21st Century Silk Road Narcotics: Establishing Joint Interagency Task Force-Southwest Asia

21st Century Silk Road Narcotics:Establishing Joint Interagency Task Force-Southwest Asia

13 September 2015

Samuel G. AndriessenStudent, American Military University

4125665

Transnational Crime and Narcotics: INTL646

Establishing JIATF-Southwest Asia

Summary

The illicit trafficking of opiates provides financing to terrorist and transnational criminal organizations, including the Taliban in Afghanistan, and currently poses a substantial risk to regional stability in the Middle East and U.S. national security. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports that “90 per cent of the world’s heroin comes from opium grown in just a few regions in Afghanistan… some 380 tons of heroin are produced” (2010, 109). The sale of opium and its derivatives generates an estimated $55 billion, of which a significant portion funds Taliban operations in Afghanistan (UNODC 2010, 111). 375 tons of heroin is trafficked via Pakistan (150 tons), the Islamic Republic of Iran (105 tons), and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (95 tons), where it then proceeds through Africa and Central Asia to its final destination in the U.S., Western Europe, Russia, and China (UNODC 2010, 110).

The National Drug Control Strategy expressly addresses the threat of opium by discussing the importance of disrupting the narcotics-insurgency and the narcotics-corruption nexuses in Afghanistan (2012, 34). A priority action of the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime is disrupting drug trafficking and its facilitation of other transnational crimes (2011, 24). The Department of Defense Counternarcotics and Global Threat Strategy’s first strategic goal is:

To disrupt and, to the degree possible disable, not only the nexus of actors and activities but also the individual activities of trafficking, insurgency, corruption, threat finance, terrorism and distribution of precursor chemicals in Afghanistan/Pakistan such that material support for the insurgency and terrorists is significantly reduced, the Afghan National Police and other law enforcement agencies are strengthened, and the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are reinforced (2011, 13).

In support of these national strategies, this paper proposes the formal establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force-Southwest Asia (JIATF-SWA). Modeled after the JIATF-South and operating under the strategic control U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), this task force would combine the efforts of U.S. military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies along with partner nations to carry out counter-narcotics operations in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The framework already exists within U.S. Naval Central Command (NAVCENT) in the form of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multi-national naval partnership whose mission is to promote security, stability, and prosperity (CMF Website 2015). Two of CMF’s three combined task forces (CTF) currently provide direct support to Middle East allies in counter-narcotics operations: CTF-150 (maritime security and counter-terrorism), and CTF-152 (Arabian Gulf security and cooperation) (CMF Website 2015). JIATF-Southwest Asia would be able to build upon the international relationships already established through CMF with both gulf country partners and coalition members, and then expand by including counter-narcotics subject matter experts from U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), as



well as bridging the gap with intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency (NSA) and other members of the Intelligence Community (IC).



Contents

Introduction ______________________________________________________

Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Gold Model_____________________

1

3

Potential Congressional Concerns _____________________________________ 5

Illegal Activities and Transnational Threats _____________________________ 7

Intelligence Agencies Support Law Enforcement _________________________ 8

Law Enforcement Agencies Acquire International Missions ________________ 9

Managing the Intelligence-Law Enforcement Relationship _________________ 10

Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the War against Terror: The Implications of September 11, 2001 __________________________ 11

Conclusion _______________________________________________________ 12



21st Century Silk Road Narcotics:Establishing Joint Interagency Task Force-Southwest Asia

Introduction

In the decade and a half since the invasion of Afghanistan, global opium production reached the previously unthinkable level of 9,000 tons, with 8,000 tons produced in Afghanistan (UNODC 2010, 109). The U.S. and NATO forces pursued eradication programs targeting poppy crops; the resulting (and predictable, if not understandable) anger of poppy farmers led them to seek Taliban protection, for a ten per cent tax (Lal 2008, 5). The global market for Afghan heroin is approximately $55 billion, and if the estimated $2.3 billion which goes to the farmers and traders in Afghanistan, that ten percent tax equals $230 million funding for the Taliban’s insurgency operations and contributes to the destabilization of Afghanistan. Within the U.S., the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) National Drug Threat Summary reported that based on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, heroin availability increased through the nation, and heroin seizures increased 87 per cent between 2009 to 2014 (2014, 10).

