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Shifting the Terror frame
How 9/11 changed the framing of Terrorist events
Nel Ruigrok*, Wouter van Atteveldt†, Rens Vliegenthart†
*ASCOR † Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam Free University Amsterdam
Kloveniersburgwal 48 De Boelelaan 1081
1012 CX Amsterdam 1081 HV Amsterdam
p.c.ruigrok@uva.nl wva@cs.vu.nl, r.vliegenthart@fsw.vu.nl
Abstract
The images of the second plane flying into the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 shook the world and shaped the way terrorism would be reported on in
the years afterwards. Analyzing all articles on terror in 4 newspapers in the US
and UK from 1996 to 2006, we conducted an automated study of the way
terrorism events were framed before and after 9/11.
We found that, especially for the US, 9/11 was the defining moment: both normal
terrorism coverage and event peaks were higher after 9/11; 9/11 caused a
permanent frame shift from diagnosis to prognosis and from the enemy as criminals to focusing on fanatical Muslims as the enemy; and 9/11 was literally
used as the point of reference in describing later terrorism events.
We also investigated the short-term dynamics after a terrorism event, and found
that in the first week there is a peak in frame variation and diagnosis, while the
amount of coverage only peaks in the second or third week, which sees a decrease
in the amount of frames used and a focus on prognosis.
Introduction
The violent terrorist attacks in the last decade form clear examples of Wolfsfeld’s (1997)
argument that events determine media coverage to a great extent. Media on their turn
determine the images that the public receives by selecting certain topics and excluding
others. Being highly dependent on the media as their main source of information
concerning far away happenings, journalists create a “window on the world” (Tuchman
1978: ix) for their audiences.
Besides the influence on the world view of the public in choosing topics, these media give
the events meaning by transforming them into words and images. Especially during a
sudden, dramatic event, people depend on these journalistic choices how to perceive the
event. It is commonly understood that the presentation of events in the news coverage has
a considerable impact on how the audience feel about the particular event being described,
and how we interpret the event and other related issues (Pan and Kosicki, 2001).
From a journalistic point of view an unexpected dramatic occurrence, or key event, can
lower the future threshold for news selection in such a way that occurrences that resemble
the key event are covered more often, increasing the effect the news might have (Brosius
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& Zillmann, 2000). Moreover, the initial news images provide a ready-made framework in
which related and further events can be presented. In this way the initial coverage is turned
into a news icon, that can be defined as “a powerful condensational image, arising out of a
news event” (Bennett and Lawrence, 1995, p.22). For example during the war in Bosnia,
the pictures of the emaciated men behind barbed wire in the ‘concentration camp’ of
Omarska, in which the war was directly compared with the Holocaust, formed such a news
icon. Politicians, the public, and journalists all embarked on a crusade to free the Muslims
from the evil Serbs. This framework reinforced by a congruence of opinion among
journalists, politicians and elites, already provided the interpretations for journalists. The
news coverage of this ‘event’ was highly emotional and portrayed the parties involved in
clearly distinguishable ways, with the Serbs being the bad guys and the Muslims being
their victims. This initial framework caused a stereotyped one-sided news coverage in
western media of the subsequent years of war (NIOD, 2002; Ruigrok, 2005).
Currently the world is confronted with a global conflict in which parts of the Muslim
population play an important role. However, this time not as the victims, but as the culprits
of several attacks to ‘our’ Western ‘values’. The War on Terror, initiated by the United
States after the attacks on 11 September 2001, is widely seen as a conflict between the
Western countries and the Islamitic countries, especially in the Middle East. With the
attacks on the early morning of 11 September 2001 the US was touched right in the heart.
The sensational attacks, with instant coverage making millions around the globe witness of
the second plane flying into the WTC building, destroyed many lives and disrupted the
entire society. The news about the events found its way into every local rag around the
world. Not only was the news covered everywhere, the coverage was accompanied with
highly emotional language and images. Moreover, the portrayal of the protagonists were
clear, with the terrorists of Al Queda being the ‘bad guys’ and the Americans being the
‘good guys’ (Seib, 2004). The tone was set within the first days and caused similar
coverage after de US decided to bomb Afghanistan and declared the War on Terror against
all terrorists and the ‘Rogue states’, sponsoring or protecting them. In the running up to the
Iraqi war the news coverage continued within this initial frame (Aday, 2005).
Terrorism, however, was not a new phenomenon in 2001, and the US had been hurt
before, with the bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the suicide
bombing on the Navy guided missile destroyer USS Cole in 2000. In fact, according to
American statistics there has been an estimate of 400 terrorist acts per year in the 90s
(Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2001).
This raises the question what differential consequences events can have on news coverage,
not only looking at the 9/11 attacks but also before these attacks and afterwards. We
compare its effects on news framing with other events and investigate whether it has been
really such a ‘world changing’ happening. More specifically, we are interested if the
attacks following 9/11, such as the Bombs in Bali, the Train in Madrid and the Subway in
London reinforced or weakened the existing frames. Or to put it differently: which events
caused a shift in the frames in the news, and were these shifts durable or permanent? In
this study we will look at news coverage about terrorism and Islam in US, British and
Dutch newspapers from 1996 to 2007. Using associative framing we will determine the
way in which a number of terrorist attacks caused shifts in frames concerning terrorism,
the perpetrators, the causes and remedies.
3
Theoretical Considerations
Associative framing
The study of framing gained an important place in the field of communication research
and became the most studied concept in the recent years. One of the most common
definition of framing is provided by Entman (1993) who describes framing as selecting
“some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." The definition
shows already the multi-facet aspect of framing research. It is about selection, salience,
and recommendation, including not only the communicator but also the audience. As
Entman (1993) points out there are at least four locations of framing that can be studied:
the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture. Frames as found in texts, news
frames, form the core interest of numerous mass media studies. Cappella and Hall
Jamieson (1997, p.39-40) describe news frames as “those rhetorical and stylistic choices,
reliably identified in news, that alter the interpretations of the topics treated and are a
consistent part of the news environment.” Examples of news frames are for example
‘strategic’ or ‘game’ frames which are often found in coverage of political campaigns
(Patterson, 1993). Other examples of news frames are ‘conflict’ and personalization
frames (Price & Tewksburry, 1997) or episodic versus thematic frames as distinguished by
Iyengar (1991).
