From Risk Regulation to Innovation Democracy: precaution, participation and the pluralising of progress

From Risk Regulation to Innovation Democracy:

precaution, participation and the pluralising of progress

www.steps-centre.org/www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/www.multicriteria-mapping.org www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/people/peoplelists/person/7513

Andy StirlingSPRU & STEPS Centre

University of Sussex

presentation to workshop on ‘responding to risks ‐ a key to dealing with socio‐ecological challenges’, Institut für Regional- und Umweltwirtschaft,

Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 23rd June 2014

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‘Sound Science’ in ‘Risk Management’

chemicals: “ …sound science will be the basis of the Commission's legislative proposal…”

Philippe Busquin

GM food “… this government's approach is to make decisions … on the basis of sound science”

Tony Blair

energy: “cool-headed, evidence based assessment … sweep away

historic prejudice and put in its place evidence and science”Malcolm Wicks

Pressures for ‘justification’ (Collingridge) and ‘blame management’ (Hood)

‘Risk’ ‘decisions’ need ‘objective science’ and ‘evidence based policy’

nuclear “needs ... a properly objective and science-weapons: based decision” Peter Kilfoyle

The Precautionary Principle

“Where an activity raises threats of

harm to the environment or human health,

precautionary measures should be taken

even if some cause and effect relationships are

not fully established scientifically.”

Wingspread, 1998

“The precautionary principle applies where

scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive

or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation

indicates that there are reasonable grounds for

concern that the potentially dangerous effects

on the environment, human, animal or plant

health may be inconsistent with the high level

of protection chosen by the EU” EU, 2000

Ambiguous as a definitive prescriptive ‘decision rule’ threat? seriousness? irreversibility? full scientific certainty? cost-effective?

Arbitrary in global legal processes: climate, chemicals, GMOs, biodiversity, trade

Non-operational and incapable of meeting political needs for justification (eg: simple neat numerical values given by for risk and cost-benefit, analysis)

Compared with ‘science based’ risk assessment, seems

“ … Where there are threats

of serious or irreversible damage,

lack of full scientific certainty

shall not be used as a reason for

postponing cost-effective measures

to prevent environmental degradation ”

Principle 15, 1992 Rio Declaration


Causes much anxiety, many strident critiques in ostensible name of reason…

- stifles discovery (Holm), limits innovation (Sunstein); “kills green revolution” (AEI)

- quest for “zero risk” (Majone) is irrational (Sunstein) sign of “unreason" (Taverne)

- “arbitrary & capricious” (Marchant); ;“spreads fear” (O’Neill); like “chemophobia” (AEI)









Causes much anxiety, many strident critiques in ostensible name of reason…

- ‘no basis’ for policy (Peterson); “dangerous” (Graham); “harms society” (O’Neill)

- “battle between science and ideology”…about “religion” (Charnley)

- needs countering by new “proactionary” (More) and “innovation” principles (Bayer)
















“If there is a threat of harm,

which is uncertain,

then some kind of action

should be taken.” Aldred, 2013

…or

uncertainty requires deliberation about action

- Reminds that ‘science based’ methods don’t reduce intractability of uncertainty

- Rejects ‘evidence based policy’ as unique basis for action under uncertainty

- Affirms essential need for deliberation, participation, accountability, democracy

Like any principle, not in itself a definitive decision rule, but a key to a process:

Energy regulation: most mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…

The Poverty of Risk Discourse

0.001 0.1 10 1000externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)low RISK high

nuclear

power


Conventional regulatory risk analysis asks simply: - is this safe?

- safe enough? - tolerable?



nuclear

power


Where comparisons made, selective and circumscribed

Appear to deliver clear, objective distinctions

Contrast emotive subjectivity of precaution or participation?

coal

power



coal

oil

gas

nuclear

hydro

wind

solar

biomass


In a single particular study: ‘sound scientific’,

‘evidence based’ risk discourse implies clear

orderings of choices by simple scalar numbers


0.001 0.1 10 1000

coal

oil

gas

nuclear

hydro

21

wind

solar

biomass

n =

‘externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)

minimum maximum25% 75%

low RISK high


but ‘objective’ peer-reviewed data

typically varies radically


coal

oil

gas

nuclear

hydro

36

20

wind 18

solar 11

biomass 22

31

21

16

n =


…‘evidence based’ risk literatures can be used to justify any choice

Tho’ concealed, the same is often

true for all options


transportmaterialscomputingmilitaryroboticssynthetic biology

“we'll restore science to its rightful place”…

“Our hope … relies on scientific and technological progress”

“One can not impede scientific progress.””

…“history is a race to advance technology”

PROGRESS

TECHNOLOGY

SCIENCE

Lisbon Strategy: “pro-innovation action” for

“Innovation Union”

“… the Government’s strategy is pro-innovation”

“strives to stay in the race””“give technology the

status it deserves”

The Myth of One-Track Progress

Why are do we tolerate such

narrow understandings

of risk?

