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LABOR REFORM AND RELATED SOCIAL ISSUES
M O D U L E 7
PORT REFORMTOOLKITSECOND EDITION
THE WORLD BANK
© 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
All rights reserved.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) or the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Neither PPIAF nor the World Bank guarantees the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors,denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of PPIAF or theWorld Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
The material in this work is copyrighted. Copyright is held by the World Bank on behalf of both the World Bank and PPIAF.No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including copying,recording, or inclusion in any information storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the World Bank.The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission promptly.
For all other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, please contact the Office of the Publisher, World Bank,1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522-2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org.
ISBN-10: 0-8213-6607-6ISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6607-3eISBN: 0-8213-6608-4eISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6608-0DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-6607-3
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MODULE SEVEN CONTENTS1. Context for Labor Reform 3132. Key Labor Issues 3173. Labor Involvement in Port Reform 3184. Organizing to Address Labor Reform: A Task Force Approach 3215. The Institutional Framework for Labor Reform 323
5.1. Redefining the Concept of Social Equity 3235.2. Meeting Commercial Needs 3245.3. Fostering Competition 3255.4. Government’s Role 3255.5. Time Frame for Port Labor Reform 326
6. Developing the Workforce Rationalization Plan 3266.1. Alternatives to Dismissals 3276.2. Elements of a Staff Retrenchment Program 3286.3. Pitfalls in Designing and Implementing Severance Packages 3296.4. Rationalizing the Workforce: When and By Whom? 331
6.4.1. Prereform Rationalization 3316.4.2. Postreform Rationalization 332
6.5. Who Should Pay for the Expenses of Port Labor Rationalization? 3337. International Support for Labor Adjustment 3348. Postreform Labor Management Relations 336References 336Annex I. World Bank Labor Adjustment Projects 337Annex II. List of Organizations That Have Obtained and Renewed an
International Labour Organization Portworker Development Program License 351
BOXESBox 1: Changes in Economic Policies: Impact on Port Labor 314Box 2: Trends in Gang Strength, 1970s and 1980s 316Box 3: Labor Competition in India and Brazil 317Box 4: Factors Prompting Port Labor Reform 317Box 5: Port Labor Reform in the European Union 318Box 6: Possible Effects of Reform on Employment 319Box 7: Working with Labor Unions: The Ghana Case 322Box 8: Sample Reference Clauses in a Concession Agreement on Employee Transfer 323Box 9: The Productivity Commission of Australia 324Box 10: Institutional Framework for Labor Reform Key Findings 325Box 11: Job Security in Ports 326Box 12: Social Plans at Moulinex 328Box 13: Port Staffing Benchmarks 330Box 14: A Downsizing Decision Tree 332
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Acknowledgments
This Second Edition of the Port Reform Toolkit has been produced with the financial assistance of a grant fromTRISP, a partnership between the U.K. Department for International Development and the World Bank, for learningand sharing of knowledge in the fields of transport and rural infrastructure services.
Financial assistance was also provided through a grant from The Netherlands Transport and Infrastructure TrustFund (Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management) for the enhancement of theToolkit’s content, for which consultants of the Rotterdam Maritime Group (RMG) were contracted.
We wish to give special thanks to Christiaan van Krimpen, John Koppies, and Simme Veldman of the RotterdamMaritime Group, Kees Marges formerly of ITF, and Marios Meletiou of the ILO for their contributions to this work.
The First Edition of the Port Reform Toolkit was prepared and elaborated thanks to the financing and technicalcontributions of the following organizations.
The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)PPIAF is a multi-donor technical assistance facility aimed at helping developing countries improve the qualityof their infrastructure through private sector involvement. For more information on the facility see the Web site: www.ppiaf.org.
The Netherlands Consultant Trust Fund
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The World Bank
International Maritime Associates (USA)
Mainport Holding Rotterdam Consultancy (formerly known as TEMPO), Rotterdam Municipal PortManagement (The Netherlands)
The Rotterdam Maritime Group (The Netherlands)
Holland and Knight LLP (USA)
ISTED (France)
Nathan Associates (USA)
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Chile)
PA Consulting (USA)
The preparation and publishing of the Port Reform Toolkit was performed under the management of Marc Juhel,Ronald Kopicki, Cornelis “Bert” Kruk, and Bradley Julian of the World Bank Transport Division.
Comments are welcome.Please send them to the World Bank Transport Help Desk.Fax: 1.202.522.3223. Internet: Transport@worldbank.org
313
1. CONTEXT FOR LABORREFORM Port labor from crane and equipment operatorsto stevedores to harbor pilots is one of the keysto success or failure in today’s competitive portand international trade environment. Too oftenport labor is blamed for a port’s failure to playan appropriate and productive role in portoperations and its nation’s economic develop-ment. Overstaffing, outdated and inefficientwork rules, poor skills and training, inflatedpay scales, and unreliability are among the mostprominently cited problems contributing to highcosts and inefficient operations in many ports.To be fair, outdated management practices cansometimes add to these problems by overlooking
the benefits of a more participatory approach toport management.
Ports and port labor do not exist in isolation.They are an integral part of, and in turn areaffected by, national economic and trade poli-cies, changes in markets and services, and tech-nological advances. Box 1 illustrates howchanges in economic policies occurring over thelast decades have affected port labor.
These changes in economic policies have beenaccompanied by other developments in technolo-gy, logistics, and transportation that have led tofurther reductions in the demand for dock work-ers. The shift from “port to port” to “door todoor” cargo delivery systems, for example, andthe use of inland container facilities have led to
7Labor Reform andRelated Social IssuesSECOND EDITION
This module is the seventh of eight modules comprising the PortReform Toolkit. The Toolkit is designed to help government officialsand private interests alike navigate the process of port reform to
achieve more modern, efficient, and financially viable seaports and relatedintermodal facilities and services.The labor reform module deals with some of the most critical elements ofport reform: the many labor related issues associated with port ownershipand operations. It is designed to help government decision makers identifythe key forces affecting port labor today, understand the need for reform ina competitive environment, evaluate alternative ways of approaching laborreform, and pursue reform in a way that maximizes efficiency and mini-mizes labor dislocation and risks to potential port investors and operators.
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Box 1: Changes in Economic Policies: Impact on Port Labor
Semiautonomous economic International trade: Labor-intensive technologies:policies (until mid 1980s) • Freedom in the selection • Limited degree of
of inputs, finished goods, specialization required to services, funds, and labor, operate single function lifting usually on a domestic or equipment.local basis. • Cargo handling and
• National markets were warehousing monopolies.reserved for domestic • Direct and cross subsidies.producers, inefficient • Increasing wages, avoidanceproduction methods, trade of new technologies, and low barriers, currency exchange productivity were all restriction, bias against institutionalized as measuresexports. that protected national
producers.• Political influence on decisions
as to which and how muchcargo handling equipment toacquire. Capital-intensiveequipment not viewed associally acceptable.
• Expansion of the labor forcesimultaneously with demand,fragmentation of functions,and dock worker registrationsystems. More cargo, moreworkers.
Export-oriented economic policies Global trade: Capital intensive-technologies:
(from mid 1980s onward) • Economic activities • Ports can provide services restructured, customs that are competitive and duties reduced, commercially attractive.competition intensified, • Productivity increased and domestic producers meet costs reduced by exposing the demands of port labor to market international markets locally mechanisms.
• Freedom in the selection of • Workforce reduction, more inputs, finished goods, cargo, less direct port services, funds, and labor, workers. Training and usually on a worldwide basis. retraining programs to
• Vigorous worldwide enhance skills of workers competition for goods and safe working conditions.and services requires labor • New techniques and work to respond to the needs of organizations introduced to port customers. motivate the labor force.
Participation of workers inworkplace decisions. Monetaryincentives granted on the basisof customers’ satisfaction, per-formance of cargo handlinggangs, and participation inenterprise profit share linked toindividual and team efforts.
Source: Author.
Economic Policies Characteristics End Result
many containers being stuffed and stripped byconsignors’ or consignees’ employees on theirown premises, often distant from the port.Handling systems have been extensively mecha-nized and are also increasingly automated.
Box 2 shows how the size of work gangs in anumber of ports has changed, or not, in responseto changing economic and competitive markets.In many of the ports shown in Box 2, the num-ber of workers per gang was very large, andremained mostly unchanged between 1970s and1980s despite the fact that cargoes increasinglywere being transported in containers with the useof modern equipment. In developing countries,where ports were operated for the most part bythe public sector, a combination of factors suchas surplus labor, strict application of union disci-pline, limited resources to acquire modern cargohandling equipment, poor training, and govern-ment policies to maintain or create employmentcontributed to overmanning in ports.
In the 1990s, private interests made significantcapital investments in ports around the world.Continued imposition of large work crews andrigid work rules in many ports, however, haveundermined the value of these investments, and,hence, the commercial feasibility of ports andterminals, both in developing and developedcountries. For example, until April 1998, in var-ious Australian ports there were typically 11 or12 workers per shift per gantry crane. With thenew enterprise agreement, this number wasreduced to six workers per shift per crane, andsubstantial productivity gains were achieved (seeBox 2). In the Port of Santos, Brazil, in 1997,labor and management reached an agreementreducing from 12 to 10 the number of workersper shift per crane. As a general matter, port ter-minal operators would rather employ a smallernumber of workers per shift while complyingwith safety and health regulations, and payhigher wages for a highly efficient, lean team.
Port labor reform presents a difficult challengefor government decision makers and therefore itis unlikely to take place unless forced by unfa-vorable existing conditions. As a result, the port
labor reform process is typically initiated onlywhen at least one, or more likely a combination,of the following three influences are present:
• Competition: Challenges a port or a ter-minal faces from competing terminals,either within the same port or from otherports in local or regional markets, oftenlead public officials, port users, and ship-pers to press for reforms to improve effi-ciency and lower costs (see Box 3).
• Community pressure: As a result of com-petitive challenges, the port and tradecommunity can be expected to object torestrictive port labor work practices,agreements, and regulations, all of whichlead to high labor costs, low productivity,and high prices for port services.
• Political commitment: When the two fore-going factors exist, they can galvanizeremedial action in the form of a planundertaken by a public authority or pro-posed by a candidate for public office aspart of a political platform. The intent isto reform port labor regimes to make theport more efficient and cost effective andthus improve competitiveness while reduc-ing the fiscal burden of the public sector.
Competition is the principal motivating forcebehind labor reform. In cases where ports servingthe same hinterland already face competition, thepropensity to undertake reform is usually higher(see Box 3). Regardless of whether there is directport or terminal competition, global competitionin its broadest sense compels port stakeholders,including labor, to assess their organizational andoperational cost structures, work methods, andprocedures. From this perspective, ports may beviewed as just one of several factors that con-tribute to a country’s or a region’s competitive-ness. As such, it is in a country’s overall econom-ic interests to improve port efficiency throughlabor reform and other measures.
The port and trade community, which includesmanufacturers, exporters, importers, and landand ocean carriers, because of its close businessrelationship with the port, can sometimes press
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governments to modify restrictive labor regula-tions that govern work practices in ports.Transforming these requirements into effectivemodernization plans may depend on other fac-tors, but presenting a common voice can consti-
tute an important force to initiate the laborreform process.
Finally, political commitment is essential toinitiate labor reform. Without strong support
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Box 2: Trends in Gang Strength, 1970s and 1980s
Aruba 1979 21 1983 12 –9
Auckland 1971 14 1982 14 Nil
Bahrain 1970 15 1982 10 –5
Beirut 1974 50 1983 15 –35
Bombay 1970 Ashore 13 1980 Ashore 13 Nil
In hold 8 In hold 8 Nil
Chittagong 1970 14 1982 14 Nil
Cochin 1973/74 Ashore 8–18 1982/83 Ashore 12 (average)
On board 10 On board 10
Doula 1970 14 1982 14 Nil
Freetown 1976 14 1983 14 Nil
Gothenburg 1976 9–13 1983 8–13 Nil
Guam 1970 14 1983 9 –5
Lagos 1970 16 1982 16 Nil
Madras 1970 24 1980 27 +3
Melbourne 1970 10–21 1983 10–21 Nil
Montreal 1970 3–14 1982 3–14 Nil
Oslo 1970 10 1982 “as required” –
Panama 1971 18 1982 18 Nil
Pinang 1970 9 1982 9 Nil
Port-au-Prince 1977 8 1982 12 +4
Puerto Rico 1970 22 1982 22 Nil
Rangoon 1972 26–30 1982 15 –(11–15)
Recife 1970 4–15 1983 4–16 +1
Rotterdam1 1970 6–14 1981 6–14 Nil
Tai–chung 1970 4–20 1982 4–20 Nil
Shuwakh 1980 12 1982 12 Nil
Singapore 1970 15 1982 10 –5
Turkey (all ports) 1970 11–13 1982 7–9 –4
A (Sweden) 1970 11 1982 9 –2
B (Norway) 1979 7–9 1982 5–7 –2
I (North Africa) 1971 17 1981 17 Nil
J (Australia) 1970 11–15 1982 6–15 –3
E (Taiwan, China) 1970 22 1982 12 –10
Source: Couper, A. D. 1986. New Cargo Handling Techniques: Implications for Port Employment and Skills. ILO.
Port Date Gang Strength Date Gang Strength Change
and reassurance from government decisionmakers for labor reform, the chances forreform to succeed are slim. Similarly, promisesfrom aspiring political leaders could fall shortafter an election is won. Moreover, the need toreduce government subsidies or the desire toobtain a one off cash injection by tenderingconcessions, have in the recent past been com-mon incentives for reform and port laborreform.
