic Bomb

Narrative over Decades

For decades, the standard story of the Pacific War ended as

follows: Americans used the atomic bombs to end the war more

quickly with fewer casualties. Even though scholars from around

1960s offered various historical interpretations of the decision

to use the bombs, this theory became the most dominant analysis

within American society. Boyer argues that for most Americans,

historians’ debates on the bombings remained arcane and remote.1

In fact, media, such as journals, textbooks, and documentaries,

often ignored the analyses and stories that challenged the

traditional theory.2 This occurred because the US government

established the traditional interpretation of the bombings as the

1 Paul Boyer, “Whose History is It Anyway,” from History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, ed. Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 130-131.2 Such as the fact that America’s intention to have military and diplomatic strength over the Soviet Union had some influence on America’s decision to the bombings, and the stories of the effectof nuclear fallout.

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official narrative. During the process, it sought to control the

spread of information about the bombings in order to prevent the

rise of opposition against the narrative. Few writers, such as

John Hershey, initially succeeded in spreading the stories of the

atrocities the bombings caused. Yet, the media eventually mostly

offered only the argument that supported the grand narrative.

Journals defended the use of the bombs and stated that they did

not cause radiation effect; movies also reinforced the

traditional argument. Nonetheless, this situation started to

change from the mid-1980s. Around the moment, America

increasingly became fearful of the potential nuclear war with the

Soviet Union. Driven by the fear, media, such as journals and

movies, started to cover the horrific effect of nuclear bombs and

the scenario of nuclear apocalypse. At the moment, it focused the

stories of the atomic bombings of Japan as they represented the

dreadful consequence of the nuclear war. For example, the movie

The Day After used footages of Hiroshima bombing to alert the public

the fear of the nuclear war and its impact. This moment became

the first breakthrough for the challenge against the traditional

narrative as more Americans started to cast doubt on the

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legitimacy of the bombings. In 1995, Enola Gay Exhibition took

place at Smithsonian’s National Air and Space museum to

commemorate the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombings. This

event became the culminating point of the clash between the

traditional and revisionist narrative of the bombings. While the

controversy spread throughout the nation, media mostly started to

deliver the stories about the atomic bombings from various

perspectives with fairness. Not only media, but also textbooks

started to incorporate both the traditional and revisionist

arguments. Therefore, media’s analysis of the atomic bombings of

Japan and their effects changed over decades and especially

started to become more tolerant of various interpretations from

the mid-1980s.

The Birth of Grand Narrative

President Harry Truman’s announcement of the atomic bombing

of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 became the government’s first

official statement to the public regarding the bomb. In the

speech, he stated that America used the revolutionary weapon to

“spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the

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ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam.”3 The word “spare”

became one of the most important keywords of the historiography

of the bombings. In fact, whether the American government

actually considered the lives of the Japanese more importantly

than the lives of Americans, it emphasized the casualty and death

estimates for making the executive decision to use the bomb.

Government officials used the estimates in order to choose

between the all-out mainland Japan invasion plans - Operation

Olympic and Coronet – and the use of atomic bombs. Initially, the

Joint Chiefs, including General Marshall and Admiral William D.

Leahy, reported that the first month of the invasion to Kyushu

region would bring about 31,000 American casualties.4 Walker

argues that this estimate became the only figures that the

President Truman heard by the end of the war.5

3 “Statement by the President of the United States, Harry Truman,” (August 6, 1945). http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/truman-hiroshima/.4 J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of AtomicBombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina, 1997), 36.5 Ibid., 39.

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Despite initially having the low estimate, the officials

began to inflate it to unrealistic numbers. First, former

President Herbert Hoover claimed that Americans would suffer

4,000,000 casualties, which would double the highest military

estimate in history.6 William Shockley, a future Nobel Laureate

scientist and an advisor to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, not

only raised the estimate to between 1.7 and 4 million, but also

argued that the invasion would cost about 400,000 to 800,000

deaths.7

After the end of the war, the government officials used the

exaggerated estimate to defend their position on the decision to

use the bombs. In February 1947, Harper’s Magazine carried Secretary

of War, Henry Stimson’s article titled “The Decision to Use the

Atomic Bomb.” It became the epitome of the official justification

of the bombings even though it contained a seriously questionable

conclusion. First, it stated that the American government had no

alternatives to the direct military use of the bombs, and the

Japanese government did not seem to agree on the unconditional

6 Robert P. Newman, Enola Gay and the Court of History (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 10.7 Ibid., 11.

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surrender.8 Second, the report claimed that both the two bombing

sites, Hiroshima and Nagasaki consisted of the “active working

parts of the Japanese war effort.”9 Yet, both of these

assumptions were false. Even though the Japanese government

rejected the surrender clause, the US government had

alternatives, especially the revision of the clause, and yet

Stimson ignored this factor. In fact, he did not mention his

support for the modification of the unconditional surrender

plan.10 Even regarding the sites, the report made an error, as

Hiroshima did not have much industrial complex compared to Kokura

and other planned bombing sites, and numerous Christians

including Westerners lived in Nagasaki.

Most importantly, the report not only made these doubtful

arguments, but also used the inflated casualty estimates in order

to justify the bomb’s usage. Stimson wrote that if the American

government had executed the mainland invasion, “the major

fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946 [and] might

8 Robert Jay Lifton, Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 107.9 Ibid., 107.10 Walker, 102.

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be expected to cost over a million casualties, in American forces

alone.”11 As noted earlier, the government had various casualty

estimates. Yet, Stimson reported only the inflated estimates in

the article. In fact, McGeorge Bundy, who had tremendous

influence on the report’s creation, had no recollection of the

source of such estimate.12

Even though the Stimson report lacked convincing evidence,

it offered the single most dominant argument for the analysis of

America’s atomic bombings of Japan within American society. After

the war, President Truman used the report as the template for his

explanation of the decision of the bombings. In December 1952,

James L. Cate, an author of US Air Force history of World War II,

questioned Truman the legitimacy of his executive decision. As

the response to the inquiry, Truman used Stimson’s casualty

estimate after George C. Marshall advised him to use higher

number.13 Since the time the report was published, Truman

gradually increased his supposed “estimates” even more: “a

quarter of a million American lives” (1948); “one-half

11 Lifton, 109. 12 Walker, 103.13 Ibid., 103.

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casualties” (1949); “millions of lives” (1959); “125,000 American

lives and 125,000 Japanese Youngsters” (1963).14 As can be

inferred, the Stimson report had tremendous impact on the

creation of the government’s official narrative. In fact,

numerous historians argue that it defined the justification of

the bombs’ usage. Lifton and Mitchell made a strong argument that

the report “became the Hiroshima narrative…[and] would prove to

be the keystone of all future justifications of the bombing.”15

Walker even claimed that the report influenced the popular views

on the atomic bomb decisions more than any other publication.16

The Appearance of Revisionists:

After the publication of Stimson’s article, scholars mostly

based their arguments on the grand narrative. For example,

Herbert Feis, who worked as the Special Consultant to three

Secretaries of War, published Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End

of the War in the Pacific in 1961. He cast skepticism on the grand

narrative by suggesting the lack of evidence for the legitimacy

of the casualty estimate, as well as the existence of alternative14 Ibid., 103-104.15 Lifton, 108.16 Walker, 102.

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choices for the US government. Paul Boyer explained that Feis

became the first major American historian who suggested the

complexity of the analysis of the atomic bombings.17 Yet, Feis

ultimately supported the official narrative that the bombs ended

the war more quickly and saved numerous lives.

In 1965, Gar Alperovitz challenged the traditional

interpretation. In Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, he claimed

that the US government did not necessarily have to use the bombs

to end the war. He argued that the government used the bombs to

emphasize its diplomatic and military strength over the Soviet

Union and thus to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its

sphere into Eastern Europe and Asia. Even though his theory met

fierce opposition as it contained unsupported evidence, it helped

the development of revisionist theories in the later days within

the scholarly field. In fact, later historians such as Martin J.

Sherwin, Barton Bernstein, J. Samuel Walker and others, created

their argument by both refuting and revising Alperovitz’s theory.

