Upload
health-education-social-protection-and-labor-world-bank
View
106
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak
World Bank Pension Core Course, Washington, April 9th, 2013
Individual contributions are noted on individual accounts. ◦ NDC – contributions pay for benefits of current pensioners ◦ FDC – contributions are prefunded
Accounts earn an “internal” rate of return: ◦ NDC – based on (nominal) covered per capita wage &
covered labor force growth ◦ FDC – (nominal) financial market rate of return
Retirement from any age after a minimum age. Life “annuity” based on individual’s account balance
and cohort (unisex) life expectancy at retirement. Annuity rate of return (or indexation) ◦ NDC - based on (nominal) covered per capita wage &
covered labor force growth ◦ FDC – based on the financial rate of return.
2
Individual accounts give transparency They state clearly the individual claim on aggregate liabilities.
Intra-generational fairness A unit of contributions gives the same pension increment – same transfer of consumption from the present to the future - for all.
Intergenerational fairness. Individuals in all generations pay the same rate on earned income into pensions. (The share of GDP going to pensions is the same over all generations.)
Social policy through non-contributory rights e.g., for early years of childcare (financed with general revenues).
Accounts can be shared between spouses/legal partners During the accumulation period and/or joint annuities can be created at retirement.
Basic equations
At macro level:
At individual level:
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒×
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒×
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
Italy, Sweden, Latvia and Poland
◦ Two western European countries with: need to keep social expenditure under control
with lower economic growth prospects
population ageing
◦ Two transition economies with: the Latvian economy was turned upside down by the
collapse of the Soviet system
Inadequate and inefficient pension system inherited from the Soviet times, with widespread special conditions and early retirement provisions
need to promote growth of the formal sector of the economy
population ageing
Italy Latvia Poland Sweden
Contribution
rate on
earnings
33% (employees)
20% (self-employed)
24% (atypical
contracts)
20% 19.52% 18.5%
NDC 33% (employees)
20% (self-employed)
24% (atypical
contracts)
14% from 2012
12.22%
From 2011:
17,22%
16.0%
FDC
Voluntary scheme 6% from 2012
7.3%
From 2012:
2,3% going up
to 3,5%
2.5%
Occupational
and voluntary
schemes 20% of labour force
in 2008
Yes, but very
low coverage
Yes, but very
low coverage
Yes,
supplement
under ceiling;
whole benefit
above
Reform Overview - Overall DC framework and contribution rates
Credits for periods outside employment ◦ Differences in disability treatment ◦ Common recognition of unemployment, maternity
and periods of care of younger children
Inheritance gains (mortality credits) ◦ Sweden distributes to remaining active accounts ◦ Indirectly used to finance transition (to FDC, to
cover for unbalanced PAYG expenditure)
Notional interest rate ◦ Per capita wage in Sweden ◦ GDP growth in Italy ◦ Wage sum growth in Poland and Latvia
Country Oldest cohort covered Recognition of acrrued rights
Italy initially mandatory for cohorts born after 1960, in 2010 expanded for older ones
Two parts of pension: from old and new schemes
Latvia all contributors covered from the beginning
Re-computation of past contributions based on work histories
Poland cohorts born after 1949 New pension calculated based on existing records, mixed old-new formula applied
Sweden cohorts born after 1941
Initial capital based on old pension formula
Source: Jabłonowski and Müller (2013) based on 1% ZUS sample
Retirement age discussion continues…
… but increase in participation rate expected.
Continuing debate on retirement age:
◦ Italy: complex changes with final equal retirement age and increases linked to life expectancy
◦ Latvia: retirement age equalized at age 62 as a part of reform package. Present discussions of increase to 65.
◦ Poland: retirement age equalization and increase to 67 from 2013 to 2040
◦ Sweden: incentives with NDC seem to help raising actual retirement age
0
5
10
15
20
25
Sweden EU27 Italy Poland
15-64 15-71 55-64
Source: Commission services, EPC.
Estimated impact of pension reform on participation rates (2020),
in percentage points
Close link between earnings and benefits – deviation at bottom and top of wage distribution
Despite different role of pillars – relatively similar outcomes
Italy Latvia Poland Sweden
0.30 0,99 1,08 0,96 1,04
0.50 0,75 0,80 0,74 0,79
0.75 0,75 0,80 0,75 0,67
1.00 0,75 0,77 0,75 0,64
1.50 0,77 0,73 0,75 0,81
2.50 0,78 0,70 0,77 0,88
Net replacement rates in the future by wage level
Based on the OECD pension models
Source: The OECD Pension Models.
