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BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Operations GENERAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY SPR-RHS-SAF-005 AUTHORISING OFFICER’S SIGNATURE Electronic Authorisation POSITION AUTHORISED BY: REGISTERED MANAGER RAILROAD OPERATIONS AUTHOR(S)’ NAME GREG STRONACH POSITION/S OPERATIONS SAFEWORKING & SYSTEMS SPECIALIST AUTHORISATION AMENDMENTS ISSUE PAGE DATE DETAILS OF AMENDMENT MAJOR / MINOR 1.0 All 05/02/09 New document MAJOR

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BHP Billiton Iron OreRailroad Operations

GENERAL OPERATIONAL SAFETYSPR-RHS-SAF-005

AUTHORISING OFFICER’S SIGNATUREElectronic AuthorisationPOSITION

AUTHORISED BY: REGISTERED MANAGER RAILROAD OPERATIONS

AUTHOR(S)’ NAMEGREG STRONACH

POSITION/SOPERATIONS SAFEWORKING & SYSTEMS SPECIALIST

AUTHORISATION

AMENDMENTS

ISSUE PAGE DATE DETAILS OF AMENDMENT MAJOR / MINOR

1.0 All 05/02/09 New document MAJOR

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ContentsOS 1.0 MODULE 1 - GENERAL SAFETY ......ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT

DEFINED.OS 1.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................10OS 1.1.1 PURPOSE OF MODULE........................................................10OS 1.2 AUTHORITY IN CASES OF EMERGENCY ......................11OS 1.2.1 AUTHORITY OF MANAGER RAILROAD OPERATIONS...............11OS 1.3 SAFETY OF WORKERS ...................................................12OS 1.3.1 SAFETY OF WORKERS WITHIN THE BHP BILLITON IRON ORE

RAILROAD CORRIDOR ...................................................................... 12OS 1.3.2 RAIL VEHICLES UNDER REPAIR TO BE PROTECTED...................13OS 1.4 RUNAWAY RAIL VEHICLE/S OR TRAIN/S .....................15OS 1.5 UNSAFE RAIL VEHICLES ................................................16OS 1.5.1 DAMAGED/DEFECTIVE RAIL VEHICLES EN-ROUTE .................16OS 1.5.2 DAMAGED/DEFECTIVE RAIL VEHICLES IN A DEPOT ...............16OS 1.5.3 OBLIGATIONS OF WORKERS ...............................................17OS 1.6 OBSTRUCTION OF TRACKS...........................................17OS 1.6.1 OBJECTS FOULING A RUNNING TRACK ................................17OS 1.7 FIRE................................................................................18OS 1.7.1 SAFETY ............................................................................ 18OS 1.7.2 REPORTING OF FIRES ......................................................... 18OS 1.7.3 ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FROM FIRE SERVICE..........................18OS 1.7.4 FIRES ON OR NEAR THE TRACK ...........................................19OS 1.7.5 FIRES ON TRAINS AND ON RAIL VEHICLES .............................20OS 1.7.6 ISOLATING BURNING RAIL VEHICLES ...................................21OS 1.7.7 EXTINGUISHING FIRES ON RAIL VEHICLES..............................22OS 1.7.8 FIRES IN, ON, OR NEAR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT...................23OS 1.7.9 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS DISCHARGED.......................................24OS 1.7.10 TYPES OF FIRE EXTINGUISHERS AND THEIR USES ......................24OS 1.8 WORKERS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT OR

EMERGENCY....................................................................................27OS 1.8.1 MOVEMENT OF TRAINS AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR EMERGENCY27OS 1.8.2 SAFETY AT AN ACCIDENT OR EMERGENCY ...........................27OS 1.8.3 ARRANGING ASSISTANCE IN AN ACCIDENT OR EMERGENCY 28OS 1.9 REPORTING AN ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR FAULTS /DEFECTS 29OS 1.9.1 REPORTING AN ACCIDENT OR AN INCIDENT.........................29OS 1.9.2 REPORTING OF FAULTS / DEFECTS ......................................29OS 1.10 USE OF AUDIO/VISUAL EQUIPMENT ............................30

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OS 1.10.1 DISTRACTIONS USING AUDIO/VISUAL EQUIPMENT WHILE

CARRYING

OUT SAFETY CRITICAL TASKS .............................................. 30OS 1.11 TRESPASSING ON THE BHP BILLITON IRON ORERAILROAD CORRIDOR ................................................................... 32OS 1.11.1 TRESPASSING ................................................................... 32OS 1.12 DRIVER FATIGUE........................................................... 33OS 1.12.1 MANAGEMENT OF DRIVER FATIGUE.................................... 33OS 1.13 TRACK WORKER COMPETENCY .................................. 34OS 1.13.1 TRACK WORKER COMPETENCY.......................................... 34OS 1.14 GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRACK WORKERS IN

CHARGE OF SAFETY..................................................... 36OS 1.14.1 RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................... 36OS 1.15 POSITIONS OF SAFETY ................................................. 38OS 1.16 PLANNING FOR SAFETY ............................................... 38OS 1.17 VIGILANCE................................................................... 39OS 2.0 MODULE 2 - TRAIN MOVEMENTS ................................ 42OS 2.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................ 42OS 2.1.1 PURPOSE OF MODULE...................................................... 42OS 2.2 SPEED OF TRAINS ......................................................... 43OS 2.2.1 SPEED OF TRAINS – GENERAL............................................. 43OS 2.2.2 SPEED OF TRAINS OVER LEVEL CROSSINGS........................... 43OS 2.2.3 FAILURE OF SPEEDOMETER ................................................. 44OS 2.2.4 SPEED OF TRAINS.............................................................. 46OS 2.3 AIR BRAKE TESTING OF TRAINS.................................... 52OS 2.3.1 PURPOSE OF SECTION ....................................................... 52OS 2.3.2 TERMINAL BRAKE TEST ........... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.OS 2.3.4 LINE-SIDE AIR TEST ............................................................ 54OS 2.3.5 MODIFIED CONTINUITY TEST ............................................... 54OS 2.3.6 TRAIN SETUP ON COMPLETIONOF TRAIN INSPECTIONS ........... 56OS 2.3.7 ROLL-BY EXAMINATION ..................................................... 59OS 2.3.8 BRAKE PIPE LEAKAGE TEST ................................................ 60OS 2.3.9 DRIVERS TO OBSERVE LOCOMOTIVE GAUGES AND DISPLAYS 60OS 2.3.10 EXCLUSION ZONE – BRAKE PIPE CONTINUITY....................... 61OS 2.3.11 TRAFFIC RAKE CERTIFICATE................................................ 62OS 2.4 SKIP KNOCKS ............................................................... 62OS 2.4.1 DEFINITION ..................................................................... 63OS 2.4.2 PROCEDURE FOR NELSON POINT YARD.............................. 63OS 2.4.3 PROCEDURE FOR BOODARIE............................................. 64OS 2.4.4 TRACKING OF KNOCKS ON RAKES ..................................... 64OS 2.4.5 PREPLANNING AND COMMUNICATION .............................. 64

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OS 2.5 SECURING OF TRAINS ..................................................65OS 2.5.1 SECURING OF TRAINS, PORTION OF A TRAIN, OR RAIL VEHICLES

65OS 2.5.2 SECURING RAIL VEHICLES ON A RUNNING TRACK.................67OS 2.5.3 SECURING OF TRAINS TO PREVENT MOVEMENT.....................68OS 2.5.4 PROCEDURE FOR PLACING CHOCKS TO PREVENT TRAIN OR

RAIL

VEHICLE MOVEMENT ........................................................ 69OS 2.5.5 TOTAL COMPRESSOR FAILURE ............................................69OS 2.5.6 HOLDING TRAINS STATIONARY............................................70OS 2.5.7 UNCOMMANDED FLOW INDICATION...................................70OS 2.5.8 COUPLING OF HOSEBAGS .................................................73OS 2.5.9 UNCOUPLING AND SECURING HOSEBAGS ...........................73OS 2.5.10 RETURN OF DEFECTIVE HOSEBAG........................................74OS 2.5.11 ISOLATING AIR BRAKES ......................................................74OS 2.5.12 APPLYING HANDBRAKES ON RAIL VEHICLES ........................76OS 2.5.13 DEFECTIVE HANDBRAKES ..................................................76OS 2.6 TRAIN IN CLEAR AND INTACT ......................................77OS 2.6.1 TRAIN TO BE IN CLEAR OF ADJACENT TRACK........................77OS 2.6.2 TRAINS STOPPING FOUL OF ANOTHER RUNNING TRACK.........77OS 2.6.3 CROSSING AND PASSING TRAINS TO BE IN CLEAR AND INTACT

78OS 2.6.4 OPPOSING TRAIN NOT IN CLEAR........................................78OS 2.6.5 OPPOSING TRAIN NOT INTACT ...........................................79OS 2.7 REPORTING TO TRAIN CONTROL BEFORE NETWORKENTRY 80OS 2.7.1 PROCEDURE FOR A TRAIN TO ENTER THE NETWORK ...............82OS 3.0 MODULE 3 - WAYSIDE EQUIPMENT..............................84OS 3.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................84OS 3.1.1 PURPOSE OF MODULE.......................................................84OS 3.2 AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION (ATP) ......................85OS 3.2.1 ATP MESSAGE DISPLAY.....................................................85OS 3.2.2 SHUNT SWITCH.................................................................. 85OS 3.2.3 TEMPORARY OVERRIDE SWITCH..........................................87OS 3.2.4 LOCATION NOT KNOWN OR LOST (NO_LOCAT) ..................88OS 3.2.5 NO CODE ...................................................................... 89OS 3.2.6 CAL_ERROR .................................................................... 91OS 3.2.7 OTHER ATP MESSAGES .....................................................92OS 3.2.8 ATP ISOLATION ............................................................... 95OS 3.3 WHEEL IMPACT LOAD DETECTOR (WILD) ....................95

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OS 3.3.1 LOCATION....................................................................... 96OS 3.3.2 ALARM RECEIPT .............................................................. 96OS 3.5 HOT WHEEL ALARM/HOT BEARING DETECTOR (HWA/HBD)...................................................................................... 97OS 3.5.1 HWA/HBD GENERAL ...................................................... 97OS 3.5.2 LOCATION....................................................................... 97OS 3.5.3 COMMUNICATION ........................................................... 97OS 3.5.4 ALARM RECEIPT ............................................................... 98OS 3.5.5 INITIAL ALARM DISPLAY..................................................... 98OS 3.5.6 PROCEDURE .................................................................... 98OS 3.6 DRAGGING EQUIPMENT DETECTOR (DED)............... 100OS 3.6.1 LOCATION..................................................................... 100OS 3.6.2 COMMUNICATION ......................................................... 100OS 3.6.3 ALARM RECEIPT ............................................................. 100OS 3.6.4 INITIAL ALARM DISPLAY................................................... 100OS 3.6.5 PROCEDURE .................................................................. 101OS 3.7 COLD RAIL ALARM (CRA) ......................................... 102OS 3.7.1 COLD RAIL ALARM - GENERAL........................................ 102OS 3.7.2 LOCATION.................................................................... 102OS 3.7.3 COMMUNICATION ......................................................... 102OS 3.7.4 ALARM RECEIPT ............................................................. 102OS 3.7.5 INITIAL ALARM DISPLAY................................................... 103OS 3.7.6 PROCEDURE .................................................................. 103OS 3.8 STREAM FLOW DETECTOR (SFD) ................................ 104OS 3.8.1 STREAM FLOW DETECTOR - GENERAL ............................... 104OS 3.8.2 LOCATION..................................................................... 104OS 3.8.3 COMMUNICATION ......................................................... 104OS 3.8.4 INDICATIONS................................................................. 105OS 3.8.5 PROCEDURE ................................................................. 105OS 4.0 MODULE 4 - LEVEL CROSSINGS................................. 108OS 4.1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................... 108OS 4.1.1 NATIONAL ROAD/PEDESTRIAN CROSSING REQUIREMENTS... 108OS 4.1.2 PURPOSE OF MODULE.................................................... 109OS 4.1.3 LEVEL CROSSING PROTECTION CATEGORIES ..................... 110OS 4.2 LEVEL CROSSINGS GENERAL..................................... 111OS 4.2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION................................................... 111OS 4.2.2 GATE DELAY.................................................................. 111OS 4.2.3 APPROACHES ................................................................ 111OS 4.2.4 SIGNAL CONTROLLED..................................................... 111OS 4.2.5 KEY SWITCH................................................................... 112OS 4.2.6 BHPIO CROSSING LISTING.............................................. 112

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OS 4.3 LEVEL CROSSING SIGNALS AND SIGNS....................114OS 4.3.1 LEVEL CROSSING SIGN....................................................114OS 4.3.2 LEVEL CROSSING PROTECTION SIGNALS ............................114OS 4.3.3 INDICATIONS AND WORKING ...........................................114OS 4.3.4 PASSING A SIGNAL AT STOP............................................115OS 4.4 BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS ...............116OS 4.4.1 OPERATION OF BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS ...116OS 4.4.2 TRAINS APPROACHING A LEVEL CROSSING .......................116OS 4.4.3 TRAINS SETTING BACK OVER LEVEL CROSSINGS PROTECTED BY

BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS ..........................117OS 4.4.4 SHUNTING SIDINGS LOCATED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF TRACK

CIRCUITS 118OS 4.5 FAILURE OF BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTSTO OPERATE .....................................................................119OS 4.5.1 FAILURE OF BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS ........119OS 4.6 HANDSIGNALLING AT A LEVEL CROSSING...............122OS 4.6.1 HANDSIGNALLER’S DUTY AT A LEVEL CROSSING.................122OS 4.6.2 HANDSIGNALLING AT A LEVEL CROSSING – BOOM GATES

AND/OR

FLASHING LIGHTS FAILED IN THE OPERATING POSITION........122OS 4.6.3 HANDSIGNALLING AT A LEVEL CROSSING – WHERE MANUAL

OPERATION OF BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS IS

REQUIRED 124OS 4.6.4 HANDSIGNALLING AT A LEVEL CROSSING – BOOM GATES

AND/OR

FLASHING LIGHTS HAVE TOTALLY FAILED ............................126OS 4.7 LEVEL CROSSINGS NOT FITTED WITH BOOM GATESAND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS.......................................................128OS 4.7.1 LEVEL CROSSINGS NOT FITTED WITH BOOM GATES AND/OR

FLASHING LIGHTS........................................................................... 128OS 4.7.2 TRAINS SETTING BACK OVER LEVEL CROSSINGS NOT FITTED WITH

BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS.....................................128OS 4.7.3 MAINTENANCE REPAIRS OR ALTERATIONS TO ROAD SIGNAGE

OR WHERE ROAD SIGNAGE HAS BEEN DAMAGED/REMOVED AND IS NO

LONGER EFFECTIVE ...................................................................... 129OS 4.8 MAINTENANCE, ALTERATION OR REPAIRS TO BOOMGATES, FLASHING LIGHTS OR PEDESTRIAN CROSSINGPROTECTION ................................................................... EQUIPMENT

130

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OS 4.9 OPERATION OF TRAINS AND ON TRACK VEHICLESWHEN

LEVEL CROSSING PROTECTION IS DISABLED .......... 131OS 4.10 HALF BOOM GATE PROTECTED LEVEL CROSSINGS. 132OS 4.10.1 PURPOSE....................................................................... 132OS 4.10.2 SCOPE.......................................................................... 132OS 4.10.3 KEY LOCATIONS ............................................................. 132OS 4.10.4 MANUAL OPERATION OF HALF BOOM OPERATED LEVEL

CROSSINGS 133

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GENERAL SAFETY

Module 1

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OS 1.0 MODULE 1 - GENERAL SAFETY

OS 1.1 INTRODUCTION

OS 1.1.1 Definitions

Emergency Incident requiring urgent action. The incident might involve death or serious injury, health and safety effects, significant damage to property or infrastructure, significant train service disruption or environmental impact.