With respect to the occurrence of framing at different levels we see a distinction in studies
examining media frames and research into audience frames (Cappella and Jamieson 1997;
Entman 1993; Scheufele 1999). The former branch of research focuses on how issues are
presented in the news (Norris 1995; Patterson 1993; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000) while
the latter branch of research focuses on how individuals perceive and interpret issues
presented to them (Domke, Shah, and Wackman 1998; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997;
Price, Tewksbury, and Power 1997; Rhee 1997; Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese
1999). A combination of these branches is found in few studies examining both media
frames and the effects of these frames on the public (e.g. Cappella and Jamieson 1997;
Iyengar 1991; Neuman, et al. 1992). This points towards two separate questions within the
study of framing: “What are frames?” and “How are frames transferred between media
and audience?” A third important question, however, is largely neglected. This question is
“Where do frames come from?” and deals with the origins of framing and frame variation
(see Snow et al., forthcoming). In this paper, we do not specifically address the effects of
framing, but rather focus on its origins and more specifically the role of key events in the
process of frame building and framing shifts. Before discussing this, some conceptual
clarification of the fuzzy concept of framing is required.
News Frames, Equivalency Frames, and Emphasis Frames
With respect to the question of what frames actually are, research shows a distinction
between equivalency frames and emphasis frames. ‘Equivalency Frames’ present an issue
in different ways with “the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases”
(Druckman 2001: 228), causing a major change in audience preference when the same
problem is presented in different wordings, such as rescuing some versus sacrificing others
(Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Emphasis frames, later
called “issue framing” (Druckman 2004), on the other hand, highlight a particular “subset
of potentially relevant considerations” (Druckman 2004: 672). In line with Entman’s
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definition, issue framing can be defined as a process of selecting and emphasizing certain
aspects of an issue on the basis of which the audience can evaluate the issue described or
the protagonists associated with the issues.
We will focus on issue framing rather than equivalency framing, since we are interested in
the relationship between different concepts and their attributes, rather than in the different
descriptions of a certain concept. Issue frames form a substantial part of the research on
news frames. Cappella and Jamieson (1997: 39-40) describe news frames as “those
rhetorical and stylistic choices, reliably identified in news, that alter the interpretations of
the topics treated and are a consistent part of the news environment.” Examples of news
frames are ‘strategic’ or ‘game’ frames, which are often found in coverage of political
campaigns (Patterson 1993). Other examples of news frames are ‘conflict’ and
personalization frames (Price and Tewksbury 1997) or episodic versus thematic frames as
distinguished by Iyengar (1991). Within the context of social movements Snow and
Benford (1988) distinguish three forms of frames that can be found in news coverage.
Diagnostic framing involves the identification of an event or social problem that is in need
of change. Prognostic framing proposes a solution to the observed problem and proposes
types of action. Finally, motivational framing represents a call to action as well as the
rationale for engaging in the proposed action. This research is in line with Entman’s
definition with respect to the “problem definition” and “causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” and can also be
considered within conflict situations. As Eilders (2000: 426) concluded in here research
into news coverage about the Kosovo war “Taken together, all newspapers called attention
to the prognostic aspects of the war. Diagnostic and identity-related aspects attracted little
attention” (Eilders, 200: 426).
The framing process
The second question mentioned above—How are frames transferred from the media to the
audience?—also leads to a number of different hypotheses. Some researchers consider
framing as a linear transfer of salience process, straight from the sender into the audience
(Eagley and Chaiken 1998; Zaller 1992; Zaller 1994). Other researchers, however,
consider the framing process as an interaction between message content and the
interpreter's social knowledge. This interaction process leads to a construction of a mental
model as a resulting state of interpretation (Rhee 1997). Besides the creation of these
mental models, the framing process can trigger a mental model or frame that already exists
within the receiver’s perception. Graber (1988) describes the way people use schematic
thinking to handle information. They extract only those limited amounts of information
from news stories that they consider important for incorporation into their schemata. Snow
and Benford (1988) state in this respect that media frames and audience frames interact
through ‘frame alignment’ and ‘frame resonance’ (see also Snow et al. 1986).The
construction of mental models, schemata or frames is a central part of the cognitive
approach to framing (D’Angelo, 2002). Grounded in cognitive psychology, the approach
uses the associative network model of human memory (Collins and Quillian 1969),
proposing that the concepts in semantic memory are represented as nodes in a complex
hierarchical network. Each concept in the network is directly related to other related
concepts. Minsky (1975) connected this view to framing when he defined a frame as a
structure containing various pieces of information. These discursive or mental structures
are closely related to the description of a schema, which is “a cognitive structure that
represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the
5
relation among those attributes,” (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 98). These cognitive structures
are based on prior knowledge (Fiske and Linville 1980).
Associative framing: the common denominator
As discussed above, framing study contains many perspectives and research lines. We
perceive, however, a common denominator in that many studies base the idea of a frame
on associations, either between concepts, concepts and attributes, or on more complex
networks of concepts. In this study, therefore, we will focus on what we call ‘associative
framing.’
Associative frames consist of associations between concepts and other concepts, where
‘concepts’ is a general term that can denote actors, issues, and attributes. From the point of
view of the cognitive perspective, these frames refer to the earlier described schemata of
interpretation (Goffman 1974), and the main associations in a message can be seen as its
“central organizing idea” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987).