The flow of opium and heroin from Afghanistan proceeds through the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia, then to secondary trade locations in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe before arriving in the final destinations of Russia, China, Western Europe, and the U.S. The U.S., Canada, Europe, Russia, and China represent two thirds of global heroin consumption for a total of 224 tons of heroin (UNODC 2010, 111). The routes heroin traffickers utilize are identifiable by their exploitation of fragile

Transnational Crime and Narcotics: INTL646 1


states as transit points (Miraglia, Ochoa, and Briscoe 2012, 8). Jessica West states that organized crime based on the drug trade in Afghanistan “on the surface appears to be a symptom of state weakness, however; it has created its own dynamics that intensify the causes of state failure and it itself best conceptualized as a proximate cause” (2006, 11).

Heroin trafficking is clearly a threat to regional and national security, and shown to directly fund insurgency operations in Afghanistan. The current force structure, focused on the drawdown of military support and providing training to Afghan security forces while also addressing the increasing threat of the ISIS, is failing to adequately combat the narcotics threat. Within CENTCOM, a singular command structure is necessary to direct combined assets from the U.S. and its allies within and across multiple countries.

Fortunately, such an organization exists: Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), which Admiral James Stavridis, the former Commander of U.S. Southern Command, described as the “crown jewel” of interagency cooperation and intelligence (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 3). JIATF-South coordinates the five branches of U.S. military, nine agencies, and eleven partner nations in a unity of effort, which has become the “gold standard” for whole-of-government organization and success. (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 5). As such, it establishes both the precedent and the framework for future interagency and international task forces, and is the proposed model for the creation of a Joint Interagency Task Force-Southwest Asia.



Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Gold Model

JIATF-South became the gold standard of joint interagency operations for a wide variety of reasons: organizational, team, and individual variables contributed to the evolution and growth of the interagency organizational team (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 79). There is a clear sense of purpose with no ambiguity about the responsibility of JIATF-South: stop the trafficking of narcotics, specifically cocaine, into the U.S. (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 34). The combination of military assets, law enforcement agents, and international partners are then empowered with the authorities of each participating agency and partner, coupled with a prioritized budget model that ensures operational needs are met.

The breadth of authorities present as a result of the cooperating agencies is a force multiplier for JIATF-South mission execution and success. For example, DoD units cannot make arrests under the Posse Comitatus Act; however, the U.S. Coast Guard does the have authority under Title 14 of the U.S. Code. Under established agreements, Coast Guard law enforcement officers on board U.S. or partner nation vessel will exercise the Coast Guard’s authority, with the vessel striking its own flag and flying the Coast Guard Ensign prior to conducting a counter-narcotics boarding (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 39).

Using the six lessons Munsing and Lamb list that would apply to the development of any future interagency teams, the following provides detail as to the elements that would require development, as well as those that already exist, for the establishment of JIATF-Southwest Asia (2011, 83-85):

1. Get a mandate from a higher authority: The mandate for JIATF-Southwest Asia would focus on eradicating the trafficking of heroin and illegal opiates out of Afghanistan, and eliminating the source of funding for the Taliban. The legal basis for JIATF-Southwest Asia is tied to the following national strategies:

a. 2012 National Drug Control Strategy:

i. Conduct Joint Counterdrug Operations with International Partners;

ii. Work with Partners in Europe, Africa, and Asia to Disrupt Drug Flows in the Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific Regions;

iii. Disrupt the Narcotics-Insurgency Nexus and the Narcotics-Corruption Nexus in Afghanistan; and,

iv. Disrupt Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Transit Zone (32-36).



b. 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Disrupt Drug Trafficking and Its Facilitation of Other Transnational Threats (24-25).