On or Near Track:

Within three (3) metres from the nearest rail of any line when measured horizontally and at any level above or below the rail when measured vertically unless in a position of safety.

Obstruction Any defect in the track or track formation, or obstacle on, above or adjacent to the Permanent Way which will prevent the safe passage of trains.

Shall To be understood as mandatory

Should Is to be understood as non-mandatory ie. Advisory or recommended.

OS 1.1.2 Purpose of Module

This module provides general information, procedures and instructions for general safety on the BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad. It also provides the procedures for actions to be taken in the event of an emergency situation.

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OS 1.2 AUTHORITY IN CASES OF EMERGENCY

OS 1.2.1 Authority of Manager Railroad Operations

The Manager BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Operations has the authority to take special action in the following cases

In any case of exceptional circumstances, or

When the serious delays and disruptions to the train service have or may occur and the situation is not covered in the BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Standards, or

Where procedures for the situation are inadequate, or

The Standards, Procedures, instructions or processes have the potential to cause an unsafe situation

In these situations, the Manager BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Operations can take special action. However, Risk Management Principles shall be applied and all instructions issued shall be confirmed in writing.

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OS 1.3 SAFETY OF WORKERS

OS 1.3.1 Safety of Workers within the BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Network

To avoid injury workers, contractors and other authorised personnel must ensure they observe safe practises within the defined network

Workers

Do not attempt to jump onto moving vehicles

Do not ride on the couplers of any rollingstock

Ride only in the designated areas of rollingstock specified for the purpose

Do not step between points or place any part of the body on or within the frogs or other components unless performing an examination of the points under controlled conditions

Do not walk or move between rollingstock unless they areo Stationary, ando At least ten [10] metres apart

If it is necessary to cross the track behind stationary rollingstock ensure that the crossing occurs at a distance safe enough to avoid injury if the rollingstock moves unexpectedly

If crossing more than one track in the above instance, do not step out from behind the rollingstock to cross the next track unless it is clear in both directions

Do not encroach within 3 metres of the nearest rail of any line unlesso Worker is in possession of a BHP Billiton

Infrastructure Cardo Person is with an Authorised Person in

possession of a BHP Billiton Infrastructure Card

o Crossing the track at a designated crossing location

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Wear approved high visibility clothing and personal protection equipment when within 3 metres from the nearest rail of any line and at all other locations identified by BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Operations

Ensure that all Personal Protective Equipmentused is authorised by BHP Billiton

Ensure all Personal Protective Equipment is in good condition and meets all the requirements of the relevant standards as defined by BHP Billiton and the relevant Occupational Health and Safety Regulations

OS 1.3.2 Rail Vehicles under Repair to be Protected

When rail vehicles are to be repaired on a train, which is on a running track

Worker carrying out repairs

Obtain permission from driver before carrying out repairs

Advise the train controller before commencing repairs

Use the approved BHP Billiton procedures to prevent the train from moving

Tell drivero When repairs are completed, and when

workers are in a position of safetyo The running condition of rail vehicles

Note: If there is any doubt as to the integrity of the rail vehicle, that vehicle must not be moved until authority is obtained from the Superintendent OCRS or their delegate.

Driver

Do not move the train until told by worker carrying out repairs thato Repairs are completed, ando All workers are in a position of safety

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Train Controller

If it is safe to do so, authorise the repairs to be carried out

WARNING: If repairs to a rail vehicle involve workers being within 3 metres from the nearest rail of any line, protection must be arranged for the adjacent track in accordance with SPR-RHS-SAF-003 – Infrastructure Trackside Safety. Do not place protection without the Authority of the Train Controller

When rail vehicles are to be repaired within a yard

Worker carrying out repairs

Obtain permission from train control.

Advise train control location and type of work to be performed.

Attach “Blue Boards’

Train Controller

Place appropriate electronic protection.

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OS 1.4 RUNAWAY RAIL VEHICLE/S OR TRAIN/S

When a train or rail vehicle has run away

Worker noticing the runaway

Transmit an emergency radio message

Tello train controllero Any train in the areao Workers working in the area

Take any action necessary to protect trains, other workers and members of the public provided it can be done without further increasing risk to self and/or others

Train Controller

Take any necessary action to protect trains, other workers and members of the public

Note: In the event that en emergency radio broadcast is made, all other radio traffic is to cease until the conclusion of the broadcast.

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OS 1.5 UNSAFE RAIL VEHICLES

OS 1.5.1 Damaged/Defective Rail Vehicles En-route

If rollingstock has been damaged or derailed, it must not be moved unless authority is sought from the Superintendent OCRS or their delegate. If this is unpractical, the driver and the train controller may confer and reach agreement if it is safe to allow the derailed or damaged rail vehicle/s to travel to clear the section or to a nominated depot where it must be examined.

If agreement can not be reached between the driver and the train controller, the rollingstock must not be moved until it can be inspected / repaired by qualified personnel

OS 1.5.2 Damaged / Defective Rail Vehicles in a Depot

If rollingstock is found or thought to be damaged or defective whilst the train is within a depot:

Worker

Have rail vehicle/s inspected by a Rollingstock Maintainer, if available or qualified worker

Tell train controller.

If repairs cannot be made and the rail vehicle/s is unsafe to travel, detach and secure the rail vehicle/s and label it as defective

Note: If there is any doubt as to the roadworthiness of rollingstock, or a rollingstock maintainer cannot be located without causing undue delay to the train service, the vehicle must be detached.

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OS 1.5.3 Obligations of Workers

When workers observe damage or defects to rail vehicles in the yard or en-route

Workers

Attempt to advise the driver of the train

Tell train controller

Train Controller

Notify the driver of the train in question

Advise the drivero Stop the traino Investigate the problemo Advise on the status of the rollingstock

Note: The requirements of sections OS 1.5.1 and OS 1.5.2 must be carried out if the rollingstock is found to be damaged or defective.

OS 1.6 OBSTRUCTION OF TRACKS

OS 1.6.1 Objects Fouling a Running Track

When an object/s fouls a running track

Workers

Report the obstruction to the train controller

Protect the obstruction byo Permanent way stop signalso Clipping points away from the obstructiono Remove the obstruction if possible and safe

to do so

Train Controller

Arrange to have the obstruction cleared.

Apply electronic protection

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OS 1.7 FIRE

OS 1.7.1 Safety

WARNING: Workers must not place themselves in danger when attempting to fight a fire. When a fire occurs, workers must assess the situation to determine if the fire can be controlled by themselves or if the assistance of the Fire Service is required.

OS 1.7.2 Reporting of Fires

Drivers and other workers must tell the train controller (who will pass the information to the ESO) of any fire on or adjacent to BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Network or that has potential to damage or is likely to disrupt traffic. The train controller must notify the Supervisor/Superintendent Train Control at the earliest opportunity.

OS 1.7.3 Assistance Required from Fire Service

When assistance from the Fire Service is required to extinguish a fire

Worker

Advise the train controller if the fire poses a threat to the network

Train Controller

Tell the ESO and/or,

Arrange for the ESO’s to attend

Worker

Allow the Fire Service to take control of fire

Give any assistance the Fire Service requires

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OS 1.7.4 Fires On or Near the Track

Note: Water shall not be used on electrical fires unless the electrical equipment has been isolated and earthed, where necessary.

a) General Fire Procedures

When a fire is discovered on or near the track

Worker

Report fire to the train controller

Protect the running tracks, if necessary, or when told by the train controller

Obtain any assistance necessary to protect life and property and put out the fire, if possible, and when safe to do so

Maintain regular communication as arranged by train controller

Train Controller

Do not allow traffic to enter the affected section until told it is safe

Ensure the ESO is contacted

Advise ESO’s

Tell Supervisor/Superintendent Train Control

Maintain communication with worker at the fire scene

If radio communication is available, transmit a message telling others in the area about the fire

Apply electronic protection if necessary.Driver

If a fire is observedo Report to the train controller and any track

workers working on the tracko Attempt to stop the train clear of the fire, if

necessary

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b) Fires in Signalling Equipment and CablingWhen a fire occurs, or is suspected

Workers

Treat the fire as an electrical fire.

Extinguish the fire, if possible, and if it is safe to do so.

Contact train controller immediately.

Train Controller

Ensure the ESO is contacted.

Tell the Supervisor/Superintendent Train Control

Arrange for repairs to be carried out immediately by relevant departments.

If the integrity of the signalling system is in doubto Suspend normal working, ando Institute emergency working, if necessary

Resume normal working only on the instructions of the Railroad Manager or nominated delegate.

OS 1.7.5 Fires on Trains and on Rail Vehicles

When a fire occurs on rail vehicles of a train

Driver

Stop and secure the train

Tell the train controller

Warn others in the vicinity that may be affected by the fire if possible

If the fire is on the locomotive, shut down diesel locomotive and turn off fuel

Isolate battery, if necessary

If it is safe to do so attempt to extinguish fire and/or isolate burning rail vehicles

Tell train controllero If fire is extinguished, oro If Fire Service is required

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Note: When the battery is isolated, in-cab radio communication will be lost.

Train Controller

Ensure the ESO is contacted

Place electronic protection on adjacent tracks if necessary

Obtain details from the driver about the fire

Enquire as to whether assistance is required

Warn others in the vicinity that may be affected by the fire if possible

Tell the Supervisor/Superintendent Train Control

Driver

Protect any adjacent tracks, if necessary or advised to do so by the train controller

OS 1.7.6 Isolating Burning Rail Vehicles

When it is necessary to isolate burning rail vehicles from a train to minimise damage or risk

Driver

Advise the train controller that an attempt is to be made to isolate the burning rail vehicle

If possible, and if safe to do soo Secure the rear portion in accordance with

BHP Billiton Procedureso Detach behind the affected rail vehicleso Pull ahead a safe distanceo Secure and detach burning rail vehicleso Pull the leading portion ahead a safe

distance

WARNING: Be aware that any metal on rail vehicles may be hot enough to burn the skin on touch.Train Controller

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Give authority to isolate the burning rail vehicle

When possible, obtain all details from the driver about the incident

Ensure the ESO is contacted

Advise the Supervisor/Superintendent Train Control

OS 1.7.7 Extinguishing Fires on Rail Vehicles

When it is necessary and safe to extinguish a fire on rail vehicles, and the Fire Service is not readily available

a) Preparation for Extinguishing Fires on Rail Vehicles

Worker

Obtain any assistance required to extinguish the fire

Make sure any action taken will not increase the hazard

Make sure the proper fire fighting equipment is used

Read instructions on the fire extinguisher before using in confined spaces

Be aware that any metal on rail vehicles may be hot enough to burn the skin on touch

b) Controlling Fires on Rail Vehicles

Worker

Use gloves when touching the affected vehicle

Be aware that flames may suddenly leap from the door or hatch on a locomotive

Stand to one side before opening a door or hatch

Locate the base of the fire

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Direct the extinguisher nozzle at theo Base of the fire water or foam fire

extinguisherso Flames above the base for Dry Chemical or

Carbon Dioxide (CO2) extinguishers

OS 1.7.8 Fires In, On, or Near Electrical Equipment

When a fire occurs in, on, or near electrical equipment

Workers

Make sure power is switched off as soon as possible

If power cannot be switched off, and only if necessary and safe, use fire extinguishers marked witho A black band on a red body, Carbon Dioxide

(CO2)o A white band on a red body, (Dry Chemical)

(see Figure OS 1.1)

Note: Water must not be used on electrical fires unless the power has been isolated.

OS 1.7.9 Fire Extinguishers Discharged

When a fire extinguisher is discharged

Worker

Advise train control

Note in log book.

Return fire extinguisher to the Supervisor

Do not return fire extinguisher to its bracket

Supervisor

Arrange to have the fire extinguisher recharged or replaced

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OS 1.7.10 Types of Fire Extinguishers and Their Uses

There are different types of fire extinguishers for different types of fires; they are listed in the figures below.

Class Use/Type of Fire

A Ordinary combustibles

B Flammable and combustible liquids

C Flammable gases

D Combustible metals

E Electrically energised equipment

F Cooking oils and fats

Figure OS1 – Classes of Fire Extinguisher

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TypePre-1997

Current Class

Water Solid red A

FoamSolid blue

Red with a blue band

A B

Powder Red with a white band A B C E

Carbon dioxide

Red with a black band A (limited) B C E F

Vapourising liquid (not halon)

Red with a yellow band A B C E

HalonSolid yellow

Withdrawn from use

A B E

Wet chemical

Solid oatmeal

Red with an oatmeal band

A F

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WaterRed in colour, it contains nine litres of water under pressure and is to be used in an upright position. It is designed for use on carbonaceous solids such as wood, paper, rubbish or textiles, and has a discharge period of 60 - 100 seconds. Water extinguishers are unsuitable for flammable liquid fires. This extinguisher must never be used on fires involving live electrical equipment.

FoamBlue in colour, it contains nine litres of an aqueous film-forming foam additive, and is to be used in an upright position. It is designed for use on flammable liquid fires such as petrol, oils and paint and has a discharge period of 40 - 90 seconds. This extinguisher must never be used on fires involving live electrical equipment.

Carbon DioxideRed in colour with a black band, it is designed for use on fires involving flammable liquids and live electrical equipment. The discharge period depends on the size of the extinguisher.

Dry ChemicalRed in colour with a white band, it contains a bi-carbonate based powder and is suitable for fires involving flammable liquids and live electrical equipment. The discharge period depends on the size of the extinguisher.

Wet ChemicalGold in colour, it has a liquid alkaline extinguishing agent, and is specifically designed for use in kitchens on deep fryer fires involving fat and cooking oil. This extinguisher must never be used on fires involving live electrical equipment.

Figure OS2 – Types of Fire Extinguisher

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OS 1.8 WORKERS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT OR EMERGENCY

OS 1.8.1 Movement of Trains after an Accident or Emergency

If it is necessary to move the train or rail vehicle after an accident or emergency

Driver

Move the train or rail vehicle only when authorised by a police officer or Railroad Manager or nominate delegate, unlesso Remaining stationary will increase the

danger to people or property

Note: Dead human bodies may be moved only on the authority of the State Coroner, who is normally represented by a Police Officer at the scene.

