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Negative Offsite Impacts of Ecological Restoration: Understanding and Avoiding Conflict. Sacramento River Conference Mark Buckley Environmental Incentives April 9, 2007. Fricker. How do we conserve and restore large/landscape scale natural processes?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Sacramento River ConferenceSacramento River ConferenceMark BuckleyMark Buckley
Environmental IncentivesEnvironmental IncentivesApril 9, 2007April 9, 2007
Negative Offsite Impacts of Negative Offsite Impacts of Ecological Restoration:Ecological Restoration:Understanding and Avoiding Understanding and Avoiding
ConflictConflict
Fricker
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
How do we conserve and restore large/landscape scale natural processes?
• Conservation is limited to areas unwanted by other land uses.
• Area characteristics that promote natural processes are often beneficial to other land uses as well.
• Conversion of land use is often the only way to improve natural processes for valuable landscapes.
TNC
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Land use
• Inner River Zone and Conservation Area (pre-restoration)
Agriculture, 76%
Other, 1%
Riparian Vegetation, 14%
Upland Vegetation, 8%
Urban, 1%
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Impacts of Riparian Restoration on Agriculture
• Weeds and pests (vertebrate and invertebrate)
• Disturbances– fires– out of channel flood flows
• Endangered species• Trespassing• Pollinators and pest control• Cultural • Financial
– tax revenues– economies of scale for
production
Buckley
Buckley
SF Chronicle
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Impacts of Farmers on SRCA Restoration and Conservation
• Increased usage of chemicals• Removal of endangered
species• Increased fencing, riparian
vegetation removal, and rip-rapping
• Political activity to reduce the full project area from 217,000 acres to 80,000 acres (2002)
• 4 of 7 counties have opted out of outer zone participation
• Colusa enacted more stringent limitations on restoration projects
Buckley
Buckley
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
U.S. Census of Agriculture 1987-2002
• Farmers in SRCA are doing worse than others:– % decrease in total acreage greater than CA as a whole– Avg. farm size has dropped 10 % faster than CA– Total sales went up 55% faster in CA
• Farmers in SRCA are doing better than others:– Number of farms has gone down in CA, but up in SRCA– All size categories lost farms for CA, all size categories
EXCEPT over 1000 acres went up in SRCA– Avg. total farm production expenses grew 17% faster for
CA– Avg market value of farms in SRCA increased faster than
CA– Orchard acreage increased 33% for CA, 54% for SRCA
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Markets: Function and Failure
Excludable Non-Excludable
Rival Private Goods (only case where markets function)•Land parcels•Agricultural Crops
Common-Property Resources (potential govt. regulation)•Atmosphere•Rivers
Non-Rival
Toll Goods•Bridges•River Access
Public Goods (potential govt. provision)•Flood protection•Natural Air/Water Purification
•Externalities caused by consumption exist for rival goods only•Externalities caused by degradation exist for all goods
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Interdependence of Restored and Developed Areas
+
+
-weeds, pests, fires, endangered species
ecosystem services (air and water quality, wildlife)
pollution, edge effects, barriers-
habitat, migratory routes, nutrition
Restored
Natural Areas
Socially Developed Areas
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Ecological and Social Compatibility of Restoration Effects by Land Type Pairing
Socially Compatible
Socially Incompatible
Ecologically Compatible
Mutually Beneficial•Pest predation (Agriculture)•Bird pops. (Suburban/Urban)•Pollination (Residential, Ag)
Direct Conflict•Endangered species (Forestry)•Large predators (Ranching)•Natural flood regimes (Residential)
Ecologically Incompatible
Inefficient/Infeasible•Fish populations (Urban)•Native vegetation (Brownfields)•Bald Eagles (Suburban)
Mutually Undesirable•Intense fires (All)•Nonnative species (Agriculture)•Ecological disequilibria (Forestry, Ag)
