Moving Beyond Law Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Evidence

Moving Beyond Law: Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Evidence

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Evidence,InferenceandEnquiryPhilipDawid,WilliamTwining,andMimiVasilaki

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780197264843PublishedtoBritishAcademyScholarshipOnline:January2013DOI:10.5871/bacad/9780197264843.001.0001

MovingBeyondLaw:InterdisciplinarityandtheStudyofEvidenceWILLIAMTWINING

DOI:10.5871/bacad/9780197264843.003.0004

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterexaminescriticallyboththeideaofamultidisciplinaryfieldoranintegratedscienceofevidence,andscepticismaboutandresistancetothisideafromthestandpointofajuristwhohasbeeninvolvedwithinterdisciplinaryworkonevidenceinlawformanyyears.Thechapterisorganizedasfollows.PartIpresentsanoverviewoftheintellectualhistoryoftheacademicstudyofevidenceinlawintheAngloAmericantraditionandshowshowimportantaspectsofthefieldcametoberecognisedasinherentlymultidisciplinary.PartIIidentifiessomelimitationsoflegalperspectivesonevidence,especiallywhenthefocusisoncontestedtrials.ItrecountsthestoryofattemptstomovebeyondlawinthedirectionofconstructingageneralfieldofevidencethatformedpartofthebackgroundoftheUCLprogramme.PartIIIexaminessomeofthereasonsforsuspicionofandresistancetotheideaofanintegratedscienceofevidence.PartIVrestatesthecaseforrecognitionandinstitutionalisationofevidenceasaspecialfocusofattentionatthepresenttimeandputsforwardapersonalagendaofgeneralquestions


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thatstillneedtobetackled.

Keywords:multidisciplinaryfield,law,contestedtrials,scienceofevidence,evidence

AbstractThepurposeofthispaperistoexaminecriticallyboththeideaofamulti-disciplinaryfieldoranintegratedscienceofevidenceandscepticismaboutandresistancetothisideafromthestandpointofajuristwhohasbeeninvolvedwithinterdisciplinaryworkonevidenceinlawformanyyears.PartIpresentsanoverviewoftheintellectualhistoryoftheacademicstudyofevidenceinlawintheAnglo-Americantraditionandshowshowimportantaspectsofthefieldcametoberecognisedasinherentlymultidisciplinary.1PartIIidentifiessomelimitationsoflegalperspectivesonevidence,especiallywhenthefocusisoncontestedtrials.Itrecountsthestoryofattemptstomovebeyondlawinthedirectionofconstructingageneralfieldofevidence,thatformedpartofthebackgroundoftheUCLprogramme.PartIIIexaminessomeofthereasonsforsuspicionofandresistancetotheideaofanintegratedscienceofevidence.PartIVrestatesthecaseforrecognitionandinstitutionalisationofevidenceasaspecialfocusofattentionatthepresenttimeandputsforwardapersonalagendaofgeneralquestionsthatstillneedtobetackled.2

(p.74) PartI.ThestudyofEvidenceinLaw:anhistoricaloverviewofaninterdisciplinarytraditionLAWISALMOSTtheonlydisciplineinwhichEvidenceisestablishedasadistinctfieldwithcourses,treatises,conferences,journals,andscholarswhoclaimitastheirmainspecialism.3Thisinstitutionalisationhasonlyoccurredwithinthecommonlawtradition.Forexample,incivillawcountriesrulesofevidence,suchastheyare,arenormallyintegratedintoCivilProcedureandCriminalProcedure,whicharetwoquitedistinctareasofexpertise.Forensicscienceandcriminalisticsarealsogenerallyconceivedaslargelyseparatedisciplines.IncommonlawEvidenceasaspecialisedfieldwaslargelythecreationofeighteenth-andnineteenth-centurytreatisewriters,mostofwhomwerepractisinglawyersorjudges.Therawmaterialoftheearlytreatiseswasjudicialdecisions,butthesewerescatteredandunevenlyreported.Itwasthewriters(p.75)whodevelopedthestructure,conceptualapparatus,andattemptsattheorising.FormostofitshistorythestudyofevidenceinlawhasfocusedonthetechnicalrulesandtheunderlyingrationalesoftheLawofEvidence,viewedlargelyasapracticalsubjectforlawyersinvolvedinlitigation.However,therehavebeenperiodswhenevidencescholarshavedrawnheavilyonarangeofotherdisciplines.

