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Executive Summary
Pakistan and Afghanistan are at a critical juncture in their history Islamic militancy has made rapid advances in these countries and if unchecked will gain control of them Its rapid advancement has been fuelled as much by state weaknesses in the two countries as by the seemingly open-ended American presence The current Pakistani action in the North-West Frontier Province and in the tribal areas indicates that the Pakistani army may have now awakened to the consequences of collaborating with militant Islamic groups No less urgent are governance issues that threaten stability in Baluchistan where insurgency is an indigenous problem and requires political compromises for an effective response
Islamabad needs a paradigm shift in its national security thinking Above all it should send clear signals to the Pakistani people and militants by sanctioning those who wage militancy both within and outside the state International pressure could help Islamabad to make this shift and reinforce its campaign against Islamic militancy Regional stability depends on two im-portant conditions external forces must vacate the region as soon as possible yet at the same time they must not leave a power vacuum in Afghanistan and Pa-kistan The spectre of a hostile Afghani-stan abetting secessionist political ele-ments in Pakistan will push Pakistan into the arms of the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul At the same time In-dia and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage in a fierce struggle over estab-lishing influence in the new Afghanistan
Abdul Hameed Nayyar
Dr A H Nayyar is a prominent Pakistani physicist who retired from Quaid-i-Azam Univer-sity Islamabad after teaching there for over 30 years Currently he is a Senior Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute Islamabad where he does policy research in the areas of education and energy He is also a Visit-ing Research Scientist in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University US a position he has held since 1998 At Princeton he works on technical issues related to nuclear dis-armament He is associated with several global peace movements and is also President of the Pakistan Peace Coalition a national network of peace and justice organizations
Abdul Hameed Nayyar
No 1 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
NORWEGIANPEACEBUILDING CENTRE
Noref Policy BriefNo 1 September 2009
- 1 -
Pakistan and Afghanistan are at a critical juncture in
their history Islamic militancy has made rapid
advances in these countries and if unchecked
will gain control of them This would signifi-
cantly boost the strength of international Islamist
movements and pose a threat to much of the world
The genie of Islamic militancy let out of the bottle
in the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s
is proving difficult to push back in Its rapid ad-
vancement has been fuelled as much by state weak-
nesses in the two countries as by the seemingly
open-ended American presence generally seen in
the region as imperial expansionism An equally
important factor is festering regional disputes
Pakistan has entered a defining phase in this
respect The authority of the state has been
directly challenged by Islamic militancy in the
Frontier Region1 as well as elsewhere in the coun-
try Civil and military leadership are finally con-
fronting this challenge Is this a passing episode in
the statersquos love-hate relationship with the militants
1 The semi-autonomous tribal lands consist of seven parts called ldquoagenciesrdquo Bajaur Mohmand Khyber Orakzai Kurram and North and South Waziristan There are also six smaller zones known as frontier regions in the transitional area between the tribal lands and the North-West Frontier Province to the east See Jayshree Bajori ldquoPakistanrsquos Tribal Areasrdquo Council on Foreign Relations httpwwwcfrorgpublication11973p2 accessed 17 September 2009
or has a paradigm shift finally occurred Can
Islamic militancy be defeated and defeated for
good What are the roles of the governments
of Pakistan Afghanistan and India In what
manner can the international forces assist the
regional governments so as to clear a path toward
exiting Afghanistan How important is it to address
the question of festering disputes in the region
Regional stability depends on two important
conditions external forces must vacate the
region as soon as possible yet at the same time
they must not leave a power vacuum in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan as this would clear the
way for the organised forces of Islamism These
two conditions make the task very difficult
Pakistan finally acts
It seems that the Taliban advance has finally been
halted by the Pakistani army Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) had spilled over from the Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the
settled areas of Swat Dir and Malakand rout-
ing out local governments The TTP defeated the
police and paramilitary forces that came to help
those administrations then enforced sharia laws
on citizens at gunpoint and extended the ad-
vance further into other districts coming to
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 2 -
within only 70 kilometres of the capital Islamabad
The provincial government had earlier hoped that
the deal it had struck with the religious group
Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Sharia Muhammadi (TNSM) to
administer an Islamic judicial system (Nizam-
e-Adl) in some areas under the provincial ad-
ministration would help stem the Taliban ad-
vance but this plan failed Indeed the TNSM
itself proved unable to influence the Taliban
As of now the army claims to have cleared
these areas of the Taliban and the government
has been quick to assure the
public that it has regained its
authority in the region The local
population that had fled en masse
to safer areas following the military
offensive have started to return to their homes and
jobs Schools over four hundred of which (main-
ly girls schools) had been destroyed by the Tali-
ban have reopened In spite of the governmentrsquos
claim of defeating the Taliban however warnings
of militant attacks on military posts and convoys
and on government buildings continue This would
appear to indicate that only those who had a great
deal to lose by staying away from their homes have
returned Others are still living in large numbers
in refugee camps in distant cities and provinces
The government of Pakistan has also directed its
attention to the tribal areas of North and South
Waziristan where militants had earlier driven out
Pakistanrsquos paramilitary forces (the Frontier Corps)
Since then the area has become a firm stronghold
of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda
and a source of inspiration for religious militant
forces elsewhere in the country It is the head-
quarters of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
a movement that emerged along the lines of the
Afghan Taliban bringing various warlord mullahs
under a loose confederation of tactical alliances
Before he was killed in Au-
gust TTPrsquos leader Baitullah
Mehsud was responsible for
many suicide bombings and
slayings in Pakistan the most
notorious of which was the murder of former
prime minister Benazir Bhutto It seemed initial-
ly that the succession issue would lead to bloody
internal contests with several contenders vying
to get hold of the huge resources of the Taliban
leadership It was expected that with Mehsudrsquos
death the Pakistani army would make rapid gains
inside the Waziristan agencies but this has not
happened The leadership tussle has not created
serious fissures in the TTP nor has the army been
able to make any major headway on the ground
Since militants have been able to move quickly and
freely within the 400 kilometre-long tribal belt
Waziristan has become a
stronghold of the Pakistani
Taliban and al-Qaeda
Pakistan and Islamism
- 3 -
mostly controlled by TTP a final thrust in Waziristan
would first require establishing government control
in other tribal agencies in the north and the frontier
regions of the adjoining settled districts The army
therefore targeted Orakzai and South Waziristan
Agency in June 2009 The most recent thrust of
the government is in the Khyber agency which
was hitherto under full control of Lashkar-e-Islam
The current Pakistani action in the North-
west Frontier Province and in the tribal areas
will have a significant impact on the future of
the region It indicates that the Pakistani estab-
lishment especially the army may have now
awakened to the deadly consequences of collabo-
rating with and patronizing militant Islamic groups
Pakistanrsquos limitations
Pakistanrsquos options against militants in areas where
security forces have been pushed back are very lim-
ited Given that the terrain does not allow for the
large-scale movement of soldiers the Pakistan army
has been forced to rely on long-distance shelling on
roughly defined targets which too often spares the
intended target and alienates the local population be-
cause of indiscriminate damage to life and property
Since mid-2008 when Pakistan failed to stop al-
Qaeda and Taliban attacks from the Federally Ad-
ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) against the al-
liance and Afghan troops the United States has
used unmanned drone aircraft with precision-guid-
ed missiles against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan
from across the border in Afghanistan But the
attacks clearly violate Pakistanrsquos sovereignty
While protesting over the US drone attacks
on North and South Waziristan2 Pakistan has
acknowledged that the attacks were effective in
taking out targets accurately and causing mini-
mum casualties among non-combatants This
claim is disputed by some observers and of course
excludes the families hosting the targeted militant
leaders Pakistan seems to have finally started col-
laborating with US forces in these attacks which
recently resulted in the killing of key guerrilla
leader Baitullah Mehsud and his close associates
The slain militant had access to sizeable resources
2 ldquoUS drones prowl over Waziristan Pakistan concernedrdquo The Daily Times 25 June 2009 httpwwwdailytimescompkdefaultasppage=20090625story_25-6-2009_pg1_5 accessed 17 Sep-tember 2009 David Ignatius ldquoA Quiet Deal With Pakistanrdquo The Washington Post November 4 2008 httpwwwwashingtonpostcomwp-dyncontentarticle20081103AR2008110302638html accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 4 -- 4 -
within the tribal area and outside and reports indi-
cate a succession war has erupted within the TTP
that has claimed the lives of a number of important
Taliban commanders Whether or not this group
survives the internal conflict remains to be seen
Anti-American sentiment is very strong among
the Pakistani public3 and consequently there is
an undercurrent of approval for Taliban resist-
