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Central Limit Theorem
A Treatise on International Relations Reconcilement
New York University
International Relations
Professor – Richard Levitt
By Steven L. Avary
4/13/2014
1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to gain insight into the theoretical framework tenets of the
two main schools of thought in international relations, Liberals and Realists, and apply
it to the Arab Spring. As such, the writings of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in
Power and Interdependence, represent the Liberal School’s Complex Interdependence
model, and John Mearsheimer’s in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, represent
Offensive Realists’ model.
A vital objective for deriving a theoretical model is the ability to assess certain historical
events and prospective predictive power of future events, with the adoption of the
model by various players in their respective game theoretic maneuvers to achieve the
desired outcome as the situation warrants.
What is important to note is the time around the books’ edition publishing and events
that may have shaped the authors’ psychological profiles. For Mearsheimer, memories
of the 9/11 attacks on America’s homeland were fresh, as well as the incursions of
Afghan and Iraq in response to the broader “War on Terror”. As such, it is
understandable why he takes a rather aggressive stance; whereas, Keohane and Nye
take a more collaborative approach, replicating the necessity for all actors to work
together to stem such situations as the repercussions from the Eurozone Crisis.
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I would like to preface my remarks by offering some general critiques before going into
specific tenets. From my perspective, at times Keohane and Nye’s comments were
nebulous, giving too great an allowance for significant fluidity, which made it difficult
to determine the strength of their convictions, contrasted with Mearsheimer’s, which
provide clear demarcations. Yet, Keohane and Nye suggest that a superior framework
might link the two along the continuum as prescribed per the situation, as some
situations are not analogous, nor transferable. Mearsheimer’s discussions are
excessively nationalistic as he discounts the potential capabilities of other countries too
much that may eventually position them to challenge to be regional hegemons. His
model appears to have more empirical support, based on historical data points, and he
describes it like a multivariate regression, with factor models based on back tested data,
and goodness of fit. Such an approach arouses concerns about data mining and the
integrity of the model inputs. These concerns are valid as he discards variables that do
not fit a tight correlation, describing them as anomalies or exogenous to the model.
QUIXOTIC QUEST – The Tenets of Complex Interdependence
The main theme proposed by Complex Interdependence suggests a soft power
approach that interconnectedness between various actors is critical and a requisite for a
prosperous state. Actors’ goals vary, depending on the issue. Defining these goals are
difficult for transgovernmental entities, while transnational’s are self-interested.
Relationships between and among actors, such as transnational and transgovernmental
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entities and political elites, are utilized as conduits for action. A nonexistent subject
hierarchy leads to a dynamic agenda environment with various actors setting priorities.
It has the intent to diminish coercion and militarism in the international relations’ arena.
The basis of instrument resource allocation is on the most pertinent to an issue, and the
ability to handle various actors. The agenda is shaped by specific issue allocation of
resources, the status of actors, and other connections as a consequence of
interdependence’s increasing responsiveness. It is suggested that it is futile for strong
states to link subject matters, and that the hierarchy is eroded via weak state
relationships. International organization roles include agenda setting, alliance
encouragement, and forum provision for weak states with the intent of political
engagement.
My biggest critique about Complex Interdependence is the belief in the “better angels”
of others by the authors that when actors have asymmetries, whether it be in such areas
as information, negotiating leverage or capability, it will not utilize it to dramatically
improve the actor’s position relative to another’s. That is not the real world. Various
policies, such as trade barriers, and protecting infant industry, are common. Some may
also review the U.N.’s vote allocation relative to funding. The U.S. provides the largest
share of funding, but not allocated a pro rata vote share based on its capital
contribution.
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The author’s military focus is on naval power, with the goal of utilizing it at times to
“show the flag” in certain hot spots or to provide safe shipping lanes in order for
unrestricted trade flows. Playing such a role though leads to free riding by others that
receive the benefit of the safety, but do not bear the cost.
