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A history of failed innovation: continuous cookingand the Soviet pulp industry, 1940s–1960s

Elena Kochetkova

To cite this article: Elena Kochetkova (2015) A history of failed innovation: continuous cookingand the Soviet pulp industry, 1940s–1960s, History and Technology, 31:2, 108-132, DOI:10.1080/07341512.2015.1111010

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History and tecHnology, 2015Vol. 31, no. 2, 108–132http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07341512.2015.1111010

© 2015 taylor & Francis

A history of failed innovation: continuous cooking and the Soviet pulp industry, 1940s–1960s

Elena Kochetkova 

department of History, national research University Higher school of economics, st. Petersburg, russia; Faculty of social sciences, University of Helsinki, Finland

Introduction

In 1956, a Soviet engineer, Dmitrii Pravdenko, sent a letter to the Presidium of the Communist Party, stating it is ‘really depressing to realize that our Soviet industry is not capable of producing good tables, beds that will not creak at night, comfortable houses and other things’. He complained that industrial problems in the USSR were the result of disor-ganized Soviet research and development as well as an irresponsible attitude of engineers towards innovation, which resulted in the lack of high quality products.1

There was much truth in Pravdenko’s criticism. As the historian of technology Loren Graham has recently shown, stories of promising inventions that never became part of the manufacturing process abound in Russian and Soviet history. People such as Alexey Popov and Sergey Lebedev – developers of the radio and the computer – are not widely known because their inventions never became successful industrial products. More often than

ABSTRACTIn the years before and after the Second World War, chemical and related industries in a variety of countries experienced a surge in innovation and development. As a result, the pulp industry became a space for considerable innovation. In Sweden, Johan Richter developed the Kamyr digester, a pulp cooker that could run continuously and was adopted by industry within a decade. Prior to Richter, Soviet engineer Leonid Zherebov designed a similar cooker. But after 25 years of experiments, Zherebov’s design failed, and Soviet factories began to produce pulp using imported Kamyr digesters. This article examines the history of continuous pulp cooking in the Soviet Union as a means to understand the nature of Russian technological innovation and its failures. The paper contends that his effort failed because of the technological system developed by Soviet forestry – a system characterized by a lack of open communication among its main institutional actors and a scarcity of resources to facilitate innovation.

KEYWORDStechnological innovation; soviet Union; continuous cooking; pulp and paper industry; Kamyr; Zherebov

CONTACT elena Kochetkova lena-kochetkova2008@yandex.ru

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not, the Soviet Union purchased analogous inventions from abroad or imported Western technologies that were in turn mass produced in the USSR.2

In explaining this, some historians have argued that only industries that required massive investment from the state, such as the military and space exploration, were able to succeed. Graham has argued that excessive centralization in the Soviet Union led to state support in research of theoretical physics, mathematics and some other spheres, but did not extend this support to industrial innovation.3 In later works, he concluded that the Soviet state failed to understand the role of innovation in the society at large.4 Kendall Bailes and Sergey Zhuravlev add to such analysis, showing that the passivity of local administrators hindered many promising innovations.5 Other researchers argue that state politics were the main barrier to innovations. Anthony Heywood’s book on the engineer Iurii Lomonosov, for instance, asserts that state use of terror was the main reason why some engineers stopped research for years on end.6 This, in turn, as Anthony Sutton argues, led to the adoption of Western technologies as a less time-consuming way to modernize, which put the Soviet Union in a relationship of dependency.7 Philip Hanson, however, is more modest in his estimates of Soviet foreign trade. He contends that in some periods, for example, between 1945 and 1958, Soviet imports were small and the Soviets focused primarily on internally reproducing equipment already purchased from the West.8

This article extends these interpretations and argues that specific, systemic problems in the Soviet Union prevented Soviet engineers from achieving technological innovations on par with those of their Western counterparts. Focusing on the pulp industry, it contends that Soviet developments in pulp cooking illuminate the roles of excessive, state-imposed secrecy on research and scarcity of resources in fostering indigenous technological devel-opment. Technical methods for producing paper may seem distant from Soviet national security interests. But continuous-use methods for cooking of pulp were deemed relevant in both civilian and military contexts. Under Stalin ‘the distinction between civilian and military information became blurred’ and thus everything was liable to become classified.9 Continuous cooking was treated by the state as a secret industry and it prevented informa-tion exchange among research institutions and factories even within the country. Engineers and scientists who worked on the project had deep disagreements on technical design of such cooking. The inhibitions to exchange of technical knowledge and perspectives played into a contrary aspect of the Soviet system. On the one hand, the regime strongly supported the author of the continuous cooking method, scientist Leonid Zherebov, but on the other did not allow open flows of exchange among relevant experts on how to develop his idea. The behind-the-scenes conflict among engineers only became apparent after Khrushchev’s liberalizing reforms, which allowed open discussions, but the new leadership chose not to pursue Zherebov’s innovation, but to transfer foreign technologies to start immediate production. Also, although the state expected the project to concentrate all the resources (from engineers’ expertise to supplies, including raw materials like wood), throughout the period innovations suffered from a lack of technical and intellectual support, which the industry lacked the wherewithal to provide.

This article illuminates, through this one case, the array of social and political factors that accompanied technological innovation in the post-war period. For this period, the subject of innovation remains significantly less researched than in the earlier years of the Stalin Era. I focus on the interactions and views of actors from administrative, research and industrial organizations involved in a single technological system. I define the ‘technological system’ as

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the network of several factories, plants and research institutions in the pulp industry, which were connected with other, related networks such as manufacture and timber industries. The performance of the system was dependent on the interactions within and across these networks. Industrial scientists and engineers played a significant role in the development of the pulp system. They defined critical problems, backward elements and offered their solutions to improve them.10 I consider Zherebov and other engineers and scientists as system builders and assign a significant role to their interactions as they sought to introduce an indigenous approach to continuous cooking.

In the first part of the article, I give a brief overview of Johan Richter’s introduction of continuous cooking in Sweden as an example of a successful industrial project. Then, I examine the activities of Soviet engineer Leonid Zherebov and several Soviet institutions involved in the development of his similar pulp cooker. Finally, I investigate the ways in which Soviet engineers subsequently adopted Swedish cookers.

Inventing successful continuous cooking in the West

Societal change and expanding consumer demands were the catalysts for the discovery of con-tinuous pulp cooking. As European societies became increasingly literate in the early twentieth century, pulp was required to manufacture paper for the growing print industry. The two world wars also drove demand as militaries became a significant consumer of pulp, which was used in the manufacture of ammunition, gun powder and rubber for aviation. Additionally, post-Second World War technological progress in food, textile, military and other industries created new products that directly or indirectly enhanced the demand for pulp.

Batched pulp cooking was the basic method used to transform wood chips (wood run through a shredder) into pulp. Chips were processed in a digester, the basic machine used to cook pulp. This process took several hours, as the machine completed all stages of cooking in sequence, from loading chips, adding chemicals, cooking and unloading the finished pulp. This method was expensive, time-consuming and produced pulp of varying quality, severely hampering the industry’s development. Following Thomas Hughes, I consider batch cooking as a reverse salience, a critical problem that caused obstacles for the development of pulp production as a system. Industrial scientists in several countries put in considerable effort to overcome this problem. They aimed to invent a digester that could cook pulp faster and allow for nonstop processing through the simultaneous addition of wood chips and unloading of finished pulp mass.11

Engineers from several countries found solutions in the early 1930s through the intro-duction of continuous cooking digesters. One of the first inventors was Johan Richter, a Norwegian-born engineer, who contributed to the continuous pulp cooking method in Sweden. In the late 1920s, he worked on continuously bleaching pulp and offered his inven-tion to the Norwegian industrialist Knud Dahl, who had founded a cellulose and paper business called Kamyr together with the Karlstad Mekaniska Werkstad in the Swedish town of Karlstad.12 The union between Richter and Dahl resulted in a successful commercial project. Many foreign companies, including the International Paper Company, sought to import their machinery. Richter and Dahl - as well as other engineers and scientists working in their group – were system builders, who managed to overcome a critical problem in order to improve the performance of the pulp industry.13 After examining continuous bleach-ing, Richter attempted the more technologically complicated project of continuous pulp

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cooking. In 1938, Kamyr constructed an experimental digester, and 10 years later launched continuous cooking at an industrial scale in a craft mill in Fengerfors, in central Sweden.