ance to American forces in Afghanistan Pakista-
nis also strongly disapprove of the drone attacks
by American forces from across the border into
Pakistani tribal territory However in the face of
increasing suicide bombings by militants all over
the country the destruction of hundreds of girlsrsquo
schools in FATA and adjoining areas increased
killings of political opponents and beheadings
and other gruesome murders support for the mili-
tants has waned In fact as shown by a recent sur-
vey4 a vast majority of Pakistanis have started
to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a threat to the
country They have begun supporting military ac-
tion against them and would like the Afghan Tali-
ban to stop using Pakistani territory for attacks
against Nato and Afghan forces Nevertheless
3 ldquoPakistani Public Opinion Growing Concerns about Extremism Continuing Discontent with USrdquo Pew Research Center Wash-ington DC 13 August 2009 httppewglobalorgreportsdisplayphpReportID=265 accessed 17 September 2009 4 ldquoPakistani Public Turns Against Taliban But Still Negative on USrdquo World Public OpinionOrg httpwwwworldpublicopinionorgpipaarticlesbrasiapacificra619php accessed 17 September 2009
the survey also shows that the public continues
to resent the US forces and their drone attacks
Dimensions of the Conflict
The conflict theatre has five principal actors
1 Islamic militants who fall into four broad
categories
bull Highly-motivated and resource rich inter-
national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda
bull Afghan Taliban who conquered and ruled Af-
ghanistan between 1997 and 2001 They took
refuge in Pakistan mainly in the tribal area
after being thrown out by the US-led interna-
tional forces in 2001 They have since been
waging a war of resistance against the Afghan
and international forces across the border
bull Al Qaeda- and Taliban-inspired tribal war-
lords in Pakistan who have cropped up wher-
ever local traditional power structures have
ceded to their militant tactics such as killing
local power holders They have enforced their
own version of Islamic law in their domains
bull A number of Islamist militant organiza-
tions spread throughout the state with the
objective of establishing an Islamic emir-
ate in Pakistan liberating Kashmir and sup-
porting international jihad against occu-
pational forces (the US India and Israel)
2 Nato and the US-led International Security Assist-
ance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) together with the
forces at the command of the Afghan government
Pakistan and Islamism
- 5 -
3 The Afghan government which is still battling with
Taliban influence in rural areas and which is de-
pendent upon the support of ISAF in its efforts
4 The government of Pakistan which had for
its own security reasons lent its full support to the
Taliban in taking over Afghanistan between 1994
and 2001 continues to regard the Taliban as an
asset in ensuring a friendly Afghanistan when the
international forces leave The government is now
facing the consequences of the Islamic militancy
it nurtured over decades to serve its geo-strategic
interests in the region especially against India
5 India has suffered at the hands of the Pakistan-
supported militancy and is now trying to recover
the foothold it had enjoyed in pre-Taliban Af-
ghanistan From there it can destabilize Pakistan by
assisting rebellions in the border regions India
is currently lending assistance to the order of
US$30 to $40 million a year to the Afghan gov-
ernment in development projects including road
reconstruction food and transport About 4000
Indian workers including 500 highly-trained
security personnel are currently employed in
various Indian projects in Afghanistan5 To
5 Jayshree Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations Council for Foreign Relations 22 July 2009 httpwwwcfrorgpublica-tion17474indiaafghanistan_relationshtml accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistanrsquos discomfort India has also established
consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar
as well as other ldquocentresrdquo along the border
which Pakistan claims are being used by
Indian intelligence the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW) to wage covert activities against it6
Cutting the Umbilical Cord
The Pakistani armyrsquos relation with militant Is-
lamic organisations is a significant factor Pa-
kistan had its first taste of aiding and using such
groups during the Afghan jihad against the So-
viet Union It housed militants from all over the
Islamic world in collaboration with the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistanrsquos
intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) had complete control over the channelling
of money and arms to the mujahedin Islamabad
therefore had no qualms about using veterans of
the Afghan jihad in the Indian section of Kash-
mir facilitating the infiltration of militants in
order to wage a war of liberation from within India
and colouring the uprising against Indian occupa-
tion so that it was seen as a holy war A number
of jihadi groups specific to Kashmir such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT the Righteous Force)
6 Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations 22 July 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 6 -- 6 -
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-
mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged
and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage
Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-
ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd
Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged
in the late 1980s and became the source of
increasing sectarian and religious violence in
the country Later any distinction between the
jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian
groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic
The activities of several of these groups have been
a source of increasing tension between India and
Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the armies of the two countries for
several months The November 2008 attack on
Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace
process between the two countries is hostage to these
groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers
The umbilical relationship between these groups
and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-
cult to sever It appears that the army needed
a lot of external and internal persuasion to
agree to turn against the groups Wheth-
er or not all military personnel agree is
still questionable Many may still regard militants
as essential in forcing India into negotiating the
Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that
even in these difficult times of combating militants
in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies
are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7
The Regional Dimension
India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and
India had collaborated with each other in sup-
porting movements in Pakistan for either great-
er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban
period was the only time when Pakistan consid-
ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani
strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-
ghan crisis would be a safe western border which
to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of
the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in
the US-led war on terror was therefore at best
ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-
kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc
within the country with the help of foreign fight-
ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos
attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there
appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront
7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 7 -
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
Pakistan and Afghanistan are at a critical juncture in
their history Islamic militancy has made rapid
advances in these countries and if unchecked
will gain control of them This would signifi-
cantly boost the strength of international Islamist
movements and pose a threat to much of the world
The genie of Islamic militancy let out of the bottle
in the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s
is proving difficult to push back in Its rapid ad-
vancement has been fuelled as much by state weak-
nesses in the two countries as by the seemingly
open-ended American presence generally seen in
the region as imperial expansionism An equally
important factor is festering regional disputes
Pakistan has entered a defining phase in this
respect The authority of the state has been
directly challenged by Islamic militancy in the
Frontier Region1 as well as elsewhere in the coun-
try Civil and military leadership are finally con-
fronting this challenge Is this a passing episode in
the statersquos love-hate relationship with the militants
1 The semi-autonomous tribal lands consist of seven parts called ldquoagenciesrdquo Bajaur Mohmand Khyber Orakzai Kurram and North and South Waziristan There are also six smaller zones known as frontier regions in the transitional area between the tribal lands and the North-West Frontier Province to the east See Jayshree Bajori ldquoPakistanrsquos Tribal Areasrdquo Council on Foreign Relations httpwwwcfrorgpublication11973p2 accessed 17 September 2009
or has a paradigm shift finally occurred Can
Islamic militancy be defeated and defeated for
good What are the roles of the governments
of Pakistan Afghanistan and India In what
manner can the international forces assist the
regional governments so as to clear a path toward
exiting Afghanistan How important is it to address
the question of festering disputes in the region
Regional stability depends on two important
conditions external forces must vacate the
region as soon as possible yet at the same time
they must not leave a power vacuum in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan as this would clear the
way for the organised forces of Islamism These
two conditions make the task very difficult
Pakistan finally acts
It seems that the Taliban advance has finally been
halted by the Pakistani army Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) had spilled over from the Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the
settled areas of Swat Dir and Malakand rout-
ing out local governments The TTP defeated the
police and paramilitary forces that came to help
those administrations then enforced sharia laws
on citizens at gunpoint and extended the ad-
vance further into other districts coming to
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 2 -
within only 70 kilometres of the capital Islamabad
The provincial government had earlier hoped that
the deal it had struck with the religious group
Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Sharia Muhammadi (TNSM) to
administer an Islamic judicial system (Nizam-
e-Adl) in some areas under the provincial ad-
ministration would help stem the Taliban ad-
vance but this plan failed Indeed the TNSM
itself proved unable to influence the Taliban
As of now the army claims to have cleared
these areas of the Taliban and the government
has been quick to assure the
public that it has regained its
authority in the region The local
population that had fled en masse
to safer areas following the military
offensive have started to return to their homes and
jobs Schools over four hundred of which (main-
ly girls schools) had been destroyed by the Tali-
ban have reopened In spite of the governmentrsquos
claim of defeating the Taliban however warnings
of militant attacks on military posts and convoys
and on government buildings continue This would
appear to indicate that only those who had a great
deal to lose by staying away from their homes have
returned Others are still living in large numbers
in refugee camps in distant cities and provinces
The government of Pakistan has also directed its
attention to the tribal areas of North and South
Waziristan where militants had earlier driven out
Pakistanrsquos paramilitary forces (the Frontier Corps)
Since then the area has become a firm stronghold
of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda
and a source of inspiration for religious militant
forces elsewhere in the country It is the head-
quarters of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
a movement that emerged along the lines of the
Afghan Taliban bringing various warlord mullahs
under a loose confederation of tactical alliances
Before he was killed in Au-
gust TTPrsquos leader Baitullah
Mehsud was responsible for
many suicide bombings and
slayings in Pakistan the most
notorious of which was the murder of former
prime minister Benazir Bhutto It seemed initial-
ly that the succession issue would lead to bloody
internal contests with several contenders vying
to get hold of the huge resources of the Taliban
leadership It was expected that with Mehsudrsquos
death the Pakistani army would make rapid gains
inside the Waziristan agencies but this has not
happened The leadership tussle has not created
serious fissures in the TTP nor has the army been
able to make any major headway on the ground
Since militants have been able to move quickly and
freely within the 400 kilometre-long tribal belt
Waziristan has become a
stronghold of the Pakistani
Taliban and al-Qaeda
Pakistan and Islamism
- 3 -
mostly controlled by TTP a final thrust in Waziristan
would first require establishing government control
in other tribal agencies in the north and the frontier
regions of the adjoining settled districts The army
therefore targeted Orakzai and South Waziristan
Agency in June 2009 The most recent thrust of
the government is in the Khyber agency which
was hitherto under full control of Lashkar-e-Islam
The current Pakistani action in the North-
west Frontier Province and in the tribal areas
will have a significant impact on the future of
the region It indicates that the Pakistani estab-
lishment especially the army may have now
awakened to the deadly consequences of collabo-
rating with and patronizing militant Islamic groups
Pakistanrsquos limitations
Pakistanrsquos options against militants in areas where
security forces have been pushed back are very lim-
ited Given that the terrain does not allow for the
large-scale movement of soldiers the Pakistan army
has been forced to rely on long-distance shelling on
roughly defined targets which too often spares the
intended target and alienates the local population be-
cause of indiscriminate damage to life and property
Since mid-2008 when Pakistan failed to stop al-
Qaeda and Taliban attacks from the Federally Ad-
ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) against the al-
liance and Afghan troops the United States has
used unmanned drone aircraft with precision-guid-
ed missiles against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan
from across the border in Afghanistan But the
attacks clearly violate Pakistanrsquos sovereignty
While protesting over the US drone attacks
on North and South Waziristan2 Pakistan has
acknowledged that the attacks were effective in
taking out targets accurately and causing mini-
mum casualties among non-combatants This
claim is disputed by some observers and of course
excludes the families hosting the targeted militant
leaders Pakistan seems to have finally started col-
laborating with US forces in these attacks which
recently resulted in the killing of key guerrilla
leader Baitullah Mehsud and his close associates
The slain militant had access to sizeable resources
2 ldquoUS drones prowl over Waziristan Pakistan concernedrdquo The Daily Times 25 June 2009 httpwwwdailytimescompkdefaultasppage=20090625story_25-6-2009_pg1_5 accessed 17 Sep-tember 2009 David Ignatius ldquoA Quiet Deal With Pakistanrdquo The Washington Post November 4 2008 httpwwwwashingtonpostcomwp-dyncontentarticle20081103AR2008110302638html accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 4 -- 4 -
within the tribal area and outside and reports indi-
cate a succession war has erupted within the TTP
that has claimed the lives of a number of important
Taliban commanders Whether or not this group
survives the internal conflict remains to be seen
Anti-American sentiment is very strong among
the Pakistani public3 and consequently there is
an undercurrent of approval for Taliban resist-
ance to American forces in Afghanistan Pakista-
nis also strongly disapprove of the drone attacks
by American forces from across the border into
Pakistani tribal territory However in the face of
increasing suicide bombings by militants all over
the country the destruction of hundreds of girlsrsquo
schools in FATA and adjoining areas increased
killings of political opponents and beheadings
and other gruesome murders support for the mili-
tants has waned In fact as shown by a recent sur-
vey4 a vast majority of Pakistanis have started
to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a threat to the
country They have begun supporting military ac-
tion against them and would like the Afghan Tali-
ban to stop using Pakistani territory for attacks
against Nato and Afghan forces Nevertheless
3 ldquoPakistani Public Opinion Growing Concerns about Extremism Continuing Discontent with USrdquo Pew Research Center Wash-ington DC 13 August 2009 httppewglobalorgreportsdisplayphpReportID=265 accessed 17 September 2009 4 ldquoPakistani Public Turns Against Taliban But Still Negative on USrdquo World Public OpinionOrg httpwwwworldpublicopinionorgpipaarticlesbrasiapacificra619php accessed 17 September 2009
the survey also shows that the public continues
to resent the US forces and their drone attacks
Dimensions of the Conflict
The conflict theatre has five principal actors
1 Islamic militants who fall into four broad
categories
bull Highly-motivated and resource rich inter-
national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda
bull Afghan Taliban who conquered and ruled Af-
ghanistan between 1997 and 2001 They took
refuge in Pakistan mainly in the tribal area
after being thrown out by the US-led interna-
tional forces in 2001 They have since been
waging a war of resistance against the Afghan
and international forces across the border
bull Al Qaeda- and Taliban-inspired tribal war-
lords in Pakistan who have cropped up wher-
ever local traditional power structures have
ceded to their militant tactics such as killing
local power holders They have enforced their
own version of Islamic law in their domains
bull A number of Islamist militant organiza-
tions spread throughout the state with the
objective of establishing an Islamic emir-
ate in Pakistan liberating Kashmir and sup-
porting international jihad against occu-
pational forces (the US India and Israel)
2 Nato and the US-led International Security Assist-
ance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) together with the
forces at the command of the Afghan government
Pakistan and Islamism
- 5 -
3 The Afghan government which is still battling with
Taliban influence in rural areas and which is de-
pendent upon the support of ISAF in its efforts
4 The government of Pakistan which had for
its own security reasons lent its full support to the
Taliban in taking over Afghanistan between 1994
and 2001 continues to regard the Taliban as an
asset in ensuring a friendly Afghanistan when the
international forces leave The government is now
facing the consequences of the Islamic militancy
it nurtured over decades to serve its geo-strategic
interests in the region especially against India
5 India has suffered at the hands of the Pakistan-
supported militancy and is now trying to recover
the foothold it had enjoyed in pre-Taliban Af-
ghanistan From there it can destabilize Pakistan by
assisting rebellions in the border regions India
is currently lending assistance to the order of
US$30 to $40 million a year to the Afghan gov-
ernment in development projects including road
reconstruction food and transport About 4000
Indian workers including 500 highly-trained
security personnel are currently employed in
various Indian projects in Afghanistan5 To
5 Jayshree Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations Council for Foreign Relations 22 July 2009 httpwwwcfrorgpublica-tion17474indiaafghanistan_relationshtml accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistanrsquos discomfort India has also established
consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar
as well as other ldquocentresrdquo along the border
which Pakistan claims are being used by
Indian intelligence the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW) to wage covert activities against it6
Cutting the Umbilical Cord
The Pakistani armyrsquos relation with militant Is-
lamic organisations is a significant factor Pa-
kistan had its first taste of aiding and using such
groups during the Afghan jihad against the So-
viet Union It housed militants from all over the
Islamic world in collaboration with the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistanrsquos
intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) had complete control over the channelling
of money and arms to the mujahedin Islamabad
therefore had no qualms about using veterans of
the Afghan jihad in the Indian section of Kash-
mir facilitating the infiltration of militants in
order to wage a war of liberation from within India
and colouring the uprising against Indian occupa-
tion so that it was seen as a holy war A number
of jihadi groups specific to Kashmir such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT the Righteous Force)
6 Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations 22 July 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 6 -- 6 -
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-
mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged
and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage
Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-
ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd
Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged
in the late 1980s and became the source of
increasing sectarian and religious violence in
the country Later any distinction between the
jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian
groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic
The activities of several of these groups have been
a source of increasing tension between India and
Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the armies of the two countries for
several months The November 2008 attack on
Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace
process between the two countries is hostage to these
groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers
The umbilical relationship between these groups
and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-
cult to sever It appears that the army needed
a lot of external and internal persuasion to
agree to turn against the groups Wheth-
er or not all military personnel agree is
still questionable Many may still regard militants
as essential in forcing India into negotiating the
Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that
even in these difficult times of combating militants
in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies
are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7
The Regional Dimension
India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and
India had collaborated with each other in sup-
porting movements in Pakistan for either great-
er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban
period was the only time when Pakistan consid-
ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani
strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-
ghan crisis would be a safe western border which
to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of
the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in
the US-led war on terror was therefore at best
ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-
kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc
within the country with the help of foreign fight-
ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos
attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there
appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront
7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 7 -
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
within only 70 kilometres of the capital Islamabad
The provincial government had earlier hoped that
the deal it had struck with the religious group
Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Sharia Muhammadi (TNSM) to
administer an Islamic judicial system (Nizam-
e-Adl) in some areas under the provincial ad-
ministration would help stem the Taliban ad-
vance but this plan failed Indeed the TNSM
itself proved unable to influence the Taliban
As of now the army claims to have cleared
these areas of the Taliban and the government
has been quick to assure the
public that it has regained its
authority in the region The local
population that had fled en masse
to safer areas following the military
offensive have started to return to their homes and
jobs Schools over four hundred of which (main-
ly girls schools) had been destroyed by the Tali-
ban have reopened In spite of the governmentrsquos
claim of defeating the Taliban however warnings
of militant attacks on military posts and convoys
and on government buildings continue This would
appear to indicate that only those who had a great
deal to lose by staying away from their homes have
returned Others are still living in large numbers
in refugee camps in distant cities and provinces
The government of Pakistan has also directed its
attention to the tribal areas of North and South
Waziristan where militants had earlier driven out
Pakistanrsquos paramilitary forces (the Frontier Corps)
Since then the area has become a firm stronghold
of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda
and a source of inspiration for religious militant
forces elsewhere in the country It is the head-
quarters of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
a movement that emerged along the lines of the
Afghan Taliban bringing various warlord mullahs
under a loose confederation of tactical alliances
Before he was killed in Au-
gust TTPrsquos leader Baitullah
Mehsud was responsible for
many suicide bombings and
slayings in Pakistan the most
notorious of which was the murder of former
prime minister Benazir Bhutto It seemed initial-
ly that the succession issue would lead to bloody
internal contests with several contenders vying
to get hold of the huge resources of the Taliban
leadership It was expected that with Mehsudrsquos
death the Pakistani army would make rapid gains
inside the Waziristan agencies but this has not
happened The leadership tussle has not created
serious fissures in the TTP nor has the army been
able to make any major headway on the ground
Since militants have been able to move quickly and
freely within the 400 kilometre-long tribal belt
Waziristan has become a
stronghold of the Pakistani
Taliban and al-Qaeda
Pakistan and Islamism
- 3 -
mostly controlled by TTP a final thrust in Waziristan
would first require establishing government control
in other tribal agencies in the north and the frontier
regions of the adjoining settled districts The army
therefore targeted Orakzai and South Waziristan
Agency in June 2009 The most recent thrust of
the government is in the Khyber agency which
was hitherto under full control of Lashkar-e-Islam
The current Pakistani action in the North-
west Frontier Province and in the tribal areas
will have a significant impact on the future of
the region It indicates that the Pakistani estab-
lishment especially the army may have now
awakened to the deadly consequences of collabo-
rating with and patronizing militant Islamic groups
Pakistanrsquos limitations
Pakistanrsquos options against militants in areas where
security forces have been pushed back are very lim-
ited Given that the terrain does not allow for the
large-scale movement of soldiers the Pakistan army
has been forced to rely on long-distance shelling on
roughly defined targets which too often spares the
intended target and alienates the local population be-
cause of indiscriminate damage to life and property
Since mid-2008 when Pakistan failed to stop al-
Qaeda and Taliban attacks from the Federally Ad-
ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) against the al-
liance and Afghan troops the United States has
used unmanned drone aircraft with precision-guid-
ed missiles against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan
from across the border in Afghanistan But the
attacks clearly violate Pakistanrsquos sovereignty
While protesting over the US drone attacks
on North and South Waziristan2 Pakistan has
acknowledged that the attacks were effective in
taking out targets accurately and causing mini-
mum casualties among non-combatants This
claim is disputed by some observers and of course
excludes the families hosting the targeted militant
leaders Pakistan seems to have finally started col-
laborating with US forces in these attacks which
recently resulted in the killing of key guerrilla
leader Baitullah Mehsud and his close associates
The slain militant had access to sizeable resources
2 ldquoUS drones prowl over Waziristan Pakistan concernedrdquo The Daily Times 25 June 2009 httpwwwdailytimescompkdefaultasppage=20090625story_25-6-2009_pg1_5 accessed 17 Sep-tember 2009 David Ignatius ldquoA Quiet Deal With Pakistanrdquo The Washington Post November 4 2008 httpwwwwashingtonpostcomwp-dyncontentarticle20081103AR2008110302638html accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 4 -- 4 -
within the tribal area and outside and reports indi-
cate a succession war has erupted within the TTP
that has claimed the lives of a number of important
Taliban commanders Whether or not this group
survives the internal conflict remains to be seen
Anti-American sentiment is very strong among
the Pakistani public3 and consequently there is
an undercurrent of approval for Taliban resist-
ance to American forces in Afghanistan Pakista-
nis also strongly disapprove of the drone attacks
by American forces from across the border into
Pakistani tribal territory However in the face of
increasing suicide bombings by militants all over
the country the destruction of hundreds of girlsrsquo
schools in FATA and adjoining areas increased
killings of political opponents and beheadings
and other gruesome murders support for the mili-
tants has waned In fact as shown by a recent sur-
vey4 a vast majority of Pakistanis have started
to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a threat to the
country They have begun supporting military ac-
tion against them and would like the Afghan Tali-
ban to stop using Pakistani territory for attacks
against Nato and Afghan forces Nevertheless
3 ldquoPakistani Public Opinion Growing Concerns about Extremism Continuing Discontent with USrdquo Pew Research Center Wash-ington DC 13 August 2009 httppewglobalorgreportsdisplayphpReportID=265 accessed 17 September 2009 4 ldquoPakistani Public Turns Against Taliban But Still Negative on USrdquo World Public OpinionOrg httpwwwworldpublicopinionorgpipaarticlesbrasiapacificra619php accessed 17 September 2009
the survey also shows that the public continues
to resent the US forces and their drone attacks
Dimensions of the Conflict
The conflict theatre has five principal actors
1 Islamic militants who fall into four broad
categories
bull Highly-motivated and resource rich inter-
national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda
bull Afghan Taliban who conquered and ruled Af-
ghanistan between 1997 and 2001 They took
refuge in Pakistan mainly in the tribal area
after being thrown out by the US-led interna-
tional forces in 2001 They have since been
waging a war of resistance against the Afghan
and international forces across the border
bull Al Qaeda- and Taliban-inspired tribal war-
lords in Pakistan who have cropped up wher-
ever local traditional power structures have
ceded to their militant tactics such as killing
local power holders They have enforced their
own version of Islamic law in their domains
bull A number of Islamist militant organiza-
tions spread throughout the state with the
objective of establishing an Islamic emir-
ate in Pakistan liberating Kashmir and sup-
porting international jihad against occu-
pational forces (the US India and Israel)
2 Nato and the US-led International Security Assist-
ance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) together with the
forces at the command of the Afghan government
Pakistan and Islamism
- 5 -
3 The Afghan government which is still battling with
Taliban influence in rural areas and which is de-
