Osprey Warrior-136 Chindit 1942-45

7/27/2019 Osprey Warrior-136 Chindit 1942-45

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND ILLUSTRATORTIM MOREMA is a freelance writer and academic. For several yearshe lectured in the Department ofWar Studies at King's College London,f rom where he obtained his PhD. He also held a six-month appointmentas Resident Historian at the Army Staff College at Camberley. His primaryinterests include the British-Indian Army during the 19th and 20th centuries,counter-insurgency, and the British and Commonwealth armies duringWorld War II. In addition to a significant number of articles and papers,Tim has written two major books: a study of the Indian Army on theNorth-West Frontier 1849-1947, and a book on the war in Burma andMalaya 1941-45. In recent years he has also worked for the new DictionaryofNationa/Biography and the Australian War Memorial, as well as actingas a historical adviser for the BBC and Carlton Television. He is based inSomerset, UK.

PETER DENNIS was born in 1950. Inspired by contemporary magazinessuch as Look and Learn he studied illustration at Liverpool Art College.Peter has since contributed to hundreds of books, predominantly on historicalsubjects, including many Osprey tit les. A keen wargamer and modelmaker,he is based in Nottinghamshire, UK.


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WARRIOR 136

CHINDIT 1942 45

TIM MOREMAN ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNISSeries edirors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic


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ACKNOWLEDGME TS

IMPERlAL WAR MUSEUM COLLECTIO S

The author is indebted to David Grant, Brian Nicholls and Ann Hunterof the British Mule Society. Thanks are also du e to Alan Jeffreys at theImperialWarMuseum.

Readers may care to note that the orl9lnal paintings from which thecolour plates in this book were prepared are available for prtvate sale.The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiriesshould be addressed to:

OTERTIST'S

Many of the photosin this book come f rom the ImperialWar Museum'shuge collectionswhich cover all aspects of conflictinvolving Britainand the Commonwealth since the start of the twentieth century.These rich resources areavailable online to search, browse and buy atwww.iwmcollections.org.uk.lnadditiontoCollectionsOnline,you canvisit the Visitor Rooms where you can explore over 8 million photographs,thousands of hours of moving images, largest soundarchive of itskind in the world, thousands of diaries and letters w r i t t ~ n by peoplein wart ime, and a huge reference library. To make an appointment,call (020) 7416 5320, or e-mail mail@iwm.org.uk.Imperial WarMuseum www.iwm.org.uk

Peter DennisFleldhead,TheParl


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A group of Chindits onOperation Langeloth prepare arailway bridge for demolition.(SE 7921)

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increasingly of a more conventional nature. Under the command of MajorGeneral 'Joe' Lentaigne, they were commined to heavy fighting in NorthernBurma in suPPOrt of US and Chinese forces, increasingly using methods verydifferent from those devised by Wingate. In August 1944 they were finallywithdrawn to India, but by then they were a pale shadow of their former selves,thanks to banle casualties, tropical disease and general debilitation caused byfighting during the monsoon. A period of rest, recuperation and retrainingimmediately began, but early in 1945 the Chindits were summarily disbandedand their officers and men redistributed throughout South-East Asia Command.

The short lifespan of the Chindits was marked by controversy. Both at thetime and ever since, the actual contribution they made in the final balance toAllied victory in the Far East ha been debated with considerable acrimony. Alarge part of their notoriety stems from Major-General Orde Wingate himself,whose enigmatic personality, military ideas and controversial style of leadershipbrought him into conflict with senior officers. Instead of revisiting these debatesin any depth, however, this book will examine the officers, COs and menwho proudly wore the Chinthe badge and carried out some of the most difficultoperations of World War II. Undoubtedly they make for a worthy subject, giventhe fearsome opponent they fought and the difficulties of climate and terrainthey overcame. Following inten ive specialized training, the Chindits foughtlong, hard campaigns, living, moving and fighting against the Imperial JapaneseArmy deep in the Burmese jungle, suffering considerable hardship. Heavy losseswere inflicted in the process from enemy action, the hostile climate and disease,since they were retained in the fighting line long after it had been planned theyshould be withdrawn for rest and recuperation. In the process the Chinditswon four Victoria Crosses as well as a wide range of other awards for gallantry.


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CHRONOLOGY19417 December194216 January27 JanuaryMarch-April

End of MayJune-July

194314 FebruaryMarch

26 March

Outbreak of World War 11 in the Far East.

Japanese invade Burma.Colonel Orde Wingate meets Wavell in ew Delhi.Brigadier Orde Wingate arrives in Burma and carries oura reconnaissance.

Remnants of Burcorps reach Imphal.Wavell agrees to test Long Range Penetration, and 77th IndianInfantry Brigade is formed. It begins training at Saugor in theCentral Provinces.

Operation Langeloth begins.77th Indian Infantry Brigade crosses the Irrawaddy River.Wingate orders withdrawal to India.

Lieutenant George Cairns,Somerset light Infantry,attached to 1st SouthStaffordshire Regiment, whowas awarded a posthumousVictoria Cross early duringOperation Thursday. (HU 2052)

18 April28 April

May-June

October

19445 February

5 March5/6 March

6/7 March

Chindits re-cross the Irrawaddy River.Wingate and his dispersal parry cross theChindwin River.The survivors of Operation Langelothreturn to Assam in dribs and drabs.Authority granted to raise a newenlarged Chindit force known asSpecial Force or 3rd (Indian) Division.

Operation Thursday begins.16th Brigade leaves Ledo to march600 miles to Indaw on foot.16th Brigade crosses the Chindwin River.The lead elements of 77th IndianInfantry Brigade are flown in toBroadway. Build up of Broadway begins.Lead gliders land at Chowringheefollowed by twO battalions ofIII th Indian Infantry Brigade.

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7 March

15 March16 March

20 March24 March

24 March27 March

27 March

6 AprilApril

17 April27 April

7/8 May9110 May11 May

16/17 May

25 May6 june26 junejune

27 August

194522 januaryFebruary

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Stilwell's Chinese Armies advance down the Hukawaungand Mogaung valleys.japanese Offensive on Imphal Plain and Kohima begins.77th Indian Infantry Brigade reaches Mawlu and constructsWhite City.16th Brigade begins work on Aberdeen stronghold.Major-General Orde Wingate dies in a plane crash in Assam16th Brigade arracks Indaw and is later repulsed.Major-General \'iI.D.A. Lentaigne takes command of the Chindits.Broadway comes under japanese attack.

japanese commence a series of fierce attacks on White City.14th Brigade lands at Aberdeen and arracks a series of japanesesupply dumps.Japanese make last arrack on White City.16th brigade captures Indaw East airfield, but it is quicklyabandoned after demolition work is completed.Blackpool is occupied by I I Ith Indian Infantry Brigade.White City is evacuated. Irs garrison is moved norrh.Broadway is abandoned. Irs garrison is moved norrh.Slim formally hands over command of the Chindits to Stillwell.A defeated and exhausted I II th Brigade abandon Blackpool.77th Brigade begins its arrack on Mogaung.Chindits capture Mogaung.The 14th, 3rd West African and I I I th brigades continueoperations near Hill 60, Shmaw and Point 2 I71.The last Chindits (77th, 14th and 3rd West African brigades)are evacuated to India.