PROGRESS

TECHNOLOGY

SCIENCE

synthetic biology

“we'll restore science to its rightful place”…

“Our hope … relies on scientific and technological progress”

“One can not impede scientific progress.””

Innovation studies alsoemphasises linearity:

- advance (Nelson)

- diffusion (Rogers)

- early movers (Teece)

- first moving (Lieberman)

- catching up (Santangelo)

- latecomers (Tellis)

- forging ahead (Abramowicz)

- leapfrogging (Brezis)

- falling behind (Aho)

So even academic analysis restricts attention to:

how much? how fast? what risk? who leads?

Misses out:

which way? what alternatives? says who ? why?

The Myth of One-Track Progress

carbon capture

grassroots innovation

behaviour change

distributed renewables

market reform nuclear power

new eco-cities

centralised renewables

Pathways to ‘Sustainable Energy’

History, economics, social science, philosophy, politics, show divergent branching infrastructure innovation trajectories

eg: alternative infrastructures for ‘the’ zero carbon transition …

… alternatives are matters for political, not managerial, institutions

social shaping (Bijker, 85) co-construction (Misa, 03)

studies: expectations (Brown, 03) imaginations (Jasanoff, 05)

Social choices get politically closed down

carbon capture behaviour change

distributed renewables

market reform nuclear power




history: contingency (Mokyr, 92) momentum (Hughes 83)path-dependence (David, 85) path creation (Karnoe,

01)

carbon capture behaviour change nuclear power





philosophy: autonomy (Winner, 77) closure (Feenberg, 91)/politics entrapment (Walker, 01) alignment (Geels, 02)

carbon capture nuclear power




economics: homeostasis (Sahal, 85) lock-in (Arthur, 89) regimes (Nelson & Winter, 77) trajectories (Dosi, 82)

nuclear power




Politics reduced to risk: from ends: strategic choices between visionsto means: detailed regulation of modalities

Not all that is scientifically realistic, technically practicable, economically feasible, socially viable, will be historically realisable


nuclear power



“We have no alternative to nuclear power …

Nuclear because: “We need to do everything…

“We need to keep the nuclear option open”

‘Elite’ ‘green’ “no alternatives” rhetoric

also miss the politics of direction

focus on “tolerability” of incumbent path… not uncertain choice

Risk Debate Closes Down Social Choice

nuclear power


increasing visible in high-level ‘planetary management’ discourse

“…the non-negotiable planetary preconditions that

humanity needs to respect…

‘Anthropocene’ ‘planetary boundaries’ and

‘control variables’ define:

…fear of “catastrophe” …is “non negotiable” …with “absolutely no uncertainty” …

brooking “no compromise”

“Sustainability” as an ‘Apolitical’ Control Agenda

But … gravity and urgency do not negate uncertainty, politics, democratic choice

unproblematic

knowledge about likelihoods

RISK

UNCERTAINTY

open dynamic systems low frequency events human factors changing contexts

problematic

Sustainability increasingly uses language of ‘evidence based policy’

Deliberating about Uncertainty

- Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Dovers, Ravetz, Wynne ...

unproblematic

problematic

unproblematic problematic


knowledge about possibilities

RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY

INCERTITUDE



what is benefit or harm? how fair? which alternatives?whose values and societies?


unproblematic

problematic




RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

novel agents or vectors surprising conditions new alternatives

wilful blinkers

INCERTITUDE




unproblematic

problematic




RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY aggregative analysis patronage, pressure political closure

insurance limitsreductive modelsstochastic reasoning

` science-based policy

institutional remits

political culture

liability protectionharm definitions indicators / metrics

IGNORANCE

risk focus is shaped by power – Beck’s “organised irresponsibility”

Power Closes Down Risk Discourse

CONTROL RISK

`

Climate Change fixations with risk and control easily lead to geoengineering…

ACKNOWLEDGE INCERTITUDE

‘Anthropocene domination’

‘fear of catastrophe’

‘planetary management’

‘non-negotiable’

‘control variables’

‘absolutely no uncertainty’

‘no compromise’

unproblematic

problematic




RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

aggregated probabilities optimisation algorithms synthetic decision trees Delphi / Foresight predictive modelling

precautionary appraisal ‘opens up’ appreciations of incertitude

Practical Cinderella Methods

unproblematic

problematic



AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

RISK

UNCERTAINTY


burden of evidence onus of persuasion uncertainty factors decision heuristics interval analysis sensitivity testing




scenarios / backcasting interactive modelling

mapping / Q-methods participatory deliberation

democratic procedures

unproblematic

problematic



AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

RISK

UNCERTAINTY






unproblematic



AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

RISK


responsive civic research curiosity monitoring,

evidentiary presumptions flexibility, reversibility

diversity, resilience, agility, adaptability

scenarios / backcasting interactive modelling

mapping / Q-methods participatory deliberation

democratic procedures

problematic UNCERTAINTY





unproblematic

problematic



precautionary appraisal

participatory deliberation

definitive prevention

RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE


Op

tion

s

Op

tion

s

humility

adaptive learning

sustainability

safety

‘opening up’: options, issues, approaches, possibilities, perspectives

reflexivity

politics


Mapping Discursive Diversity

Multicriteria Mapping ‘opens up’ politics and power in expertise

Analysis of 12 UK government GM advisors (2001)

organicslow input intensive

GM 1GM 2GM 3


GM 1GM 2GM 3

UK Governmentecology chair


GM 1GM 2GM 3


GM 1GM 2GM 3

UK Governmentsafety chair

GM industry research executive

Green NGO scientist

Acknowledging assumptions, values, uncertainties ‘plural & conditional’ approach is rigorous & democraticoffers basis for Dryzek and Niemeyer’s ‘meta-consensus’