ThestorystartswithChiefBaronGilbertsTheLawofEvidence,writteninthe1720s,butpublishedposthumouslyin1754.Forthenext150yearsacentralconcernofthewriterswastoestablishtheLawofEvidenceonthebasisofasingleprinciple.Themainpioneeringeffortscanbeseenasaseriesofilluminatingmistakesuptothelatenineteenthcentury,whenJamesBradleyThayerofHarvardlaidthefoundationforthestructureofthemodernlaw.4GilberttriedtoestablishtheLawofEvidenceasa


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coherentfieldonthebasisofanexplicitlyLockeanepistemologyandasingleorganisingprinciple,TheBestEvidenceRule:

Thefirsttherefore,andmostsignalRule,inRelationtoEvidenceisthis,ThataManmusthavetheutmostEvidence,theNatureoftheFactiscapableof;fortheDesignoftheLawistocometorigidDemonstrationinMattersofRight,andtherecanbenoDemonstrationofaFactwithoutthebestEvidencethattheNatureoftheThingiscapableof.5

GilbertsrigidinterpretationofwhatconstitutesthebestevidencetooktheformofahierarchyofrulesofweightonaScaleofProbability6withPublicRecordsatthetoptrumpingnon-officialdocumentsundersealdowntooraltestimonybycompetentwitnessesatthebottom.Gilbertsschemewasfollowedbyearlynineteenth-centurytreatisewriters,butisnowrecognisedthatasanaccountoftheEnglishLawofEvidenceitwasbasedontwofalsepremises:first,Gilbertfailedtodistinguishbetweenweightandadmissibilityand,second,hisschemepostulatedahierarchyofrulesofweight.7Thereare(p.76) noformalrulesofweightinthecommonlaw:therearenogeneralrulesthatprescribethatofficialevidenceshouldbegivenpriorityoverunofficialevidence;thatwrittenevidencehasmoreprobativeforcethanoraltestimony;nor,althoughthisisnotalwaysobservedbythemedia,thatcircumstantialevidenceisweakerthantestimony.8Asimilarerrorhasbeenrepeatedthroughouthistory,mostrecentlyinmoredoctrinaireversionsofevidence-basedmedicineandevidence-basedpolicythathavetriedtoformalisetheweighingofevidenceonthebasisofperemptoryrulesprescribinghierarchiesofweightandreliability.9

OneofGilbertsachievementswastoprovideaclear,andquitesoft,targettoattack.JeremyBenthamdemolishedGilbertsFalseTheoryofEvidenceinaclassicpolemic,10beforegoingontodevelophisRationaleofJudicialEvidenceinfivevolumes.11Benthamdidnotrespectboundariesbetweendisciplines.HiswritingsonevidencecontainmanyimportantinsightsandoverthelasttwocenturiestheAnglo-AmericanLawofEvidencehasevolvedinpiecemeal,haltingfashioninthegeneraldirectionthathecharted.However,legalopinionhasalmostunanimouslyjudgedthathewenttoofarinadvocatingthetotalabolitionofallbindingrulesofevidence(andprocedure).12Hiscentralpreceptwasthenon-exclusionprinciple:

Bethedisputewhatitmayseeeverythingthatistobeseen:heareverybodywhoislikelytoknowanythingaboutthematter:heareverybody,butmostattentivelyofall,andfirstofall,thosewhoarelikelytoknowmostaboutittheparties.13

(p.77) Benthamsanti-nomianthesissoundsradicaltocommonlawyers,butinnearlyallotherspheresofpracticallifeweoperateunderasystemoffreeproof,thatisanabsenceofformalrulesinregardtoweight,credibility,orquantumaswellasadmissibility.14Benthamsreasonisinstructive:

Tofindinfalliblerulesforevidence,ruleswhichinsureajustdecisionis,fromthe


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natureofthings,absolutelyimpossible;butthehumanmindistooapttoestablishruleswhichonlyincreasetheprobabilitiesofabaddecision.Alltheservicethatanimpartialinvestigatorofthetruthcanperforminthisrespectis,toputthelegislatorsandjudgesontheirguardagainstsuchhastyrules.15

Inanageofbureaucratisationandaudit,thiswarningshouldstillhaveresonance.Thepressurestosimplify,standardiseandcodifyaregreaterthanever.

