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8/10/2019 ON THE POSITION OF MAIMONA PHILOSOPHY
1/13
On the Position of Maimon's PhilosophyAuthor(s): Nathan RotenstreichSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Mar., 1968), pp. 534-545Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20124632.
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2/13
EXPLORATION
ON
THE
POSITIONOF
MAIMONA
PHILOSOPHY
NATHAN
RUTENSTREICH
I
Interwoven
in the complex texture
of Solomon Maim?n
's
(1752-1800)
system
are
strands
of
thought originating
in
the
theories
of his
avowed
creditors. Maim?n is
one
of the
first
modern
philosophers
who
acknowledges
his
debt to
diverse
philo
sophical
trends
and
traditions.
Among
his
major
creditors,
Maim?n
includes Maimonides
and
Spinoza.1
The
present
analysis,
however,
will
be restricted
to
an
exploration
of
his
debt
to
Leibniz,
Hume,
and
Kant.
In interweaving aspects of thought from Leibniz and Hume,
Maim?n
takes
his
departure
from
the
earlier
synthesis
of their
posi
tions,
wrorked
out
by
Kant
in
the
Critique
of
Pure Reason.
But
Maim?n
goes
beyond
Kant,
by
interlacing
theories of
the
critical
philosophy
itself,
with
the web
Kant
had
woven
of
strands
from
Leibniz
and Hume. What
permitted
Maim?n
to
link
the
seemingly
incompatible
systems
of the
rationalist and the
sceptic?
In
the
first
place,
both
thinkers
sought
to
establish the
validity
of
the
relation
between
the
two
pillars
of
knowledge,
concepts
and
sense
data.
Secondly,
both
philosophers
believed
that the
way
to
ac
complish
their
aim
was
to
derive
one
component
of
knowledge
from
the other.
According
to
Leibniz,
the
empirical
factor
can
be
derived
from the
conceptual;
while,
according
to
Hume,
ideas
can
be derived
from
impressions.
But
the
difference
in
direction
does
not
alter the
fact that
both
Leibniz
and Hume
posit
a
genetic
relation
between the
two
factors
:
according
to
both,
concepts
are
applicable
to
sense-data
because
one
factor
grows
out
of the other.
Hume
maintains
that
concepts
1
On Maimon's relation
to
Spinoza
see
S.
H.
Bergman,
The
Philosophy
of
Solomon
Maim?n
(Jerusalem,
1967),
pp.
216
ff.
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3/13
ON THE POSITIONOFMAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY 535
are
valid
because
they
are
copies
of
impressions;
Leibniz maintains
that
the
empirical
factor
can
be
explained
hecause it constitutes
a
stage
in
a
continuous
context
originating
in the monad.
Both
Leibniz
and
Hume,
then,
sought?albeit
in
opposite
directions?a
continuous
transition
between
the
heterogeneous
component
fac
tors
of
human
knowledge.
Kant
rejects
this
method
of
coping
with
the
problem
of
valid
ity.
Taking
his
departure
from
the
assumption
that
there
can
be
no continuous transition between
concepts
and sense
impressions,
Kant
sought
another
way
of
establishing
the
validity
of
concepts,
or
alternately,
a
different tnethod
of
justifying
their
application
to
sense-data.
According
to
Kant,
the
relation between
the
two
fac
tors
is
not
genetic
but
functional.2
Unlike
Leibniz
and
Hume,
who
abolish
duality,
Kant
sustains
it.
Whereas
Leibniz and
Hume
represent
duality
as
the
crux
and
source
of
their
problem,
Kant
represents
it
as
the
framework and foundation for
his
solution.
Arguing
that the
function of
relating
and
ordering
pertains
to
the
very nature of concepts, and that only by being incorporated into
a
conceptually
determined structure
does the datum
occupy
a
log
ical
position.
Kant establishes the
interrelatedness
of
the
two
fac
tors,
without
assuming
that
one
can
be derived
from
the
other.
Unlike
Leibniz,
who
posits
a
genetic
relation
in
which
intelligible
truths find
empirical
realization
and unlike
Hume,
who
posits
a
genetic
relation
in
which
sense
impressions
find their
conceptual
copies,
Kant
posits
a
relation based
upon
the
synthetic
nature
of
knowledge,
i.e.,
a
relation
subsisting
between
heterogeneous
factors.