As mentioned previously, in this paper we follow the distinction in diagnostic, prognostic
and motivational framing as has been proposed by Snow and Benford (1988) for the study
of social movements’ communication to their (potential) participants. Previous studies
have found this distinction of conceptual utility for the study of newspaper coverage as
well (Snow et al. forthcoming, Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007), though motivational
framing elements are strongly connected to the specific aims and goals of social
movements and are far less present in media coverage. Therefore, we limit ourselves to a
division in diagnostic and prognostic framing elements. This division neatly fits in the
associative framing approach, since both diagnostic and prognostic framing elements are
well represented in a network of associations between concepts.
Framing Terrorist events
In their seminal work into media events Dayan and Katz (1992, pp.196/197) define events
as “dominating televised occasions based on interruption and withdrawal from routine
broadcast schedules.” Overall studies show that major dramatic events increase media
coverage to a great extent. Moreover, media coverage goes beyond the actual event toward
all kinds of related topics (Kepplinger & Habermeir, 1995; Lawrence & Bennett, 2000;
Vasterman, 2005). Besides the increased attention paid to the event, the event might also
change the way in which the issue is portrayed in the media. They can be seen as “critical
discourse moments” in which media can reframe the event and the related issues (Chilton,
1987; Gamson, 1992). Brosius and Eps (1995) for example, studied the impact of four so-
called “key events” on news selection in the case of violence against aliens and asylum
seekers in Germany. They found that the amount, as well as the shape, of coverage
increased significantly after these key events. According to Brosius and Eps (1995: 407),
key events have a prototyping quality, giving dramatic events meaning by constructing
them within a simplified framework. Such frameworks will reduce ambiguity, evoke
myths or prejudices, establish associations, and reinforcing culturally based ideas (Becker,
1995; Kitzinger, 2000). The effect of these tendencies according to Kepplinger and
Habermeier (1995, 389) is that event-based coverage creates ‘the false impression that
events accumulate and problems become more urgent. ’
Studies into news events show that within a short time span, with repeating coverage in all
major media outlets specific news coverage can easily become a news icon, a prototype
(Brosius and Eps, 1995; Bennett and Lawrence, 1995). Such icon is capable of condensing
the issue at hand with all its complexities into one striking image. With respect to the news
6
coverage a news icon provides journalists rich narrative material (Hoskins, 2006; Aday,
2005). One of the characters of a news icon is the fact that this coverage survives the
initial story and reappears in a wide variety of related news contexts. In these cases the
news icon will serve as a definitional cue for new events. As a consequence news icons
can trigger or reinforce existing frames, such as patriotism, or military supremacy. With
news media routinely drawing upon past images, video, phrases, people, places and
events, as well as other media, to locate and to shape what today passes as ‘news’
(Hoskins, 2006), icons can over time turn into media templates. Media templates as
Kitzinger (2000) argues differ from icons in that they are “defined by their retrospective
use in secondary reporting rather than contemporaneous coverage”. Media templates
therefore explain current events, by referring to an ongoing problem “Templates are used
to highlight patterns in particular issues or social problems.” (Ktizinger, 2000, 76).With
respect to the Bosnian war the pictures of the detention camps became a news icon and
media template, while with respect to the war on terrorism the second plane flying into the
WTC tower fulfilled this role for future coverage.
Terrorist events: the impact of 9/11
9/11 caused a major shift in the framing of terrorist attacks. A study into the news
coverage of a Swedish newspaper about terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,
and Madrid in 2004, showed a significant difference in the amount of attention paid to
both events (Persson 2004). Madrid received far more attention than the African countries.
Moreover, the study reveals differences in the interpretation of the events. Kenya and
Tanzania were framed as a tragedy and crime, while Madrid was a moral outrage everyone
should care about; terrorism was labeled as something ‘new,’ ‘Islamic’ and ‘global’, The
description of the causes of terrorism remained very limited in the news (Persson 2004:
36).
Whereas the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were covered with a focus on the causes as
well as the actions to take afterwards, the coverage about 9/11 focused more heavily on
the actions to take as retaliation. Addressing the nation on September 20, President Bush
said, ‘‘On September 11th, [the] enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our
country’’ (Bush, 2001, para. 12). With the American government pleading for a war on
terror we see this reflected in the news coverage. As Ryan (2004) found while studying the
editorials of 10 newspapers in the US, the most important remedy after 9/11 was put in a
‘war on terrorism’ frame. No editorials argued against military intervention or took the
time to discuss the possible consequences of such action. Other research found the same
patterns. Marvin Kalb and Stephen Hess (2003: 2) argue that the horrific events 9/11
instantly created a new focus on American national purpose, forcefully articulated by the
president, and a new framing device for the media: The war on terrorism. Norris et al
(2003: 4) argue that 9/11 is a “symbolizing critical culture shift in the predominant news
frame used by the American mass media for understanding issues of national security etc.”
(Norris et al 2003: 4).
In line with Bird’s argument (1990: 380) that journalists perform the role of storytellers
that use ‘general themes’ and put them into ‘established formulae’, researchers found that
the subsequent news coverage about terrorism was framed within certain master frames.
9/11 became a media template providing the framework in which terrorism is perceived.
In line with other studies into key events (see Kepplinger and Habemeier, 1995; Brosius
and Eps,1995), related topics also saw a change in the coverage. Ross and Bantimaroudis
(2006) for example found that that The New York Times covered Israel and the Palestinian
7
territories more frequently and in more diverse ways in the 6 months after September
2001.