Burma Road re-opens.The Chindits are disbanded.


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A bearded Chindit leads aheavily encumbered mulethrough the Burmese jungle.(SE 7910)

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The expansion of the Chindits from a single brigade to over a divisionalsized formation saw no radical departure in recruitment pattern for what wasnow known as Special Force. While the remaining fit troops of 77th IndianInfantry Brigade formed a hard core, new units were al located dur ing 1942first to make up 111th Indian Infantry Brigade. The bulk of the infantryfor Operation Thursday, however, was drawn from regular battalions of70th Division, despite strong opposition from GHQ India that wanted to keepthis British infantry division in being. In addition, Wingate was allocated theas yet raw and untried troops of 3rd West African Brigade. All these troopswere in a very different league from the low-qualiry troops of his first brigade.70th Division was composed of crack, battle-hardened and highly trainedconvent ional t roops. Even so, its constituent units did not escape weedingout during an extremely arduous training period, which again winnowed ou tthe wheat from the chaff, in addition to those simply judged too old for theoperations ahead at the grand age of 40 as before. Gaps again were filled byvolunteers from all over India Command.

TACTICS AND TRAININGThe tactical doctrine devised by Wingate for waging hit-and-run guerrillawarfare behind Japanese lines, exploiting the Chindits' mobility and abiliry toevade enemy pursuit by hiding in the vastness of the Burmese jungle, was verydifferent from that used by conventional British and Indian units in the FarEast. To carry our this highly specialized role major changes were necessaryin the organization, equipment and armament of Chindit units, which in turninfluenced their tactical handling and training.

The 400-man strong 'column' (built around an infantry company of threeplatoons) became the main sub-unit in combat, with eight initially formed in the


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firsr LRP brigade. Each column consisted of a headquarters, a Burma Riflesreconnaissance plaroon, a demolirion or commando squad, an infantry companyof four platoons, a support plaroon equipped wirh twO 3-inch morrars and twoVickers medium machine guns (MMGs), a mule rransport plaroon, an air liaisonderachment composed of an RAF officer and radio operarors, a docror and rwoorderlies and a radio derachment for intercommunicarion. A hundred mulesprovided firsr- and second-line rransport and 15 horses mounts for officers.Bullocks also accompanied 77rh Indian Infantry Brigade on OperarionLOlIgc/oth, as well as rhe occasional ' liberared' elephant. Given rhe Chindirs'reliance on air supply rhe Royal Air Force secrion, equipped wirh radios carriedon mule back, was viral and had responsibiliry for arranging supply drop,direcring the construcrion of emergency airsrrips and direcring close air supportsorties from rhe ground. On campaign each column normally operaredindependenrly, marching through the jungle, making hir-and-run and arracksand rhen dispersing as required ro avoid enemy arracks ro reform ar pre-arrangedrendezvous points. Occa ionally columns would combine wirh one or moreother unirs for a specific operarion.

The selecred units of 77rh indian Infantry Brigade deployed ro a training areaar Saugor, near Jhansi, in the Central Provinces in July 1942, where the mon oonhad jusr broken, wirh units occupying bivouacs far from nearby roads deep inrhe dripping wer scrub jungle. This area had been deliberarely chosen for irsresemblance ro central Burma, where rhe brigade was destined ro operare.A comprehensive and particularly gruelling rraining regimen immediately began,personally devised by Wingate, who believed hard rraining was rhe key rosuccess, despire the appalling weather rhat flooded bivouacs and drowned severalmen. A constant srream of pamphlets, traininginsrrucrions and other directives were promulgatedby Brigade HQ, complementing a series of livelylecrures, group discussions and Tacrical ExercisesWirhoUT Troops given by Wingare expounding hisstill developing ideas abour LRP in rhe jungle.

The level of rraining and combat effecrivenessof unirs assigned ro Wingare was very mixed.As already noted, while rhe 142nd CommandoCompany and rhe 2nd Burma Rifles were highlytrained and experienced, the rest were not. Indeed,the majority of 77th Indian Infantry Brigade neededremedial basic work in addir ion ro special izedinstruction in the tactics of LRP before being judgedready for combat. The 13th King's (Liverpool)Regiment and 3/2nd Gurkha Rifle containeda high proportion of inexperienced, very old orvery young soldiers in its ranks, possessing onlya sketchy knowledge of individual military skillsand minor tactics inculcated during basic training;considerable work was needed ro make them fitfor combat. On rop of this, weapons rraining andtraining for specialists - signallers, Vickers MMGcrews and mortar crews - was urgenrly required,and this continued rhroughour rhe rraining period.This was nor an isolared phenomenon. A majorrraining deficir exisred rhroughour India Command

ARoyal Air Force sergeantoperates an air-groundwireless set in ajungle bivouac.(IND 22921

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A radio operator uses aNo.22 set to maintain contactbetween (hindit columns.(IND 2074)

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as a result of the massive expansion of the pre-war Indian Army, battle lossesin Malaya and Burma and a lack of experienced officers to command and trainthe plethora of units.

The new Chindits had first to learn ro live and move rhrough the jungle - akey lesson of the retreat from Burma - absorbing such skills as jungle lore(identifying ediblelharmful plants and building shelters). This included longperiods of time simply accusromizing them to the sights and sounds of the jungleby day and night, which for most was a strange, depressing and frighreningenvironment, as well as learning how ro move quickly and quietly rhrough

ORDE WINGATE SUPERVISING TRAININGMajor-General Orde Wingate was arguably one of the most eccentric British officers to reachhigh command during World War II. His experience of guerrilla warfare in Palestine and Ethiopiahad marked him out as a gifted leader of irregular troops, and based upon this impressive recordGeneral Wavell brought him to India Command in 1942 to apply his ideas to the war against theImperial Japanese Army in Burma. As the originator of long-range penetration, he was keenlyinterested in directing and overseeing the instruction of British, Gurkha, West African andBurmese troops that came under his command between 1942 and 1944. His standards werealways high, and those who failed to meet them often fell vict im to his violent temper.Trainingcontinued right upto the last minute before troops were committed to Operation Thursday,with the late arrivals to Special Force in particular still having much to leam abautliving, movingand fighting in the jungle in accordance with the specialized principles and tactics of long-rangepenetration. In this illustration Wingate is shown at Lalaghat in Assam in March 1944, as Chinditsembarked upon Waco gliders and Dakota transport aircraft (many for the first time), which canbe seen in the background.