c. 2011 DoD Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy:

i. To disrupt and, to the degree possible disable, not only the nexus of actors and activities but also the individual activities of trafficking, insurgency, corruption, threat finance, terrorism and distribution of precursor chemicals in Afghanistan/Pakistan such that material support for the insurgency and terrorists is significantly reduced, the Afghan National Police and other law enforcement agencies are strengthened, and the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are reinforced; and,

ii. The size, scope, and influence of targeted TCOs and trafficking networks are mitigated such that these groups pose only limited, isolated threats to U.S. national security and international security (13-16).

d. 2012 DoD Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership - Priorities for 21st Century Defense: Counter terrorism and irregular warfare; Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations (4-6).

2. Tailor a holistic solution set to a discrete problem: Similar to JIATF-South, the singular mission of JIATF-Southwest Asia would be stopping drug trafficking out of Afghanistan; combining intelligence, service and agency assets, and secure cooperation of international partners; and resulting in drug shipments disrupted, traffickers prosecuted, the Taliban and terrorist groups weakened.

3. Know your partners: JIATF-Southwest Asia could build on the relationships already cultivated within JIATF-South to build the initial foundation for operations and tactics. The challenge for organizational leadership will be buy-in from international partners to build an effective coalition. The following international initiatives have been implemented with regards to trafficking in Afghanistan and neighboring countries (UNODC 2015):

a. Paris Pact Initiative: Regional coordination program for countries affected by Afghan heroin trafficking, concentrating on strengthening border controls, regional cooperation, and counter-narcotics legal reform and frameworks.

b. Triangular Initiative: Called for greater cooperation as result of the Paris Pact Expert Round Table recommendations. Enhances cross—border cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.



c. Rainbow Strategy: Umbrella framework to facilitate implementation of priority actions identified at Paris Pact Expert Round Tables.

d. Central Asian Regional and Information Coordination Centre (CARICC): Facilitates information and intelligence exchange and analysis, and coordinates operational activities.

4. Get resources: Resourcing an interagency and international coalition can become a bureaucratic catastrophe that kills the initiative before it can get off the ground. Fortunately, JIATF-South established a precedent for funding counter-narcotic operations. Currently, JIATF-South requests fund through its Combatant Commander, SOUTHCOM, which Congress then appropriates into a specific counter-narcotics account which can only be utilized by JIATF-South (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 36). JIATF-Southwest Asia would therefore request funds through CENTCOM and those funds then placed into an accounting string specifically established for counter-narcotics operations. Additionally, resourcing operations is facilitated by a current presence of forces within the CENTCOM area of responsibility, including DEA, FBI, CIA, and DIA, as well as an established relationship with nations participating in CMF and concurrent UNODC initiatives.

5. Build networks: The number of interested parties focused on stabilizing the Middle East provides the necessary framework for building on existing networks. JIATF-Southwest Asia’s access to various U.S. agencies and international partners would allow it to draw specific resources with specialized expertise for sensitive missions or capitalize on wide spectrum training for general stabilization and training operations.

Potential Congressional Concerns

The creation of JIATF-Southwest Asia will require extensive diplomatic work to establish the requisite legal framework by which the participating nations can investigate and prosecute cases. Narcotic trafficking has been declared illegal by international treaties, but the trafficking of narcotics is not a universal crime, meaning countries have a requirement to suppress the transit of illegal narcotics without the universal jurisdiction for enforcement (Best 2001, 8). Article 108 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states: “1) All States shall cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to international conventions; and 2) Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying its flag is engaged in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may request cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic” (UNCLOS 1982).

Article 110 of the UNCLOS provides jurisdictional authority for “a warship, which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other that a ship entitled to complete



immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96… may proceed to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag” if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that “the ship is engaged in piracy, the ship is engaged in the slave trade, the ship is without nationality, or though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship” (UNCLOS 1982).