Both
Leibniz
and Hume furnish
Maim?n
with
criteria for
measuring
Kant's
solution
to
the
problem
of
validity.
On
the
one
hand,
Maim?n
applies
the
Leibnizian
criterion
which?by
repre
senting
the
empirical
factor
as
a
realization of the
rational
factor?
robs
the
former of its
independence.
On
the other
hand,
he
applies
Hume's
criterion
according
to
which
the
empirical
factor
can
be
neither abolished
nor
reduced
to
another factor.
It
is
not
only
against
Kant,
but
also
against
Leibniz
that Maim?n
raises
his
2
See
my
Experience
and its
Systemalization,
Studies in
Kant
(The
Hague,
1965).
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536 NATHAN ROTENSTR?ICH
objections.
For the burden
of
Maim?n
's
objection
is
this:
to
translate
intelligible
truths
into
empirical
truths
is
impossible
owing
to
the
irreducible
residuum
of
experience
established
by
Hume.
If the
heterogeneity
of the
factors
is
ultimate?so
Maim?n
's
criticism runs?then
Kant's
solution is
unsatisfactory.
To
repre
sent
duality
as
the
foundation for
one's
solution,
is
merely
to
pretend
that
the
question
itself is
an
answer.
But
Maim?n
uses
Leibniz
as a
weapon
rather
than
as
a
target
for
criticism.
According
to
Maim?n,
Leibniz
provides
the
only
possibility
of
solving
the
problem:
a
relation between
empirical
data and
intelligible
concepts
can
be
established
only
by
eliminating
the
former,
that is
to
say,
only by making
the
empirical
factor
thoroughly
intelligible.
In
assuming
a
synthetic
connection be
tween the
factors,
Kant
transfers
the
problem
and
its
solution
to
a
new
sphere.
But the
heterogeneity
of the factors is
a
problem
posed
by
synthesis
as
well.
Kant
assumes
that
he has
overcome
the
acute form
of
heterogeneity
which
might
preclude
the
possi
bility
of a
synthetic
connection.
This, however,
is
analogous
to
the
assumption
that
by
bringing
one
extreme
in
contact
with
the
other,
we
cancel the
polar opposition
between them. Like
Hume,
whose
spokesman
he
purports
to
be,
Maim?n
emphasizes
the
ir
reducibility
of
the datum. But
whereas Hume maintains the
primacy
of
the
datum,
Maim?n maintains its
independence
vis-?-vis
the
concept.
In this
respect,
Maim?n
fights
Kant with
a
Kantian
weapon;
for it
was
Kant
who
taught
that
the
empirical-perceptual
factor
is
no
less
independent
than
the
conceptual
factor.
Accord
ing to Maim?n, if the empirical factor is independent, then even
synthesis
is
impossible.
On the
one
hand, then,
Maimon's
position
resembles
Kant's
in
that
it lies
midway
between Leibniz's
and
Hume's.
On the
other
hand,
however,
Maim?n
diverges
from
Kant
in
using
Kant's
system
as
evidence
that
the
impossibility
of
solving
the
problem
raised
by
Hume
implies
the
impossibility
of
realizing
the
solution
proposed by
Leibniz.
To
put
it
another
way,
because
he
con
sciously
confines the
solution
he
proposes
within the limits
of
finite understanding, Kant draws a distinction between archetypal
understanding
and
ectypal
understanding.
Maim?n
apparently
agrees
with
Kant that
the solution
is confined within the
limits of
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ON
THE
POSITION
OF MAIMON'S
PHILOSOPHY
537
finite
understanding.
But
he
goes
beyond
Kant
in
two
respects.
For
one
thing,
he
stresses
the
limits
of
finite
understanding by
putting
more
pointedly
the
problem posed
by
Hume,
i.e.,
by
pointing
out
what
makes
human
understanding
finite.
For
an
other,
he
furnishes
finite
understanding
with
a
criterion
for
measuring
its
own
finitude
by juxtaposing
it
with
the infinite
understanding
posited
by
Leibniz.