Continuous digester operation required techniques to feed the digester at high pressure, which enabled adding wood chips to the machine without mechanical damage or a serious loss of steam.14 The digester consisted of several zones of different temperature, in which various stages of cooking were done simultaneously and, thus, could produce more pulp without stopping the apparatus, thus automating a series of processing tasks.15

In its first iterations, the maximum capacity of the new digester was low – slightly more than 100 tons of pulp – and it had technical weaknesses in heating and washing. It took another 10 years of development to change the industry. Answering the understandable scepticism of other specialists, Richter said that ‘people used to ask the same question when we started to make bleaching continuous, and look what they are buying now, all of them’.16 Indeed, despite the small capacity and critical problems in construction, the digester was a promising innovation. Given the increasing demand for pulp in various industries, the continuous method had important potential. In the late 1940s–mid 1950s, companies from different countries purchased the Kamyr apparatus. Engineers and industrialists in other countries continued improving the digester, often in contact with Kamyr. To some extent, perfecting continuous cooking was a collective effort, with collaboration among engineers internationally. There were later attempts undertaken by American companies Esco and Pandia (the division of the Black-Clawson Company), Australian APPM and others to launch analogous machines, which eventually introduced various digesters, most of which were modifications of Kamyr.17

One of the first Kamyr-digesters outside Sweden was installed in Finland in 1952 by the company Joutseno Pulp OY and had a capacity of 120 tons. Joutseno’s engineers took part in experiments in the USA initiated by the Technical Association of the Pulp and Paper Industry. These experiments were conducted in close cooperation with Kamyr and French mills in Condat.18 The main technical problem in the construction of the digester was the heating system, since the apparatus had to work at high temperature without stopping to cool. Another Finnish company, the former Kamyr partner Ahlström OY, found a solution to the problem.19 Ahlström’s experiments helped invent the cold blow, which cooled the pulp while washing debris from the hot cooked mass. Later, a Canadian mill in Port-Melon launched a digester with another method called ‘Hi-Heat Washing’ that also solved the heating problem. In the end, accumulated experience resulted in improvements, diffusing variations of one technology. Sven Rydhom, an engineer at the Technical Association, paid his respects ‘not only to Kamyr men but to all pioneers of continuous cooking working in the industry who have carried the double burden of technical difficulties of development’.20 By the mid-1960s, the pulp sector employed several variations on the Kamyr digesters, which differed in methods of blowdown, washing the mass and other technical features.

In the mid-1960s, there were 16 Kamyr digesters in different countries, some of which had a capacity of 750 tons a day.21 Among the companies working to construct new digesters, the Kamyr Company kept its lead by opening new markets and retained its position as the leading international supplier of continuous cookers.22

Leonid Zherebov and first Soviet experiments

In the Soviet Union, the engineer Leonid Zherebov designed another continuous pulp cooker.23 Born in tsarist Russia in 1863, Zherebov graduated from Moscow University and

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gained his first professional experience at a paper factory in Kamensk, not far from Moscow. He eventually became a director at the plant. After continuing his education at Moscow Higher Technical School, Zherebov moved away from practical engineering and devoted his time to the theoretical examination of timber for manufacturing pulp and paper. He was among the few researchers in his field who continued to work under the Bolsheviks and escaped the repressions of the 1930s. During these years, he received patents for his inventions and founded several educational and research organizations.24

The list of Zherebov’s achievements under the Soviet rule was formidable. In 1919, he became a co-founder of the Moscow Institute of Forestry Engineering; nine years later he helped found the All-Union Timber Research Institute, which was subsequently divided into several institutions. These included the Central Research Institute for the Pulp and Paper Industry (TsNIIB), the Central Research Institute of Forestry and the Central Research Institute of Wood Processing. In the 1920s, he was involved in scientific reforms initiated by the Bolshevik leadership, which included the creation of a network of research institutions.25 In 1938, Zherebov became the head of the All-Union Engineer Society of Workers of the Paper Industry. He received many awards for his research activities, including the Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner of Labour. In a volume celebrating the 100th anniversary of his birth, his students and colleagues wrote that his life ‘was full of creative search which all was aimed to develop paper and cellulose, hydrolyzed, and wood chemical industry’.26

Zherebov worked on different aspects of wood chemistry and pioneered various uses of wood in industrial production. The continuous cooking of pulp was one of his major inventions. Like Kamyr, his method moved raw materials through the digester with the ability to regulate the temperature of cooking throughout the apparatus. The key difference between Swedish and Soviet inventions was related to the temperature and time needed for mass to move through the digester. In Zherebov’s model it took only 20 min, as the digester worked at very high temperatures, ranging from 200 to 220 °C. In comparison, the Kamyr digester required about 60–90 min at 170°, while batch cooking used lower temperature and took six to seven hours to produce cellulose.27 However, the project remained a design only until the early 1930s when Zherebov managed to find support from the Soviet leadership. While the same search for an improved digester was happening in other counties, in the USSR the problem of pulp production was considered an urgent task of the state as Stalin sought to industrialize at a breakneck pace.

Several factories had been constructed in the pre-war period, but their number remained small.28 To a large extent they were equipped with foreign technology, actively transferred by the Soviet government before Second World War.29 These factories were the catalyst for the construction of dependant industrial mono-towns near them. The capacity of these new plants, however, did not match that of the rapidly developing pulp technologies and production of factories in other countries. Despite huge stores of timber, the Soviet pulp and paper industry processed only five per cent of cut trees, while the American industry used 35 and the Canadian 40 per cent of wood.30 The lack of mechanization of forest works and industrial manufacture as well as improper storage of wood at factories were the main reasons for the lower production in Soviet factories. Moreover, new plants were woefully undersupplied and lacking modern equipment or experts. For example, plants were often built in areas that were rapidly deforested and, thus, were a long distance from supplies of wood. Compared to many other industries, before Second World War the pulp remained rather marginalized.31

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Zherebov’s method was supported by officials at the highest level. He was one of few scientists strongly supported by the state in an industry not yet designated as essential to the military. Although the construction of digester resistant to high temperatures was expensive, it could satisfy two needs of the Soviet government: solving the problem of insufficient and bad quality pulp, as well as the shortage of labour; the new technology reduced the number of workers needed in a pulp factory.32 Batch cooking did not allow engineers, research institutions and, finally, the main consumer of pulp, the Soviet state, to set aims and norms of production. Therefore, Zherebov offered a promising invention that could help improve the performance of pulp production and to some extent contribute to Stalin’s ambitious tasks of surpassing the West and make the country the leading inventor in the industry in the world.33

Zherebov’s initial experiments were quite successful. In 1936, at the Moscow Central Heating and Power Plant and then at the Dobrushsky Pulp and Paper Plant in Belorussia in 1936, he constructed an experimental digester and managed to produce pulp of good quality via continuous cooking. Three years later, a new pulp and paper plant in L`gov began production by a continuous method. As early as 1938, the head of the People`s Commissariat of Forestry Industry Mikhail Ryzhov (who would die in the Stalinist repressions just few months later) issued a decree ordering that the method must be turned into industrial use throughout Soviet industry. Following this decree, nine years elapsed in which the indus-trial launch of the cooker was apparently forgotten during the Second World War. The fate of the experimental digester seems to be unknown, but it is probable that it was lost or deconstructed in the war period.34

As tensions with capitalist countries escalated on the eve of and after Second World War, the USSR became more concerned with producing pulp for military purposes. As Bruce Parrott has noted, the Soviet technological strategy was defined by foreign politics.35 Some authors have even argued that Soviet leadership initiated the war with Finland in order to achieve its modern industrial capacities for pulp and paper production near the Finnish–Soviet border by attaining more territory.36 Indeed, during Second World War the Soviet Union annexed several plants on the Karelian peninsula and Ladoga Karelia, as well as factories in the Baltic States and Japan.37 However, because the war resulted in significant damage to the enterprises when the Finns evacuated machinery (which was returned gradu-ally after the war, but often installed very chaotically), the annexation did not bring a radical improvement to the Soviet pulp and paper industry. It was clear that improving existing technology would be more efficient than expanding production through the construction of new factories. As a result, introducing intensive methods of pulp production was seen as a priority and encouraged by state officials. The ministry decided to continue Zherebov’s project and recognized it now as ‘the towering achievement of a Soviet scientist’.38

Implementing Zherebov`s method after Second World War: initial highs and lows

Two years after the war, the Minister of the Pulp and Paper Industry Leonid Grachev published a decree on Zherebov’s invention. It stated that now ‘it was urgent to create an experimental digester for continuous cooking of pulp’, and then put the experiment into industrial production immediately.39 For these purposes, the Ministry allocated a large sum.40 If Richter gained support from a private company, Zherebov’s idea was

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supported by state officials, who would play a leading role in organizing and controlling the implementation of continuous cooking after the war. The invention was registered as an author right (avtorskoe svidetel`stvo), the basic form of intellectual property which inventors could use in the Soviet Union. It implied that the inventor, as Soviet sources formulated it, ‘relied his idea to the Soviet society’ (practically, the state or, more precisely, to institutions responsible for innovating). While recognized as the author, the inventor was not an exclusive owner of the invention.41 The project was, from the beginning, monopolized by the state to a greater extent than anywhere else in the world, including Nazi Germany and Japan under Hirohito.42

Thus, not Zherebov, but ministerial officials selected the location for the first industrial application of pulp by continuous cooking, the Enso (in 1951 its name was changed to the Russian Svetogorsk) pulp and paper plant. Located on in an area annexed from Finland, this plant was chosen probably because of its capacity and comparatively modern equipment, as the former owner-Finnish company Enso-Gutzeit OY – had completed a basic renovation of the facilities shortly before the war. As a result, it was the most updated plant in the Soviet Union, despite all the new factories constructed in the previous decade.43

The Ministry assigned the responsibilities for experimenting with and implementing continuous cooking to the plant’s administration. However, in post-war Enso, the intentions of Moscow did not give rise to strong enthusiasm since they required finding qualified engineers and proper raw materials. After the war, Finland returned evacuated equipment, but there was still a problem with installation, finding additional equipment and locating engineers capable of working with the new machinery. In addition, damaged equipment required maintenance, but not all the parts and components were manufactured in the Soviet Union. The first Soviet chemical machinery factories were launched in the late 1920s, but they could produce only some technical parts because of a lack of technology and facili-ties.44 Large-scale production of chemical equipment commenced only in 1942, when the Research Institute for the Construction of Chemical Machinery was founded with the task of renovating old plants and constructing new equipment. Its capacity was not sufficient, and in 1960 a new plant was opened in Petrozavodsk to manufacture equipment for the pulp and paper industry as part of a campaign to overcome the backwardness in this industry.45 Still, manufacturing pulp producing machines and parts was a significant problem during the whole Soviet era that required technological improvements.