Eventually, they agreed upon the argument that the government

17 Tokikake Ii, The Quest for No Answers: American and Japanese Historiography of the Decision and Rationality behind the Atomic Bomb Dropping on Hiroshima (December 8th, 2012), 2.

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could have pursued alternative decisions, and yet political

concerns, such as the power of the Soviet Union, to some extent

influenced America to decide to use the atomic bomb.18

The Few Challengers against the Narrative

While scholars started criticizing the grand narrative of

the bombings, few people also sought to question the legitimacy

of the decision. A war journalist, John Hershey, became one of

the first individuals to expose the devastation caused by the

bombs. In 1946, he published Hiroshima, in which he reported the

horror and misery of the bomb’s aftermath through collections of

first-hand accounts by the victims. It depicted the gruesome

sceneries of the ground zero:

“Mr. Takamoto found about twenty men and women on the sandpit…he took a woman by the hands, but her skin slipped off…their [dead men and women’s] backs and breasts were clammy…[the burns on their skins were] red and swollen…and finally…suppurated and smelly…he had to keep [conscious that] these are human beings.”19

Unlike the dry analysis of the official narrative, the

author offered sympathetic attitude toward the victims, and

18 Lifton, 274.19 John Hershey, Hiroshima (New Edition) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 60.

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vividly described the effect of radiation on the victims by

visualizing the horrific experience. Due to the novelty of its

graphic depiction, the story spread throughout the nation. The

New Yorker, which initially ran the story as a four-part series,

quickly sold out; ABC radio networks read the whole article for

four evenings, and other networks reran the program after its

demand from the audience.20 Numerous Americans generally gave

support and awe to the publication.21 Even though one reader of

the article, Mary McCarthy, eventually concluded that it

supposedly did not differentiate between the atrocities caused by

atomic bombs and regular bombings, she gave credit to Hershey’s

effort as she wrote to Politics in November 1946 that “[before the

publication] no one dared think of Hiroshima…Mr. Hershey has

filled that hole [in world history]…has made it familiar.”22 Just

as her remark suggested, the content of the article surprised 20 Lifton, 87.21 Within the random sample of 339 letters, telegrams, and postcards sent to the New Yorker within two weeks after the publication of the article, the readers’ approval of the story was a ten to one margin. Michael J. Yavenditti, “John Hershey andthe American Conscience,” from Hiroshima’s Shadow, ed. Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifshultz (Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998), 293.22 Mary McCarthy, “The ‘Hiroshima”’New Yorker,” (November 1946) from Hiroshima’s Shadow, 303.

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most Americans as they did not know the physical impact of the

bombs. In fact, one reader, who in 1945 initially supported the

atomic bombings, even criticized his opinion as he noted that “I

am bitterly humiliated that my country should have been the one

to first (or at all) invoke this method of warfare.”23

At the same time when Hershey’s article became popular,

Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, also challenged the

official narrative. Especially, he sought to deliver the story of

the radioactive fallout of the bombings to American public. In

the article The Literacy of Survival, he asked the readers their

awareness of the impact of radiation as well as the legitimacy of

the government’s decision:

“Do we know…that many thousands of human beings in Japan will die of cancer during the next few years because of radioactivity…Have we as a people any sense of responsibility for the crime [of the bombings]? Have we attempted to press our leaders for an answer [for the truth about the decision and] the responsibility for making the decision as to whether atomic bombs would be used on human beings? ...we have learned…that Japan was ready to quit evenbefore Hiroshima, what happens to the argument that numberless thousands of American lives were saved?”24

23 Yavenditti, “John Hershey and the American Conscience,” from Hiroshima’s Shadow, 294.24 Norman Cousins, “The Literacy of Survival, The Saturday Review,” (September 14, 1946) from Hiroshima’s Shadow, 305.

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He continued to become one of the few activists against the use

of atomic bombs. He supported the Hiroshima Maidens, who were the

25 disfigured survivors of the bomb, by helping them to get

recovery surgery in America in 1955. As can be seen from the

stories of the two writers, some criticism against the use of

atomic bombs appeared in media.

Government’s Censorship and Its Reasons

Despite the gradual appearance of few writers and

journalists who challenged the official analysis, most of them

did not publish articles that questioned the legitimacy of the

atomic bombings any further.25 In fact, Lifton states that since

the late 1940s, the news report on Hiroshima bombing mostly

remained undistinguished with little or no signs of investigative

journalism.26 This trend originated from the American

government’s fear of the spread of stories and ideas that could

25 The few writers such as John Hershey were able to publish the counter-arguments as they managed to evade the government’s control over the content of the articles. Hershey succeeded in the publication of his book as he did not submit his material to the US government for censorship clearance before publishing it on the New Yorker. Yavenditti, “John Hershey and the American Conscience,” from Hiroshima’s Shadow, 292.26 Lifton, 265.

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undermine its justification of the bombings. After the release of

Cousins’ article, government officials, especially James Conant,

sought to present the definitive official analysis as they

regarded the rise of opposition forces from the writers, such as

Cousins, as a threat. During the creation of the Stimson’s

report, Conant warned him the possibility that the rising

counter-arguments could gain momentum enough to become the

narratives that would remain for generations: “if the small

minority [meaning the people who cast doubts just as Hershey and

Cousins] represents the type of person who is both sentimental

and verbally minded and in contact with our youth could create a

distortion of history.”27 This infers that the officials who

participated in the writing of the report sought to direct the

reasoning away from the opposing forces.

In order to prevent the rise of counter-argument, government

sought to control the spread of information regarding the use of

atomic bombs and their effect. First, it ordered the scientists

participated in the Manhattan Project not to spread information

regarding the atomic bombings. One of the scientists, Leo Szilard

27 Ibid., 94.

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recalls that “for weeks following Hiroshima, the scientists were

not allowed to express a public opinion ‘on the political

implications of the bomb’.”28 Lifton notes that the government

concealed the scientists’ statement against the bombing by

classifying them as top secret.29

The government’s control over the information became

influential on media right after the end of the war. On September

2, An Australian war correspondent, Wilfred Burchett, visited

Hiroshima to report the city’s devastation. There, he encountered

the gruesome aftereffects of the bomb when he visited local

hospital. Unknown at the time, he became one of the first

reporters who wrote about the radiation poisoning: “30 days after

the bombing [of Hiroshima]…people are still dying, mysteriously

and horribly –people who were uninjured – from an unknown

something…atomic plague.”30 The General Head Quarters’ officials

rejected Burchett’s request to send his draft news report to

Tokyo. This occurred as GHQ had executed censorship on the spread28 After the publication of the article, Burchett became one of the reports who were expelled from Japan after his camera films containing shots of Hiroshima ruins were confiscated by GHQ. Ibid., 55, 65.29 Ibid., 65.30 Ibid., 47-48.

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of information on aftermaths of the atomic bombs from the end of

the war. Yet, Burchett managed to pass through the GHQ authority

by asking his colleague to send it to London Daily Press. Lifton

suggests that it slipped through the officials as it was

published for London and not for the United States.31

After the article was published, GHQ moved the news

reporters out of Tokyo and put them in Yokohama under

surveillance so that the reporters could not get easy access to

the GHQ’s information and the travel to the ground zero.32 Not

only the US government denied the journalists’ entrance, it used

some journalists, who cooperated with its effort to prevent the

information against the bombings, to spread the report that would

defend the government’s action. During the visit, Burchett met

with American journalists, including the New York Times writer

William L. Laurence, who were sent by the government. Burchett

later noted how they wrote false news reports under the influence

of the government:

“[William L Laurence was] was the U.S. War Department’s nuclear propagandist. [He was hired] by General Leslie R.

31 Ibid., 48.32 Ibid., 49-50.

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Groves…to act as a super public relations officer and news ‘manager.’ [He] became a virtual oracle for Allied reporters…Given the pre-rehearsed character of the Investigatory [sic] Group’s ‘findings,’ it is no wonder that Laurence in the New York Times, and myself [Burchett] in the London Daily Express, ended up writing dramatically different reports. I reported what I had seen and heard, while Laurence sent back a pre-fabricated report reflecting the ‘official line’.”33

Burchett’s observation clearly signifies that the government

sought to manipulate the spread of information of the bombings.

