Secure Multi-party Computation Minimizing Online Rounds

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Secure Multi-party ComputationMinimizing Online Rounds

Seung Geol Choi Columbia University

Joint work with

Ariel Elbaz (Columbia University)

Tal Malkin (Columbia University)

Moti Yung (Columbia University & Google)

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Outline

• Motivation

• Our Results– First Protocol– Second Protocol

• Conclusion

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Multi-party Computing with Encrypted Data (MPCED)

P1

P2

Pn

…

x y

external parties

Considered implicitly in [FH96,JJ00,CDN01]

many computations on encrypted database

dynamic data contribution from external parties

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Round-complexity of protocols

• Critical measure on the efficiency• There are constant-round MPC protocols, but

the exact constant is big.• Focus on online round-complexity

– Possibly allow any poly-time preprocessing independent of the function of interest and input.

– Minimization of turn-around time– Preprocessing can be handled separately, e.g., by

cloud computing

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Outline

• Motivation

• Our Results– First Protocol– Second Protocol

• Conclusion

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Previous Work

Adaptive/Static #rounds #corrupt

[CLOS02] Adaptive O(d) < n

[DN03] Adaptive (Arithm.) O(d) <n

[DI05] Adaptive 2const

< n/5< n/2

[DIK08+] Adaptive const < n/2

[IPS08] Adaptive const < n

Yes, for static case

Can we do it in one or two rounds for <n corruption?

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Our Results

• Two protocols for MPCED with small online round complexity w/ preprocessing– one-round protocol P1

– Two-round protocol P2 (Depending on the case, P2

has more efficient preprocessing than P2).

• Static and <n corruption• Uses ElGamal encryption

– extendable to any threshold homomorphic encryption schemes.

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Outline

• Motivation

• Our Results– First Protocol– Second Protocol

• Conclusion

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First Protocol

• Takes one round

• General Idea: Modify Yao’s protocol– Garble a universal circuit instead of a given

circuit– Replace OT w/ one-round equivalent step

using homomorphism.

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Preprocessing

• Generate a Garbled Circuit for a Universal Circuit [V76,KS08]

• Overall, follow Yao’s technique except input wire keys.

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l0 l1 r0 r1

El0,r0(k1)

El1,r0(k1)

El0,r1(k1)

El1,r1(k0)

k0 k1

Yao’s Garbled Circuit

NAND

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l0 l1 r0 r1

El0,r0(k1)

El1,r0(k1)

El0,r1(k1)

El1,r1(k0)

k0 k1

l0 l1 r0 r1

El0,r0(k1)

El1,r0(k1)

El0,r1(k1)

El1,r1(k0)

k0 k1

l0 l1 r0 r1

El0,r0(k1)

El1,r0(k1)

El0,r1(k1)

El1,r1(k0)

k0 k1

Yao’s Garbled Circuit

NAND Once keys of the input wires in the entire circuit are determined, can compute the circuit locally.

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Preprocessing - 2

• Input wires– Pick a random h for global use: hidden

– Keys in each input wire j, say wj0 and wj

1,

should satisfy wj1 = wj

0 * h

– publish H = Ey(h)

– publish Ey(wj0) for each input wire j

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Encrypted Input Data

• Ey(hb) for Boolean input b

– If b = 0, publish Ey(1)

– If b = 1, re-randomize H

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Online Stage

• Given – input wire: W0 = Ey(w0)

– Input data: C = Ey(hb)

• Decrypt W0 * C

– Note W0 * C = Ey(w0*hb) = Ey(wb)

• Requires only a single round

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First Protocol: Summary

• Use garbled universal circuit with augmented manipulation in the input wires

• Replace OT procedure in Yao with threshold decryption using homomorphism

• Needs a single online round

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Outline

• Motivation

• Our Results– First Protocol– Second Protocol

• Conclusion

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Second Protocol

• Takes two rounds.

• Natural extension of two-party case [CEJMY07]

• Idea– Preprocessing: garble individual gates

• Independent of a circuit or input

– Online stage: construct wires between garbled gates and inputs

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Preprocessing

• Garbled NAND gates

• Bunch of fresh ElGamal key pairs: (pk, Ey(sk))

NAND

NAND

NAND

1yx

x > y

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Garbled NAND gateswith fresh ElGamal key pairs

Intermediate gates: NAND + keys

top-level gates: IDENTITY + keys

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Online stage

• Construct wires between garbled gates and inputs– How? Use CODE (explained next)

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Conditional Oblivious Decryption Exposure (CODE)

• Functionality– Assumes parties share the private key for y

– Input: three ciphertexts Cin, Cout, Ckey, a key z

– Output: Ez(Mkey) if Min Mout, Ez(random) otherwise

Ey(g)

Ey(1) Ey(100)

Cout

Cin

Ckey

Output: Ez(random)

Ey(1)

Ey(1) Ey(100)

Cout

Cin

Ckey

Output: Ez(100)

Can be implemented w/ homomorphic enc in 2 rounds.

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Online Stage – Run CODEs• Run CODE in parallel

for each Cin, Cout, Ckey tuple.NAND

NAND x

encrypted under z = pkL * pkR: Ez(skL)

... ... ... Not encrypted z =1: skR

Then, locally computes the circuit using CODE outputs inductively.

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Online Stage – After Running CODE

... ... ...Ez(skL) skR

EpkL*pkR(sk)

Decrypt Final columnUsing sk

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Summary : Second Protocol

• Preprocessing– Garbled NAND gates, fresh ElGamal keys

• Online Stage– Run 2-round CODE protocols in parallel

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Summary

• Second Protocol– online #round: two

– No blow-up of gates

– 2n-round explicit preprocessing: efficient when n is very small (when n is big, use generic protocols)

• First Protocol– online #rounds: one

– Logarithmic blow-up of gates

– No explicit preprocessing: should use generic protocols such as [IPS08].

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Outline

• Motivation

• Our Results– First Protocol– Second Protocol

• Conclusion

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Multi-party Computing with Encrypted Data (MPCED)

P1

P2

Pn

…

x y

external parties

Considered implicitly in [FH96,JJ00,CDN01]

many computations on encrypted database

dynamic data contribution from external parties

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Our Results

• Two protocols for MPCED with small online round complexity w/ preprocessing– one-round protocol P1

– Two-round protocol P2 (Depending on the case, P2

has more efficient preprocessing than P2).

• Static and <n corruption

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Thank you