OS 1.8.2 Safety at an Accident or Emergency

a) Before taking any action

Worker

Check for any actual danger or potential danger

Avoid, remove or isolate any danger, if possible

Advise train controller.

Note: Make sure the electrical power has been switched off before touching any worker who is in contact with electrical equipment.

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b) Before taking any action where people are injured and a danger exists

Worker

Assess the situation

Check for actual or potential danger too Selfo The injured person/so Bystanders

Remove or isolate the danger, or

Move the injured away from the danger, if it is safe to do so

Assist the injured, if possible

Advise the train controller

OS 1.8.3 Arranging Assistance in an Accident or Emergency

When arranging assistance

Worker

If applicable broadcast an emergency radio message

Advise the train controller

Give the exact location of the accident or emergency

Ask for the type of assistance required, for example, Ambulance, Police or Fire Services

Give detailed instructions on how to reach the site, if possible

State the number of injured and the type of injuries, where possible

Give name/s of the injured to emergency and medical services, if possible

Note: When accident occurs, the Train Controller in conjunction with Rail Transport Supervisor Rail Operations shall arrange for the driver to be relieved at the scene if required.

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OS 1.9 REPORTING AN ACCIDENT, INCIDENT OR FAULTS / DEFECTS

OS 1.9.1 Reporting an Accident or an Incident

When an accident or incident such as an injury or a breach of safeworking procedures occurs, or the potential for an accident or incident exists

Worker

Report the accident or incident, or the potential for an accident or incident, to the train controller

Train Controller

Notify responsible Superintendent/Manager

Advise the ESO

Compile and submit relevant BHP Billiton forms

OS 1.9.2 Reporting of Faults / Defects

Workers who see any faults or defects in the workplace are to report the matter to their supervisor or train control. The faults or defects may include

Defects on trains

Safeworking faults

Damage or faults with the track

Rail vehicles

Any other faults or defects that could lead to injury of workers / public or damage to equipment

Note: Do not touch potentially damaged or broken wiring.

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OS 1.10 USE OF AUDIO/VISUAL EQUIPMENT

OS 1.10.1 Distractions Using Audio/Visual Equipment While Carrying Out Safety Critical tasks

Workers and contractors must not allow themselves to be distracted by the use of audio/visual equipment while carrying out safety critical tasks.

a) Risks

The following consequences may occur from a person being distracted while performing a safety critical task:

Collision

SPAD

Derailment

Injury or death

b) Examples of Types of Audio / Visual Equipment

The types of audio/visual equipment that contribute to a distraction can be but are not limited to the following:

Radio communication equipment other than BHP Billiton Railroad radios.

Desk top computers with computer games/DVD/CD etc.

Laptops and portable hand held computers

Mobile phones

Personal radios, CD/MP3/DVD players

Televisions

Cameras

Newspapers and Magazines

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c) Responsibilities of Safety Critical Workers

Any worker or contractor carrying out a safety critical task or monitoring safety critical communications must take necessary action to eliminate the risk of being distracted at a critical time in their task. JHA’s should be used to evaluate the risk of distraction during safety critical tasks.

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OS 1.11 TRESPASSING ON THE BHP BILLITON IRON ORE RAILROAD NETWORK

OS 1.11.1Trespassing

When workers on duty, other than a driver of a moving train, see persons who are apparently on BHP Billiton Iron Ore railroad property without permission

Worker/s

Identify themselves as a worker of BHP Billiton

Ask to see their BHP Billiton Infrastructure Card

Ask the person to identify themselves, and the reason they are on BHP Billiton property

Advise them of the danger of being within the BHP Billiton Network, that they could beendangeringo Themselveso Workerso Propertyo BHP Billiton Operations, oro General public

Advise train control

Note: When driver on a moving train see a trespasser on BHP Billiton property, they must give details to the train controller as soon as possible.

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OS 1.12 DRIVER FATIGUE

OS 1.12.1Management of Driver Fatigue

In relation to driver fatigue, the following procedures apply:

A driver shall not commence or continue to operate a train if their ability to operate a train safely is impaired due to incapacity, for example througho Illnesso Injuryo Fatigue

Where incapacity has occurred after the commencement of duty, the train crew shallo Report to train control, stop their train and

obtain the appropriate Authority, as required by the circumstances

o Not request Authority to proceed until their capacity to manage the train safely is restored or another driver is provided

As soon as practicable, the driver shall complete a report detailing the circumstances of the incapacity and submit it to Manager Railroad Operations or their delegate

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OS 1.13 TRACK WORKER COMPETENCY

OS 1.13.1 Track Worker Competency

Note: This section shall be read in conjunction with SPR-RHS-SAF-003 – Infrastructure Trackside Safety

The following applies to track worker competency on theBHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Operations Network

Track workers shall be competent ino BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Operations

SPR-RHS-SAF-003 – Infrastructure Trackside Safety

o Current BHP Billiton Infrastructure Card

To be responsible for track working the worksite supervisor in charge shall be competent in the appropriate operational and practical requirements relating too Interface arrangements for network access,

entry and exit, and associated documentation

o Route and infrastructure knowledge for the track segment over which travel is to be undertaken by rail in track vehicles or machines

o Infrastructure knowledge in relation to a work site or area where the work is to be performed

o The specific track vehicles and machines and other equipment to be used

o The work to be performedo The safety and conduct of all people

involved at the work siteo The use of LPA, TOA, TWA, TRI, No

Authority Requiredo The use of a Worksite Planner (WP4), JHA

and Take 5

Note: Where the track vehicle or machine is operating as a train, Proceed Authorities are used.

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All track workers, who are required to be on or near the track, shall be certified as competent in track awareness and in possession of a BHP Billiton Infrastructure card

Where a person (for example a visitor) not certified in track awareness is required to be on or near the track, a competent and accredited track worker shall accompany and be responsible for the person

Only a qualified person holding a current BHP Billiton Infrastructure Card may be present on or near the track using a NAR

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OS 1.14 GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRACK WORKERS IN CHARGE OF SAFETY

OS 1.14.1 Responsibilities

For each work site or movement on or near the track the track worker in charge of safety shall

Worksite Supervisor

Ensure accurate time is maintained and is used for all procedures and communications

Ensure everyone on or near a work site, for which the worksite supervisor is responsibleo Understands and complies with the rules,

procedures and instructions to the extent that it relates to their duties; and

Is correctly attired in high visibility clothing and PPE

Be present at the work site before, during and at the completion of track work and be responsible for work site protection arrangements (unless a handover of duties occurs in accordance with Standard 1 – Infrastructure Trackside Safety)

Ensure any equipment being used that affects safety is in proper working order

Whilst on duty, be readily available to be contacted by train control, including establishing the method of communications to be used

Report to train control faults in communication equipment, for example, telephones or radios maintained for the use of track workers

Report all accidents including near misses, to train control

Not start, nor allow contractors any operationthat may affect the track or works connected with them unless the proposed work has beeno Approved through the proper procedures,

and o Authorised by train control

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Ensure that if the Worksite supervisor in charge of an LPA, TOA, TWA or TRI is to be changed whilst it is still currento A hand over is conducted between the

incoming and outgoing Worksite supervisors, and an understanding reached on all issues affecting safe operations, and

o Train control is advised of the name of the new Worksite supervisor.

Note: This section must be read in conjunction with SPR-RHS-SAF-003 – Infrastructure Trackside Safety

Procedures

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OS 1.15 POSITIONS OF SAFETY

Positions of safety are places as follows:

Where there is at least 3 metres clearance between the person and the nearest rail of any line.

A place which has been properly constructed as a refuge

Where a suitable structure or physical barrier has been erected to provide protection

Behind the safety line at designated locations, buildings and structures

OS 1.16 PLANNING FOR SAFETY

The Worksite supervisor shall assess the work site and plan for safety. Planning for safety shall include, but not be limited to, the following considerations:

The use of the Worksite Planner (Form WP4)

Completion of a JHA and Take 5

The correct choice between an LPA, TOA, TWA, TRI or NAR for the type of work and equipment to be used

Method of work site protection

Assessing the physical characteristics specific to the work site

Weather conditions, including visibility

Noise generated by the type of work and equipment being used

Track speed

Adjacent tracks

Direction of trains and track maintenance machines.

Sighting distance required

Appointment of look-out(s), where required

Look-out positions

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Determining positions of safety

Communications with train control and with trains

Other hazards

Briefing all concerned on site in relation to the approach of a train, in respect ofo Where to go when a movement approacheso Who will provide the warning of the

approaching movemento How the warning will be providedo Who will clear equipment from the track and

the time needed to do so, ando The maximum train speed at the work site.

OS 1.17 VIGILANCE

Track workers shall be vigilant and not rely solely on the train schedules, train overviews or train monitoring systems for information as to the running of trains. Trains and other track vehicles and machines may run without any prior advice, or be in addition to or vary from train information provided by the train controller.

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PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY

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TRAIN MOVEMENTS

Module 2

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OS 2.0 MODULE 2 - TRAIN MOVEMENTS

OS 2.1 INTRODUCTION

OS 2.1.1 Definitions

ATP (Automatic Train Protection)

An electronic supervisory, system of ensuring trains do not exceed permitted speeds and/or limits of authority.

Authorised Person

A competent person authorised to perform duties specified in these standards.

Foul When a vehicle or object is not sufficiently clear of an adjacent running line.

Hand Signaller A qualified person appointed to use flags, lights and other devices to control traffic and to protect employees, contractors, the public and obstructions.

In Clear A train “in clear” when it is within the clearance point for crossing purposes, or when the entire train is within station protection and is not foul of an adjacent line.

Modified Continuity Test:

An air brake examination that confirms the correct brake operation on the first three cars beyond the further most amalgamation point when a locomotive/s or car/s are attached or detached from a train.

Shall To be understood as mandatory

Should Is to be understood as non-mandatory ie. Advisory or recommended.

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OS 2.1.2 Purpose of Module

This module provides general information on train movements and procedures and instructions for train operations on the BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Network.

OS 2.2 SPEED OF TRAINS

OS 2.2.1 Speed of Trains – General

Automatic Train Protection (ATP) shall govern the maximum speed at which trains may travel together with the assistance of speed boards, where provided. Speed boards indicate the maximum speed at which a train may travel, provided there is no conflict with the signals or instructions, for example:

Rollingstock maximum permitted speed

Permanent way speed restriction equipment

Special permanent speed boards restricting the operation of certain traffic on a section of track

Low Speed Indicator (LSI)

ATP indications

Operating notice or other instructions

Hand signallers instructions

Speed restrictions advised by train control

Speed restrictions as per speed restriction sheet.

OS 2.2.2 Speed of Trains over Level Crossings

Trains may travel at the speed nominated for the track section applicable to the level crossing, providing there are no other speed restrictions as stated in OS 2.2.1.

Driver

Sound the whistle approaching the crossing

Make sure the track is clear

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Ensure the speed of the train will allow it to cross the level crossing at the nominated speed

Maintain a constant speed through the crossing to allow for correct operation of the level crossing equipment (particularly crossings fitted with speed predictors)

OS 2.2.3 Failure of Speedometer

When a speedometer fails at the driving station of a locomotive or train unit

Driver

Report the failure to the train controller

Use other speed indicatorso D.I.D Panelo Locotrolo Turn locomotive consist if configurations

allow.

If a second driver member is availableo Have second driver member give regular

speed updates

Train Controller

Arrange to have a locomotive with a functional speedometer placed at the front of the train at the first opportunity, or

Arrange to have the speedometer repaired as soon as possible

Note: Trains must not leave a depot or commence a journey with a defective speedometer.

Table OS 2.2.3 may be used to assist with the calculation of speed in instances where no speedometer is available.

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Km/h Minutes/Seconds per Km

Km/h Minutes/Seconds per Km

Km/h Minutes/Seconds per Km

20 3.00 25 2.24 30 2.00

35 1.42.9 40 1.30 42 1.25.7

44 1.21.8 46 1.18.3 48 1.15

50 1.12 52 1.09.2 54 1.06.6

56 1.04.3 58 1.02.1 60 1.00

62 0.58 64 0.56.2 66 0.54.5

68 0.52.9 70 0.51.4 72 0.50

74 0.48.6 76 0.47.4 78 0.46.2

80 0.45 82 0.43.9 84 0.42.9

86 0.41.9 88 0.40.9 90 0.40

92 0.39.1 94 0.38.3 96 0.37.5

98 0.36.7 100 0.36

Table OS 2.2.3 – Speed Table

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OS 2.2.4 Speed of Trains

MainlineThe following maximum permissible speeds are detailed for mainline train working. Speeds not defined as empty or loaded are deemed to be the same for both directions.

Other speeds relative to train or locomotive working are as defined for those respective areas.

Newman Mainline

LocationPermissible

Speed

Hedland to Goldsworthy Junction 60 km/h

Goldsworthy Junction to Jimblebar Junction 75 km/h

Shaw to Garden (loaded) 65 km/h

Jimblebar Junction to Newman 75 km/h

Jimblebar Junction to Jimblebar Mine 75 km/h

Jimblebar Mine to Jimblebar Junction (loaded) 75 km/h

Yandi Junction to Yandi 75 km/h

Yandi to Kurrajura loaded) 60 km/h

Yandi to Mining Area C 75 km/h

Passing track entry (empty) 35 km/h

Passing track exit (empty) 45 km/h

Passing track entry and exit (loaded) 35 km/h

Light locomotive/s as specified but not to exceed

100 km/h

Light locomotive/s, track maintenance machine, work trains travelling in the down direction on either the “Up” or “Down” mainlines between GJ1/GJ3 signals and the 12.6 km level crossing NML

20 km/h

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Goldsworthy Mainline

LocationPermissible

Speed

Goldsworthy Junction (GML trains only until clear) 35 km/h

Goldsworthy Junction to 58.5 km 60 km/h

58.5 km to 89 km 70 km/h

89 km to 164 km 60 km/h

164 km to 203.45 km 70 km/h

ATP Switch Node imposed restrictionsPassing track entry and exit

25 km/h

Goldsworthy and Hardie passing track Approach (entry) Nodes for loaded trains taking the mainlinewhen the exit turnout is set for reverse (stop)

35 km/h

Note: GML speed change enforcement locations are defined by the time to action countdown activating within the ATP Display.