A key to JIATF-South’s success is the bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements in place with partner nations that extend certain jurisdictional authorities to assets in order for a boarding team to embark and conduct a right of visit boarding. An example of this was provided to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation by Read Admiral Wayne Justice, former Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Capabilities:

For a foreign flagged vessel, the Coast Guard tactical commander implements a bi-lateral agreement or arrangement in force with the vessel’s flag state to confirm registry, and to stop, board and search the vessel for drugs. If drugs are found, jurisdiction and disposition over the vessel, drugs and crew are coordinated with the State Department, DOJ [Department of Justice], and the flag state (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 3).

CMF currently performs limited operations in this capacity, but it is also constrained by a lack of distinct bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements. CMF is a voluntary partnership that conducts maritime security and counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Oman (CMF Website 2015). In this capacity, it conducts approaches and right of visit boardings of vessels to verify nationality, and uses this basis to build reasonable suspicion of illicit trafficking, which then allows the boarding team to conduct a more thorough examination of the vessel. While, the process of requesting permission for partner flag states is similar, it is not nearly as efficient as that of JIATF-South. Additionally, the nature of the suspect vessels is different from those JIATF-South targets in that the local dhows (the most common type of fishing vessel found in the Middle East) do fly state flags while go-fasts and pangas native to JIATF-South’s area of operations do not fly flags. This is significant because rather than utilizing the more expedient process of declaring a vessel without nationality, boarding a flagged vessel requires explicit permission from the flag state, which can take hours depending on the relationship with the flag state and the level of authority necessary for permission.

In spite of the unique challenges CMF encounters, it does have concrete successes. In April 2014, HMAS Darwin, an Australian warship, seized 1,032 kilograms of heroin from a suspicious dhow in the Indian Ocean, the largest heroin seizure in CMF’s hisotry (CMF Website 2014). Combined Task Force 150 seizures of heroin in 2014 totaled 2,367 kilograms and 2,044 kilograms in 2013 (CMF Website 2014). The seizures are the coordinated effort of CTF 150’s boarding teams and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) as part of a “determined multinational campaign by maritime forces to disrupt drug smuggling in the Indian Ocean, profits from which are known to provide funding for terrorist organisations including Al Qaeda and the Taliban” (CMF Website 2014).



Another jurisdictional matter that will have to be resolved regards prosecution for traffickers. JIATF-South has a well-established process for the disposition of traffickers within the U.S. judicial system. Detaining, transferring, prosecuting, and convicting traffickers from the Middle East and Southwest Asia presents a logistical issue, as well as an international relations dilemma given the harsher punishments imposed by Muslim countries. In a 2001 report to Congress, Best states that “To bring someone from a foreign country to trial in the U.S. or to act directly to impede criminal activity in a foreign country, the U.S., or its agents, is breaking (or, at the very least, coming close to the edge of) the law of another country (or even customary international law)” (Best, 28).

Illegal Activities and Transnational Threats

President Reagan quickly recognized the growing threats of terrorism and narcotics trafficking, and issued Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, assigning the CIA responsibility for collecting and producing intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production, and authorizing intelligence agencies to “participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities” (Best 2001, 11). In 1986, President Reagan went further and enacted National Security Decision Directive 221, declaring narcotics trafficking a national security threat, authorizing the Secretary of Defense to take measures that would “enable U.S. military forces to support counternarcotics efforts more actively” (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 9).

In 2010, the U.S. DEA reported that 19 of 44 U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations participate in the illegal drug trade (Johnson 2010). The United Nations estimates that the international drug trade generates $322 billion per year (Jacobson and Levitt, 2010, 118). ). The sale of opium and its derivatives generates an estimated $55 billion, of which a significant portion funds Taliban operations in Afghanistan (UNODC 2010, 111). 375 tons of heroin is trafficked via Pakistan (150 tons), the Islamic Republic of Iran (105 tons), and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (95 tons), where it then proceeds through Africa and Central Asia to its final destination in the U.S., Western Europe, Russia, and China (UNODC 2010, 110).