pendent upon the support of ISAF in its efforts
4 The government of Pakistan which had for
its own security reasons lent its full support to the
Taliban in taking over Afghanistan between 1994
and 2001 continues to regard the Taliban as an
asset in ensuring a friendly Afghanistan when the
international forces leave The government is now
facing the consequences of the Islamic militancy
it nurtured over decades to serve its geo-strategic
interests in the region especially against India
5 India has suffered at the hands of the Pakistan-
supported militancy and is now trying to recover
the foothold it had enjoyed in pre-Taliban Af-
ghanistan From there it can destabilize Pakistan by
assisting rebellions in the border regions India
is currently lending assistance to the order of
US$30 to $40 million a year to the Afghan gov-
ernment in development projects including road
reconstruction food and transport About 4000
Indian workers including 500 highly-trained
security personnel are currently employed in
various Indian projects in Afghanistan5 To
5 Jayshree Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations Council for Foreign Relations 22 July 2009 httpwwwcfrorgpublica-tion17474indiaafghanistan_relationshtml accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistanrsquos discomfort India has also established
consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar
as well as other ldquocentresrdquo along the border
which Pakistan claims are being used by
Indian intelligence the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW) to wage covert activities against it6
Cutting the Umbilical Cord
The Pakistani armyrsquos relation with militant Is-
lamic organisations is a significant factor Pa-
kistan had its first taste of aiding and using such
groups during the Afghan jihad against the So-
viet Union It housed militants from all over the
Islamic world in collaboration with the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistanrsquos
intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) had complete control over the channelling
of money and arms to the mujahedin Islamabad
therefore had no qualms about using veterans of
the Afghan jihad in the Indian section of Kash-
mir facilitating the infiltration of militants in
order to wage a war of liberation from within India
and colouring the uprising against Indian occupa-
tion so that it was seen as a holy war A number
of jihadi groups specific to Kashmir such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT the Righteous Force)
6 Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations 22 July 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 6 -- 6 -
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-
mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged
and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage
Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-
ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd
Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged
in the late 1980s and became the source of
increasing sectarian and religious violence in
the country Later any distinction between the
jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian
groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic
The activities of several of these groups have been
a source of increasing tension between India and
Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the armies of the two countries for
several months The November 2008 attack on
Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace
process between the two countries is hostage to these
groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers
The umbilical relationship between these groups
and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-
cult to sever It appears that the army needed
a lot of external and internal persuasion to
agree to turn against the groups Wheth-
er or not all military personnel agree is
still questionable Many may still regard militants
as essential in forcing India into negotiating the
Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that
even in these difficult times of combating militants
in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies
are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7
The Regional Dimension
India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and
India had collaborated with each other in sup-
porting movements in Pakistan for either great-
er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban
period was the only time when Pakistan consid-
ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani
strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-
ghan crisis would be a safe western border which
to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of
the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in
the US-led war on terror was therefore at best
ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-
kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc
within the country with the help of foreign fight-
ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos
attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there
appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront
7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 7 -
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
mostly controlled by TTP a final thrust in Waziristan
would first require establishing government control
in other tribal agencies in the north and the frontier
regions of the adjoining settled districts The army
therefore targeted Orakzai and South Waziristan
Agency in June 2009 The most recent thrust of
the government is in the Khyber agency which
was hitherto under full control of Lashkar-e-Islam
The current Pakistani action in the North-
west Frontier Province and in the tribal areas
will have a significant impact on the future of
the region It indicates that the Pakistani estab-
lishment especially the army may have now
awakened to the deadly consequences of collabo-
rating with and patronizing militant Islamic groups
Pakistanrsquos limitations
Pakistanrsquos options against militants in areas where
security forces have been pushed back are very lim-
ited Given that the terrain does not allow for the
large-scale movement of soldiers the Pakistan army
has been forced to rely on long-distance shelling on
roughly defined targets which too often spares the
intended target and alienates the local population be-
cause of indiscriminate damage to life and property
Since mid-2008 when Pakistan failed to stop al-
Qaeda and Taliban attacks from the Federally Ad-
ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) against the al-
liance and Afghan troops the United States has
used unmanned drone aircraft with precision-guid-
ed missiles against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan
from across the border in Afghanistan But the
attacks clearly violate Pakistanrsquos sovereignty
While protesting over the US drone attacks
on North and South Waziristan2 Pakistan has
acknowledged that the attacks were effective in
taking out targets accurately and causing mini-
mum casualties among non-combatants This
claim is disputed by some observers and of course
excludes the families hosting the targeted militant
leaders Pakistan seems to have finally started col-
laborating with US forces in these attacks which
recently resulted in the killing of key guerrilla
leader Baitullah Mehsud and his close associates
The slain militant had access to sizeable resources
2 ldquoUS drones prowl over Waziristan Pakistan concernedrdquo The Daily Times 25 June 2009 httpwwwdailytimescompkdefaultasppage=20090625story_25-6-2009_pg1_5 accessed 17 Sep-tember 2009 David Ignatius ldquoA Quiet Deal With Pakistanrdquo The Washington Post November 4 2008 httpwwwwashingtonpostcomwp-dyncontentarticle20081103AR2008110302638html accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 4 -- 4 -
within the tribal area and outside and reports indi-
cate a succession war has erupted within the TTP
that has claimed the lives of a number of important
Taliban commanders Whether or not this group
survives the internal conflict remains to be seen
Anti-American sentiment is very strong among
the Pakistani public3 and consequently there is
an undercurrent of approval for Taliban resist-
ance to American forces in Afghanistan Pakista-
nis also strongly disapprove of the drone attacks
by American forces from across the border into
Pakistani tribal territory However in the face of
increasing suicide bombings by militants all over
the country the destruction of hundreds of girlsrsquo
schools in FATA and adjoining areas increased
killings of political opponents and beheadings
and other gruesome murders support for the mili-
tants has waned In fact as shown by a recent sur-
vey4 a vast majority of Pakistanis have started
to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a threat to the
country They have begun supporting military ac-
tion against them and would like the Afghan Tali-
ban to stop using Pakistani territory for attacks
against Nato and Afghan forces Nevertheless
3 ldquoPakistani Public Opinion Growing Concerns about Extremism Continuing Discontent with USrdquo Pew Research Center Wash-ington DC 13 August 2009 httppewglobalorgreportsdisplayphpReportID=265 accessed 17 September 2009 4 ldquoPakistani Public Turns Against Taliban But Still Negative on USrdquo World Public OpinionOrg httpwwwworldpublicopinionorgpipaarticlesbrasiapacificra619php accessed 17 September 2009
the survey also shows that the public continues
to resent the US forces and their drone attacks
Dimensions of the Conflict
The conflict theatre has five principal actors
1 Islamic militants who fall into four broad
categories
bull Highly-motivated and resource rich inter-
national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda
bull Afghan Taliban who conquered and ruled Af-
ghanistan between 1997 and 2001 They took
refuge in Pakistan mainly in the tribal area
after being thrown out by the US-led interna-
tional forces in 2001 They have since been
waging a war of resistance against the Afghan
and international forces across the border
bull Al Qaeda- and Taliban-inspired tribal war-
lords in Pakistan who have cropped up wher-
ever local traditional power structures have
ceded to their militant tactics such as killing
local power holders They have enforced their
own version of Islamic law in their domains
bull A number of Islamist militant organiza-
tions spread throughout the state with the
objective of establishing an Islamic emir-
ate in Pakistan liberating Kashmir and sup-
porting international jihad against occu-
pational forces (the US India and Israel)
2 Nato and the US-led International Security Assist-
ance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) together with the
forces at the command of the Afghan government
Pakistan and Islamism
- 5 -
3 The Afghan government which is still battling with