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Two exhausted men ofthe 13th King's (liverpool)Regiment and aGurkhaRifleman being flownout from Burma aboard atransport aircraft. (HU 67284)

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difficult terrain. In particular, the vital skills needed to live, move and fight in thejungle included map reading, jungle navigation, scouting and patrolling, andmarksmanship also received attention.

Training overseen by Wingate consisted primarily of long series of forcedmarches , by day or night, carrying full arms, ammunition and equipmentthrough the surrounding jungle, often on shorr common rations and withoutadequate water. These marches, moreover, inculcated skills such as silentmovement, and compass and map reading in jungle terrain, as well as buildingup the necessary physical and mental stamina required by men carrying heavypacks for extended periods of time. This relentless training proved particularlyarduous, especially for officer and men who had enjoyed a 'soft ' war to date,with many pushed beyond the limits of what they thought they could endure.As a result the ranks were heavily thinned to remove the unfit and those whofervently wished themselves elsewhere. Training during the monsoon monthsin itself caused casualties from disease, with dysentery and malaria abounding.Within three weeks of training commencing, 30 per cent of the British battalionwas either in or ttying to enter hospital. A peak figure of 70 per cent on sickparade was reached four weeks later, but this was reduced so that at the end oftraining it stood at just three per cent. New blood was injected into units byselecting officers, COs and volunteers from other units serving in IndiaCommand, who arrived in dribs and drabs throughout the training period.

The new and highly specialized tactics of LRP were carefully graduallyinculcated to all ranks in a system of progressive training, working firstas sections and platoons and ultimately as columns, once t roops becameaccu tomed to the jungle. LRP tactics were broken down into simple stages andtaught as drills that were practised incessantly until they became almost secondnature. These included marching in 'column snakes' through different types ofjungle, 'jigs' to disguise a path taken and confuse a pursuing enemy, crossing


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open spaces, dispersal drills carried our on unexpecred conracr wirh rhe enemyor afrer a raid before reassembling ar a remore locarion, an d moving inro an d ourof bivouacs. Th e larrer covered rhe procedure for columns moving quickly inroan d ou r of designared bivouac areas, occupying a defensive posirion, unloadingmules an d rhen building fires, cooking food and consrrucring shelrers. Parriculardrills were also developed for immediare acrion an d conracr wirh rhe enemy,covering arracking villages, parrolling, consrrucring booby rrapsan d esrablishingambushes an d blocks. River crossings were also regularly pracrised in CenrralIndia. A long series of exercises were also carried ou r simularing arracks onairfields, demolirion of bridges an d laying various rypes of ambushes on enemylines of communicarion.

The pack mule wa s a viral parr of rhe Chindirs. Indeed, wirhour rhemlong-range penerrarion would have been impossible, since rhe mule wasrhe only form of rransporr capable of negoriaring rhe jungle and indeed ofgoing almosr anywhere a m a n c ou ld go wirhour him having ro use hi hands.Th e long rrains of mule rransporr accompanying each Chindir column were,however, ofren a racricalliabilirv; rhey required careful prorecrion, since rheloss of even a few animals could have disasrrous resulrs. M ul es w er e ofrenvery difficulr, moreover, ro conceal. Indeed, beforeOperarion Thursday muleswere 'de-voiced' by Royal Army Vererinary Corps or Indian Army VererinaryCorps vers ro prevenr mules b ra yi ng a n d berraying rhe posirion of Chindircolumns ro rhe enemy. This hardy, sure-foared an d sroic beasr of burden,a valued an d ofren dearly loved companion ro many Chindirs, wa s employedfor a variery of rasks.

Th e facr rhar each C hi nd ir c ol um n was dependenr on mules forrransporrarion an d aircrafr for re-supply meanr careful rraining in borh areaswas essenrial. Th e rraining of RAF an d Army personnel in rhe inrricacies ofair supply - complerely ne w ro all - was viral given irs cenrral iry ro Wingare 'sideas of LRP. This included selecring drop zones, clearing vegerarion as requiredan d building signal fires, r ad io an d visual signalling ro aircrafr, garheringparachured an d free-dropped supplies an d rhen quickly disrriburing ir roind iv idua l men. Aircrafr ro rrain wirh , however, were in very shorr supply.In parricular, rhe new Chindirs also ha d much ro learn abour handling mulesan d animal husbandry in general. M os r o f rhe newly de ignared mulereers ha dno experience wharsoever of pack animals, upon which columns depended for

AUS Army engineer usesa grader. landed by glider,to level an airstrip in Burmato make it suitable for transponaircraft. (SE 7932)

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The light-plane airstrip at WhiteCity. The stronghold itself waslocated in the nearby hills.(SE 7937)

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first- and second-line transport. The former carried suPPOrt weapons, heavywireless sets, ammunition and spare light machine guns (LMGs), while thelaner carried spare bedding, rations and other vital equipment. Loading andunloading was carefully pract ised, as well as care of the animals, who couldeasily suffer galls from chafing of badly packed or poorly balanced loads.

77th Indian Infantry Brigade's training culminated in a brigade-leve lexercise with all columns simulating an attack on Jhansi, after marching over180 miles on foot, just before Christmas 1942. Much had been achieved inhardening the troops and teaching them LRP. As Philip Stibbe recalled:

We all knew how to live and move in the jungle; we all had a pretty good ideaof the special tactics we were going to emplov and every man in the columnhad some idea about how to use a map and compass, a skill which was laterto save many lives.' (Stibbe 1994. p.2S)With hindsight , however , it is clear that the basic military skills of many

of Wingate's troops remained poor, which later caused serious difficultiesthroughout Operation Longeloth. Insufficient attention, moreover, had beenpaid ro swimming, river crossings and watermanship. The fault for fai lingro remedy these serious problems must lie at Wingate' s door , since he hadsix months' grace and full responsibil ity for instruction. Overall combateffectiveness was further undermined by the last-minute arrival of individualjunior officers, muleteers and infantry drafts in the effort ro make up numbers.Training for Operation Longeloth and Operation ThursdayThe experience gained during Operation Longeloth taught much about thespecialized tactics of LRP and living, moving and fighting in the jungle againstthe Imperial Japanese Army. These les ons were quickly passed on in t ra iningro 1 I I th Indian Infantry Brigade (already under training) and then fromOcrober 1943 the rest of the now greatly expanded and newly dubbed Special


