Research Exam - University of California, San...

Research ExamNishant Bhaskar

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The problem

Passive Eavesdropper

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Wireless personal devices have become a homing beacon2

ApplicationPresentation

SessionTransportNetworkData LinkPhysical

Existing measures not enough

Alwaysavailable

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Not just a cautionary tale

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Techniques for wireless device identification• Passive eavesdropping • Tradeoff decision made by an adversary in

choosing a technique

Implications of device identification• User tracking – Social, physical, behavioral

In this survey

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Focused on papers in WiFi and Bluetooth

Limit analysis to link and physical layer device identification

Scope of survey

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1. Identifying information in wireless signals• Link layer• Physical layer

2. Taxonomy

3. Identification techniques• Link layer – Packet Contents• Link layer – Packet Timing• Physical layer - Signal propagation• Physical layer – Hardware imperfections

4. Tracking the device owner

Outline

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Due to manufacturer implementations

Packet contents transmitted in the clear• Device discovery packets • Link layer headers

Link layer controls packet timing• Packet scheduling and transmission• Timing properties can be measured

Identifying information - Link Layer

(a)

(b) (c)

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PhysicallayertransmitsthephysicalRFsignal• Informationindependentofhigherlayerconstraints

Physicallayermeasurement• Effectofsignalpropagationthroughthewirelesschannel• Fundamentalnon-idealitiesduetoRFsignalchainimperfections

Identifying information - Physical Layer

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1. Identifying information in wireless signals• Link layer• Physical layer

2. Taxonomy

3. Identification techniques• Link layer – Packet Contents• Link layer – Packet Timing• Physical layer - Signal propagation• Physical layer – Hardware imperfections

4. Tracking the device owner

Outline

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Universality • Works for all device roles? (Role)

Stability• Features stable with changing environment? (Environment)• Features stable with software updates? (Software)

Practicality• Cheap data collection equipment? (Cost)• Proven to work outside controlled environments? (Outdoor)

Taxonomy

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Technique Role Environment Software Cost OutdoorLink LayerPacket Contents Yes Yes No Yes YesPacket Timing No1 Yes No2 Yes YesPhysical LayerSignal Propagation Yes No Yes Yes NoHardware Imperfections Yes Yes Yes No No

Taxonomy

1:Inter-packetarrivalrate->Yes2:Clockskew->Yes

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1. Identifying information in wireless signals• Link layer• Physical layer

2. Taxonomy

3. Identification techniques• Link layer – Packet Contents• Link layer – Packet Timing• Physical layer - Signal propagation• Physical layer – Hardware imperfections

4. Tracking the device owner

Outline

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(a)

(b) (c)

Link Layer - Packet contents

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Packet contents (Martin et al. [PETS ‘19])

Handoff

WiFi settings

InstantHotspot

WiFi JoinNetwork

Nearby

WatchConnection

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Nearby messages broadcast 200 times/minute

MAC address changes, data field doesn’t• MAC addresses can be linked• Device can be continuously tracked

Use global MAC address• When sent concurrently with Handoff

Packet contents (Martin et al. [PETS ‘19])

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Handoff messages• Sent by Handoff-enabled apps• User interaction, app open/close

Sequence number predictable• Identification possible after several days• Knowing HW/SW improves prediction

Packet contents (Martin et al. [PETS ‘19])

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Freudiger et al. [WiSec ’15]• Sequence numbers link WiFi probe requests• Probes use global address when screen is active

Vanhoef et al. [Asia CCS ‘16]• IE fields identify WiFi device models, sequence numbers identify devices• SSID fingerprint of previously connected APs• WPS UUID derived from MAC address with a fixed seed

Martin et al. [PETS ‘17]• mDNS WiFi packets identify device model• Authentication packets contain global address

Packet contents overview

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Spill et al. [WOOT ‘06]• Reverse engineered Bluetooth MAC address, clock bits• Determined hopping to be able to follow device

Ryan et al. [WOOT ‘13]• Observed channel hopping for BLE was fixed increments• Whitening was much simpler than Bluetooth

Becker et al. [PETS ‘19] • BLE MAC address randomize but same advertisement payload• Devices can be tracked after randomization

Packet contents overview

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Most commonly used technique for user tracking

A reflection of protocol stack design choices• Properties susceptible to change with firmware upgrade

Identifying correct features is a manual process• There always is a feature out there!