The United Nations stated that “Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a menace to States and societies, eroding human security and the fundamental obligation of States to provide for law and order” (Miraglia, Ochoa, and Briscoe 2012, 13). In addition to undermining governmental institutions and establishing illicit economies which further weaken legitimate economic development, TOC and DTO groups also capitalize on corruption to further advance their control and freedom of operations (Miraglia, Ochoa, and Briscoe 2012, 13). As states fail to deter criminal organizations, groups that are more radical will take advantage of the fragile governance to build their bases of operation, as was the case with al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and its connection to the Taliban.

The regional implications of heroin trafficking are evident in the cases of the Central Asian countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In Turkmenistan, there is evidence that not only was the state refusing international pressure to secure its borders and the trafficking of narcotics through the country, but that it was implicitly involved in trafficking in that drugs, and specifically Afghan heroin, were not only being stowed within the Central Bank but also in the presidential palace (Lewis 2010, 42-43). In Tajikistan, its close ties with the Afghan Northern Alliance resulted in Tajikistan becoming a key conduit for heroin (Lewis 2010, 44). President Emomali Rahmon conducted purges of rivals within his own government to consolidate control and establish a monopoly over the drug trade, to the level that the Drug Control Agency maintained dominance over rivals (Lewis 2010, 44). It is suspected that convoys of vehicles trafficking heroin and precursor chemicals between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan exists, but there is a complete lack of cooperation on the part of the Uzbek government (Lewis 2010, 45). Bayaman Erkinbaev, an alleged drug kingpin who controlled a key trafficking route through Osh in Kyrgyzstan, was elected to parliament with 95 per cent of the vote (Lewis 201, 46). Gang violence and killings in the mid-2000s were the result of rival groups competing for dominance and leaving the political control of Kyrgyzstan in upheaval, although trafficking itself remained unchanged (Lewis 2010, 46).

In addition to instability in the source region, narcotics trafficking negatively impacts transit nations as well. The effects of narcotics trafficking are clear in the violence of Central America, the political unrest in Africa, and overall trends of corruption within government agencies around the world. Compounded by the actual effects of narcotics, there is a distinct connection between drug trafficking organizations, TCOs, terrorist groups, and global insecurity.

Intelligence Agencies Support Law Enforcement

Intelligence support of law enforcement has developed significantly since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Agreements between Intelligence Community (IC) agencies and law enforcement agencies have enhanced the efficacy and scope of operations, and oversight ensures appropriate separation of law enforcement sensitive information and national intelligence. JIATF-South is a textbook example of the integration between sensitive intelligence gained and using only that information relevant to law enforcement so that sources are not revealed, as well as separating information obtained about U.S. citizens (which is for law enforcement use only) from the IC. JIATF-



South has invested heavily in developing its intelligence assets, or tactical analysis teams (TATs); ten per cent of JIATF-South’s staff serves on its twenty TATs and provides DoD counternarcotics and drug related intelligence to its Embassy Country Teams (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 70). TATs also have the advantage of being directly “plugged into a network of downrange counterdrug intelligence sources” (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 25).

The relationship JIATF-South developed with its IC partners has resulted in secondary benefits. The National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency have designated JIATF-South a “tactical live environment test bed to test and evaluate current and emerging technologies against highly mobile dark asymmetrical threats” (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 38). Using new technology and tactics not only ensures that JIATF-South (and in correlation, the IC by using established and proven technology) remains on the forefront of tactics and maintains an operational edge over DTOs, it encourages continued cooperation and sharing of ideas amongst otherwise segregated agencies.

One of the best examples of intelligence programs successfully supporting law enforcement was the establishment of Panama Express (PANEX). After his 1998 arrest and extradition to the U.S., Castrillon Henao, the “movement coordinator” for Pablo Escobar, provided such valuable information that enforcement officials built Panama Express, an interagency organized crime drug enforcement Task Force (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 25-26). PANEX includes representatives from the DEA, FBI, IRS, ICE, Coast Guard, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Sarasota, Hillsborough, and Pinellas Counties Sheriff’s Offices, and its intelligence has contributed to the disruption of 600 metric tons of cocaine and successful prosecution of 1,300 smugglers (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 26). While the initial success of PANEX was due to information provided by one individual, it is the combined efforts of all participating agencies that resulted in its sustained successes. It is that characteristic which lends the PANEX model to be applicable for other interagency operations, especially JIATF-Southwest Asia because it utilizes the experience and expertise of teams that have an established track record for success.