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The eccentric and highly charismatic Wingate, who possessed a great giftof inspiring the officers and men under his command, quickly improvedmorale and instilled a new drive and energy amongst his followers, as wellas a new sense of purpose. A combination of his personal eloquence, Biblicalinspiration and intense belief in his own leadership and ideas meant Wingateexuded sufficient zeal, enthusiasm and quiet confidence to quickly win overthose who heard him speak. In parr the distinctive and rather eccentric figurehe cu t in his long-outdated Wolseley sun helmet, scruffy crumpled junglebush jacket and trousers, dirty boots and rifle hung over his shoulder was adeliberate affectation or piece of showmanship, contributing to his appealto many other ranks and marked him ou t as being very different to o thersenior officers. So did his evident dislike of military formality and personaleccentricities - evidenced by his fervent advocacy of eating raw onions as ahealth tonic and his lack of concern about greeting fellow officers in the nude.While a small hardcore of Officers remained sceptical of the man, his methodsand his ideas, Wingate 's compelling magnetic personality and dynamismconvinced the vast majority that they could win and make a real diffetencein the war in the Far East. Indeed, he quickly breathed life and fire into thisnew force. It has endured to the present day, as witnessed in the vigorous

A close-up shot of a bearded(hindit and his faithful muleduring Operation Thursday.(5E 7953)


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General William Slim. GeneralOrde Wingate and assortedstaff officers hold ameeting atImphal in March 1944. In thebackground is a B ~ 2 S mediumbomber. (MH 7881)24

defence of any criricism levelled againsr rheir former leader by those whoserved with the Chindits. Other factors contributed to the high elan andcombat effectiveness of rhe Chindits. Wingate built the Chindit identity uponthe firm foundation of the peculiarly British regimental svstem, in which eachBrirish/Gurkha unit possessed a powerful, fiercelv defended sense of beingan elite drawn from a particular regional area and jealous of its hard-wontraditions, beliefs and history. The ultimate bedrock of belief and belongingfor all Chindits in large part was to each soldiers' own mates or peer group,with whom he lived, moved and shared basic friendship and mutual support.A sense of being special was inculcated by the arduous training regimen,moreover, that 77th Indian Infantry Brigade undertook, and the fact rhar somany men were weeded out, with only the best being retained.

The sense of being a special elite, capable of defearing the Japanese'superman' and living, moving and fighring in rhe jungle, was cementedamongst officers and men of 77th Indian Infantry Brigade as a result ofOperation Longeloth. This powerful self-belief, loyalty to and confidence inWingate and his methods was passed on to the new intake - the officers, NCOsand men of 111 rh Indian Infantry Brigade, already under training, 3rd WestAfrican Brigade and rhen the brigades of the former 70th Division, by a varieryof means. A combination of personal visits, speeches and other pep talks byWingate and his disciples passed on rhe message to the new intake, most ofwhom already had earlier combat experience in North Africa. Morale amongstChindits under training also soared as a result of skilful propaganda andwidespread publiciry given to Wingate and his command. A growing sen e ofcorporate identiry and a feeling of belonging was magnified, moreover, by rheadoption and increasing use of the distinctive name 'Chindir' for LRP troops,a new Chinthe emblem as a formation sign and a Chindit shoulder flashproudly worn on the sleeve of uniforms. Wingate further built upon a bedrockof new propaganda promulgared in India Command during 1943 and 1944,inrended to convince British, Gurkha and Indian soldiers of rhe vital importanceof defending India and defearing the 'evil' Imperial Japanese Army, as well asimprovements in welfare and living condi tions for all ranks. As a resulr, the


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majoriry of Chindits in Special Force went intobattle in 1943 and 1944 firmly convinced of themerits of LRP and with the fullest confidencein Wingate's leadership.

The Chindit' high morale - perhapssurprisingly - was maintained during OperationThursday, despite the privations experienced bymost of the men. A downside of this profoundbelief and unquestioning faith in Wingate,however, was the immense psychological shockwhen news of his death on 24 March 1944in a plane crash reached Special Force andreverberated down the chain of command. Itwas felt as a body blow to many men. Arguablythe powerful sense of self-belief, the sense ofbelonging to an elite and high morale enjoyedby the Chindits kept it in being and allowed theunit to weather the storm, despite living, movingand fighting under conditions of extremehardship and for an extended period of time.A shared experience of marching on footlong distances across difficult terrain, carryinga crushing weight and existing on meagrerations, as well facing the same dangers createdan enduring powerful esprit de corps to the end.

APPEARANCE, EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONRYThose troops serving in 77th Indian Infantry Brigade between February andMay 1943 largely wore the same tropical uniform on Operation LOllgeloth asother Commonwealth troops in India Command, since specialized lightweightclothing, arms and equipment specifically adapted to living, moving andfighting in a hot, humid and harsh jungle environment was unavailable.

The different units making up 77th Indian Infantry Brigade wore a mixtureof kit on their first campaign behind Japanese lines. In February 1943 thesoldiers of the 13th King's Regiment entered battle wearing a mixtureof hastily re-dyed, Indian-made khaki drill, as well as a few items of locallymade, jungle-green dyed uniform and equipment. Headgear consisted of thedistinctive, popular and highly practical Australian bush or slouch hat, an itemwhich was both cool and provided shaded vision. Many carried woollen capcomforters to wear at night in higher, colder areas along the Indo-Burmesefrontier. Each soldier wore a khaki drill sh ir ts and long trousers, standardheavy ammunition boots and sometimes web anklets. Lightweight woollenpul lovers were also car ried . In contrast, the Gurkhas and men of the2nd Burma Rifles wore normal regimental uniform of green-dyed khaki shirtsand rrousers, web anklets , black leather boots with iron-studded soles andheels and Gurkha hats with a camouflage net.

The Chindits normally entered battle festooned like a Christmas tree witharm, packs and web equipment. Much personal equipment and ammunitionwas carried, crammed into standard 1937-pattern webbing equipment that hadbeen dyed green just before Langeloth began. The basic web ammunition

The irrepressible Major BernardFergusson pictured shortlyaher Operation Longeloth.(KY471212A)

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The Chinthe emblem, chosenas the formation sign for theChindits. (Kevin Lyles)

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and were highly effective. Fitted with a discharger cup and firing a ballistitecartridge, special SMLEs, moreover, were retained to fire No. 36 grenades upto 200 yards.

