Running head: Inquiry, Social Change, and Implications for Art Educational Research 1

Foundations of Educational Research & Doctoral Scholarship I [EDUS 702]

Inquiry, Social Change, and Implications for Art Educational Research

Written Response Three

3/27/2017

Kyle Guzik

Virginia Commonwealth University

Response Three 2

Theory of Social Change and Approach to Inquiry

To develop my theory of social change I begin with the propositions that support my approach to

inquiry. Rather than delineating a theory of social change and then an approach to inquiry it

informs (or vice versa), I will attempt to examine these concepts simultaneously to emphasize

my perspective on their intertwined nature. The Hegelian dialectic is a useful logical model and

is also important in explanations of social events. In argumentation, first, one proposes a thesis,

which is a claim. In sociology, a thesis is a given event that occurs and affects humanity. The

antithesis is the response to the thesis; it is a reaction that contradicts the thesis. An antithesis

may be considered the cultural response to an event. Synthesis is the integration of the thesis and

antithesis. A generic example of a sociocultural dialectic process might include resolution by a

population of tensions initiated by a natural disaster. A hypothetical sequence from dialectical

materialism could include instigation of a cultural event by one population, leading to

counteraction by another, with a final reckoning occurring between populations.

The Hegelian dialectic implies phenomenological consequences. These consequences involve

the nature of subjectivity, idiosyncratic experience unique to an individual:

This Dialectic, which unsettles all particular judgements and opinions,

transmuting the Evil into Good and Good into Evil, left at last nothing remaining

but the mere action of subjectivity itself… – Thought. Thought contemplates

everything under the form of Universality, and is consequently the impulsion

towards and production of the Universal (Hegel, 1899, p. 438).

Hegel reflected upon contradictions in Jesuit ideology. The Roman Catholic Church developed

the Society of Jesus to resist the Protestant Reformation. Therefore, Jesuit argumentation

developed with the goal of aggressively proving specific claims. Judgement and opinion became

irrelevant because only one interpretation of any evidence could exist, that endorsed by the

Roman Catholic Church. Contradictions appear because without interpretation, the distinction

between good and evil becomes unclear. Elimination of opinion and judgement extinguished

hermeneutics and left only phenomenology, subjective experience. For Hegel, cognition is

subjectivity. Thought is the integration of sensory data with an individual’s mental constructs.

This conceptual framework can be considered universalist in that it is a form of monism, an

umbrella term for attributions of oneness. In my approach to inquiry, I use objectivist

epistemology (Rallis & Rossman, 2012). However, I do not presume that objectivist

epistemological claims should be accepted axiomatically. I am concerned with rational inquiry

that yields insight into causal explanations of the natural world. However, problems remain:

[I]t must be observed that the unity of Thought with its Object is already

implicitly present [i.e. in the fundamental constitution of the Universe]. For

Reason is the substantial basis of Consciousness as well as of the External and

Natural. Thus, that which presents itself as the Object of Thought is no longer an

absolutely distinct form of existence (Hegel, 1899, p. 439).

Universalist explanations that employ reason to link consciousness with the natural world that

exists external to the subjective observer are of the same category (monism) as universalist

Response Three 3

theological explanations. This is the crux of critiques involving charges of scientism, that

empiricism is a form of secular religion. This becomes apparent in Aguste Comte’s (1899)

origination of the modern formulation of positivism. Comte describes positivism as an extension

of the Deism promulgated by Founding Fathers of the United States such as Benjamin Franklin.

Deism supposed, or posited, the existence of a supreme being. However, this being acted only as

a prime mover and ceased interference with causality after creating the universe. Comte’s (1899)

description of positivism employs a similar casuistry evident in the Jesuit tradition in which

theoretical rules derived from past instances apply to future instances:

[Positivisme] dans des vues d'abord scientifiques, y voit maintenant la source de

la solution sociale d'après la fondation d'un véritable pouvoir spirituel, capable de

concilier radicalement l'ordre et le progrès. La plénitude et la gravité de cette

nouvelle adhésion résultent de son harmonie spontanée avec le fond de la

situation Américaine où les vrais conservateurs se sentient près d’être écrasés par

de redoutables niveleurs, contre lesquels ils ne voient d’autre ressource

systématique que dans la religion démontrée qui caractérise le positivisme (p.