Taliban influence in rural areas and which is de-
pendent upon the support of ISAF in its efforts
4 The government of Pakistan which had for
its own security reasons lent its full support to the
Taliban in taking over Afghanistan between 1994
and 2001 continues to regard the Taliban as an
asset in ensuring a friendly Afghanistan when the
international forces leave The government is now
facing the consequences of the Islamic militancy
it nurtured over decades to serve its geo-strategic
interests in the region especially against India
5 India has suffered at the hands of the Pakistan-
supported militancy and is now trying to recover
the foothold it had enjoyed in pre-Taliban Af-
ghanistan From there it can destabilize Pakistan by
assisting rebellions in the border regions India
is currently lending assistance to the order of
US$30 to $40 million a year to the Afghan gov-
ernment in development projects including road
reconstruction food and transport About 4000
Indian workers including 500 highly-trained
security personnel are currently employed in
various Indian projects in Afghanistan5 To
5 Jayshree Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations Council for Foreign Relations 22 July 2009 httpwwwcfrorgpublica-tion17474indiaafghanistan_relationshtml accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistanrsquos discomfort India has also established
consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar
as well as other ldquocentresrdquo along the border
which Pakistan claims are being used by
Indian intelligence the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW) to wage covert activities against it6
Cutting the Umbilical Cord
The Pakistani armyrsquos relation with militant Is-
lamic organisations is a significant factor Pa-
kistan had its first taste of aiding and using such
groups during the Afghan jihad against the So-
viet Union It housed militants from all over the
Islamic world in collaboration with the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistanrsquos
intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) had complete control over the channelling
of money and arms to the mujahedin Islamabad
therefore had no qualms about using veterans of
the Afghan jihad in the Indian section of Kash-
mir facilitating the infiltration of militants in
order to wage a war of liberation from within India
and colouring the uprising against Indian occupa-
tion so that it was seen as a holy war A number
of jihadi groups specific to Kashmir such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT the Righteous Force)
6 Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations 22 July 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 6 -- 6 -
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-
mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged
and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage
Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-
ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd
Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged
in the late 1980s and became the source of
increasing sectarian and religious violence in
the country Later any distinction between the
jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian
groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic
The activities of several of these groups have been
a source of increasing tension between India and
Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the armies of the two countries for
several months The November 2008 attack on
Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace
process between the two countries is hostage to these
groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers
The umbilical relationship between these groups
and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-
cult to sever It appears that the army needed
a lot of external and internal persuasion to
agree to turn against the groups Wheth-
er or not all military personnel agree is
still questionable Many may still regard militants
as essential in forcing India into negotiating the
Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that
even in these difficult times of combating militants
in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies
are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7
The Regional Dimension
India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and
India had collaborated with each other in sup-
porting movements in Pakistan for either great-
er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban
period was the only time when Pakistan consid-
ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani
strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-
ghan crisis would be a safe western border which
to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of
the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in
the US-led war on terror was therefore at best
ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-
kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc
within the country with the help of foreign fight-
ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos
attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there
appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront
7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 7 -
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
within the tribal area and outside and reports indi-
cate a succession war has erupted within the TTP
that has claimed the lives of a number of important
Taliban commanders Whether or not this group
survives the internal conflict remains to be seen
Anti-American sentiment is very strong among
the Pakistani public3 and consequently there is
an undercurrent of approval for Taliban resist-
ance to American forces in Afghanistan Pakista-
nis also strongly disapprove of the drone attacks
by American forces from across the border into
Pakistani tribal territory However in the face of
increasing suicide bombings by militants all over
the country the destruction of hundreds of girlsrsquo
schools in FATA and adjoining areas increased
killings of political opponents and beheadings
and other gruesome murders support for the mili-
tants has waned In fact as shown by a recent sur-
vey4 a vast majority of Pakistanis have started
to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a threat to the
country They have begun supporting military ac-
tion against them and would like the Afghan Tali-
ban to stop using Pakistani territory for attacks
against Nato and Afghan forces Nevertheless
3 ldquoPakistani Public Opinion Growing Concerns about Extremism Continuing Discontent with USrdquo Pew Research Center Wash-ington DC 13 August 2009 httppewglobalorgreportsdisplayphpReportID=265 accessed 17 September 2009 4 ldquoPakistani Public Turns Against Taliban But Still Negative on USrdquo World Public OpinionOrg httpwwwworldpublicopinionorgpipaarticlesbrasiapacificra619php accessed 17 September 2009
the survey also shows that the public continues
to resent the US forces and their drone attacks
Dimensions of the Conflict
The conflict theatre has five principal actors
1 Islamic militants who fall into four broad
categories
bull Highly-motivated and resource rich inter-
national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda
bull Afghan Taliban who conquered and ruled Af-
ghanistan between 1997 and 2001 They took
refuge in Pakistan mainly in the tribal area
after being thrown out by the US-led interna-
tional forces in 2001 They have since been
waging a war of resistance against the Afghan
and international forces across the border
bull Al Qaeda- and Taliban-inspired tribal war-
lords in Pakistan who have cropped up wher-
ever local traditional power structures have
ceded to their militant tactics such as killing
local power holders They have enforced their
own version of Islamic law in their domains
bull A number of Islamist militant organiza-
tions spread throughout the state with the
objective of establishing an Islamic emir-
ate in Pakistan liberating Kashmir and sup-
porting international jihad against occu-
pational forces (the US India and Israel)
2 Nato and the US-led International Security Assist-
ance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) together with the
forces at the command of the Afghan government
Pakistan and Islamism
- 5 -
3 The Afghan government which is still battling with
Taliban influence in rural areas and which is de-
pendent upon the support of ISAF in its efforts
4 The government of Pakistan which had for
its own security reasons lent its full support to the
Taliban in taking over Afghanistan between 1994
and 2001 continues to regard the Taliban as an
asset in ensuring a friendly Afghanistan when the
international forces leave The government is now
facing the consequences of the Islamic militancy
it nurtured over decades to serve its geo-strategic
interests in the region especially against India
5 India has suffered at the hands of the Pakistan-
supported militancy and is now trying to recover
the foothold it had enjoyed in pre-Taliban Af-
ghanistan From there it can destabilize Pakistan by
assisting rebellions in the border regions India
is currently lending assistance to the order of
US$30 to $40 million a year to the Afghan gov-
ernment in development projects including road
reconstruction food and transport About 4000
Indian workers including 500 highly-trained
security personnel are currently employed in
various Indian projects in Afghanistan5 To
5 Jayshree Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations Council for Foreign Relations 22 July 2009 httpwwwcfrorgpublica-tion17474indiaafghanistan_relationshtml accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistanrsquos discomfort India has also established
consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar
as well as other ldquocentresrdquo along the border
which Pakistan claims are being used by
Indian intelligence the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW) to wage covert activities against it6
Cutting the Umbilical Cord
The Pakistani armyrsquos relation with militant Is-
lamic organisations is a significant factor Pa-
kistan had its first taste of aiding and using such
groups during the Afghan jihad against the So-
viet Union It housed militants from all over the
Islamic world in collaboration with the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistanrsquos
intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) had complete control over the channelling
of money and arms to the mujahedin Islamabad
therefore had no qualms about using veterans of
the Afghan jihad in the Indian section of Kash-
mir facilitating the infiltration of militants in
order to wage a war of liberation from within India
and colouring the uprising against Indian occupa-
tion so that it was seen as a holy war A number
of jihadi groups specific to Kashmir such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT the Righteous Force)