The main source of immediate, close-quarter, indirect fire support atthe disposal of Chindit columns was the 2-inch mortar, firing smoke,high-explosive and illumination rounds. This highly effective lightweightweapon consisted of little more than a short rube, a simple firing mechanismand a base plate. It was operated hand-held with the spade or base plateresting firmly on the ground. A round was fired by dropping the shell downthe short barrel , after which the angle readjusted for the next shot. It had amaximum range of 500 yards, although for reasons of accuracy it was bestoperated at a range of 300 yards or less.Early in the war the bolt-operated 0.55-inch Boyes anti-tank (AT) riflesprovided the Chindits with a man-portable anti-armour weapon. Its heavyweight (36 pounds), length (72 inches), limited effectiveness against all butthe most lightly armoured vehicle and powerful recoil when fired made itan unpopular weapon from the start. The Boves AT rifle was normally firedfrom the prone position, and was employed against tanks, enemy motorvehicles, bunkers and emplacements.The Chindits' main source of sustained fire support came from crew-servedweapons in the form of the venerable, but still highly effective and reliable,water-cooled .303 Vickers medium machine gun and 3-inch mortars; twOof each were retained within each column. The tripod-mounted, belt-fed.303 Vickers MMG was capable of producing a greater volume of sustainedsmall-arms fire than any other infantry weapon. It could fire at a rate of up to500 rounds a minute, directlv or indirectly, at ranges up to 3,000 yards, but wasextremely heavv at 88.5 pounds. It was operated by a two-man crew - oneman to fire the weapon and a second to ensure the smooth feeding of itsammunition belr. Four men and several mules, however, were needed to movethe gun, its tripod, ammunition, spare parts and the water needed to cool it.

Three-inch mortars could fire smoke and high-explosive bombs at hightrajectorv into enemy positions. The mortar consisted of a hollow tube with afiring pin at its bottom, a bipod stand and heavy base plate to absorb recoil.

CHINDIT WEAPONSFew of the personal weapons carried and employed by the Chindits during operations Langelothand Thursday had been specially developed for use in the jungle.In fact the vast majority werestandard tried and tested venerable British infantry weapons that had widely employed in othertheatres ofwar. The simplicity and robustness of the .303 Short Magazine Lee-Enfield rifle (1, shownwith bayonet), Bren Light MachineGun (2), and to a lesser extent Thompson SubmachineGun (3),however, stood theChindits in good stead during both operations Langeloth and Thursday,especially during the latter's final phase when the monsoon imposed the greatest test of bothmen, weapons and equipment. During this period rain and mud posed a constant problem tothe operation of these weapons.Only two new personal weapons- the Sten gun (4) and smallnumbers of the US M1Carbine (5) - made their appearanceduring Operation Thursday, withthe latterproving highly popular.Although the Sten wasmuch lighter than theThompson itnever escaped an early reputation for being liable to dischargewhen dropped or mishandled.For heavy support theChinditswere dependent on the .303 Vickers medium machine gun (6)and 3-inch mortar (7), both of which could be transported, broken down in smaller parts,by mule. During Operation Thursday theywere supplemented by a small number of Lifebuoyflamethrowers (8) - namedafter the distinctive round fuel tank - that proved highly effectiveagainst Japanesebunkers and occupied buildings. The other items shown are a 2inchmortar (9),which weighed 32.5 lb. the Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank (PIAn weapon (10), the Boys anti-tankrifle (1 1), the Enfield .38Mk 1pistol (12) and theNo. 36 hand grenade or Mills bomb (13).


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A supply drop in progress overthe Burmese jungle. (lNO 7075)

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This comparatively crude heavy weapon could be broken down andmanhandled in three loads, but on campaign needed several mules to transportit and its ammunition. A major drawback was that each bomb weighed10 pounds . With a range of up to 1.5 miles and a maximum rate of fire of15 rounds a minute when used by a well-trained crew, it was a powerful sourceof indirect fire and constituted the main piece of indirect fire support availableto Chindit columns. One major drawback, though, was that it consumedammunition at a prodigious rate.

The overall weight of arms and equipmenr carried by each Chinditwas crushing, almost bending him double and dominating his life in the field.When fully loaded, Chindit packs and personal equipmenr weighed in ataround 70 pounds on average - about half a man's normal body weighr.Following supply drops this weight was often increased further, unril rationshad been eaten away. Inrense rainfall a lso increased the weight carr ied, asuniforms and equipmenr became sodden. Some variations, however, existed,depending on the task allocated to a Chindir. The 0.1 of a Bren gun team, forexample, carried 86 pounds just after a supply drop had provided five days'K rations. The weight carried fell to 15 pounds for a brigadier and the relativelyfew technicians, whose equipmenr was carried by mules or chargers.


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The greatest change in appearance of Chindit soldiers on campaignbetween 1943 and 1944 on Operation Thursday was the far more serviceablejungle-green uniform worn by officers, NCOs and other ranks that wasa product of growing British experience of living, moving and fighting in thejungle. For the majority of British and West African troops, this consisted of anAustralian bush or slouch hat, an Indian-made grey-green wool flannel, khakidrill or Aertex bush shirr (essentially a four-pocket jacket) worn outside thetrousers, corron batrledress trousers and ammunition boots sometimes wornwith shorr purrees. A silk 'panic map' of Burma was normally worn around theneck for use in an emergency. Green-dyed 1937-parrern web equipment,containing a water botrle, ammunition and other personal equipment, wasworn as before. On the right hip a kukri was worn covered with a green corroncover. An Everest pack was worn on the back, normally containing items suchas seven days' K rations, a jumper, cap comforrer, a green light wool blanketcur in half, a groundsheet , two spare pairs of socks, laces, a housewife,anti-mosquito ointment, mepacrine tablets, toothbrush, toothpaste, razor, soap,a small khaki hand towel and PT shoe.The same basic mix of small a rms - .303 Lee Enfield Rifles, Tommy guns,

and Bren guns - were carried by Chindits during Operation Thursday, althoughtwo new weapons made an appearance. Some officers carried the shor r,lightweight .30 US M1 carbines, capable of firing semi-automatic from aIS-round magazine - which proved highly popular. Although Thompsons wereretained in use until the end of the war, a growing number of the far simplerand cheaper mass-produced Sten machine carbines were carried in the field.Firing a 9mm bullet, this weapon had a 32-round magazine. Although earlymodels had a (thoroughly deserved) poor reputation with regard to safety andreliability, those produced later during the war generally performed well.The Boyes AT Rifle was replaced between 1943 and 1944 with the PlAT

(Projector Infantry Anti-Tank); this weapon fired a hollow-charge round that

A heavily loaded mule is led upa freshly cut path up a hillside.(SE 7927)

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to the ground under the weighr carried or rhrew their loads. The latter requiredimmediate action by muleteers already working hard at ensuring the free passageof their charges through dense foliage or over fallen trees. A column would oftenbecome strung out as minor delays, such as leading mules around or overobstacles, caused it to elongate as the day progressed, with men in the rearguardhaving to march flat out to keep up.