In fact, the journalists fabricated the story, as Laurence wrote

on September 13, 1945 that the group of scientists led by

Brigadier General T.F. Farrell – the chief of the War

Department’s atomic bomb mission – “found no evidence of

continuing radioactivity in the blasted area [of Hiroshima] on

Sept. 9.”34

The US government manipulated the spread of information of

not only news media, but also movie films to retain its

justification of the official narrative. First, it censored The

Effects of the Atomic Bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Directed by

Lieutenant Daniel McGovern of US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)

33 Wifred Burchett, “The First Nuclear War,” from Hiroshima’s Shadow,64.34 Ibid., 64-65.

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right after the war, the black-and-white film showed the

devastated cities and the impact of the bombs through the footage

of the victims of radiation effects at hospitals. The government

classified the film as top secret material and never made it

public until 1968, when the Pentagon sent the copy to the

Japanese government. McGovern, whose other films on ground zero

were also censored, later described the government’s fear about

the spread of “undesired” materials. According to him, Atomic

Energy Commision (AEC), the Pentagon, and Manhattan Project

participants told him that the stories on those films were

forbidden for release under any circumstance, as the films showed

the true physical effects of nuclear bombs.35

Upon the creation of MGM film, The Beginning or the End, in 1946,

the government again ordered the director to change its final

script. Initially, the movie was supposed to question the

legitimacy of the use of the atomic bombs through the story of

the Manhattan Project.36 Yet, the director had to leave out most 35Lifton, 59.36 Some scenes portrayed the devastated cities and victims of the bombs, and even delivered skepticism towards “fewer casualties” theory as a scientist in the film said “it would have been betterto lose half a million American lives than release atomic energy in the world.” Ibid., 360.

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of the supposed scenes that challenged the grand narrative.

Instead of expressing the doubt, the film eventually reinforced

the traditional interpretation. In one of the scenes that was

added upon the government’s request, Truman’s character said “the

bomb would shorten the war by at least a year…a year less of war

will mean life for untold numbers of Russians, of Chinese - of

Japanese - and from three hundred thousand to half a million of

America’s finest youth.”37

As can be suggested from the stories of the censorship, the

US government sought to control the spread of the information of

the bombings to prevent the rise of the opposition forces. Under

this trend, it established its version of the atomic bomb

analysis as the most dominant theory within American society.38

37 Ibid., 363-364.38 Historian J. Samuel Walker first acknowledges the obscurity of the definition or the extent of collective memory. Yet, in order to seek a reasonable explanation for the means of collective memory study, he refers to John Bodnar’s argument that the federal government generally had been the primary agent for the creation of popular views on historical events. Walker writes that Bodner’s idea is applicable to the case study on the government’s influence on the “memory” of the decision of atomic bomb droppings. J. Samuel Walker, “History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb,” from Hiroshima in History and Memory, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University, 1996), 188-189.

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Media in the later decades mostly reinforced the traditional

analysis.39 The movie about Enola Gay pilot Paul W. Tibbets titled

Above and Beyond (1953), offered the most typical interpretation

again to the audience. In one scene, the character who was based

on Leslie Groves gave Tibbets a buzzer and asked him, “what if

you could push that button and end the war, saving half a million

Americans – but you’d kill 100,000 people in an instant?”40

Again, this line simply signifies that media kept delivering the

government’s skewed views. In fact, even in 1965, NBC White Paper

documentary called The Decision to Drop the Bomb also referred back to

Stimson’s report and concluded that the Hiroshima bombing was

America’s “least abhorrent choice.”41

Journals: Newsweek and Time from 1945-1975

The two major news journals, Newsweek and Time,

interestingly followed similar patterns of the historiography of

the decision to execute the atomic bombings. In August 1945

issues, both journals emphasized the praise for the triumph over

39 Refer to the next section regarding the influence on the journals in the later decades.40 Lifton, 367.41 Ibid., 267.

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evil regime – Japan – and the scientific novelty of nuclear

weapons. Yet, they seemed to have subtle differences in the way

they described about the bombings. Newsweek had rather more

patriotic style of writing than Time. The initial report on the

Hiroshima bombing in August 13 was titled “Awesome Force of Atom

Bomb Loosed to Hasten Jap Surrender.” The headline did not seem

to have a strong basis as Truman in the initial official

statement after the bombing, did not claim that the bombs ended

the war quicker. Yet, the writer continued delivering bold

assumptions throughout the article. Adding to Truman’s statement

of Hiroshima bombing as for “sparing the Japanese people,” the

writer noted that aside from “the actual atomic bomb, future

invasion probably worried the Japanese less. If anything short of

invasion could bring Japan to surrender, atomic power was it.”42

As compared to Newsweek, Time initially did not run a

slanted article. Throughout the article, the writer never

mentioned the idea that the bombs “spared” the people and ended

the war quicker. Instead, it focused on the uncertainty of the

42 “Awesome Force of Atom Bomb Loosed to Hasten Jap Surrender,” Newsweek (August 13, 1945), 32.

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safety of the new weapon. After quoting Truman’s speech, the

writer noted that “it [the bomb] represented a brutal challenge

to the world to keep the peace…a weapon which might wipe out with

a few strokes any nation’s power to resist an enemy.”43 Even

though the article also seemed to offer the possibility for the

peaceful use of nuclear power, it remained suspicious of the

resourceful use of the power of the novel scientific weapon. It

concluded that the future for the nuclear power as the source of

energy and fuel “might be many years distant. [Truman said]

atomic energy cannot now be produced on the basis to compete with

coal, oil…there must be a long period of intensive research.”44

From 1945 up until 1965, Newsweek also had special reports

on the scientific features of the atomic bombs. In August 1945

issue, Newsweek featured the basic characteristics of radioactive

materials, and the mechanism of nuclear chain reaction. Yet, the

article never covered the possible physical effect or the doubts

on the use of the nuclear bombs. Instead, it described only how

43 “U.S. at War,” Time (August 13, 1945), 17.44 Ibid., 17.

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America became the diplomatic conqueror of the race of the new

weapon development:

The international race for the conquest of atomic power was suddenly on…a race for world military domination. For the first country to solve the problem would have a weapon to rule the world – constructively or destructively. The Anglo-Americans won.45

The last sentence – “the Anglo-Americans won” – suggests that the

article sought to present the victory of the racial battle

between the “white” Americans and the “yellow” Japanese. As in

this example, Newsweek seemed to emphasize the tone of racial

prejudice, as the sentence did not have much connection to other

preceding sentences of the article. In fact in other cases, the

journal not only used the common racial slur, “Jap,” but also

consistently introduced phrases that suggested the supposed

physical inferiority and the dogged “Kamikaze” spirit of the

Japanese. For example, when the journal war correspondent Robert

Shaplen reported his coverage from Hiroshima, he first described

that the Japanese police officers bowed him “stiffly from the

waist, as if the tops of their small [italics added] bodies were

45“A New Era: The Secrets of Science,” Newsweek (August 20, 1945),37.

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separated from their legs by rusty hinges.”46 Then he continued

to make a wild imagination out of the Japanese tradition of

bowing. He claimed that even though the Japanese made “courteous

enough replies and still more bows” to him, “they [their

courtesy] were not bows of a defeated people. If anything they

seemed a little mocking and so did the smiles that played around

their mouths.”47 While his entire article was filled with

animosity toward the Japanese, it did not pay attention to the

devastated condition and emotion that they confronted at the

ground zero.

The prejudiced undertone seemed to blur the graveness of the

actual atrocities of the bombs’ aftermath. In the article that

preceded Shaplen’s report, Newsweek seemingly introduced a story

of a Japanese female actress Zdo Naka, who had the symptoms of

the radiation poisoning. It noted the decrease of her white blood

cell count and the symptom’s resemblance to the ones “arise when

radium or X-rays are used on the human body.”48 Yet, it did not

46 Robert Shaplen, “Bob Shaplen: Jap Smiles Seem to Mock the Yanks,” Newsweek (September 10, 1945), 32.47 Ibid., 32.48 “Atom Aftermath,” Newsweek (September 10, 1945), 32.

