BOOK REVIEWS BY A.H AMIN

1999-2008

Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired)

The author of Book Reviews

History of The Baloch Regiment

1820-1939-The Colonial Period-Major

General Rafiuddin Ahmad (Retired) -

Published by Baloch Regiment

Centre, Abbottabad; Printed by

Central Army Press Rawalpindi (First

Edition, 1998.)

Reviewed by A.H AMIN

October 2001

The two volumes on the history of the

Baloch Regiment are a welcome edition

to the extremely short list of books on

Pakistani Military History. The first volume

covers the period from 1820 to 1939

while the second volume covers the

period from 1939 to 1956. Major General

Rafiuddin Ahmed took to military writing

at an early stage in his military career

and came to be regarded as an

accomplished military writer by the time

he reached colonel rank in the mid early

1970s. This scribe read a bunch of one of

his excellent writeups on German

Airborne Warfare in 1975-76 at Quetta.

These were presented to my father by

then Lieutenant Colonel Rafi and as far as

I recollect the general was then an

instructor at the command and staff

college Quetta. The writers father in laws

family were active members of Aligarh

Old Boys Association Rawalpindi .The

readers may note that the most active

members of this association included a

prominent Baluchi Brigadier Gulzar

Ahmad, and most meetings of the

association were held at this scribes

grandfathers residence in Rawalpindi ,

which now houses the Darya Abad Girls

School. A major qualification of General

Rafi is that in essence he is not a member

of the “Typical Prototype Generals Trade

Union” having been promoted to general

rank a little late ! Before we proceed

further it is important to caution the

layman reader about the immense odds

that a military writer confronts once he

writes a regimental history ! Writing a

regimental history of an infantry regiment

consisting of many battalions which

participated in many wars including two

world wars spread over an 180 years

period is a gigantic undertaking ! It is but

natural that any such enterprise cannot

be perfect or free of factual as well as

analytical errors ! In addition it must be

remembered that Indo Pak and this

includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,

Nepal, and Sri Lanka is not a “History

Friendly” Region and “Intellectual

Honesty” is the rarest commodity in all

official quarters whether civil or military

in this entire region of intellectual

darkness. Organisations as well as

political parties are run on the basis of

personal interest rather than national

interest and at least two Indo Pak Wars

were triggered by individuals who were

motivated by egoistic and personal rather

than nationalistic motivations disguised in

high sounding slogans! The readers must

also note that General Rafi’s history is

one which although not an official history

was “officially sponsored” in terms of

financial support and thus the general, as

happens with all official or officially

supported intellectual ventures, even in

far more advanced western countries,

was allowed to proceed in a certain

officially prescribed course which did not

allow him to be too critical in conduct of

operations of the post 1947 period

involving “Sacred Cows” of the Pakistani

military establishment. In the first volume

however the general has been more

critical since those who called the shots

then are now patronless skeletons, little

more than footnotes of history and their

conduct can be criticised. The general has

however made an effort to do some

critical analysis “in between the lines”

which is reasonable! At places he has

been uncritical but the first volume is

certainly better since history is easier to

be written when the actors have long

been dead and are in no position to cause

any mental or physical discomfiture to the

historian in question!The military history

of various battalions of the regiment has

been covered in an excellent manner

linking the unit’s role with the overall

military situation. The narrative is most

interesting since the author has included

various incidents from unit histories

involving details of battle actions in which

gallantry awards were won or accounts

dealing with military personalities. The

author does not hesitate from giving his

opinion on various historical aspects and

this makes the narrative more interesting.