216).

Positivism was a “social solution” implemented by “real conservatives” (the Founders) to resist

the frightening potential of the American Revolution to cause socioeconomic equality, a

possibility they viewed as an existential threat (Comte, 1899, p. 216). Comte (1899) claims that

the Founders viewed positivism as a “systematic resource” because it was a “demonstrated

religion” that could restore hierarchical control via “true spiritual power” (p. 216). Consider the

dialectical nature of this process. The succession of the Thirteen Colonies from Great Britain

generated a thesis of social instability. The political aristocracy who participated in the

Continental Congress required a new form of social control consistent with American

Enlightenment dogma. Comte describes this system (the antithesis developed by the colonial

oligarchy to American revolutionary social instability) as positivism. The framing of the

Constitution of the United States might be considered a synthesis of these sociocultural forces.

Contradictions remain in my argument for objectivist epistemology. I have a naturalistic

worldview free from supernatural and mystical elements. I find the Hegelian dialectic appealing

in its explanatory power of societal change because of its congruence with materialism and

physicalism. One may align Comte’s account of positivism within a dialectical framework. Yet,

both the Hegelian dialectic and Comte’s positivism can be considered forms of monism. They

are concerned with unified explanations. Religions might also be considered another form of

monism in that they each provide one explanation for events and the nature of reality. However,

one formulation common to religions is the existence of an immaterial soul. This construct

distinguishes the monism evident in Hegel and Comte’s ideas with a creeping dualism in

theology. Dualism is the view that there are two mutually irreducible, ontologically distinct

forms of phenomena and/or substance. The proposition of an immaterial soul is a form of mind-

body dualism. It is also conceivable that religions could involve pluralism, in which there are

multiple ontologically distinct items such as heaven, hell, reincarnation, karma, spiritual or faith-

based phenomena, and deities. In this conception, the soul is a form of consciousness that exists

independently from the natural world. Inside this soul mental events can occur, which are

distinct from physical events in objective reality. Unlike theology, dialecticism and positivism

Response Three 4

do not require mental and physical dualism specifically, regardless of whether other forms of

dualism can be identified in the latter two constructs.

Psychophysical reductionism is another form of monism, which supports the empirical basis of

my approach to inquiry and theory of social change. My operational definition of

psychophysical reduction is that material, physical evidence supports psychological claims, and

ultimately, this evidence is the only support for these claims. Critics of psychophysical reduction

complain that it limits the choices researchers can make when developing special science

theories. This is a mistake. As a prerequisite, this argument concedes that the special sciences

ground claims in the psychological and social sciences. Reductionist methodology does not

constrain or regulate theory choice in the special sciences. Explanations from special sciences

such as chemistry, biology, and neuroscience ultimately reduce theoretically to fundamental

physics.

Biclle (1996) proposes that “as successful development occurs in both psychology and

neuroscience, psychological theories will come to stand in the reduction relation… to counterpart

neurobiological theories” (p. 62). These neurobiological theories have also had counterparts in

basic physics. Thus, in this chain of causal reasoning psychology is linked to neurobiology,

which is linked to physics. This view supposes that the role of philosophy is to assimilate and

adapt knowledge from the natural sciences to the present volume of philosophical discourse.

Philosophy can be considered an applied science, or technology. In addition, psychology and

neurobiology are perceived as in development. Researchers in these fields continue to propose

new questions and explanations, which evolve subject to empirical verification. As long as this

development continues to occur there is no restriction on the theoretical choices available to

researchers.