Throughmostofthenineteenth-centurytreatisesontheLawofEvidencestruggledtoconstructacoherentframeworkforexposition.Thereweresomeilluminatingfailures.Taxonomiesrelatingtosources(e.g.witnesstestimony,documentaryevidence,realevidence)ortotypesofdatafrequentlyusedasevidence(e.g.classesofdocuments,confessions,traces,laterfingerprintsandpolygraphs)orfieldsoflaw(evidenceintorts,property,contract)justdidnotworkasframeworksforexpositionofevidencedoctrine.Somelegaltreatiseswereorganisedaroundthetasksofprovingparticularkindsofmatterstobeproved(probanda)forexample,howtoprovedebt,arson,thecausesofrailwayaccidents,orparticularcrimes.16Allofthesetendedtodeteriorateintowhatcanbesatirisedasthelawofmilkchurnscategoriesthatweretooparticularandfragmented,lackingorganisingconceptsandgeneralprin-ciples.17Itwasonlywhenitwasrealisedthatstructuredargumentcould(p.78) provideageneralframework(whatWigmorecalledthelogicofproof)thatthefieldwasabletoachievesomecoherence.

Duringthenineteenthcenturytheexclusionaryruleswerethinneddown,generallyinthedirectionindicatedbyBentham,butinapiecemealfashionthatwasquitecontrarytotheradicalspiritofhisproposals,andnotalwaysbecauseofhisinfluence.18However,someofBenthamsspecifictargetssurvived,includingtherighttosilence,theprivilegeagainstself-incrimination,lawyerclientprivilege,andsafeguardsfortheaccusedincriminalcases.Bythe1870spiecemealreformsandthedeclineoftheBestEvidenceRuletoanevidentiaryghostlefttheLawofEvidencelookinglikeacollectionoffragmentedtechnicalruleswithnocoherenceorform.19

ThenextsignificantattempttorationalisethefieldwasbyJamesFitzjamesStephen,whoasarelativelyyoungmandraftedtheIndianEvidenceActof1872anddevelopedageneraltheoryofjudicialevidencebasedonrelevance.Stephenelegantlysimplifiedandstreamlinedtherulesofevidence,buthistheorywassoonrecognisedtobeasplendidmistake.20IftheLawofEvidenceismainlyconcernedwithexclusionofcertainkindsofrelevantevidence,thenrelevancecannotitselfprovidethebasisforexclusion.ThispavedthewayforJamesBradleyThayer(18311902)toperceivethattheLawofEvidenceprovidesforaseriesofdiverseexceptionstoageneralprincipleofadmittingallrelevantevidence.Thayerpronouncedtwoprincipleswhichtodayformthefoundationforthemodernlawofevidenceincommonlawsystems,includingtheinfluentialAmericanFederalRulesofEvidence:

(1)Thatnothingistobereceivedwhichisnotlogicallyprobativeofsomematterrequiringtobeproved;(2)Thateverythingwhichisthusprobativeshouldcomein,unlessaclearground


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ofpolicyoflawexcludesit.21

ThayersawthattheAnglo-AmericanLawofEvidenceconsistsofaseriesofexceptionstoaprincipleoffreeproof(i.e.absenceofrules)andthatfreeproof,farfrommeaningthatanythinggoes,referstostructuredrationalargumentbasedonordinaryprinciplesofpracticalreasoning.ThebasisoftheLawofEvidenceisamatteroffactandlogic,guidedbyhistwoprinciples(excludeallirrelevantevidence;includeallrelevantevidence,unless).Relevancemeanstendstosupportortendstonegatewhatistobeproved(p.79) theultimateprobandumormaterialfactsinlegalparlance.Thetestofrelevanceisamatteroflogicandgeneralexperience,22notlaw.InhissplendidphraseThelawhasnomandamustothelogicalfaculty,meaningthatthelawcannottellyouhowtothink.23

ThayersownwritingsconcentratedverylargelyontheLawofEvidence,whichheconceivedquitenarrowly,buthisbasicinsightswerebuiltonandgreatlyexpandedbyseveralofhisstudents,mostnotablyJohnHenryWigmore(18631943).