The battle accounts are supported by

excellent maps although credits for most

have not been mentioned in the

acknowledgement section. The

photographs and paintings are of

excellent quality and make the book very

interesting to read. The author has taken

pains to highlight the role of the Baluchis

in various remote campaigns in East

Africa in the late 1890s. Many in Pakistan

were not aware of these campaigns. The

acounts dealing with the Sepoy Rebellion

of 1857 and the First World War are

extremely well done . The analysis

integrates the pure military history aspect

with the Indo Pak and particularly Indo

Muslim point of view. It is a difficult

exercise since the Indian Army was a

mercenary army and employed to fight

against the freedom fighters! The writer

has managed to highlight the

performance of the Baluch Regiment and

has also been symapthetic to the

Freedom Fighters. For some reason he did

not have any sympathy with the Sindhi

Hurs, but this shall be discussed in the

next review of volume two.The strangest

part of the work is absence of an

introduction or a foreword by any retired

or serving Baluchi officer! This perhaps is

an indication of the lack of importance

that we attach to anything connected

with intellectual activity! The emphasis

remains on self projection, personal

advancement and personal fortune

building ! We have a large number of so

called illustrious retired officers! One visit

to ’Pindi, Islamabad or Lahore is enough

to prove their existence in terms of

material progress! But what is their

intellectual contribution to posterity in

terms of transferring conceptual and

intellectual experiences! Nil! All did

exceedingly well on paper but have

nothing to pen down! Ayub the longest

serving chief wrote a book but that book

had little to do with military history!

Yahya was held in detention till he died

and wrote little or we know little about

what he wrote! The breed of Attique, A.I

Akram etc is extinct! The lack of three or

four pages written by any senior officer,

serving or retired, and the Baluch

Regiment did produce many generals(!)

as opening remarks in General Rafi’s

history is without doubt an irrefutable

proof of our intellectual bankruptcy!The

first volume contains factual errors which

were entirely avoidable had the writer

relied simply on three or four standard

books on Indian Military history. The

Safavids were overthrown not by Nadir

Shah (Page-8) but by the Ghilzai Pathans

from Afghanistan, who were previously

Persian subjects and who in turn were

overthrown by Nadir Shah in 1726. The

Marhattas reached the outskirts of Delhi

not in 1738 (Page-9) but in 1737 (Refers-

Page-436-Oxford History of India-Percival

Spear-1937 and Page-294-Later Mughals-

Volume Two-William Irvine-Calcutta-1921-

22). The assertion that “An Afghan power

arose in Kabul” (Page-Nine and Ten) is

also incorrect. Ahmad Shah Abdali was

crowned as the first king of Afghanistan

at Kandahar in 1748 at the age of 23 and

captured Kabul later but kept his capital

at Kandahar till his death and is buried in

Kandahar. Ahmad Shah did not begin his

career as a Mughal adversary (Page-Nine)

but as a soldier in Nadir Shah’s army and

later made his entry into real power

politics once he plundered Nadir Shah’s

treasure in the chaotic situation after

Nadir’s assasination by his Qizilbash

generals. Ahmad Shah Abdali annexed

Punjab not in 1754 (Page-10) but in 1751-

52 (Refers-Page-434-The Cambridge

History of India-Volume Four-The Mughal

Period-Edited by Wolsely Haig and

Richard Burn). The assertion that Ahmad

Shah Abdali won the gratitude of Muslims

and Hindus alike for defeating Marathas is

also debatable. The target of both the

Afghans and the Marathas were the rich

and in this regard they did not give

anyone a waiver simply because he was a

Muslim or a Hindu! As a matter of fact

Abdali proclaimed by Iqbal as a great

hero mercilessly subjected Muslim Delhi

and Muslim Punjab to merciless slaughter,

rapine and plunder and his deeds are a

frequent subject of even poetical works of

Muslim poets like Waris Shah and Mir Taqi

Mir! The layman reader may note that the

loot that this so called soldier of Islam

gathered in 1757 alone from Muslim Delhi

was carried from Delhi to Afghanistan by

28,000 transport animals ! (Refers-The

Pursuit of Urdu Literature-Ralph Russell-

Zed Books-London -1997-Distributed by

Vanguard Books-Lahore). Delhi was

captured by Lake not in 1805 (Page-11)

but September 1803. The writer has

supported 1st Punjab’s claim (Page-30) of

being the 3rd Battalion of Coastal Sepoys

which in reality was the result of Lord

Roberts decision to replace Madrasis with

Punjabi manpower in the period 1885-

1893. It is an indisputable fact that the

post 1885 Punjabi manpower had nothing

to do with the pre 1885 battlehonours of

the 2nd, 6th,16th, 22nd and 24th Madras

Native Infantry which to date they claim

as their own. The men of 3rd Battalion of

Coastal Sepoys were not the ancestors of

the post 1885 manpower of 1st Punjab.