Law Enforcement Agencies Acquire International Missions

The role of law enforcement agencies in a smaller, more connected world in which crimes can take place simultaneously across international jurisdictions has evolved considerably in the fourteen years following September 11, 2001. As homeland security and national defense spheres of influence converged, law enforcement agencies began to undertake an increasingly more significant role in War on Terror. FBI, DEA, ICE, and CBP have officials serving in embassies as attachés throughout the world. Their involvement in TATs is one reason why the intelligence and law enforcement nexus has been so effective within JIATF-South.

Following the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia, in which 19 U.S. military personnel were killed, DoJ and FBI personnel conducted an investigation (Best 2001, 22). Although investigators received little cooperation from the



Saudi government, it was an important development in legal investigation outside the jurisdiction of the U.S.

Currently, CMF incorporates NCIS agents assisting in the interdiction and seizure of narcotics within the NAVCENT area of responsibility. NCIS’ coordination with CMF has resulted in the seizure and destruction of 1.7 tons of illegal narcotics (CMF 2015). Despite its name, NCIS is a U.S. federal law enforcement agency that protects and defends the Department of the Navy, and is a component of the Transnational Organized Crimes Unit responsible for countering narcotics, piracy, and terrorism maritime missions (CMF 2015).

The added benefit of agencies operating overseas on international and interagency initiatives is the sharing of training, tactics, and procedures. One such example is the U.S. Coast Guard’s Middle East Training Team (METT), assigned to NAVCENT headquarters in Manama, Bahrain. The METT is composed of law enforcement and Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) experts and provide training to partner nations and agencies on at sea boarding tactics. The METT has provided training to all Gulf Country Coalition and CMF coalition members, as well as nations in Africa. The METT’s training of VBSS teams has been vital to the execution of at sea seizures of heroin and other illicit contraband. The state-of-the-art training facility available to the METT includes a full-sized dhow, as well as a system of containers simulating a shipboard environment, and is used by all tenant NAVCENT commands and international partners.

Managing the Intelligence-Law Enforcement Relationship

JIATF-South succeeds because it “monitors over 1,000 potential air and sea targets a day, looking for only two or three that it will zero in on as high priority suspects” (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 77). The relationship between intelligence and law enforcement has to be carefully managed, however, because lives are at risk if intelligence is carelessly used and a source revealed in the process. The combination of human intelligence, TATs, PANEX, and signals intelligence means that drugs could be tracked from when they departed to interdiction: “The intelligence led to very successful, predicable outcomes,” recalled a former director, “We knew what was happening. There was no risk. We could put assets right where [the traffickers] would be. But there were repercussions… A lot of our informants were killed” (Munsing and Lamb 2011, 27).

In addition to the danger intelligence sharing during law enforcement cases poses to sources, there are legal concerns that may affect the prosecution of cases. Because defendants have a right to review all evidence brought against them in the spirit of due process, the opportunity exists for disclosure of classified information (and thus the comprise of sources) to be necessary for prosecution or risk the case being dismissed on Constitutional grounds (Best 2001, 17). Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey “challenged the efforts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to use classified material to justify deportation of several Iraqis without sharing it with him as their counsel” (Best 2001, 17). JIATF-South has overcome this challenge by instituting procedures so that even if intelligence was used in the interdiction of a suspected



narcotics trafficking vessel, the boarding team is required to develop probable cause during their boarding to justify a search. In this way, boarding officers use their own experience and training to locate and seize narcotics without relying on intelligence, and thereby ensuring that all evidence obtained is admissible in court.