FormostofthetwentiethcenturyWigmorewasthedominantfigureinthestudyofEvidenceintheUnitedStatesandbeyond.ForpractitionersandjudgeshismainworkwashisenormoustreatiseontheLawofEvidence,whichovertimeexpandedtofilltensubstantialvolumes.24However,wearehereconcernedwithotheraspectsofhisworkthathaverecentlybecomemoreprominent.BuildingonThayerswork,Wigmoredividedthestudyofevidenceinlawintotwoparts,whichhecalledtheTrialRulesandthePrinciplesofProof.25AlthoughhisreputationrestedmainlyonhisworkontheLawofEvidence,hearguedforcefullythatthePrinciplesofProofarepriorto,andmoreimportantthan,theLawofEvidence.ThetitleofhismainworkonthesubjectisThePrinciplesofProofasGivenbyLogic,PsychologyandGeneralExperienceandillustratedinJudicialTrials.26Althoughitfocusesmainlyoncontestedjurytrials,thisbookisamultidisciplinarytext,whichcontainsalmostnolaw.Itdealsextensivelywithwitnesspsychology,forensicscienceasitthenwas,andWigmoresownchartmethodofconstructingandrepresentingcomplexargumentsbasedonmixedmassesofevidence.Itisabout(p.80) structuringargumentsaboutquestionsoffactincontestedtrialskeyconcepts,includingrelevance,probativeforce,andcredibilityarenotgovernedbylegalrules.

Thestructureisprovidedbyanapplicationofideasaboutpracticalreasoningingeneral;theideaofgeneralexperiencereferstoasocietysstockofknowledge(ormorecorrectlystockofbeliefs)widelyheldbeliefsheldataparticularmomentinhistory.Thelinkisthatinordinaryreasoningeveryinferentialstepiswarrantedbyageneralisationdrawnfromthisstockofbeliefs.27Thesemayrangefromacitizenscommonsensebeliefstoexperience-basedgeneralisationstomoreorlesswell-groundedpropositionsbasedonempiricalresearch,whichmayrangefromimpressionisticsurveystorigorousandrepeatedscientificstudies.Thusalmostanyformofknowledgeorbeliefcancomeintoanargumentaboutanissueoffactthroughsuchbackgroundgeneralisations.Ofcourse,itiseasytoshowthatmanycommonsensebeliefsarebasedonspeculation,


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superstition,myth,orprejudiceandthatthecontentsofanyindividualsstockofbeliefsvarygreatlyinrespectofreliability.Moreovertheideaofcognitiveconsensusaboutcommonsenseneedstobetreatedwithcare,especiallyinamulticulturalsociety,28andthecognitivecompetenceofordinaryadultsissometimeschallenged.29Itisalsoeasilyshownthatwhatpassesforknowledgeatanytimemaylaterberejectedorproventobefalseandthatevenwell-foundedscientificgeneralisationsareopentorefinement,revisionorfalsification.Inreachingimportantdecisionsbyrationalmeansitissensibletorelyonthebestinformationavailable,butoftenthatisnomorethanfalliblegeneralexperience.Whatelsecanwerelyon?

