Secure Localizationmews.sv.cmu.edu/teaching/14814/s11/files/survey_041911.pdf · Introduction •...

Secure Localization

Presented byEric Chen, Frank Mokaya, Yu Seung Kim

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April 19, 2011

Contents

• Introduction• SeRLoc: Robust Localization for

Wireless Sensor Networks - Frank• Distance Bounding in Noisy

Environments – Yu Seung• Secure Positioning in Wireless

Networks - Eric

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Introduction

• Range-based algorithms– Estimating distance to landmarks

based on various physical properties (e.g., RSS, ToA, TDoA)

– Ex) Distance Bounding Protocol• Range-free algorithms

– Using coarser metrics to place bounds on candidate positions

– Ex) SeRLocwest.cmu.edu

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SeRLoc: Robust Localization for Wireless Sensor Networks

Loukas Lazos and Radha Poovendran ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks 2005

Presented by Frank

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Secure Localization for WSNs• WSNs monitor important vulnerable

systems: buildings, disaster mgmt.– Sensors need to have accurate location info

• Because of hostile environment, WSNs are vulnerable to many threats– Wrong location info can mean a lost life e.g.

in disaster response scenario• In short: We need Secure Localization

– Ensure robust location estimation even in the presence of adversaries

What threats are you talking about?• External

– Replay Attacks: • worm-hole attack

– Node impersonation attacks:• Sybil attack

• Internal– Other Compromise of network entities

• Sensor and Locator node capture• Not addressed

– Phy layer attacks: Jamming– MAC layer attacks: DoS

Solution? SeRLoc: SEcure Range-Independent LOCalization

• SeRLOC features– Two- tier network architecture– Range-less location estimation– Decentralized implementation– Robustness against security threats

Locators (Li): Randomly deployed

Known Location, Orientation

(X1, Y1)

SeRLOC Overview & AssumptionsSensors (Si): Randomly deployed, unknown location r

RLocator range R

Beamwidth θ

θ

Sensor range r

(X2, Y2)

(X3, Y3)

Locator

Sensor

Li : Directional Antennas

Si : Omnidirectional Antennas

©Radha Poovendran Seattle, Washington

ROILocator Sensor

L1

L4

L3(0, 0)

sL3

What’s the Idea behind SeRLoc?

• Location data gathering:– Each Locator Li transmits

information that defines the sector Seci

• Search Area Identified: – Each Sensor Si defines a

region of interest for its location based on all Locators LHs heard by Si

©Radha Poovendran Seattle, Washington

SeRLoc – ROI computationGRID Score Table (GST)

Sensor Search Area 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 21 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 22 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 22 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 22 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 21 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 3 4 32 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ROI

©Radha Poovendran Seattle, Washington

• Majority vote: Points with highest score in search area define the ROI

• Location set S: S : (xest, yest ) = (1n

xgii=1

n

∑ , 1n

ygii=1

n

∑ )

Security Mechanisms in SeRLOC1. Encryption: ensures authenticity of locators

– All beacons from locators encrypted with symmetric key K0

– Sensors have symmetric pairwise keys KsLi, with locators Li

– Locators use master Key KLi to derive KsLi using a pseudorandom function h, & unique sensor IDs: KsLi = hKLi(IDs)

– Scalability? Expansion prospects?• Preload sensors with extra keys• Use secret quantity known only to admin. Use this

quantity to load new keys

Security Mechanisms in SeRLOC2. Locator ID authentication: Ensures malicious

sensors cant inject bogus info into network– Based on efficient collision-resistant one-way hash

chains to provide locator ID authentication– Each locator Li has password PWi derived by use of

hash function e.g. SHA1 s.t. • H(PWi) = H(PWj) if and only if PWi = PWj

– Each sensor preloaded with table of locator IDs and corresponding hash values Hn(PWi): n ->large no.

– Each beacon from Li includes hash value Hn-j(Pwi)– Jth rec’d beacon verified if

• H(Hn-j+1(PWi)) = Hn-j(PWi)– After verification hash counter incremented so as

to process only one beacon from Li per time

Threat Analysis• Wormhole attack (WH): messages at one end

of link tunneled and replayed at a target destination point

L1 L3

L2 L4 L6

L5

Wormhole link

• Attacker records beacons at 2 and replays them at 1 through wormhole

• Sensor at 1 misled to believe it can hear L1-L6

1

2

(WH) Detection and Defense• Single Message/sector per locator

property– all sector beacons tx’d simultaneously– Same but fresh hash used for auth.– As a result sensor accepts one msg/ Li– Hearing >1 sector from a locator means

that attack is underway– Multipath, imperfect sectorization

effects treated as attack

(WH) Detection and Defense• Communication Range constraint

property– Sensor cannot hear two locators Li, Lj :

{LHs} more than 2R apart. R is range of transmission of each locator

– Violation means attack is underway

Ai

Aj

Wormhole link

2R

Li LjR

R

RLL ji 2≤−

Threat Analysis• Sybil attack (SA): adversary fabricates legit

node IDs or impersonates multiple network entities. Essentially, globally shared key K0 compromised

• Once K0breached, attacker can:– Insert bogus location info into the network – attach an already published hash value from a

locator not heard by the sensor under attack, and encrypt it with the compromised K0

– Impersonate a higher number of locators than LHs and compromise majority voting scheme