From
Hume,
Maim?n
adopted
the
ultimate
fact of sensation and
the
conclusion
Hume
based
upon
it,
namely
that the relations
among
concepts
are
purely
psycholog
ical. From
Leibniz,
Maim?n
adopted
the
cognitive
ideal
by
con
trast with
which
the
nature
of
empirical
knowledge
is
illuminated.
What
conclusions
can
we
draw
from
Maim?n's
adaptation
of
elements
from
Leibniz,
Hume and
Kant? First
of
all,
because
Kant's
system
constitutes the
background
against
which
Maim?n
develops
his
theory,
we
can
increase
our
appreciation
of
Kant
by
studying
Maim?n.
Secondly,
we
may
expect
that
one
problem
with
which
Maim?n
will
be
preoccupied
will
be the
nature
of
valid
knowledge. Finally, we may assume that the other problem with
which
Maim?n
will
be
preoccupied
will
be
the
nature of
the factors
which
prevent
the realization of
valid
knowledge.3
II
What
are
the
distinguishing
marks of valid
knowledge?
To
answer
this
question
it
is
necessary
to
recall that in
classical
philos
ophy
a
distinction
was
drawn between the
intelligible
world
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
empirical
world
on
the other.
The
first
step
toward
cancelling
this
distinction
was
taken
by
Kant.
By
substituting
understanding
and
sensation
for
intelligible
world
and
sensible
world,
Kant
transformed
what liad hitherto
been
a
differ
ence
in
the
structure
of the
world,
into
a
difference
within
the
limits of
knowledge.
But
despite
the
enclosure of
the diverse
factors
within
the realm of
knowledge,
their
duality
remained
intact. The
cognitive
significance
which
Kant
assigns
to
the
differ
3
See
the
most
recent
comprehensive
study
:
Samuel
Atlas,
From
Critical
to
Speculative
Idealism:
The
Philosophy of
Solomon Maim?n
(The
Hague,
1964).
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538
NATHAN
ROTENSTREICH
ence
between
understanding
and
sensation?as
distinguished
from
the
ontological
validity
it had been
assigned
in
classical
philosophy
?can,
perhaps,
be
said
to
constitute
the
logical
condition of
Kant's
idea
of
synthesis.
Maim?n
goes
beyond
Kant
by
asking:
if
under
standing
and
sensation
are
indeed elements
of
knowledge,
then
why
must
their
duality
be maintained? If
understanding
and
sensation
are
indeed constituents of
knowledge,
then
they
ought
to
be understood
as
elements
of
a
single
system,
rather than
as
two
systems,
one of which is based
upon
the other.
In
abolishing
the
ontological
difference,
and
in
substituting
a
difference between
two
sources
of
knowledge,
Kant
took the first
step
toward
rationalization.
The
second
step
toward
rationaliza
tion is
taken
by
Maim?n,
who
abolishes
the difference
between the
two
sources
of
knowledge
and
substitutes
a
duality
immanent
in
the
sphere
of
knowledge;
a
duality
immanent
in
the
process
of
rationalization
which
perpetually
and
progressively
overcomes
the
irrational
factor,
i.e.,
the datum.
By
being
absorbed
into
the
process
of
rationalization,
the irrational factor is robbed of its
irreducibility
which would otherwise
arrogate
a
stable
status.
Integration
into the continuous
process
of
rationalization
is
substituted for
the
fixed
status
of
the
components
of
knowledge.
The
change
undergone
by
the
datum entails
a
new
view
both
of
concepts
and
of
the
syntheses
connected
with
them. From
Kant's
well-known observation
that
concepts
without
intuitions
are
empty,
and
intuitions without
concepts
are
blind,
it follows that
contents
are
created
through
synthesis.
It
is
the
content
which
constitutes the encounter between the different elements. Abolish
ing
the difference between
the
elements entails
the
absorption
of
the
content
into
the
concept
itself,
i.e.,
into
the
concept
as
endowed
with
the
power
of
explication.
As endowed
with
the
power
of
explication,
the
concept
itself
is the
content.