The threat of Japanese pursuit was always taken seriously, with full militaryprecaurions obeyed ar all rimes and great care taken to disguise the path takenby the Chindits. Ar periodic intervals, columns halted and did a 'j ig' , with menturning 90 degrees to left or righr and then marching a predetermined distance,keeping contact wirh the man to right or left. Each man would then turn back90 degrees and re ume the march rhrough rhe jungle on a completely new path.This effectively covered tracks from a pursuing enemy. Every 50 minutes acolumn normally halted for an eagerly awaited ren-minure break, during whichmen would throw themselves to the ground for a well-earned rest. The distancecovered by a column was extremely variable depending on the going and thephysical well-being of the troops. On a march along a road, just under fourmiles could be achieved by a Chindit column in 50 minutes, but in bad goingin rhe jungle this fell considerably. In Burma on fine days and in good going itaveraged about two miles per hour and in mountain and thick jungle it wassometimes down to five miles a day.The reception of a nightly (and occasionally dayrime) supply drop by acolumn was a frequent and welcome break from normal routine for a Chindit.Indeed, air supply drop was literally the lifeline for Chindits operating behindenemy lines, bringing with it vitally needed food for man and beast, ammunitionand other much needed stores, as well as other luxuries. An RAF officeraccompanying each column would find a suitable drop zone in the jungle or aclearing whose location was immediately radioed to base. To prevent Japaneseinterference, platOon ambushes were quickly placed on all likely routes to thearea, listening posts sent ou t on the flanks and in the centre of the DZ anotherplatoon held in readiness for a counterattack. Other troops, meanwhile, quicklycollected sufficient fuel for bonfires marking ou t the landing zone to the air,

A group of (hind it ' and USAAFglider pilots at Broadwayshortly after the initial landingin March 1944. (EA 20827)

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Agroup ofChindits usingrubber inflatable boats to crossawide river in Burma. Rivercrossings were a frequentfeature of life on campaign inBurma. liND 2072)

Agroup ofChindits prepare aroadblock behind enemy lines.(IND 2078)

while others prepared to gather, pile and then redistr ibute supplies after theywere collected. When supplies were dropped by parachute, or free-droppedwithout them, the contents would be carefully watched as they descended, buteven so a considerable amount was often lost. Air re-supply, moreover, haddangers of its own. Injuries caused by air supply drops was known by the genericterm 'Death from flying fruit ' in 111 th Indian Infantrv Brigade after a man waskilled by free-dropped sack of pineapples. Following the end of a drop, timewas of the essence. After supplies were quickly collected, stockpiled and thendivvied out, troops would move away for at least half an hour and carefullyconceal tracks.

The daily march normally continued until dusk when a column wouldbivouac in an all-round defensive posi tion. A nightly hal ting place wouldnormally be located in an area of thick jungle nearby a stream, which providedboth drinking water and downstream a site for ablutions and a toilet. Aparticular drill was followed each day for forming a bivouac, a procedure thathad been drummed into each Chindit . When ordered to bivouac, a column


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AUSAAF L5 light aircraft takesoff from a jungle airstrip.(SE 7933)

This pictureof Orde Wingatewas taken shortly after hereturned to Assam afterOperation Longclorh.(lND 2237)

40

oxen, the lat ter providing meat on the hoof and tran porta tion for animalfodder. It slowly advanced over the Zibyu Taungdan Range, after successfullyreceiving a first supply drop, and then the Mangin Range through an areavery thinly occupied by enemy troops. Along with nos.7 and 8 columns,Calvert was ordered by Wingate southwards ro Sinlaumaung where ajapanese force had been reported. 0 enemy troops were present, however,and they quickly returned ro the main body after eat ing food prepared for thejapanese and liberating an elephant and a horse.

The advance from the Chindwin ro the railwayline - 100 miles approximately - rook roughlytwo weeks given the difficult terrain that had ro betraversed. No.3 and No.5 columns profited fromdiversions made by other columns near Pinlebu,further north, and made direct for the strategicallyimportant railway line, running from Shwebo northto Myitkina, to prepare demolitions. When a japanesegarrison was located at Wuntho, direct ai r supportwas called in and attacked the village. On 6 MarchNo.3 Column reached the railway line where it blewup two bridges and destroyed the permanent wayin 70 places. Two lorry loads of japanese infantrycoming from Wuntho were ambushed by coveringparties protecting the work of the demolition teams,which, af ter stiff fighting, finally broke contactand fled into the jungle. Without having lost a man

0.3 Column quickly withdrew into the jungleto a prearranged rendezvous, having strewn thesurrounding area with numerous booby traps madefrom 3-inch mortar rounds.

No.3 Column made slow progress throughhigh elephant grass towards the Irrawaddy River,carefully evading japanese pursuit. After BurmaRifles patrols discovered that japanese troops wereoccupying the small towns of Tigyaing and Tawma,


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Major-General OrdeWingatebriefs Chindit officers andmen at Sylhet in Assamshonly before the beginningofOperation Thursday.Standing nearby is ColonelPhilip Cochrane USAAF, wholed No.1 Air Commando.(MH 7877)

Wingate is briefed by a seniorstaff officer, Brigadier Tulloch,shonly after OperationThursday has begun. (MH 7867)48

astride japanese road and rail communications in the railway valley, making itimpossible for the japanese to ignore. As a result, the japane e high commandhurriedly re-deployed its forces. In the interim, Chindit columns acted as eyesand ears, attacked approaching enemy troop and generally made their presencefelt in the surrounding area by interfering with road and rail communications.

The japane e launched their fir t major attack on White City on the nightof 21 March, gaining twO foothold in the perimeter. A counterattack by the


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Agroup ofChindits 'brew up'in a jungle bivouac. (IND 2289)

BELOW RIGHTAgroup of senior officers,including Orde Wingate,Colonel Frank Merrill andBrigadier Michael Calvert.at Broadway in central Burma.(MH 7873)BELOW LEFTOrde Wingate awaits thearrival of transport aircraftat Broadway. (MH 7882)

Ciry, during which Hayashi was killed while leading the attack mounted on awhite horse. Although the japanese penetrated the defence they were eitherkilled by machine-gun fire or evicted in fierce hand-to-hand fighting from theposition by South Staffs and Wesr African troops.The defence of White City was by no means purely passive. On 10 April

Lentaigne informed Calvert that 3rd West African Brigade, commanded byBrigadier Gilmore, would garri on rhe srronghold and rhar henceforth histroops would operate outside the block. With a srriking force consisring of the3/9rh Gurkha Rifles, 7th igerian Regiment and a recently arrived columnof 45rh Reconnaissance Regiment (part of 16rh Brigade), Calverr beganatracking enemy staging and concentration areas, as well as cutting road andrail communications in rhe vicinity. This striking force initially had mixedsuccess as it attacked rhe heavily dug-in japanese near Sepein on 13 April todraw pressure off rhe block, despire intense close ai r support and shellingfrom White City. Further fierce fighring occurred as the Chindits attackedjapanese lines of communications and rroops squeezed into an area between