To develop expertise in this area, a technical college was founded in Svetogorsk, the settlement nearby the plant (later, an industrial town). Most lecturers came from factories and universities in Leningrad, a technological centre for pulp and paper industry that also delivered newly minted engineers to the plant. Local engineers, in particular those who worked in the scientific–technical society (nauchno-tekhnicheskoe obschestvo) had ties with Leningrad`s research organizations, including the Central Research Institute of Paper and Pulp (TsNIIB). Such societies were voluntary organizations in many factories, with a general aim of assisting technological progress and improving production.

Some members of the society, a small group of engineers, shared the main responsibility for the project. They included the head of the plant, Afanasii Sil`chenko, chief engineer Konstantin Malyshkin, three more engineers and 20 skilled workers who played technical roles and maintained the digester. The specialists and workers were to participate in the project alongside their main work.46 In the project’s first years, Zherebov’s construction office located in Moscow and the Central Administration of the Sulphite Cellulose Industry or

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Glavsulfittselliuloza (in 1948 changed to the Central Administration of Cellulose Industry or Glavtselliuloza) supervised it.

Although the Ministry initially decreed that the project would be fulfilled within one year, in 1947 it failed due to a lack of technical parts and equipment. The Ministry board blamed the factory’s leadership. It claimed that the factory had an irresponsible attitude towards the project, i.e. ‘the most significant innovation of Soviet science’. In addition, the head of Glavsulfittselliuloza Malytin wrote to the head of the plant that ‘to a large extent, the delay in implementation of continuous pulp cooking is happening because of you’. Malytin specified that the leadership of the plant ‘did not take any concrete measures to order the equipment’.47 Sil’chenko explained that he was not able to find the appropriate parts as they were not produced in the Soviet Union. As the historian Donald Filtzer has shown, Soviet ‘engineering factories, that made machines, simply did not make the spare parts for them’. It was much easier to acquire a new machine than a spare part for an old one.48 In fact, the plant requested permission to import equipment from Finland, which had close trade connections with the Soviet Union.49 However, purchasing parts from abroad was not a simple task and required the involvement of the State Committee on Introducing Modern Techniques to the People’s Economy of the Soviet Union and organizations of foreign trade. Moreover, finding the parts required identifying appropriate suppliers in foreign professional literature, requesting help from engineers who had travelled abroad on research trips or soliciting foreign companies and then negotiating with foreign partners on the inter-state level. Getting the right parts was thus a long and painstaking process.

There were a number of suppliers of foreign equipment to the Enso plant in the following years.50 In 1950, the plant received some tools for an experimental digester, but the launch was delayed because other necessary parts (high-heat pumps) were missing. In October 1950, the Minister issued a new decree, complaining that the work of implementing con-tinuous pulp cooking was moving at an ‘impossibly slow pace’.51 In response, Sil’chenko said that ‘the plant was not blame’. He specified that they lacked expertise, as the skilled engineers in the plant as well as the workers lacked training in continuous cooking and simply did not know what to do with the new equipment.52 This problem extended well beyond pulp cooking. It was a problem throughout the industry. One local newspaper published dozens of notices by specialists and workers who complained that some did not want to learn new technologies and did not know how to work with modern machinery.53

In 1950, an anonymous report (probably prepared by one of specialists who worked on the project) on Zherebov’s digester observed that ‘there was no any sign of motivated research’.54 Other engineers complained, ‘The digester was a secret project, and it was not discussed widely by other specialists of the plant. There was a narrow circle of people who solved all the questions’.55 Indeed, in trying to launch a revolutionary technology, the Soviet leadership was eager to keep the digester secret in order to prevent its leak to the West. This might explain why even despite having no resources for the development of the technology, the Ministry did not seek foreign expertise openly. Instead, during the first three years of the project, all the responsibility was put on domestic potential – specifically, on a small group of engineers working in the plant. As mentioned above, pulp was a dual-use technology and had shared purposes with military industry. The Soviet Union had a large military sector, and hundreds of factories ‘produced dual-use products which were immediately capable of or easily adaptable to defense use’.56 In this sense, the plant in Enso/Svetogorsk was a on the periphery of the military–industrial complex.57

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The group of specialists that worked on the digester had connections with Zherebov`s development laboratory in Moscow, which dealt primarily with improvements to the initial project. In the early 1950s, a specialist from the laboratory, Khutolev, came to the plant, but his participation, as some local engineers complained, was not active enough.58 In the same year, the administration of the plant tried to initiate an agreement with the Leningrad branch of the Research Institute of Chemical Machinery in order to find help in implementing Zherebov’s project. The institute responded by saying that they did not have specialists able to fulfil the task.59 However, archival sources demon-strate that slightly later this institute used Finnish machinery to work on continuous cooking.60 This story illustrates the competition between different institutions in the Soviet Union; specialists of the research institute who were not formally responsible for implementing Zherebov’s method, did not feel obliged to share their experience with the Enso plant.61

In 1951, the Ministry assigned the above-mentioned TsNIIB the task of assisting with implementation.62 The institute’s engagement in Enso/Svetogorsk was not initially very active. For example, engineers at the plant tried to find technical literature on continuous cooking from TsNIIB, as the local library was not equipped with papers on the method. It seems probable that works published by Richter were not easily acces-sible, although specialists on the project were aware of the inventor. And despite the fact that the Enso project was supported at the highest level, the plant did not receive detailed materials or instructions on Zherebov’s method. The documentation given by Zherebov’s research board was enough to explain the basic principles of his complicated technological process, but could not provide the answers to specific questions. In 1951, in a letter to the head of TsNIIB Sergey Puzyrev, Sil’chenko wrote that from all the mate-rials on continuous cooking ‘there was only a project of installation of digester and a short technical description’.63 The letter was marked as secret and proved that only few people knew about the project. Using his position as the head of the plant Sil`chenko asked for the loan or purchase of technical literature on continuous cooking. In par-ticular, he asked about articles by Richter which, he assumed, should have been in the institute’s collection.64 The answer from Puzyrev was rather astonishing; he indicated that there was translation of a paper by Richter and Otto on continuous cooking, but that he could not provide a copy. The reason, Puzyrev explained, was that there was only a single copy of the required volume and all the typists were too busy to make a duplicate.65 As a result, it was only possible to read the book in the reading room of the library. It is unclear whether or not Sil’chenko finally found the articles elsewhere or managed to get a copy from the institute’s library. Nonetheless, there was a clear and strong divide between the industrial organization and research institution, even when both were assigned to work on the same project. This indicates the inefficiency of the circulation of knowledge between different Soviet institutions.