Synthesis
no
longer
denotes
the
self-transcendence
of
concepts
and their
application
to
intuitions. The
fullness
furnished
by
intuition is
implicit,
to
begin
with,
in the
concept;
and
synthesis
is but
the fullness
of
the
con
cept. Being
full
to
begin
with,
not
depending
upon
intuition
for
its fullness, the concept can serve as a starting point for an
explicative
process,
i.e.,
for
a
genetic
process
in
which the
problem
of
validity
finds
its
solution.
It
may
accordingly
be said that
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ON
THE
POSITION
OFMAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY
539
Maim?n
goes
beyond
Leibniz,
Hume,
and
Kant
by developing
the
central
tenet
of
each:
with the
help
of
Kant's
concept
of
synthesis,
Maim?n undertakes
to
demonstrate the
possibility
of
a
transition
from
understanding
to
experience,
which
was
maintained
by
Leibniz and
denied
by
Hume.
But
by
so
doing,
he
assigned
a new
meaning
to
Kant's
conception
of
synthesis;
whereas
Kant
defined
concepts
as
functions which
order
the
datum,
Maim?n defines them
as
the
content
of
the universe.
Ill
Maim?n 's
new
interpretation
of
synthesis
leads
him
to
a new
conception
of
the
rationality
of the universe.
Rationality,
Maim?n
maintains,
consists
in
the
creation of
the
datum
out
of the
concept,
not in
the
explanation
of the
datum
by
means
of the
concept.
Rationality
is realized in the
generation
of
the datum.
Maim?n
sought
concrete
expression
for
this
concept
of
rationality
in
the
following
facets of his
system
:
(A)
Conspicuous
in
its absence from
the
epistemological
sphere
is the
noncognitive
factor
posited
by
Kant,
namely
the
thing-in-itself.4
In
Kant's
system,
the
thing-in-itself
fulfills
the
twofold
function of
(a)
supplying
knowledge
with
the
datum;
and
(b)
guaranteeing
that
the datum will
not be eliminated
from
knowledge.
Kant's
thing-in-itself
frustrates,
as
it
were,
the
ten
dency
of
the
concept
to
produce
the datum
out
of
itself
by
way
of
a
continuous
transition.
If,
however,
by
concept
we
mean
the
element of
fullness,
then there
is
neither
room
nor
reason
for
limiting
its
fullness
by
assigning
a
cognitive
function
to
the
thing
in-itself;
there
is
neither
room
nor
reason
for
allotting
a
cognitive
function
to
a
factor
which
subsists
beyond
the
sphere
of
knowl
edge.
Anticipating
Hermann
Cohen
and
his
followers,
Maim?n
argues
that the
thing-in-itself
cannot
bear
the
brunt of criticism
based
upon
an
analysis
of the
nature
and constituent elements
of
knowledge.
4
See
Bergman,
op.
cit.,
pp.
7
ff.,
and
Atlas,
op.
cit.,
pp.
20
ff.
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540
NATHAN
ROTENSTREICH
(B)
Elimination
of
the
thing-in-itself
is
entailed
by
the
assumption
concerning
the
synthetic
character of
concepts
;
but
no
positive
characteristic
of
synthesis
is
illuminated
by
its
elimination.
The
synthetic
character
of
concepts
finds
positive expression
in
the
apparent pivot
of
Maimon's
system,
the
law of
determinability
(Satz
der
Bestimmbarkeit).
How
is it
possible,
Maim?n
asks,
to
link
a
particular
predicate
with
a
particular subject?
Predication,
a
fundamental
function
of
all
knowledge,
is
not
an
arbitrary
act of
formal assertion. This function must
necessarily
be anchored in
the
meaning
and
structure
of the
concepts
it
combines;
it
is
not
only
from the
perspective
of the
assertion,
but also from the
per
spective
of
content,
that
a
particular
term
must
constitute
a
pred
icate
of
a
particular subject.
Or,
as
Maim?n
puts
it,
the content
must
be
the
measure
of
whether the
subject
is determined
by
the
predicate,
and whether
the
predicate
is the
determination. The
combination
in
the assertion
is
accordingly
based
upon
the
clarity
of the
known
content;
and the known
content
guides
the
combina
tion in the assertion. Not the formal facets of the proposi
tional
structure,
but the known
contents
permit
us
to
say
This is
a
right-angled triangle,
and
prevent
us
from
saying
This
is
a
right-angled
truth.