While a port labor reform process may be insti-gated by either competition, community pres-sure, or political push, the most favorable con-dition occurs when all three forces are presentsimultaneously (the shaded area in Box 4).
Box 5 describes the efforts of port labor reformin the European Union.
2. KEY LABOR ISSUES In numerous developing countries, as well as insome industrialized ones, existing port laborregimes, collective agreements, and managementand labor practices are inflexible, outdated, andinefficient. Consequently, they hinder the develop-ment of the commercial and operating environ-ments that ports require to respond to theincreasing demands of customers and competitivemarkets. Governments, as a result, mustappraise, in consultation with other port stake-holders, the extent to which labor regimes, col-lective agreements, and labor and managementpractices serve as a barrier to the achievementof the port’s commercial goals.
In conducting this appraisal, many issues haveto be addressed, including, but not limited to:
• Restrictions on which entities can offercargo handling and other services in theport.
• Reducing overstaffing by adapting gangsizes and other staffing to generallyaccepted levels.
• Rigid and outdated job descriptions andduties.
• Limitations on working hours and days.
• Inefficient overtime allocation at exces-sive wage rates.
• Hiring of port labor exclusively throughthe unions.
• Restrictions on output.
• Unsettled and combative workplace culture.
• Insufficient training and retraining oppor-tunities.
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Box 3: Labor Competition in India and Brazil
In 2000, Western India’s main container port,Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNP), located withinMumbai Bay, used gangs of 4 workers for
container handling while the Port of Mumbaiused gangs of 15 workers to perform thesame task, putting more pressure on the latterto undertake labor reform sooner than theEastern Indian port of Calcutta, which usedgangs of 28 workers and had no competingport in the vicinity at that time.
Likewise, competition arising due to theproximity of the Port of Sepetiba to the Portof Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, has encouraged thelatter to negotiate more flexible labor arrange-ments and tariffs than the Brazilian Port ofSantos, which at the time had no nearbycompeting port (now the container terminalshave been privatized and multiple competingterminals exist in the same port).
Source: Author.
Box 4: Factors Prompting Port Labor Reform
Source: Author.
CompetitionCommunityPressure
PoliticalCommitment
• Lack of clear and meaningful productivi-ty objectives.
• Inadequate occupational health and safetyprocedures.
Some port reformers have opened labor marketsto competition as an approach to address theseissues. In this context, the existence of inflexibleand exclusive dock labor boards or union laborpools runs counter to the desire to increasemanagement discretion over the recruitment,qualification, and use of specific employees.
Many government-owned and operated portsface not just one of these issues, but a combina-tion of them. And solving these issues is criticalto any successful port reform strategy. Simplyshifting the burden of these issues from a publicauthority to the private sector, however, will dolittle or nothing to resolve them. Box 6 showshow certain port reforms can affect employmentconditions and labor management relations.
3. LABOR INVOLVEMENT INPORT REFORM A realistic and responsible port reform initiativemust recognize and deal with the possible
adverse human and social effects that mayresult from implementation. To ensure thatdock workers’ rights and interests are properlytaken into account, the International TransportWorkers’ Federation (ITF) recommends thatpolicy makers should involve labor at all stagesof port reform.
The principal areas of interest for port laborinclude, but are not limited to:
• Stable and fulfilling employment.
• Reasonable incomes.
• Decent working conditions.
• Social security and pension provision.
• Education and vocational training.
• Health, safety, and the environment.
• Workplace democracy.
• Freedom from discrimination on the basisof race, religion, social status, or gender.
• Freedom from corruption and coercion.
Historically, trade unions have worked to advo-cate these interests. And trade unions can be
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The European Commission attemptednumerous times (2001, 2003, and early2006) to adopt a proposed directive on
market access to port services. The aim was toestablish clear rules and to set up an open andtransparent procedure for access to port services.The proposal sought to reinforce quality servicein ports with a strong focus on port labor andconcession terms. Port labor, however, supportedby several industry stakeholders, fought stronglyagainst the proposals, which included dockworker strikes in Germany, the Netherlands,Portugal, and France.
The key objective of the commission’s initia-tive, namely to increase port efficiency, would alsoallow a port service provider to employ personnelof its own choice. Self-handling would be allowedand self-handlers would be treated neither morenor less favorably than other providers of a com-parable service. Self-handling is when a port userprovides for itself one or more categories of portservices, for example when ferry operators carry
out their own loading operations. Services includecargo handling, towage, mooring, pilotage, andpassenger services and represent a major part oftotal costs of port calls for ships and of cargotransported through ports. There are, in theopinion of the commission, no reasons why self-handling should not, in principle, be allowed ifoperators believe that such action provides betteruse of their resources and increases efficiency.
Many port stakeholders (port unions, opera-tors, and shipping lines) felt that this type of liber-alization would not only undermine the positionof the regular port workers, but would also openthe door for inexperienced, poorly trained, andunderpaid port workers on an on call basis, giv-ing rise to the emergence of malafide employerswho would diminish the quality of port services.
The most recent proposal in January 2006was rejected by the commission on a vote of532 to 120.
Source: Author.
Box 5: Port Labor Reform in the European Union
expected to continue to play an important role inthe port community during and after the periodof reform implementation. Government authori-ties, when undertaking reform, must recognizethis legitimate and important role and should notview port reform predominantly as an opportu-nity to break trade unions or otherwise under-mine their role in protecting workers’ interests.
Despite the critical role that labor plays inports, many countries have designed and imple-mented port reform adjustment programs with-out the involvement of workers’ representativesand unions.
Failure of governments to secure constructivelabor involvement in port reforms can typicallybe traced to:
• Mistrust stemming from historic disputesand the recurring conflicts over capital-labor tradeoffs.
• Inadequate and untimely preparation ofport reform proposals, making it difficultfor labor to take part in consultationsand negotiations.
• Financial resources that are too limited tocover training needs created by port reform.
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Box 6: Possible Effects of Reform on Employment
• Reclassification of posts. • Greater job mobility. • Greater emphasis on profes-sionalism.
• New job patterns. • Diminished guarantee of • More discretionary power in tenure and job security. making management deci-
sions and formulating enter-prise policies.
• Labor retrenchment and direct • Need for retraining and • More emphasis on strict job losses. skill upgrading. implementation of these deci-
sions and policies.
• Gender-based employment • Longer working hours • Marginalization of unions’policies. and/or increased work influence and bargaining
load. power.
• Discrimination against shop • Payment by results • More tedious wage bargaining stewards and other labor schemes and pay freezes. with preferences for individual representatives. rather than collective
agreements.
• Medium- and long-term • Loss of seniority and • Tougher stance of employment gains due to service grades. management on workers increased investment, growth, • Wider wage differentials performance and work privatized firms, and with greater incentive discipline.diversification of services. components.
• Loss of pension rights. • Efficiency arguments and• Loss of social benefits profit-making gain importance
(for example, housing, over social objectives.transport, child care, and health insurance schemes).
• Abolition of ban on undertaking strikes and industrial actions.
Source: UNCTAD. 1995. Comparative Experiences with Privatization: Policy Insights and Lessons Learned.
Employment effects Employment conditions Management labor relations
Governments, however, have much to gain frominvolving labor early and effectively in the portreform process. Port labor is one of the mostvaluable assets of the port community. Thispool of trained personnel is a deep source ofpractical knowledge with vast experience inport operations. This source can be tapped tocontribute problem-solving expertise and inno-vation to add value to the goods and services ofcustomers.
On the other hand, labor unions themselvesmust face a number of crucial challenges toadjust and optimize their own effectivenesswhen dealing with reform. As listed by a formerITF official, the main challenges include:
• Union participation. The participation oftrade unions in the reform process is abig challenge because it requires a com-mitment from trade union leaders.Negotiation implies compromise and thismay not always be to the liking of allaffected trade union members. Unionleaders must accept that once they havenegotiated the best deal possible, it istheir responsibility to defend it stronglyto their members.
• Unification of workers’ short- and long-term interests. The issues confrontinglabor during the transition period toreform versus the period following theintroduction of reform are different. Inthe transition period, the challenge fortrade unions is primarily to defend theshort-term interests of workers. At thesame time, trade unions have to look tothe future and to defend the workers’long-term interests. This means that theyhave to understand longer term trendsaffecting the port industry and to be ableto develop appropriate policy and a strat-egy for the future.
• Increase expertise within the union.Participating actively and effectively in areform process requires trade unions tobecome thoroughly knowledgeable aboutshipping, ports, and international trade,
and to commit significant humanresources to the reform process. In addi-tion, trade union structure must allow forthe internal exchange of information anddebate. In some cases this expertise needsto be developed, as it has been withinthose unions more experienced in reformprocesses. There are several ways todevelop this expertise within a union,including training.
• Introduction of new trade union struc-tures. One obstacle to successful portreform could lie in outdated union struc-tures that divide workers into manysmall, different unions, that sometimescompete among themselves for member-ship. Efficient trade union structures, cov-ering the whole industry, should be creat-ed to enable union officials to exchangeinformation within the union, to organizethe necessary internal debate, and topresent a consistent approach in theirdialogue with public authorities.
• Finding solutions to social problemscaused by reforms. The main source ofport workers’ opposition to reform isuncertainty. Faced with the fear of unem-ployment or major cuts in income, labor’sfirst reaction is always to say no. Unlessworkers can be given an interest in theresults of the reform, they will resist anychange. Employment and income guaran-tees for port workers affected by reformare, therefore, essential in creating the cli-mate required for successful and lastingport reforms. The costs of severance pay,unemployment benefits, pensions, cashpayments for early retirement, or othermeasures must be considered a legitimatepart of the overall cost of reform. Thechallenge for the trade unions, whichcomes prior to solving social problems, isto develop their own policy on thoseissues and to reach common ground withpublic authorities and private employers.
• Reform acceptance. Unions increasinglyrecognize the need for a differentiation of
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their policies on reforms and reform.Resolutions adopted at ITF’s LatinAmerican and Caribbean and AfricanRegional Dockers’ Conferences in Lima(November 1996) and Mombasa(December 1996) indicated for the firsttime that unions acknowledged that thereis no standard model for port restructur-ing and that increased involvement of theprivate sector is an option that cannot bediscarded. The basis for this changingattitude toward reform was the increasedawareness that it is not reform thatthreatens working conditions, but theprocess through which it is implemented.
• New culture of competition. A majorconsequence of reform is an increase incompetition. This usually calls for newflexibility in working practices. There aremany forms of flexibility, and tradeunions should understand this aspect ofreform and competition thoroughly toagain find a balance between what is pre-sented as necessary and what is recog-nized as socially acceptable.
• Understanding the need for new laborrelations. Reform brings with it a com-plete realignment of labor relations. Inthe case of state-owned ports and relatedcompanies, the relationship is betweenonly two parties: government and labor.Reform means that a third party is intro-duced: the private entrepreneur oremployer. For many trade union officialsthis change requires a complete overhaulof the way they used to think about laborrelations. Moreover, it also requires frommanagers a completely different attitudeand approach. Trade unions, employers,and would-be entrepreneurs can nolonger rely on governments or otherauthorities when decisions need to bemade. In many instances, entrepreneurshave to make their own decisions, insome cases in consultation with laborrepresentatives and in some cases in con-sultation with authorities. Authorities
must learn that the state, on many occa-sions, should no longer take the lead, butshould provide an environment in whichentrepreneurs are encouraged to maketheir own decisions and in which tradeunions and employers are encouraged todevelop joint approaches to addressinglabor issues. Box 7 describes Ghana’sapproach for addressing a number ofthese challenges.
Box 8 presents an example of the reference tothe port labor clauses in a concession agree-ment.
4. ORGANIZING TO ADDRESSLABOR REFORM: A TASKFORCE APPROACH Successful port labor reform requires govern-ments, labor, and private interests to grapplewith a wide range of economic, operational,social, safety, and cultural issues. To come togrips with these myriad issues, some govern-ments have established a labor reform taskforce, often headed by the ministry of labor, toconsult with port stakeholders regarding anychanges that might be made in government poli-cies and practices to improve port productivityand cost effectiveness.
The labor reform task force should include rep-resentatives of all government agencies and pri-vate sector stakeholders affected by portreform, including:
• Ministries of transport, labor, finance,economics, and planning.
• Port authorities.
• Port labor representatives.
• Main port customers and users, includingexporters, importers, carriers and agents,freight forwarders, and multimodal trans-port operators.
• Private investors, terminal operators, andcargo handling and stevedoring companies.
The labor reform task force should conduct itsactivities in an open and transparent manner.
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Its main areas of activity should typicallyinclude:
• Commissioning or conducting studies:Many governments prefer to be assistedand guided by expert professionals, retain-ing consultancy services to work closelywith management, workers, and otherport stakeholders in assessing the weak-nesses and strengths of labor regimes, col-lective agreements, and work practices.
• Organizing seminars and workshops:These help to build consensus by allow-ing all port stakeholders to share theirviews and concerns on various issues.These events also permit employers toexplain to workers what sort of competi-tion they face, their firms’ financial
performance, and the need to addresscompetitive challenges.
• Informing the community and con-sumers: Using the media to disseminatethe results of studies and workshopshelps to keep the community and con-sumers at large informed, making it easi-er to gain their support for necessarychanges. The community and consumersneed to be enlightened as to why portlabor reform is needed, what is involved,how the main difficulties will be mitigat-ed, and what the expected benefits are tothe entire economy or country.
• Fostering the creation of joint commit-tees: Such joint committees betweenunions and private terminal operators
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As a strategic option to achieve its devel-opment objectives, the government ofGhana designed in 1998 the Ghana Trade
and Investment Gateway Project (GHATIG) withthe support of the World Bank. The primaryobjective of GHATIG is to create an environmentconducive to economic growth and develop-ment led by private sector initiatives.