The media template of the War on Terror was also found in the news coverage when the
US was preparing to go to war in Iraq. President Bush justified this initiative claiming that
Saddam Hussein was implicated in the 9/11 attacks on the United States and had not
complied with United Nations (UN) requirements about weapons inspections. In addition
he stated that Hussein still possessed numerous weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that
he planned to use against the United States as well as deliver to terrorists. Fitting perfectly
well in the template, these views were taken over easily by the media, without counter
arguments. As Fried (2005: 131) concluded in her study into the news coverage of
newsmagazines in the running up to the Iraqi war “Terrorism and Americans’ fears about
it provided a substantial context to coverage of Iraq before the war.” The New York
Times even apologized recently for its one-sided news coverage in the build up to the Iraqi
war. Ombudsman Daniel Okrent (2004) states that the newspaper “fell for
misinformation,” and concluded that “the failure was not individual, but institutional.”
With respect to the news coverage before and after 9/11 we expect changes, both in the
amount of news coverage as well as the frames in which the news about terrorism is
covered.
Our first hypothesis deals with the attention for the issue of terrorism and is rather
straightforward. More than any other event the 9/11 attacks dominated the political and
media agenda for a long period in time and therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1a. The amount of attention for terror increases significantly after the 9/11 attacks
H1b. The peaks caused by events after 9/11 are higher than before 9/11
Our second hypothesis considers the shift of framing from diagnostic to prognostic
elements. The initial coverage, right after 9/11, is likely to focus upon the possible reasons
for the attacks and the attribution of blame to certain actors. After a while, the focus is
likely to shift to more prognostic framing, focusing on the question what needs to be done
to prevent similar events to occur in the future (see Snow et al. forthcoming for a similar
argument).
H2. Framing shows a shift from diagnostic to prognostic framing
The third hypothesis deals with the question how 9/11 has altered the framing of the issue.
Here, we hypothesize the icon-function that 9/11 has. This function is likely to be most
present in diagnostic framing, since it functions as a prototype that helps to make sense of
the diagnostic interpretation (‘what happened?’ and ‘what is going on?’) of other events.
Therefore, our third hypothesis is:
H3. Regarding diagnostic framing, with 9/11 being an icon, reference is made to this
event, more significantly than any other preceding attack.
We argue, however, that the icon-function is contingent upon the proximity
(geographically as well as culturally) of the event. More specifically, we expect that for
the United Kingdom the Metro bombings have led to a change in the event that has taken
up the role as main icon:
H3a: for the British newspapers the London attacks will become an icon,
supplanting the news icon of 9/11
Finally we will focus on the aspect of temporality. “Time matters,” as Abbot (2001)
argues and therefore we expect that also frame shifts within the framing of the conflict. In
8
the initial phase right after an event, numerous actors will try to bring forward different
interpretations of it. After some time, it is likely that some consensus is reached and some
form of frame-crystallization takes place (Snow et al. forthcoming). Therefore, we expect
that after an initial diffuse picture of numerous frames, in the longer run a limited number
of frames will dominate the news coverage:
H4: After initial a huge number of frames right after 9/11, the variation will decrease
over time
Events and emotions
During recent years we see an overall change in the news coverage of catastrophes,
accidents and awful happenings, focusing more on human aspects of the issue at hand,
including a rise in the emotional aspects of the event. Slattery et al (2001, 298) found “a
marked increase in embedded sensationalism/human interest” while Kitch (2000) argues
that ordinary people’s grievances after a dreadful happening is becoming a news story
itself.
When looking at tragic events, and especially at events becoming a media template, the
coverage is often accompanied by a lot of emotions. Several scholars have argued that
extraordinary tragic events are reported on in a striking similar frame, including an
increased number of human and emotional aspects. Some studies even show a national
consensus and unity born out of mourning together ( Kitch, 2000, 2003; Linenthal, 2001;
Pantti, 2005;Pantti and Wieten, 2005). According to Rosenthal (2003), the news media
represent crises as “crucial catalysts of … collective emotions”
One such striking emotion is fear, which is a powerful emotion. Fear can draw people
together, seeking safety in numbers. A situation in which society faces a common threat,
such as a flood, hard winters, or from other groups, has often had a positive effect on
communities, strengthening bonds that might otherwise have been weak, establishing a
sphere of community where instead there would only have been individuals. The same
effect is found when a society collectively mourns victims, such as a public figure being
murdered. News coverage about such an event can create a feeling of temporary national
consensus, ‘‘a nationwide bereaved community’’ (Linenthal, 2001, p. 111), in an
otherwise devided society (Pantti and Wieten, 2005).
9/11 and emotional coverage
The emotional elements were also traced in the news coverage about 9/11. Studying
journalism about the 9/11 attacks, researchers show that television coverage put a high
level of emotions in the footage with repeated showing of horrific images and citizens'
reactions, and news anchors' controlled but clearly visible displays of emotions (Carey,
2002; Schudson, 2002). With reports live from “Ground Zero” and the Pentagon including
ordinary citizens the content of television coverage included emotionally-involved
individuals. In a comparative study into emotional cues in both newspapers and television
coverage of 9/11 Cho et al (2003) found that in both media emotional cues were found,
even stronger in the television news transcripts. The emotionality lasted in within the
dominant ‘war on terror’ frame. As Clausen (2003: 113) concluded after researching the
coverage of the first commemoration of 9/11: “Stories were framed, angled, geared and
worded to suit the emotional and cognitive framework of audiences at home.” The same is
true for the news coverage of the London attacks. Hoskins (2006: 464) argues that a
significant proportion of the mainstream media reports about the attacks “focused around
the ‘public mood’ of shock, fear and resoluteness.”
9
With respect to the framing of the terrorist attacks we expect a change in the emotional
news coverage after the 9/11 attack
H5: The 9/11 attack caused an increased attention to emotional news coverage
regarding the issue of terrorism.