Packet contents summary

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1. Identifying information in wireless signals• Link layer• Physical layer

2. Taxonomy

3. Identification techniques• Link layer – Packet Contents• Link layer – Packet Timing• Physical layer - Signal propagation• Physical layer – Hardware imperfections

4. Tracking the device owner

Outline

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Link layer schedules transmissions• Device discovery packets• Data packets

Timing side channel for device identification

Packet timing identification• Clock skew• Inter-packet arrival rate

Link layer - Packet timing

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Clock skew for device identification• Measured arrival time of preambles• Baseband properties filter preambles • Same properties for transmitter clock• Similarity distance for identification

Packet timing (Huang et al. [INFOCOM ‘14])

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Minimal variation in skew • 0.5 ppm across devices in an hour• 0.55 ppm across temperature ranges

High accuracy in identification• 38/56 devices were the exact same make

Packet timing (Huang et al. [INFOCOM ‘14])

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Jana et al. [MobiCom ‘08]• Computed clock skew for 802.11 radios• Used TSF timestamp in AP beacons, and microsecond timer on receiver side

Arackaparambil et al [WiSec ‘10]• Used TSF timestamp at receiver to improve measurement variance• Demonstrated virtual AP clock skew impersonation attack.

Packet timing overview

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Franklin et al. [SEC ‘06]• Inter probe request time identifies (NIC driver, host OS)

Loh et al. [WiSec ‘08]• Use time between probe request bursts for identification• Lower resolution of measurement needed (order of minutes)

Matte et al. [WiSec ‘16]• Combined inter burst and inter probe request timings• Needed only 4 group of bursts per transmitter for identification

Packet timing overview

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Inter packet arrival rate works for all devices.• Not stable to firmware upgrades

Clock skew is stable to firmware upgrades• But works only for master devices

Packet timing is a dangerous user tracking tool• Packet arrival rate reveals wireless application usage

Packet timing summary

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1. Identifying information in wireless signals• Link layer• Physical layer

2. Taxonomy

3. Identification techniques• Link layer – Packet Contents• Link layer – Packet Timing• Physical layer - Signal propagation• Physical layer – Hardware imperfections

4. Tracking the device owner

Outline

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Signal propagation through medium • Modifies signal properties

Idea of location as identity• Signal propagation used for localization• Utilize existing network of wireless devices

Signal changes can be measured through• Received Signal strength• Channel State Information

Physical layer - Signal propagation

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Multiple signal strength readings• Authentication request tagged with RSS from

different APs

Signalprints identify location of transmitter• Close transmitters differ by a max threshold• Far transmitters differ by atleast a min threshold

Signal propagation (Faria et al. [WiSec ‘06])

Faria etal.,Detectingidentity-basedattacksinwirelessnetworksusingsignalprints.WiSe’0630

Accuracy of 91% in identifying devices• Devices separated by 7m in a room 45m X 24m• Using RSS values from 4 APs

Signalprint values influenced by environment• Moving furniture or people

Signal propagation (Faria et al. [WiSec ‘06])

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Bauer et al. [PETS ‘09]• Performed k-means clustering on signal strength values

Sheng et al. [INFOCOM ‘08]• Due to antennae diversity, RSS distributions follow GMM• Used mixture models to identify transmitter at particular location

Ghose et al. [INFOCOM ‘18]• RSS patterns vary according to relative motion of transmitter/receiver• Used that to design an authenticator with a helper device

Signal propagation overview

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Sen et al. [MobiSys ‘12]• CFRs at same location from same subcarrier form clusters.• Sampling multiple locations in a 1m X 1m grid to identify exact location

Jin et al. [ToWC ‘10]• CIR based localization by taking IFFT on CFR• Log scale ensures large delay components contribute to CIR

Signal propagation overview

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Signal propagation represents the wireless environment• Not stable to environment changes• Typically used indoors or in a constrained environment

Used to supplement other identification techniques• Predominately a localization technique• Signal strength can be measured by any radio

Signal propagation summary

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1. Identifying information in wireless signals• Link layer• Physical layer

2. Taxonomy

3. Identification techniques• Link layer – Packet Contents• Link layer – Packet Timing• Physical layer - Signal propagation• Physical layer – Hardware imperfections

