The effects of substantive and affective verbal conflict on the quality of decisions of small...

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The effects of substantive andaffective verbal conflict on thequality of decisions of smallproblem solving groupsMae Arnold Bell aa Assistant Professor in the Department of SpeechCommunication , University of Washington , SeattlePublished online: 22 May 2009.

To cite this article: Mae Arnold Bell (1979) The effects of substantive and affective verbalconflict on the quality of decisions of small problem solving groups, Central States SpeechJournal, 30:1, 75-82, DOI: 10.1080/10510977909367999

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10510977909367999

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THE EFFECTS OF SUBSTANTIVE ANDAFFECTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT ON THE

QUALITY OF DECISIONS OF SMALLPROBLEM SOLVING GROUPS

Mae Arnold Bell

THE traditional theoretical perspec-tive provided by textbooks of group

discussion seems to share some of thephilosophical underpinnings of confron-tation theory of nineteenth century Eng-land, represented by spokesmen such asWalter Bagehot and John Stuart Mill.For example, in his essay, "The Age ofDiscussion," Bagehot explains:

It is easy to see why the common discussion ofcommon actions or common interests shouldbecome the root of change. The mere puttingup of a subject to discussion, with the objectof being guided by that discussion, is a clearadmission that that subject is in no degreesettled by the established rule.i

Or as Mill expressed a similar senti-ment: ". . . the only way in which a hu-man being can make some approach toknowing the whole of a subject is byhearing what can be said about it bypersons of every variety of opinion, andstudying all modes in which it can belooked at by every character of mind."2

Recent theoretical and empiricalworks focusing on the processes of groupinteraction reinforce that perspective.

Mae Arnold Bell is an Assistant Professor in theDepartment of Speech Communication at theUniversity of Washington in Seattle.

1 Walter Bagehot, Psysics and Politics (NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 166.

2 John Stuart Mill, "Of the Liberty ofThought and Discussion," in On Liberty, ed.Currin V. Shields (New York: The Bobbs-MerrillCo., Inc., 1956), p. 25.

Collins and and Guetzkow articulatethe theoretical underpinning of the as-sumed advantage group decision mak-ing offers: more communication leadsto greater information exchange andmore critical response to that informa-tion.3 A number of studies have at-tempted an empirical test of the assump-tion that conflict of ideas leads to higherquality decisions. Torrance,4 Hall andWatson,5 and Bower6 provide evidencethat the presence of conflict of ideasduring the group's deliberations resultsin higher quality solutions. Hall andWilliams conclude, "Kelley and Thibaut(1954) have suggested that individualsare likely to reexamine their opinionsonly when it becomes obvious that theydiffer from those of others. . . . It wouldappear that lack of conflict attentuatesgroup performance . . . with the effectthat the group's fullest potential is notrealized."7

3 Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, ASocial Psychology of Group Processes forDecision-Making (New York: Wiley & Sons,1964).

4 Paul E. Torrance, "Function of ExpressedDisagreement in Small Group Processes," SocialForces, 35 (1957), 314-318.

5 Jay Hall and W. H. Watson, "The Effectsof Normative Intervention on Group Decision-Making Performance," Human Relations, 23(1970), 299-317.

6 J. L. Bower, "Group Decision-Making: AReport of an Experimental Study," BehavioralScience, 10 (1965) , 277-289.

7 Jay Hall and Martha Williams, "A Com-parison of Decision-Making Performances in

CENTRAL STATES SPEECH JOURNAL, Volume 30, Spring 1979

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Most group discussion textbooks sharethat perspective by including JohnDewey's Five Steps to Reflective Think-ing* which emphasize that a best solu-tion will emerge out of the variety ofpositions (or solutions) initially pro-posed through systematic, rational dis-course. Thus, one communication vari-able—communication characterized asreason-giving discourse of divergentideas—seems theoretically related tomaking good decisions. Likewise, thisemphasis on rational discourse suggeststhat a contrasting approach, irrationaldiscourse which would not focus on rea-sons but emotions, is detrimental toeffective decision-making.