Whereas,
according
to
the realistic
solution,
knowledge
is valid
because it
copies
the clear
structure
of the
world,
according
to
Maim?n,
knowledge
is valid
when it
is
formulated
in
assertions which
reflect
its
own
clear
structure,
i.e.,
the
structure
of
a
determinable
subject
and its determinations.
Maim?n
also
maintains
that
the
concept
is
not
merely
an
ordering
function
but
also
a
fullness of
content,
because
its
very
nature
leads
us
to
bring
forth from
potentiality
into
actuality
its
implicit
deter
minations.
Here
Maim?n
seems
to
interweave
two
strands
of
Aristotle's
philosophy:
the
element
of
emergence
from
potentiality
into
actuality
as a
law
of the
universe,
and the
element of
related
ness
between
subject
and
predicate
as
the
structure
of
propositions.
As
represented
by
Maim?n,
the
passage
from
potentiality
into
actuality
is
implicit
in
the
relation
between
subject
and
predicate;
the
structure
of the universe is
implicit
in
the
structure
of
proposi
tions.
The
encounter
between
metaphysical
and
logical
structure
occurs neither on the plane of the universe, nor on the plane of
formal
logic,
but
on
the
plane
of
knowledge
saturated with
con
ceptual
content.
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9/13
ON
THE
POSITION
OF
MAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY
541
(C)
The
pivotal
notion
of Maim?n's
system
is
not
exhausted
in the
observation that
it combines
an
element
of
Aristotelian
logic
with
an
element of
Aristotelian
metaphysics,
the
subject-predicate
structure
of
propositions
with the
dynamic
structure
of the uni
verse.
For
Maim?n also
adapts
for
his
purposes
the
element of
substance
and
accident.
Maim?n
explicitly
represents
the
relation
between
substance
and
accident
as
displaying
a
structure
which
has
been transferred
to
the
logical
sphere
:
he
correlates
the
determined
subject with substance as being independent of its determination;
and
he
correlates
the determination with the
accident
as
being
dependent
upon
the determined
subject.
Maim?n
's
transfer of
ontological
categories
to
the
logical-conceptual
sphere
clearly
reflects
his
tendency
to
abolish
the
duality
of
the
spheres.
Also
reflected
in
this
transfer is
Maimon's
closely
related
argument
that
the
structure
of substances
cannot
be
transparent
or
rational,
unless
it
is
at
the
same
time the
structure
of
concepts.
To
understand
why
Maim?n transfers the
structure
of
sub
stance and accident to the
conceptual
sphere,
is at the same time
to
understand
why
he criticizes the
notion
that the
category
of
causality
constitutes the
supreme
principle
of
knowledge.
Were
we
to
represent
as
a
central
metaphysical
motif
the
conflict between
the
principle
of
substance
and
the
principle
of
causality,
we
would
have
to
include Maim?n
among
the
leading proponents
of the
former:
measuring
the
principle
of
causality
by
his
standard
of
rationality,
Maim?n
argues
that
the
relation
between
cause
and
effect
is
not
meaningful,
because?being
a
relation of
implication
rather than explication?it is not based upon the inner content of
the
related
terms.
The assertion and
determination which
many
thinkers
represent
as
the
strength
of
the
causality principle
are
represented by
Maim?n
as
its
weakness.
A connection of this
kind,
Maim?n
argues,
is external and
meaningless.
Maimon's
cognitive
ideal,
then,
is
to
find
an
immanent-meaningful
founda
tion
for the
interconnectedness
of
elements,
even
when
their
con
nection
occurs
merely
in
time.
This
ideal
cannot
be satisfied
by
the
merely
temporal
relation
of succession. Maim?n
consequently
tries to correlate the principle of causality with
a
type of continuous
transition
based
upon
the
content
of the
phases
which follow
one
another,
not
upon
their
position
in
a
temporal
sequence.
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10/13
542 NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
(D)
The
very
terminology employed
by
Maim?n
reflects
the
rationalization
predominant
in
his
teaching.