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
1 year 2 years 3 years
Italy
gross loss compensation
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
1 year 2 years 3 years
Latvia
gross loss compensation
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
1 year 2 years 3 years
Poland
gross loss compensation
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
1 year 2 years 3 years
Sweden
gross loss compensation
◦ Latvia
Reduced FDC contribution
Reduced newly granted early retirement pensions
◦ Poland – good economic performance with maintained small GDP growth but high budget deficit
Social Insurance Fund deficit covered with commercial loans and state budget loan – SIF can also borrow from Demographic Reserve Fund
Demographic Reserve Fund finances part of expenditure
Reduced FDC contribution
Increase of retirement ages as a long-term change agenda
◦ Sweden
Automatic balancing mechanism initiated
Negative indexation of benefits
◦ Italy
No specific adjustment
Risk of future ad hoc measures?
Source: Jabłonowski and Müller (2013)
Source: Jabłonowski and Müller (2013)
Source: Jabłonowski and Müller (2013)
NDC formula uses life expectancy for the entire population
Risk of bias if the system covers only the part of workforce ◦ Deficit in the financing if actual life expectancy of
the covered group is higher than for the entire population
DC systems both nonfinancial and financial have strong link between lifetime earnings and pensions
Risk of low pensions for people with shorter working careers and low wage levels
NDC system requires maintenance of individual accounts ◦ For the entire working population ◦ For long periods of work ◦ Contributions that are not assigned and not registered and
do not increase individual’s pension rights.
This requires: ◦ Prepared social security administration ◦ Well-designed communication channels between all
stakeholders: social security institutions, employers, banks and individuals
◦ Good quality unique ID numbers Revision of existing numbers (if exist) Establishing a new one (costly and complicated)
Regularly revised life expectancy information
Indexation information: ◦ Wage growth and labour force growth
Record keeping
Quality of information must be assured
All participants are equally responsible for adequate performance of the system
Computer system is important….
…. as well as system managers
Proper identification should be ensured
Procedures should be designed to avoid errors
70%
80%
90%
100%
Sep
tem
ber 2
001
Dec
ember
200
1
Mar
ch 2
002
June
2002
Sep
tem
ber 2
002
Dec
ember
200
2
Mar
ch 2
003
June
2003
Sep
tem
ber 2
003
Dec
ember
200
3
Mar
ch 2
004
June
2004
Identification of employers Identification of employees
Formal control Identification of payments
Overall efficiency
Simple and understandable message to individuals
Annual pension statements
On-line access to the OA account
Country 2010 2020 2040 2060 Change
2010-2060
Italy 15,3 14,5 15,6 14,4 -0,9
Latvia 9,7 7,3 6,3 5,9 -3,8
Poland 11,8 10,9 10,3 9,6 -2,2
Sweden 9,6 9,6 10,2 10,2 0,6
EU27 11,3 11,3 12,9 12,9 1,5
Source: 2012 Ageing Report, European Commission.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Simulation: value of OA pension for 100 000 currency unitis
for 65-year old in Poland
OA Pension Reduction due to life expectancy change
Source: own calculation based on GUS data
Source: Orange report 2011
Source: 2012 Ageing Report, European Commission.
Source: 2012 Ageing Report, European Commission.
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2040 2040-2050 2050-2060
Italy
Dependency ratio contribution Coverage ratio contribution
Employment effect contribution Benefit ratio contribution
In the long-run the NDC pension system reaches financial balance (as expected in DC system)
Strong link between contributions and benefits in the NDC encourages participation, but requires long working lives and stable wages
NDC offers transparency and stable financing, but needs high coverage, long working lives and good administration
Chlon-Dominczak, Franco and Palmer (2012), The First Wave of NDC Countries – Taking Stock Ten Plus Years Down the Road - Sweden, Poland, Latvia and Italy in: Holzmann, R., E. Palmer and D. Robalino. 2012, eds. NDC Pension Schemes in a Changing Pension World, Volume 1: Progress, Issues, and Implementation. Washington D.C.: The World Bank & Swedish Social Insurance Agency.
Jabłonowski, J. and Müller, C. (2013), 3 sides of 1 coin – Long-term Fiscal Stability, Adequacy and Intergenerational Redistribution of the reformed Old-age Pension System in Poland , National Bank of Poland
European Commission (2012), Ageing Report 2012.