Another communication variable im-plicit in such rational decision-makingmodels is flexibility. The Dewey model,for example, stresses that all the plaus-ible solutions, and some not so plausible,should be explicated before the group,as individual members or as a whole,begin movement toward one specificsolution that becomes their final choice.A number of experimental and fieldstudies9 reinforce Dewey's suggestionthat diversity of possible solutions earlyin a group's deliberations, i.e., its re-maining open to several possibilities, re-sults in a better final decision.

A study by Marr10 suggests a thirdvariable, sex, which may confound the

Established and Ad Hoc Groups," Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 3 (1966), 221.

8 For example, see Dennis Gouran, Discus-sion: The Process of Group Decision-Making(New York: Harper and Row, 1974) 24.

9 A representative experimental study wouldbe Milton Shaw and W. Penrod, "Validity ofInformation, Attempted Influence, and Qualityof a Group Decision," Psychological Reports, 10(1962), 19-23; a representative field study is PaulE. Torrance, "Group Decision-Making and Dis-agreement," Social Forces, 35 (1957), 314-318; arepresentative documentary study would beIrving Janis' Victims oj Groupthink (Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972).

10 Theodore J. Marr, "Conciliation and VerbalResponses as Functions of Orientation andThreat in Group Interaction," Speech Mono-graphs, 41 (1974), 6-18.

relationships between rationality, flex-ibility, and quality decisions in a smallgroup setting. His results indicate pos-sible sex differences for both rationalityand flexibility: "The results of thisstudy indicate that females tend to com-promise more than males. Furthermore,males apparently are less logical andmore emotional in their conciliatory re-sponses to verbal statements."11

Although the quality of groups' de-cisions has served as a perennial focusfor empirical investigation, few studiesbegin with the assumption that conflictof ideas contributes to the quality of theemerging synthesis of ideas. For ex-ample, most investigations do not focusprimarily on the communication ofgroups as a factor influencing the qual-ity of solution. Or, if communication isa factor, attention is devoted to struc-tural variables rather than processvariables which focus on the form andfunction of actual communication ofsmall groups. Such structural variablesas individual versus group solutions,12

type of task,13 opportunity to com-municate as defined in centralized/decentralized networks14 have served asfoci for some extended lines of research.

A few studies do focus on the group'scommunication defined as a processvariable and quality of decision. In his

11 Ibid., 17.12 Shaw provides a comprehensive review of

social psychological research in Group Dynamics:The Psychology of Small Group Behavior (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1976), 58-68.

13 R. N. Kent and J. E. McGrath, "Task andGroup Characteristics as Factors InfluencingGroup Performance," Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology, 5 (1969), 429-440, or ArthurP. Bochner, "Special Reports: Task and Instru-mentation Variables as Factors Jeopardizing theValidity of Published Group CommunicationResearch, 1970-1971," Speech Monographs, 41(1974), 169-178.

14 H. J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Com-munication Patterns on Group Performance,"Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46(1951), 38-50, or M. E. Shaw, "Some Effects ofProlonged Experience in Communication Nets,"Journal of Applied Psychology, 40 (1956), 38-50.

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SMALL PROBLEM SOLVING GROUPS 77

review of group effectiveness, Bass con-cludes the group productivity is depen-dent on the effectiveness of group inter-action.15 That relationship between theeffectiveness of the communication orinteraction of the group and quality de-cisions is not clearcut, however. Severalstudies provide support for the link be-tween effective communication and qual-ity decisions,16 and others do not providesuch evidence.17

Most of the experimental studies citedearlier had the groups solve problemsfor which the best or correct solutionwas determined by a panel of "experts"in the problem's content area.18 Thequalifications entitling the experts totheir status are rarely provided. Whenthey are included, some question couldbe raised regarding the possibility ofestablishment and other biases beingintroduced. To avoid justifying thechoice of experts, the problem chosenfor this study had only one correct solu-tion, verifiable mathematically. Ad-mittedly many of the problems whichsmall groups attempt to solve do nothave one clearly best solution, but theassumption is that the processes whichwould lead a group to one of the judg-mentally best solutions should beequally operative in a situation in whichthe correct solution could be ascertained.