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seem to regard the story with either seriousness or sympathy at

all. Instead, it sought to dismiss the story by denying to

acknowledge that the radioactive fallout of the nuclear bombs

caused the symptoms. Before introducing the brief description of

the symptoms, it claimed that “the Japanese continued to insist

that radioactivity killed people days after they had been exposed

to it.”49 By using the word “insist,” the writer inferred that

the Japanese claim for the radiation poisoning did not have any

solid background.

As mentioned in the previous section, the dismissal of the

physical effect from the bombs’ aftermath in journals and other

media mostly originated from the US government’s direction to the

journalists to downplay the story of the fallout for US to dodge

accusation from the Japanese government. According to the New York

Times journalist, W.L. Laurence, General Groves brought him and

thirty other journalists to the Trinity test center specifically

to “give lie to Japanese propaganda” that radiations caused the

symptoms and subsequent deaths of the Japanese in the bombing

site, as Groves asked them to cooperate with his effort to deny

49 Ibid., 31.

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the bombs’ aftereffects.50 Even though Laurence actually knew

that the fallout definitely had significant impact on the

patients’ symptoms from both the visit to the Trinity and the

Japan’s ground zero, he wrote a false report on the New York Times

that the surface radiation of the test center dwindled to

miniscule level, and concluded that “the bomb was not as bad as

it was painted.”51 In truth, both statements obviously did not

have strong reasoning, and yet most journals did not challenge

the manipulated official statement. Based on the “deliberate”

observation at the Trinity, Life magazine made a similar argument

as Newsweek did in September 1945 issue that only “a few Japanese

could have died from immediate exposure to radiation, and none

died from radioactivity afterward.”52 Such story on Newsweek and

other journal articles suggests that they accepted the

government’s official statement by dismissing the fallout and

denying its connection to the ground zero patients’ symptoms.

50 Groves made a press conference on a different occasion to orderjournalists that “if any Japanese had died from exposure to radiation ‘the number was very small’ and could be partially attributed to poor Japanese medical care…radiation levels were solow ‘you could live there [Hiroshima] forever’.” Lifton, 52-54.51 Ibid., 52.52 Ibid., 52.

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Not only the journals ignored the bombs’ aftermath, but also

seemed to regulate the public opinion regarding the bombings.

Throughout the anniversary years of the bombings from 1955 to

1975, editors of both Newsweek and Time did not ask the readers

to submit their opinions and thoughts on the bombings and general

discussions on nuclear weapons, even though they frequently

questioned them regarding other social and cultural issues. In

fact, the two journals did not have any single letters regarding

the atomic bombs in the editorial letters section. As can be

suggested from the analysis of the journals’ dismissive stance on

the fallout and this observation, journalists also seemed to sort

out carefully the opinions against the “official” explanation

regarding the bombings, as the possibility of not having any

single doubt on the bombings and the explanation of the

radioactive poisoning, within public would be improbable.

In the later years until 1975, the two journals did not

report much about the atomic bombings to Japan. Time did not

carry the article on the bombings until 1985, even though it made

a special report on then occupied Okinawa in 1955. Especially,

both journals made no coverage on the topic in 1975. Around the

28

time, America could not care about the atrocities that it brought

to Japan during the war as it had to confront numerous domestic

and international conflicts. In fact, the stories that became the

front covers of the journals all related to issues other than the

atomic bombings.53

Especially, the fear of the Cold War took over the issues

regarding nuclear weapons. In July and August 1965, Newsweek ran

special reports on the atomic bomb. The articles mostly focused

on the diplomatic issues regarding the post-war nuclear arms race

by reporting the nuclear developments of democratic and communist

nations. Especially, the journal seemed to focus its attention

more on the contrast of the intentions of the nuclear development

between the United States and communist regime, mostly the Soviet

Union. In July and August issues, it emphasized the legitimacy of

the US development of nuclear weapons by claiming that the nation

engaged in the nuclear development for the sake of the

preservation of peace. For example, it noted America’s support

53 For example, the front covers of Newsweek and Time from July toAugust of 1965 were about the Vietnam War and the rise of communism, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration policy, and the Watts Riot.

29

for the Atoms for Peace effort, unlike the Soviet Union which

supposedly developed nuclear arms for the destruction of

international peace.54

The Peace Effort originated from the President Dwight

Eisenhower administration, sought to justify the nuclear

development by emphasizing the improvement of scientific

technology and its contribution of diplomatic peace preservation.

Newsweek seemed to support the effort as it featured Robert

Oppenheimer’s statement that he was “a firm believer that these

weapons [nuclear bombs] saved the peace in Europe immediately

after the war…since 1950 both sides [US and the Soviet Union] are

so afraid of using them that it has stabilized the situation.”55

While focusing on the nuclear arms’ benefit for the diplomatic

stability, it seemed to ignore again the fearful physical impact

of the bombs, and even justified the possible use of the bombs in

the Vietnam War, as “the distinction between the ‘unthinkable’

nuclear actions [inferring the bombs dropped on Japan] and

‘thinkable’ conventional actions [such as the regular air raids

54 “The Bomb: From Hiroshima to…,” Newsweek (August 9, 1965), 53.55 “Trinity Plus Twenty,” Newsweek (July 19, 1965), 51.

30

on Northern Vietnam] could…become blurred.”56 These examples

suggest that journals such as Newsweek left no room for the doubt

for the nuclear bombs as they sought to defend the bombs’

legitimacy and role in the years of the Cold War.

The Rise of Doubts and Fear of Nuclear Weapons and

Apocalypse

Up until the 1970s, the support for the conventional

understandings of the atomic bombings to Japan, and the alleged

“safe” use of nuclear weapons prevailed within American society

and media. This trend made a sudden shift from the early 1980s

when the fear of the nuclear apocalypse hit American government,

media, and public. When Ronald Reagan began his presidency in

1981, he set out a plan for the establishment of defense system

against the threat of the Soviet Union and the Congress approved

his request for 10 % increase of US military budget.57 In order

to pursue his vision, he proposed the Strategic Defense

56 Ibid., 51. “The Bomb: From Hiroshima to…,” Newsweek (August 9, 1965), 52.57 Fred I. Greenstein, “The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis,” Political Psychology 19, no.1 (March 1998), 5.

31

Initiative (SDI) that sought to create a shield against potential

nuclear missile attacks from the Soviet Union. For the United

States, the Initiative meant the increase of its nuclear testing

and weapon development to counter the potential attacks. This

proposal worsened US relations with the Soviet Union, as the

Soviets regarded the Initiative as the step for the United States

to reinforce its diplomatic power and the control over aerial

field.58

While the US government’s concern of the potential nuclear

threat rose, the fear of the nuclear war coincidentally increased

within American public minds. In the early 1980s, especially in

between 1981 and 1983, the national polls suggested that almost

50% of the Americans considered that the US would be “very

likely” or “fairly likely” to engage in a nuclear warfare within

the next decade.59 They also highly feared the eruption of the

nuclear war as compared to the preceding generations. For

58 Ibid., 5.59 Also, vast majority of the Americans (about in between 63% and 79%) throughout the 1980s regarded that the subsequent war would involve nuclear weapons. Robert T. Schatz, Susan T. Fiske, “International Reactions to theThreat of Nuclear War: The Rise and Fall of Concern in the Eighties,” Political Psychology 13, no. 1 (March 1992), 2.

32

example, the result of the questionnaire regarding the nuclear

war showed that 62% of 938 ordinary Americans agreed that “a

nuclear war will occur in my lifetime,” and 66% of them said that

they were either “very worried” or “worried” about the war.60

According to Zweigenhaft, the percentage suggests that the early

1980s saw the unprecedented increase of the fear as only 14%

Americans in 1958 and 22% in 1961 answered to the Gallop Poll

that they worried “often” or “a great deal” about a nuclear

war.61 Driven by the fear indicated in the polls, numerous

activists protested against nuclear weapons in the early 1980s.