Framing the other
When talking about tragic events that might cause fear and other related emotions, part of
the news coverage immediately turns towards the human side of the happenings, both the
culprits and the victims. As we saw in the example of the Omarska detention camps, the
distinction between good guys and bad guys was easily made and continued on in
subsequent news coverage. A news event therefore has the power to define this distinction
“through priming or framing, events might also guide the positive or negative evaluation
of issues or persons” (Brosius and Eps, 1995: 408). Often the scapegoating starts when
people feel threatened by the events and the fear of new future events. Glassner’s (2003)
provides clear examples of this reciprocal relationship. The diagnoses of the external
threat often employ the devise of scapegoating to demonstrate the immediacy and
relevance of the danger. In describing the scapegoat, news media tend to use simplified
images, creating a distinction between the victims and culprits, by portraying the latter as
‘others’. Enemies and villains are the most extreme form of the Other, and they are
frequently portrayed as evil to make them easier to hate (Harle, 2000, pp. 11-2): ‘‘The evil
Other is, actually, the enemy of God, and the war against it is a holy war’’
9/11 and framing the other
After 9/11, journalists embraced enthusiastically the new framework of ‘war on terror’, in
order to interpret the ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of a state. Studies investigated the portrayal
of Muslims in the media before and after 9/11 and found different results. Nacos and
Torres-Reyna (2003: 151) found a shift from “limited and stereotypical coverage in the
pre-9/11 period to a more comprehensive, inclusive, and less stereotypical news
presentation.” The researchers found that not only more access was granted to Muslims,
they also found a difference in the content of the news. Whereas the media associated
Muslims with negative and stereotypical topics before 9/11, afterwards they focused on a
bigger range of topics. Moreover the researchers found a shift from episodic framing
towards more thematic framing patterns. As one expert in the field pointed out as early as
1981, the cultures and peoples of the Middle East “are not easily explained in quick two-
minute network news stories” (Shaheen 1981).Other researchers, however, argue that after
the initial period of disorientation, news coverage recaptured the old frames in which they
shaped the news about Arabs, associating them with violence, terror and Islam (Karim
2002: 12; see also Persson 2004). These findings are in line with the research of Brosius
and Eps (1995) and the stereotypes of asylum seekers in Germany.
Research into the news coverage of the Bali bombings show the same pattern, with a
portrayal of the bombers as terrorists and as a continuous threat. They were also portrayed
as militants, and Muslim radicals. The tone of the stories indicated that the enemy was
identified as members of Al Qaeda, 'Muslim hardliners', 'religious fanatics', and 'Muslim
radicals'.
Researching the news coverage about Bin Laden after the attacks Winch (2005) concludes
that the Al Qaeda leader was mainly described in news reports as a savage, uncivilized and
barbarian.
10
In line with these researchers we expect an important shift of the frame in which the
perpetrators of attacks are covered.
H6: 9/11 caused a major shift in the news coverage about the perpetrators of terrorist
attacks from criminals towards Islamic fanatics causing a threat to the world.
Methodology
This study analyzes the coverage of the issue of Terrorism in the United States and the
United Kingdom from the 1st of January 1996 until the 31
st of December 2006. For each
country, we analyzed two newspapers, one ‘quality’ broadsheet paper (the Washington
Post and The Guardian) and one ‘popular’ newspaper (the USA Today and The Sun), and
included all articles in the Lexis Nexis database that included ‘terror*’, i.e. any word
beginning with ‘terror’, yielding a total of 87452 articles. Table 1 shows the amount of
articles and total frequency of ‘terror*’ words per medium per year.
Table 1: Numbers of hits and articles containing ‘terror*’ in the studies period
UK US
The Guardian The Sun1 USA Today Washington Post Total
Year N Freq. N Freq. N Freq. N Freq. N Freq.
1996 1117 3755 560 2116 1372 6100 3049 11971
1997 929 2672 370 1171 1071 4560 2370 8403
1998 1406 4630 422 1720 1335 6307 3163 12657
1999 1190 3805 356 1121 1428 5131 2975 10058
2000 992 3034 654 1152 285 1102 1272 4816 3203 10104
2001 2670 12380 1857 4558 2483 12109 6996 35352 14006 64399
2002 2886 12691 1650 4064 2583 12501 8290 39175 15409 68431
2003 2608 11414 1376 3293 1654 8131 6182 29087 11820 51925
2004 2678 12907 1571 3975 1671 7920 5805 27986 11725 52788
2005 2831 15009 1496 3647 1037 4840 4512 20969 9876 44465
2006 2921 13708 1648 3950 1114 5123 4173 19298 9856 42079
Total 22228 96005 10253 24640 12535 57854 42436 198781 87452 377280
Frame Definitions
Except for the first hypothesis, all hypotheses depend on the use of certain frames in
covering terror. As explained in the previous section, we use associative framing, meaning
that we are looking for the association between terror and other concepts. Table 2 gives an
overview of the concepts used. We categorized these concepts into three main categories:
Diagnostic and descriptive concepts; prognostic concepts; and reference events. The
diagnostic concepts are subdivided into three subcategories: factual descriptions (what
happened); sensational or emotional descriptions, focusing on violence and grief; and
depiction of the Enemy.
Operationalization
The measurements in this study follow the Associative Framing method described in
Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt (2007). The core notion of this method is that a unit of
1 The Sun was not included in Lexis Nexis until 2000, but since the period before 9/11 is mainly used for reference
purposes and we are not interested in differences between newspapers we do not think this is a real problem.
11
measurement (a document) mentions a number of concepts. Since we wanted to study
direct associations with terror, we used the paragraph as unit of measurement.
The visibility of terror in a certain period can then be defined as the chance of reading
about terror in a random document, which is the weighted average reading chance of terror
over all paragraphs in that period. The reading chance in a paragraph was based on the
frequency of references to that concept, and we weighted all paragraphs by their position
in the article, the page number of the article in the newspaper, and the weekday of the
newspaper, based on a small survey of advertising costs (Van Atteveldt et al, 2006 p.12).