15 Bernard M. Bass, "The Definition of a'Group,'" in Small Group Communication: aReader, ed. Robert S. Cathcart and Larry A.Samovar (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. BrownCo., 1975), 24-27.

16 John W. Thibaut and L. H. Srickland,"Communication, Task Demands, and GroupEffectiveness," Journal of Personality, 28 (I960),156-166; Dale G. Leathers, "Quality of GroupCommunication as a Determinant of GroupProduct," Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), 166-173.

17 Judee K. Burgoon, "Unwillingness to Com-municate as a Predictor of Small Group Dis-cussion Behaviors and Evaluations," CentralStates Speech Journal, 28 (1977), 122-133.

18 For example, see J. A. Cammalleri, et al.,"Effects of Different Leadership Styles on GroupAccuracy," Journal of Applied Psychology, 57(1973), 32-37.

The preceding review of investiga-tions of the quality of groups' final de-cisions suggested a rationale for a studyof group problem solving to determinewhether the manner in which membersof a decision making group communicatewith one another is associated with thequality of the decisions they reach.Specifically, the following study was de-signed to measure the impact of con-flicting substantive (rational) and affec-tive (irrational) verbal communicationfor both sexes on both the quality of thefinal decision and the flexibility of thegroup members during their delibera-tions.

PROCEDURES

The experiment consisted of a sim-ulated discussion of the "horsetradingproblem" designed by N. R. F. Maierand Allen R. Solem.

A man bought a horse for $60 and sold it for$70. Then he bought it back for $80 and soldit again for $90. How much did he make or losein the horsetrading business?^

The procedures employed replicatedthree earlier investigations20 which in-dicated that 33 percent of the collegefreshmen participating would not choosethe correct answer, "made $20," but oneof the following three incorrect answers:"broke even," "made $10," and "made$30."

One hundred fifty-four universityundergraduate students enrolled in two

19 Norman R. F. Maier and Allen R. Solem," T h e Contribution of a Discussion Leader to theQuality of Group Thinking: T h e Effective Useof Minority Opinions," in Group Dynamics: Re-search and Theory, ed. Dorwin Cartwright andAlvin Zander, 1st ed. (White Plains, New York:Row, Peterson, 1953), 561-572.

20 Ibid.; Mae Arnold Bell, " T h e Effects ofSubstantive and Affective Conflict in Problem-solving Groups," Speech Monographs, 41 (1974),19-23; L. R. Hoffman and M. R. F. Maier, "SexDifferences, Sex Compositions, and GroupProblemsolving," Journal of Abnormal SocialPsychology, 63 (1961), 453-456.

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basic communication courses volun-teered to participate. Two groups offour persons each were scheduled foreach session from two different classesto assure that no participant would beacquainted with all seven other experi-mental volunteers: the possibility existedthat the other three "persons" in his/hergroup were strangers. Although eachparticipant was led to believe he or shewas communicating with three otherpeople in the room, actually each personreceived one of the following four sets ofmessages prepared in advance by theinvestigator: high-substantive/high af-fective; high-substantive/low-affective;low-substantive/high affective; low-sub-stantive/low-affective. All four sets ofprogrammed messages were modeledfrom actual responses of pilot par-ticipants, but with the investigator con-trolling for level of substantive andaffective conflict. The stimulus messagesof the high substantive condition wereoperationally denned as "highly sub-stantive if it offers a mathematical pro-cedure indicating how the source of theresponse arrived at the answer." Thelow substantive condition did not offerany mathematical procedure or explana-tion. The high affective stimulus mes-sages contained antagonistic words to-ward either the group's other par-ticipants or toward their ideas; the lowaffective condition contained no anta-gonism. An example of one such com-bination is the first message in thehigh-substantive condition:

Your logic is wrong. Stop moving the numbersaround and listen. Look, he sold the horse for a$10 profit, then he bought it back and lost that$10 because it cost him $10 more than he sold itfor. Now, that's obvious he made $10 profit. Ifyou can't see that, something is wrong withyou.2i

21 For examples of one set of messages fittingeach combination, see above article by Bell.

The same procedure was followed foreach hour's group of participants. Afterthe investigator had acquainted themwith the use of the cathode ray tubecomputer terminals, she explained thatthe purpose of the experiment was tostudy groups' verbal problem-solving.The confounding influence of visualand related nonverbal cues was offeredas one reason for the use of the computerterminals. Next was the statement of thehorsetrading problem, the rules for com-municating with each other, and thefollowing reward schedule for finalchoices:

I£ everyone in your four-person group agrees onthe correct answer, each will receive $1.50 forparticipating. If you are the only person in yourgroup to get the correct answer, you will receive$1.00 for participating and the other three willreceive nothing. If all persons agree on the sameincorrect answer, each participant will receive$.50. Otherwise, none of you will receive anymoney.

The participants were given twominutes to decide on one of the fouroptions provided for their initial in-dividually determined answers. Havingtyped in their answers, they were toldthat the computer had tallied theirchoices and the results were displayedfor all four "players." For every par-ticipant, all four possible answers weredisplayed, the three fictitious playerschoosing the three not chosen by thenaive participant. The naive participantand the three "players" then began ex-changing messages for a total of twentyresponses, each being told by the com-puter when to respond so that, accordingto the instructions, each one was assureda "turn" before the others continuedto send messages. The naive participantwas free to type in whatever he or shewished to communicate. Participantswere randomly assigned to one of thefour message conditions. After they hadcommunicated, participants made their

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SMALL PROBLEM SOLVING GROUPS 79

second and final choices. The dependentvariables to be analyzed were the changeto final correct solution and the flex-ibility, i.e., the number of different solu-tions a person entertained during thesimulated discussion. Regarding the cor-rectness of the final solution, the focalquestion of this study is whether thekind of communication individuals re-ceive during decision-making contributesto their choice of the correct solution bythe time the final choice is made. Theassumption is that in a highly substan-tive discussion in which negative affectis not present, group members, uponhearing the correct solution (and in allconditions either the naive participantor a fictional participant supported thecorrect solution) will be more likely tochange to that choice than group mem-bers in other conditions. Related to thathypothesis is one which implies that ina highly substantive discussion with nonegative affect, group members whoinitially choose the correct solution willbe more likely to continue to choose itthroughout.

Similarly, the hypotheses concerningthe flexibility of participants assumethat individuals are more likely to switchto another person's answer—even as agesture of conciliation, not necessarilybecause they believe the other's answerto be correct—if the deliberations arecharacterized as highly substantive andnot overtly antagonistic.

Two hypotheses were generated foreach dependent variable. Hypothesesconcerning final choice:

1. Verbal behavior high in substantivecontent evokes more changes to thecorrect solution than verbal be-havior low substantive content.

2. Verbal behavior low in affectivecontent evokes more changes to thecorrect solution than verbal be-havior high in affective content.

Hypotheses concerning flexibility:3. Verbal behavior high in substantive

content evokes a greater degree offlexibility than verbal behavior lowin substantive content.

4. Verbal behavior low in affectivecontent evokes a greater degree offlexibility than verbal behaviorhigh in affective content.

Although the Marr study was sug-gestive of the possible impact of a sexdifference on the above relationships,the lack of corroborative evidence ledto no specific hypotheses regarding sexon change to correct choice or flexibility.