This case is even more indicative when considering that the cooperation between Enso/Svetogorsk and the Institute occurred as the state sought to strengthen connections between research and production. However, it was not a successful project, a fact recognized by the administration of the Institute. As Larin, the vice head of the scientific department of the Institute responsible for the relationship, said in 1951:

in the first years of cooperation there were significant problems. In particular, specialists of the Institute sought to maintain the appearance of being active by coming to plants to give

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lectures and papers, sometimes even not strongly connected thematically with the pulp and paper industry.66

Larin also stressed that excessive technical aid to factories might distract specialists from ‘pure theoretical research’ (here he probably meant the investigations of research scientists). This conclusion contradicted his critics, by expressing the unwillingness of researchers to work in industry – a fact illustrated the pattern of communication with Enso/Svetogorsk described above. As Kendall Bailes noted, industrial scientists generally visited factories only occasionally in order to give instructions and left soon thereafter.67

During the summer of 1951, the engineer-in-chief of the plant Konstantin Malyshkin corresponded with Glavtselliuloza complaining about a lack of machinery and electrical equipment needed for the upper section of the digester, despite regular requests to the central offices for industrial management.68 The typical answer he received said that ‘there are no facilities in the warehouses’ and at the same time a contradicting statement ‘take decisive measures to finish the works’.69 All this produced delays in launching the digester, first until late 1951, then into 1952. The digester was finally completed in December 1952, but its functioning revealed defects, mostly because of improper assembly. The testing devices did not work correctly because of mistakes made during installation. The head of the State Committee on Science and Technology wrote that quite often assessments of Svetogorsk machinery were mostly done by eye and depended on the qualification and experience of operating personnel.70

In 1953, the plant received additional funding to finish the project and start industrial production.71 This meant that the state was still investing its hopes in the project, relying on the existing resources. In 1953, Malyshkin reported to the Ministry that the digester was checked and installed, but again described a number of technical problems.72 In the following two years, engineers were involved in repair and attempts to overcome deficiencies in the equipment.73

De-stalinization and the end of the project

During the Khrushchev era, the state encouraged society to express their views more openly including some topics – a change that is referred to as the ‘thaw’.74 As John Barber et al. indicated, in the de-Stalinization era secrecy was reduced and basically limited to defence and national security.75 It influenced the digester project, particularly as the participation of TsNIIB became more active. When the Zherebov`s digester was installed in 1955, specialists in Svetogorsk made one more attempt to launch continuous cooking as an industrial process. It was now technically successful as the engineers finally adjusted the digester for cooking at high temperature, but failed to produce pulp of good quality. The basic problem stemmed from the impossibility of cooking pulp at 200° necessary to produce mass of good quality. To examine the failure, a group of specialists from TsNIIB visited the factory in December 1955. After inspection, they organized a joint meeting in Leningrad with the engineer-in-chief of Svetogorsk, Konstantin Malyshkin, to discuss the results of the trip. Among other issues, the specialists stressed technical foul-ups and mistakes made while installing the digester. Thus, in her report, Institute specialist Galina Kosaya complained that the digester was installed improperly by factory engineers.76 As had been the case previously, Malyshkin said in response that the problem was in the bad quality of Soviet parts. For example, he asserted that the engi-neers in Svetogorsk did not have a functioning apparatus to use as an example for important

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parameters or the cooking time of pulp in the digester.77 Indeed, the digester was a closed apparatus in which loading, cooking and washing were done simultaneously – making the use of automated controls extremely important in managing the complicated process.78

In early 1956, yet another delegation came to Svetogorsk to check the digester, this time comprised of engineers and managers from administrative institutions including the State Committee on Science and Technology, the Ministry of Machine Making and the Ministry of Paper and Wood-Working Industry. They concluded that construction was done mostly on the basis of existing materials borrowed from the other parts of the plant while the quality of pulp was low and did not meet standards.79 The delegates decreed that the digester had to be fixed by May 1956, but it was now also important to introduce and investigate the continuous cooking digesters already installed and operating in Sweden and Finland. They recommended the engineers in Svetogorsk intensify their study of a Kamyr digester already purchased from Finland in 1955, which was installed but still not functioning in the Marysky pulp and paper plant – one of the most modern Soviet factories at that time, but located quite far from Svetogorsk.80 The commission said that travelling to Finland was necessary in order to examine their digesters and speed up research in the Soviet Union. It was also important, they said, to send some experienced engineers from Svetogorsk to the Marysky plant to assist in launching a Kamyr digester there. Finally, ‘it was necessary to investigate thoroughly this digester and transform this experience into Zherebov`s parameters’.81

This trip to check the plant seems to be among the last attempts from the leadership to intro-duce Zherebov’s method, and shows the pivot on the part of the Ministry and related institutions away from developing domestic and towards adopting foreign technologies. In 1955, the Kamyr installation was purchased by the Soviet Union and its investigation was included in the chief plan of development and implementation.82 The purchase of foreign technology was the result of the state’s campaign to achieve rapid modernization through utilizing foreign technology.

Starting in the mid-1950s, the state began strongly criticizing the project. In May 1955, at the meeting of the Central Administration of Cellulose Industry, Vice Chairman P. Alekseev stressed that the passivity of the Ministry was the reason for the delay in dealing with the project.83 A year later, the State Committee on New Technology reported to the Council of Ministers of the USSR that the Ministry of Paper and Wood-Working Industry lagged behind in introducing new technologies and techniques. They admitted that 20 years before Zherebov’s method had been presented to the Moscow branch of the Central Research Institute of Pulp and Paper when there was no analogous research abroad. They stressed that the Ministry issued more than twenty decrees on the method, as well as included it to the state plan on techniques five times, and the total cost of the project was more than 20 million rubles, a large sum, but all this had zero effect.84 In addition, they stressed that much later than in Enso/Svetogorsk, similar research was launched abroad and became widespread in Sweden, Finland and the USA.85

In these conclusions given by industry administrators, we see responsibility put on the Ministry for its inability to supervise research, and implement new technologies quickly. Accusing the administrators of institutions, ministries or factories was a typical strategy in the Soviet industrial sector and re produced the idea of bureaucratic irresponsibility. In this story, indeed, we see that the role of the Ministry in charge of the digesters was limited by decrees and resolutions while the special board of the Central Administration of Cellulose Industry should have not provided expert and technical assistance. In many cases, neither this organization, nor the research office of Zherebov or TsNIIB provided much assistance to the Enso/Svetogorsk engineers.

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The year 1956 was also a turning point in the interactions between the institutions involved in the project. In August, a three day debate was organized in TsNIIB in Leningrad. This debated involved not only specialists from the Institute and the plant, but also a wider group of participants, including professors from the S.M. Kirov Forest Academy in Leningrad and specialists from Zherebov`s office and the Research Institute of the Chemical Machinery. The decision to organize a general discussion was probably seen as a matter of great urgency because the engineer-in-chief of the Svetogorsky plant was not notified about the format of the event. As he said at the beginning of his presentation, he did not expect to see so many people in the room and had anticipated a small group of specialists as before.86

The meeting exposed a conflict between specialists from different institutions which cen-tred on the basic point of Zherebov`s invention – the temperature of cooking. It was the first time that Zherebov`s method was attacked as such: in particular, specialists from TsNIIB heavily criticized his innovative idea for cooking pulp at above 200°. One of them, Nikolay Rosenberg, argued that the project was not successful because the technical parameters of the digester could not be implemented in practice. He stressed that the Swedish company Kamyr could produce digesters on a by-order basis, but even they would not guarantee the digester if it was used to cook the pulp above 200° as Zherebov insisted.87 He concluded that Zherebov’s idea was impossible and proposed to construct a new digester based on a more rational approach. Zherebov, who had been supported by the Ministry for two decades, was now sharply criticized. Rosenberg was the first to attack the construction of the Svetogorsk digester not only because of installation, but also project design problems. As a result, he persuaded the audience that Zherebov`s project was unpromising, time consuming, and had become a goal in and of itself rather than contributing to real, functional and applied industry progress.88 His presentation ended in outcries from the audience, demanding that Zherebov be invited to the meeting at once.89

Zherebov arrived at the meeting the next day to deliver a public answer to Rosenberg. In his rebuttal, he asserted that in the past he had successfully cooked pulp at temperatures over 200° and the failures of the digester in Svetogorsk were caused by improper construction (done by the plant and supervised by TsNIIB), rather than his method itself. He blamed the Institute, arguing that they wanted to stop implementation because of cost and time, but stressed the significance of his invention for the future. ‘No one engineer has a right to refuse from a project even if he failed more than twice’, he said while contending that the Institute did not observe the conditions for proper installation.90 In addition, Zherebov accused Rosenberg of interfering in the experiments at Svetogorsk, of changing the technical parameters of the project, and lowering the cooking temperature.

The meeting also exposed why Zherebov had little role at Svetogorsk. I could not find any indication of his presence in local sources.91 The absence was noted by the head of TsNIIB Sergey Puzyrev, who asked why Zherebov had not come to Svetogorsk and did not communicate with scientists before the 1956 meeting. Zherebov replied that his invention was of secret character and he felt obliged to be cautious, but also complained that TsNIIB monopolized the project and its oversight, excluding him deliberately from visiting the plant. Zherebov wanted Soviet engineers, rather than foreign experts, to complete the project.92 Backed by support from the Ministry, TsNIIB argued that Zherebov had monopolized the project and did not allow anyone to enter Svetogorsk.93 These accusations illustrate that Svetogorsk’s engineers had to work alone, without the support of the research organizations theoretically involved in installing equipment at the factory. The explanation emerged from

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how the author of an industrial innovation had no responsibility to work on his project him-self. In practice, we see that neither TsNIIB nor Zherebov’s office (both state organizations) took an active part in the project, but all accused the other in monopolizing the invention.

