Putin’s Campaign Against Chechen Society Usam Baysaev Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow

ince 2003, the Kremlin has shifted its strategy in Chechnya from conventional warfare to “Chechenization.” Reminiscent of the Sta-linist purges of the past, this brutal initiative centers around the

personality cult of Moscow-appointed president Ramzan Kadyrov and his recruitment of criminal gangs to terrorize Chechen civilians. The policy, coupled with a sense of abandonment and betrayal by the West, has radicalized ordinary Chechens, swaying them away from West-leaning nationalism and toward jihadist extremism. The recent decla-ration by Chechen Islamists of the establishment of a United Caucasian Islamic Emirate should come as no surprise to anyone following events

in the region. To stem the tide of radicalism and re-store Chechnya’s faith in democratic values, the in-ternational community—including the UN Human Rights Council and the European Union—must push for Russian war criminals to stand trial and send a clear signal to Russia that its violation of Chechen human rights will not go unpunished.

—Usam Baysaev, January 15, 2008

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A period marked by the Russian army’s intense military activities, Russian forces use artillery, aerial bombardment, and missile strikes to attack densely inhabited areas, civilian gathering points, refugee colonies, schools, hospitals, as well as any other structures that are integral to the survival of the Chechen Republic. The Russian army conducts mass killings of peaceful civilians in occupied villages and towns (Alhan-Urt, Old City Grozny, the village of New Aldy, etc.)

The Chechen defenders are forced to retreat into the mountainous regions of the Republic. The Russian army and Armed Police blockade highly inhabited points and bombard them with artillery. After the bombardment, they invade the area, kidnap any inhabitants, and bring the residents to specially prepared facilities where the people are tortured and beaten. The majority of the detainees are allowed to go free after a period of time— usually after a heavy ransom is paid by the relatives of the prisoners.

Major purges are replaced by strikes against individual civilians and their families. Russian armed forces begin the practice of lightning raids—armed men in masks arrive in bulletproof vehicles without license plates and kidnap people. Many of these raids are now being conducted by local Chechen gangs organized by Kadyrov. A network of secret jails and detention centers is established to house the detainees.

Victory Boulevard in downtown Grozny. The promenade remained untouched during the war and is trumpeted as a symbol of Chechnya’s revival.

But reconstruction is one of the myths promulgated by the Putin and Kadyrov regimes. The destruction pictured above is located only one block away from Victory Boulevard.

Behind the “repaired housing” untouched ruins remain.

Typical residential housing in Grozny.

An elderly man walking through a Grozny neighborhood.

During the Soviet era, a common poster featured Stalin sitting among children with the caption, “Thank you for our happy childhoods, Comrade Stalin!” Pictured above, Kadyrov sits with local children and the poster reads, “He will do anything for their smiles!”

The Ramzan Kadyrov Fan Club promotes a poetry contest. This month’s theme is “Ramzan Kadyrov: A Hero of Our Time.”

Billboards in Chechnya commonly feature the trio of former Chechen president Akhmed Kadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov, and Vladimir Putin. Locals call them “The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.”

The poster reads: “I have always been proud of my people.” Chechen youth often vandalize such banners, adding “but that did not stop me from betraying them.”

To build a statue in the image of a man is considered idolatry in Islam. However, this Grozny monument to Kadyrov the Elder is positioned directly across from a mosque. Residents have long joked that authorities would sooner demolish the mosque than lay a hand on the monument.

1) In recent years, more and more young men who grew up during the conflict have been joining the separatist forces. Their worldview—shaped primarily by a desire for vengeance against the people who killed or kidnapped their loved ones—is different from that of the previous generation of independence-minded fighters.2) A widespread rejection of the traditional Sufist tradition in Chechen Islam due to the collaboration of Sufi elders with Russian authorities and the subsequent creation of puppet structures within the Sufi leadership.3) Distrust of Western democratic values due to pro-Russian stance of Western countries.

The 1994–1996 war: The first slogan behind the fighters reads, “Freedom or Death.” The second reads, “Chechnya is the province of Allah.” At this point, freedom was more important than religion.

Fighters from the 1994–1996 war didn’t wear religious garb.

Fighters from the 1994–1996 war commonly used the secular ,Western “V for Victory” symbol.

The forests of Chechnya, 2006. A single raised finger means that Allah is one and everything stems from Him.

A man sitting on top of a monument to Kadyrov the Elder.

1) Chechen separatists have reduced the number of military operations in the Chechen territory to minimize the number of skirmishes with pro-Russian forces and to lower the risk of a civil war in Chechnya.2) A strategic decision to conserve forces for the long run, due to the assumption that the war will continue indefinitely.3) The extension of the conflict beyond the boundaries of Chechnya and the formation of armed resistance movements in other regions of the North Caucasus.

1) The hostile Russian policy toward the Caucasus, which is expressed in the form of kidnappings, fabrications of alleged criminal actions, torture, and executions without trial.

2) The de-facto repeal of the “autonomous” nature of the North Caucasian republics.

The non-fighting youth of Chechnya. The raised finger is also a symbol of resistance to Russia.