Mine Yards

Yarrie Mine

LocationPermissible

Speed

Under inspection gantry (empty trains only) 15 km/h

Yarrie Balloon Loop 20 km/h

Under train loader (Locomotives only) 5 km/h

Under train loader 15 km/h

Balloon switch (loaded) 35 km/h

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Nimingarra Mine

LocationPermissible

Speed

Nimingarra (Propelling) 15 km/h

Nimingarra tunnel to Rubin West switch 30 km/h

All turnouts when set for reverse 15 km/h

Newman Mine

LocationPermissible

Speed

21 Turnout to 423.8 km 35 km/h

423.8 km to Tunnels 20 km/h

Through Loadout Tunnels 15 km/h

Tunnels to 12 Turnout 20 km/h

12 Turnout till clear of 21 Turnout 35 km/h

Jimblebar Mine

LocationPermissible

Speed

Jimblebar Mine Balloon Loop 20 km/h

Ore Body 25 25 km/h

Over the Weigh Bridges 4 km/h

Yandi 1

LocationPermissible

Speed

Yandi 1 Arrival Signal to Balloon Loop 35 km/h

Balloon Loop 20 km/h

Tunnel 5 km/h

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Yandi 2

LocationPermissible

Speed

Yandi 2 Arrival Signal to Balloon Loop 60 km/h

Balloon Loop 20 km/h

Tunnel 5 km/h

Beyond 1.5km on Exit side of the Tunnel 65 km/h

Junctions and Yards

Jimblebar Junction Yard

LocationPermissible

Speed

Jimblebar Junction Yard 60 km/h

Turnout 51(all positions) 60km/h

Turnouts 52, 53 and 54 (all positions) 35 km/h

Turnouts 55 and 56 (set for reverse only) 35 km/h

Turnout 57 35 km/h

Hedland Yard

LocationPermissible

Speed

Arrival / Departure signals 35 km/h

Reception (200a/b turnouts to LSS road X’ing) 35 km/h

Central Yard ( LSS X’ing to Bi-Lo X’ing) 35 km/h

300 and 400 Series Turnouts set for the reverse 20 km/h

Bi-Lo CrossingNote: Speed may be increased once the crossing is covered by the lead vehicle providing the train is not traversing turnouts set for reverse.

20 km/h

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North Yard (Bi-Lo X’ing to dumpers) 35 km/h

Dumpers 5 km/h

Dumper Yard (Dumpers to loco prep facility) 20 km/h

Locomotive Preparation Facility (LPF) 10 km/h

South Yard (Loco prep facility LPF to Yard office X’ing)

35 km/h

Departure Yard (Yard office X’ing to 201 turnout) 35 km/h

“I” Area 10 km/h

“I” Area spur 10 km/h

Number 1 and 2 spurs (entry) 10 km/h

Number 1 and 2 spurs (depart) 20 km/h

100 Road 20 km/h

Ore Car Repair Shop roads 10 km/h

Locomotive Service Facility roads 10 km/h

Locomotive Service Facility Weighbridge road 2 km/h

Locomotive Service Shop and pits 5 km/h

Locomotive Overhaul Shop roads 10 km/h

Short leg of “Y” 10 km/h

Long leg of “Y” 20 km/h

Double slip / Fuel spur / Turning spur 15 km/h

Hard stand 20 km/h

Unballasted track unless otherwise instructed 5 km/h

All other areas 10 km/h

Propelling movementsNote: Speed shall not override more restrictive speeds e.g. Dumpers / LPF

25 km/h

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Bofin

LocationPermissible

Speed

Bofin Mainline 50 km/h

Boodarie Loop 15 km/h

Boodarie Service Road 15 km/h

Boodarie dead-end spur 10 km/h

Boodarie (old) GML Prep Facility 15 km/h

Boodarie Wye 15 km/h

Boodarie Wye Prep Facility (BLPF) 10 km/h

Boodarie Workshop roads (outside derailers) 15 km/h

Boodarie Workshop roads (inside derailers) 5 km/h

Finucane Island Balloon Loop 20 km/h

Finucane Island Hopper 15 km/h

Western Yard car dumper road 20 km/h

Car Dumper 4 5 km/h

Miscellaneous

LocationPermissible

Speed

Transfer road 35 km/h

Avoidance Road 60 km/h

Bing Yard roads 10 km/h

Quarry 8 10 km/h

Maintenance sidings / Backtracks / Storage roads 10 km/h

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OS 2.3 AIR BRAKE TESTING OF TRAINS

OS 2.3.1 Purpose of Section

This section outlines the Rail Operating procedure for the air testing of trains.

OS 2.3.2 Terminal Brake Test

A terminal brake test is a train safety test carried out at a terminal station such as Boodarie and Nelson Point that includes all the requirements of:

A Visual and Audible Brake Test

A Knock Test and

A Continuity Test

A full terminal brake test is required on all trains departing for a mainline journey or as specified in set BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad guidelines for the period / distance between terminal brake tests.

Note: If a train has been standing for a period of 24hrs or more without an air supply attached, then the train shall not move onto the mainline unless visual and audible test is carried out.

For all loaded rakes which have received both a knock test and a visual and audible brake test at Nelson Point and Boodarie, the car examiner shall attach a green ‘Traffic Rake’ Certificate to the brake pipe cut out cock at the dumper end (Port End) of the rake.

a) Visual and Audible Brake Test (Function Test)

A visual and audible brake test shall be carried out by a Car examiner / maintainer on all trains receiving a terminal brake test, and shall include the application and release of the brakes on each vehicle on the train.

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b) Knock Test

A knock test shall be carried out on all trains receiving a terminal brake test and shall include a check by a car examiner/maintainer of the following ore car equipment:

Worn brake blocks (replace when near condemning mark).

Broken, damaged or missing brake blocks –replace.

Missing brake block keys.

Change out any leaking valves and gaskets.

Condition of side bearers and bolster spring.

Replace leaking “O” rings.

Replace broken knuckle pins.

Flattened air pipes.

Obvious wheel faults, such as flat / hot/ shelled / cracked wheels.

Obvious draft gear faults.

Body damage or severe body corrosion.

Record and report any maintenance required.

A Knock test can be conducted either before or after dumping. A ‘Priority’ knock test is a type of knock test which is used where dumper queues are short, and some non-essential maintenance is left until the next knock test. The main difference between a ‘normal knock’ and ‘priority knock ’is the level of in the field maintenance performed on individual ore cars. (The procedure for Knock Tests is outlined in Section OS 2.4 – Knock Tests of this document).

c) Continuity Test

A continuity test shall be carried out as part of every terminal brake test to prove continuity of the brake pipe on the full length of the train. The Visual and Audible Brake test satisfies the requirement of a Terminal Test continuity test.

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OS 2.3.3 Brake Pipe Continuity Test

A brake pipe continuity test proves continuity of the brake pipe from the front to the rear of the train or rake.

After charging the brake pipe, the application and release of the brakes shall be observed on the last three vehicles of the train. Where the train is fitted with an electronic means of monitoring the pressure of the brake pipe on the last vehicle of the train transmitted to the lead locomotive, this device may be used to conduct the brake pipe continuity test.

Note: When a locotrol train has been left unattended for a period of time (i.e.: Bing) a continuity test shall be conducted prior to departure. Continuity tests are also required before departing all mines and load out locations, including Quarry 8.

OS 2.3.4 Line-side Air Test

Line side air testing utilises an air supply other than a locomotive to test trains, to make sure train brakes are operational and that the brake pipe is continuous throughout the train.

OS 2.3.5 Modified Continuity Test

A modified continuity test is conducted on trains to ensure the brake pipe is continuous rear-ward beyond where an interruption of brake pipe continuity occurred on a train. After re-coupling and charging the brake pipe, the application and release of the brakes shall be observed on at least three vehicles beyond the point of the brake pipe interruption.

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A modified continuity test is carried out when:

Any locomotive is attached to a train (excluding the dumpers).

Any rail vehicle/s is attached to, or detached from a train (other than from the rear of a train).

Any brake pipe angle cocks on a train are closed to effect repairs (i.e.: change hose bag etc).

Continuity of the brake pipe is interrupted (other than removal of vehicles from the rear of a train).

Conducting a run around movement i.e.: OB25 or other locations as required.

Note: A modified continuity test is not required where an operational EOTM is fitted and a continuity test can be conducted.

In the event that the condition of brake pipe continuity on the train is not known, then a continuity test shall be carried out.

For the movement of ore car rakes at the Port, specific instructions apply.

For moving loaded rakes from reception (51-54rd’s) and the car dumpers at Nelson Point; and where the condition of the brake pipe continuity on the rake is known; 3 cars are required to be observed during the “brake function check” when a modified brake test is carried out.

For moving loaded rakes from reception (51-54rd’s) and the car dumpers at Nelson Point; and where the condition of the brake pipe continuity on the rake is unknown; a full continuity shall be performed. For moving rakes from the North Yard (1-12rd’s) to the car dumper and from the car dumper to the South yard, Brake Test Procedure 6.4.1 below applies.

Guidelines on conditions where a modified test is carried out are included in Section OS 2.3.4 and Specific BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad instructions issued.

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a) Modified Continuity Test (Car Dumping)

Prior to the commencement of, and during shunting movements, the air brake shall be connected to all railway vehicles except where covered by specific instructions.

A modified continuity test (car dumping) shall be carried out to make sure the brake pipe is continuous rear-ward beyond the point of any interruption of the brake pipe continuity on the consist.

The modified brake test (car Dumping) should only be carried out where the hauling or propelling locomotives automatic brake valve is operational and cut-in.This specific test has two parts: the first part is carried out before entering the dumpers and the second is carried out immediately after dumping is complete.

This first part of this test is to be carried out as follows:

Start with consist marshalled from the Port End as follows

o Locomotive (manned)

o Loaded ore car rake

o Index cars

o Compressor car (cut in and running)

Charge train with both feed valves to 620 kpa (90 psi) and then reduce brake pipe pressure from the lead locomotive by more than 110 kpa (15 psi) using the lead automatic brake valve. For SD40 and Dash 8 locomotives, observe strong audible blow to atmosphere with compressor car feed valve maintaining a brake pipe air supply to the lead.

Cut the lead automatic brake valve cut out valve to out. Observe that brake pipe pressure rises by at least 70 kpa (10 psi) in less than 30 seconds, thereby proving continuity of the brake pipe from rear feed valve (compressor car) to the lead locomotive.

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The second part of the test is to be carried out as follows:

On completion of dumping of the preceding rake and receiving appropriate authority, proceed into the car dumper and propel the rake in advance while spotting the loaded rake. On completion of spotting, apply a service brake application of at least 100 kpa (15 psi) on the loaded rake.

Detach from the loaded rake and attach to the empty rake as per instructions. Shut down the compressor car and isolate the feed valve. Recharge the ore car brakes until the flow meter indicates that the ore car brakes are released and almost recharged.

Propel the empty rake at less than 5 km/hr until the locomotive is 6 cars clear of the dumper. Apply a service brake application of between 100 kpa and 140 kpa and check the rake stops as required. After the locomotive has stopped and the brake pipe pressure stabilized, recharge the brake pipe.

Observe the time taken for the flow to decreaseand for the brake pipe to recharge, and ensure that these times are consistent with a 100 car train. If the flow decreases in less than a minute, the air is not continuous through the train. If this occurs, stop and investigate.

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OS 2.3.6 Train Setup on Completion of Train Inspections

On completion of car knocking and brake testing

Yard Controller

Advise examiners which rake is to be left behind.

Examiner/ Car Maintainer

Dump rake to be left behind leaving brake cock open and corresponding locomotive brake cock closed

Re-open all other brake pipe cocks that were closed between locomotives and rakes for testing purposes.

Do not lift any coupling pins for the pre-empting of rake separations

Prior to boarding a locomotive the following checks and inspections shall be carried out at ground level to ensure the integrity and reliability of the equipment and associated fittings essential for their safe operation.

a) A rake has been left unattended with locomotive/s attached

Driver

Check brake pipe cocks are open between the locomotive/s and first vehicle.

b) Rake has been left unattended with locomotive/s attached and compressor cars attached

Driver/Yardman

Check the brake pipe cocks are open between the compressor car and ore car.

Check the brake pipe cock is closed on the trailing end of the compressor car.

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When on board the locomotive

Driver

Conduct a continuity test to ensure the integrity of the brake pipe.

Yardman

Make the break at the location determined by the yard controller.

Assist in continuity test as directed by driver.

OS 2.3.7 Roll-By Examination

A roll-by examination is conducted by an authorised person and is required to make sure there are no obvious defects on the train. Where there has not been a knock test carried out since unloading, a roll-by test shall be carried out before departure.

When carrying out a roll-by examination, the driver shall limit the train speed to 25 km /hr to allow qualified person to observe the ore cars.

In addition, when any worker is in a position to observe a train passing, they are expected to use sight, hearing and smell to detect anything out of the ordinary with any rail vehicle and report any defect to the driver, train controller or other appropriate officer.

Where wayside detection equipment has detected significant wheel impact levels, a roll-by examination is used to gauge the severity of potential wheel or bearing defects.

When carrying out roll-by examination of trains passing through yards, the driver, yardman, examiner or qualified employee shall check for the following:

All wheels are rotating

Defective or noisy bearings

Skids and Flat Spots on Wheels

Handbrake chains are fully released

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That audible leaks from branch pipes, angle cocks and air hoses are not excessive

Position of car body on bogie bolster and side bearers

Other obvious defects

In all cases where a knock test has been carried out on loaded rakes, a roll-by examination is required before a mainline journey commences.

Note: All empty trains originating from Nelson Point, Boodarie and Bing shall have a roll-by examination on departure.

OS 2.3.8 Brake Pipe Leakage Test

A brake pipe leakage test is necessary to determine if leakage of air from the train brake system is within allowable limits for regulatory or locotrol purposes. After marshalling a train for mainline departure the driver shall ensure that a train brake pipe leakage test is conducted. Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 35 kpa per minute.

OS 2.3.9 Drivers to Observe Locomotive Gauges and Displays

Drivers are required to constantly monitor locomotive gauges and displays as they affect the safe working and degree of control of the equipment being operated. In particular, the driver shall observe the status of the brake pipe gauges whether operating on the mainline or in yards with reference to the operating condition of the vehicles being hauled. The flow meter and brake pipe gauge shall be observed regularly to gather an indication of the following:

Flow Rate (relative to brake pipe length and temperature).

Brake pipe pressure at the last car to determine taper.

That the brake pipe is continuous through out the train.

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OS 2.3.10 Exclusion Zone – Brake Pipe Continuity

For the purpose of train safety, an exclusion zone has been declared on all rail traffic between the Bi Lo Crossing and car dumpers 1, 2 and 3 at Nelson Point.

No BHP Billiton personnel or contractors are permitted to carry out work on any rolling stock in this exclusio zone, and in particular these personnel or contractors shall not carry out any actions that will affect the integrity of the brake pipe between the lead and rear of any ore car rake. This requirement does not preclude the attachment or removal of compressor cars or fuel tankers from one end of an ore car rake or maintainers attending to compressor car faults.

Under normal operations, loaded rakes entering this area will have brake pipe continuity established before entering and as such will not require a further continuity test before being pulled to the relevant dumper for spotting, except if being left for a period greater than 24 hrs.

Note: The Manager Railroad Operations or their delegate may issue specific instructions on a per case basis that work be carried out in this area after ensuring the safety of all personnel working or likely to work in the area. This is to be done using appropriate Risk Management processes.

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OS 2.3.11Traffic Rake Certificate

For all loaded rakes that have received both a knock test and a visual and audible brake test at Nelson Point and Boodarie, the car examiner shall attach a green ‘Traffic Rake’ Certificate to the brake pipe cut out cock at the dumper end (Port End) of the rake.