Although their number was small, some recognized specialists from other institutions, such as Iurii Nepenin (the docent of the S.M. Kirov Forest Academy in Leningrad), who were not involved in the project, supported Zherebov and his methodl. However, those who participated in the practical implementation of the project were highly critical. Malyshkin, for example, stated during the meeting that wood cooked at above 200° produced dung, not pulp.94

The argument at the meeting was divided between so-called theoretical scientists, who conducted successful but limited experiments in their laboratories, and applied scientists, who were not successful in translating these experiments into industrial practice. The con-flict seems to have arisen from how communication and labour were distributed during the project’s construction. For example, if a part or technical aspect of the digester malfunc-tioned, the plant would replace it – but these engineers did not have a sense of the project as a whole, a matter relegated to the theoreticians. This division emerged from a larger conflict between research institutions that were generally isolated from each other and unable to communicate effectively. In practice, both Zherebov`s office and TsNIIB worked separately, and the meeting in 1956 was among the first joint discussions of the project.

Many participants said that it was important to discuss the digester project widely, since achieving such a technologically complex project in secret made any success hard to prove. The specialist Korotkov admitted, ‘it is ridiculous, but there are many rumors… many say the digester for continuous cooking is the digester of continuous repairs and reconstructions’.95 The need to publicize scientific knowledge to a large audience was part of the larger trend of the internationalization of scientific and technological knowledge in the twentieth century. As Joseph Berliner argued, if the state did not participate in international intercourse, it lost in the promotion of technological progress.96

In its conclusion, the 1956 meeting decided that theexisting technological equipment of the Svetogorsk digester does not look promising anymore because of improperly executed construction and cannot be used for the creation of domestic digester for continuous cooking … This is why further work on the digester is not reasonable and must be stopped.97

The meeting concluded that the Leningrad Research Institute of Chemical Machinery should work on a new project and present it to a wider audience.98 It is probable that the decision to stop the project was also connected with the change in the supervision of technical innovations. Due to the reorganization of invention policy, in 1955 the Ministry lost its responsibility for innovating, and it was the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries of the Council of Ministers of the USSR which was now responsible for overseeing new design and development. I assume that this committee did not include such an ambiguous project in its programme and chose to take care about newer innovations.

Still, shortly after the meeting, Zherebov sought support from the Minister of the Paper and Timber Industry Feodor Varaksin, claiming that the specialists from TsNIIB were very hostile towards his high-temperature cooking method, despite his successful experiments of 20 years before. He also reminded Varaksin that his project was supported by the Ministry extending back before the war and asked to continue the project, but exclude Rosenberg, Kosaya, and Malyshkin. Zherebov blamed them for not following his design specifications

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and for perpetrating the myth that his cooking methods were impossible. The meeting, he argued, had been planned in advance so that the discussions were not productive.99 In addition, Zherebov explained that he was forced to act in secret and could not communi-cate with other specialists frequently as his method was classified by the Military Board of the Committee on Inventions in the very beginning. Again, although the project was later declassified officially, it was still treated as secret – even as TsNIIB began to involve to the project independently, without addressing Zherebov and his research office.100 However, while Zherebov appealed to his previous relationship with the Ministry support in previ-ous years, the new administration was immersed in Khrushchev’s campaign to catch up and surpass the West. Rapid modernization, under this campaign, increasingly relied on Western experience. Indeed, during Stalin’s time, Zherebov had tight contacts with the minister Leonid Grachev who believed in his idea. As Paul Gregory and Stuart Roberts argued, Soviet leaders invested in old-fashioned projects which resulted in manufacturing unnecessary products and supported certain production figures.101 This probably explains why the project continued for so long despite many problems. In the beginning of the Khrushchev period, new leadership at the ministry ceased supporting Zherebov.

Kamyr in the USSR: technology transfer

Khrushchev’s new technological policy allowed for closer communications with Western engineers. Soviet leadership initiated rapid technological modernization in 1955, and industries were urged to ‘surpass and overcome America’.102 The government strived to fulfil this task using Western achievements in technology, foregrounding the importance of borrowing from the West, and, thus, initiated a shift from autarky to cooperation with the outer world.103 It meant not only more intensive trade connections, but collaboration between experts on the micro level. Among other practices, it brought foreign engineers to the Soviet Union while sending Soviet engineers to other countries. As a rule, these trips were organized by the State Committee on New Technology within agreements on scientific–technical cooperation signed with foreign countries,104 In the pulp and paper industry, the cooperation involved Soviet scientists learning new technologies, such as bleaching and production of viscose. Delegates were to prepare reports which sometimes were very lengthy and full of details.105

In the late 1950s, TsNIIB began to examine the possibilities of importing Western contin-uous cooking technology and expertise. In 1957, the Institute invited the Swedish engineer Lennart Stockman, who headed the research laboratory that had experimented with the Kamyr digester.106 Also, Soviet engineers took to Finnish and Swedish factories in order to learn continuous cooking methods more thoroughly. In 1957, a group of engineers headed by I. Khodakov visited enterprises in Finland and Kamyr Company in Sweden. In their report, they described the principles of continuous cooking and stressed that Kamyr digesters had some technical drawbacks (although they did not explain what exactly), but were quite popular among producers in various countries.107 This and many other reports on examining continuous cooking abroad were published as booklets and spread among professional libraries and institutions.108

Three years later, a group of engineers from the Balakhna pulp and paper plant travelled to Finland. After spending two weeks in Finnish factories, these engineers argued for the installation of continuous cooking machinery in Balakhna. As they reported, they could

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implement some aspects of technologies transferred from Finland and thus reduce the cook-ing time of pulp. In addition, after their return, they organized a large industrial conference, hosting engineers from across the country in order to discuss Finnish experience in con-tinuous cooking. These engineers acquired the status of experts and discoverers of a new technological world. Some engineers of Svetogorsk, including V. Sykol, Z. Danilin and V. Malyshev took part in this event, saying in their report that the conference provided valuable expertise and enabled them to improve some elements of Zherebov`s digester, which they had continued working on independently, without supervision from the responsible Ministry.109 Their efforts, however, were not successful, and the maximum capacity of the digester was only 50 tons of pulp a day, a very small output.110 The urgent state need to introduce the technology and produce better pulp had been fulfilled now using and improving upon for-eign equipment while the domestic project failed to play a leading role in pulp production.

By the mid-1960s three Kamyr digesters with the capacity of up to 300 tons of pulp a day had already been used in three Soviet enterprises in different parts of the country for industrial purposes, and some industrial research was underway. In 1966, the docent of the S.M. Kirov Forest Academy in Leningrad Iurii Nepenin (he was among few participants who supported Zherebov`s project in the meeting of 1956) published an overview of continuous cooking by Kamyr machines based on his travel to the Marysky plant. His analysis was based on an inspection of the digester and compared it with the data drawn from articles published in foreign professional journals available in the Soviet Union. He stressed that in 1966 there were three working Kamyr digesters in different parts of the Soviet Union: in Marysky, Segazha and Kotlas plants. In his view, among all these enterprises, only the Marysky one used proper wood chips delivered by sawmilling plants, while the others were not supplied with material of correct size and quality. Wood chips, however, were the most important components in cooking pulp and had influence on the cooking process and the quality of the pulp mass.111 Nepenin stressed fairly that a lack of good materials had a negative impact on the pulp mass and the digesters as well as required the reorganization of work in the factories responsible for supplying wood chips. This was a result of badly organized supplying of industrial plants with raw materials, a problem that remained as critical in the 1960s as it had been in the late 1940s–50s. Indeed, the number of trees cut in the USSR was far larger than required by the industry. Waste was considerable. Paul Josephson has pointed out that Soviet factories processed only 60 per cent of cut timber.112 Many inspection reports complained about low levels of mechanization and bad transpor-tation, storage and other aspects of harvesting timber.113

In the early 1960s, some other Soviet plants used digesters of different design – modifi-cations of Kamyr as well as alternative designs also purchased abroad. In particular, in 1962, a Pandia digester delivered by Parsons and Whittemore was purchased for the Chersonese pulp and paper factory in Crimea. Like Kamyr’s digester, this apparatus was thoroughly investigated by Soviet engineers.114 Local engineers replaced few technical components (feeders) with those produced in the Soviet Union because of splits, while the digester itself quickly became rusted.115 By the 1960s, therefore, some replacement parts and modifications were already produced in the Soviet Union. In any case, Western technological innovation was successfully introduced to Soviet manufacturing and used both for industrial purposes and research to modify foreign technology.

However, neither Zherebov’s project nor Kamyr digesters improved the performance of the Soviet pulp industry significantly. Despite a general growth of inputs (due to the

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enlargement of production), the technological level of the industry remained low.116 In 1960, the Soviet leadership issued a decree which said about the need to liquidate ‘the backwardness of the pulp and paper industry’. It outlined a programme of changes such as reconstruction of factories, the implementation of modern technologies, increasing pro-duction – essentially the same problems identified as early as the 1910s. In the following years, dozens of plants were renovated, but not the entire system. Problems in supplying the factories with machinery and raw materials remained, as did issues with product quality that first appeared when Zherebov`s digester was being installed. Nevertheless, these problems did not preclude some positive developments. For example, by the end of the Khrushchev era some new technologies were introduced to the industry enabling the production of producing viscose pulp, and the use of wood wastes in production, among others.