Detection and Defense• Specify a threshold Lmax as the

maximum allowable number of locators heard by each sensor

• If a sensor hears more than Lmax locators, it assumes attack – Select Lmax so P(|LHs| ≥ Lmax) is low

and P(|LHs| > Lmax /2) is high• Sensor binds to Closest Locator using

Closest Locator Algorithm (CLA) to determine its position

Distance Bounding in Noisy Environments

Dave Singelee and Bart PreneelESAS ’07

Presented by Yu Seung

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Proximity Based Authentication

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Distance Bounding Protocols

• Determining an upper bound on the distance between V and P

• Distance sources– RSS, AoA, ToF– Attacker can mislead the signal

strength by using directional antenna

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Attacks Against DBP

• Mafia fraud attacks (a.k.a. relay attacks)– An intruder close to V can identify itself to V as P

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• Terrorist fraud attacks– Collaboration between P and intruder

Design Principles of secure DBP

• P has to identify itself (ex. shared secret key)• To prevent mafia fraud attacks, DBP should

have a challenge-response protocol– the challenge should be unpredictable and the

response should depend on the challenge• To prevent terrorist fraud attacks,

– Using private (or symmetric key)– Using trusted hardware

• Communication process should be minimized

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DBP by Brands and Chaum

• Proposed in EUROCRYPT ‘93

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Start of rapid bit exchange

End of rapid bit exchange

verify commit

verify sign(m)

}1,0{ℜ∈im }1,0{ℜ∈iα

P V)||( 1 kmmcommit

iα

iβiii m⊕← αβ

)()_( 1 msigncommitopenkkm βαβα |||| 11 ←

kkm βαβα |||| 11 ←

MAD by Capkun et al.

• Mutual authentication protocol using DBP

• Both parties estimate an upper bound on the distance between themselves

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RFID Protocol by Hancke and Kuhn

• Proposed in SecureComm 2005• Designed to cope with bit errors during

the fast bit exchanges• Useful in noisy environments such as RFID• For given the security parameter x and the

n fast bit exchanges, DBP succeeds if at least (n-x) of the responses are correct

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RFID Protocol (cont.)

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Noise Resilient MAD

• Combining the strengths of MAD and RFID– Mutual entity authentication– Resilient to bit errors during the exchange

• Exchanging all challenges and responses again on a slower channel with error correction with MAD too costly

• Instead, extends k bits to n bits based on ECC in initial phase and exchanges n bits

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Noise Resilient MAD (cont.)

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Performance Analysis

• An attacker has a major advantage when bit errors due to noise can appear

• Resilient MAD shows slightly lower FR ratio than Hancke and Kuhn’s DBP

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Performance Analysis (cont.)

• Resilient MAD shows significantly lower FA ratio than Hancke and Kuhn’s DBP

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Performance Analysis (cont.)

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Secure Positioning in Wireless Networks

Srdjan Capkun and Jean-Pierre HubauxIEEE JSAC 2006

Presented by Eric

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Attack model

• External attackers and Internal attackers (compromised nodes)

• Node centric – asks public base stations for position

• Infrastructure centric - Infrastructure computes the location based on their mutual communication

Attacks - GPS

• GPS satellite simulators can spoof radio signals

• Civilian GPS receivers will accept the strongest signal

• This type of attack can be prevented, if we can authenticate the satellite (but we can’t)

Attack – Ultrasound positioning

• Ultrasound positioning systems measure the time of flight of ultrasound signals to determine a node’s location

• Vulnerabilities:- Wormhole attack- Replay attack

Attack – Radio Positioning

• Use received signal strength to infer the distance from transmitter

• Vulnerabilities:– Compromised node can reply with

fake signal strength– Replay attack

Verifiable Multilateration

• VM is a secure localization technique that is related to the following techniques

• Distance bounding techniques upper bounds the distance of one device to another (compromised) device

• Authenticated ranging protocols enable two honest and trusted parties to measure their mutual distance in an authenticated manner

Verifiable Multilateration

• Step 1: verifiers v1...vn perform distance bounding to u

• Step 2: computes the estimated distance (x, y) with the results from step 1

• Step 3:– d test: is (x,y) within the measurement error?– Point in triangle test: does (x,y) fall in a

triangle formed by at least one triplet of verifiers?

Cooperative positioning

• Deploying a large number of landmarks is difficult

• SPINE- Sensor nodes can be used to locate each other using a cooperative technique based on VM

Conclusion

• Range-free algorithm (SeRLoc)– Distributed algorithm– Sector antennas are required

• Range-based algorithm (Distance Bounding Protocols)

– Prevention of distance reduction– Hardware to support high precision is required– High synchronization among nodes is required

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Questions?

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©Radha Poovendran

SeRLoc - Security mechanisms•Message Encryption: Messages encrypted with a symmetric key K0.•Beacon Format:

Locator’s coordinates Slopes of the sector

ID authentication

Shared symmetric key

Li : { (Xi, Yi) || (θi,1, θi,2) || (Hn-j(PWi)), j } K0

• Every sensor stores the values Hn(PWi) for all the locators.

• A sensor can authenticate all locators that are within its range

PWi H0(Pwi)H H1(Pwi) Hn(Pwi)H H H

one-way hash functionHash chain

Synchronization var