Within this context, the government ofGhana has approved a policy to furtherimprove the operation of the ports, which willreduce the cost of operations and shorten theturnaround time of ships. The policy entailsincreased private sector participation in themanagement of ports. The Ghana Ports andHarbours Authority (GPHA) will be convertedinto a “landlord” port authority while the pri-vate sector will participate in port operations,particularly container handling operations, dock-yards, and sites’ maintenance and services.
The port reforms that are sought throughthe implementation of the GHATIG Projectconstitute a major change in the port sector ofGhana. The most critical issue in managingchange (that is, making change work) is over-coming the resistance to change in many ofthe stakeholders in the port industry. However,in the case of the proposed port reforms inGhana, due to the proper, professional, andtimely and proactive actions of the government(particularly the initiatives of the Minister of
Roads and Transport) and the GPHA manage-ment, the strength of the resistance to changehas been minimized. The avoidance of anyautocratic approach and the consultative, per-suasive, and participative style that has beenadopted by the government in promoting theport reform process has resulted in a very pos-itive atmosphere among the port communityfor the implementation of the port componentof the GHATIG Project. The public consultationthrough a national workshop on the accept-ability of the government’s policies pertinent toport reforms and the personal site visits of theMinister of Road and Transport to the ports tospeak, and more importantly listen, to the portworkforce and the port labor unions, coupledwith the constructive work that has beenundertaken by the GPHA management, hassecured the collaboration of the majority of thestakeholders in the port sector. It is interestingto note that representatives of the Maritimeand Port Workers Union (MDU) have joinedforces with the GPHA management in its effortto address the port rationalization issues inrelation to the port reform process. MDU rep-resentatives are now members of the organiza-tional restructuring and labor rationalizationworking team of the GHATIG ProjectImplementation Committee and attend itsmeetings on a regular basis.
Source: Author.
Box 7: Working with Labor Unions: The Ghana Case
might address issues affecting operatingefficiency and safety and can help resolveon-the-dock problems and disputes with-out formal government intervention.
• Defining government’s role regarding ports:Governments should play an active andfocused role in regulating and monitoringcompanies that operate in the port systemto ensure that safety and health laws andregulations are followed. Governments canassume an active and effective role in pro-moting the use of ports for the benefit ofthe entire community and economy.
• Developing a workforce rationalizationplan: The task force should draw up andexplain programs for staff restructuring andrationalization. In developing these pro-grams, the task force should evaluate arange of measures including incentiveschemes for early retirement, voluntary sep-aration, provision of training and retrain-ing, and career development as well asassistance in job search and outplacement.
For the task force to be in a position to workeffectively, sufficient budget must be allocatedby all participants’ organizations to make itpossible for the team to complete its tasks andwork schedule. Box 9 describes Australia’sapproach to creating a port reform task force(Box 10 provides the productivity research con-ducted by Australia’s port reform task force).
5. THE INSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORK FOR LABORREFORM Port labor reform is a balancing act that mustconsider workers’ rights and social equity, portusers’ and operators’ commercial needs, theneed to foster competition, and the interactionbetween governments and port interests.
5.1. Redefining the Concept ofSocial Equity The current concept of social equity (that is, joband wage security) was developed at a timewhen governments believed they could insulate
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1. The Operator shall employ the employeesengaged in container handling operations inwhatever way who desire to work for theOperator on terms and conditions that areoverall not less than those such employeeswere drawing at the time of their terminationas employees of the [name] Ports Authority.To this purpose the Operator shall sourcenot less than [number] employees employedby the [name] Ports Authority with therequired skills:
(a) Initially from staff working on the [name]Container Terminal; if unable to sourcethe total number required, then
(b) From staff working at other locations of the[name] Ports Authority, employed in theport of [name]; and if there still is a shortfallof the total number required and theGovernment is satisfied that the Operatoris unable to obtain the required number ofemployees from the [name] Ports Authority,employed in the port of [name], then
(c) The Operator may source its employeesfrom outside the [name] Ports Authority.
2. The Operator shall undertake such consul-tation with employees and employees’representatives as the Operator in its dis-cretion deems fit. In so doing, theOperator shall have due regard to andobserve:
(a) Any applicable law.
(b) Any other agreements relating to theemployees or employees’ representa-tives concerned.
(c) The relevant contracts of employmentof said employees.
(d) All relevant consultation provisions andobligations concerning the said employ-ees or employees’ representatives.
3. Subject to applicable law, the Governmentshall transfer to the Operator suchemployment records relating to thoseformer employees of the Government whoare employed by the Operator upon hand-over as the Operator shall reasonablyrequire.
Source: Author.
Box 8: Sample Reference Clauses in a Concession Agreement on Employee Transfer
their economies from the rigors of fierce inter-national competition. Developing countries, inparticular, often pursued policies designed toreserve domestic markets for national entrepre-neurs while seeking to create broader exportmarkets through the receipt of preferentialtreatment under multilateral trade agreements.In this environment, dock workers (and otherlabor) were sheltered from the full force andeffect of international competition, or so it mayhave seemed.
Similarly, governments were temporarily sparedhaving to make difficult decisions associatedwith adjusting labor conditions and relation-
ships to conform to global market forces.Governments, therefore, guaranteed dock work-ers’ jobs, purchasing power, and benefits. At thesame time, they were often reluctant to makeinvestments in new technology or to take stepsto reduce costs and improve productivity. Theunfortunate truth is that this interpretation ofsocial equity raised the costs and prices ofimported and domestic products in nationalmarkets and contributed to a downward spiralof noncompetitiveness. As such, this concept ofsocial equity was unsustainable.
The concept of social equity today has shiftedto a commercial opportunity-oriented approach.Under this approach, job security, which ulti-mately depends on expansion of trade andtransport activities, is not achieved throughgovernment guarantees of work, but througheducation, training, and retraining programs.By this means, the enhancement of workforceskills and abilities, together with greaterparticipation in workplace decisions, lead tobetter job opportunities and improved produc-tivity. Box 11 compares past and presentaspects of job security.
For workers displaced as a result of reforms, faircompensation should be granted for the relin-quishment of their acquired rights and privi-leges. To facilitate their early reentry into thenational workforce, displaced workers should beoffered retraining programs and job search assis-tance, and above all, an institutional structurethat ensures that benefits and privileges given upby these workers will not be appropriated bysome other group within the port or trade com-munity. Labor’s possible role in this area wouldbe to ensure that training programs become anintegral component of the modernizationprocess, promote occupational health and safety,and establish a collaborative process for theselection and introduction of new equipment.
5.2. Meeting Commercial Needs Establishing interport, intraport, interunion,intraunion, and nonunion competition is key toaddressing shipping and port companies’ needsfor improved productivity and cost effectiveness.
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Box 9: The Productivity Commission ofAustralia
The Productivity Commission, an inde-pendent commonwealth agency, is thegovernment’s principal review and advi-
sory body on microeconomic policy and regu-lation. It conducts public inquiries andresearch into a broad range of economic andsocial issues affecting the welfare ofAustralians.
The commission’s work covers all sectorsof the economy. It extends to the public andprivate sectors and focuses on areas of com-monwealth as well as state and territoryresponsibility.
The commission performs its role throughthe following key activities: holding publicinquiries and reporting on a variety of mattersbrought to the commission’s attention; initiat-ing research on industry and productivityissues; reporting annually on industry andproductivity performance generally; assis-tance and regulation promoting public under-standing of matters related to industry andproductivity; providing secretariat andresearch services to government bodies,including developing performance indicatorsfor government provided or sponsored servic-es; reviewing and advising on regulationthrough the Office of Regulation Review; andinvestigating and reporting on complaintsabout the implementation of the common-wealth government’s competitive neutralityarrangements.
Source: Author.
Creating this competition usually requires eco-nomic regulatory reform, including the elimina-tion of bureaucratic obstacles to the free inter-play of market mechanisms affecting the supplyand demand of dock workers and decentraliza-tion, including the assurance that laborresponds to local market signals without cross-subsidies among related labor organizations incompeting ports.
Labor’s possible role in this area would be tonegotiate with port employers to establish jobeducation and experience requirements and pro-vide training courses that address local marketneeds.
5.3. Fostering Competition Antimonopoly laws must be applied to terminaloperators and dock labor alike to ensure thatmarket mechanisms do not result in the creation
of cartels. Labor’s possible role in competitionshould be to ensure that market mechanisms areused to compete fairly and that port operatorsdo not abuse their market power.
5.4. Government’s Role To avoid pressures to modify market outcomes,governments should remove themselves fromdirect involvement in port labor relations, col-lective negotiations, and informal dispute reso-lution. A proper commercial setting should beable to function without political influence,although the government has a major role toplay in labor rationalization and its funding.
Labor’s possible role in this area would be tonegotiate on a transparent basis without politicalmanipulation; suggest measures to improve pro-ductivity, facilitate work, and reduce costs; andshare decision authority at the operational level.
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Productivity Commission 1998, WorkArrangement in Container Stevedoring,Research Report, AusInfo, Canberra,
Australia
• Flexibility in the allocation and use of labor iscritical to stevedore workplace performancegiven the highly variable demand for steve-doring services at Australian ports.
• The container stevedoring industry is char-acterized by a system of complex, inflexible,and prescriptive work arrangements thatconstrain workplace performance. Theyimpede productivity, reduce timeliness andreliability, and increase labor costs.
• The most significant work arrangements arethe order of engagement (specifying theorder in which different types of employeesare engaged for a shift), shift premiums andpenalty rates, and redundancy provisions.
• The order of engagement, in combinationwith relatively high shift premiums and penal-ty rates, add significantly to total labor costsfor a given level of activity. They detract fromproductivity by creating incentives for perma-nent operational employees to seek overtimeand lead to poor timeliness and reliability.They can also have deleterious effects on thelives of operational employees.
• The high cost of redundancies restricts theability of stevedores to adjust manning levelsof permanent employees. The redundancyagreements also foster skill mismatches andreduce the ability of management to allocatethe best person for the job.
• There are a number of factors that impedechange, including an adversarial workplaceculture, strong union bargaining power, limit-ed competition in the labor market for oper-ational stevedoring employees, and limita-tions on competition in the industry.
• The Workplace Relations Act of 1996 facili-tates change by enabling work arrange-ments to be determined primarily at theworkplace level. Together with the second-ary boycott revisions to the Trade PracticesAct, it has also reduced some sources ofunion bargaining power.
• Responsibility for better outcomes ultimatelyrests with managers and their employees.Greater competition in container stevedoringwould increase the pressures on both sidesto change work arrangements and improveperformance.
Source: Productivity Commission. 1998. Work Arrangementin Container Stevedoring, Research Report, AusInfo,Canberra, Australia.
Box 10: Institutional Framework for Labor Reform Key Findings
5.5. Time Frame for Port LaborReform Port labor reform is an economically andpolitically challenging process. As such, it canbe expected to elicit strong political emotionsboth for and against. Consequently, the portlabor reform process should be begun andcompleted within the term of a single publicadministration. The reason for this is that thechanges to existing labor regimes that areconsidered “objective” by one administrationcould be judged to be “biased” by succeedingadministrations. Trying to carry over thisreform process from one administration to thenext often results in significant delays or eventhe discontinuation of the entire reformprocess.
Further, if port reform includes inviting poten-tial investors to operate state-owned portfacilities, it would be advantageous to con-clude the labor reform component before theproject is marketed and a request for bids istendered. This will clarify the potentialinvestors’ future labor relations and costs,
thereby reducing the degree of uncertainty andrisk and, with the right labor reforms, makingthe offering more attractive to reputableinvestors and operators.
Nevertheless, one can expect that labor reformwill be a continuing process that will involveadjustments to respond to changing marketconditions.
6. DEVELOPING THEWORKFORCE RATIONALIZATIONPLAN An effective workforce rationalization planmust be built on accurate and relevant informa-tion and must consider the full range of ration-alization alternatives, not just dismissals.
The design of a port labor rationalization planand program is one the most important phasesof the overall port reform process. To bedesigned correctly, the plan and associated pro-grams should be based on detailed, reliableinformation on the port enterprise, the work-force, and local markets. In this respect, it is
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Box 11: Job Security in Ports
Source: Author.
In the past
Job security was obtained throughpolitical alliances and the avoidanceof market mechanisms. The resultswere often not those desired and alsoincluded a de-emphasis of the need for:
• Knowledge of and experience with international port practices.
• Labor participation in managementcommittees.
• Acceptance of new cargo-handlingtechnology.
• Training programs to increase theskills of the labor force.
Job security obtained by responding tomarket mechanisms. This creates a need for formal training programs, multi-skilling, willingness to acceptnew technologies, and commonality of goals among port customers,employers, and dock labor. The usualimpact is:
• Collective agreements negotiatedto promote trade.
• Dock labor generates ideas that lead to progressive gains in productivity and efficiency.
• Employers willing to train port workers.
In the future
useful to review the lessons learned from previ-ous government labor rationalization programs.
Before developing a rationalization plan, thelabor reform task force should assemble the fol-lowing information:
• Port master plans and strategic goals forthe short, medium, and long terms.
• Estimates of required activity levels(throughput forecasts).
• Demographic information about the cur-rent port workforce, including data onemployee age, marital status, number ofdependents, level of education, length ofservice, and accumulated benefits (forexample, employer’s pension fund contri-butions, life insurance benefits, and accu-mulated holidays).
• Current staffing levels by operational,administrative, and management cate-gories, and descriptions of job require-ments.