Despite the failure of the project, Zherebov was still considered by many engineers a significant Soviet inventor. Even before his death, various institutions published volumes devoted to his professional life. Some engineers stressed that his ideas were developed earlier than similar concepts in other countries,117 while others argued that his invention was adopted if not stolen by foreign engineers who could successfully adapt it for indus-trial production.118 Zherebov died in 1958, two years after his invention was scrapped, and 25 years after its introduction. It has been never implemented afterwards.

Conclusions

This story demonstrates the obstacles for research created by the nationalization of science and technology as well as by military bias in economic planning. Under Stalin the state monopolized significant inventions for military and kept them secret not only from the outer world, but within the country. Zhrebov’s project was thus restricted to a small group of spe-cialists, which, in turn, encountered a range of barriers, especially in communications and the sharing of knowledge across institutions. Monopolization and secrecy created a dilemma around the digester. Zherebov’s innovative idea to cook pulp at very high temperatures was not supported by the research institute TsNIIB, even though it was intimately involved in the project. However, Zherebov’s method was defended by the ministry, an umbrella institution for all the actors. Until the mid-1950s, the disagreements between research institutions evolved implicitly as Stalin’s regime did not provide a space for discussions of the innovation; different actors chose to support different variations of the original design. This is why other institutions did not criticize the project and chose to act independently from Zherebov in attempts to decrease the temperature. ‘The digester dilemma’ showed that the state was focused on the desired result, not on evaluating and resolving the differ-ent means to get there. The consequence was that the pulp project became technologically ambiguous as state support excluded discussions and criticism of the invention by other researchers. In practice, as the example of Kamyr digester showed, such technologies as continuous cooking were difficult to develop and required many iterations of experiments and improvements as well the expertise of a broader research community. Stalin’s regime prevented Soviet inventers from taking part in an innovation process that throughout the West relied on significant international exchange of knowledge and methods.119

Scholars rarely address the shifts in research and design innovating in the Khrushchev period. The conflict between two research boards, TsNIIB and Zherebov’s research group, exploded in the ‘thaw’ period in public discussions of the project. It also resulted in Zherebov,

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‘Stalin`s engineer’, losing his strong support from the ministry. New ministerial officials and new organs responsible for innovating sought easier ways to modernize. As a result, they gravitated towards importing foreign technologies already available, upending Stalin’s more indigenously oriented approach. This change of policy undermined Zherebov’s project after 25 years of investment in it.

Second, despite the military relevance of the project, the Soviet economy and industry were not capable of providing sufficient resources for this complicated technology. The history of Zherebov’s project illustrates the ways in which scarcity of resources affected the project and innovation on a broader scale. This problem persisted until the fall of the USSR.120 The process of turning invention into industrial production and from testing to technological adjustments was time consuming and marked by trial and error. It required, as Hughes noted about large technological systems, many actors working across different roles and institutions to build a functional network. As a part of such a system, continu-ous cooking and, thus, the activities of engineers, depended on a range of resources, from good-quality wood to spare parts and professional literature. In practice, however, the project revealed problems in the pulp industry, one of the most outdated in the USSR. As the story shows, the system continually suffered from one or more missing components. The Enso/Svetogorsky plant faced delays in acquiring technical parts, raw materials and even the books required for expertise. Although the project received substantial funding, purchasing parts and literature was complicated and sometimes impossible. The adaptation of Kamyr’s digesters, already functioning in a better (Western) technological system, did not improve the situation and the Soviet system remained backward for the whole Soviet period. Essentially, this case proves the impossibility of improving the system as a whole simply by replacing one element.

Undoubtedly, the political system defined the technological one, and these two sets of overlapping factors were connected to the larger question of the effectiveness of Soviet econ-omy. One might say that the post-war autarky of Stalin’s economy and intensive technology transfer in Khrushchev’s time did not enable inventions to accumulate a coherent system of mutually supporting resources. They were two polar strategies. The functions of both political and technological systems in the Soviet state seemed to provide little possibility for successful innovation.

Notes

1. Pis`mo leitenanta-inzhenera Pravdenko M. Pervukhinu (Letter by engineer lieutenant Pravdenko to M. Pervukhin)//RGAE (Russian State Archive of the Economy). F. 8513. Op. 1. D. 232. L. 101–105.

2. Graham, Lonely Ideas.3. Graham, Science in Russia, 180.4. Graham, Lonely Ideas; Research under communism is considered thoroughly by Asif Siddiqi,

who focused on Germans worked in the post-war Soviet Union. See Siddiqi, ‘Germans in Russia’. He also showed that in the USSR creating of ballistic rockets was not initially well planned and mostly based on enthusiasm of innovators. See Siddiqi, The Red Rockets` Glare.

5. Bailes, Technology and Society, 345; Zhuravlev, ‘Malen`kie liudi’. The authors explain that heads of factories usually spent additional funds on over-fulfilling plans (as encouragements for workers) rather than supporting time-consuming inventions. While Zhuravlev mainly discussed the bureaucracy at the local level, Bailes listed a larger number of reasons why Soviet innovations failed. In particular, he stressed the imbalance between industrial production and

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applied research, as many scientists were focused on fundamental investigations that had a little connection with the practical industrial sector.

6. Heywood, Engineer of Revolutionary Russia. See also Graham, The Ghost.7. Sutton, Western Technology, xxv. Even in the 1930s, the age of ‘high Stalinism’ when the state

was especially closed ideologically, purchases of Western (firstly, American) technology and visits from foreign specialists played a large role in industrialization. See Cohen, ‘Circulatory Localities’.

8. Hanson, The Rise and Fall, 61.9. Barber et al., ‘The Structure, 23. See more on how information was defragmented in Stalin`s

Russia in Medushevsky, ‘Stalinisim kak model’.10. Hughes, Networks of Power.11. ‘From Chips to Pulp in Minutes’, 8.12. Kamyr’s name originated from two companies: AB Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad of Sweden

and Myrens Verkstad of Norway.13. Hughes, “The Evolution,” 52.14. Toivanen, Learning and Corporate Strategy, 209.15. Riche, “Impact of Automation,” 1114.16. Rydholm, Continuous Pulping Processes, 3.17. An overview of circulation of pulp cooking technologies (including improving batch cooking)

in the nineteenth century is given in Burke, ‘Wood Pulp’, 179.18. Rydholm, Continuous Pulping Processes, 7.19. Laakso, Modeling of Chip Bed Backing, 19.20. Rydholm, Continuous Pulping Processes, 10.21. Nepenin, Varka sul`fatnoi tsellulozy, 9.22. Toivanen, Learning and Corporate Strategy, 210.23. I assume that there were some contacts between Richter and Zherebov, although I did not

find any indications in the sources.24. For example, in 1926 he received a patent for producing galipot from resinous wood, a project

he had finished 11 years earlier. See Baza patentov SSSR. In the NEP period, between 1924 and 1931, the Soviet state encouraged partial capitalism and allowed patents as a form of private intellectual property. See more in Kolesnikov, ‘Vekhi otechestvennogo izobretatel`stva’, 62.

25. Graham, Science in Russia, 174.26. Zherebov, K 100-letiu so dnya rozhdenia, 2.27. M. Serdiukov, M. Popov, A. Vasilenko. Dokladnaya zapiska po voprosu o nepreryvnoi varke

tsellulozy na Svetogorskom ZBK Ministerstva bumazhnoi i derevoobrabatyvaiushchei promyshlennosti, 1956 god (Report on continuous pulp cooking in the Svetogorsk pulp and paper plant of the Ministry of Paper and Wood Processing Industry)//RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 2. D. 146. L. 5–6.

28. Among the largest factories are Balakhna built in 1925, Kondopoga (1929), Vishery (1931), Maryisk (1938), Segezha (1939) and Solikamsk (1941).

29. On foreign factor in Soviet modernization see Schattenberg, Stalins Ingenieure; Zhuravlev, ‘Malen`kie liudi’; Golubev et al., The Search, among others.

30. Doklad GNTK SM SSSR ‘O sostoianii i tekhnicheskom urovne tsellulozno-bumazhnoi promyshlennosti’, 20.09.1957 (Report by the State Committee on Science and Technology ‘On the pulp and paper industry and its technical level’, 20.09.1957)//RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 3. D. 1154. L. 57.

31. Even in high priority industries there was a low level of mechanization and a scarce array of products. Thus, as Robert Campbell says, although the Soviet Union possessed rich energy resources, the development was tempered by a lack of new technologies. See Campbell, Soviet Energy Technologies. Also, see The Technological Level.

32. Reducing labour was a logical outcome of automation of industrial production in all over the world. The mid-twentieth century witnessed a rapid automation in many fields, the process closely connected with the development of computing and cybernetics.

33. Bailes, Technology and Society, 343.

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34. Richter’s invention was likely interrupted by the war.35. Parrott, Politics and Technology.36. Kilin, Karelia v politike, 42. Kilin argues that the war with Finland was initiated by the Soviet

government because of two reasons: it wanted the Finns not to enter into alliance with Germany and annex the Finnish territory near the Leningrad military district.