Technically the First Punjabi claim is right

but historically and ethnically no one can

deny the fact that some two third of the

manpower of the Madras Infantry of pre

1885 was South Indian Hindu. The 1st

Punjabis should thank Lord Roberts for

getting the pre 1885 Battle Honours won

by a regiment which consisted of some

two third Madrasi Hindus and one third

Muslims of mixed ancestry. Lord Hastings

tenure lasted not from 1814-23 (Page-38)

but from 1813-1823 having begun from

13th October 1813 (Refers-Page-238-A

Popular History of British India-W. Cooke

Taylor-1854-Reprinted Mittal Publications-

Delhi-1987). The assertion that the

“British Government in India tried to

salvage its position through swift

retaliation “(Page-41) i.e teaching

Afghans a lesson is incorrect. The actual

happenings were as following. The British

Governor General Ellenborough was

irresolute and simply wanted to withdraw

the Bengal and Bombay Armies from

Kandahar and Jalalabad. His generals i.e

Nott and Pollock were more resolute and

knew well by their experience of having

Jallalabad and Kandahar successfully that

the predominantly Hindu sepoys of the

Bengal and Madras Armies and a smaller

nucleus of British regiments could still

teach the Afghans some parting lesson by

once again capturing Kabul. It was

resolution on part of both these

indomitable generals that the British

recaptured Kabul once again in

Seprember 1842 and then withdrew the

Bengal and Bombay Armies via the longer

route i.e Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul-

Jalalabad-Khaibar. (Refers-Pages-269 and

270- A History of the British Army-Volume

XII-1839-1852-Hon J.W Fortescue-

Macmillan and Co Limited-London-1927

and Refers-Page-407-Cooke Taylor-Op

Cit). The Governor General had initially

given simple orders to withdraw from

Afghanistan in May 1842. It was under

military pressure that he agreed to a

withdrawal after recapturing Kabul ! The

statement that “In January 1843 Amir

Dost Mohammad returned to Kabul”