The association between terror and another concept is defined as the chance of reading
about that concept given that one reads about terror in a random paragraph. This is equal
to the proportion of paragraphs about terror that are also about that concept, where
‘aboutness’ is probabilistic. Effectively, the association is the weighted average of the
probability of seeing both the concept and terror in a paragraph divided by the visibility of
terror.
This measure of association is related to more traditional measures of association such as
cosine distance, correlation, and χ2 values, but it differs substantively on two counts. First,
this is a deliberately asymmetric measure since, for example, Hamas might be strongly
associated with terrorism while terrorism is more strongly associated with other concepts
such as Al Qaeda. Second, we are not interested in associations compared to what one
would predict based on independent distribution but rather in the associations themselves.
If all articles are framed in a dominant frame, say, the patriotic frame, this still means that
the individual articles are framed that way. Apart from these desirable substantive
features, using this asymmetric measure has the convenient methodological property that
all associations of a concept can be calculated based only on the articles in which that
concept occurs, while symmetric measures such as correlation would also require all
articles containing the concepts with which the first concept might co-occur.
Table 2 : Concepts used in the study
Diagnosis Enemy
Islam / Fundamentalism
Rogue States Criminals
Factual description
Event description
Motivations
Sensational Description
Human Interest Violence
Mourning
Prognosis War on Terror
Intelligence / Counterterrorism
International Cooperation Patriotic Unity / Religious Terms
Fear
Civil Rights
Reference Events Oklahoma Bombings
USS Cole
9/11 attack Bali bombing
Madrid bombing
London bombing
12
Results
Visibility of Terror
Figure 1 shows the monthly visibility of terror during the whole research period, split by
country. Immediately obvious is the peak for September 2001, especially in the American
newspapers. Peaks for the other events can also be seen, both before 9/11 (the Embassy
bombings) and after (the Madrid, Bali, and London bombings).
2006,11
2006,09
2006,07
2006,05
2006,03
2006,01
2005,11
2005,09
2005,07
2005,05
2005,03
2005,01
2004,11
2004,09
2004,07
2004,05
2004,03
2004,01
2003,11
2003,09
2003,07
2003,05
2003,03
2003,01
2002,11
2002,09
2002,07
2002,05
2002,03
2002,01
2001,11
2001,09
2001,07
2001,05
2001,03
2001,01
2000,11
2000,09
2000,07
2000,05
2000,03
2000,01
1999,11
1999,09
1999,07
1999,05
1999,03
1999,01
1998,11
1998,09
1998,07
1998,05
1998,03
1998,01
1997,11
1997,09
1997,07
1997,05
1997,03
1997,01
1996,11
1996,09
1996,07
1996,05
1996,03
1996,01
Date (year.month)
2500,00
2000,00
1500,00
1000,00
500,00
0,00
Vis
ibilit
y o
f T
err
or
us
uk
country
Figure 1: Visibility of terror over time in American and British press.
In both countries, overall visibility of the Terror issue is higher after 9/11. Between 9/11
and the London bombings this visibility is substantially higher in the US, where the peak
from 9/11 decays quite slowly. After London there is a small rise in the base level of terror
visibility in the British papers, catching up with the American visibility.
It is also interesting to focus on the dynamics immediately after each event. Figure 2(a)
shows the average visibility of terror from two weeks before each event until 9 weeks
after. Quite obvious is the higher value of the American peak, but both lines follow the
same pattern: a strong increase from week 0 (the natural week containing the event) with a
peak at weeks 1, 2, followed by a slow decline.
Figures 2 (b) and (c) show the visibility dynamics around the different events in the UK
and US, respectively. All events follow more or less the same pattern, with one main
exception: in the UK, the embassy bombings does not peak before week 3. This might be
partially caused by the fact that it occurred on a Friday, making week 0 more the ‘week
before’ than the ‘week of’ the event; note however that this does not happen in the US,
and that the peak is in week +3 rather than +1, so this can only explain part of the
discrepancy.
13
From these results, it is clear that terror coverage is strongly event driven: peaks of around
a month after each event, with relative silence in between. Before 9/11 there is hardly any
news not directly related to an event, while afterwards there is a higher ‘base level’ of
newspaper coverage mentioning terror. Moreover, the peaks after 9/11 are higher,
although whether this is caused by the proximity and scale of these events or by the
salience of 9/11 as media template is unknown. These findings confirm hypotheses H1a
and H2b.
Variance in framing
The variance in framing is computed as the entropy of the distribution of frames per time
period. Since the entropy is maximal if all frames occur with the same frequency and zero
if one frame is completely dominant, this is a useful measure of the use of a variety of
frames in reporting. Figure 3 shows this entropy over the whole research period.
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
4,80
4,60
4,40
4,20
4,00
3,80
Sum
ent
us
uk
country
Figure 3: Variation (entropy) of frame use over time in American and British press.
It is interesting to note that, similar to visibility, the lines for the UK and US more or less
follow each other before 9/11 and after London, and are apart between these events.
Interestingly, the entropy for the UK is higher in this period while the visibility was lower:
800,00
600,00
400,00
200,00
0,00
country: us
london
madrid
bali
9/11
USS cole
ambassades
period2250,00
200,00
150,00
100,00
50,00
0,00
Mean
vis
ter
us
uk
country250,00
200,00
150,00
100,00
50,00
0,00
country: uk
150,00
100,00Su
m v
iste
r
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Visibility of terror in the weeks following an event
(a) averaged over all events; (b) and (c) per event
14
apparently the US reports more often on terror but using fewer different frames. Another
interesting finding is that the overall entropy does not change much over time: even
though visibility after 9/11 is much higher than before, this does not lead to more variation
in the use of different frames until the final years of our study.
Again, it is interesting to consider the short-term dynamics in the weeks after the event.