Especially the years between 1982 and 1983 became the height of

the activists’ rally for the freeze of nuclear arms development,

as seven hundred thousand activists protested for their cause at

New York’s Central Park in June 1982.62

60 Zweigenhaft conducted the research in the late summer of 1982, and the participants were ordinary citizens of Greensboro, North Carolina, from various age, education, race, religious, and work groups.Richard F. Zweigenhaft, “Providing Information and Shaping Attitudes about Nuclear Dangers: Implications for Public Education,” Political Psychology 6, no. 3 (September 1985), 464.61 Ibid., 464.62 Paul Boyer, “Exotic Resonances: Hiroshima in American Memory,” from Hiroshima in History and Memory, 153.

33

Impact of the Fear on Media: Novels, Journals,

Documentaries, and Movies

The fear of nuclear war and the subsequent activists’

protests both seemed to have a larger impact on the significant

rise of media’s attention to the deadliness and physical effect

of nuclear bombs. Boyer argues that “the activist climate of the

early 1980s…assured a larger audience” for novels that dealt with

atomic bombs, such as Masuji Ibuse’s Black Rain.63 The book depicted

a story of a woman and her family, who became the victim of the

“black rain” which was the radioactively contaminated rain that

fell right after the bombings. According to Boyer, even though

English version of the novel had already appeared in small-

circulation Japan Quarterly in 1967-1968, it became widely

popular to the public when the Bantam paperback version was

published in 1985.64

Similar to Hershey’s Hiroshima, most of the novels depicted

the devastation and horrific aftereffects of the bombings.

English version of Keizi Nakazawa’s I Saw It, which was the

63 Ibid., 156.64 Ibid., 156-157.

34

prototype of the more famous cartoon Barefoot Gen, was published in

1982, and the author drew the story of the bombings based on his

first-hand experience in Hiroshima; A paperback version of a

writing collection of atomic bomb survivors Children of Hiroshima was

published in the same year; A collection of short stories about

Hiroshima called Atomic Aftermath was published in English version

in 1984.65

Not only the novels, but also documentaries about the

bombings and nuclear fallout flooded the American society. In

1986, director John Junkerman created an atomic bomb documentary

Hellfire: A Journey from Hiroshima with a guidance of a historian John

Dower. It looked at the atrocities of the bombings through the

lens of Japanese artists Iri and Toshi Maruki, who drew the

Hiroshima Murals and other depictions of the bombs’ physical

impact.66 In 1982, Atomic Café was released in order to shed a light

on America’s attitude of nuclear aftereffects. The documentary

directors, including Kevin Rafferty, ridiculed the Americans’

lack of the proper knowledge for nuclear radiation effect and the

65 Ibid., 155-157.66 Ibid., 157-158.

35

nation’s headlong pursuit of nuclear development by using mostly

the actual public and military footages, mostly from during World

War II to around the onset of the Cold War. For example, it

showed military instructional video which claimed that the atomic

bomb radiation had no harmful effect on human, as well as the

public announcement footage that instructed people that just the

ducking and running upon the nuclear weapon attack would be

sufficient to save them from danger. By showing the Americans’

ignorance, the documentary sought to criticize the Reagan’s

support for nuclear development and to alert people the nuclear

danger during the height of the fear of nuclear war.67

Moreover, the fear of nuclear power even became the central

theme in major Hollywood movies from the 1980s. For example, the

story of Terminator series revolved around the battle to prevent

the nuclear apocalypse. In the first movie The Terminator (1984),

the protagonist Sarah Connor was suddenly told by a man time-

travelled from the future, Kyle Reese, that America saw a major

nuclear war in the future and her yet unborn son, John Connor

67 Bob Mielke, “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Nuclear Test Documentary,” Film Quarterly 58, no. 3 (Spring 2005), 28.

36

would become the savior of the apocalyptic world. Not only the

movie featured major battle scenes with a killer robot, it also

delivered grave images and message of devastation caused by

nuclear power. It constantly showed scenes of a chaotic warzone,

which had no reminiscence of American sceneries. Not only that,

the lines in the movie also reflected the growing fear of nuclear

weapons in the actual America in the 1980s. Reese explains to

Sarah Connor that “there was a nuclear war a few years from now…

everything…just gone…[the machines] saw all the people as a

threat [indiscriminately]. Decided our fate in a microsecond:

extermination!”68

As all the examples mentioned above suggests, most media

suddenly started to focus more on the danger of nuclear weapons

and warfare. Mere portrayal of the atomic bomb development and

the bombs’ effect had already existed from before as in the cases

of Hershey’s Hiroshima and Hollywood’s The Beginning or the End. Yet,

they did not necessarily become a major social trend as the most

dominant notion of nuclear arms – that the atomic bombs helped

68 The Terminator, 1984. Jerome F. Shapiro, Atomic Bomb Cinema: The Apocalyptic Imagination on Film (New York: Routledge, 2002), 194.

37

end the war, and nuclear power was safe and could be used in a

peaceful scientific development – spread throughout the nation.

Unlike such condition, the media in 1980s sought to pay stronger

attention to the downside and the fear of nuclear power and

weapons. While doing so, it used the stories and images of the

atomic bombings of Japan as the representation of the potential

nuclear apocalypse. Boyer explains that the protestors against

nuclear weapons explicitly used the Hiroshima memories to alert

the society.69 In fact, the television movie The Day After (1983)

incorporated the essence of the terror of the Hiroshima

bombing.70 The story revolved around the total nuclear war

between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Kansas

City inhabitants’ struggle to survive the aftermath of nuclear

attack. In order to portray the devastation, it constantly

associated the apocalyptic sceneries of Hiroshima with the fear

of the nuclear attack in the real world of the 1980s. Verbally,

69 Boyer, “Exotic Resonances: Hiroshima in American Memory,” 159.70 This television movie, produced by ABC network, gained a substantial viewing percentage that set the record of the highest-rated television movies in the 25 years of that industry. Shapiro, 186.

38

it included a dialogue between two physicians concerning the

nuclear war threat:

A physician: They’re even people leaving Kansas City [for concerning potential nuclear attack]

Another physician: We’re not talking about Hiroshima anymore…Hiroshima was “peanuts.”71

Even though the word “peanuts” seemingly connoted condescending

tone, it actually signified the severe extent of the Hiroshima

aftermath as the character used it as the way to emphasize the

extent of the potential nuclear damage in the scientific and

diplomatic capability of the 1980.

Not only verbally, but the movie also visualized the

devastation of the nuclear bombs as close as the visual

technology at that time could possibly use. It contained numerous

minutes of shocking footages: mushroom clouds; simple and yet

striking computer graphic effects of people turning into

skeletons; buildings torn down with nuclear blast; the physical

effects of nuclear radiation, including receding hair and

appearance of spots on skins; the actual footages of Hiroshima

city after the bombing, which was taken in 1946 by Herbert Sussan

71 The Day After, 1983.

39

and recently declassified at the time.72 Despite some footages

seemed too naïve as compared to the actual images of the

bombings, the movie sought to depict the actual images of the

nuclear effect of Hiroshima in order to deliver the fearful

consequence of nuclear war. This was unprecedented as most of the

actual footages of the ground zero were classified as top secret

and media up until then often dismissed the aftermath as in the

case of Newsweek. Lifton also argues that, by showing the nuclear

devastation, the movie even challenged the conventional

conviction created after World War II that nuclear bombs saved

the world and brought peace to the future society.73

Journals, such as Newsweek and Time also started to shed

light on the atrocities of the atomic bombings. Both journals put

the atomic bombings of Japan on their front covers in the 40th

year anniversary of the incident. Even though they did not

specifically answer to the question regarding the legitimacy of

the bombs, they seemed to analyze the bombings impartially from

both the American and Japanese standpoints. Both used first-hand

72 Lifton, 372.73 Ibid., 373.

40

accounts of American scientists and military officers, and

ordinary Japanese who became the victims of the nuclear fallout.

For the American standpoint, they sought to report the qualm that

the scientists and officers had for the bombings. For the

Japanese perspective, the journals carefully reported the

devastation and the physical effect of the nuclear bombs without

any prejudice or distortion - unlike Newsweek in the earlier

decades. Even more, they seemed to welcome a variety of opinion

regarding the issue as they carried letters from the readers

which both supported and opposed the traditional narrative of the

bombings.74 These observations also reinforced the argument that

media from the 1980s finally started to give reasonable attention

to the reality behind the use and the effect of atomic bombs.