The increasing linkages have led to a dramatic growth in globalization. While certain
aspects have been positive, like the opening up of China, and helping to lift hundreds of
millions out of abject poverty, it has its detriments as well. One of the issues with the
Eurozone Crisis is the common currency, which prevents Greece from having the ability
to devalue its currency and increase exports. Bretton Woods’s policies restrained U.S.
monetary power, pressured its balance of payments, which led to the end of the gold
standard.
Rights for weaker states are pursued in forums like the International Criminal Court,
where cases against perpetrators of crimes of aggression and against humanity are
tried.
Complex Interdependence Theory provides four models as the reason for regime
change: Economic Process, Eroding Hegemony, Issue Structure and International
Organization.
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Economic Process via economic and technological changes render regimes antiquated,
leading to a metamorphosis. In so doing, efficiency may be forgone by governments in
order to promote other values.
Eroding Hegemony states that international regimes change when the power hierarchy
changes, and this phenomena is largely a result of military power dynamics.
Drawbacks in this model are due to uncertainties in domestic politics’ role, incapacity to
discern the subject matter, and to disregard contacts in the multi-channel system.
Issue Structure provides rules for a particular area generally made by the strongest
country in that issue. Typically, trying to connect different issues to the focal issue will
not work.
The International Organization Model states that governments and international
organizations have multi-level linkages as behavior advocates, which may become
entrenched. Power is distributed to them, but given process constraints, limits the
ability to utilize it to full capacity. Procedural constraints determine the power to
derive preferred outcomes, not a state’s brute power in a specific subject area.
China may be a good example of the Economic Process Model. While feeling residual
effects of Communism, it has made great strides by opening up its markets to trade and
technology adoption. However, in the building of a canal in China, Milton Friedman
noticed that although modern equipment like tractors were available, the workers used
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shovels to dig. Asking why the heavy machinery was not used, he was told it is a jobs
program. Friedman replied, “well, then you should take away their shovels and give
them all spoons.”1
The Eroding Hegemony Model speaks to the deterioration of Russia. With the breakup
of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, a significant amount of territory and
population needed to support a large military evaporated. Instead of engaging many
actors in the multi-channel system with favorable economic alliances, it has routinely
thwarted existing agreements such as the takings of Royal Dutch/Shell’s assets in the
Sakhalin Islands, further eroding any goodwill with existing or potential partners.
Addressing the AIDS epidemic in Africa reflects the Issue Structure model. As America
is on the forefront of battling this disease, various global institutions look to American
know how and resources to lead this battle. However, sometimes the most important
actor may not participate, as it may perceive itself vulnerable. Such is the case of the
Kyoto Protocol. The headline issue was emissions reduction; although, ancillary goals
involved wealth redistribution with inequitable country mandates. Thus, the U.S.
abstained from becoming a signatory, yet signatories to Kyoto breached emission limits,
questioning its efficacy.
1 Economic Freedom Team, “How to Create a Job: Creating Value, Not Just Work”. 2011
(http://www.economicfreedom.org/2011/09/14/how-to-create-a-job-creating-value-not-just-work/)
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When there is no congruence between existing distribution of power and power
fundamentals, a regime change will occur. This model may also apply to relationships
between the U.S. and the U.N., where America took over the lead in the Korean War.
Such an issue is experienced frequently by America with its relationship with the
United Nations. Although the U.S. sought approval by the U.N. on its broader war on
terror with militaristic activities in Iraq, it was stymied by some of the U.N. members.
An example of roles for International Organization is to make small less powerful states
pari passu with a greater voice via linkages in various bodies. It is somewhat analogous
to a bicameral legislature. One chamber provides the opportunity for all actors to have
equal representation, regardless of perceived or real power; whereas, the other chamber
allocates greater weight to actors with more power (e.g., population). Each has their
benefits and detriments, but both must come together to resolve differences.
HEG YOUR BETS – The Tenets of Offensive Realism
Offensive Realism is state-centric, a hard power philosophy with a predominance on
safety, predicated on the instruments of a powerful military supported by a strong
economy. The economy seeks to maximize wealth, and has the capacity to produce
both guns and butter in vast amounts. Absolute power gains are a goal, but relative
power gains are more important as a great power has an insatiable quest for its
overarching goal, to be the global hegemon. Nuclear weapon superiority underpins
this quest, as the great power is not satisfied in a MAD world. In so doing, they will be
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opportunistic by attempting to capitalize on expanding their relative position, whether
it economic, territorial, militaristic, or influential. However, such a cynical mindset and
belligerent stance can be counterproductive, as economic opportunities, available
otherwise to help fund a strong military, may not be extended by other actors.