WigmoresPrinciplesofProofwascompiledinaperiodwhenforensicscience,witnesspsychologyandothercognatespecialismswererelativelyundeveloped.Thiswasbeforegenetics,databases,DNAprofilingandmatchingoftracestransformedmethodsofinvestigationandwhatisgenerallyknownasscientificevidence.Althoughbetweenthefirsteditionin1913andthelasteditionin1937,hetriedtokeepupwithscientificdevelopments,thebooknowappearsquaint,out-datedandpoorlyorganisedinitsbraveattempt(p.81) tosynthesiseknowledgeandassessthereliabilityofsuchmattersaspolygraphs,fingerprints,andthedemeanourofwitnesses.Butthecoreofhisbasicinsightsstillholdsgood:First,followingThayer,thefoundationofthesubjectofevidenceinlawisordinaryinformallogic.30Second,thereliabilityandprobativeforceofevidencecanonlyexceptionallybemadethesubjectofbindingrulesaboutclassesofevidence.Thirdthebasicconceptsofevidenceinlawarenotlegalconcepts.31Withonlyminorexceptions,relevance,credibility,probativeforceandotherkeyconceptsarenotdefinedbylaw;32and,fourth,thatevaluatingthecredibilityandweightofevidencedependsongeneralexperiencewhichincludesthewholegamutofspecialistdisciplines.

Thusinanimportantsense,alargepartofthesubjectofevidenceinlawisbyitsnaturemultidisciplinary.Unfortunately,nearlyallofthescholarlylegalliteraturesinceWigmorehastendedtofocuslargelyonaspectsthatarepeculiartolegalcontexts:theexclusionaryrulesthatareexceptionstotheprincipleofadmittingallrelevantevidence,theinstitutionalandproceduralpeculiaritiesofjurytrials,issuesconcerningproductionandpresentationofevidenceincourt,appealsandsoon.Itisoddthat,whenasubjectisdefinedasaseriesofdiverseexceptionstoageneralprinciple,thefocusisalmostexclusivelyontheexceptions,evenwhentheyareofdiminishingimportance.33ThecrucialbridgebetweentheprinciplesofproofandtheLawofEvidenceisrelevance,whichisnotdefinedbylaw.34

FromWigmoresfirsteditionofThePrinciplesofJudicialProofin1913untilthe1980stherewerespasmodiceffortsbylegalscholarstodeveloptheideasassociatedwiththeprinciplesofproof,butmostofthesedidnotflourish.35Thereasonsforthisarecomplex.Forensicscienceanditsproliferating(p.82) subdisciplinesdevelopedlargelyoutsidelawschools.Contactswithpsychologistsinterestedinlawwereattimesmorefrequent,36butmostpyschologicalstudiesofwitnesses,jurydecision-making,andotheraspectsoflegalprocesswerebasedmainlyinpsychologydepartments.SofaraslegaleducationwasconcernedWigmoresideaofThePrinciplesofProofwasperceivedtobeanon-


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subject,perhapsbecauserule-orientedacademiclawyersbelievedthat,insofarastherearenorules,thereisnosubjectmatterforlawyerstostudy;37or,iffact-determinationisjustcommonsense,itcouldbepickedupwithoutformalinstruction.Thereisalsoanaturaltendencyforspecialiststoemphasisethedistinctiveaspectsoftheirsubject.

Therewas,furthermore,afeelingthatinterdisciplinaryworkwasnotpractical.ThiswasthefateofthecollaborativeeffortsofJeromeMichael,abrilliantlegalproceduralist,andMortimerAdler,awell-knownphilosopher.Theiroutstandingbookwasonlyprivatelyprinted.38InhisElementsofLegalControversyMichaeleloquentlyexpressedtheinherentmultidisciplinarityoftheprinciplesofproof:

sincelegalcontroversyisconductedbymeansofwords,youneedsomeknowledgeabouttheuseofwordsassymbols,thatis,somegrammaticalknowledge.Sinceissuesoffactareconstitutedofcontradictorypropositions,areformedbytheassertionanddenialofpropositions,andaretriedbytheproofanddisproofofpropositions,youneedsomeknowledgeofthenatureofpropositionsandoftherelationshipswhichcanobtainamongthem,andofthecharacterofissuesoffactandofproofanddisproof,thatis,somelogicalknowledge.Sincethepropositionswhicharematerialtolegalcontroversycanneverbeprovedtobetrueorfalsebutonlytobeprobabletosomedegreeandsinceissuesoffactareresolvedbythecalculationoftherelativeprobabilitiesofthecontradictorypropositionsofwhichtheyarecomposed,youneedsomeknowledgeofthedistinctionbetweentruthorfalsityandprobabilityandofthelogicofprobability.Sincepropositionsareactualorpotentialknowledge,sinceproofordisproofisanaffairofknowledge,since,iftheyaretruthful,thepartiestolegalcontroversyassert,andwitnessesreport,theirknowledge,andsinceknowledgeisofvarioussorts,youneedsomeknowledgeaboutknowledge,such,forinstance,asknowledgeofthedistinctionbetweendirectorperceptualandindirectorinferentialknowledge.Sincethereareintrinsicandessentialdifferencesbetweenlawandfact,betweenpropositions(p.83) aboutmattersoffactandstatementsaboutmattersoflaw,andbetweenissuesoffactandissuesoflawandthewaysinwhichtheyarerespectivelytriedandresolved,youneedsomeknowledgeaboutthesematters.Sincelitigantsandallthosewhoparticipateintheconductandresolutionoftheircontroversiesaremenandsincemanyoftheproceduralrulesarebaseduponpresuppositionsabouthumannatureandbehavior,youneedsomepsychologicalknowledge.Finally,ofcourse,youneedsuchknowledgeasisnecessarytoenableyoutounderstandthetangentialendswhichareservedbyprocedurallawandtocriticizetheruleswhicharedesignedtoservethem.39

Michaelsvisionofthesubjectoflegalproofincludedtheclassictriviumoflogic,grammarandrhetoric;forensicpsychology;thedetailedexplorationofprobability;theinterconnectionsbetweenlawandfact;andthebasicconcepts,doctrines,andpoliciesofthelawofevidence.Recentlythatlisthasexpandedtoincludemoreemphasisonscientificevidence,narrative,discourseanalysis,andcomputerapplicationstomentionbutafew.Notsurprisingly,manylawyershavefoundsuchaconceptionofthesubjectdauntinga


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mattertowhichIshallreturnbuttheimmediatepointisthattheseconnectionswithotherdisciplinescanbemappedwithinasingle,quiteflexibleframework.Fordespitethecomplexities,theAnglo-Americanlegaltraditionhashadaremarkablyhomogeneousmainstream.

TheRationalistTraditionThayerprovidedacoherentstructurefortheLawofEvidence;WigmoreexpandedthistoincludeboththePrinciplesofProofandtheLawofEvidenceinanintegratedconceptionofthestudyofEvidenceinadjudication.40Thesewerenotaprioriconstructions,butratherhistoricallyinformedsynthesesofthecentralideasinatraditionthatextendsfromGilberttothepresentday.ThisRationalistTraditionhasatitscoretheideaofthepursuitofcorrectdecisioninadjudicationbyrationalmeansthroughargumentationbasedonevidence.41Rationalityinthiscontextiscontrastedwithirrationalmeansofdisputeprocessingsuchastrialbybattle,compurgation,ordeal,appealsto(p.84) thesupernatural,ortossingacoin.42MostevidencescholarsadoptedorassumedaparticularviewofinductivelogicinthetraditionofFrancisBacon,JohnStuartMill,andmodernphilosophers,suchasJonathanCohenandStephenToulmin.However,theRationalistTraditioncanbeinterpretedbroadlytoincludealternativeconceptionsofrationality,includingvariousconceptionsofprobability.43

ThecharacteristicassumptionsofdiscourseaboutevidencewithintheRationalistTraditioncanbesuccinctlyrestatedasfollows:epistemologyiscognitivistratherthansceptical;acorrespondencetheoryoftruthisgenerallypreferredtoacoherencetheory;44themodeofdecisionmakingisseenasrational,ascontrastedwithirrationalmodes;thecharacteristicmodeofreasoningisinduction;thepursuitoftruthasameanstojusticeunderthelawcommandsahigh,butnotnecessarilyanoverriding,priorityasasocialvalue.45