(Page-41) is misleading and implies that

this “Amir” was fighting some kind of war

of liberation. As a matter of fact this Amir

had surrendered to the East India

Company’s troops on 3rd November 1840

and living a comfortable life as a state

prisoner with a large number of wives at

Ludhiana . He was released not because

of the myth in Afghanistan that he was

exchanged for British prisoners (who had

a matter of fact been released in 1842 by

a British punitive column) but simply

because Ellenborough had decided to

follow a policy of good will as the Afghans

had not harmed the British non

combatant hostages. The British losses at

Battle of Miani are described as heavy

(Page-50) although they were not

relatively heavy (about 62 Killed and 194

wounded) once compared to British

Indian Battles of that time like Assaye,

Chillianwalla etc. The writer states that

there were very few all Muslim battalions

in Indian Army except the three Baluch

Battalions (Page-61). The Bengal Army

had six All Muslim infantry Battalions in

1893 i.e the 5th, 12th, 17th, 18th, 33rd

and 40th.I was unable to find footnote

one in the main text of chapter six. This

probably was a printing error. The

spellings of Fortescue are not

“Fortesque”. Delhi was garrisoned not by

six infantry regiments on 11th May 1857

(Page-80) but by three i.e the 38th, 54th,

and 74th Bengal Native Infantry. There

were no British detachments in Delhi

(Page 80) but few British ordnance

personnel serving as technical staff in the

magazine. Detachment in strict military

terminology means a subunit in between

an infantry section or platoon. The writer

states that there were Bengal Army units

in Sindh (Page-81). This is incorrect since

there were no Bengal Army units in Sindh

in 1857. The two native units i.e 14 and

21 Native Infantry were Bombay Army

units. The two Bengal Army units bearing

numbers 14 and 21 Bengal Native

Infantry were at Peshawar and Jhelum

respectively. 14 NI rebelled and was

destroyed while 21 NI remained loyal,

survived the rebellion and still survives as

a unit of the Indian Army.Both the

Bombay Army units in Sindh in 1857

however had a large number of

Hindustanis and one of them i.e the 21

Native Infantry did rebel .Bengal Army

was withdrawn from Sindh after 1850 and

the area was a part of Bombay

Presidency. Nicholson was not a captain

from the British Army (Page-86) but from

the private Bengal Army of the English

East India Company. The term “Maratha

Army” ( Page-95,104 etc) is

misleading.The Gwalior Contingent led by

Tantia Topi consisted of Hindustani

(Refers -The Revolt in Central India-1857-

59-Intelligence Branch-Army

Headquarters- Simla-1908.) troops

serving in Gwalior state and hardly had

any Marathas. The only other troops that

Tantia led consisted of Hindustani

regiments of Bengal Army stationed in

Central India or the Doab. The Sepoy

Rebellion had some Maratha leaders but

very few Maratha soldiers since the

largely Maratha Bombay Army never

rebelled.It is incorrect that the caste basis

was abolished and enrolment of Brahmins

was discouraged (Page-112) in the post

1857 reorganisation . As a matter of fact

there were no class basis in the

companies of the pre 1857 Bengal Army

and all classes were mixed in each

company . On the other hand companies

were recruited strictly on “One Class” or

“One Caste” basis in the reorganised post

1857 Bengal Army. After 1857 more loyal

than the king loyalists like Sayyid Ahmad

Khan became self styled consultants on

the policy of divide and rule and

suggested to their British masters that

the rebellion of 1857 had started because

“ Government certainly did put the two

antagonistic races into the same

regiment, but constant intercourse had

done its work and the two races in a

regiment had almost become one. It is

but natural and to be expected, that a

feeling of friendship and brotherhood

must spring up between the men of a

regiment, constantly brought together as

they are. They consider themselves as

one body and thus it was that the

difference which exists between Hindoos

and Mahomeddans had, in these

regiments, been almost entirely

smoothed away. “( Refers- Page-66-

Causes of the Indian Revolt-1858-Sayyid

Ahmad Khan- Written after 1857 rebellion

and presented to Lord Canning the

Governor General) As late as 1885 there

were “caste companies” as well as

companies based on “ethnic classes” or

“ethnic class cum religion”.Thus there

were at least 25 “Hindustani Hindu

Brahman Infantry Companies” in the

Bengal Army out of total 352 regular

infantry companies (Refers-Pages-406

& 407-A Sketch of the Services of

the Bengal Army up to year 1895-Lieut

F.G Cardew-Office of the Superintendent

Government Printing Press-Calcutta-

1903).The assertion that the first

contingent consisting of Indian troops

west of Suez consisting of 126

Baluchistan Infantry in 1878 (Page-129) is

also incorrect.The first Indian troops were

employed west of Suez Canal was in 1801

(when the Suez Canal had not been

excavated) (Refers-Pages 74 & 75-

Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit). These consisted

of troops of Bengal and Bombay Armies.

There is no doubt that the first Indian VC

was won by the Baluch Regiment.

However the writer should have

mentioned that Indians became eligible

for this award only from 1911. Lettow

Vorbeck complimented 11 Baluch but the

odds that Lettow Vorbeck faced were a

hundred time greater than any Indian

British or South African troops.The

readers may note that Lettow Vorbeck

with just maximum 3,500 white troops

and maximum 12,000 native troops kept

at bay some 300,000 British South African

Colonial and Indian troops inflicting

15,000 battle casualties on the allies ,

some 700,000 disaeses casualties , one

camp followers are included and a

financial loss of 350 Million US Dollars

finally withdrawing into Portueguese East

Africa .(Refers-Pages-183 & 184-

Concise History of WW ONE-Brig

Vincent.J.Esposito-Pall Mall Press-London-

1965) .Lettow did not surrender till the

end and did so only once he heard that

Germany had concluded an armistice with

the allies!The assertion that Afghanistan

took advantage of the British involvement

in the Great War(Page-217) and attacked

British India is also incorrect.The Afghans

missed the golden period in WW One

once India was defended by a total of just

15,000 British troops (Refers -Page-479-

Cambridge History of India-Volume

Six ) .Once they attacked the British the

war was already over and the British had

reinforced India. The most serious

drawback of the book is the fact that

exact class composition of each battalion

in WW One and in the period 1919-39 has

not been given.The readers must note

that errors are a natural part of any

historical work.The resource starved and

intellectually barren Pakistani society is

not “Research friendly”.Pakistani scholars

cannot hire research associates like

Churchill could.It is a one man show and

once one man does it , it is but natural

that more errors will be committed.

Nevertheless the writer did a

commendable job.His achievements have

to be viewed in the relative dimension.

What is the contribution of our senior

retired officers to military writing?