The Clash of the Conventional Narrative and Its Opposition: A Brief Overview of the 1995 Enola Gay Exhibit Controversy

After the fear of the nuclear apocalypse developed and

helped bringing attention to the devastation of the atomic 74 “Living with the Bomb: The First Generation of the Atomic Age,”Newsweek (July 29, 1985), 28-50. “Were We Right to Drop the Bomb?” Newsweek (August 19, 1985),4-5. Roger Rosenblatt, “The Atomic Age,” Time (July 29, 1985), 32-46. “Atomic Era,” Time (August 19, 1985), 10.

41

bombings of Japan, America saw a major clash between the

traditional analysis and its opposition surrounding the atomic

bombings during the 1990s. Especially, the clash occurred when

the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum sought to present

an exhibition of Enola Gay and the story of the end of World War

II in 1995 as 50-year anniversary of the end of the war. This

became the height of the long-existed conflict of the

understanding of the bombings from the end of the war, as an

advisor of the exhibit Edward Linenthal observed that “50th

anniversary intensified argument over any form of remembrance [of

the bombings].”75

Initially, the museum curators sought to present more recent

and impartial analysis of the bombings by incorporating the

revisionist scholars’ arguments along with traditional

interpretation. One of the museum directors, Martin Harwit,

initially sought to include most themes crucial to the

understanding of the atomic bombings of 1945: the story of the

latter stage of the Pacific War mostly right before the war’s

end; Truman’s intention behind the bombing decision; the possible

75 Ibid., 276.

42

alternatives to the bombings; the devastating effect of the

bombings including the nuclear fallout; the bombings’ relevance

to the Cold War era.

Yet, the curators’ plan met huge opposition from World War

II veterans. For veterans, the exhibit disgraced their honorary

war effort as they regarded that it portrayed “the Japanese as

victims of American aggression and the atomic bombings as

unnecessary, wrongful acts.”76 Especially, they pressured the

curators to revise the exhibit’s references to the casualty

estimates of the planned Japan invasion. The curators initially

planned to use the estimates based on the current historiography

– which was around 30,000 to 50,000 casualties – but the veterans

pushed for the “million casualties” theory.77 For the veterans,

the support of the lower estimates meant that they would

acknowledge the possibility that the bombings were not

necessarily the best means to end the war quicker and prevented

the sacrifice of numerous Americans. As a result, they sought to

76 Michael H. Hogan, “The Enola Gay Controversy: History, Memory, and the Politics of Presentation,” from Hiroshima in History and Memory, 205.77 Lifton, 282-283.

43

eliminate historical fact that could undermine the traditional

narrative that they believed.

The refusal to the counter-narratives also emerged from the

US Congress as it criticized the exhibit’s plan as “biased” and

the Republican Tom Lewis declared that he would not allow the

government’s budget to be used to “revise history” that offered

“an apology to Japan.”78 From the government’s standpoint, the

exhibit would alter the narrative the government created right

after the war and thus could jeopardize the national identity on

the nuclear development. From the time right after the end of the

war, America kept portraying World War II as the “Good War,” and

especially the victory of the Pacific War using the atomic bomb

became the epitome of such notion.79 From the veterans and the

government’s perspective, the proposed content of the exhibit

challenged the long-lasted conventional argument and could lead

America having an identity crisis. As Boyer noted that for the

believers of the “Good War” notion, any questioning of the

78 Ibid., 285.79 Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1998), 250.

44

official narrative challenged the image of World War II that

became the cornerstone of national self-identity.80 Eventually,

the museum curators had to alter the initial plan as it

eliminated most of the plans for the reference to atomic

aftereffects and adopted the official casualty estimates. Yet,

the controversy became the culminating point for the challenge to

the traditional narrative as the conflict became the nationwide

issue of the early 1990s.

Journals’ Gradual Shift towards Impartial Analysis: Newsweek

and Times, 1994-1995

Both Newsweek and Time initially made a negative reaction to

the Smithsonian’s exhibit controversy. In August 1994, Newsweek

ran a short article on America’s decision to use the atomic

bombs. It opposed the museum curators’ effort by upholding the

traditional argument:

“Though some Japanese and Western scholars argue that a meredemonstration of the bomb might have prompted a Japanese surrender, there’s little evidence to support that. The U.S.calculation…seems inescapable…an invasion of Japan would have been bloodier than the bombing…Museum officials insist

80 Ibid., 261.

45

that veterans [of the war] will not get what [the revision of the exhibit planning] some have suggested.”81

Similarly, Time had even more harsh article against the

revisionists’ theory. It simply lambasted the exhibit proposal by

making a subjective support for America’s decision of the

bombings and defending the image of “Good War”:

“[The exhibit] interpreted Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a way that managed to transport a righteous ’60s moral stance on Viet Nam back in time to portray the Japanese as…innocent victims of American beastliness...The curators seemed to be confused about who [the Japanese] started the war and who pursued it with relentless inhumanity…Nothing less than sucha devastation [of the bombings] would serve to eradicate a Japanese militarist regime…Not to have used it [the bomb] would have been inexplicable.”82

Despite having strongly supported the traditional narrative

before, the two journals made a sudden change in their approach

to the bombings the following year by offering a nice impartial

report of the stories behind the incident. Especially, Newsweek

ran a remarkable special report on the bombings by incorporating

both the traditional and revisionists views on the atomic

81 Bill Powell, Daniel Glick, “The New Battle of Hiroshima – History: How Should We Display the Enola Gay?” Newsweek (August 29, 1994), 36.82 Lance Morrow, “Hiroshima and the Time Machine,” Time (September19, 1994), 94.

46

bombings.83 First, it used the casualty estimates of the

potential invasion – 20,000 American soldiers – based on the more

recent historiography.84 It also challenged the conventional

notion that the bombs prevented America from having “the death

estimates of more than a million.” It noted the President

Truman’s exaggeration of the figures, and explained that

Stimson’s article was “somewhat misleading.”85 It introduced the

alternative reasoning behind the use of the bombs as it referred

to Gar Alperovitz’s theory. The report also examined the

aftereffects of the bombs more closely than in the 1985 issue by

showing the then current research result of the Radiation Effects

Research Foundation.86

83 Time also carried a thorough report on the story of the PacificWar in August. The writers seemed to avoid mentioning about the legitimacy of the bombing as the article simply recounted the stories of the war and the bombs’ effect. Interestingly, it seemed to pass on the fear of the nuclear holocaust as it actually ran an article on the post-war nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it was a well-written and extremely unbiased article unlike any Time articles in the previous decades. John Barry, “Future Shock,” Time (July 24, 1995), 32-37. Howard Chua-Eoan, “War of the Worlds,” Time (August7, 1995), 43-53.84 Evan Thomas, “Why We Did It,” Newsweek (July 24, 1995), 25.85 Ibid., 28, 30.86 Tom Masland, “A Silent Bomb,” Newsweek (July 24, 1995), 31.

47

In order to maintain the report’s fairness, the journal also

noted the account of a Navy officer who believed that the bombs

saved numerous lives, and wrote about the atrocities that the

Japanese military did to POWs and the inhabitants of then

Japanese colonies.87 All these special reports discussed the

issues surrounding the atomic bombings from all the different

perspectives of the war and the bombings: standpoint of

diplomacy, morality, atrocities that both America and Japan made,

and the bombs’ aftermath. For the first time from the 1945 issue,

Newsweek explicitly sought to incorporate the revisionists’

theory. Using the theory, it openly discussed the legitimacy of

the bombs’ usage unlike in its issue in 1985 which focused mostly

on the physical effects of the nuclear bombs. Therefore, the

journals started to offer the objective analysis from the mid-

1990s.

Shift towards the Mixture of Traditional and Revisionists’ Theories : Secondary Schools’ U.S. History Textbooks

Unlike in the cases of other media, the rise of

revisionists’ theory did not seem to occur within secondary 87 Osborn Elliot, “Eyewitness,” Newsweek (July 24, 1995), 29. Bill Powell, “Who’s Story Now?” Newsweek (July 24, 1995), 38-39.