Mearsheimer comments that it is impossible to become the global hegemon, that certain
constraints, mainly the stopping power of water, limit a state to regional hegemony.
The agenda hierarchy is driven largely by concerns about anarchy and swings in the
balance of power and safety and how they might impact non-safety subject matter
discussions. The diversity in issue effects are diminished via connections, which
buttresses the agenda hierarchy, and the role of international organizations are
insignificant and constrained by the state’s capacity and prominence of its military.
With the emphasis on military power, Mearsheimer provides certain qualifying criteria
deemed necessary. A state must have a large population, not only as potential military
personnel, but also to provide the requisite labor pool for economic activity that
sustains the military. Given his comments about the stopping power of water, he
suggests the main ingredient for a powerful military is a significantly large Army for
land battles, and subordinates the Navy and Air Force to mere support roles for the
Army. He is cognizant that the quantitative aspect of sheer size is not sufficient, as
sometimes the qualitative aspects of strategy, training and equipment are superior.
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As a testament to the significance of a strong economy during World War II, the United
States built more airplanes in 1944 than Japan did from 1939-1945.2
Strategy is critical for success. For instance, at the beginning of World War II, France
arguably had the largest Army, and the French were under the illusion that they were
in a dominant position with the “impregnable” Maginot Line. Yet, the Germans found
the weakness in this strategy, and followed the axiom, if you cannot go over an
obstacle, go around it.
Equipment qualitative features can counter larger numbers. Indeed, the Allied forces
had great difficulty combating Germany’s Tiger tank with its thicker armor and
powerful cannon.
Often certain intangible elements are the deciding factor. The immersion of Henry V’s
forces in Esprit de Corps was instrumental in the British victory against the French at
Agincourt, yet such loyalty unchecked can lead to disastrous results as experienced in
The Charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava.
Based on Mearsheimer’s theory, given its geographical location, Australia has one of the
greatest natural defenses in the world as it is surrounded completely by oceans. This
country has significant natural resource wealth, a robust economy and high
2 The War At Home PBS, September 2007. Washington, D.C.
(http://www.pbs.org/thewar/at_home_war_production.htm)
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GDP/Capita, ranking 13th in the world.3 Though it has a relatively small populace and
its military is not of significant size to thwart a great power, totaling less than 100,000.4
A few countries in its region, mainly China, Japan, and Russia, may have had
opportunities to breach Australia’s homeland, but if past is prologue, unless it becomes
a dehydrated world, it is highly unlikely to be overtaken by sheer force of conventional
weapons.
SPRING IN BOOM – Applied Theory to the Arab Spring
Major themes for the Arab Spring include anarchy and regime change. It is believed the
original epicenter for the collection of movements was in Tunisia December 2010, when
Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, protested the harassment, humiliation and seizure
of his goods by a public official by lighting himself aflame. Others in Tunisia joined in
protest, and sought regime change from its existing autocratic government. The
Tunisian events created an after-shock with protests following shortly thereafter across
much of North Africa and the Middle East. Much of the grievances related to economic,
human rights and religious oppression of autocratic regimes. Sizeable protests across
3 Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Key Economic Indicators, 2014”
(http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/1345.0?opendocument?opendocument#from-
banner=LN) 4 Appendix 7: People: Defence actual staffing". Defence Annual Report 2008–09. Department of Defence.
Retrieved 28 June 2010.
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the region led to an anarchic environment, and what resulted were various actions in
response to this outpouring.
It might be said that the Bouazizi event could fall under the Economic Process regime
change model, as Tunisia’s economy lags global progress considerably. With modern
technology and greater access to information, the populace is cognizant of this status.