RESULTS

Neither hypothesis concerning cor-rectness of final choice was confirmed.Table 1 presents the results of the two-way chi square analysis for Hypothesis1. The Pearson x

2 statistic was .31.

TABLE 1

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF FINAL CORRECT CHOICEBV SUBSTANTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT CONDITIONS

LowSub.HiSub.Col.Total

Initial Correctto Final Wrong

8

4

12

Initial Wrongto FinalWrong Choice

34

45

79

Initial Wrongto FinalCorrect Choice

12

14

26

Initial Correctto FinalCorrect Choice

21

16

37

RowTotal

75

79

154

K2 = .31, df = 3, H A

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Table 2 presents the results of the two- women in the high-substantive condi-way chi square analysis for Hypothesis 2. tions. Men, on the other hand, are more

The analysis of the flexibility of the likely to change in the high than in theparticipants' choices during the inter- low-substantive conditions. The x2 statis-action confirmed one of the hypotheses, tic for Table 5 is 11.15, p <.01.The x2 analysis in Tables 3 through The other hypothesis concerning flex-5 indicated that participants receiv- ibility— that low affective verbal be-ing high substantive communication havior evokes greater flexibility thanchanged choices significantly more than high-affective verbal behavior—was notparticipants receiving low substantive confirmed. Table 6 contains the x2 anal-communication. The Pearson x

2 statistic ysis; the Pearson x2 was .47. Nor was theis 8.06, p <.O5. Further analysis accord- difference comparing the sexes in theing to sex indicated that the male par- affective conditions significant,ticipants account for the significantdifference. Women in the low-substan- DISCUSSION

tive conditions were equally likely to The results concerning the movementchange choices during the interaction as toward correct solution and flexibility of

TABLE 2Cm SQUARE ANALYSIS OF FINAL CORRECT CHOICE

BY AFFECTIVE VERBAL CONFLICT CONDITIONS

Initial Wrong Initial Wrong Initial Right Initial Right Rowto Final Right to Final Wrong to Final Right to Final Wrong Total

LowAff. 43 16 21 6 86HiAff. 36 10 16 6 68Col.Total 79 26 37 12 154

X2 = .90, df = 3, n.s.

TABLE 3

Sub. Condition

Low SubstantiveHigh SubstantiveColumn Total

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE COMMUNICATIONCONDITIONS BY FLEXIBILITY

No Change

433275

One Change

143145

Two or MoreChanges

181634

Row Total

7579

154

= .12, df — 2, p <.05.

TABLE 4

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF FEMALE PARTICIPANTS'FLEXIBILITY BY SUBSTANTIVE CONFLICT CONDITIONS

Sub. Condition No Change One Change Two or More Row TotalChanges

Low Substantive 16 10 9 35High Substantive 15 13 8 36 .Column Total 31 23 17 71

X2 = .79, df = 2, us .

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SMALL PROBLEM SOLVING GROUPS 81

TABLE 5

Sub. Condition

Low SubstantiveHigh SubstantiveColumn Total

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OFFLEXIBILITY BY SUBSTANTIVE

No Change One

271744

MALE PARTICIPANTS'CONFLICT CONDITIONS

: Change

41822

Two or MoreChanges

98

17

Row Total

404383

X2 = .004, df = 2, p <.01.

TABLE 6

Sub. Condition

Low AffectiveHigh AffectiveColumn Total

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF FLEXIBILITYBY AFFECTIVE CONFLICT CONDITIONS

No Change

413475

One Change

271845

Two or MoreChanges

181634

Row Total

8668

154

X2 - .79, df = 2, n.s.

choices during the interaction, taken to-gether, raise some conceptually interest-ing issues. The significant finding thatindividuals are more open to changingtheir original choices when the com-munication is highly substantive thanwhen it is not substantive are encour-aging and consistent with several studieswhich indicate that consensus (forwhich some group members must bewilling to move toward others' choices)is related to orientation behavior.22 Thefact that this flexibility did not also re-sult in significantly more correct solu-tions in the high-substantive conditionsis somewhat disconcerting. Clearly, theemphasis of the field of speech com-munication on groups' reaching con-sensus assumes that those consensualagreements are also "good" solutions.