4. Tracking the device owner

Outline

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Manufacturing imperfections • Quantified using signal non-idealities

Signal properties reflect hardware identity

Can be measured using • Transient signal • steady state signal

Physical layer - Hardware imperfections

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Physical layer - Hardware imperfections

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Attach a sensor to AP• Vector signal analyzer for measurement• Data relayed to central server for fingerprinting

Use steady state signal modulation properties for identification

• Frequency error, SYNC correlation, I/Q offset, magnitude error and phase error

Briketal.,WirelessDeviceIdentificationwithRadiometricSignatures.,MobiCom ’08,ACM

Hardware imperfections (Brik et al. [MobiCom‘08 ])

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High accuracy and stability for device identification• > 99.5% for over 138 devices• Minimal change in accuracy when devices moved around

Too ideal a test environment?• Vo-Huu et al. (WiSec 16) attempted reproducing results• Significant lower accuracy but high reproducibility

Briketal.,WirelessDeviceIdentificationwithRadiometricSignatures.,MobiCom ’08,ACM

Hardware imperfections (Brik et al. [MobiCom‘08 ])

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Hall et al. [WOC ‘03]• Detected Bluetooth radios using phase of transients• Observed slope of phase is linear at start of transmission

Hall et al. [IASTED ‘04]• Detected WiFi radios using phase, frequency and amplitude of transient

Suski et al. [GLOBECOM ‘08]• Amplitude of transient works better at low SNR• Used power spectral density to classify WiFi radios

Hardware imperfections overview

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Vo-Huu et al. [WiSec ‘16]• Used combination of CFO, SFO, transient for identification• Transient has higher contribution than modulation properties

Liu et al. [INFOCOM ‘19]• I/Q mismatch phase error from channel estimate• Phase gradients due to signal have lower variance than noise

Sun et al. [HotWireless ‘17]• Observed variation in CFO values, for detecting BLE signal• A BLE transmission exhibits constant CFO

Hardware imperfections overview

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A technique of great promise and frustration!• Best identifier for transmitter hardware• Measurement of properties reliably and accurately is hard

Require costly hardware • Demonstrated to work in only controlled environment

Further work needs to be done • Cost effective SDR tools and designing more reliable techniques

Hardware imperfections summary

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Identification techniques - Summary

Technique Role Environment Software Cost OutdoorLink LayerPacket Contents Yes Yes No Yes YesPacket Timing No1 Yes No2 Yes YesPhysical LayerSignal Propagation Yes No Yes Yes NoHardware Imperfections Yes Yes Yes No No1:Inter-packetarrivalrate->Yes2:Clockskew->Yes

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A number of identifiers exist at link and physical layer

An adversary’s choice is a tradeoff decision

Link layer techniques efficacy can be reduced by not transmitting so often

Physical layer techniques harder to defend against, but still not mature

Identification techniques - Summary

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1. Identifying information in wireless signals• Link layer• Physical layer

2. Taxonomy

3. Identification techniques• Link layer – Packet Contents• Link layer – Packet Timing• Physical layer - Signal propagation• Physical layer – Hardware imperfections

4. Tracking the device owner

Outline

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Tracking the device owner

Passive Eavesdropper

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Device identification information can be used to track the user46

User social linkages

Preferred Network List can be obtained by eavesdropping probe requests47

PNL indicates likely city of residence• Geographic locations of APs from Wigle• Provenance rank for each likely city

Performed analysis on dataset collected at political rallies

• Closely predicted city-wise voting patterns• Social linkages revealed

User social linkages (Luzio et al. [INFOCOM ‘16])

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Connectedstate

User activity tracking

Physical activity related to data traffic of tracker49

Fitness tracker leaks physical activity• Increased activity -> more data packets• Classification accuracy of activity -> 97.6%

Accelerometer features related to data traffic• Strong correlation observed• Can distinguish individual walking patterns

User activity tracking (Das et al. [HotMobile ‘16])

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A large amount of user tracking information is available

User tracking features exposed predominately at the link layer

We need to make better design choices and not keep repeating mistakes

Tracking the device owner - Summary

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Practical physical layer device identification

Analyzing potential privacy concerns with directed BLE advertisements

Wireless privacy leakage in personal medical devices

Directions for future work

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Questions?

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