Comments watson

Comments on Watson

Sebastian Watzl (CSMN, Oslo)

The Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika View

Faculty Attention is a mental faculty that allocates resources.

Separation Attention is distinct from consciousness

Necessity Attention is necessary (but not sufficient) for consciousness

Self There is unified persisting subject of experience.

Control Attention is always directly controlled by the subject.

The Buddhist View

time

experiential events

No Faculty No unified mental faculty that allocates resources.

No Self No unified persisting subject of experience.

Temporal Atomism Every fundamental experience momentary.

IntrinsicnessAttentiveness is an intrinsic feature of experiences.

No Control Attention never controlled by the subject.

attentive experiential events

The Buddhist Argumentative Strategy

Focus of the Debate:

What explains the character of the experiential

stream?(not: what is the character of the experiential stream)

The Buddhist argues for a sparse, deflationary,

atomistic mental ontology.

Methodological advice

Don’t introduce entities beyond necessity!

If something is not needed to explain the character of the

experiential stream, don’t believe it exists!

The Buddhist Argumentative Strategy

Discussion Points 1 Why should a defender of

the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika view accept this methodological advice?

Seems to presuppose a strong presumption in favor of the sparse ontology.

Alternative methodological advice: Ask what best explains

uncontroversial features of mental life.

Ask also about the point or function of some feature of mental life.

Awareness of Attention and Time

Are we ever aware of attending or shifting attention?

Buddhist (?)

No, nothing beyond the sequence of experiential events is

ever “apprehended”

That seems false

Can be (or become) aware of shifting attention.

Awareness of Attention and Time

Argument against Temporal Atomism

1. Awareness of shifting attention from red dot to green

dot is awareness of a temporally extended experiential

process or change in experience.

2. This process is not momentary.

3. Awareness of shifting attention is not illusory

________________________________________________

4. Not all aspects of experience are momentary

experiential events.

Awareness of Attention and Time

Objection: Should understand awareness of shifting attention from

red dot to green dot as: attentive experience of red dot followed by attentive experience of green dot.

If we don’t go beyond experience, there is still no reason to believe in fundamentally non-momentary aspects of mental life.

Reply: Same strategy would understand awareness of a moving

dot as: awareness of dot at one location followed by awareness of dot at different location.

The don’t go beyond experience strategy then would lead to the conclusion that everything (not just mental life) is fundamentally momentary.

Awareness of Attention and Time

Discussion Points 2

Do Buddhists accept the

parallelism between

temporal atomism about

mental life and temporal

atomism generally?

Do Buddhists (explicitly)

reject the claim that a

change in experience is

not sufficient for an

experience of change?

Awareness of Attention and Agent Control

It seems to me that I can control my attention. I can, just like that, focus on the green dot.

Attention, in a case like this, seems to be a paradigmatic example of a voluntary activity. Central to the Nyāyā-

Vaiśeṣika view

Also: Reid, Malebranche, W. James

Freedom over attention one of the last bastions of freedom as we think of external factors outside our control and

Awareness of Attention and Agent Control

Argument Against the No-Self View

1. There is an experience of actively controlling the focus

of attention.

2. The experience in (1) is an experience as of oneself

controlling the focus of attention.

3. An experience as of oneself controlling the focus of

attention is an experience as of a thing or substance that

does something and has a variety of experiences and not an experience of

one experience event causing another experience

event.

4. The experience in (3) is not illusory

_______________________________________________

5. There is a thing or substance that does something and has a variety of

experiences

Awareness of Attention and Agent Control

The Sāṅkhyas deny (5). But Buddhists don’t.

Success of this argument would also undercut the

main line of support for the no-self view.

The Buddhist will probably try to deny (2) or (3).

Awareness of Attention and Agent Control

Discussion Point 3

Do Buddhists discuss

this argument?

If so, how do they

respond to it?

Is not, what would they

say?

An Argument against Persisting Subjects

Another argument against the Self view

1. If there were a persisting self, then that self would

need to undergo qualitative change over time (since it

is affected by various distinct objects and to be

affected by something requires being changed by it).

2. But the self cannot undergo qualitative change over

time (because then it would have two different natures

at different times).

____________________________________________

_

3. There is no persisting self

An Argument against Persisting Subjects

Another argument against the Self view

1. If there were a persisting self, then that self would

need to undergo qualitative change over time (since it

is affected by various distinct objects and to be

affected by something requires being changed by it).

2. But the self cannot undergo qualitative change over

time (because then it would have two different natures

at different times).

____________________________________________

_

3. There is no persisting self

quality

(~ guṇa?)

nature

(~svabhāva?_

An Argument against Persisting Subjects

Another argument against the Self view

1. If there were a persisting self, then that self would

need to undergo a change in qualities over time

(since it is affected by various distinct objects and to

be affected by something requires being changed by

it).

2. But the self cannot undergo a change in nature over

time (because then it would have two different natures

at different times).

____________________________________________

_

3. There is no persisting self

An Argument against Persisting Subjects

Discussion Point 4

Have the Nyāyā-

Vaiśeṣikas made this

response?

If so, how did/would the

Buddhists reply?

Explaining Patterns in the Experiential

Mosaic

Explaining Patterns in the Experiential

Mosaic

The Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣikas might argue that their view is

better than the Buddhist view, because it can explain

patterns in the stream of consciousness that for the

Buddhist are brute facts:

Attentive experiences are accompanied by (other)

inattentive experiences.

Training can affect attention generally.

...

Explaining Patterns in the Experiential

Mosaic

Discussion point 5 Would the Buddhists

allow such explanatory arguments?

How far can such arguments go?

Thanks Alex!

and hope to learn more ....

The Questions

The Buddhist Argumentative Strategy

Awareness of Attention and Time

Awareness of Attention and Agent Control

An Argument against Persisting Subjects

Explaining Patterns in the Experiential Mosaic