Particularly
per
tinent,
in
this
respect,
is
the
term
differential,
which
Maim?n
uses
to
denote the
process
of
creating
the datum
out
of the
con
cept,
the
perceptions
being
integrals
of
the
conceptual
elements.
As
S.
H.
Bergman
has
shown,3
the
position
occupied
by
the
concept
of
differential
in
Maimon's
system
is
parallel
to
the
position
occupied
by
the
concept
of
schematism
in
Kant's
system.
Yet
this
aspect
of Maimon's
concept
need not detain us, since it
pertains
to
the technical
machinery
of
his
system,
rather than
to
its
main
trend
toward
rationalization.
To
throw further
light
on
that
trend,
it
might
be
worthwhile
to
examine the
relations
between
Formal
Logic,
which
pertains
to
the
structure
of
judgments,
and
Transcendental
Logic,
which
per
tains
to
objects.
Maim?n
was
among
the
first
philosophers
to
take issue
with
Kant
on
this
central
matter.
Unlike
Kant,
Maim?n
maintains the
primacy
of
Transcendental
Logic
and its inde
pendence of Formal Logic. In thus diverging from Kant, Maim?n
sought,
first of
all,
to
invest
thought
with
content
and,
secondly,
to
make
Formal
Logic?which
deliberately
disregards
and abstracts
from
content?merely
an
abstraction of
the
full,
and
consequently
creative,
concept.
Once
we
admit that
the
concept
is
dynamic,
that
it is
the
precondition
of rationalization
through generation
of
the
datum
out
of
a
concept,
then
we
are
driven
to
regard
content
saturated
thought
as
primary,
and formal
thought
as
secondary.6
IV
If
Maimon's
system appears
Janus-faced,
it
is
because
the
trend
toward
rationalization
is
accompanied
by
an
awareness
that
ration
ality
cannot be
realized
within
the
limits
of finite
understanding.
Rationalization
is
obstructed
by
the
factual difference
between the
component
elements
of
knowledge,
i.e.,
by
the
dual
structure
de
scribed
in
Kant's
critical
system.
Maimon's
factual
scepticism
is
5
See
Bergman,
op.
cit.,
pp.
65
ff.; Atlas,
op. cit.,
pp.
109
ff.
6
See
Rotenstreich,
Experience
and
its
Systematization,
Studies
in
Kant, pp.
14
ff.
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11/13
ON
THE POSITION
OF MAIMON'S
PHILOSOPHY
543
based
upon
two
different
uses
of Kant's
system:
on
the
one
hand,
he
measures
Kant's
system by
the
standard
of
rationalization,
and
finds it
wanting;
on
the
other
hand,
he
measures
rationalization
by
Kant's
system,
and
finds
that
it
cannot
be
realized.
Thus
Maim?n
seems
to
accept
the
Kantian
system
de
facto,
even
though
he
denies that
it
constitutes
a
solution
to
the
problem
it
was
designed
to
solve.
Maimon's
system
may
accordingly
be described
as
a
combination
of
fundamental
rationalism
and factual
scepticism.
What other reason is there for Maimon's factual scepticism?
It
will be
recalled
that
there
is
an
element
of
ambiguity
in
Kant's
concept
of
experience.
Experience
connotes the domain
of
sensuous
encounter with data.
It is
in
this
sense
that
Kant
says
Everything
else
has
to
be
left
to
experience.
7
Yet
when
he
says
that
he
deals
with
experience
as
grounded
both
in
perception
and
in
understanding,8
he refers
to
experience
as
a
synthesis
and
not
as
a
mere
encounter.
In
any
case
Kant does
not
offer
an
exhaustive
explanation
of
the
relation
between
the
two
meanings
of
expe
rience. Maim?n
seems
to
have been
more
precise
in
this
matter;
using
Kantian
terms,
he
maintained
that
a
particular
sense-impres
sion
is
an
actual
experience,
while
the total
system
of
knowledge
represents
possible
experience.
This
implies
that
concepts
are
applicable
to
knowledge
in
general
qua
possible
experience,
and
that
they
are
not
applicable
to
actual
experience
qua
this
or
that
particular impression.