The Shunt Crew spotting the loaded rake shall remove the ‘Traffic Rake’ Certificate prior to the rake entering the car dumper and return it to the car examiners.

The ‘Traffic Rake’ Certificate certifies that the Rake is fit for mainline traffic. No BHP Billiton employee or contractor shall carry out any work that would affect brake pipe continuity of the rake, the braking system or equipment safety of the ore cars in any way while the Certificate is in place. The ‘Traffic Rake’ Certificate does not replace any existing requirements for brake testing of trains departing Port for mainline traffic.

OS 2.3.12 Percentage of Isolated or Inoperative Brakes

Maximum number of vehicles with isolated / inoperative brakes in any one train shall not exceed

5% of the total train on departure from Nelson Point, Boodarie or Bing.

7% of the total train on departure from a mine or intermediate station on Newman Mainline, MAC Mainline and Goldsworthy Mainline.

10% of the total train of a service train excluding locomotives.

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OS 2.4 SKIP KNOCKS

OS 2.4.1 Definition

Skip Knock - indicates that the rake/s arriving in Nelson Point or Boodarie Yards have,

been identified as having been ‘knocked’ on the previous journey and

NO requirement for a further ‘knock’ is necessary.

Note: If a rake does not require a ‘Knock’ it will only receive a ‘Brake Test’ prior to departure.

OS 2.4.2 Procedure for Nelson Point Yard

When loaded trains arrive at Nelson Point Yard and are identified as having been ‘Knocked’ on the previous journey, the following shall apply:

Train comes to a stand at reception, break is made (if more than single rake train) and the first portion is taken to the car dumper for unloading.

If another car dumper can be utilised, the rear portion will proceed to the car dumper for unloading.

When an empty rake arrives at the South Yard and identified as having been ‘Knocked’ on the previous journey and a ‘Knock’ and ‘Brake Test’ has not been conducted on arrival, the following shall apply.

A brake test only (including a visual inspection of wheels) shall be conducted and the train marshalled and readied for departure.

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OS 2.4.3 Procedure for Boodarie

When an empty rake arrives at Boodarie and is identified as having been ‘Knocked’ on the previous journey, the following shall apply:

A brake test only (including a visual inspection of wheels) shall be conducted.

OS 2.4.4 Tracking of Knocks on Rakes

When a ‘Knock’ is conducted on a rake it is recorded and the information is stored. The information is retrievable by the Yard and 6PG Controllers to assist in their planning for presentation of rakes to the dumpers.

Yard and 6PG Controllers are to ensure that they complete the ‘End Knock’ on RROPS when the ‘Knock’ has been completed. This will allow easy access to the information regarding the 'Knock' for future/further reference.

In the event that the 'Knock' information is questioned or in doubt, the 'Knock' sheet can be used as a secondary check. However, if in doubt the ‘Knock’ is to be conducted.

OS 2.4.5 Preplanning and Communication

Maximising the benefits from this initiative is dependant upon the continued good planning of rakes to the dumpers and the recognition of the importance of effective communication between yard control, 6PG control, examiners, rail transport supervisors and shift coordinators.

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OS 2.5 SECURING OF TRAINS

OS 2.5.1 Securing of Trains, Portion of a Train, or Rail Vehicles

When securing a train, portion of a train, or rail vehicles on a mainline or back track

Worker

Make sure rail vehicle/train has stopped

Close both brake pipe cocks

Disconnect hosebags

Hold the hosebag firmly

Open the brake pipe cock slowly

Do not direct airflow onto yourself or other workers

Wait until the air flow stops

Leave brake pipe cock open on the lead vehicle of the remaining vehicle/s.

WARNING: Do not close the brake pipe cock before the airflow stops; otherwise a train brake release may occur.

Advise the train controllero The location of the first rail vehicle

Apply as many handbrakes as directed by the train controller according to grade, hand brake chart (see figure OS 2.5) or the use of the electronic handbrake calculator.

Apply chocks, if necessary

Make sure any derail devices are in place (if supplied)

Secure the points away from the occupied track (if possible)

Note: Within the Nelson Point Yard, three handbrakes are sufficient to hold a rake stationary other than between the Old Yard Tower and the Bi-Lo Crossing where one handbrake every three cars is to be applied on loaded rakes.

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Train Controller

Advise the driver/worker to apply handbrakes in accordance with the grade, handbrake chart or the electronic handbrake calculator.

Advise driver/worker to apply chocks, if necessary

Loaded Trains Empty Trains

Grade Locomotive Brake

Applied

Locomotive Brake

Released

Locomotive Brake

Applied

Locomotive Brake

Released

0.00% 0% 0% 0% 0%0.05% 0% 3% 0% 1%0.10% 0% 5% 0% 2%0.20% 0% 11% 0% 4%0.30% 5% 16% 0% 5%0.40% 10% 21% 0% 7%0.50% 16% 27% 0% 9%0.60% 21% 32% 0% 11%0.70% 26% 37% 0% 13%0.80% 32% 43% 0% 15%0.90% 37% 48% 0% 16%1.00% 42% 53% 0% 18%1.10% 48% 59% 0% 20%1.20% 53% 64% 2% 22%1.30% 58% 69% 4% 24%1.40% 64% 75% 5% 25%1.50% 69% 80% 7% 27%1.60% 74% 85% 9% 29%1.70% 80% 91% 11% 31%1.80% 85% 96% 13% 33%

Figure OS 2.5 Hand Brake Chart

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Note: If the average gradient cannot be determined, the train controller shall determine the heaviest gradient any portion of the train is standing on and advise the number of handbrakes required relative to that grade.

OS 2.5.2 Securing Rail Vehicles on a Running Track

When it is necessary, in an emergency, to stow rail vehicles, including locomotives on a running track

Worker/Driver

Obtain approval from the train controller

Secure the points for other than the occupied track (if possible)

Driver

Apply as many handbrakes as deemed necessary according to grade, hand brake chart (see figure OS 2.5) or as directed by the train controller using electronic handbrake calculator.

Use chocks where required

Note: To stow vehicles on a running line, the Manager Railroad Operations or their delegate (in most instances this will be the train controller) must grant authority

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OS 2.5.3 Stabling Locomotives

Locomotive/s detached from trains, attached to compressor/index cars that are left unattended (running or shutdown)

In addition to existing stabling requirements for locomotives the following shall apply,

Driver / Qualified Worker

Stabling one or more locomotives, one locomotive handbrake shall be applied.

If a locomotive is removed from stabled consist, one handbrake is to be applied to a remaining locomotive.

Handbrake to be released prior to moving a stabled locomotive.

Note: Mines spare locomotive and Newman fuel train locomotive shall be handbrake as per the above requirements.

Note: A locomotive that is to be stabled and the handbrake is defective, the locomotive shall be secure by chocks as per OS 2.5.14.

OS 2.5.4 Securing of Trains to Prevent Movement

When the locomotive independent brake, or hand/park brakes are not sufficient to prevent train movement

Driver

If movement occurs, apply automatic train brakes

Apply as many handbrakes as deemed necessary according to grade, hand brake chart (see figure OS 2.5) or as directed by the train controller using electronic handbrake calculator.

Use chocks where required

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OS 2.5.5 Procedure for Placing Chocks to Prevent Train or Rail Vehicle Movement

When it is not possible to hold a train or rail vehicle stationary with handbrakes

Driver / Qualified Person placing chocks

Check the drawgearo If bunched (drawgear pushed in), chock

wheels from the bottom of the gradeo If stretched (drawgear pulled taut), chock

wheels from the top of the grade

Place chocks under wheels on one side of rail vehicle only

Tell train controller which rail vehicle/s is chocked

Train Controller

Make sure the next driver who moves the rail vehicle/s is aware which rail vehicle/s is chocked

Note: Care must be taken when placing or removing chocks under the wheels of rail vehicles. Hold the chock so the hand is not between the chock and the rail or wheel.

OS 2.5.6 Total Compressor Failure

When all compressors fail on a trainDriver

Bring the train to a stop at a suitable location as soon as practicable using a service brake application, and a dynamic brake, if available

Do not recharge the brake system or release any brake application

When the train comes to a stop, make an emergency brake application

Leave the emergency brake applied until the compressor is operational

Apply handbrakes to secure train , if necessary

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OS 2.5.7 Holding Trains Stationary

When it is required to hold a train stationary under normal operating conditions

Driver

Use the locomotive independent brake

If the independent brake will not hold the train stationary, make a sufficient reduction of automatic train brake.

OS 2.5.8 Uncommanded Flow Indication

When the flowmeter registers an uncommanded flow indication from the brake pipe

Driver

Make a visual check, where possible, to make sure the rest of the train is following safely and is intact

If the train appears to be parted, stop.o Tell the train controller of the situation

a) Possible Accident to a Train

Driver

If duplicated track, carry out emergency radio procedures (emergency, emergency, emergency)

Where necessary, provide train protection

Check if adjacent track/s is fouled (if applicable)

Check for the cause of the air loss, or other indications

Secure all portions of the train by application of the independent brake and handbrakes

If there is an accident, give the train controller the details

When the situation has been resolvedo Tell train controllero remove any protection placed (if applicable)

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b) Where the Train Appears to be Intact

Driver

Secure train by using independent brake and, where necessary, handbrakes

Investigate the cause

Take spare brake pipe hosebag and equipment needed to replace hosebag

If the cause is a burst hosebag, replace defective hosebago Advise the train controller

Note: It is essential the train is secured against movement before repairs are carried out.

c) Brake Pipe Pressure is Restored

Driver

Carry out a continuity brake test

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OS 2.5.9 Brake Pipe Dump and Penalties

a) Uncommanded Emergency Brake Application (Dump).

When trains encounter uncommanded emergency brake applications (dumps) the brakes apply at a rapid rate with increased brake cylinder pressure.

To initiate the release of the brakes; the brake pipe has to be recharged above 425kpa before the brake cylinder pressure will start to reduce. It is because of this brake lock on effect that trains are required to be secured before attempting to recover the brakes.

On descending grades the train shall be secured (as per the hand brake chart), prior to recharging the brake pipe, the train brakes are reapplied, then the hand brakes can be released. Once this is done and the driver is back on the lead locomotive the train brakes can be released and the train can proceed.

b) ATP and Other Onboard Systems Initiated Penalty Brake Applications.

Two types of penalty brake applications are;

i. Full Service Brake Application Penalty.

The train is brought to a stand and the driver is required to go to suppression to recover. The driver can release and proceed as long as operating requirements are complied with.

ii. Handles Off Penalty.

The brake pipe pressure is reduced to zero at the service rate. If the driver releases this application while on a steep descending grade the train will start to move immediately and there is no activating air left to initiate the emergency application.

Therefore, should a Handles Off penalty occur on a loaded train descending the MAC bank, Yandi bank or Chichester range (Shaw to Garden) the train shall be brought to a stand, Train Control informed and the incident treated as if it is an emergency brake application.

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OS 2.5.10 Coupling of Hosebags

When attaching rail vehicle/s

Worker

Remove dirt and moisture from the hosebag byo Carefully opening the hosebag cocko Tapping the hosebag

Couple hosebags after rail vehicle/s is attached

Fully open hosebag cocks slowly

Make sure spare hosebags are coupled correctly

Note: The hosebag, when not coupled, must be firmly held and directed away from the face of the worker before opening the cock. Ensure the hosebag cock is closed to reduce the risk of serious injury.

OS 2.5.11 Uncoupling and Securing Hosebags

When detaching rail vehicle/s

Worker

Close hosebag cocks on both adjacent rail vehicles

Uncouple hosebags before rail vehicle is detached

Dummy up hosebags.

Secure rail vehicles

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OS 2.5.12 Return of Defective Hosebag

When a defective hosebag is located on rail vehicle in a depot

Worker

Replace the defective hosebag

When a defective hosebag is located on rail vehicle en-route

Driver

Replace the defective hosebag in accordance with section OS 2.5.8

Forward the hosebag to the rollingstock maintenance depot

OS 2.5.13 Isolating Air Brakes

Relayed Brakes

Driver/Worker

Ensure the car/train is secured against unintended movement

Close the branch pipe cut off cock (slowly if excessive air leakage is evident to prevent dumping the trains brake pipe)

Drain the supply reservoir and leave the drain cock open

Operate the hand release mechanism to drain the air from the brake cylinders

Check brake blocks have moved clear of the wheels

If the car to be isolated is the last car, it must be either remarshalled into the train or taken off. Ensure that the new last car has an operating air brake

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Note: If last car isolated mid-section. Authority required from Manager Railroad Operations to move to first suitable location to detach.

Record defective car number and location in the train consist

Advise the train controller

Non-Relayed Brake Equipment

Driver/Worker

Ensure the car/train is secured against unintended movement

Close the branch pipe cut off cock (slowly if excessive air leakage is evident to prevent dumping the trains brake pipe)

Using the hand release, drain air from the brake cylinders and brake system

Check brake blocks have moved clear of the wheels

GML Tomlinson (red) cars, wedge the hand release valve open (with a rock) to fully exhaust reservoir to atmosphere

If the car to be isolated is the last car, it must be either remarshalled into the train or taken off. Ensure that the new last car has an operating air brake

Note: If last car isolated mid-section. Authority required form Manager Railroad Operations to move to first suitable location to detach.

Record defective car number and location in the train consist

Advise the train controller

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OS 2.5.14 Applying Handbrakes on Rail Vehicles

When applying a handbrake on rail vehicles in a yard or siding

Worker Apply airbrake, if possible Apply handbrake fully (do not over tighten) Release airbrake

OS 2.5.15 Defective Handbrakes

When handbrakes become defective

Worker

Notify supervising officer

Attach defect labels to the handbrake and to the rail vehicle

If necessary, secure the rail vehicle with chocks

Supervising Officer

Make sure repairs are carried out as soon as possible

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OS 2.6 TRAIN IN CLEAR AND INTACT

OS 2.6.1 Train to be In Clear of Adjacent Track

When a train on a bidirectional single line, in other than Remote Controlled Signalling (RCS) territory, is brought to a stand at a station to allow another train to cross or pass

Driver

Check train is intact byo Verbal confirmation of another who can see

the rear of train signals, oro Visually determining the correct rail vehicle

is at the rear of the train, oro The correct number of rail vehicles are on

the train, oro Carrying out a brake pipe leakage testo End of Train Monitor

Make sure the train is in clear by comparing the length of the train with the capacity of the mainline or loop

If train is not in clear, tell train controller and driver of opposing train

Protect the train, if necessary

OS 2.6.2 Trains Stopping Foul of Another Running Track

When a train stops foul of a track on which other trains may cross or pass

Driver

Immediately tell other trains, the train controller

Protect the train, if necessary

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OS 2.6.3 Crossing and Passing Trains to be In Clear and Intact

When trains are crossing or passing at a station

Driver

Make sure the opposing train is in clear and intact by checking theo Other train is in clearo Last rail vehicle has the rear of train signal

fitted and working

Tell other driver, if possible, the train is intact

Note: This procedure does not need to be carried out in Remote Controlled Signalling (RCS) Territory, except when an opposing train is travelling on the authority of Form RCS1.