37. A comprehensive list of Soviet pulp and paper enterprises in different regions is given in Barr, ‘Regional Variation’, 47–8. The authors counted that of 186 plants working in 1965, 37 were that moved to the Soviet Union between 1940 and 1945 as the result of territorial expansion in the Baltic States, Kaliningrad, areas annexed from Finland and the Sakhalin region.

38. Prikaz Ministerstva tselluloznoi i bumazhnoi promyshlennosti SSSR ot 6 dekabria 1947 goda (Decree of the Ministry of Pulp and Paper Industry of the USSR issued on 6 December 1947)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 27; Prikaz Ministra tselluloznoi i bumazhnoi promyshlennosti (Decree of the Minister of Pulp and Paper Industry)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 42. The Ministry of Pulp and Paper Industry was reorganized in 1948 when it was unified with the Ministry of the Forestry Industry into the Ministry of Forestry and Paper Industry until 1951. Then a new Ministry of Paper and Wood Processing Ministry was created.

39. Prikaz Ministerstva tselluloznoi i bumazhnoi promyshlennosi SSSR ot 6 dekabria 1947 goda (Decree by the Ministry of Pulp and Paper Industry of the USSR issued on 6 December1947)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 25. The Ministry of Pulp and Paper Industry was reorganized in 1948 when it was unified with the Ministry of the Forestry Industry into the Ministry of Forestry and Paper Industry until 1951. Then a new Ministry of Paper and Wood Processing Ministry was created.

40. Perechen` stroitel`stva ustanovok po nepreryvnoi varok i nepreryvnomu gidrolizu (List of facilities for continuous pulp cooking and continuous hydrolysis)//LOGAV. F. R-180. F. 1. L. 24.

41. Kolesnikov, Istoriya izobretatel`stva, 5. The exception was the NEP period which allowed private intellectual property in the form of patenting. After the war, inventing was centralized and put into responsibility of a special Committee on Inventions (functioned between 1946 and 1947) and the Committee on Implementing New Techniques into the Economy (1947–1951) usually acted through ministries. In 1951–1955 inventions were given directly to ministries, which opened departments focused on innovations.

42. Kragh, ‘The Soviet Enterprise’, 367.43. Laine, ‘Modernization’, 29.44. In 1930, a factory in Nikolaev in the Ukrainian Republic, produced the first domestic pulp

digesters, which were installed in new pulp and paper plants. In 1934, the factories of the Central Administration of the Chemical Industry (a body within the People’s Commissariat of Forestry Industry) in Suma and Kiev began the production of digesters and furnaces designed after plans of foreign companies and ‘foreign professional literature’. Vybor obosnovania konstruktsi i tipov vysokoproizvoditel`nogo oborudovania dlia proizvodstva polutsellulozy i tsellulozy iz trostnika (Choosing the construction and types of highly efficient equipment for making semipulp and pulp from reeds)//RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 3. D. 1178. L. 68–69.

45. This campaign was launched by a decree on ‘Measures on Liquidating the Backwardness of Pulp and Paper Industry’ which implied improving technologies, mechanization of works in factories, brining new technologies and producing modern techniques for pulp and paper industrial sector.

46. Stenografichesky otchet 28 sessii Uchenogo soveta instituta o resultatakh eksperimental`nykh rabot, provedennykh v 1955–1956 gg. na Svetogorskoi ustanovke dlia nepreryvnoi varki sul`fitnoi tselluilozy (Stenographic report of the 28th session of the Institute on the results of experiments held in 1955–1956 with the digester for continuous cooking of sulphite cellulose in Svetogorsk)//RGANT (Sankt-Peterburg). F. 303. Op. 13. D. 281. L. 57.

47. Pis`mo i.o. nachal`nika Glavsul`fittsellulozy Maluitina direktoru Enso, 1947 (Letter to the associate director of Glavsulphittselluloza Maliutin to the head of Enso)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 4.

48. Filtzer, Soviet Workers, 26.

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49. Actually, the Soviet Union had intensive trade connections with a number of Western and developing countries. Among huge literature on this issue, see more in Cain, ‘Economic Statecraft’.

50. Akty po priemke importnogo oborudovania (Lists of received foreign equipment)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 4. D. 57. L. 60, 77, 91.

51. Prikaz ministra lesnoi i bumazhnoi promyshlennosti SSSR ot 16.10.1950 g. (Decree by the Minister of Forestry and Paper Industry of the USSR, issued on 16 October 1950)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 15. L. 6.

52. Pis`mo direktora Svetogorskogo TsBK Sil`chenko zamestiteliu nachalnika Glavtsellulozy P.N. Alekseevu, 1950 g. (Letter by the head of the Svetogorsky Pulp and Paper Plant A. Sil`chenko to the associate director of Glavtselluloza, 1950)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 2. D. 20. L. 16.

53. Stakhanovets (Svetogorsky rabochii) was a local newspaper, the main source of information in the plant.

54. Otchet ob osvoenii i eksperimental`nykh ispytaniiakh opytnoi ustanovki dlia nepreryvnoi varki (Report on implementing and experiments on continuous pulp cooking)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 4. D. 331. L. 10.

55. Ibid.56. Barber et al., ‘The Structure,’ 9.57. In the reports on supplies of bleached pulp, there were several classified enterprises which

received raw materials for military purposes. See Otchety po vepolneniu plana sbyta produktsii (Reports on supplies)//LOGAV. F.R-180. Op. 5. D. 293. L. 5, among others.

58. Protokol soveshchania pri zamestitele ministra K.A. Veinove, 1953 g. (Protocol of the meeting held by deputy minister K.A. Veinov in 1953)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 25. L. 8.

59. Pis`mo nachal`niku inspektsii pri Ministerstve lesnoi i bumazhnoi promyshlennosti SSSR Nikiforovu ot direktora Enso A. Sil`chenko ot 4 dekabria 1950 goda (Letter to the head of the inspection of the Ministry of Forestry and Paper Industry of the USSR Nikiforov sent by the head of Enso A. Sil`chenko, 4th December, 1950)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 2. D. 20. L. 33.

60. Otchet o komandirovke L.A. Mazina (Report on the business trip by L.A. Mazin)//RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 7. D. 925. L. 103.

61. There were more indications about these obstacles in communication between research and industry. The Kamsky paper plant had been initially constructed on the basis of plans proposed by Giprobum – the head institution to construct industrial objects in the Soviet Union. However, as the first head of the plant M. Eliashberg said, this plan included many significant mistakes. While the plant was under construction, the engineers decided to work out a new one, actually not referring to Giprobum. See Kamskomu kombinatu 20 let, 63. These examples witness that the Soviet system allowed competition between organizations inside the country. See more on competition in socialism in Competition in Socialist society.

62. TsNIIB was established in 1930 (Zherebov was among its founders) as the first research organization in the pulp and paper industry. It consisted of several departments, each dealing with both applied and theoretical research in the field, being important in terms of conducting research on pulp-based products.

63. Sekretnoe pis`mo A. Sil`chenko direktoru TSNIIB Minlesbumproma SSSR S.A. Puzyrevu, 1951 god (Secret letter by A. Sil`chenko to the head of the Central Institute of Paper of the Ministry of Forestry and Paper Industry S.A. Puzyrev)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 2. D. 15. L. 1.

64. Ibid.65. Pis`mo direktora TsNIIB Minlesbumproma SSSR S.A. Puzyreva direktoru Enso A. Sil`chenko

(Letter by the head of the Central Institute of Paper and Pulp of the Ministry of Forestry and Paper Industry S. Puzyrev to the head of Enso A. Sil`chenko)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 2. D. 15. L. 2.

66. Otchet o rabote, provedennoi TsNIIbom po tvorcheskomu sodruzhestvu nauki i proizvodstva (Report on the activities of the Central Institute of Paper and Pulp in the cooperation of science and industry)//RGANT SPb. F. 303. Op. 13. D. 84. L. 17–18.

67. Bailes, Technology and Society, 371.68. Pis`mo glavnogo inzhenera K. Malyshkina i.o. nachal`nika Glavtsellulozy Minlesbumproma

SSSR E.A. Kuznetsovu, 1951 god (Letter by the engineer-in-chief K. Malyshkin to the vice-

128 E. KocHETKovA

director of Glavtselluloza of the Ministry of Forestry and Paper Industry E.A. Kuznetsov)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 2. D. 15. L. 7.

69. Pis`mo nachal`nika Glavtsellulozy M. Serdiukova glavnomu inzheneru K. Malyshkinu (Letter by the head of Glavtselluloza M. Serdiukov to the engineer-in-chief K. Malyshkin)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 2. D. 15. L. 8.

70. Spravka o tekhnicheskom urovne tekhnologii proizvodstva na TSBP, 1957 (Summary of the technical level of production in pulp and paper enterprises)//RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 2. D. 40.