48

school textbooks until the mid-1990s. Few of them published in

the 1980s mentioned about the alternatives to the decision of the

bombings or the subsequent nuclear fallout.88 Most of them simply

explained the Manhattan Project and the traditional analysis that

America used the bombs to save millions of lives. Fleming’s

research on the textbooks in the 1980s also indicated that while

they devoted much space on the scientific development of the

bombs, they did not mention about the reasoning behind the

bombings and their long-term impacts.89

However, the textbooks from the mid-1990s increasingly

started to offer various explanations and stories regarding the

use of the atomic bombs and their effects. History of the United States,

published in 1997, offered Gar Alperovitz’s theory as it noted

that “Truman’s decision to use the weapon on Japan may have been

influenced by the desire to demonstrate American might to the

88 Out of 7 secondary school textbooks published in the 1980s I consulted, only 2 mentioned about the alternative reasoning behind the bombings (Irving F. Ahlquist et.al, United States History (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1984) and Norman K. Risuord, Terry L. Haywoode, People and Our Community (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982)).89 Dan B. Fleming, “Nuclear War: What Place in Secondary Education?” The High School Journal 67, no. 2 (December 1983-January 1984), 73-74.

49

Soviet Union.”90 Not only Alperovitz’s theory, The Americans:

Reconstruction through the 20th Century (1999) added that America rushed

to the bombing decision as it wanted to justify the use of

enormous budget for the Manhattan Project.91 Throughout the

section on the atomic bombings, it described the brutality and

the immorality of the incident as it referred to the first-hand

account of the victims. Even more, it encouraged students to

learn about the bombings from different perspectives by assigning

the students to list and weigh the pros and cons of the decision

of the bombings. 92 America: Pathways to the Present – Civil War to the Present

(1998) wrote even more critical analysis of the bombings. First,

it gave an extensive description of the devastation of the bombed

cities and the radiation effect, by putting both the visual 90 Thomas V. DiBacco, Covna C. Mason, Christian G. Appy, History of the United States (Grade 9-12) (Evanston, IL: McDougal Littell Houghton, 1997), 626.91 Gerald A. Danzer, J. Jorge Kior de Alva, Nancy Woloch, Louis E.Wilson, The Americans: Reconstruction through the 20th Century (Annotated Teacher’s Edition) (Grade 7-12) (Evanston, IL: McDougal Littel, 1999), 591.92 As a teacher’s guidance to the assignment, the textbook noted the potential answers. The answers for the support of the bombings referred to both the traditional narrative and the diplomatic power the bombings had over the Soviet Union during the Cold War; the answers against the bombings noted that US madean immoral act for both dropping such a fearful bomb and without the warning. Ibid., 590-592.

50

images of the ground zero and graphic descriptions written of the

Nagasaki bomb’s victim: “The skin was peeling off his face and

chest…his whole body was coated with it [dirt] and the blood

trickling from his body made red streaks.”93 When it mentioned

the nuclear aftereffects, it not only noted its physical effect

but also the social prejudice against the victims for having

disfigured physical features in the post-war years.94 Secondly,

the textbook explained the Interim Committee’s dismissal of the

alternative plans to end the war, and suggested that the

government made the decision for the sake of the strengthening of

diplomatic power:

“They [Interim Committee] were unwilling to choose any of the alternatives to dropping the bomb. They did not want to incur further casualties…[and] to suffer the embarrassment of a failed demonstration…The deployment of a new atomic weapon allowed the United States to flex its muscles before the eyes of its communist rival. The Interim Committee therefore recommended dropping the new bomb.”95

All of the textbooks examined earlier offered the explanation

that reflected both traditional and revisionists’ argument, as

93 Andrew Cayton, Elizabeth Israels Perry, Allan M. Winkler, America: Pathways to the Present – Civil War to the Present (Grade 9-12) (Needham, MA: Prentice Hall, 1998), 550.94 Ibid., 550.95 Ibid., 549-550.

51

well as the standpoint of both America and Japan. This

observation suggests that most textbooks from the mid-1990s

started to give more balanced description of the bombings.

Epilogue: The Past, Present, and Future of the Atomic Bomb

Narrative within Media

From right after the end of World War II, America stated

that the atomic bombings of Japan ended the war more quickly and

saved many lives. This became the long-standing narrative to

explain the legitimacy of the bombings. Some Americans, such as

John Hershey, sought to challenge the view by describing the

devastation of the bombings. Yet, the grand narrative overpowered

the opposition. Right after the war, the government sought to

prevent the spread of counter-arguments by manipulating

journalists and movie directors to deliver only the official

narrative. This situation caused them to follow the narrative

even in the later decades. Nonetheless, media suddenly started to

offer counter-arguments from the early 1980s. The fear of nuclear

apocalypse caused journalists, directors, and writers to focus

more on the effects of the nuclear radiation. This trend became

52

the beginning of the media’s shift of its analysis of the stories

regarding atomic bombings. Driven by the controversy of Enola Gay

exhibit at Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum in 1995,

journals and textbooks started to offer different interpretations

of the use of the atomic bombs and their effects using both

traditional and revisionist arguments from the perspectives of

both America and Japan.

In recent years, media has increasingly become more

supportive of the revisionist argument and has focused its

attention even more on the experience of the hibakushas – the

victims of the radiation effects. In 2010, a director M.T. Silvia

released a documentary titled Atomic Mom. It described the story

of her mother, Pauline Silvia, who conducted radiation research

for Atomic Energy Commission in the post-war years, and the

stories of Emiko Okada and other Japanese who experienced the

Hiroshima bombing.96 While doing so, the documentary questioned

the legitimacy of the use of the bombs during the war and the

96 “Movie Review: Atomic Mom (2010), Shows How the Nuclear Crisis Began Long Ago,” (April 4, 2011).http://www.examiner.com/review/movie-review-atomic-mom-2010-shows-how-the-nuclear-crisis-began-long-ago.

53

nuclear development in the post-war periods. Then, it discussed

on the American public’s unawareness of the truth about the

atomic bomb effects in the post-war periods. It also inferred

that the strong opposition prevented the spread of the truth

about the radiation effects by referring to the veterans’ protest

against the Enola Gay exhibit. While this documentary challenged

the grand narrative by reporting the nuclear effects, Oliver

Stone harshly criticized the theory through the heavy use of

revisionists’ argument in the documentary Oliver Stone’s Untold History of

the United States: Episode 3 – The Bomb (2012). Through the introduction

of the facts that countered the official narrative, such as about

the inflated casualty estimates and Gar Alperovitz’s theory, it

offered the audience the opportunity to reconsider its beliefs of

the bombings.97

In this year, 2013, media especially has been active for

its effort to reevaluate the legitimacy and the atrocities of the

97 A chapter on the atomic bombings in the companion book written with Peter Kuznick also reflected the current historiography by citing from historians such as Barton Bernstein, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Robert J. Lifton, etc. Oliver Stone, Peter Kuznick, TheUntold History of the United States (New York: Gallery Books, 2012), Chapter 4 (131-180), Notes (638-645).

54

bombings. On August 19, Internet search engine, Google, started

featuring the images of the exhibit collections at Hiroshima and

Nagasaki Peace Memorial Museums as a part of the Google Cultural

Institute.98 In August, Oliver Stone visited the Hiroshima Peace

Memorial Park and attended both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace

Ceremony to raise awareness of the horror of nuclear bombs.