OS 2.6.4 Opposing Train Not In Clear

If a train is NOT in clear of the track on which another train is to cross or pass

Driver

Stop clear of other train

Tell driver of other train their train is not in clear

Driver of other train

Pull in clear of the opposing track, if possible

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OS 2.6.5 Opposing Train Not Intact

When the opposing train is NOT intact at a station

Driver

Tell driver of opposing train

Tell train controllerTrain Controller

Check the location of all rail vehicles

Make sure section is clear

Authorise train to proceed if satisfied the section is clear

Driver

Do not proceed until authorised by train controller

Figure OS 2.6 Intact and In Clear

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OS 2.7 DELAYED IN A TRACK SECTION

Train delayed in a track section and no communication available with driver

Train Controller

If necessary, stop any rail vehicle that may be required to travel on the adjacent track.

Warn any rail vehicle that may be required to travel on the adjacent track

OS 2.8 STOPPING OF TRAINS

When it is necessary to stop a train mid section

Driver

Advise the train controller

o Location

o Reason for stopping

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OS 2.9 LOCOMOTIVE ANCILLARY SAFETY EQUIPEMENT FAILURE

OS 2.9.1 Malfunction of Singular On-Board Locomotive Safety Equipment.

Driver

Request authority from train controller to isolate such equipment

Train Controller

In consultation with rail transport supervisor and driver, should make alternative arrangements for the safe operation of the train.

OS 2.9.2 Malfunction of All On-Board Locomotive Safety Equipment.

Train Controller

In consultation with rail transport supervisor and driver, shall make alternative arrangements for the safe operation of trains.

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OS 2.10 REPORTING TO TRAIN CONTROL BEFORE NETWORK ENTRY

The following procedure shall apply before a train enters the network running lines from any of the following:

The train's origin location

A yard, terminal, mine or port

Another train control jurisdiction

OS 2.10.1 Procedure for a Train to Enter the Network

Driver

Establish communication with train control to confirm correct operation of the voice communications equipment; and

Discuss with train control any issues that are pertinent to their working.

Confirm departure time from origin location, yard or terminal, confirm train identification details; and

Confirm train length, train crew names and time on duty, as appropriate to their working (if applicable)

Confirm correct speed restriction sheet including any alterations.

Train Controller

Confirm and record the details, as appropriate to the operational management of the train through the jurisdiction

Ensure the train details are entered correctly into the RROPS System

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WAYSIDE EQUIPMENT

Module 3

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OS 3.0 MODULE 3 - WAYSIDE EQUIPMENT

OS 3.1 INTRODUCTION

OS 3.1.1 Definitions

ATP (Automatic Train Protection)

An electronic supervisory, system of ensuring trains do not exceed permitted speeds and/or limits of authority.

Dragging Equipment Detector (DED)

A device fitted at rail height to detect any dragging equipment from a railway vehicle.

Hot Wheel/Hot Bearing Detector

A device installed at various locations on track to detect the temperature of wheels and bearings on Railway Vehicles as they pass the detector location.

Trackside Warning Equipment

Those devices installed at various sites on track to detect and report on the condition of the track and passing rail traffic.

OS 3.1.2 Purpose of Module

This module provides general information on the Wayside Equipment used on the BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad. It will also provide procedures and instructions for the use and application of these systems.

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OS 3.2 AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION (ATP)

OS 3.2.1 ATP Message Display

The ATP Action Plan is intended to assist drivers in fault identification and system peculiarities / irregularities

These are some of the messages displayed by ATP.

ATP MESSAGE DISPLAY

ATP DISPLAY DESCRIPTION

Trail Loco set up as a trailing unit

Remote Loco set up as controlling remote

Shunt Shunt switch has been activated

Override Override switch has been activated

No_Locat Transponder failure

No_Code No cab signal is being picked up

Cal_Fail Wheel Calibration failure

Cal_Err Transponder ID data not right

Brk_Fail Brake Test Failure

TrspFail Transponder Interface Fail

SenAFail Speed Sensor A Fail

SenBFail Speed Sensor B Fail

FcolFail Forward Receiver Coil Failure

RcolFail Rear Receiver Coil Failure

FreqFail Off-Frequencies Fail

Tst_Fail Departure Test Failed

Select EndGen Field Off and Reverser centred and out.

BP too low Brake Pipe too low to conduct test

CC1,2,3,4_Fail Cab Codes has Failed

OS 3.2.2 Shunt Switch

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The Shunt switch is located on the drivers control stand and can only be operated on authorisation from the train controller.

The full description of use and activation is listed below.

SHUNT SWITCH

Location: Drivers control stand

Operation: Authorised by train controller only

Usage:

Only used for shunting operations Following moves / Assisting trains While Propelling Cars When helping disabled trainsAll applications used only in ATP or Node Territory

Activation:

Must be stationary prior to operation Spring loaded toggle switch, alarm will sound

whilst activating switch Turn the switch “On” and release and the system

goes into Shunt Mode “Shunting” is displayed on ATP message display Turn the switch “On” and release the second time

and the system returns to Normal Train is restricted to 35km/h while in shunt.

Note: If switch is held in the ‘On” position for more than 7 seconds an error will be declared and the switch will be ignored until the Ultra Cab II is cycled

Note: Penalty brake application will occur when speed is exceeded

Warning: Banker Locomotives are not to use SHUNT MODE.

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OS 3.2.3 Temporary Override Switch

The temporary override switch is located on the drivers control stand. It may only be used if authorised by the train controller or if the driver is in possession of a valid Form RCS1.

TEMPORARY OVERRIDE SWITCH

Location: Drivers control stand

Operation:Authorised by train controller Or in possession of a valid Form RCS1

Usage:

Used in ATP failure situations Used to allow movement when system is enforcing

a Stop or Restrictive speed RCS1 Forms as well as authority to override ATP

are required to pass signals at Stop. Override switch will Not override a Cal Error (for

Cal Error see Section OS 3.2.6)

Activation:

Spring loaded toggle switch, alarm will sound whilst activating switch

Turn the switch “On” and release to put system into Override mode

“Override” is displayed in ATP message display The Ultra Cab II will resume Normal operations

when the condition that was overridden is corrected

Note: If switch is held in the ‘On” position for more than 7 seconds an error will be declared and the switch will be ignored until the Ultra Cab II is cycled

Note: Use of the temporary override switch does not allow a variation from Safeworking Procedures. Safeworking Procedures must be adhered to at all times

Note: A driver may use their discretion in an emergency situation to override the ATP. However, the train controller must be advised of all details of the situation as soon as possible.

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OS 3.2.4 Location Not Known or Lost (No_Locat)

No_Locat(Location not known or lost)

Definition:

The restricted mode is the result of the ATP system not being able to use its track map to determine local track speeds or block enforcementThe ATP System will display a target speed and No_Locat

Cause:

When entering ATP territory, returns to ATP Active after 100 metres and passes over 2nd entry Transponder

When the Locomotive detects incorrect location data or no data within 15 km from last valid Transponder ID received.

The ATP system deems itself lost after missing 2 transponder locations

Missing Transponders or antenna damaged

Action:

Override may be utilised to allow track speed to be continued

If a 0 Target is displayed, Override will not allow the ATP system to enforce the Stop prior to the signal location

In the case of a 35 Diverge Target, the operation of Override would not allow ATP to enforce the speed.

System will impose speed restrictions within 3 km of signal location

Normal operation will be restored when location is verified with correct location from next transponder. ATP_Act will be displayed

If stationary and 0 target speed displayed ATP will not permit further movement

Warning: Safeworking considerations must be considered prior to the operation of Override in the case of a No_Locat situation. System may need to be isolated

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OS 3.2.5 No Code

There are three scenarios in relation to No Code.

a) The 25kmh Restricted Speed imposed by Cab Code 0 after passing a proceed signal.

Cause:

A broken rail has occurred straight after the locomotive passed the proceed signal.

The Cab Signal Generator has failed to start up and send cab codes for next signal.

Something has occupied the block section from the other end about the same time as the locomotive.

Something is tracking out the cab codes between the signal and the locomotive. E.g. ( water over the track, equipment working on the track, etc)

The way side equipment has failed in total.

Action:

The first train over the section cannot Overrideand it continues across the section at 25kmh.

The Traffic Controller checks the telemetry once the section is clear and if track occupation remains then it is potentially a Broken Rail.

Note: If there is no track occupation then it is probably the Cab Signal Generator. The fault must be rectified.

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b) If a No Code is detected within 3 km of a Red signal the ATP system will impose a Zero (0) target speed instead of a 25 km target.

Cause:

An imposed Stop initiated by Cab Code 0 prior to passing a signal.

ATP will not allow a train to pass any signal without receiving a Proceed cab code.

Action:

This is an extension of the previous situation. Traffic Controller must check the telemetry for next section. If track is clear and signal indication is at Proceed train controller shall authorise the Driver to Override the restrictive state.

If the Receiver Coils are damaged ATP will display a restricted speed (25), Time To Action and No Code

Note: The System may need to be isolated

c) A No Code is detected when stationary

Cause: If reverser is centred If direction is selected and Gen Field CB is off.

Action: Select direction and ensure Gen Field CB is On.

Note: If entering a passing track that is occupied (Flashing Red, Subsidiary or Form RCS1) you will receive a ‘0 No Code’.

Note: No Code will count you down to the signal and not to the rear of the obstruction

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OS 3.2.6 Cal_Error

A Cal_Error occurs if the Transponder ID received is out of tolerance.

Cal_Err

Definition: Transponder ID received is out of tolerance

Cause:

Transponder error Transponder identification out of all

parameters Transponder is in wrong location The one or both traction motors tachos

connected to the ATP system has been isolated.

The system can no longer calculate distance or speed.

Excessive wheel slip or wheel slideNote: In this instance the train is given a penalty brake application

Action:

To clear, Cycle computer, Cycle RF source circuit breaker Conduct departure test and proceed as normal if possible.

If Cal Err is still displayed then follow theCalibration Procedure via the Ultra Cab II console1. Switch Gen field switch On2. Place Reverser in forward3. Press Upper toggle switch to Calibrate

position and release4. Wait until WHL DIA1 appears in the display5. Lift lower toggle switch to Scroll position (5

times) until Quit is displayedTo avoid mistakes ensure the CPU display scrolls through the following in order:

MTR CALCLEAR SPDATETIMEQUIT

Permission from train control prior to opening the Ultra Cab II cabinet.

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Note: If Cal Err relates to wheel slip/slide the ATP Air Isolation switch can be switched off with permission of train control. Once clear of the problem area the train must be stopped and the ATP system restored. If not, ATP may need to be isolated.

OS 3.2.7 Other ATP Messages

Other messages that may appear are listed below

CAL FAILDescription: Wheel calibration Test Loop Failure

Action:

The ATP System will operate utilising the previous wheel calibration in its memory. However, the failure must be recorded and reported as continuous and subsequent failures could develop into

Brk_Fail

Description: The Brake Test has failed during departure test

Action:Check the brake system and conduct the departure test again

TrspFail

Description:The Amtec Transponder Interface has failed during the departure test.

Action:Check the RF Source circuit breaker and re-conduct the departure test.

SenAFail / SenBFail

Description:Either one of the traction motor speed Speed Sensors have failed during the departure test process

Action:Check the Traction Motor and Speed Sensor cut outs and reconduct the departure test

FcolFail / RcolFail

Description:The Forward or Rear Cab Signal Receiver Coils have failed during the departure test

Action:Check the receiver coils are still correctly positioned behind the Cow catcher on both ends of the locomotive. reconduct the departure test.

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FreqFailDescription: The Frequency test for the Cab Codes has failed.

Action:Check circuit breakers and receiver coils and reconduct the departure test.

Tst_Fail

Description: Some aspect of the Departure test has failed

Action:Press the Scroll button to identify which function has failed. Rectify the fault and re-conduct the departure test.

Select End

Description:The ATP departure test can not proceed if a direction of travel has not been selected

Action:Turn the Generator Field switch On and place the Reverser in forward / reverse

Speed

Description:This message is displayed when a departure test is attempted on a Dash 8 while in motion.

Action:

It also results in a penalty application due to recent soft ware changes.It does not occur on AC6000s as the drop down menu will not show the departure test function key while the locomotive is in motion

BP too low

Description:This indicates the Brake Pipe pressure is too low for the departure test to proceed and therefore the test will fail

Action:Check the Auto Brakes are released prior to the full departure test being conducted.

CC1,2,3,4 &0_Fail

Description:This indicates that the ATP system cannot identify or respond to a cab code command

Action:

Re-conduct the departure test and any subsequentfailure the system is a total failure.Note: If this message is displayed, notify train control and Isolate ATP

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Kill Code(Displayed on CPU Card in Ultra Cab II console)

Description:Failure to Calibrate in an ATP Active area

Action:Set Reverser to reverse and re-calibrate ATP

ATP Subsystem Failures

Description:If the Display goes blank due to Vital voltage failure

Action:

The ATP’s failsafe system will impose a Penalty Brake applicationThe system cannot operate without a Display therefore the system is a failure.

Note: If this message is displayed, notify train control and Isolate ATP

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OS 3.2.8 ATP Isolation

Should it be necessary to isolate the ATP, the following process shall be adopted.

ATP ISOLATION

Description:The System should only be isolated after thoroughly exhausting all avenues of trouble shooting.

Action:

Contact train control and obtain authority to Isolate system

Stop the Train Break the seal on the A.T.P. Isolation Switch Turn the ATP isolation switch “out” This isolates the air portion of the system.

(EPIC) Turn the Main ATP circuit breaker “Off” at

main control panel This isolates the electrical side of the system

(Ultra Cab II). Record the isolation on Locomotive Log Book.

Note: The ATP will no longer provide vital supervision and the alerter is the only supervisory system operational

Note: All trains shall have an ATP equipped locomotive leading with ATP activated and operational prior to departure from a terminal unless otherwise authorised by the Registered Manager Railroad Operations.

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OS 3.3 WHEEL IMPACT LOAD DETECTOR (WILD)

OS 3.3.1 Location

The wheel impact load detector is located at the 39 kilometre.

OS 3.3.2 Alarm Receipt

Hardcopies of a report is sent to the OCRS Nelson Point.

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OS 3.4 HOT WHEEL ALARM/HOT BEARING DETECTOR (HWA/HBD)

OS 3.4.1 HWA/HBD General

The Hot Wheel Alarm/Hot Bearing Detector activates when the temperature of wheels/bearings exceeds predetermined temperature.

OS 3.4.2 Location

NML 39.4 km GML 37.95 km

84.9 km 97.35 km

128.8 km 141.35 km

154.3 km 172.00 km

179.9 km

226.1 km

258.1 km MAC M311 km

284.4 km

322.9 km

370.1 km

OS 3.4.3 Communication

All alarms are received directly by the train control centre, whilst simultaneously transmitting annunciation advice of defects detected to the driver.

Driver advised of

Axle number/s

Rail (side)

Type of defect

Vehicle number

Car position.