6 Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations 22 July 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 6 -- 6 -
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-
mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged
and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage
Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-
ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd
Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged
in the late 1980s and became the source of
increasing sectarian and religious violence in
the country Later any distinction between the
jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian
groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic
The activities of several of these groups have been
a source of increasing tension between India and
Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the armies of the two countries for
several months The November 2008 attack on
Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace
process between the two countries is hostage to these
groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers
The umbilical relationship between these groups
and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-
cult to sever It appears that the army needed
a lot of external and internal persuasion to
agree to turn against the groups Wheth-
er or not all military personnel agree is
still questionable Many may still regard militants
as essential in forcing India into negotiating the
Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that
even in these difficult times of combating militants
in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies
are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7
The Regional Dimension
India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and
India had collaborated with each other in sup-
porting movements in Pakistan for either great-
er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban
period was the only time when Pakistan consid-
ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani
strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-
ghan crisis would be a safe western border which
to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of
the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in
the US-led war on terror was therefore at best
ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-
kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc
within the country with the help of foreign fight-
ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos
attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there
appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront
7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 7 -
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
3 The Afghan government which is still battling with
Taliban influence in rural areas and which is de-
pendent upon the support of ISAF in its efforts
4 The government of Pakistan which had for
its own security reasons lent its full support to the
Taliban in taking over Afghanistan between 1994
and 2001 continues to regard the Taliban as an
asset in ensuring a friendly Afghanistan when the
international forces leave The government is now
facing the consequences of the Islamic militancy
it nurtured over decades to serve its geo-strategic
interests in the region especially against India
5 India has suffered at the hands of the Pakistan-
supported militancy and is now trying to recover
the foothold it had enjoyed in pre-Taliban Af-
ghanistan From there it can destabilize Pakistan by
assisting rebellions in the border regions India
is currently lending assistance to the order of
US$30 to $40 million a year to the Afghan gov-
ernment in development projects including road
reconstruction food and transport About 4000
Indian workers including 500 highly-trained
security personnel are currently employed in
various Indian projects in Afghanistan5 To
5 Jayshree Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations Council for Foreign Relations 22 July 2009 httpwwwcfrorgpublica-tion17474indiaafghanistan_relationshtml accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistanrsquos discomfort India has also established
consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar
as well as other ldquocentresrdquo along the border
which Pakistan claims are being used by
Indian intelligence the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW) to wage covert activities against it6
Cutting the Umbilical Cord
The Pakistani armyrsquos relation with militant Is-
lamic organisations is a significant factor Pa-
kistan had its first taste of aiding and using such
groups during the Afghan jihad against the So-
viet Union It housed militants from all over the
Islamic world in collaboration with the US Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistanrsquos
intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) had complete control over the channelling
of money and arms to the mujahedin Islamabad
therefore had no qualms about using veterans of
the Afghan jihad in the Indian section of Kash-
mir facilitating the infiltration of militants in
order to wage a war of liberation from within India
and colouring the uprising against Indian occupa-
tion so that it was seen as a holy war A number
of jihadi groups specific to Kashmir such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT the Righteous Force)
6 Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations 22 July 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 6 -- 6 -
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-
mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged
and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage
Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-
ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd
Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged
in the late 1980s and became the source of
increasing sectarian and religious violence in
the country Later any distinction between the
jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian
groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic
The activities of several of these groups have been
a source of increasing tension between India and
Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the armies of the two countries for
several months The November 2008 attack on
Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace
process between the two countries is hostage to these
groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers
The umbilical relationship between these groups
and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-
cult to sever It appears that the army needed
a lot of external and internal persuasion to
agree to turn against the groups Wheth-
er or not all military personnel agree is
still questionable Many may still regard militants
as essential in forcing India into negotiating the
Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that
even in these difficult times of combating militants
in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies
are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7
The Regional Dimension
India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and
India had collaborated with each other in sup-
porting movements in Pakistan for either great-
er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban
period was the only time when Pakistan consid-
ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani
strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-
ghan crisis would be a safe western border which
to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of
the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in
the US-led war on terror was therefore at best
ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-
kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc
within the country with the help of foreign fight-
ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos
attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there
appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront
7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 7 -
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-
mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged
and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage
Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-
ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd
Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged
in the late 1980s and became the source of
increasing sectarian and religious violence in
the country Later any distinction between the
jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian
groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic
The activities of several of these groups have been
a source of increasing tension between India and
Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-
tion between the armies of the two countries for
several months The November 2008 attack on
Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace
process between the two countries is hostage to these
groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers
The umbilical relationship between these groups
and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-
cult to sever It appears that the army needed
a lot of external and internal persuasion to
agree to turn against the groups Wheth-
er or not all military personnel agree is
still questionable Many may still regard militants
as essential in forcing India into negotiating the
Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that
even in these difficult times of combating militants
in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies
are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7
The Regional Dimension
India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and
India had collaborated with each other in sup-
porting movements in Pakistan for either great-
er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban
period was the only time when Pakistan consid-
ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani
strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-
ghan crisis would be a safe western border which
to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of
the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in
the US-led war on terror was therefore at best
ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-
kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc
within the country with the help of foreign fight-
ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos
attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there
appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront
7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 7 -
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-
da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan
India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage
in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in
the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-
ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly
allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-
stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting
trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and
in the southern province of Baluchistan through
the extensive network of consulates along the bor-
der that India has established and through Bal-
uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-
bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly
involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy
in Kabul The Karzai government for its part
accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on
Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the
Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets
Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any
move that distinguishes between good and bad
Taliban and engages the former in negotiations
on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban
are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan
8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009
and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul
government The bad Taliban are the ones who are
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-
tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming
to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan
a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful
of being taken over by such militant ideologies
Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-
ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-
ban9 Both the US and British governments seem
inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those
Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The
9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009
10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 8 -- 8 -
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-
ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change
after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-
ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations
with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a
future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-
kistan of a hostile government on its western border
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-
itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them
against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective
was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-
mir issue which had been relegated to such a low
level that even the United Nations had taken it off its
active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions
of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989
India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-
eral times often coming very close to devising a
solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that
as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-
cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame
of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To
achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on
11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009
militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which
they facilitate through providing arms and training
Nevertheless while under state patronage over the
years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively
autonomous in their decision-making and sources
of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-
ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian
Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008
attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these
groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they
exist and work openly often under changed names
They are known to have connections with al-Qae-
da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known
to have carried out several terrorist attacks and
12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009
Pakistan and Islamism
- 9 -- 9 -
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has
now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai
attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has
not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-
nate them The head of the organisation was initial-
ly only placed under house arrest and is now free
under court orders The reluctance to clamp down
on these groups comes from ambivalence about
their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives
The lack of response by the state against these
groups even when they transgress the limits of the
law has allowed them to expand their influence in
society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups
patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere
can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most
noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-
tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-
tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and
a few districts of Baluchistan In most places
Islamic militants have been organising themselves
through madrassas and mosques A shocking
example of this was the near-insurgency waged
by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of
Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-
lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash
which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-
cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so
many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque
in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-
ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on
the part of the security institutions of the state
Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of
Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-
ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western
Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A
huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central
Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the
militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a
large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of
a local mullah Security agencies have concluded
that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been
taking refuge in Karachi and could become active
on orders from their high command13 Local politi-
cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some
13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
- 10 -- 10 -
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
who executed the attack on Mumbai in November
2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it
Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-
try as well as pressure from outside to help
it make the transition Its campaign against
the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated
Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-
tional question and on centre-province relations
within the country where the economic exploi-
tation of weaker provinces must come to an end
The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-
lem and requires political compromises for an
effective response Pakistan can-
not hope to win a war against Is-
lamic militancy and terrorism if it
also has to fight wars of secession
In putting its house in order Pa-
kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of
showing a lack of coherence and
consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy
on the one hand and releasing those who took up
arms against the state and aided militancy within the
country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the
Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on
the other shows continued ambivalence and sends
the wrong signals to both the public and militant
districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from
residents and they have called for government ac-
tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident
of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood
in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators
who burnt seven members of a family including
women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-
haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-
lise other governments through religious militancy
are now being questioned after its own security was
imperilled at the hands of the same
militancy Islamabad needs a para-
digm shift in its national security
thinking and it has been slow to do
that It has mounted a serious cam-
paign in the tribal region in which
hundreds of militants have been
killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-
rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number
of militants who were part of the Taliban network
On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still
reluctant to take firm action against the militants
Pakistan also needs a
paradigm shift on the
national question and on
centre-province relations
within the country
Pakistan and Islamism
- 11 -
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-
suring that violators of the law of the land do not go
unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal
lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes
The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-
mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with
Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in
the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may
be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant
groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-
der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan
The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have
returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under
unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no
words in the past in expressing his hostility to-
wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India
This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the
Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-
ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan
would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of
the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul
The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway
Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno
Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno
Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)
1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006
2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain
3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008
4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009
5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban
Further reading
- 12 -
Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009
Recommended