Egypt’s revolution led a shift to state-centric Realism, with Mubarak ceding power and
placing the Egyptian Army as the dominant actor. Additional concerns arose from the
Egyptian populace, as they wanted a civilian leadership, yet the outcome of the vote,
with Morsi a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, led to a shift in pushing the country
towards a theocratic-like system. This shift would lead to erosion of liberties, and Morsi
made a decree that his powers were limitless and not subject to challenge by the
judiciary. Essentially, the Libyan civil war, ouster, and death of Gaddafi is based on
Eroding Hegemony, especially deteriorating economics with an approximate 30%
unemployment rate at the time of the unrest.5 The outbreak in Syria drove Assad to
appeal to Syrian patriotism and loyalty claiming the disturbances were propagated by
foreigners. He responded to the rebels in-kind by taking a strong Realist stance by
defending the Syrian regime’s position by attacking various rebel outposts and killing
many of them including with use of Sarin gas, a weapon of mass destruction. The
outcry by various global actors did not sway or concern Assad about most of Syria’s
5 Kawczynski, Daniel, “Seeking Gaddafi: Libya, the West and the Arab Spring”. Biteback. 2011: 231
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global relationships. And, the countries surrounding the area had to balance the needs
of a large migration of Syrian refugees and remaining in the good graces of its
interconnected counterparts, while maintaining their sovereignty with the refugees
encroachment and demands on their respective economic and support systems.
CONCLUSION
Based on the theories of cooperation (Complex Interdependence) and competition
(Offensive Realism), I consider myself a pragmatic hybrid of Co-Opetition; therefore,
closely mirroring Keohane and Nye’s commentary of a linkage of the two different
philosophies along the continuum, and utilized for situations it is best suited. My
decision tree algorithm might resemble a statistical distribution. If the distribution of
events and the environment resemble something close to a normal distribution, Then
follow Keohane and Nye’s path, Else, follow Mearsheimer’s recommendations when
there is skewness and/or kurtosis present, with exceptions and limits for both.
What drives this viewpoint is the necessity for flexibility as circumstances dictate. I
believe the Complex Interdependence position as postulated is naïve about altruism in
the intent of others. The Law of the Sea provides clarity as to whom can “legally drink
your milkshake”, challenging the status quo. Given such a situation, it may leave a
state with only one option, cooperation, sometimes with powers that do not have the
other states interests at heart. Mearsheimer’s position is too cynical and bellicose. He
echoes a paranoia-like mantra resembling the French “tous azimuts”, or threats from all
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around. With such a distrustful mindset, it may result in costs from unconsummated
opportunities. What is lost in the conversation is the importance of marshaling all the
resources at its disposal. Never take an option off the table. For instance, focusing on a
single branch of the military and implying the others are support roles. The reality is
lines and operations between the various branches in the military are often blurred. For
instance, sometimes Navy SEALs operate in the land theaters. What is important is
they are a cohesive group, operate under the same flag, play complementary roles, and
their activities are seamless between them. The determining factor is what is the
mission? Does it require surgical strikes that can be accomplished with airstrikes,
barrages along a coastline from naval ships, or significant brute force in the form of
boots on the ground? Or, is it a combination of all, introducing the enemy to “Shock
and Awe”?
With respect to American International Relations policy, I believe the Great Seal is
emblematic of a correct posture -- A Great Eagle astride with an olive branch clasped by
one foot and a bundle of arrows with the other, and the Eye of Providence and its
inscription Annuit Coeptis – “Providence favors our undertakings”.6 A popular
anecdote spoken to FDR by Churchill says, “… I would prefer the American eagle's
6 http://greatseal.com/mottoes/coeptis.html
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neck to be on a swivel so that it could face the olive branches or the arrows, as the
occasion might demand".7
I concur with Churchill with one modification, that the default position of the eagle’s
head be repositioned from the olive branch to afore. As such, the Eye of Providence
scans the horizon for opportunities and threats, with the mobilization of American
assets and implementation of policy maneuvers in preparation to address them.
7 Patterson, Richard S., and Richardson Dougall. “The Eagle and the Shield”. Honolulu, Hawaii, University
Press of the Pacific. 2006: 426-429
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