22 Studies include Dennis S. Gouran, "Vari-ables Related to Consensus in Group Discussionson Questions of Policy," Speech Monographs,36 (1969), 387-391; Thomas J. Knutson, "AnExperimental Study of the Effects of Orienta-tion Behavior on Small Group Consensus,"Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), 159-165;Theodore Marr, "Concilliation and Verbal Re-sponses as Functions of Orientation and Threatin Group Interaction," Speech Monographs, 41(1974), 6-18.

That assumption is not supported by theresults of this study. While the experi-mental limitations may account for thelack of significant movement toward thecorrect answer—such obvious limitationsas no face-to-face interaction and nopossibility for persuasion adapted specifi-cally for the persons involved—the re-sults of this study do suggest that themere hearing of a substantive explana-tion supporting the correct solution isnot sufficient.

The significant results between menand women's responses to the experi-mental communication conditions areneither encouraging nor entirely con-sistent with earlier related research. Theresults—that women participants are aslikely to select more than one solutionin the low-substantive communicationconditions as in the high-substantiveconditions—appears to be yet anotherstudy supporting the view that womenare generally more persuasible thanmen. In this instance, the women wereas likely to change their minds when nosubstantive reasons were offered to doso as when good reasons were offered.

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The male participants were more dis-criminating. These results are not acontradiction to the Marr study citedearlier. In that study the groups' taskcontained no "right" answer, other thanone the group members could simplycompromise on in order for most ofthem to make some money. Therefore,flexibility in choice of solution was ra-tional; consequently, Marr's interpreta-tion of his results is that women par-ticipants acted more rationally thantheir male counterparts. In this study,however, flexibility per se is not rational,only to the degree that such flexibilityleads to selecting the correct solution.On the post-experimental questionnaire,all participants indicated that theirstrategy during the interaction was thateveryone should get the right answerand each make $1.50. Changing fromanswer to answer, without substantivesupport for such changes, which is de-scriptive of the women participants' be-havior, does not appear to be rationalbehavior contributing to their expressedgoal. Such conciliatory changes in choicemight contribute to everyone's arrivingat consensus, but not to each person'searning the maximum financial reim-bursement. The men's increase in changeof choice only in the high-substantiveconditions implies that they were re-sponding to the reasons offered for otheranswers, not to be conciliatory.

The nonsignificant results concerningflexibility between the affective com-munication conditions is consistentwith Marr's research—neither men norwomen participants' flexibility changessignificantly as a function of differences

in affective communication. These re-sults are somewhat encouraging in thatat least the sexual stereotype of men inour society as being more aggressive thanwomen, particularly in highly affectivesituations, is not supported. For bothmen and women, the affective natureof the communication situation did notsignificantly affect the flexibility ofchoice. Of course, the creation of af-fective conflict in both Marr's study andthe present investigation is open to thechallenge that mere words cannot rea-sonably approximate this type of con-flict, which appears to be associated withcomplex rational and nonverbal vari-ables, at least more so than substantiveconflict.

The findings of the study are tenta-tive, at least partially because of thestrictly controlled environment in whichthe communication occurred. Neverthe-less, the results are suggestive of furtherresearch, using perhaps the samebasic variables, but observed in notonly laboratory groups (collections ofstrangers) communicating in face-to-faceinteraction, but also established groupsin which at least some strategies of per-suasion already exist for probably bothkinds of communicative situations—thosecharacterized by substantive exchangesand by affective exchanges. Identifica-tion of such differences in conversationinitiated to solve groups' problemswould contribute to testing that gen-eralization of Bagehot and Mill: that amajor determinant of group perfor-mance is the degree to which informa-tion can be exchanged among themembers of the group.

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