Figure 4(a) shows the entropy per country from two weeks before until 9 weeks after the
event averaged over the major events. Both countries display a remarkably similar pattern:
a peak at week 0 (the natural week in which the event occurs), followed by a decline. It is
very interesting that the entropy peaks in week 0 while the visibility peaks only 1 or 2
weeks later: apparently, the first week is a chaotic week in which the event is reported on
from multiple angles, while the bulk of the coverage happens in the two weeks after that,
with the frame more crystallized. Figure 4(b) shows the entropy for 9/11 rather than
averaged over all events, which follows this general pattern.
In these findings we see an immediate peak with slow decline in frame variance after 9/11,
confirming hypothesis 4. The long term effect of 9/11 is one of less variance than before,
indicating the emergence of a dominant frame, especially in the US. This lasts until around
2005, where the difficulties of the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and the London
bombings cause the lines to converge. Thus, although we confirm hypothesis 4 for the
short term dynamics, the long term dynamics are slightly more complex: a short peak in
frame variance followed by a strong drop and a subsequent slow recovery.
Event references
Figure 5(a) and (b) show the association of terror with reference events for the
investigated media in the UK and US, respectively. In the UK, there are hardly any
references to events except for Lockerbie before 9/11. After 9/11, references to this event
dominate, especially until Bali. After both Bali and Madrid, references to that even peak in
the description phase, but quickly decrease afterwards. Interestingly, references to 9/11
fall after each new event even though it is not replaced by other references. After London,
this event takes over the lead from 9/11 in terms of references, although it is not clear how
this will progress after a future major event.
.09.08.07.06.05.04.03.02.01.00-.01-.02
yw2
4.30
4.20
4.10
4.00
Me
an
en
t
(a)
.09.08.07.06.05.04.03.02.01.00-.01
yw2
4.50
4.25
4.00
3.75
3.50
Me
an
en
t
us
uk
country
(b)
Figure 4: Variation (Entropy) immediately following an event
(a) averaged over all events (b) after 9/11
15
In the US, before 9/11 references are always to the most recent terror event: Oklahoma
until August 98, the Embassy bombings until October 2000, and the USS Cole until 9/11
(the latter in competition with the Embassy bombings). After 9/11, this picture changes
dramatically: 9/11 stays very high as a reference event, peaking at each new event and
staying at a very high level. New events receive a peak as they are described, but do not
strongly function as reference events later.
From these findings we can see that in the American press 9/11 clearly becomes the
reference event for future events, with continuous references to 9/11 and strong peaks with
each new event. For the UK, 9/11 also becomes a strong reference event, but loses
importance after each new event. After London, this new event supplants 9/11 as the most
important reference event, although we do not know what the reference will be for future
events since London was the last major event in the analyzed time period. These findings
confirm hypothesis H3 and partly confirm hypothesis H3a.
Prognosis / Diagnosis
As described in the previous section, we divide the frames into two broad categories:
diagnostic frames (description and sense-making) and prognostic frames (plans and
thoughts about the future). Figure 6 shows the ratio of prognosis to diagnosis for both
countries. At each event, there is a negative peak in prognosis as coverage is spent on
describing the event. 9/11 is a watershed for both the US and British press, after which the
prognosis ratio fluctuates around 1.8 rather than 1. The US rate is higher than the UK rate
after 9/11, and the UK rate drops rather than falls after the London bombings. This finding
confirms hypothesis 2.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: References to other events over time in the UK (a) and US (b)
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,12
0,10
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0,00
Su
m a
ss
country: uk
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,25
0,20
0,15
0,10
0,05
0,00
country: us
london
bali
madrid
embassies
lockerbie
munic
oklahoma
uss cole
9 11
objid
16
Figure 6: Ratio of Prognosis to Diagnosis in association with terror over time
The dynamics after the individual events are slightly chaotic, but averaged over the
different events a pattern becomes clear, as can be seen in figure 7(a): in the weeks
immediately following an event the ratio of prognosis drops to even as the event is
described, climbing to its pre-event level after the second or third week. There is no clear
peak in prognosis, even when looking at longer time frames. The dynamics for 9/11, as
shown in figure 7(b), paint a different picture: there is no drop in prognosis and prognosis
climbs steadily to the higher level clear from figure 6. This finding indicates that 9/11
played a frame shifting role with a permanent increase in prognostic framing, while the
other events follow a local event logic of diagnosis followed by prognosis.
Diagnosis
Zooming in on the diagnostic framing, we can subdivide this frame into three subframes as
described in the previous section: factually describing the event, sensationally describing
the event (focusing on violence and destruction), and describing the perceived enemy.
Figures 8 (a) and (b) show the relative size of these subframes for the UK and US,
respectively. In both countries, there is a clear shift around 9/11: before that period all
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
2,40
2,10
1,80
1,50
1,20
0,90
0,60
Sum
ass
us
uk
country
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Ratio of prognosis to diagnosis following (a) all events (averaged) (b) 9/11
1,70
1,60
1,50
1,40
1,30
1,20
1,10
1,00
Me
an
as
s
us
uk
country
.15
.14
.13
.12
.11
.10
.09
.08
.07
.06
.05
.04
.03
.02
.01
.00
-.01
-.02
yw2
2.40
2.10
1.80
1.50
1.20
0.90
0.60
Mea
n a
ss
us
uk
country
17
three frames have approximately the same importance, while after 9/11 the description of
the enemy increases markedly. In the US, this is mainly at the expense of sensational
description, while in the UK the factual description loses ground. These findings lead us to
reject hypothesis H5, as sensational description decreases rather than increases in the US
as is stable in the UK.
The enemy frame can be further divided into three components: describing the terrorists as
criminals; as fanatical Islamists; and as rogue states sponsoring terrorism. Figures 9 (a)
and (b) show this subdivision for the US and UK. In the UK, terrorism was mainly seen as
a criminal problem until 9/11, after which Islam quickly gains first place. State-sponsored
terrorism remains low during the whole period. In the US, there is a similar picture:
before 9/11 the three frames are approximately equal, and after 9/11 the Islam frame
quickly gains prominence, especially at the expense of the criminal frame. These findings
confirm hypothesis H6.