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OS 3.4.4 Alarm Receipt

The alarm is both audible and screen alarm.

Once the alarm is acknowledged, it is transferred from the Alarm Screen, to the Operational Diary Screen only.

OS 3.4.5 Initial Alarm Display

Example:

Date TimeControl

AreaKM Peg HWA1 Text

06/02 06:51:26 CA09 284 HWA1

284 km Hot Box West rail Axle 53

OS 3.4.6 Procedure

Train Controller

Locate and confirm location on the mimic screen.

Confirm and identify train in area.

Advise driver to bring the train to a stand clear of HWA/HBD.

Note: Driver will already have the annunciation/audible advice and should already be bringing the train to a stand

From Hotbox Viewero Note the axle/s number o East or West sideo Hot wheel/s or axle/s

Endorse the train control diagram includingo Cars numbero Any faults/action taken

If necessary, broadcast request for assistance from any mobile in the vicinity to assist the driver.

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Advise the driver of the details.

If mobile assistance used, or 2nd driver is on the Train, no 10 minute check call required

If the driver is ‘Driver Only’ and required to walk the train, initiate ‘Train Walk’ procedures, calling every 10 minutes until the driver is back on the locomotive or until assistance arrives

Instruct driver to check affected car/s and those on either side

If there is a significant delay or a drivers hours may exceed 12 hrs (this includes the affected driver or any other driver affected by the delay), call the relevant Supervisor Rail Operations to arrange relief/assistance

Once the train has been checkedo If no abnormality detected (NAD), train

continues on journey. If mobile available, they are to be used to carry out ‘Roll-by examination’ of the train

o If fault detected, the train controller shall consult with the driver and Rollingstock Maintainers to ascertain next course of action

o If no mobile is available and assistance is required, call out ‘On Call’ Track Maintenance Personnel or, if near a rail crew location, call for assistance

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OS 3.5 DRAGGING EQUIPMENT DETECTOR (DED)

OS 3.5.1 Location

DED’s are located at all signal locations and at selected switch locations.

OS 3.5.2 Communication

All alarms are received directly by the train control centre only.

OS 3.5.3 Alarm Receipt

The Alarm is audible and screen alarm as well as train control mimic panel indication.

A red coloured rectangle box with the acronym ‘DED’ is displayed on the Mimic Screen at the location of the activation. The alarm will remain displayed on the alarm screen until reset in the field, this is usually done by a Signal Maintainer.

OS 3.5.4 Initial Alarm Display

Example:Date Time Con. area Station Text

06/02 07:00:27 CA08 YJN

DED YJN Dragging

Equipment Detected

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OS 3.5.5 Procedure

Train Controller

Advise the driver of the activation.

Driver of the train is to be advised to bring the train to an immediate stand.

If necessary, broadcast request for assistance from any mobile in the vicinity to assist the driver.

Endorse the train control diagram includingo Car/s number.o Any faults/action taken.

If mobile assistance used, or 2nd driver is on the Train, no 10 minute check call required.

If the driver is ‘Driver Only’ and required to walk the train, initiate ‘Train Walk’ procedures, calling every 10 minutes until the driver is back on the locomotive or until assistance arrives.

Instruct driver to check the portion of the train that has passed the DED for low hanging objects.

If there is a significant delay or a drivers hours may exceed 12 hrs (this includes the affected driver or any other driver affected by the delay), call the relevant rail crew /relieving driver (Yandi), to arrange relief/assistance.

Once the Train has been checkedo If no abnormality detected (NAD), train

continues on journey. If mobile available, they are to be used to carry out ‘Roll-by examination’ of the train.

o If fault detected, advise the worker/driver to raise and secure the low hanging object. The train may then continue on with its journey.

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OS 3.6 COLD RAIL ALARM (CRA)

OS 3.6.1 Cold Rail Alarm - General

The Cold Rail Alarm activates when the temperature drops below 7 degrees. The alarm will restore to normal once the temperature rises above 10 degrees.

OS 3.6.2 Location

The Cold Rail Detector is located at the M311.0 km.

OS 3.6.3 Communication

All alarms are received directly by the train control centre only.

OS 3.6.4 Alarm Receipt

The Alarm is both audible and screen alarm.

Once the alarm is acknowledged, it is transferred from the Alarm Screen, to the Operational Diary Screen only.

An alarm is also received when the alarm resets back to normal. This Alarm is both audible and screen alarm which, when reset, transfers to the Operational Diary Screen.

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OS 3.6.5 Initial Alarm Display

Example:Date Time Con.area Station Text

06/02 07:00:27 CA06 226HWA1 226 km Cold Rail Alarm

OS 3.6.6 Procedure

Train Controller

Notify drivers of all loaded trains, including service and work trains, to reduce speed to 60 km/h between all mines (Jimblebar, Newman, OB18, OB25, Mining Area C, Yandi 1 & 2) and Abydos.

Advise the GML train controller as to the status of the alarm, including when it is reset.

The Speed Restriction Sheet is to amended to include the speed restriction, along with locomotive numbers of the trains advised.

The train control diagram is to be endorsed, including lines showing, activation and reset of the alarm in the affected area, including time.

Once the alarm resets, advise the drivers of affected trains to resume normal road speed.

Train control diagram to be endorsed, including time.

Note: It is possible to receive multiple activations and resets for this alarm. On all occasions, the above procedure must be followed.

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OS 3.7 STREAM FLOW DETECTOR (SFD)

OS 3.7.1 Stream Flow Detector - General

Stream Flow Detectors are strategically located in areas of high water flow where it can affect track and structure formations.

The Stream Flow Detectors activates when the water level in the twin tank device exceeds a predetermined set level and raises a float switch. This creates a short across the affected track section.

OS 3.7.2 Location

NML GML86.4 km 231.0 km 108.0 km113.0 km 289.1 km 183.0 km171.5 km 289.9 km189.0 km 405.5 km

OS 3.7.3 Communication

There is no alarm received by the train control centre. Trains in the affected section receive a ‘No Code’ on the ATP, or signals revert to stop, if approaching.

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OS 3.7.4 Indications

Train Control

A ‘Track Occupation’ appears on the mimic screen in the affected area.

Any cleared signals will restore to stop.

Train

If approaching an affected section, signals (if cleared) will restore to stop, preventing entry into the section.

If the train is already in the affected section, the cab signal present should stop and a ‘No Code’ should be received on the ATP.

OS 3.7.5 Procedure

Train Control

The driver is to be advised to stop the train immediately, if ‘No Code’ is received in the affected section.

Advise driver of the situation, and keep the driver informed of any further developments.

If the train is outside the affected area, and a ‘Track Occupation’ appears on the Mimic Screen, place electronic protection on both sides to prevent entry into the area.

Endorse the train control diagram includeo Locationo Action taken

Carry out ‘Track Occupations’ procedures and callout a hi-rail/signal technician to run and/or verify track integrity.

Receive advice from the hi-rail/signal technician as to whether the track is safe for normal operation.

The detector is to be manually reset by the attending signal technician staff, to ensure the

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site has been attended and the track condition verified. The ‘Track Occupation’ and track short will disappear

If it is safe for normal traffico Remove electronic protection.o Restore signals

If it is not safe for normal traffic, consult with the track maintenance staff as to the next course of action

If there is a significant delay or a drivers hours may exceed 12 hrs (this includes the affected driver or any other driver affected by the delay), advise the rail transport supervisor to arrange relief/assistance.

Advise appropriate management.

Note: It should be noted that during periods of heavy rain, the driver shall advise the train controller of flowing streams.

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LEVEL CROSSINGS

Module 4

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OS 4.0 MODULE 4 - LEVEL CROSSINGS

OS 4.1 INTRODUCTION

OS 4.1.1 Definitions

Hand Signaller: A qualified person appointed to use flags, lights and other devices to control traffic and to protect employees, contractors, the public and obstructions.

Shall: To be understood as mandatory

Should: Is to be understood as non-mandatory ie. Advisory or recommended.

Train Controller:

A qualified person authorised to control all rail movements and authorise work in the vicinity of track in a designated train control area.

OS 4.1.2 National Road/Pedestrian Crossing Requirements

In accordance with AS 4292, the following applies in relation to Road/Pedestrian Crossings:

Crossing controls shall be provided at designated level crossings.

The selection of the crossing control for a particular level crossing shall consider the risks to all users of the crossing.

Crossing controls shall comply with AS 1742.7, Manual of uniform traffic control devices, Part 7:Railway crossings.

Crossing controls shall be either—o Passive controls—for example signs,

manual gates, mazes or combination thereof; or

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o Active controls—for example flashing lights, boom gates, pedestrian gates, walk/don't walk signals, audible alarms in conjunction with signs, and mazes if required

Warning of approaching trains shall be provided to those about to cross the railway so that they can either stop prior to the crossing or clear the crossing before the train arrives. This warning shall be achieved either by: o Providing direct viewing of the approaching

train at passive controlled crossings; or o Providing a timely warning at active

controlled crossings.

Where active controls are used, the warning provided shall clearly indicate to the user whenthe crossing is not safe to cross.

Note: If the warning time could be unduly long (failure and maintenance situations aside), the crossing shall not be closed for a time that is likely to test the patience of the crossing user prior to and following the passage of a train.

When determining the crossing control measures to be applied the possibility of other train(s) occupying the crossing in either direction immediately after a previous train needs to be considered.

OS 4.1.3 Purpose of Module

The purpose of this module is to give a description of procedures for the operation of level crossings. It includes the following sections

Level crossing signals and signs.

Boom gates and/or flashing lights.

Failure of boom gates and/or flashing lights to operate.

Handsignalling over a level crossing.

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Level crossings not fitted with boom gates and/or flashing lights.

Maintenance or repairs to boom gates, flashing lights or pedestrian crossing protection equipment.

OS 4.1.4 Level Crossing Protection Categories

Railway crossing protection falls into two categories.

Passive protection uses signs (stop or give way) to warn motorists about a level crossing.

Active protection uses one or more of lights, bells, boom gates or lit signs to warn motorists that a train is approaching a level crossing.

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OS 4.2 LEVEL CROSSINGS GENERAL

OS 4.2.1 General Description

The Standard HXP Level crossing uses a monitored length of track on each approach to calculate train speed. This speed then determines when the crossing will start up to give a standard warning time to the public. For example, a slower train will get closer to the crossing than one travelling faster.

Note: Track maintenance machines should hold a constant speed when approaching level crossings to prevent inconsistent warning times.

OS 4.2.2 Gate Delay

The standard delay time for level crossings is 30 seconds. On the Broome and Great Northern Highways; the boom gates are delayed a further 6 seconds to allow road trains more time to clear the level crossing.

OS 4.2.3 Approaches

The approach is the length of track preceding the crossing used to calculate and monitor train approach speed to the crossing. In a standard HXP crossing, a train should not stand in this area unless in an emergency situation.

OS 4.2.4 Signal Controlled

Signalled controlled level crossings is when the signalling system interacts with the operation of the level crossing.

The M306.9 has the standard 850 metre approach when the Yandi Mine switch is set for the Mac route but is reduced to 500 metre approach ending at YM4 to

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prevent the crossing from operating when a train goes into Yandi 2.

Note: Track maintenance machines are not to be held at YM4 for trains going into Yandi 2 because they will occupy the crossing approach.

The 12.6 & 15.2 are on dual track and operate on speed monitoring. If the crossing is operating with one train movement and a second train movement is detected on the other track then the crossing will keep operating until the second movement has cleared the crossing.

OS 4.2.5 Key Switch

Key Switching is used only on boom gate crossings. A key is to be obtained from train control (for crossings located at the 12.6 and 15.2 km). All other crossings shall have key locked in a box at the crossing location. When in possession of the key and with permission from train control, insert it into a switch located at the level crossing. In the “raise” position the boom gates are held in the vertical position but the crossing lights and bells will continue to function normally.

This Key is only to be used in conjunction with a traffic management plan and is returned to train control at the completion of the job or at the end of the shift.

A track closure and crossing isolation is required for longer periods.

OS 4.2.6 BHPIO Crossing Listing

Goldsworthy Mainline

9.6 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

10.96 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

19.3 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

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57.3 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

Newman Mainline

12.6 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

15.2 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

54.9 km HXP Level Xing

91.3 km HXP Level Xing

114.0 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

154.4 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

211.6 km HXP Level Xing

M281.7 km HXP Level Xing

M306.9 km HXP Boom Gate Level Xing

288.5 km HXP Level Xing

386.1 km HXP Level Xing

J401.8 km Flashing Lights only

J415.8 km HXP Level Xing

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OS 4.3 LEVEL CROSSING SIGNALS AND SIGNS

OS 4.3.1 Level Crossing Sign

Location

Placed on approach signals or approach beacons to some level crossings.

Purpose

To indicate to drivers and other workers that they are approaching a level crossing fitted with flashing lights and protected by a stop signal.

OS 4.3.2 Level Crossing Protection Signals

Description

A two aspect colour light signal.

Location

At various locations on the BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad.

Purpose

To provide protection to some level crossings.

OS 4.3.3 Indications and Working

a) Operation of Level Crossing Signals

Signals protecting level crossings are operated by the train controller, or a worker using a manual switch facility.

b) Passing Level Crossing Signals at STOP

If a train is required to pass a signal protecting a level crossing at STOP, the driver must be issued with a RCS1 form from the train controller. Driver must also follow the instructions outlined in section OS 4.3.4.

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OS 4.3.4 Passing a Signal at STOP

After a driver is authorised to proceed past a signal, which protects a level crossing fitted with boom gates and/or flashing lights

Driver

Approach level crossing with caution.

Sound whistle.

Make sure train makes contact with the level crossing track circuit.

Wait until the flashing lights are operating and/or boom gates are horizontal.

Make sure headlight is on full.

Proceed across level crossing.

Note: If in dual track territory, the whistle must be sounded continuously across the crossing.

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OS 4.4 BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS

OS 4.4.1 Operation of Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights

When level crossings are protected by boom gates and/or flashing lights, the operation of these may be

Controlled automatically from track circuits, or

Controlled automatically by a Predictor.

Operated from the test box or key switch.

Note: All level crossing boom gates and flashing lights are fitted with a manual switching facility for operation in emergency situations or for maintenance purposes.

OS 4.4.2 Trains Approaching a Level Crossing

When a train approaches a level crossing fitted with boom gates and/or flashing lights

Driver

Headlight on

Sound whistle

Where possible, checko Lights are flashingo Roadway is clearo Boom gates, if fitted, have lowered to the

horizontal position.

If boom gates and/or flashing lights are not operating correctly (see Section OS 4.5 of this module)o Sound whistle continuouslyo Attempt to stop the train before the level

crossing.o Tell train controller and all trains in the

vicinity.

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WARNING: Any damage or malfunction of level crossing protection equipment must be reported to the train controller.

Note: Do not make any attempt to manipulate level crossing equipment unless authorised by the train controller and/or the signal engineer.

OS 4.4.3 Trains Setting Back over Level Crossings Protected by Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights

When setting back over a level crossing protected by boom gates and/or flashing lights

Driver

Have a qualified worker, in radio contact with, or within, clear sight of the driver, proceed in advance of the movement.