There
is
no
internal connection
between
this
particular
impression
in its
ultimate
factuality
and
the
system
of
knowledge.
Hence
the
applicability
of
the
system
to
the
impres
sion
is
not
demonstrated
by
Kant.
The
question
quid
facti
remains
unsolved;
rationalization
through
generation
of
the datum
from
the
concept
remains
unattainable
within
the
limits
of
finite
under
standing.
In
the
history
of
sceptical
ideas,
Maimon's
factual
scepticism
occupies
a
special
position
His
scepticism
is
aware
of,
and
mea
sures
itself
by,
a
criterion of
knowledge
immune
against
scepticism.
Both
scepticism
and
relativism
are
generally
challenged
on
the
7
Kritik
der reinen
Vernunft,
B,
p.
218. In trans,
by
Kemp
Smith
(London,
1950),
p.
208.
8
Prolegomena
zu
einer
jeden k?nftigen
Metaphysik,
etc.
S
20,
trans,
by
Peter and
Lucas
(Manchester,
1953).
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12/13
544
NATHAN
ROTENSTREICH
grounds
that
they
presuppose
what
they
negate.
More
specifically,
it
is
objected,
first
of
all,
that
the
sceptic
assertion
there
is
no
certain
judgment
is
itself
a
certain
judgment.
Secondly,
it is
objected
that
scepticism
is
possible
only
by
comparison
with
some
thing
which
is
beyond
doubt. Neither of
these
objections
seems
pertinent
to
Maimon's
scepticism.
Maim?n
explicitly
restricts
doubt within
the
limits of
empirical knowledge.
Doubt,
as
he
puts
it,
applies
to
the existence of
thought
concerning objects
in
conformity
to the a
priori
conditions of
knowledge.
Such doubt
does
not
cancel
itself
because
it
applies
only
to
knowledge
of
objects,
not to
knowledge
of the
structure
of
knowledge.
Further
more,
such
scepticism
is
explicitly
formulated
by
reference
to
a
definite, crystallized,
cognitive
ideal. Such
scepticism accordingly
implies
the
nonrealization of
the
ideal,
not
the
self-contradiction
or
self-destruction
of
knowledge.
V
The
Janus-faced
character
of
Maimon's
system
carries decisive
weight
from the
viewpoint
of the
development
of
philosophy.
We
may
venture
to
say
that
Maim?n
formulated the
program
of nine
teenth
century
idealism,
fully
aware
that
the
program
could
not
be
carried out.
Nineteenth
century
idealism
may
be described
as a
philosophical
movement
which
endeavors,
or
dares,
to
undertake
the
execution
of
Maimon's
program.
Idealism
tries
to
abolish the
sceptical boundary set by Maim?n; it attempts to abolish the differ
ence
between
finite
consciousness
and infinite-divine consciousness.
It is
not
by
chance
that
Hegel's system
is described
by
Whitehead
as a
philosophic
attitude
of
a
God.9
Hegel's
design
was
to
abolish
the
inner
opposition
between
our
minds and
objects,
and
to
repre
sent
objects
or
objectivity
as
objectified
mind.
Why
do
we
describe
this
realization
of
Maimon's
program
as
daring?
Unlike
Maim?n,
Hegel
does
not
represent
finite
mind
as
a
limitation
of
infinite
mind;
he
represents
infinite
mind
as
an
immanent
explication
of
9
Analysis
of
Meaning,
in
Essays
in Science
and
Philosophy
(London,
1948),
p.
99.
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13/13
ON
THE
POSITION
OF
MAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY
45
finite mind.
This
is
why
Hegel
assigns
a
central
position
in
his
system
to
the
Phenomenology of
Spirit;
for
it
is
here
that
he
justifies
his
daring
venture.
Here
he undertakes
to
demonstrate
not
only
that
Maimon's
program
can
be
realized
as
a
matter
of
principle,
but
also that
it is
actually
realized,
and
realized
precisely
by
that
finite
mind
which
Maim?n
represented
as
incapable
of
realizing
rationalization.
What
Maim?n
represents
as
frustrating
the
trend
toward
realization,
Hegel represents
as
sustaining
it.
The
Hebrew
University
of
Jerusalem.
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