• Estimates of minimum staffing levels byoperational, administrative, and manage-ment categories, and descriptions of newor modified job requirements.
• National and local laws, regulations, andpolicies relating to labor rationalization.
• All relevant collective bargaining andemployment agreements that describework rules, compensation, benefits, train-ing, contracting out rules, exclusivestaffing provisions, and so forth.
• Training needs and skills of workers whowill be seeking alternative employment.
• Existing government and private sectororganizations capable of assisting withretraining and job searches, and theircapacity to provide training at therequired levels.
In developing a realistic labor rationalizationplan, appraising the local labor market situationand conditions will be as important as assessingthe specific enterprise being restructured.
Displaced workers will need to be reintegratedinto local and regional markets. To facilitatetheir reentry, the labor reform task force willhave to gather information about and carefullyconsider the following factors:
• The overall macroeconomic situation ofthe country and, more specifically, theeconomic and social condition of thearea or region in which the port islocated.
• Existing employment and unemploymentpatterns, job creation schemes, and thegrowth of sectors within regions.
• The labor absorption capacity andgrowth potential of different sectors ofthe economy.
• The skills and experience of the work-force.
This information should be available to all par-ties affected by port reform because it willbecome the basis on which many decisions willbe made.
6.1. Alternatives to DismissalsToo often, labor rationalization has been equat-ed to wholesale dismissals. Labor forces can berationalized in a number of ways, however, andthe immediate dismissal of employees is notalways necessary. In a climate of cooperationand mutual respect, labor and managementhave been able to implement agreements involv-ing flexible work arrangements that preservejobs or reduce the workforce through meansother than involuntary dismissals. Some of thesearrangements and measures include:
• Normal attrition of the workforce as aresult of retirements, deaths, or resigna-tions.
• Part-time employment, flexible workinghours, reduction in working hours, vari-able work weeks, job sharing, and over-time restrictions.
• General or job category-specific hiringfreezes.
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• Absorbing cost reductions across theorganization by sharing reductions inhours of work and pay.
• Work rotation among other governmentdepartments in cases where the port is themain employer of the city and jobs in thesurrounding areas are very scarce.
Each of these alternatives merits careful consid-eration in the development of a labor rationali-zation plan. Box 12 describes one company’sapproach to labor rationalization.
6.2. Elements of a StaffRetrenchment Program Measures such as the flexible work arrange-ments described above may prove insufficient toattain workforce reductions needed to make theport enterprise commercially feasible or attrac-
tive to new investors. In such cases, policy mak-ers have to adopt other measures. A staffretrenchment program is an option that permitsgovernments to reduce large numbers of work-ers in an operationally rational and sociallyresponsible manner. To be viable, this kind ofsolution should be the result of negotiationswith trade unions or workforce representatives.Such programs typically include various meas-ures aimed at cushioning the adverse affectsworkers may suffer as a result of dislocations.
The main components of a staff retrenchmentprogram normally include:
• Compensation, with incentives for earlyretirement and voluntary separation.Retrenchment programs often permitemployees to retire with either full orreduced pension benefits at an earlier age
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Social plans can be described as agree-ments reached between labor and man-agement to develop an organized set of
measures seeking alternatives to dismissal,assistance in arranging reemployment else-where, and compensation in an effort to limitthe number of planned redundancies and min-imize the impact on workers and communities.The social planning process typically beginsafter an organization has announced that itintends to scale back the size of its workforceor even shut down operations entirely.
Following such an announcement, thesocial partners meet to find workable alterna-tives to mass redundancies. These alterna-tives tend to involve such initiatives as earlyretirement schemes, incentives for voluntaryredundancies, natural attrition, conversionfrom full-time to part-time status, reduction inworking hours, wage moderation or cuts incompensation, relocation to another work sitewithin the organization, and worker retraining.If redundancies cannot be avoided, the socialplans address such matters as an orderlyprocess for layoffs, redundancy payments, jobcounseling, job search assistance, and train-ing for new and expanding occupations. InFrance, for example, companies employingmore than 50 workers are legally required to
draw up a social plan to limit the number ofredundancies. Moulinex announced its inten-tions in June 1996 to make 2,100 workersredundant over three years, close two sites inNormandy, and transfer the head office westof Paris. It then signed an agreement with itsfive trade unions in January 1997, whichreduced the number of planned job cuts from2,100 to 1,468 through a combination ofreductions in working time and early retire-ment. Working time will be reduced by 15 per-cent for 750 workers, from 39 hours to 33hours and 15 minutes per week, paid at 97.2percent of the base salary and organized on avoluntary basis. Early retirement will be offeredto 718 employees from age 56. To prevent theloss of 600 more jobs, Moulinex will offer arelocation package of 12,195 to encourageworkers to move to other locations withinthe company. The primary objectives ofsocial plans such as that concluded atMoulinex are to maintain employment levelswherever possible, reduce disruption, andfacilitate reemployment when layoffs areunavoidable.
Source: ILO. 1998. “The ILO’s Response to the FinancialCrisis in East and South-East Asia.” Technical paper for theILO’s High Level Tripartite Meeting on Social Responses tothe Financial Crisis in East and South East Asian Countries,Bangkok, Thailand, April 22–24, 1998.
Box 12: Social Plans at Moulinex
than normal. Numerous public enterpris-es have either reduced the minimumretirement age by five years or added fiveyears to length of service. Financial incen-tives are normally calculated based on thenumber of years of service, each year ofservice entitling the separated employeeto one month’s salary, with a ceiling ofpossibly 24 months of wages.
• Compensation for involuntary separation.When the targeted workforce reduction isnot reached through voluntary programs,and workers have to be dismissed or laidoff, they normally receive a lower sever-ance payment, for example, 80 percent ofthe amount received by workers who leftvoluntarily. Dismissed workers are alsoentitled to training and outplacementassistance. Criteria to decide who shouldbe dismissed could be based on: workers’records of attendance; frequency ofpenalties or suspensions; overall perform-ance evaluations by immediate supervi-sors; and family situation (for example,marital status or number of dependents).In some countries, the standard is still“first in last out” when making redun-dancy decisions.
• Provision of training and retraining. Thetraining and retraining component of theretrenchment program is aimed at facili-tating the return of displaced workers togainful employment. Experiences in vari-ous countries, however, have revealedthat in many cases only 20 percent of thedisplaced workers take advantage of theretraining programs being offered. Themain reasons for this low level of partici-pation include timing delays, weak insti-tutional capacity of the local public sec-tor, and low educational level. To have agreater chance of success, retraining pro-grams should be demand driven, not sup-ply driven.
• Guidance and assistance in job searchingand outplacement. This component isclosely linked to retraining and is aimed
at assisting displaced personnel who willbe seeking employment. However, dis-placed personnel should be able to takeadvantage of this service regardless ofwhether they have been retrained.Services could include resume assistance;providing information about employmentopportunities; sharing information onhow to start one’s own business; estab-lishing cooperatives; and other measures.
6.3. Pitfalls in Designing andImplementing Severance Packages Retrenchment efforts involving significant staffreductions often face considerable politicalopposition. As noted above, to overcome oppo-sition and to fairly treat public employees wholose their jobs, governments often offer sever-ance pay to those workers forced to leave pub-lic employment. But problems in the design andimplementation of these compensation schemesoften reduce their efficiency and may notachieve their objectives.
Potential problems include:
• Paying too much. Workers are paid morethan would have been necessary toinduce them to leave. These increasedcosts may bring a retrenchment programto a halt because funds run out.
• Adverse selection. Severance pay pack-ages do a poor job at targeting redundantworkers; often the best workers tend toaccept the buyout because they havereadily available alternatives, while theworst tend to remain.
• The revolving door. Workers accept sev-erance pay but are later rehired when it isdetermined that their skills are needed.As a result, the severance package iswasted and downsizing is not achieved.
How do ports accurately measure the portion ofthe labor force that is excessive? Typically, agovernment- or state-owned enterprise, allowedto restructure on its own, may cut more workersthan is socially optimal, particularly if the costof downsizing is borne by another agency. When
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wages are higher in the public sector than in theprivate sector, governments tend to overestimateredundancies. Cuts are also exaggerated whenemployment in a given government agencyaffects the earnings of those it does not employ;for instance, in communities where the govern-ment agency being reformed is the primarysource of direct and indirect employment.However, agencies tend to underestimate thenumber of necessary redundancies when heavilysubsidized by the general budget. Although eachport’s situation is unique, applying certain rules
of thumb can help ports and governments iden-tify where they may be overstaffed or wheretheir productivity significantly trails other ports.Box 13 identifies a number of these benchmarks.
From a financial point of view, shrinking bloatedgovernments appears to be a very profitableundertaking, even when employees get substan-tial severance pay. Practice shows that ifemployees are given two to three years of salaryto leave, for example, then in a mere two yearsthe money spent is recovered through cost
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Box 13: Port Staffing Benchmarks
Small authority: a few million tons About 50
Average port authority: 10–20 million tons From 150 to 250
Large ports: example: 100–300 million tons 1,000
More generally, and indicative ration would be: 100,000 tons per staff per year, with large varia-tions: small ports require more than this propor-tion, large ports gain from scale economies andrequire relatively less staff; general cargo requiresmore staffing than bulk traffic.
Type of cargo Performance
Containers 1,000 TEUs of staff per year(including operational, administrative, and (for a large array of yearly throughput, from management staff) 150,000 up to 600,000 TEUs). Comment: also Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants, here there are economies of scale 150,000 TEU = World Container Terminals 1997. 150 people / 600,000 TEU = 500 people
Breakbulk Cargo 40 tons per hour 2.5 tons/hour/dockerBoxes on 2 ton pallets built in the hold (fruits, frozen goods, and so forth):
Gang: 15 to 17 dockers (excluding transfer and storage crew, crane driver, maintenance staff)
Prepalletized boxes, handled with cages: 160 tons per hour 14 tons/hour/docker
Gang: about 13, including transfer (excluding storage crew, crane driver, maintenance staff)
Exotic wood in logs, handled with slings: 80 tons per hour 6 tons/hour/docker
Gang: 12 to 15 dockers (excluding transfer and storage crew, crane driver, maintenance staff)
Exotic wood in logs, handled with hydraulic 140 tons per hour 14 tons/hour/dockerclamps: Gang: 10 dockers (excluding transfer and storage crew, crane driver, and maintenance staff)
Source: Author.
Size of the port authority Recommended staffing level
savings and productivity improvements.However, research has found that governmentsmust take care to avoid losing the best employees,so as not to have to rehire them later.
Ironically, severance packages often have theadverse effect of inducing the most productivepeople to leave. Quite often, the best publicemployees have to be rehired, an expensive wayof getting back to “square one.” World Bankresearch has found substantial rehiring in abouta quarter of the surveyed retrenchment pro-grams. What, then, are the best mechanisms forshedding redundant public sector workers? Ifseverance packages are offered to induce volun-tary departures, how should they be designed tominimize the total cost? And are there ways tostructure such packages to induce to least pro-ductive employees to depart while encouragingto most valuable employees to stay?
Too often, severance pay is offered indiscrimi-nately, without an overall plan for continuedoperations. Some public sector employees takethe package, others stay, and only later do gov-ernments know which personnel and skillsremain. The sequence should be reversed, firstidentifying the services to be cut or transferredto the private sector; second, identifying thespecific overstaffed jobs; and meanwhile enforc-ing work hours and attendance recordkeepingto chase away “ghost” workers. Only thenshould those specifically targeted to leave beoffered a severance package.
Tailoring severance packages to observablecharacteristics, such as age, education, numberof dependents and the like, may substantiallyreduce the costs of downsizing. Care must betaken, however, not to discriminate against par-ticular categories of personnel in a manner con-trary to human rights and labor law.
Usually, the packages involve a multiple of theseparated worker’s current salary in the publicsector, the multiple being related to seniority.But these packages tend to overcompensate thepeople who accept them. World Bank researchestimates overcompensation in selected coun-tries at about 20 percent.
To keep the best employees, the research find-ings suggest developing a menu of alternativesto the standard severance package. For instance,public employees could be given the followingchoices: (a) keep their jobs; (b) leave and getseverance pay; or (c) keep their jobs, but with ahigher salary and on a fixed term contract. Thislast option would help retain the more produc-tive public employees who have good outsidealternatives and are not afraid of losing theirjobs. Without the third option, those employeeswould tend to take the severance pay and leave.
Box 14 depicts a decision tree that can helpport reformers carefully think through theprocess of workforce rationalization.
6.4. Rationalizing the Workforce:When and By Whom? Workforce rationalization can take place at anumber of points along the path to port reformand, depending on when it takes place, can beimplemented by either the government or by theprivate sector. There are pros and cons to eachof the various approaches.
6.4.1. Prereform Rationalization
Having the government initiate workforcerationalization prior to reforming other ele-ments of port ownership and operation in mostcases has several advantages:
• Presents potential concessionaires andinvestors with a “cleaner” business deci-sion.
• Reduces uncertainty and certain risksassociated with the project, permittingthe government to get the best price forthe concession.
• Places the expense of rationalization onthe government, which in most cases isthe entity that contributed most heavilyto the overstaffing, rigid work rules, andother conditions that reduced efficiency.
• May result in less disruption to portoperations as a result of work stoppages,sick outs, slow downs, and other actions.
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At the same time, having the government initi-ate workforce rationalization prior to reformingother elements of port ownership and operationcan have drawbacks, including:
• Governments may cut too few from theworkforce in response to political pres-sure, leaving potential concessionairesand investors with an oversupply oflabor.