Multicriteria Mapping ‘opens up’ politics and power in expertise

Mapping Discursive Diversity

temporality of dynamics – are ‘disturbances’ envisaged as:

shocks

(transitory disturbance to otherwise continuous trajectory) time

driver of change

quality level

food: - supply bottlenecks- price spikes

floods - severe rain episodes

magnitude

From Knowledge to Action(Precaution: ‘uncertainty requires deliberation about action’)

shocks

food: - market trends- resource depletion

floods: - higher rainfall climate

temporality of dynamics – are ‘disturbances’ envisaged as:

driver of change

quality level

stresses

(pressure for enduring disturbance to orientation of trajectory)

From Knowledge to Action

shockscontrol

food: - mandate supply chains - regulate prices

floods: - water flow management

style of action – do interventions aim at:

driver of changequality level


shockscontrol

food: - market structuring- resource substitutions

floods: - engineered defence

style of action – do interventions aim at:


stresses


response

food: - agile supply chains - price elasticity

floods: - retrofit flood resistance


2: style of action – do interventions aim at:

shocks


response

food: - foresighted institutions- diverse dependencies

floods: - managed retreat


shocks

stresses

2: style of action – do interventions aim at:


shock (transitory

disturbance)

stress (enduring

disturbance)

control (tractable drivers)

respond (intractable drivers)

temporality of change

style of action

Distinguishing Properties of Sustainability

shock (transitory

disturbance)

stress (enduring

disturbance)



temporality of change

style of action

STABILITY

DURABILITY

RESILIENCE

ROBUSTNESS


STABILITY

DURABILITY

RESILIENCE

ROBUSTNESS

SUSTAINABILITYtemporality of change

style of action


shock (transitory

disturbance)

stress (enduring

disturbance)



stability

durability

resilience

robustness

clear conditions

for diverse strategies

From Sustaining …

stability

durability

resilience

robustness

shock

stress

control response

sustain

change

clear conditions

for diverse strategies

From Sustaining … to transforming

stability

durability

resilience

robustness

sustain

change

transruption

shock

stress

control response

take advantage of shock to control a specific change

eg: UK government and coal power in 1980s; UK nuclear and renewables in 2010s

From Sustaining … to transforming

transition

stability

durability

resilience

robustness

shock

stress

control response

harness stress as an opportunity for controlling towards a particular change

eg: Netherlands Energie Transitie to low carbon in 2000s

transruption

sustain

change


transition

transilience

stability

durability

resilience

robustness

shock

stress

control response

shocks present a chance for responsive actions to steer

away from status quo

eg: Greenpeace et al move to campaign against nuclear

power after Chernobyl, 1986

transruption

sustain

change


transition

transilience

transformation

stability

durability

resilienceshock

stress

control response

stress offers a pressure to help responsive actions steer away

from status quo

eg: grassroots civil society mobilisation on climate change

‘peak oil’, 2000s

transruption

sustain

change


transition

transilience

transformation

stability

durability

resilience

robustness

shock

stress

control response

transruption

sustain

change

clear conditions for diverse policy repertoiresfor maintaining sustainability

and transforming unsustainabiltiy


transition

transilience

transformation

stability

durability

resilience

robustness

shock

stress

control response

transruption

sustain

change

Sustainability governance:civil society is crucialpathways are political

quality through democracy


technological ‘lock-in’

institutionalised technical risk assessment

multiple feasible

Innovation trajectories

restricted appreciation

knowledge economy

‘closed down’ politics

POSSIBLE PATHWAYS

presumed benefits case-by-case focus narrow remits aggregated attention regulatory capture technocratic procedures

risk

narrow practices

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tion

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privileged trajectories

single ‘best’ / ‘optimal’ / most ‘legitimate’

decisions

€

Towards Innovation Democracyprevailing ‘risk regulation’ or ‘transition management’ model

reconciles: science and democracy: neither ‘no alternative’ nor

‘anything goes’

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POSSIBLE PATHWAYS

diverse pathways

innovation democracy

“broaden out” inputs to appraisal

“open up” space for politics

“plural conditionality”

“meta-consensus”

accountability

robustnessSustainability

O

ptio

ns

choice discourse

more options, issues, uncertainties, perspectives

“letting go” diversity experiment

tools and practices for ‘broadening out’ , ‘opening up’ and ‘letting go’

Towards Innovation Democracy

Business

From Risk Regulation to Innovation Democracy: precaution, participation and the pluralising of progress