•Positive externalities are generated under social compatibility•Negative externalities are generated under social incompatibility
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Negative Offsite Impacts (Externalities) of Restoration
• Mutually Undesirable– Indirect effect– Technical or cost problem– Generated because costly to control or
effective control options do not exist• Direct Conflict
– Direct effect– Tradeoffs occur– Bargaining potentially necessary/beneficialLack of bargaining resolution success can lead
to government intervention
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Cooperative Outcome• Use Nash Bargaining Solution as a target
max ∏(ui – di)
• Universally individually-rational– Most stable = most individual gains = most equitable – Gains measured from non-cooperative outcome, NOT
from prior case • Non-cooperative outcome is a function of pre-existing state
• Net welfare gains possible when non-zero sumPresent State
Fully Restored Fully Developed
Possible Outcomes
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Basic Restoration and Defense Decisions
Restoration with defense
Restoration only
No Restoration
Restorationist
Farmer
restore
nothing
nothing
defend
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Restoration Decisions with Mitigation
Restorationist
Farmer
restore
nothing
nothing
defend
defend
nothing
restore with mitigation
Restoration with defense
Restoration only
Restoration with mitigation and defense
Restoration with mitigation
No Restoration
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
1 year 10 years 20 years% more restoration with mitigation option
11% 10% 7%
% less defense with mitigation option
19% 17% 20%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1 year 1 year w/ mitigation
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
20 years 20 years w/ mitigation
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
10 years 10 years w/ mitigation
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
20 years 20 yearsw/ mitigation
No restoration
Restoration with defense
Restoration with mitigation
Restoration only
Weeds
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
10 Year, 1 Farmer Weed Simulations
ecological effects (+)
agricultural effects (-)
A
B C
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Conclusions• Compatibility of other land uses can influence
restoration success• Ecological and social compatibility both influence
existence of externalities, negative externality resolution options, and necessary tradeoffs
• Beliefs and expectations of all parties influence outcomes and potential cooperative gains
• Mitigation and cooperation can lead to mutual gains
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Acknowledgements• National Science Foundation (Biocomplexity
and Economics programs)• STEPS Institute for Innovation in
Environmental Research• USDA CSREES NRI Managed Ecosystems
Program
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Parameter Value (for 100 acres) Sourcediscount rate 5 percentFarmersweed control costs
(chemicals and labor)
1 yr - $9150 10 yrs - $74,000 20 yrs - $120,000
UC Ag Extension guidance, 2003
vertebrate pest control costs
1 yr - $41,500 10 yrs - $105,000 20 yrs - $150,000
Pierce and Wiggers, 1997; UC, 2003
walnut prices $0.47 to $0.77 per pound UC Ag Ext., 2003walnut yields 2400 to 8400 lbs./acre UC Ag Ext., 2003expected damage 0 to 50 percent of yield Falta, 2003restoration mitigation
effect80 percent
neighboring farmer externality
25 percent
Revenues 1 yr - Y=-808.8-(O*0.078)+P*O net returns above operating costs: $13,000 to $500,000
10, 20 yrs - Y=-2038.8-(O*0.078)+P*Onet returns above total costs: 10 yrs: -$890,000 to $3,000,000 20 yrs: -$1,400,000 to $4,900,000
UC Ag Ext., 2003
Restorationistcost of land $10,000/acre UC Ag Ext., 2003, Efseaff,
2005cost of restoration $4500/acre, over 3 years=$429,000 Efseaff, 2005cost of weed control 1 yr - $40,000 10 yrs - $324,000 20 yrs -
$523,000Efseaff, 2005
cost of vertebrate pest control
1 yr - $40,500 10 yrs - $97,000 20 yrs - $137,000
Pierce and Wiggers, 1997; UC Ag Ext., 2003
ecological benefit 1 yr - $23,700 to $160,000 10 yrs - $193,000 to $13,000,000 20 yrs - $295,000 to $19,000,000
Loomis et al., 2000
loss from defense 0 to 100 percentloss from 2nd defense additional 75% of first damage
Recommended