During his interview for Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri Newspaper), he

stated that

“It is a myth that the atomic bombings were necessary to endthe war. As an American, I would like to apologize…I had never cast doubt on the myth until the 1980s, but started tomore deeply. I want to be constructive on [the analysis of] history. The Japanese also should not accept the America’s myth [of the bombings] and should learn the reason why the bombs were dropped.”99

98 http://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/home. “‘Google Rekishi Archive’de Hiroshima Nagasaki no Genbaku Shiryo 232 Ten o Online Tenji,” (“Google Cultural Institute” Features Online Exhibition of 232 Sources of Atomic Bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), MyNavi News (August 19, 2013). http://news.mynavi.jp/news/2013/08/19/131/?google_editors_picks=true. 99 “Genbaku ga Hitsuyou Datta to Iunowa Gensou…Stone Kantoku,” (It is a myth that the atomic bombs were necessary…Director Stone) Yomiuri Shinbun Online (August 5, 2013) (Accessed August 5, 2013, but the news link does not exist anymore) Original Link: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/20130804-OYT1T00618.htm?from=ylist . Same quote now can be accessed from http://richardkoshimizu.at.webry.info/201308/article_18.html .

55

His statement suggests that the he also became aware of the

alternative theories during when the shift of the bombings’

analysis began in media. With the effort of activists such as

Stone, the historical interpretation of the atomic bombings in

media will continue to shift for proper understanding of the

truth behind the event.

56

Bibliography:

Primary Records:

Burchett, Wifred. “The First Nuclear War.” Hiroshima’s Shadow. Edited by Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifshultz, 63-77. Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998.

Cousins, Norman. “The Literacy of Survival, The Saturday Review.” September 14, 1946. Hiroshima’s Shadow. Edited by Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifshultz, 305-306. Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998.

“Genbaku ga Hitsuyou Datta to Iunowa Gensou…Stone Kantoku,” (It is a myth that the atomic bombs were necessary…Director Stone) Yomiuri Shinbun Online (August 5, 2013) (Accessed August 5, 2013, but the news link does not exist anymore) Original Link: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/20130804-OYT1T00618.htm?from=ylist . Same quote now can be accessed from http://richardkoshimizu.at.webry.info/201308/article_18.html.

Google Cultural Institute. http://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/home.

“‘Google Rekishi Archive’de Hiroshima Nagasaki no Genbaku Shiryo 232 Ten o Online Tenji.” (“Google Cultural Institute”Features Online Exhibition of 232 Sources of Atomic Bombs ofHiroshima and Nagasaki). MyNavi News (August 19, 2013). http://news.mynavi.jp/news/2013/08/19/131/?google_editors_picks=true.

Hershey, John. Hiroshima (New Edition). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.

McCarthy, Mary. “The ‘Hiroshima’ New Yorker.” November 1946. Hiroshima’s Shadow. Edited by Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifshultz, 303-304. Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998.

“Statement by the President of the United States, Harry Truman.” August 6, 1945.

57

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/truman-hiroshima/.

Primary Journals: Newsweek and Time

“A New Era: The Secrets of Science.” Newsweek, 32, 37. August 20, 1945.

“Atom Aftermath.” Newsweek, 31-32. September 10, 1945.

“Atomic Era.” Time, 10. August 19, 1985.

“Awesome Force of Atom Bomb Loosed to Hasten Jap Surrender.”Newsweek, 32-33. August 13, 1945.

Barry, John. “Future Shock.” Time, 32-37. July 24, 1995.

Chua-Eoan, Howard. “War of the Worlds.” Time, 43-53. August7, 1995.

Elliot, Osborn. “Eyewitness.” Newsweek, 29. July 24, 1995.

“Living with the Bomb: The First Generation of the Atomic Age,” Newsweek, 28-50. July 29, 1985.

Masland, Tom. “A Silent Bomb.” Newsweek, 31. July 24, 1995.

Morrow, Lance. “Hiroshima and the Time Machine.” Time, 94. September 19, 1994.

Powell, Bill; Daniel Glick. “The New Battle of Hiroshima – History: How Should We Display the Enola Gay?” Newsweek, 36.August 29, 1994.

____. “Who’s Story Now?” Newsweek, 38-39. July 24, 1995.

Rosenblatt, Roger. “The Atomic Age.” Time, 32-46. July 29, 1985.

Shaplen, Robert. “Bob Shaplen: Jap Smiles Seem to Mock the Yanks.” Newsweek, 32-33. September 10, 1945.

58

“The Bomb: From Hiroshima to….” Newsweek, 52-57. August 9, 1965.

Thomas, Evan. “Why We Did It.” Newsweek, 22-28. July 24, 1995.

“Trinity Plus Twenty.” Newsweek, 50-52. July 19, 1965.

“Okinawa: Levittown-on-the-Pacific.” Time, 18-20. August 15,1955.

“U.S. at War.” Time, 17-18. August 13, 1945.

“Were We Right to Drop the Bomb?” Newsweek, 4-5. August 19, 1985.

Documentaries and Movies:

Atomic Café, 1982. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOUtZOqgSG8.

Atomic Mom, 2010.

Oliver Stone’s Untold History of the United States: Episode 3 – The Bomb, 2012.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVLYyvpIex4.

The Day After, 1983. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2B7sdLPMfc.

The Terminator, 1984.

Textbooks:

Ahlquist, Irving F.et.al. United States History. Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1984.

Cayton, Andrew. Elizabeth Israels Perry, Allan M. Winkler. America: Pathways to the Present – Civil War to the Present (Grade 9-12). Needham, MA: Prentice Hall, 1998.

Danzer, Gerald A.; J. Jorge Kior de Alva, Nancy Woloch, Louis E. Wilson. The Americans: Reconstruction through the 20th Century(Annotated Teacher’s Edition) (Grade 7-12). Evanston, IL: McDougal Littel, 1999.

59

Dibacco, Thomas V.; Covna C. Mason, Christian G. Appy. History of the United States, (Grade 9-12). Evanston, IL: McDougal Littell Houghton, 1997.

Risuord, Norman K.; Terry L. Haywoode. People and Our Community. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982.

Secondary Sources:

Boyer, Paul. Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1998.

_____. “Exotic Resonances: Hiroshima in American Memory.” Hiroshima in History and Memory. Edited by Michael J. Hogan, 143-167. New York: Cambridge University, 1996.

_____. “Whose History is It Anyway” History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past. Edited by Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, 115-139. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996.

Fleming, Dan B. “Nuclear War: What Place in Secondary Education?” The High School Journal 67, no. 2 (December 1983-January 1984): page 72-76.

Greenstein, Fred I. “The Impact of Personality on the End ofthe Cold War: A Counterfactual Analysis.” Political Psychology 19, no.1 (March 1998): page 1-16.

Hogan, Michael H.“The Enola Gay Controversy: History, Memory, and the Politics of Presentation.” Hiroshima in History and Memory. Edited by Michael J. Hogan, 200-232. New York: Cambridge University, 1996.

Ii, Tokikake. The Quest for No Answers: American and Japanese Historiography of the Decision and Rationality behind the Atomic Bomb Dropping on Hiroshima. December 8th, 2012.

Lifton, Robert Jay. Greg Mitchell. Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995.

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Mielke, Bob. “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Nuclear Test Documentary.” Film Quarterly 58, no. 3 (Spring 2005): page 28-37.

“Movie Review: Atomic Mom (2010), Shows How the Nuclear Crisis Began Long Ago.” April 4, 2011.http://www.examiner.com/review/movie-review-atomic-mom-2010-shows-how-the-nuclear-crisis-began-long-ago.

Newman, Robert P. Enola Gay and the Court of History. New York: Peter Lang, 2004.

Schatz, Robert T., Susan T. Fiske. “International Reactions to the Threat of Nuclear War: The Rise and Fall of Concern in the Eighties.” Political Psychology 13, no. 1 (March 1992): page 1-29.

Shapiro, Jerome F. Atomic Bomb Cinema: The Apocalyptic Imagination on Film. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Stone, Oliver Stone; Peter Kuznick. The Untold History of the UnitedStates. New York: Gallery Books, 2012.

Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina, 1997.

______. “History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb.” Hiroshima in History and Memory. Edited by Michael J. Hogan, 187-199. New York: Cambridge University, 1996.

Yavenditti, Michael J. “John Hershey and the American Conscience.” Hiroshima’s Shadow. Edited by Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifshultz, 288-302. Stony Creek, CT: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998.

Zweigenhaft, Richard F. “Providing Information and Shaping Attitudes about Nuclear Dangers: Implications for Public Education.” Political Psychology 6, no. 3 (September 1985): page 461-480.