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The Japanese railway linenear White City. March 1944.ISE 7923)

OPPOSITEOne of the last pictures takenof Major-General Orde Wingatebefore his death in March 1944.lEA 20829)52

Calvert and the defenders of White City. Although the Chindits sufferedheavily - with nearly 70 dead and 150 wounded - the badly mauled japane enever attacked White City again.

ow that the menace to White City had been removed, 77th Indian InfantryBrigade reverted to a mobile role and marched northwards on 25 April towardsthe Gangaw Range. It and its reinforcements had achieved quite remarkableresults. A japanese force of near-divisional strength had been fought to astandstill by seven Chindit battalions - four British, two West African and oneGurkha - and a lengthy break imposed on rail communications. With thecentre of gravity of Operation Thursday shifting northwards and the monsoondue to close down the airstrip, a decision was taken to abandon White City,along with Broadway and Aberdeen. The final evacuation of the stronghold by14th Brigade was carried ou t while the japanese were still licking their woundsfrom earlier intense fighting, and proved hugely successful. A successionof DC3s flew in on the final day and night removing casualties, 25-pounders,anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, stores and other equipment, all of which wasback-loaded to India. The heavily mined and booby-trapped fortress was finallyabandoned to the enemy on 9/I0 May, when the remaining Chindits marchedaway unopposed northwards to rejoin the main body of Special Force.Operation Thursday: l11th Indian Infantry Brigade and the defenceof BlackpoolIn early May 1944, 111 th Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Majorjack Masters, was ordered to establish a new block on the strategic road andrailway in the Hopin area, as the centre of gravity of Operation Thursdayshifted northwards. This new stronghold - codenamed Blackpool - was60 miles north of White City and occupied an isolated hill feature at the endof a jungle-covered spur running down from the Bumrawng Bum range. It waslocated near the village of lawkwin, where it could prevent reinforcementsreaching Mogaung and Myitkina and thereby assist Stillwell's CAC( orthern Combat Area Command) advance. Although not straddling therailway line, the position dominated it from a distance of a mile, had areasdefiladed from line of sight, level space for a 25-pounder battery, a good watersource and nearby paddy fields where an airstr ip could be built. J 11 th IndianInfantry Brigade was not left unsupported. 14th Brigade, marching north fromWhite City, would protect Blackpool from the west, with the West Africansalso in support, while 77th Indian Infantry Brigade would keep east of


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Agroup ofWest African(hindi" board an RAF (-47Dakota transport aircraft enroule for Burma. (IND 7046)

the next morning a newly deployed 105mm japanese guns began harassing fireon Blackpool.The japanese maintained heavy pressure on the Deep sector, making a series

of head-on attacks repeated every night for five days - largely ignoring Othermore vulnerable, lightly defended sectors of the perimeter. In particular, thevital airstrip, fully operational from 12 May, where DC3 after DC3 brought invitally needed supplies and evacuated casualties, escaped attack despite beingin full view. These japanese assaults, moreover, conducted mostly at platoonstrength, displayed little skill or subtlety and as a result suffered heavily in theface of intense small arms, MMG and mortar fire. They did, however, graduallywear down the willpower and endurance of the over-worked men of theKing's Own. 25-pounders, 2-pounder anti-tank guns, Bofors anti-aircraft guns,ammunition, barbed wire and Other supplies, meanwhile, were slowly flown in.As intended the 25-pdr artillery battery began on 13 May bombarding therailway line, supporting the perimeter and abortively trying to suppressthe japanese artillery. Throughout the day USAAF Mustangs and B-25s, calledin by the Chindits, wheeled overhead, bombing and strafing suspected enemypositions or concentration areas and giving the attackers no respite. As a resultthe japanese kept close to the perimeter to escape air attack, with snipersexacting a heavy toll on the defenders. As time progressed the japanese artillerygrew increasingly bold and employed ammunition on a lavish scale, causinga steady drain of casualties and preventing the defenders from sleeping.On 17 May japanese 105mm and 155mm artillery and mortars systematicallypounded the Deep with such ferocity that Masters was forced to quicklysubstitute its exhausted garrison for fresher troops. A gap of an hour, however,


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meant rhar rhe ensuing and derermined Japanese infantry arrack failed, beinghai red early rhe fol lowing morning by intense machine-gun, morrar andarrillery fire. However, rhe nexr day rhe Japanese broke conracr and wirhdrewinro rhe jungle ro lick rheir wounds, afrer suffering heavy losses ro air arrackand arrillery and morrar fire during rhe course of repeared ground arracks.A Chindir parrol found few japanese bodies, bur rhe jungle was lirrered wirhbloody bandages, empry carrridge cases, and equipment.

The glowering monsoon clouds had sreadily builr up since Blackpool hadbeen occupied, wirh rain showers growing sreadily in frequency and intensiry.When rhe monsoon finally broke, in irs full fury, ir had a massive impacr onoperarions in and around rhe srronghold. As Masrers larer wrore:

The Deep sector looked like Passchendaele - blasred trees, feet and twistedhands sticking out of the earth, bloody shirrs, ammunition clips, holes half fullof warer, each containing two pale huge-eyed men, trying to keep rheir riflesOut of the mud. (Masters 1961, p.245)A combinarion of rhe pouring rain and l imired vision because of dense

cloud sharply currailed air supply missions using rhe airsrrip, preventing rhereplenishmenr of food and especially ammunirion (which was being consumedar a prodigious rare), as well as interfering wirh virally needed close air supporr.Evacuaring rhe sick and wounded, moreover, became increasingly difficulr.The sick rare in Blackpool also soared, wirh jungle sores and malaria aboundingamongsr exhausred men already physically debilirared by malnurririon.

The monsoon had perhaps rhe grearesr impacr on rhe Chindir columnsadvancing rowards Blackpool in supporr, wirh movement rhrough rhe drippingwer jungle along slippery muddy parhs and rracksslowed ro an almosr glacial pace. Rivers quicklyflooded, overflowing rheir banks and becomingimpossible ro cro s, while srreams and rivulers wererransformed into raging rorrents. 14rh Brigadewas bogged down en roure ro Blackpool by rhewearher and extremely difficulr rerrain, and japaneseresisrance prevented ir being used as floaringcolumns around rhe srronghold as intended. In largeparr 77rh Indian Infantry Brigade could only warchfrom rhe far side of rhe Namyin River, now in fullspare, as rhe japanese assaulr on Blackpool garheredpace and ferociry.