A balance will be required between acting on intelligence to investigate a case and allowing an event to develop, even if other illegal activity is not enforced (Best 2001, 15). This would be particularly challenging for JIATF-Southwest Asia to manage given the direct nexus between narcotics and terrorism. Protecting a source and continuing intelligence gathering may outweigh the benefits of executing a case, especially if there is a greater national security concern involved; this would be a decision that would likely require an command decision, whether at the Combatant Commander or Commander-In-Chief level. Preventing the funding by narcotics for terrorist groups becomes irrelevant if sensitive sources are lost or killed who were providing invaluable information on a potential attack.

Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the War against Terror: The Implications of September 11, 2001

The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act expanded authorities of both intelligence and law enforcement agencies and enhanced information sharing (Best 2001, 5). The statute eased restrictions on law enforcement agencies established in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, such as allowing exploitation of information technologies and wire tapping, and transferring foreign intelligence information obtained from law enforcement sources to intelligence agencies (Best 2001, 30). In the decade and a half since its passage, the USA PATRIOT Act remains a controversial source of authorities to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. As revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013, those authorities were utilized by agencies to significantly expand intelligence collection methods, including the collection of phone record “meta-data” of U.S. citizens.

Continued and emerging threats constantly force changes in global security. The Arab Spring, once thought to be the vanguard of popular democratic ideals in the Middle East, has devolved into civil unrest that has left Shia minorities targeted by Sunni governments and increased the number of radicalized groups in the region. Al- Qa’ida has expanded its influence to the Arabian Peninsula. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has taken advantage of instability within Syria and Iraq to establish a radical caliphate. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, despite international sanctions and pressure to allow inspectors in the country. The military drawdown in Afghanistan threatens prolonged stability of the state. Iranian backed Houthi rebels, threatening Saudi Arabia’s influence on the Arabian Peninsula, ousted the recognized government of Yemen.

These threats demand a whole-of-government approach that incorporates unrivaled coordination between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The multi-faceted



threats are as complex as any faced during the Cold War, and it requires interoperability to address them. The uncomfortable reality is that a teenager with a computer is as capable of hacking into banking systems as government databases or releasing classified documents, and all having dire consequences to national security.

Conclusion

The globalization of communications, travel, information exchange, and technology has created immediately recognizable improvements to the quality of life and understanding of the global community. It has also produced previously unimaginable challenges in how transnational criminal organizations, drug trafficking organizations, and terrorist groups have utilized gaps in regulations and security to exploit those advances. Regional instability and security crisis have effects that are far more profound on the global commons than at any other time in history. As the roles of the U.S. and its coalition allies change in the Middle East, command and control structures need to evolve to ensure that agency interoperability remains robust enough to address regional security concerns while also being flexible to adapt to changing tactics.

JIATF-South has repeatedly demonstrated the capability to mesh assets from law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies into a singular entity with a singular purpose and a proven record of accomplishment. Not only has it successfully integrated agencies and partnerships that have limited similarities, it has proven that utilizing different agencies is in fact a force multiplier in terms of mission accomplishment. Additionally, by maintaining a forward-looking posture, it has remained flexible enough to face new threats and counter with new tactics.

The flow of heroin out of Afghanistan directly threatens the progress made over the past fourteen years. Much like the cocaine trafficking from South and Central America, heroin entrenches itself in the corrupt and fragile states and festers within, resulting in a greater crises as political structures fail to provide necessary governance to the population. JIATF-Southwest Asia would create the necessary structure for a unity of effort focused on eradicating the illicit trafficking of heroin. By taking a holistic approach that takes into account the growing, production, interdiction, prevention, training, and deterrence necessary, JIATF-Southwest Asia can achieve not only a reduction in the production of heroin and trafficking of illegal opiates, but also enhance the rule of law necessary for Afghanistan to be a functional, fully self-sufficient state and in turn stabilize the region.



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Documents

21st Century Silk Road Narcotics: Establishing Joint Interagency Task Force-Southwest Asia