• Governments may not structure cutbacks,severance packages, and incentives toretain the best personnel and criticalskills.
6.4.2. Postreform Rationalization
Delaying workforce rationalization until afterother port reforms have been implemented alsohas strengths and drawbacks.
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Box 14: A Downsizing Decision Tree
Source: Rama, Martin. 1999. “Public Sector Downsizing: An Introduction.” World Bank
Economic Review, Vol. 13.
Isadverse
selection a serious
concern?
Isoverstaffing an obstacle
toprivatization?
Isprivatization advisable?
yesno
Using targeting and menus to
identifyredundancies
Predict loss of
redundant workers
Set up training and other
redeployment services
Let workers choose their mix
of cash and services
Assess percentage of
redundant workers
Privatizewithout
priordownsizing
Ispredicted loss
higher than legal
compensation?
Isfull
compensation of workers
needed?
Set compensation
based on predicted loss
Settle old-agepensionliabilities
Paylegal
compensation
Assess economic returns to
downsizing
no
No
no
No
YesYes
yes
yes
On the positive side, delaying workforce ration-alization until after other port reforms havebeen implemented means that decisions in thisarea will be made by private sector concession-aires and investors who are efficiency mindedand profit oriented. This, in turn, suggests thattheir decisions about workforce restructuringwill be more attuned to operating needs andcustomer demands.
On the negative side, forcing the new concession-aires and investors to implement workforcereform can significantly increase the uncertaintyand risk associated with the reform initiative.This, in turn, can scare away potential biddersand result in a lower concession or selling pricefor the government. In addition, port labor mightbe inclined to pursue work actions against a pri-vate employer more readily than against a gov-ernment employer. Indeed, in some countries it isillegal for public employees to engage in workstoppages and other disruptive work actions.
In cases where overstaffing is not an issue andsignificant downsizing is not required, it is gen-erally preferable for the new operator andinvestor to assume the task of rationalizing theworkforce. This situation would be unlikely tooccur in seaports, however, especially those indeveloping countries. Indeed, seaports haveserved for many years as natural shelters toavert unemployment and as a source of politicalpatronage for various public administrations.
Thus, the question for policy makers is: What isthe maximum number of workers the prospec-tive concessionaire can be asked to employwithout undermining the entire port reform ini-tiative? If too many workers are imposed on thenew concessionaire, the business propositionwill be less attractive. As a result, few compet-ing bids may be submitted and the sales price orthe concession fee most probably will be signifi-cantly discounted.
A new terminal operator typically prefers tohave the freedom to determine the firm’srequired number of staff and skill mix. Thegovernment will normally have an interest inthe new terminal operator absorbing the highest
possible number of workers. In many instancesa compromise is reached between the two, butthe new terminal operator should be given theoption to further adjust the workforce size andcomposition, which may lead to further disloca-tions postreform.
For example, in Argentina in 1991, concession-aires of the five terminals at Puerto Nuevo,Buenos Aires, were required to employ 1,350workers from the public agencies previouslyoperating at the port, or to negotiate an equiva-lent number of redundancy agreements. Thenumber of workers assigned to each concession-aire was based on the business plan submittedin the bid. For example, 130 workers wereassigned to Terminal Five, but most of themwere offered and accepted severance packagesonly a few months after the new firm startedoperating. Out of the 218 workers assigned toTerminal Three, 119 of them were offered andaccepted severance packages. Of the 900 work-ers assigned to Terminals One and Two, in May1999, only 419 remained with the firm.Severance payments ranged from$15,000–$20,000 per worker.
The terminal operators at the Port of BuenosAires preferred the compensated dismissaloption to retaining an oversupply of workers.This was due in part to the distorting gaps inwages and length of vacation among workersperforming the same tasks. Because of theirlonger length of service, former public sectorworkers were entitled to higher salaries andextended periods of vacation compared tonew private sector hires. In addition, at anaverage age of 50 years, most of the trans-ferred public sector workers were “worn out”as a result of having worked in the old portunder difficult and, in some cases, hazardousworking conditions.
6.5. Who Should Pay for theExpenses of Port LaborRationalization?The expenses associated with downsizingcould amount to millions of dollars depending
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
333
MO
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on the number of workers, levels of set com-pensation, and safety net components such astraining and outplacement assistance. Manycountries have recognized the convenience ofreducing the workforce prior to private sectorparticipation in state-owned enterprises, butoffsetting the expenses related to labor reduc-tion has been a difficult task for many govern-ments, especially in view of pressing budgetaryconstraints.
For the government of Mozambique, for exam-ple, the staff rationalization component, whichincluded staff reductions of approximately14,000, pension fund payments, staff redeploy-ment, and social mitigation as part of theMozambique Rail and Port RestructuringProject in 1999 was estimated to cost the gov-ernment $50 million. Compensation paid toworkers laid off in Chilean ports as a result ofthe deregulation of dock labor in 1981 amount-ed to a total of $30 million. Payments perworker averaged $14,300 and ranged between$10,000 and $200,000. In 1991, the govern-ment of Colombia provided $50 million tocompensate 8,000 Colombian dock workers forthe loss of acquired rights. The restructuring ofVenezuelan ports in 1991 led to the layoff of10,279 dock workers and 2,000 officials in theNational Ports Institute. All received doublecompensation from the government ofVenezuela, amounting to $182 million overall,or $14,822 per person.
When considering whether and how to paysuch sums, governments have to contrast theseexpenditures with the broader long-term goalsof port reform, which are to make ports moreefficient and cost effective in support of theoverall economy. Therefore governments, asformer employers, and the private sector, asnew employers, both have an important role toplay in the financing of the expenses associatedwith port labor reductions. Actually, it couldalso be possible, in view of the benefits to beexpected from a quick resolution of the issue, toask port customers (shipping lines, for instance)to contribute to the modernization coststhrough a temporary levy on tariffs.
7. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTFOR LABOR ADJUSTMENTA number of programs and funding sources canbe used to support port labor reform, several ofwhich are described below.
Since 1990, the World Bank (Bank) has sup-ported labor adjustment in reform and enter-prise restructuring in about 50 operationsaround the world. The main elements of Banksupport have included:
• Technical assistance for governments tohelp:
~ Develop staff inventories and profiles.
~ Identify staffing needs.
~ Develop severance and retirement pack-ages.
~ Analyze labor market characteristicsand needs.
~ Redeploy workers through active labormarket programs.
~ Design employee share ownershipschemes.
~ Establish consultative mechanisms.
~ Prepare communications programs.
• Direct financing for severance payments,provided that such financing results inimproved productivity of the sector andrelated enterprises and that social mitiga-tion measures are put in place. The firstexample of this type of support was thereform of Brazil Railways, where a Bankproject financed half the costs of the sev-erance program. For a list of other exam-ples, see Annex 1.
• Poverty alleviation programs such associal funds to provide compensatoryassistance, advice and training, placementservices, and credit for self-employment.Such funds are typically targeted to thepoor, but they have been used for stateenterprise workers in cases of extremeeconomic distress or where large-scale
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
334
MO
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redundancies occur in concentrated areas(as in the case of mining in Bolivia andPeru).
Education and vocational training are vital tothe change process. Training should include notonly general education and broad industry-focused vocational training, but also specific jobinstruction, communication and social skillscourses, and health, safety and environmentaltraining. Sufficient and continuing funds arenecessary to finance the education and traininginfrastructure. The need for lifelong training toenable workers to cope with the permanentchanges taking place in the industry is recog-nized in the 1989 EU charter of FundamentalSocial Rights of Workers, which states that:“...every worker of the European Communitymust be able to have access to vocational train-ing and benefit there from throughout his orher working life.”
Moreover, good education and vocationaltraining are increasingly recognized and used asan instrument to improve the quality of theproducts and services of businesses and thusenhance their competitiveness. Therefore, edu-cation and vocational training are in the bestinterest of the port community as a whole.Furthermore, a lack of education and trainingmeans a lack of opportunities to teach theworkers the essence of transport economics andpolicies, the position of ports in the intermodaltransport system and its dependency on theother modes of transport, and about the forcesshaping the competitive environment.
The objective of the International Labor Office(ILO) Port Worker Development Program(PDP) is to enable governments and portauthorities of developing countries to establisheffective and systematic port worker trainingschemes. This training is designed to improvecontainer handling performance, working con-ditions and practices, safety, and the statusand welfare of port workers. See Annex II fora list of training centers or organizations thathave acquired the PDP training materialsand licenses.
The translation into Spanish of the PDP andthe training of PDP instructors and coordina-tors was undertaken under a GermanTechnical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) projectin Latin America. Since 2000, the program isregularly implemented in several Latin Americancountries. PDP is also being translated intoChinese.
Outreach for training programs has alsobeen improved through the establishment andstrengthening of training centers, managementtraining institutes, universities, and coopera-tion networks associated with the internation-al TRAINMAR Program of UNCTAD (UnitedNations Conference on Trade andDevelopment) in Central and South Americaand the Caribbean. This was achieved throughthe upgrading of local and regional trainingcapabilities and the application of the system-atic TRAINMAR methodology for the devel-opment and exchange of standard trainingmaterials as part of cooperation projectsfinanced by UNDP (United NationsDevelopment Programme), the EuropeanCommission, Germany, and France. Since1988, the three TRAINMAR networks inLatin America and the Caribbean are regular-ly and successfully developing and deliveringcourses and management training programsdirected at all categories of personnel fromthe port and transport industry.
Further information on the PDP may beobtained from: Chief, Maritime IndustriesBranch, Sectoral Activities Department,International Labor Office, 4 route desMorillons, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland,telephone (41.22) 799-7466, fax (41.22) 799-7050, e-mail: marit@ilo.org.
Further information on the TRAINMARnetworks in South and Central Americaand on the implementation of the PDP inLatin America may be obtained from:ATAS (Asociación TRAINMAR de Américadel Sur—South American TRAINMARAssociation) Montevideo, Uruguay. Web site: www.atas-trainmar.org.
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
335
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8. POSTREFORM LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS Once port reform is implemented, port labor andmanagement must continue to cooperate ifreform is to achieve its objectives. The proposedchanges in labor regimes, collective agreements,and work practices to improve productivity andcurtail cost will stand a better chance of success ifthey are reached with the agreement of all stake-holders. For mutual gains, labor and managementhave to concentrate on building stronger relation-ships through better communication and morecooperation. In that respect, it appears appropri-ate to foster the establishment of joint committeesbetween port workers and terminal operators toresolve operational problems and disputes with-out having to resort to official intervention.
Participation of port workers in workplace deci-sions has an enormous potential to motivateworkers and to enhance customers’ satisfaction.The combination of better communication andworking toward agreed objectives can set thestage for improved labor management relationsin ports that are undertaking reform. Successfullabor reform can only be achieved when thecommercial goals (efficiency and growth) of the
employers are balanced with the social goals(equity and fairness) of their employees.
REFERENCESAusInfo. 1998. “Work Arrangement in Container
Stevedoring, Research Report.” ProductivityCommission, AusInfo, Canberra, Australia.
Couper, A. D. 1986. “New Cargo HandlingTechniques: Implications for Port Employment andSkills.” ILO.
ILO (International Labour Organization). 1998.“The ILO’s Response to the Financial Crisis inEast and South-East Asia.” Technical paper forthe ILO’s High Level Tripartite Meeting on SocialResponses to the Financial Crisis in East andSouth East Asia Countries, Bangkok, Thailand,April 22–24, 1998. Web site: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/ bangkok/download/crisis/gb274.pdf.
Rama, Martin. 1999. “Public Sector Downsizing: AnIntroduction.” World Bank.
Economic Review, Vol. 13.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment). 1995. “Comparative Experienceswith Privatization: Policy Insights and LessonsLearned.” UNCTAD: New York and Geneva. Website: http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/dp22_2122 /chap5.PDF.
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
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Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
337
MO
DU
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AN
NE
X I.
WO
RLD
BA
NK
LA
BO
R A
DJU
ST
ME
NT
PR
OJE
CT
S
EC
A
1.R
ailw
ays
Turk
ey06
/09/
2005
Adj
ustm
ent s
chem
es
Impr
ove
the
finan
cial
via
bilit
y,To
tal:
$221
mill
ion
No
Res
truc
turin
g fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;pr
oduc
tivity
, and
effe
ctiv
enes
s (W
B $
184.
7 m
illio
n);
Pro
ject
(AP
L)tr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
of
rai
lway
s op
erat
ions
.C
ompo
nent
B: T
otal
N
o. 2
8049
-TU
wor
kers
Com
pone
nts:
B/S
taff
adju
stm
ent
$81.
5 m
illio
n (W
B
and
soci
al p
lan
finan
ces
$65.
2 m
illio
n);
impl
emen
tatio
n of
the
Com
pone
nt D
: re
stru
ctur
ing
proc
ess
and
Tota
l $0.
6 m
illio
n av
oids
soc
ial u
nres
t thr
ough
(W
B $
0.6
mill
ion)
soci
al m
itiga
tion
prog
ram
(s
ever
ance
pay
men
t and
co
mpe
nsat
ion
ince
ntiv
es;
retr
aini
ng a
nd re
depl
oym
ent;
and
supp
ort s
ervi
ces)
; D/
Sta
ff tr
aini
ng a
nd re
trai
ning
su
ppor
ts th
e im
plem
enta
tion
of th
e tr
aini
ng p
rogr
am in
ra
ilway
pro
cedu
res
revi
ew
and
desi
gn; o
pera
tiona
l pe
rfor
man
ce m
onito
ring;
im
prov
ed c
omm
unic
atio
n an
d ne
gotia
tion
skill
s w
ithin
th
e TC
DD
; and
labo
rre
gula
tion
on s
afet
y an
d he
alth
.