Despitethisbroadconsensus,legalevidencescholarshiphashaditsshareofdebatesanddisagreements.Fromanearlystagetherewasacontinuinguneasinessaboutwhethertherewereorshouldbeanyformalrulesofevidence,whatpreciselymightbethestatusofsuchrules(and,inparticular,ofjudicialrulingsonpointsofevidence)andaboutthescopeofEvidenceasasubject.Therehasbeenrepeated,almostcyclicalpoliticalcontroversyaboutbalancingefficientenforcementofcriminallawwithdueprocessandprotectinginnocentaccusedfromconviction.Somedebatesarequitespecialisedforexample,aboutpresumptions,hearsayandthebestevidencerule.Othersrepresentparticularapplicationsofstandardlegalorjuristiccontroversies,suchasdebatesabouttheprosandconsofthejuryortheadversarysystemorjudge-madelaworcodification.Some,suchasdisagreementsbetweenutilitarians(p.85) anddeontologists,betweencivillibertariansandproponentsoflawandorder,betweenPascaliansandBaconians,andbetweenatomistsandholists,reflectwiderdifferences.Butthesedisagreementshavebyandlargetakenplacewithinasharedframeworkofassumptionsandconcepts.46

AfterWigmoreBetweentheFirstWorldWarandabout1980,thestudyofEvidencewasinthe


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doldrums,partlybecausethefieldwasovershadowedbyWigmore,whodominatedthesubjectandwasnotinhibitedaboutseeingoffrivals.47Then,stimulatedfromseveraldirections,therearosethevariegatedmovementtowardsbroadeningthefieldthatcametobeknownastheNewEvidenceScholarship.48Thestimulusforthiscamefromseveraldirections.Perhapsthemainoneswere:(a)movestoreformtheLawofEvidence,oreventocodifyit,gatheredmomentumaftertheSecondWordWar,culminatingintheFederalRulesofEvidence(enacted1975)andrathermorepiecemealreforminEnglandandelsewhere;(b)themovementtodeveloplinksbetweenlawandthesocialsciences,representedbytheLawandSocietyMovementintheUnitedStatesandsocio-legalstudiesintheUnitedKingdom.HerethemainactivitiesrelevanttoEvidenceinvolvedtheinterfacebetweenLawandPsychology,whereinterestinwitnesspsychology(especiallyidentificationevidence)revived,butwentbeyondthistoincludesuchmattersasjuryresearch,discourseanalysis,andinteractioninthecourtroom.49(c)ForensicSciencecontinuedtodeveloplargelyindependentlyoflaw,butitsconnectionswereobviousanditreceivedanenormousstimulusfromDNAanalysisandITapplications;(d)BenthamstudiesalsobecameestablishedduringthisperiodanditisworthrememberingthatBenthamisstilltheleadingtheoristofevidence,thathiswritingsonevidencerepresentasubstantialproportionofhislargelyforgottenworks,andthathewasneveronetorespectdisciplinaryboundaries.And,finally(e)therewasadramaticriseininterestinthe(p.86) relationshipbetweenstatisticsandlegalproof,largelystimulatedbythemisuseofstatisticsintheCaliforniacaseofPeoplev.Collins.50

Thislastdevelopmentinvolvedanumberofdifferentconcerns.Thefirstcommentatorsstressedthepotentialofstatisticalanalysisinevaluatingevidence,providedthatitwasproperlyused,51butinafamous1971paperProfessorLaurenceTribeofHarvardarguedthatevenifallreasoningaboutdisputedquestionsoffactisinprinciplemathematical,itwouldbebothinappropriateanddangerousasamatterofpolicytoencourageorallowexplicitquantificationofsuchmattersasthecriminalstandardofprooforthelikelihoodofguiltinidentificationcases.52ThedebatemovedtoaquitedifferentplanewiththeinterventionofJonathanCohen,aphilosopherfromOxford,whochallengedtheassumptionthatallargumentsaboutprobabilitiesareinprinciplemathematicalor,ashetermedit,Pascalian.53Law,hesuggested,providesoneofthestandardexamplesofnon-Pascalianinductivist(Baconian)reasoning.54Cohenstimulatedcontroversiesinseveraldisciplines,notablylaw,medicaldiagnosis,andpsychology.55CohensthesisprovokedsharpattacksfromjuristsinEngland,Australia,andespeciallytheUnitedStates,butgainedagooddealofsupportfrommanyevidencescholarswhoweredeeplyscepticalofthemathematicisationofargumentsaboutevidenceincourt.56Theselargelytheoreticalprobabilitiesdebateshaverumbledon,some-what(p.87) obscuringthefactthattheuseofstatisticsinprovingspecificmatterssuchaspaternity,discrimination,andoffenderprofilinghasgrownsignificantlyinimportanceovertheyears.57Theuseofprobabilitytheoryasageneralmodelforevidentialreasoningisonething;therelevanceofstatisticaldataasevidenceinsomecasesisquiteanother.