Nominal ! In this regard General Rafi’s

history is a positive contribution ! At least

he has made a significant attempt to add

something to the limited amount of

analytical and factual data of Pakistani

military history. I remember a letter I

received from General Tirmizi in reply to a

tactical paper that I had sent him.Tirmizi

wrote “ I have not studied the concept

but I do commend your effort for taking

so much pain and coming up with

something thought providing”. General

Rafi’s work is thought provoking provided

it is read. What he states may not be

totally convincing but it will hopefully

cause some ripples and perhaps will spur

some lazier minds to make another

intellectual endeavour ! A vain hope , but

one which we must entertain ! The

printing is excellent and the quality of

paper excellent. General Rafi has made a

landmark effort in military history writing.

His work has filled a serious void in

Pakistani military history. We wish him

best of luck with the third volume and

hope he will be more forthright in dealing

with Pakistani military history which has

been promiscuously mixed with myths

and fantasies.

History of The Baloch Regiment

1939-1956

Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad

(Retired)

Published by Baloch Regiment Centre,

Abbottabad; Printed by

Central Army Press Rawalpindi(First

Edition, 2000)

A.H Amin

October 2000

Book ReviewThe second volume of Baloch

Regiment history is a

welcome addition to the extremely

limited number of books on

Indo-Pak military history. Maximum part

of the volume deals with

the Second World War. The author has

laid greater stress on the

general military history of the Second

World War than on Baloch

Regiments’ role in it. This appears to have

been done since limited

material was available on the regimental

histories of the Baloch

units which participated in the war and

the fact that the Baloch

Regiment was relatively a much smaller

regiment than the Punjab

or the FF Groups. The first chapter

contains a good description

about the organisation of the Baloch

Regiment. The details

pertaining to units raised during World

War Two are sketchy. A

casual remark states that “new classes

and areas were included”

but no specific figures have been given.

The portions dealing with

events of Second World War are excellent

for the layman readers.

The author has also dealt with the

political aspects of Indian

perceptions about the Second World War,

with special stress on

the difference between Muslim League

and Congress Party

positions.The descriptions about

circumstances in which various

gallantry awards were won in WW Two

are very well written. Yahya

Khan’s escape is described in a very

interesting manner, however,

the author has not discussed the Axis

Camp Commandant’s warning

to Yahya about having him shot once he

was caught escaping before

his final successful escape. This incident

has been mentioned in

one of Shaukat Riza’s books (The 1965

War). The author made a

passing reference to General Messervy’s

getting captured by the

Germans in North Africa while giving his

designation but not name.

Had he mentioned his name the narrative

may have been more

interesting since Pakistan Army’s first C in

C was a German

prisoner for some time as a general

officer before he escaped (the

Germans not knowing that they had

captured the British general

officer commanding a British armoured

division). The author’s

treatment of 1947-48 War could have

been more extensive. He

has once again quoted Fazal Muqeem’s

criticism of Liaquat about

calling off Operation Venus but has not

given detailed reasons as

to how it may have succeeded when the

Indian Army in December

was well poised to meet it. Even the

Pakistani official account of

1970 written many years later refutes

Fazal Muqeem’s criticisms.

Rafi should have been more critical and

should have given a

dispassionate and concrete analysis

rather than repeating

Muqeem’s criticism. It should not have

been difficult for the

author to analyse the detailed pros and

cons of the projected

operation Venus. This discussion would

certainly have added meat

to the bones i.e. reproduced judgement of

Fazal Muqeem Khan. It

is fifty two years now from 1948. One

wonders whether the 1948

war would ever be properly analysed or

not! The volume contains

some minor factual errors. The German

Blitzkrieg struck across

Western Europe not in June 1940 (Page-

16) but in May 1940.

Rajauri was not captured by a brigade

group (Page-206) but by a

tank squadron of Central India Horse by a

surprise attack through

a nala. The infantry brigade later joined

the tank squadron after

Rajauri had been captured.The book

contains extremely elaborate

and detailed appendices dealing with

various aspects of Baloch

regiment history. The research scholars,

very rare in Pakistan, will

find these particularly useful. The second

volume on the whole is a

fine contribution to Pakistani military

history. We hope that the

book will cover many blanks in Pakistani

military history. We hope

that General Rafi will be more forthright,

critical and blunt in his

third volume which covers the 1965, and

1971 wars.