2.E
mpl
oym
ent
Ser
bia
and
04/3
0/20
03A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
S
eeks
to im
prov
e th
e ef
ficie
ncy
Tota
l: $5
.45
No
Pro
mot
ion
Mon
tene
gro
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rs;
of la
bor
prog
ram
s by
pilo
ting
and
mill
ion
(WB
P
roje
ct (L
IL)
publ
ic w
orks
;te
stin
g ne
w a
ppro
ache
s,$2
.75
mill
ion;
N
o. 2
5657
–YU
labo
r m
arke
t inf
orm
atio
n in
nova
tive
labo
r de
ploy
men
tD
FID
$1.
75
and
mon
itorin
gpr
ogra
ms,
and
em
ploy
men
t m
illio
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serv
ices
in s
elec
ted
area
s.
Bor
row
er $
0.95
).C
ompo
nent
s: 1
/ D
esig
n of
C
ompo
nent
1:
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
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Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
y co
mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
338
MO
DU
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Labo
r R
edep
loym
ent A
ctiv
ities
: to
tal:
$2.4
1 pr
ovid
e as
sist
ance
thro
ugh
mill
ion
(WB
: la
bor
rede
ploy
men
t ser
vice
s,
$1.2
mill
ion)
;re
inte
grat
e di
spla
ced
wor
kers
C
ompo
nent
2:
into
the
labo
r m
arke
t &
tota
l: $
2.03
m
itiga
te th
e so
cial
cos
ts o
f m
illio
n (W
B:
ente
rpris
e re
stru
ctur
ing;
2/
$1.0
2 m
illio
n);
Pilo
ting
Ref
orm
s in
Pub
lic
Com
pone
nt 3
: E
mpl
oym
ent S
ervi
ces:
Des
ign,
to
tal:
$0.4
mill
ion
pilo
t, an
d ev
alua
te c
ost-
(WB
: $0.
21
effe
ctiv
e pu
blic
em
ploy
men
t m
illio
n)se
rvic
es, t
o as
sist
the
unem
ploy
ed re
ente
r th
e la
bor
mar
ket,
thro
ugh
impr
oved
em
ploy
men
t se
rvic
es, s
earc
h as
sist
ance
pr
ogra
ms,
and
sm
all
busi
ness
adv
isor
y se
rvic
es;
3/ L
abor
mar
ket
info
rmat
ion,
and
eva
luat
ion:
B
uild
ing
loca
l cap
acity
to
gene
rate
, ana
lyze
, and
use
th
e in
form
atio
n fo
r po
licy
form
ulat
ion,
and
pro
gram
de
sign
;
3.S
ocia
l Sup
port
FY
R
06/1
6/19
99A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
A
ims
to m
itiga
te th
e ne
gativ
eTo
tal:
$11.
6 Ye
s (IC
R—
No.
Pro
ject
(SS
P)
Mac
edon
iafo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;so
cial
and
eco
nom
ic im
pact
m
illio
n (W
B $
10.
2757
4,
No.
194
32-M
Kem
ploy
men
t ser
vice
s;of
ban
krup
tcy
and
labo
rm
illio
n;
01/1
5/20
03)
labo
r ad
min
istr
atio
nre
stru
ctur
ing
of th
e m
ajor
ity
Gov
ernm
ent
stat
e-ow
ned
ente
rpris
es
$1.6
0).
(MS
OE
s), a
s w
ell a
s, th
e C
ompo
nent
1:
emer
genc
y ec
onom
ic
tota
l: $4
.56
disr
uptio
n du
e to
the
mill
ion
(WB
: co
nflic
t in
Kos
ovo.
The
$4
.56
mill
ion)
;
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
ion
Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
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mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
339
MO
DU
LE 7
proj
ect s
uppo
rts
com
plet
ion
Com
pone
nt 2
: of
ent
erpr
ises
priv
atiz
atio
n To
tal:
$6.1
8 an
d fo
cuse
s on
pov
erty
m
illio
n (W
B:
alle
viat
ion
and
hum
an
$4.8
4 m
illio
n);
capi
tal d
evel
opm
ent b
y C
ompo
nent
3:
targ
etin
g so
cial
ass
ista
nce
Tota
l: $0
.4
prog
ram
s an
d up
grad
ing
mill
ion
(WB
: so
cial
ser
vice
s. C
ompo
nent
s:
$0.3
9 m
illio
n);
1/ L
abor
rest
ruct
urin
g:
Com
pone
nt 4
: Fi
nanc
es s
ever
ance
pay
men
ts
Tota
l: $0
.46
for
wor
kers
of M
SO
Es
and
mill
ion
(WB
lim
ited
assi
stan
ce to
dev
elop
$0
.21
mill
ion)
empl
oym
ent s
ervi
ces;
2/
Labo
r re
depl
oym
ent:
Faci
litat
e ta
rget
ed b
enef
icia
ries
into
the
labo
r fo
rce;
3/
Soc
ial b
enef
its:
Impr
ove
soci
al p
rogr
ams
effe
ctiv
enes
s an
d de
velo
p in
stitu
tiona
l cap
acity
to
eval
uate
soc
ial p
rote
ctio
n an
d la
bor
mar
ket p
rogr
ams.
4.P
rivat
izat
ion
Turk
ey11
/27/
2000
Adj
ustm
ent s
chem
es
Sup
port
s ac
hiev
emen
ts o
f the
Tota
l: $3
55.3
N
o S
ocia
l Sup
port
fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;go
vern
men
t’s p
rivat
izat
ion
mill
ion
(WB
P
roje
ct (P
SS
P)
empl
oym
ent s
ervi
ces;
prog
ram
, miti
gate
s th
e$2
50.0
mill
ion;
N
o. 2
0709
-TU
trai
ning
for
retr
ench
ed
nega
tive
soci
al a
nd e
cono
mic
Gov
ernm
ent
wor
kers
impa
ct o
f the
priv
atiz
atio
n of
$1
05.3
mill
ion)
.st
ate-
owne
d en
terp
rises
, and
C
ompo
nent
1:
mon
itors
the
soci
al im
pact
of
Tota
l: $3
22.4
th
e E
cono
mic
Ref
orm
Pro
gram
m
illio
n (W
B:
(ER
P).
Com
pone
nts:
1/
Job
$225
.7 m
illio
n);
Loss
Com
pens
atio
n: P
rovi
des
Com
pone
nt 2
: se
vera
nce
and
rela
ted
Tota
l: $2
8.3
paym
ents
to d
ispl
aced
m
illio
n (W
B:
wor
kers
; 2/
Labo
r $2
0.2
mill
ion)
Red
eplo
ymen
t Pro
gram
(LR
P):
Pro
vide
s la
bor
rede
ploy
men
t se
rvic
es (j
ob c
ouns
elin
g,
retr
aini
ng, t
empo
rary
co
mm
unity
em
ploy
men
t, sm
all
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
340
MO
DU
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busi
ness
incu
bato
rs, s
mal
l bu
sine
ss te
chni
cal a
ssis
tanc
e)
to d
ispl
aced
wor
kers
, and
in
clud
ing
seco
ndar
y la
yoffs
, to
ass
ist t
hem
in r
apid
ly
reen
terin
g th
e la
bor
mar
ket.
5.S
econ
d Tu
rkey
05/1
0/20
05A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
S
uppo
rt th
e go
vern
men
t’sTo
tal:
$581
.7
No
Priv
atiz
atio
n fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;pr
ivat
izat
ion
prog
ram
by
mill
ion
(WB
S
ocia
l Sup
port
em
ploy
men
t ser
vice
s;m
itiga
ting
the
nega
tive
soci
al$4
65.4
mill
ion
Pro
ject
(PS
SP
2)tr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
an
d ec
onom
ic im
pact
of t
he(€
360
mill
ion)
.N
o: 3
1738
-TU
wor
kers
;pr
ivat
izat
ion
of s
tate
-ow
ned
Com
pone
nt 1
: la
bor
adm
inis
trat
ion
ente
rpris
es (S
OE
s).
Tota
l: €42
0.1
Com
pone
nts:
1/
Job
Loss
m
illio
n;C
ompe
nsat
ion
(JLC
): as
sist
s C
ompo
nent
2:
wor
kers
mad
e re
dund
ant
Tota
l: €27
.2
(sev
eran
ce a
nd re
late
d pa
ymen
ts,
mill
ion;
ea
rly re
tirem
ent);
2/
Labo
r C
ompo
nent
3:
Red
eplo
ymen
t Ser
vice
s (L
RS
): To
tal:
€0.
9 m
illio
nhe
lps
affe
cted
wor
kers
find
al
tern
ativ
e em
ploy
men
t (fi
nanc
es a
var
iety
of L
RS
, in
clud
ing
job
coun
selin
g,
plac
emen
t ser
vice
s, la
bor
retr
aini
ng, b
usin
ess
advi
sory
se
rvic
es, a
nd te
mpo
rary
co
mm
unity
em
ploy
men
t thr
ough
th
e Tu
rkis
h E
mpl
oym
ent A
genc
y [IS
KU
R],
and
smal
l bus
ines
s in
cuba
tors
thro
ugh
the
Sm
all a
nd
Med
ium
Indu
stry
Dev
elop
men
t A
genc
y [K
OS
GEB
]); 3
/Man
agem
ent,
Mon
itorin
g an
d E
valu
atio
n (M
ME
): en
sure
effe
ctiv
e im
plem
enta
tion
an
d as
sess
the
soci
al im
pact
of
priv
atiz
atio
n.
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
ion
Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
y co
mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
341
MO
DU
LE 7
6.H
ard
Coa
l P
olan
d03
/10/
2004
Adj
ustm
ent s
chem
es
Dow
nsiz
e em
ploy
men
t and
To
tal:
$300
N
oS
ocia
l fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;re
depl
oy s
urpl
us la
bor u
sing
soc
ially
mill
ion
(WB
M
itiga
tion
empl
oym
ent s
ubsi
dies
acce
ptab
le m
easu
res
to m
itiga
te$2
00 m
illio
n;
Pro
ject
the
cons
eque
nces
of p
rogr
amG
over
nmen
t N
o: 2
8061
-PO
Lim
plem
enta
tion
and
the
prop
osed
$100
mill
ion)
.ne
w e
mpl
oym
ent r
estr
uctu
ring.
C
ompo
nent
1:
Com
pone
nts:
1/
Sev
eran
ce
WB
: $70
P
aym
ents
for u
nder
grou
nd w
orke
rsm
illio
n;un
der t
he 2
003–
2006
Pro
gram
; 2/
Com
pone
nt 2
: Se
vera
nce
Paym
ents
, Res
killin
g an
dW
B: $
35
Ree
mpl
oym
ent f
or s
urfa
ce w
orke
rsm
illio
n;un
der
the
2003
–200
6 P
rogr
am,
Com
pone
nt 3
: in
clud
ing:
sev
eran
ce p
aym
ents
toW
B: $
95
surfa
ce w
orke
rs a
nd re
empl
oym
ent
mill
ion
ince
ntiv
es p
aym
ents
to e
mpl
oyer
s hi
ring
elig
ible
redu
ndan
t exs
urfa
ce
wor
kers
; 3/
Sev
eran
ce p
aym
ent
com
mitm
ents
from
pre
viou
sly
impl
emen
ted
Min
ers’
Soc
ial
Pac
kage
s un
der
the
1998
–200
2 P
rogr
am.
7.R
ailw
ay
Pol
and
04/3
0/20
01A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
Aim
s to
rest
ruct
ure
Pol
ish
Sta
teTo
tal f
inan
cing
N
oR
estr
uctu
ring
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rs;
Rai
lway
s’ (P
KP
) to
incr
ease
$335
.26
mill
ion
Pro
ject
empl
oym
ent s
ervi
ces;
effic
ienc
y, im
prov
e fin
ance
s,(W
B $
101.
03
No:
217
97-P
OL
unem
ploy
men
t an
d pr
ivat
ize
sele
cted
act
iviti
es.
mill
ion)
; as
sist
ance
/insu
ranc
e;C
ompo
nent
s fin
ance
and
C
ompo
nent
1:
trai
ning
for
retr
ench
ed
supp
ort:
1/ In
com
e su
ppor
t$2
96.2
mill
ion
wor
kers
(sev
eran
ce lu
mp
sum
s;(W
B $
98.5
7 pr
eret
irem
ent b
enef
its; r
ailw
aym
illio
n, e
xcep
t le
ave;
une
mpl
oym
ent b
enef
it);
for
the
2/ L
abor
Red
eplo
ymen
t un
empl
oym
ent
Pro
gram
s (re
qual
ifica
tion
bene
fit);
trai
ning
as
wel
l as
prof
essi
onal
C
ompo
nent
2:
and
soci
al a
dvic
e an
d ot
her
$23.
68 m
illio
n fo
rms
of p
rofe
ssio
nal
(no
WB
gu
idan
ce).
Thes
e in
clud
e fin
anci
ng)
gene
ral l
abor
rede
ploy
men
t pr
ogra
ms,
and
spe
cial
labo
r re
depl
oym
ent p
rogr
ams.