The defenders of Blackpool briefly enjoyed arespire amidsr rhe growing monsoon rains afrerrhe arrackers on rhe Deep wirhdrew. Ir was noneroo soon, since borh of Masrers' original Bririshbarralions were near dead on rhei r feer havingfoughr and worked hard for 10 days since rhesrronghold was occupied. The embarrled garrison ofBlackpool did receive some supporr. On 20 May rhecompararively fir, fresh and resred 3/9rh GurkhaRifles arrived and rook over rhe sourhern perimerer,followed by 0.82 Column of rhe King's Regimentfrom Broadway. Wirh sufficient manpower nowavailable, rhe perimerer was rhickened and floaring

Agroup of tired and beardedChindits in 16th Brigade carryawounded comrade throughthe jungle. (KY 481781)

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SELECT BffiLIOGRAPHYAllen, Louis Bllrma: The Longest War (London: Oem, 1984)Anglim, Simon 'Orde Wingate and the Theoty Behind the Chindit Operation "

Royal Ullited Service Illstitlltioll JOIlTl/al, 147, 0.2 (April, 2002), pp. 92-97- - 'Orde Wingate. Guerilla Warfare and Long-Range Penetration, 1940-44',Small Wars and Illsllrgencies, 17, '0. 3 (September 2006), pp. 241-62

Baggaley, James A Chilldit Story (London: Souvenir Pre s, 1954)Bidwell, Shelford The Chindit War (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985)- - and Mead, Peter 'Orde Wingate: Two Views', jOllrl1al of Contemporary History, 15(July 1999), pp. 401-04Burchett, W.G. Wingate's Phantom Army (Bombay: Thacker, 1944)Calvert, Michael Prisoners of Hope (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952)- - Fighting Mad, 2nd edition (London: Airlife, 1996)- - Chilldit (London: Ballamine, 1964)Carfrae, Charles Chindit Coillmll (London: Kimber, 1985)Chinnery, Philip March or Die: Tile Stor)' of Willgate's Chilldits (London: Airlife, 1997)Fergusson, Bernard Beyolld the Chilldwill (London: Collins, 1945)- - The Wild Grew Earth (London: Collins, 1946)- - The Trumpet ill the Hall (London: Collins, 1970)Hedley, John jllllgie Fighter. Infalltry Officer, Chidllit & SOE Agellt ill Bllmld, 194 I - I945

(Brighton: Tom Donovan, 1996)Hickey, Michael The Ullforgettable Anny: Slim's XIVth Army ill Bllrma (London: BCA, 1992)James, Robert Rhodes Chilldit (London: John Murray, 1980)James, Harold Across the TIJreshold of Bailie (Lewes: The Book Guild, 1993)Jeffrey, W.E SlIllbeams Like Swords (London: Hodder & Stoughron, 1951)Jeffreys, Alan British Illfalltrymall ill the Far East 1941-45 (London: Osprey, 2001)Kirby, Major-General Woodburn (ed.1 The Official Histor)' of The War Against japall,

vols. 11 and 111 (London: HMSO, 1962 and 1965)Leathart, SCOtt With the Gllrkhas: India, Bllrma, Sillgapore, Malaya, Illdollesia 1 9 ~ o - 1 9 5 9

(Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 1986)Masters, John The Road Past Malldalay (London: Micheal Joseph, 1961)Mead, Peter Orde Willgate alld the Historialls (Devon: Merlin Books, 1987)Moreman, Tim The jllllgle, the japallese alld the British Commonwealth Armies

at War, 1945-45 (London: Frank Cass, 2006)Paimer, Robin A Sigllal Honollr: With tl,. Chidnits alld XIV Army ill Bllrma (London:

Leo Cooper, 1999)Rolo, Charles Willgate's Raider's (London: Harrap, 1944)Rooney, David Bllrma Victory (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992)- - Willgate alld the Chilldits. Redressillg the Balallce (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994)Royle, Trevor Orde Willgate (London: Weidenfeld and icholson, 1982)Sharpe, Phillip To Be A Chilldit (London: White Lorus Press, 1995)Shaw, Jesse The March Ollt (London: Hart Publishing, 1953)- - Special Forces: A Chindits Story (London: Alan Surton Publishing, 1986)Slim, Field Marshal Sir William Defeat ill/O Vietory (London: Cassell, 1956)Smith, E.D. Bailie for Bllrma (London: Batsford, 1979)Stibbe, Phillip Retllm Via Rangooll (London: Leo Cooper, 1994)Sykes, Christopher Orde Wingate (London: Sykes, 1959)Thompson, Julian The Imperial War Mllsellm Book of War Behilld Ellem)' Lilies (London:

Imperial War Museum, 1998)- - The Imperial War Mllsellm Book of the War ill Bllrma (London: Imperial War Museum, 2002)Thompson, Sir Robert Make for the Hills (London: Leo Cooper, 1988)Towill, Bill A Chilldit's Chrollicle (London: Author's Choice, 2000)Tulloch, Derek Willgate in Peace and War (London: Macdonald, 1972)

63


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INDEXRdC'rr-ncr'S to IIlUSIT,JIlOIlS an" show" 10 bold.Aberdn 1 5 l r o n ~ h o l d l 8. 51,1Ir supp1r drops 1-. 11. 11. 30. 3'-38. 49.urcral1 32. H. ;;8: Douglas Dak0l3 (C-FIOC-])

5.14.26. Sl. 54. 56. 56. 59; I:hdC'r .. -. 14.17.31.37. ;;4; Sorth AmC'rlcan 6-15 ~ t I H : h d l 24,3 .... 49.56: S'onh Amt'nca P-51 Mustang H. 49. )6:SIIrl.Son lS "'D, S83JrStnps. prC'p3nng 17.11.463 p ~ a r a n c C ' 15-26. J I. 31. 54bank C ' ~ p c n C ' n c : C ' 39-42.44-46.48-50. U. H. )6-60

Oper.U1on Longelo", 39-41.44su 44-46.48-50. H:ddence of Black pool 52.54.56-60:


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CHINDIT 1942-45Named after mythical beasts guarding Buddhist temples, the Chinditswere an elite unit of the British Army in WorldWar II, whose distinctivefighting methods were tested deep behind enemy lines in the junglesof Burma. Based on the innovative ideas ofwarfare that its commanderhad developed in Palestine and Ethiopia, the Chindits rapidly becamea force possessing a high degree of ability, belief, and esprit de corps.Charting the Chindits' operations against the Japanese in Burma in, 943-44, this book outlines the experiences of its officers and men asthey battled both the unforgiving terrain and an implacable foe. It alsoassesses the contribution made by these elite troops to the Allied victoryin South-East Asia that has proved such a source of controversy ever since.

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