Qualified Worker

Stop the train on the approach side of the level crossing.

If necessary, manually operate protection equipment.

Wait until the boom gates are horizontal and/or the flashing lights are operating.

Tell driver to proceed across the level crossing.

Driver

Sound the whistle.

Proceed cautiously over the level crossing.

Note: Trains shall not set back without authority from the train controller.

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OS 4.4.4 Shunting Sidings Located within the Limits of Track Circuits

When it is necessary to shunt sidings located within the limits of track circuits controlling the operation of boom gates and/or flashing lights

Driver

Advise the train controller that a shunt will occur at the siding and the boom gates/flashing lights will be activated.

If possible, key operate the boom gates/flashing lights.

Keep shunting time to a minimum to reduce delays for road traffic at the level crossing.

Train Controller

Receive advise from the driver that a shunt is to occur.

Be prepared for delays to road traffic at the level crossing.

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OS 4.5 FAILURE OF BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS TO OPERATE

OS 4.5.1 Failure of Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights

a) Failure to Operate on Approach of Train

When the boom gates and/or flashing lights fail to operate on the approach of a train

Driver

Sound whistle continuously.

Make sure headlight is on.

Attempt to stop the train clear of the level crossing on the approach side.

Tell train controller and all other trains in the vicinity.

If the train stops foul of the roadway, the roadway must be cleared as soon as possible.

Train Controller

Stop all trains approaching the level crossing including trains on adjacent tracks.

Tell Signal technician.

Organise to manually operate the boom gates/flashing lights.

Worker

Obtain a Key to operate the Boom Gates.

Use the key to open the door of the box located on the side of the equipment housing.

Manually operate the boom gates and/or flashing lights.

Driver

Wait for boom gates and/or flashing lights to operate.

Allow train to clear the level crossing.

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Restore the manually operated equipment to the NORMAL position.

Lock the box.

b) Failure to Operate after Manual Operation

If after one minute of manual operation the boom gates and/or flashing lights fail to operate

WARNING: The authority to STOP road traffic at level crossings, by law, is given to members of the Police Service or to persons who have been accredited in this capacity

Driver

Contact the train controller

Train Controller

Tello ESO

o Police serviceo All approaching drivers until fault is rectified

Arrange foro Police or accredited person to protect the

level crossing.o Handsignaller/s to be at the level crossing, if

required.

Tell Signals Technician

Driver

Before proceeding across the level crossing, make sure the level crossing is protected by police or accredited person.

Make sure headlight is on.

Sound whistle.

Note: If police or accredited person is not in attendance, the train must not proceed over the crossing until the crossing is protected.

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Note: The failure of level crossing protection equipment to operate on the approach of a train, and/or when manually operated, is a wrong side signal failure. In all cases the Signals Engineer must be told immediately. The Signals Engineer will advise on the integrity of the signalling system to enable appropriate arrangements to be made for the safe running of trains.

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OS 4.6 HANDSIGNALLING AT A LEVEL CROSSING

OS 4.6.1 Handsignaller’s Duty at a Level Crossing

When a worker is required to carry out handsignalling duties at a level crossing fitted with boom gates and/or flashing lights

WARNING: Handsignaller/s do not direct road traffic

Handsignaller

Make sureo Communication equipment supplied is

capable of contacting the train controller and drivers and is operating correctly.

o High visibility clothing is worn.o Red flags and red lights are available to stop

rail traffic.o White flags and white lights are available to

signal rail traffic.

Do not stand directly in the path of road traffic when displaying a STOP signal to rail traffic.

When the crossing is protected by police or accredited persono Signal rail traffic over the level crossing.

OS 4.6.2 Handsignalling at a Level Crossing – Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights Failed in the Operating Position

When boom gates fail in the lowered position, or flashing lights continue to operate

Train Controller

Tell all drivers who will approach the level crossing before handsignaller/s are in place to take special caution and be prepared to stop on the approach side of the level crossing.

Advise local Police Service.

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Arrange for handsignaller/s to be sent to the level crossing.

Arrange to supply handsignaller/s with radios if possible, to allow contact with train controller and drivers.

Tell handsignaller/s approximate time of arrival of trains at the level crossing.

Make sure drivers approaching level crossing are aware handsignaller/s are at the level crossing.

Make sure handsignaller/s are aware drivers have been told.

Handsignaller/s

Contact train controller to obtain authority to commence handsignalling.

Allow road traffic to proceed over the level crossing by raising the boom gates.

WARNING: Do not direct road traffic unless qualified

Driver

Alert handsignaller/s by radio or by sounding the whistle when the train is approaching the level crossing.

Be prepared to stop clear of level crossing on the approach side.

Shall not cross level crossing unless signalled by handsignaller.

If no handsignaller/s are present at the crossingo Approach the crossing with caution.o Be prepared to stop before the crossing.o Proceed over the crossing when it is safe to

do so.

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Handsignaller/s

Wait until alerted by driver.

Stop traffic clear of the level crossing by lowering boom gates.

If boom gate are not fitted, waito Until the crossing is clear of road traffic, oro Until the road traffic has stopped.

Signal train across level crossing when it is safe to do so.

Driver

Sound whistle.

Make sure headlight is on.

Proceed cautiously across the level crossing when signalled by the handsignaller.

Handsignaller/s

When the train is clear, allow road traffic to proceed over the level crossing by raising the boom gates.

OS 4.6.3 Handsignalling at a Level Crossing – Where Manual Operation of Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights is Required

When track circuiting fails to operate the boom gates and/or flashing lights, and it is necessary to run trains over a level crossing which can be worked by manual operation

Train Controller

Arrange for handsignaller/s to be placed at the affected crossing.

Arrange to supply handsignaller/s with radios, if possible, to allow contact with train controller and drivers.

Tell handsignaller/s approximate arrival times of trains at the level crossing.

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Make sure drivers approaching level crossing are aware handsignaller/s are at the level crossing.

Driver

Alert handsignaller/s by radio or by sounding whistle when the train is approaching the level crossing.

Be prepared to stop on the approach side of the level crossing.

Do not cross level crossing unless signalled by handsignaller/s.

Handsignaller/s

Use a key to open the door of the box located on the side of the equipment housing.

Manually operate the boom gates and/or flashing lights.

Wait for boom gates and/or flashing lights to operate.

Signal the train over the crossing.

Driver

Sound whistle.

Make sure headlight is on

Proceed cautiously across level crossing when signalled.

Handsignaller/s

Allow train to clear the level crossing.

Restore the manually operated equipment to the NORMAL position.

Lock the box.

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OS 4.6.4 Handsignalling at a Level Crossing – Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights have Totally Failed

When boom gates and/or flashing lights have totally failed and cannot be manually operated

Train Controller

Arrange for Handsignaller/s to be placed at the affected level crossing.

Arrange to supply Handsignaller/s with radios, if possible, to allow contact with train controller and drivers.

Tell Handsignaller/s approximate time of arrival of trains at the level crossing.

Make sure drivers approaching level crossing are aware Handsignaller/s are controlling the level crossing.

Driver

Alert Handsignaller/s by radio or by sounding the whistle when the train is approaching the level crossing.

Stop clear of the level crossing on the approach side.

Do not cross level crossing until signalled by handsignaller.

Handsignaller/s

Contact the train controller to obtain authority to commence handsignalling.

Take up a position at the level crossing.

When the crossing is protected by police or accredited persono Signal rail traffic over the level crossing.

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Driver

Sound whistle.

Make sure headlight is on.

Proceed cautiously across level crossing.

Note: If police or accredited person is not in attendance, the train must not proceed over the crossing until the crossing is protected.

Note: A member of the driver may be used as a handsignaller, if available.

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OS 4.7 LEVEL CROSSINGS NOT FITTED WITH BOOM GATES AND/OR FLASHING LIGHTS

OS 4.7.1 Level Crossings Not Fitted with Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights

When approaching a level crossing not fitted with boom gates and/or flashing lights

Driver

Make sure the headlight is on full beam.

Sound whistle

OS 4.7.2 Trains Setting Back Over Level Crossings Not Fitted with Boom Gates and/or Flashing Lights

When setting back over a level crossing NOT fitted with boom gates and/or flashing lights

Driver

Have a qualified worker in radio contact with, or within clear sight of the driver, proceed in advance of the movement.

Have train under control and be prepared to stop short.

Qualified Worker

Stop the train on the approach side of the level crossing (if necessary)

Make sure road walkways are clear.

Make sure road traffic has stopped before signalling the train over the level crossing.

Remain at the level crossing until locomotive/trains has occupied the level crossing.

Driver

Sound the whistle

Proceed cautiously over the level crossing when safe to do so.

Note: Trains shall not set back without authority from the train controller.

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OS 4.7.3 Maintenance Repairs or Alterations to Road Signage or where Road Signage has been Damaged/Removed and is no Longer Effective

When it is necessary to carry out maintenance repairs or alterations to road signage, or where road signage has been damaged/removed and is no longer effective

Worker

Tell the train controller if the road signage is no longer effective.

Train Controller

Tello ESOo Police serviceo Driver of trains approaching the affected

level crossing.

Arrange foro Protection of the level crossing by police or

accredited person.o Handsignaller/s to be at the level crossing.

Driver

If no Handsignallers at level crossingo Reduce speed approaching level crossing.o Ensure the crossing is protected by police or

accredited person.o Sound whistle.o Make sure headlight is on.o Proceed over crossing be prepared to stop

short of any obstruction.

If Handsignallers are at the crossingo proceed when signalled by the

handsignaller.

Handsignallers

When the crossing is protected by police or accredited persono Signal rail traffic over the level crossing.

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OS 4.8 MAINTENANCE, ALTERATION OR REPAIRS TO BOOM GATES, FLASHING LIGHTS OR PEDESTRIAN CROSSING PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

When it is necessary to disrupt the normal operation of level crossing or pedestrian crossing protection equipment for maintenance, alterations or repairs

Signal Maintenance/Repair Worker

Tell train controller the details of the work to be carried out.

Follow the traffic management plan.

Train Controller

Carry out the required procedures to protect road/rail traffic.

Issue authority to commence work.

Signal Maintenance/Repair Worker

Obtain authority from the train controller to commence work.

Tell the train controller when work is completed.

Note: If due to damage or maintenance, booms and/or flashing lights on one side of a level crossing are not operational, the crossing must be protected by police or accredited person. Handsignaller/s may be sent to signal rail traffic over the crossing.

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OS 4.9 OPERATION OF TRAINS AND ON TRACK VEHICLES WHEN LEVEL CROSSING PROTECTION IS DISABLED

When level crossing protection is disabled the level crossing flashing lights and/or boom arms will not operate when track circuits are occupied and must be manually operated by a handsignaller at the level crossing equipment box.

Handsignaller:

Report to train controller on arrival at level crossing giving name and contact details.

Key operate level crossing protection equipment and signal trains to proceed once level crossing equipment is operating (In accordance with section OS 4.6.3 of this manual).

Do not leave site without permission from train controller.

Train Controller

Record on track protection checklist or track authority form particulars of level crossings disabled, include name and contact details of handsignaller.

Include in handover particulars of any level crossing equipment that is disabled.

Advise handsignaller of estimated time of arrival (ETA) of approaching trains.

Issue Form RCS1 to trains to pass signals at stop and proceed over level crossing.

Advise driver location of level crossings which are disabled and to proceed across only when level crossing equipment is operating and when signalled across level crossing by handsignaller.

Handsignaller

Incoming hand signaller to advise train controller on taking over hand signalling duties giving name and contact details Not to leave site without permission of train controller.

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OS 4.10 HALF BOOM GATE PROTECTED LEVEL CROSSINGS

OS 4.10.1 Purpose

This procedure outlines the process for manual operation of half boom gate protected level crossings installed on the BHP Billiton Iron Ore Railroad Network.

OS 4.10.2 Scope

This procedure shall apply for all authorised personnel required to disable the half boom gate at a level crossing in order to carry out their duties that would cause the crossing to operate.

OS 4.10.3 Key Locations

12.6 km NML and 15.2 km NML level crossings

6PG train control shall control the issue of the manual operation key for boom gate for the 12.6 km and 15.2 km level crossings on Newman Mainline within the Hedland area.

Authorised person requiring the boom gate manual operation key

Attend train control centre (6PG) and request key.

Sign key issue register.

Note: The 12.6km and 15.2km boom gate level crossing key switch is located in the local control panel.

Newman mainline locations other than 12.6km and 15.2km

114.0km,

154.0km

M 306.9km

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Goldsworthy mainline locations

9.6km

11.0km

19.0km

57.0km

The manual operation key for all boom gate protected level crossings, except for the 12.6km NML and 15.2km NML, shall be locked in a box attached to the crossing location.

Note: The key box will raise an alarm for the crossing on the train controller’s panel when opened.

OS 4.10.4 Manual Operation of Half Boom Gate Operated Level Crossings

The authorised person in charge of the manual operation key shall contact the relevant train controller for their work area to obtain permission to commence work and take local control or manual control of the boom gate level crossing being affected by the work.

When permission has been granted open the local panel or box containing the manual operation switch (locked with a railroad “B” key). Opening the manual operation box will send a “boom gate alarm” to train control.

Insert the manual operation key and turn to the “RAISE” position (the switches in the local panels are of a type which requires the switch to be unlocked, then the switch to be turned). The boom gate mechanisms will now be held in the raised position for the duration of the work regardless of the condition of the track circuit.

Note: The bells and lights at the crossing will operate when the track circuit is interrupted except at the 12.6 and 15.2 crossings where the bells and lights will operate as soon as the switch is in “RAISE”.

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The person-in-charge of the work shall appoint a authorised person as a handsignaller for the crossing. The handsignaller shall be in attendance at all times while the crossing is in manual operation.

The handsignaller shall be responsible for the safe passage of all road and rail traffic until relieved or the crossing is restored to automatic operation.

The handsignaller shall as required and directed by either the train controller or the person in charge of the work group switch the key to the “LOWER” position for any rail traffic movements. The operation of the switch to “LOWER” will allow the boom gates to drop to the horizontal position to stop road traffic.

The person-in-charge of the work shall on completion of the work, return to the crossing and together with the handsignaller restore the crossing to automatic operation by returning the key switch to the “AUTO” position.

Note: Before returning the key switch to “AUTO” ensure that the roadway is clear of traffic as the boom gates may descend and then raise to the normal position.

The person-in-charge shall remove the key from the manual key switch, lock the key switch box or local panel and confirm with the train controller the indications for the crossing are all normal before leaving site.

Should the crossing not indicate normal after being locked up the person-in-charge shall remain on site at the crossing and protect all traffic movements until a signal technician or responsible BHPBIO signals officer attends.

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OS 6.0 REFERENCES

AS 4292.5 – 2006 Part 5 Operation Systems.

Code of Practice for the Defined Interstate Rail Network Volume 3 - Operations and SafeworkingJanuary 2003

Glossary for the National Codes of Practice and Dictionary of Railway Terminology

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Notes

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Notes