On the Nash Equilibria of Graphical Games for Channel Access in Multihop Wireless Networks

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On the Nash Equilibria of Graphical Games for Channel Access in Multihop Wireless Networks. Vaggelis G. Douros Stavros Toumpis George C. Polyzos. WWRF-WCNC @ Istanbul, 06 .0 4 .2014. Motivation (1). New communication paradigms will arise. Motivation (2). - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Vaggelis G. Douros Stavros Toumpis

George C. Polyzos

On the Nash Equilibria of Graphical Games for Channel Access

in Multihop Wireless Networks

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WWRF-WCNC @ Istanbul, 06.04.2014

Motivation (1)

New communication paradigms will arise

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Motivation (2)

Proximal communication-D2D scenarios More devices…more interference Our work: Channel access in such scenarios which

device should transmit/receive data and when3

Problem Description (1)

Each node either transmits to one of its neighbors or waits

Node 3 transmits successfully to node 4 IFF none of the red transmissions take place

If node 3 decides to transmit to node 4, then none of the green transmissions will succeed

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2 3 541 6

2 3 541 6

Problem Description (2)

The problem: How can these autonomous nodes avoid collisions?

The (well-known) solution: maximal scheduling…

is not enough/incentive-compatible

We need to find equilibria!

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2 31

2 31

2 31

On the Nash Equilibria (1)

How can we find a Nash Equilibrium? The (well-known) solution: Apply a best

response scheme… will not converge Our approach: A distributed iterative

randomized scheme, where nodes exchange feedback in a 2-hop neighborhood to decide upon their new strategy

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On the Nash Equilibria (2)

This is a special type of game called graphical game Payoff depends on the strategy of nodes that are up

to 2 hops away c, e: cost transmission/reception (c>e)

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On the Nash Equilibria (3)

Each node i has |Di| neighbors and |Di|+1 strategies. Each strategy is chosen with prob. 1/(|Di|+1)

A successful transmission is repeated in the next round

Strategies that cannot be chosen increase the probability of Wait8

2 3 541

2 3 541

2 3 541

2 3 541

This is a NE!

Performance Evaluation (1)

Perfect k-ary trees of depth d Average number of rounds for

convergence to a NE as a function of – k and d – the number of nodes

Analysis of the avg./max./min. number of successful transmissions at a NE

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Performance Evaluation (2)

Fast convergence, ~ proportional with the logarithm of the number of nodes

Effect of the depth d more important than param. k

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Performance Evaluation (3)

For trees of similar number of nodes, longer trees more successful transmissions

Any NE is almost equally preferable in terms of number of successful transmissions

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Longer

Shorter

Take-home Messages

Channel access for selfish devices in proximity can lead to efficient NE with minimal cooperation– stronger notion than maximal scheduling– fast convergence– without spending much energy

More (sophisticated) schemes & tradeoffs, theoretical analysis etc. @IWCMC 2014

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Acknowledgement (1)

Vaggelis G. Douros is supported by the HERAKLEITOS II Programme which is co-financed by the European Social Fund and National Funds through the Greek Ministry of Education.

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This research has been co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong Learning" of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) - Research Funding Program: Heracleitus I I . I nvesting in knowledge society through the European Social Fund.

Acknowledgement (2)

The research of Stavros Toumpis has been co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program “Education and Lifelong Learning” of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) Research Funding Program: THALES. Investing in knowledge society through the European Social Fund.

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Teşekkür Ederim!

Vaggelis G. Douros

Mobile Multimedia Laboratory

Department of Informatics

Athens University of Economics and Business

douros@aueb.gr

http://mm.aueb.gr/~douros

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