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
342
MO
DU
LE 7
8.R
ailw
ay
Cro
atia
12/0
8/19
98A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
S
eeks
to m
oder
nize
and
To
tal f
inan
cing
IC
Rep
ort
Mod
erni
zatio
n fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
re
stru
ctur
e H
rvat
ske
$183
.0 m
illio
n N
o: 3
3204
and
(sev
eran
ce p
aym
ent)
Zel
jezn
ice
(HZ
) to
dim
inis
h(W
B $
101
12/1
9/20
05R
estr
uctu
ring
its d
efic
it an
d fin
anci
alm
illio
n);
Pro
ject
burd
en o
n th
e bu
dget
whi
leC
ompo
nent
6:
No:
185
53-H
Rcr
eatin
g a
com
pany
ada
pted
$8
2.4
mill
ion
to a
com
petit
ive
tran
spor
t (W
B $
35.4
m
arke
t. Th
e m
ajor
soc
ial
mill
ion)
issu
e fa
ced
by th
e pr
ojec
t is
rela
ted
to th
e st
aff
retr
ench
men
t and
ser
vice
s re
duct
ion
com
pone
nts.
Th
e pr
ojec
t for
esee
s th
e se
para
tion
of a
bout
7,0
00
staf
f (30
per
cent
of t
he
1998
sta
ff). C
ompo
nent
6:
Red
unda
nt s
taff
will
be
elig
ible
for
a re
dund
ancy
or
an e
arly
retir
emen
t pac
kage
.
Asi
a
1.E
nter
pris
e B
angl
ades
h05
/11/
2004
Adj
ustm
ent s
chem
es
Trig
ger
empl
oym
ent
Tota
l fin
anci
ng
Gro
wth
and
fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;ge
nera
tion
thro
ugh
priv
ate
$480
mill
ion
Ban
k m
icro
ente
rpris
es
sect
or e
nter
pris
e gr
owth
(WB
$25
0.0
Mod
erni
zatio
n (m
icro
cred
it);
and
refo
rms
with
in th
e S
OE
s.m
illio
n);
Pro
ject
empl
oym
ent s
ervi
ces
Com
pone
nts:
1/
Ent
erpr
ise
Com
pone
nt 1
: N
o: 2
7979
(Uni
ted
Kin
gdom
grow
th s
uppo
rts
the
$20
mill
ion
Dep
artm
ent f
or
deve
lopm
ent o
f the
sm
all
(WB
$10
mill
ion)
; In
tern
atio
nal
ente
rpris
e se
ctor
thro
ugh
Com
pone
nt 4
: D
evel
opm
ent [
DFI
D]);
the
Sm
all E
nter
pris
e Fu
nd$3
72 m
illio
n tr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
(S
EF)
, as
a re
finan
cing
faci
lity
(WB
$18
0 w
orke
rs (D
FID
) w
here
fund
s w
ill b
e on
-loan
m
illio
n; D
FID
to
SM
E-f
ocus
ed b
anks
to
$77.
5 m
illio
n);
help
sca
le u
p th
eir
smal
l C
ompo
nent
5:
ente
rpris
e po
rtfo
lio;
$10
mill
ion
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
ion
Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
y co
mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
343
MO
DU
LE 7
4/ S
uppo
rt fo
r vo
lunt
ary
(ent
irely
by
retir
emen
t sch
emes
D
FID
)(V
RS
) in
SO
Es,
whi
ch
are
bein
g cl
osed
dow
n an
d/or
priv
atiz
ed—
cove
ring
retir
emen
ts (c
ontin
ue th
e as
sist
ance
initi
ated
und
er
the
Wor
ld B
ank’
s D
evel
opm
ent S
uppo
rt
Cre
dit [
DS
C],
whi
ch
supp
orte
d m
uch
of th
e fir
st tr
anch
e of
28
SO
E
clos
ures
in 2
001–
2). D
esig
ned
to c
over
the
VR
S c
osts
to
the
gove
rnm
ent o
f a
seco
nd tr
anch
e of
abo
ut
95 e
nter
pris
es s
late
d fo
r cl
osur
e/pr
ivat
izat
ion
over
the
perio
d 20
02–3
to 2
007–
8;
5/ R
etra
inin
g an
d co
unse
ling
serv
ices
for
retr
ench
ed/
retir
ed s
taff
of S
OE
, fin
ance
d co
mpl
etel
y by
D
FID
. Act
iviti
es in
clud
e sa
fety
net
pro
gram
and
so
cial
ass
ista
nce
and
soci
al
prot
ectio
n pr
ogra
m.
It pr
ovid
es a
dequ
ate
coun
selin
g an
d re
trai
ning
su
ppor
t to
retir
ed w
orke
rs.
2.U
ttar
Pra
desh
In
dia
03/2
4/20
00A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
for
Sup
port
s th
e in
itiat
ion
of
Tota
l fin
anci
ng
Yes.
ICR
Pow
er S
ecto
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
the
pow
er s
ecto
r re
form
$236
mill
ion
(SC
L-R
estr
uctu
ring
proc
ess
by e
stab
lishi
ng(W
B $
150
mill
ion)
; 45
450
Pro
ject
a ne
w le
gal,
regu
lato
ry,
Com
pone
nt
PP
FB-
No:
202
50-I
Nan
d in
stitu
tiona
l fra
mew
ork;
5: $
5 m
illio
n P
2291
cr
eate
new
pow
er
(all
WB
)P
PFB
-P22
90)
corp
orat
ions
; pre
pare
for
Rep
ort N
o:
priv
atiz
atio
n of
the
3242
3di
strib
utio
n bu
sine
ss;
05/2
4/20
05
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
344
MO
DU
LE 7
redu
ce th
e m
ost c
ritic
al
bott
lene
cks
in th
e po
wer
sy
stem
to im
prov
e th
e su
pply
and
est
ablis
h th
e be
nefit
s; a
nd to
bui
ld a
nd
deve
lop
supp
ort a
mon
g ke
y st
akeh
olde
rs in
the
stat
e. C
ompo
nent
5 h
elps
de
velo
p a
VR
S.
3.B
anki
ng
Pak
ista
n10
/01/
2001
Adj
ustm
ent s
chem
es
Sup
port
impl
emen
tatio
n of
Tota
l fin
anci
ng
Yes.
ICR
S
ecto
r fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
bank
ing
refo
rm p
rogr
am$5
40 m
illio
n (ID
A-3
5710
)R
estr
uctu
ring
to c
reat
e a
com
petit
ive
(WB
IDA
$30
0 R
epor
t No:
and
priv
ate
bank
ing
syst
em,
mill
ion)
; 32
588
Priv
atiz
atio
n st
rong
regu
lato
ryC
ompo
nent
1:
06/1
5/20
05P
roje
ctfr
amew
ork,
and
an
$437
mill
ion
No:
225
09-
effe
ctiv
e ba
nkin
g co
urt
(WB
$30
0.0)
PAK
syst
em. C
ompo
nent
1:
Fina
nces
the
Nat
iona
lized
C
omm
erci
al B
ank
(NC
B)
staf
f rat
iona
lizat
ion
thro
ugh
a vo
lunt
ary
sepa
ratio
n sc
hem
e, w
here
by a
se
vera
nce
pack
age
(con
sist
ing
of c
ash
com
pens
atio
n ca
lcul
ated
on
the
basi
s of
one
m
onth
pay
per
yea
r of
se
rvic
e, p
lus
com
mut
atio
n of
all
annu
al le
ave,
pen
sion
s,
and
med
ical
ben
efits
) will
be
pro
vide
d. T
he v
olun
tary
sc
hem
e w
ill b
e co
mpl
emen
ted
by th
e ou
tsou
rcin
g of
non
core
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
ion
Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
y co
mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
345
MO
DU
LE 7
staf
f and
leav
e w
ithou
t pa
y, b
ut w
ithou
t ben
efits
fo
r th
ose
in e
xecu
tive
leve
ls.
4.E
nter
pris
e C
hina
06/2
8/19
99Tr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
Th
e pr
ojec
t will
hel
p re
visi
tTo
tal f
inan
cing
IC N
ote
Ref
orm
w
orke
rs;
and
test
way
s to
fost
er$8
.14
mill
ion
Rep
ort N
o.P
roje
ctem
ploy
men
t ser
vice
s re
trai
ning
of l
aid-
off
(WB
IDA
$5
2745
4N
o: 1
9300
-CH
A(c
ouns
elin
g)w
orke
rs in
a m
anne
r th
atm
illio
n);
11/3
0/20
03is
targ
eted
at j
ob g
row
th
Cof
inan
cier
s
oppo
rtun
ities
, esp
ecia
lly
$2.2
2 m
illio
n in
the
serv
ice
sect
ors.
an
d O
ne o
f the
se w
ays
will
G
over
nmen
t be
retr
aini
ng a
nd
$0.9
2 m
illio
n;C
ompo
nent
3:
coun
selin
g to
laid
-off
Tota
l $1.
24
stat
e en
terp
rise
empl
oyee
s m
illio
n (W
B $
0.90
)to
sta
rt th
eir
own
busi
ness
es
(reem
ploy
men
t) (C
ompo
nent
3).
Eac
h co
mpo
nent
will
be
impl
emen
ted
in th
e fo
llow
ing
area
s:
Cha
ngsh
a, S
heny
ang,
W
uhan
, and
Wuh
u.
Afr
ica
1.Tr
ansp
ort
Mal
i03
/11/
2004
Adj
ustm
ent s
chem
es
Com
pone
nt A
1: S
ocia
lN
oC
orrid
ors
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rs;
and
com
pens
atio
n pl
anIm
prov
emen
t em
ploy
men
t ser
vice
s;to
miti
gate
the
impa
ct o
f the
Pro
ject
trai
ning
for
retr
ench
ed
conc
essi
onin
g of
rai
lN
o. 2
7668
wor
kers
serv
ices
to a
priv
ate
oper
ator
on
staf
f dec
lare
d To
tal:
$32.
8 re
dund
ant.
Fina
nced
m
illio
nac
tiviti
es: s
ever
ance
C
ompo
nent
pa
ymen
ts; t
echn
ical
1:
$13
.47
advi
sory
ser
vice
s an
d m
illio
nop
erat
ing
cost
s of
the
Sev
eran
ce
unit
crea
ted
to p
rovi
de
paym
ents
:
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
346
MO
DU
LE 7
supp
ort t
o re
dund
ant s
taff
$13.
2 m
illio
n;in
eva
luat
ing
trai
ning
nee
ds,
Adv
isor
y fin
ding
a n
ew jo
b, a
nd
serv
ices
to
prep
arin
g pe
rson
al b
usin
ess
the
unit
that
pr
ojec
ts; f
acili
tatin
g w
ill p
rovi
de
rein
sert
ion
of re
dund
ant
supp
ort t
o st
aff;
and
tech
nica
l re
dund
ant
advi
sory
ser
vice
s to
st
aff:
$0.1
6 m
onito
r th
e so
cial
impa
ct
mill
ion
of re
dund
anci
es d
urin
g an
d af
ter
the
perio
d of
im
plem
enta
tion
of th
e so
cial
and
co
mpe
nsat
ion
plan
.
2.Tr
ansp
ort
Mad
agas
car
05/0
2/20
00A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
for
Str
engt
hen
tran
spor
t S
ecto
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;se
ctor
pol
icy
and
Ref
orm
and
tr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
m
anag
emen
t by
Reh
abili
tatio
n w
orke
rsim
plem
enta
tion
of a
Pro
ject
soci
al m
itiga
tion
stra
tegy
(AP
L-P
hase
1)
incl
udin
g ca
paci
ty-b
uild
ing
No:
203
95-M
AG
and
trai
ning
for
envi
ronm
enta
l ass
essm
ent
and
prep
arat
ion
of
a co
mpr
ehen
sive
soc
ial
prot
ectio
n an
d m
itiga
tion
prog
ram
for
the
wor
kers
di
spla
ced
as a
resu
lt of
se
ctor
rest
ruct
urin
g.3.
Priv
ate
Sen
egal
Trai
ning
for
retr
ench
ed
Pos
tal r
efor
ms
($6.
5 m
illio
nIn
vest
men
t w
orke
rs;
finan
ced
by ID
A):
Fina
nce
Pro
mot
ion
adju
stm
ent s
chem
es
the
prep
arat
ion
ofP
roje
ctfo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
com
pens
atio
n pa
ckag
es.
Trai
ning
will
gen
eral
ly
cove
r in
divi
dual
, gro
up,
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
ion
Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
y co
mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
347
MO
DU
LE 7
and
on-t
he-jo
b tr
aini
ng
of te
chni
cal s
taff.
4.E
cono
mic
N
iger
ia11
/15/
2004
Trai
ning
for
retr
ench
ed
Com
pone
nts:
2/
Pilo
t civ
il To
tal f
inan
cing
No
Ref
orm
and
w
orke
rs;
serv
ice
adm
inis
trat
ive
$179
.22
mill
ion
Gov
erna
nce
adju
stm
ent s
chem
es
refo
rms
supp
ort
(WB
-ID
A: $
140)
;P
roje
ct
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rs
rest
ruct
urin
gTr
aini
ng $
48.2
3(fe
dera
l (fr
om p
ublic
sec
tor);
in fo
ur p
ilot m
inis
trie
sM
illio
ngo
vern
men
t)em
ploy
men
t ser
vice
san
d ca
paci
ty b
uild
ing
Sev
eran
ceN
o: 3
0383
-NG
for
the
new
ly e
stab
lishe
d$4
8.23
mill
ion
Bur
eau
for
Pub
lic S
ervi
ce
Ref
orm
s (B
PS
R).
Ass
ista
nce
incl
udes
: ter
min
atio
n be
nefit
s an
d fa
cilit
atin
g re
inse
rtio
n th
roug
h tr
aini
ng
activ
ities
to a
id
rede
ploy
men
t tow
ard
new
ac
tiviti
es, a
dapt
atio
n to
ne
w jo
bs, a
cqui
sitio
n of
sk
ills
nece
ssar
y to
dev
elop
pe
rson
al p
roje
cts,
and
cu
stom
ized
cou
nsel
ing;
3/
Pen
sion
s re
form
s.5.