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Diagnostic framing over time for the UK (a) and US (b)
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,60
0,40
0,20
Su
m a
ss
rel
country: us
description
sensational
enemy
cl3
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,80
0,60
0,40
0,20
0,00
Su
m a
ss
rel
country: uk
(a) (b)
Figure 9: Framing the Enemy over time for the UK (a) and US (b)
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,80
0,60
0,40
0,20
0,00
Su
m a
ss
rel
country: uk
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,70
0,60
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
Su
m a
ssre
l
country: us
rogue states, axis of evil, sponsoring, safe haven, wmd, nuclear
criminelen
islam, fanatici, zelfmoord
cl2
18
Prognosis
Similar to the diagnostic frame, the prognostic frame is divided as explained in the
methodology. Figures 11 (a) and (b) show the relative size of the constituents of the
prognostic frame for the US and UK. In both countries, Patriotic Unity, International
Cooperation and Civil Liberties are very small subframes. Fear about the future has
middle ground with a consistent 15% share of the prognosis frame in both countries. In
both countries, civil liberties and concerns for prisoner abuses increases slightly in the
final years as the result of Abu Ghraib and other scandals.
In both countries, the main discussion is about two possible ways to counter terror:
through intelligence operations, and through war. In the UK, counter-intelligence starts out
slightly higher than war, while in the US they vie for first place. In both countries, the war
on terror gains prominence immediately after 9/11, and remains in first place until halfway
through 2005, two years after the famous ‘end of major combat operations’ proclaimed by
Bush in May 2003. Figure 12 summarizes this by showing the ratio of War to Counter-
intelligence for both countries, underscoring the remarkable similarity of the American
and British newspapers in this regard. There were no clear patterns in the short-term
dynamics after events.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Diagnosis over time for the UK (a) and US (b)
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,60
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
Su
m a
ss
rel
country: uk
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
0,60
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
Su
m a
ss
rel
country: us
patriotic unity
fear
burgerrechten, abu graib, guantanamo
international cooperation
intelligence, wiretapping, legislation
war on terror
cl2
19
2006,1
2006,0
2006,0
2006,0
2005,1
2005,0
2005,0
2005,0
2004,1
2004,0
2004,0
2004,0
2003,1
2003,0
2003,0
2003,0
2002,1
2002,0
2002,0
2002,0
2001,1
2001,0
2001,0
2001,0
2000,1
2000,0
2000,0
2000,0
1999,1
1999,0
1999,0
1999,0
1998,1
1998,0
1998,0
1998,0
1997,1
1997,0
1997,0
1997,0
1996,1
1996,0
1996,0
1996,0
3,00
2,50
2,00
1,50
1,00
0,50
0,00
Sum
ass
rel
us
uk
country
Figure 12: Ratio of war to counterintelligence as solutions over time
Conclusions and Discussion
In this study we looked at how terror events caused frame shifts in the American and
British press from before the 1998 embassy bombings until after the 2005 London
bombings. Our conclusions are based on Associative Frames found in newspaper coverage
of terror using automatic content analysis.
Looking at the long term dynamics of framing, 9/11 was clearly a defining moment. After
9/11 both the base level of terrorism visibility and the peaks caused by events are clearly
higher than before. Especially in the US, 9/11 became a strong media template, and this
event is frequently referred to in the coverage after 9/11 and peaks with each new terror
attack. In the British press 9/11 was also a strong reference point, but this decreased over
time, finally being supplanted by the London bombings as the main reference event in the
final period of our study. We also found that 9/11 caused a marked frame shift from
diagnostic framing to prognostic framing; and within the diagnostic framing there was a
shift from depicting the enemy as criminals towards depicting them as fundamentalist
Muslims. After 9/11 there was a temporary dominance of the War on Terror as the main
prognostic frame, but this decreased over time as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq bogged
down.
Since this data set contained a number of major terror events both before and after 9/11, it
also offered an opportunity to investigate the short term dynamics of the media coverage
of dramatic events. We found that in general, the wave of media attention to an event is
fairly broad, taking one or two weeks to reach its peak and lasting for at least a month. The
first week is characterized by high frame variation and relatively high attention to
diagnosis. The frame variation drops sharply as the diagnosis is replaced by prognosis and
attention peaks in the second and third week. This complements our earlier findings that
the first week of an event is reported from a fairly global angle, which is replaced by a
more local focus as the media shifts from describing and diagnosis to analysis and
prognosis (Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt, 2007).
Since we only had two newspapers per country, it is difficult to draw many conclusions
between newspaper types or between countries. In most of our analyses, the American and
British media show the same patterns and follow each other fairly closely. We did find
20
some interesting differences, however. Firstly, the visibility effect of 9/11 is smaller in the
British press, and the importance of 9/11 as the main media template diminishes quicker
and is replaced by the London bombings. Second, after 9/11 the UK displays more frame
variation than the American press, but converges again after London.
We believe that these are very interesting results that paint an interesting picture of both
the long term media logic and the short term dynamics of the coverage of terror events.
However, it is important to realize that these results are based on pure frequencies and co-
occurrence counts. On the one hand this shows how powerful this can be as an analysis
instrument if the dataset is very large and the concepts can be clearly identified based on
words. On the other hand, it also means that we should realize the restrictions inherent in
this approach. We know that Muslims are associated with terror more often after 9/11 than
before, but we do not know whether this association is positive or negative, or whether
they are the causes of terrorism, its victims, or neither. It is vital that large-scale frequency
based studies such as this are accompanied by more in-depth analyses to provide the
interpretation of such findings.
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