71. Perechen` stroitel`stva ustanovok po nepreryvnoi varke i nepreryvnomu gidrolizu, 1953 – 1955 gg. (List of facilities for continuous pulp cooking and continuous hydrolysis)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 24.

72. Pis`mo glavnogo inzhenera Malyshkina ministru bumazhnoi i derevoobrabatuvaiushchi promyshlennosti K.A. Veinovu, 1953 god (Letter by the engineer-in-chief Malyshkin to the Minister of Paper and Timber Industry K.A. Veinov, 1953)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 25. L. 1.

73. Otchet ob osvoenii i eksperimental`nukh ispytaniakh opytnoi ustanovki dli nepreryvnoi varki (Report on implementing and experiments on continuous pulp cooking)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 4. D. 331. L. 4, 8.

74. The ‘thaw’ allowed some criticism of many Soviet realities. In 1956, the Soviet writer Vladimir Dudintsev published his well-known Not by Bread Alone, the story of engineer Lopatkin, who tried to launch the production of pipes for the chemical industry, an unprecedented invention, but one that faced hostility and an impenetrable bureaucracy. The book contained reflections on Soviet industry and implied that engineers were hostile towards new ideas. See Dudintsev, Not by Bread Alone.

75. Barber et al., “The Structure,” 24.76. Stenografichesky otchet 28 sessii Uchenogo soveta instituta o rezultatakh eksperimental`nykh

rabot, provedennykh v 1955–56 gg. na Svetogorskoi ustanovke dlia nepreryvnoi varki sulfitnoi tselliulozy (Minutes of the 28th session of the Scientific Council of the Institute on the results of the experimental scientific research, conducted in 1955–56 on the Svetogosrky` digester for continuous cooking of sulphite pulp//RGANTD SPb. F. 303. Op. 13. D. 281. L. 17.

77. Ibid., 47.78. Control and measuring instruments were a constant problem at the plant. The local archive is

full of complaints of engineers on that there were not instruments available and also that there was a lack of specialists in this field. As a result, the plant initiated special courses in a local technical school to train graduates with relevant expertise. Otchet o rabote Svetogorskogo vechernego tselliulozno-bumazhnogo tekhmikuma (Report on the activities of Svetogorsky pulp and paper technical school)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 1. D. 18. L. 4.

79. M. Serdiukov, M. Popov, A. Vasilenko. Dokladnaya zapiska po voprosu o nepreryvnoi varke tsellulozy na Svetogorskom ZBK Ministerstva bumazhnoi i derevoobrabatyvaiushchei promyshlennosti, 1956 god (Report on continuous pulp cooking in the Svetogorsk pulp and paper plant of the Ministry of Paper and Wood Processing Industry prepared by M. Serdiukov, M. Popov, A. Vasilenko)//RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 2. D. 146. L. 5–6.

80. The reason why a foreign digester was set in the Marisky plant seems to be unclear. It is probable that the Ministry considered that expensive and valuable techniques should be delivered into inner parts of the country, so not installed in the border region.

81. Ibid., 7.82. Pis`mo zampreda Gostekhniki Y. Maksareva v SM SSSR, 14.3.56 (Letter of the vice director

of Gostekhnika Y. Maksarev to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 14th March 1956)//RGAE. F. 9480. Оp. 2. D. 146. L. 9.

83. Protokoly i reshchenia rasshirennogo zasedania Tekhnicheskogo soveta po nepreryvnoi varke, 31.05.1955 (Protocols and decisions of the extended meeting of the Technical council on continuous cooking, 31st May 1955)//LOGAV. F. R-180. Op. 4. D. 332. L. 38.

84. This number of decrees is probable, although I found only five. The sum spent for the project might also be true, but the sources use in this article show it to be much lesser. This letter saying about the results of the meeting does not provide more detailed data, other than final figures.

HISToRy And TEcHnoLogy 129

85. Pis`mo zampreda Gostekhniki U. Maksareva v SM SSSR, 14 marta 1956 goda (Letter of the vice-director of Gostekhnika Y. Maksarev to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 14th March 1956)//RGAE. F. 9480. Op. 2. D. 146. L. 9.

86. Stenografichesky otchet 28 sessii Uchenogo soveta instituta o rezultatakh eksperimental`nykh rabot, provedennykh v 1955–56 gg. na Svetogorskoi ustanovke dlia nepreryvnoi varki sulfitnoi tselliulozy (Minutes of the 28th session of the Scientific Council of the Institute on the results of the experimental scientific research, conducted in 1955–56 on the Svetogosrky` digester for continuous cooking of sulphite pulp//RGANTD SPb. F. 303. Op. 13. D. 281. L. 44.

87. Ibid., 87.88. Ibid., 99.89. Ibid., 101.90. Ibid., 121.91. This might be also explained by Zherebov’s advanced age (in 1956 he was already 93 years

old) and his devotion to highly theoretical work.92. Ibid., 127.93. Sekretariu Karasnogvardeiskogo raionnogo komiteta KPSS Kazakovu M.M. (A Letter to the

secretary of the committee of Krasnogvardeisky region M.M. Kazakov)//RGANTD Samara. F. 613. Op.1–1. D. 171. L.102.

94. Ibid., 196.95. Ibid., 171.96. Berliner, Soviet Industry, 212–3.97. Ibid., 216.98. This project never materialized, however.99. Dokladnaya zapiska ministru po voprosu osvoenoia opytnoi ustanovki dlia skoroi nepreryvnoi

varki na Svetogorskom TsBK (Note to the Minister on the question of experimental digester for quick continuous cooking in Svetogorsk)//RGANTD SPb. F. 303. Op. 12. D. 267. L. 5, 14.

100. Ibid., 30.101. Gregory and Stuart, Soviet and Post-Soviet, 379.102. More on modernization and Khrushchev see, for example, in Modernization in Russia.103. Parrott, Politics and Technology.104. In 1955, for example, the Soviet leadership signed an agreement with Finland on scientific–

technical cooperation. See more on the history of the Committee in Temirbulatova, Gosudarstvennyi komitet.

105. See more in Autio-Sarasmo, ‘Knowledge’106. Perepiska s Otdelom vneshnikh snosheni Ministerstva o naucho-technicheskom

sotrudnichestve s kapitalisticheskimi stranami (Correspondence with the Department on external affairs of the Ministry on scientific-technical cooperation with capitalist countries)//RGANTD SPb. F. 303. Op. 13. D. 339. L. 27–28.

107. Nepreryvnaya varka sulfatnoi tselliulozy i polutselluilozy, M., 1958.108. The destiny of reports was different. Most of them were put into archives and only few

published in newspapers and special booklets.109. Rekomendatsii nauchno-tekhnicheskogo soveshchiania po voprosu uluchshenia

kachestva sul`fitnoi viskoznoi tsellulozy, sozvannogo GKNT SM SSSR i NTO bumazhnoi i derevopererabatyvaiuchshei promyshlennosti, 1960 g. (Recommendations of scientific–technical meeting on improving the quality of sulphite viscose pulp held by the State Committee on Science and Technology of the USSR and scientific–technical society of paper and timber industry)//GARF. F. 409. Op. 1. D. 1190. L. 140.

110. Osanov, “Metod skoroi nepreruvnoi varki,” 47.111. Nepenin, Varka sul`fatnoi tsellulozy, 17.112. Josephson, “War on Nature,” 25.113. Meropriyatiya po uluchsheniu dorozhnogo stroitel`stva v lespromkhozakh kombinata

“Zapkarelles”//NARK. F. R-2979. Op. 1. D. 44/428. L. 1–2.114. Tarasiuk, Osvoenie varochnogo apparata Pandia, 3.115. Ibid., 22.

130 E. KocHETKovA

116. In the USSR, the production of pulp was (in 1000 tons per year) 592 in 1940, 2282 in 1960, 5110 in 1970. The USSR was among the five largest producers of pulp in the world. See Alekhin ‘Tselliulozno-bumazhnaya promyshellnost’.

117. Alekseev, ‘Sozdatel` metoda nepreryvnoi varki,’ 78.118. Maliutin, ‘Sovremennoe konstruktivnoe reshchenie’, 82.119. Hanson, The Comparative Economics, 1.120. The authors of a recent monumental book on the history of pulp and paper industry

issued in Russian, essentially the only one in existence, argues that Zherebov’s ideawas not implemented because of insufficiently organized machinery industry and a lack of required construction materials. The problems, however, seem to be more general, covering resource supply and knowledge circulation. See Istoriya tselluilozno-bumazhnoi promyshlennosti.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Julia Lajus as well as Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Sakari Heikkinen, Niklas Jensen-Eriksen and Mats Fridlund for their valuable comments at the First Annual Conference of the Doctoral Program in Political, Societal and Regional Change in the University of Helsinki.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

The article was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2015–2016 [grant number 15-01-0056] and supported within the framework of a subsidy granted to the HSE by the Government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitiveness Program.

ORCID

Elena Kochetkova   http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9722-1157

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