Rai
lway
s Z
ambi
a10
/18/
2000
Adj
ustm
ent s
chem
es
Pro
ject
aim
s a
subs
tant
ial
Tota
l fin
anci
ng
Yes.
ICR
Res
truc
turin
g fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;re
stru
ctur
ing
of Z
ambi
a$3
1.0
mill
ion
(IDA
-343
30P
roje
cttr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
R
ailw
ays,
to in
crea
se it
s(W
B ID
A $
27);
TF-2
3134
),N
o: 2
1073
-ZM
wor
kers
oper
atin
g ef
ficie
ncy,
Com
pone
nt 2
: R
epor
t No:
redu
ce o
pera
tiona
l cos
ts,
$16.
90 m
illio
n 32
520
and
conf
igur
e its
frei
ght
(WB
$15
.2
12/2
0/20
05se
rvic
es, a
nd ta
riffs
. m
illio
n);
Com
pone
nts
2/ S
taff
Com
pone
nt 7
: ra
tiona
lizat
ion
finan
ces
$1 m
illio
n re
tren
chm
ent c
ompe
nsat
ion
(all
WB
) th
roug
h se
vera
nce
paym
ents
, and
an
addi
tiona
l 15
perc
ent
cont
inge
ncy
will
be
prov
ided
to c
ope
with
an
y va
riatio
ns; a
nd p
ensi
on
oblig
atio
ns a
nd li
abili
ties
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
348
MO
DU
LE 7
fund
ed b
y th
e pe
nsio
n fu
nd;
7/ S
ocia
l miti
gatio
n, b
ased
on
reco
mm
enda
tions
of t
he
soci
al a
sses
smen
ts.
6.P
rivat
izat
ion
Uga
nda
05/2
2/20
00A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
P
roje
ct a
ims
to im
prov
e th
eTo
tal f
inan
cing
N
oan
d U
tility
fo
r re
tren
ched
wor
kers
;qu
ality
, cov
erag
e, a
nd
$92.
1 m
illio
n S
ecto
r em
ploy
men
t ser
vice
sec
onom
ic e
ffici
ency
of
(WB
IDA
R
efor
m
com
mer
cial
and
util
ity$4
5.3
mill
ion)
;P
roje
ctse
rvic
es th
roug
hC
ompo
nent
1:
No:
200
16-U
Gpr
ivat
izat
ion,
priv
ate
$71.
7 m
illio
n pa
rtic
ipat
ion
in in
fras
truc
ture
, (W
B $
25.5
mill
ion)
and
an im
prov
ed re
gula
tory
fr
amew
ork.
Com
pone
nt 1
: P
rovi
des
tech
nica
l ass
ista
nce
and
on-t
he-jo
b tr
aini
ng to
hel
p th
e go
vern
men
t des
ign
and
impl
emen
t the
priv
atiz
atio
n pr
ogra
m, a
nd s
ever
ance
pa
ymen
ts a
nd re
depl
oym
ent
supp
ort.
7.R
ailw
ays
Moz
ambi
que
09/1
4/19
99A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
In
crea
se th
e op
erat
ing
Tota
l fin
anci
ng
No
and
Por
ts
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rs;
effic
ienc
y of
thre
e m
ajor
$1
20 m
illio
n R
estr
uctu
ring
empl
oym
ent s
ervi
ces;
port
-rai
l sys
tem
s in
(WB
IDA
P
roje
cttr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
M
ozam
biqu
e, a
nd e
nabl
e $1
00.0
mill
ion)
; w
orke
rssh
are
incr
ease
s in
thei
rin
tern
atio
nal f
reig
ht tr
affic
w
ith n
eigh
borin
g co
untr
ies.
C
ompo
nent
2: T
he a
dver
se
Com
pone
nt 2
: im
pact
of i
nvol
unta
ry
tota
l $93
.5
sepa
ratio
ns o
f a la
rge
num
ber
mill
ion,
of w
hich
, of
sur
plus
sta
ff is
min
imiz
ed
staf
f red
unda
ncy
thro
ugh
a st
aff r
atio
naliz
atio
n $8
4 m
illio
n pr
ogra
m th
at o
ffers
spe
cial
ly
(WB
$67
mill
ion)
de
sign
ed re
tirem
ent a
nd
and
$7 m
illio
n
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
ion
Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
y co
mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
349
MO
DU
LE 7
retr
ench
men
t pac
kage
s;
(sta
ff re
depl
oym
ent)
rede
ploy
men
t sup
port
to
help
wor
kers
find
alte
rnat
ive
jobs
or
beco
me
self-
empl
oyed
; so
cial
miti
gatio
n m
easu
res;
cr
eatio
n of
a p
ensi
on fu
nd
for
the
rem
aini
ng C
FM
empl
oyee
s; a
com
preh
ensi
ve
pens
ion
stud
y fo
r al
l pub
lic
ente
rpris
es in
clud
ing
CFM
.La
tin A
mer
ica
and
the
Car
ibbe
an R
egio
n
1.P
osta
l Ser
vice
s Tr
inid
ad a
nd
02/2
5/19
99A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
S
eeks
to e
xpan
d th
e co
vera
geTo
tal f
inan
cing
R
efor
m P
roje
ctTo
bago
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rsan
d qu
ality
of p
osta
l ser
vice
s,$2
3.04
mill
ion
achi
eve
maj
or e
ffici
ency
gai
ns,
(WB
$14
.85)
;an
d, b
ecom
e m
ore
resp
onsi
ve
to c
lient
nee
ds. C
ompo
nent
: V
SE
P
Volu
ntar
y se
para
tion
assi
stan
ce,
com
pone
nt
aim
ed a
t im
prov
ing
labo
r fin
ance
d by
ef
ficie
ncy,
is g
over
nmen
t’s-
the
gove
rnm
ent
finan
ced
Volu
ntar
y S
epar
atio
n
only
$2.
7E
mpl
oym
ent P
acka
ge (V
SE
P),
mill
ion
cons
iste
nt w
ith th
e co
untr
y’s
labo
r la
ws,
and
gra
nted
afte
r
cons
ulta
tion
with
the
unio
n.
Mid
dle
Eas
t an
d N
orth
Afr
ica
Reg
ion
1.Tr
ansp
ort
Tuni
sia
02/2
1/20
01A
djus
tmen
t sch
emes
P
hase
2 o
f pro
ject
that
Tota
l fin
anci
ng
No
Sec
tor
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rsfin
ance
s in
vest
men
ts in
$56.
6 m
illio
nIn
vest
men
t ur
ban
tran
spor
t as
wel
l(W
B $
37.6
); P
roje
ctas
add
ition
al in
vest
men
tsA
PL
in r
ailw
ays
and
capa
city
(Pha
se II
) bu
ildin
g in
tran
spor
t sec
tor
No:
211
51
man
agem
ent.
As
a pa
rtS
ever
ance
TU
Nof
the
inve
stm
ent p
rogr
am$3
6.2
mill
ion
to im
prov
e pu
blic
bus
ser
vice
, pr
ojec
t fin
ance
s se
vera
nce
paym
ents
to a
bout
900
re
dund
ant e
mpl
oyee
s of
pu
blic
bus
com
pani
es.
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
350
MO
DU
LE 7
2.C
ivil
Ser
vice
R
epub
lic
03/2
3/20
00Tr
aini
ng fo
r re
tren
ched
P
roje
ct w
ill e
stab
lish
aTo
tal f
inan
cing
No
Mod
erni
zatio
n of
Yem
enw
orke
rs;
mec
hani
sm to
redu
ce th
e$3
3 m
illio
nP
roje
ctad
just
men
t sch
emes
nu
mbe
r of
unq
ualif
ied
civi
l(W
B $
30);
No:
202
09-
for
retr
ench
ed w
orke
rsse
rvan
ts a
nd in
itiat
e a
* B
uy-o
ut
YE
Mre
stru
ctur
ing
proc
ess
inpa
ckag
es w
ill
indi
vidu
al m
inis
trie
s.
be fi
nanc
edC
ompo
nent
s: 1
/ A
mon
g by
the
ot
her
activ
ities
, inc
lude
s go
vern
men
tex
tens
ive
trai
ning
thro
ugh
spec
ific
mod
ular
cou
rses
on
new
cor
e sy
stem
s an
d sk
ills;
2/
Tech
nica
l as
sist
ance
will
be
prov
ided
to
cre
ate
a ci
vil s
ervi
ce fu
nd
and
esta
blis
h its
pol
icy
fram
ewor
k re
gard
ing
retir
emen
t, re
dund
ancy
, and
se
vera
nce
optio
ns.
Fina
ncin
g (to
tal,
Eva
luat
ion
Pro
ject
Nam
eA
pp
rova
lb
y co
mp
onen
t an
d(Y
es—
No.
and
Num
ber
Cou
ntry
Dat
eIn
terv
entio
n Ty
pe
Des
crip
tion
and
Com
pon
ents
by
inst
itutio
ns)
Rep
ort
#/N
o)
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
351
MO
DU
LE 7
ANNEX II. LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE OBTAINED ANDRENEWED AN INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATIONPORTWORKER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM LICENSE
List of organizations which have obtained and renewed a ILO PDP License
Hong Kong International Container Terminals Ltd. (Hong Kong, China) TEMPO, Municipal Port Management (the Netherlands) YES YES NO
Shipping and Transport College/International Maritime Transport Academy (the Netherlands YES NO
Mauritius Port Authority (Mauritius) YES YES
PORTNET Academy (South Africa) YES NO
Sri Lanka Ports Authority (Sri Lanka) YES YES
PNG Harbours Board (Guinea)
JP Training & Development SDN BHD (Malaysia) YES YES NO
MOMAF - Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries / Shipping and Logistics Bureau (Republic of Korea) YES NO
Carriers Container Council, Inc. (United States) YES YES
Colombo Nautical & Engineering College (Sri Lanka)
Jakarta International Container Terminal (Indonesia) YES NO
Wubeling and Partners, port safety Consultants, Rotterdam (the Netherlands) YES NO
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (Hong Kong, China) YES NO
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (United States) YES YES
World Maritime University (Sweden) YES YES
Pelabuhan Tanjung Pelepas Sdn Bhd (Malaysia) YES YES
Pacific Maritime Association (United States) YES YES
AMC Search Ltd. (Australia) YES YES
Global Maritime & Transportation School (United States) YES YES
UNCTAD (Switzerland) YES YES
Klang Container Terminal Bhd (Malaysia)
Chung-Ang University (Republic of Korea) YES YES
Express Maritime Services Ltd. (Ghana) YES YES
Sea Ports Corporation Training Centre (Sudan)
Instituto de Educacion Nautica y Portuaria A.C. (IENPAC) (Mexico) YES YES
Regional Maritime Academy (Ghana) YES YES
IFIRA Wharf & Stevedoring (1994) Ltd. /(Port Vila, Vanuatu ) YES YES
Kelang Multi Terminal (WESTPORT) (Malyasia) YES YES
Hong Kong Logistics Association (Hong Kong, China) YES YES
Thessaloniki Port Authority S.A. (Greece) YES YES
Port and Coast Directory (Maritime Authority) (Brazil) YES YES
Philippine Ports Authority (Philippines) YES YES
Altamira Terminal Portuaria (ATP) (Mexico)
Internacional de Contenedores Asociados de Veracruz (Mexico)
Oriental Port and Allied Services Corporation (Philippines) YES YES
Joint Dock Labour Industrial Council (Nigeria) YES YES
Container and RO-RO Terminal (Slovenia) YES YES
Thai Laemchabang Terminal Co., Ltd. (Thailand) YES YES
Nonrenewed Organization/Institution Acquired License Valid License License
ANNEX II. CONTINUED
Kerria Ltd. (Russian Federation) YES YES
Shipping & Logistics (Australia) YES YES
P&O Ports Pvt. Ltd. (India) YES YES
Nigerian Ports Authority (Nigeria) YES YES
Malaysian Association of Productivity (Malaysia) YES YES
Indian Institute of Port Management (India) YES YES
Shanghai Maritime University (China) YES YES
Department of Maritime Transport, Ministry of Transport and Communication (Eritrea) YES YES
Arab Academy for Science and Technology, Port Training Institute (Egypt) YES YES
Modern Terminals Limited (Hong Kong, China) YES YES
Consilium Services Inc. (Canada) YES YES
Manzanillo International Terminal-Panama S.A. (Panama) YES YES
Comision Centroamericana de Transporte Maritimo (Nicaragua) YES YES
HZSAFETY B.V. (the Netherlands) YES YES
PSA Corporation Limited (Singapore) YES YES
PLIPDECO (Trinidad and Tobago) YES YES
Fundacion Puertos de las Palmas (Spain) YES YES
Chittagong Port Authority (Bangladesh) Cia. Minera Antamina S.A. (Peru) YES YES
Ministry for Competitiveness and Communications (Malta) YES YES
Arser S.A. (Turkey) YES YES
Sri Lanka Port Authorities (Sri Lanka) YES YES
Bandari College, Tanzania Harbours Authority (Tanzania) YES YES
Panama Ports Corporation (Balboa and Cristobal Terminals) (Panama) YES YES
Kenya Port Authority (Kenya) YES YES
Dubai Port Authority (United Arab Emirates) YES YES
Association TRAINMAR in South America (ATAS) (Argentina) YES YES
Source: International Labor Organisation.
Labor Reform and Related Social Issues
352
MO
DU
LE 7
Nonrenewed Organization/Institution Acquired License Valid License License
Recommended