While the motivation for the development of positivism may have been to reestablish social

hierarchical control, contemporary theorists need not grate at the possibility that their social

research is somehow less than, or even ontologically distinct from basic research. Instead

anthropology, psychology, biology, physics, etc. can be viewed as heuristic approaches with

different levels of resolution in reductionist methodology. Consider a continuum in sociology

regarding the regulation of social change, between predictable progression and radical

transformation (Rallis & Rossman, 2012, p. 33). A description of periods of stasis interrupted by

profound alterations could be applied to the concept of cultural revolution in societal

development, or to the concept of punctuated equilibria in evolutionary biology. Cultural events

are subject to physical events. Examples include changes in population size, meteorological

phenomena, DNA replication errors, and variation in background radiation due to cosmic ray

events as well as geological distribution of radioactive elements. Cultural events are also subject

to technological changes, including inventions, such as iPhones, arrowheads, forge welding,

cuneiform tablets, or monotheism. Parallels can be drawn between different areas of research

and identification of these interrelationships expand human knowledge.

Trustworthy Research

Rallis and Rossman (2012) describe the scientific method as a “systematic inquiry cycle” (p. 46).

The scientific method requires the following fundamental steps:

Response Three 5

• [First scientists are] curious and ask a question;

• Construct a hypothesis;

• Observe and collect data or test the hypothesis by doing an experiment;

• Analyze the data and draw a conclusion;

• Communicate results; and

• Repeat or replicate the experiment (Rallis & Rossman, 2012, p. 46).

Systematic inquiry helps researchers demonstrate the trustworthiness of their research studies.

When developing hypotheses, researchers should relate their work to relevant theory. Extensive

review of the background literature surrounding a given problem helps researchers to increase the

specificity of their questions, identify what is already known and what research approaches have

already been attempted, and provide support for the construct validity of research methodologies

used in their research. Research that conforms to the systematic inquiry cycle is subject to peer

review. In order to collaborate with scientific peers, researchers should propose hypotheses that

are verifiable with empirical evidence. A research hypothesis should also be falsifiable in that

evidence could conceivably be collected or arguments could be made that would lead researchers

to reject the hypothesis. Literature review can help a researcher construct a falsifiable claim.

Literature review can also help a researcher avoid the logical fallacy of the argument from

ignorance, the incorrect belief that a claim is true if it has not been proven false, or that a claim is

false if it has not been proven true. Attention to extant literature can help scientists establish initial

confidence in their methods of inquiry by demonstrating to potential reviewers that the scientist

has given consideration to the concerns of the learning community that has previously explored

and is interested in the subjects and fields related to their research.

Dissertation Research and Conceptions of Trustworthiness

For my dissertation, I will conduct research in art education. My understanding of what that

statement means continues to evolve. My plan has been to conduct recordings and from these

render transcripts during observations of art teachers and students under various instructional

settings. I would then subject those transcripts to some form of statistical analysis and make

causal claims. One problem with this approach is that it is quantitative, lexical, and conceptual.

These approaches investigate an incomplete construct of visual language. Lexical

communication could be considered irrelevant to research in visual language, in that it is

contradictory to investigate visual ideas with written language. A work of art might be the best

response to another work of art. Redundant quantitative analysis of art instruction could be used

to impose a new regulatory framework on art teachers or to destroy what many students enjoy

most about art classes. In defense of my plans, one of my goals would be to better understand

intentionality in the human mind. I do not buy into the statement attributed to Warhol that “art is

anything you can get away with,” and I would not apply this notion to my dissertation research.

However, I accept the premise that anything can be art; and therefore, also, everything is art. For

this reason, I believe that art cannot be created; it can only be found in nature. Because of this,

in order for my dissertation research to be trustworthy it must investigate questions authentic to

the field of art education. To me, art education seems more concerned with finding art (and

artists) rather than attempting to create it (and them). In addition, to me, art educational questions

concern the natural world and objective reality. Reductionist methodology seems to me to be the

most honest way to address these questions.

Response Three 6

References:

Biclle, J. (1996). New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological

caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(1), 57-78.

Comte, A. (1903). Correspondance inedite dʹ Auguste Comte. Paris, FR: Au Siège de la

Société Positiviste.

Hegel, G. (1899). The philosophy of history. (J. Sibree, Trans.). New York, NY: The

Colonial Press.

Rallis, S., & Rossman, Gretchen B. (2012). The research journey: Introduction to

inquiry. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.