Undoubtedly,theliteratureontheFederalRulesanddebatesaboutprobabilitiesareimportantexamplesofawidespreadrevivalofacademicinterestinEvidenceinlaw.But


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theserepresentonlytwopartsofamuchmorevariedpicture.Sincethe1980stherehavebeenmanymultidisciplinaryconferencesandseminarsexclusivelydevotedtoEvidenceinlaw.58Theseillustratedthelivelinessinthefieldandtheextentoftheinvolvementofnon-lawyers,buttheyhadonemajorlimitation:thefocuswasalmostentirelyonlitigation.

PartIII.LimitationsoflawManynon-lawyersinterestedininferentialreasoningandargumentationhaverecognisedthatlawprovidesarichsourceofconcrete,real-life,casesthatillustratefacetsofevidence,inferenceandproof.Toulmin(philosopher),Perelman(rhetoric),Gaskins(philosopher),theAmsterdamSchoolofArgumentationandaboveallSchum(psychologyandstatistics)aresomemodernexamples.59Schumevengoessofarastosuggestthatlegalscholarshiponevidenceforms(p.88) themajorsourceofinspirationforanyoneinterestedinageneralstudyofthegeneralpropertiesandusesofevidence.60

AsIamanenthusiastformysubject,IamusuallydelightedwhenIfindmyterritoryisthoughttobeinterestingbycolleaguesfromotherdisciplines.However,itisimportanttorecognisethelimitationsofstandardlegalexamples.Inconsideringproblemsofevidenceandinferencethreedistinctionsarecrucial:thedifferencebetweenpast-directedandfuture-directedinquiries;thedistinctionbetweenparticularandgeneralinquiries;andthedistinctionbetweenhypothesisformationandhypothesistesting.Forvariousreasons,includingthetendencytoequateEvidenceinlawwiththeLawofEvidence,thecontestedtrialiswidelyperceivedtobethemainarenainwhichevidentiaryissuesarise.Adjudicationofissuesoffactincontestedtrialsistypicallypast-directed,particular,andhypothesistestingitonlyexceptionallydealswithpredictingthefuture,provinggeneralempiricalpropositions,orhypothesisformation.Thesecharacteristicsofstandardlegalexamplesmaylimittheirsignificanceinmanyothercontexts.

Ofcourse,theprototypeofthecontestedtrial,especiallyincommonlawadversarialproceedings,hascertainfeaturesthatdoindeedmakeitarichsourceofmaterialforstudy:typicallytheproceedingsarepublic,theconflictisovert,theissuesaresharplydefined,evidenceispresented,questionedandarguedabout,andthelegalrecordmakesforneatpackagingofcomplexmaterial.Oftentherecordcontainsagreatdealofdetail,thedataandargumentsarecomplex,andthereisamixedmassofevidenceofdifferentkinds.Aboveall,trialsdealwithreallifeproblemsratherthanhypotheticalorfictitiousexamples.Forthoseinterestedininferencetheremaybenoisefactorsthathavetobefilteredoutsuchastechnicalitiesofprocedure,lawyerstactics,artificialrulesofevidence,andblurredlinesbetweenrationalargumentandeffectivepersuasion.Buttrialrecords,officialinquiriesandlikedocumentscanprovideawealthofexamples,notonlyforlawyers,thatillustratedifferentattributesandcredentialsofevidence,thestructureofcomplexarguments,problemsofcombiningmixedmassesofevidence,andcommonfallaciesinreasoningfromevidence.

Disputedtrialsaretypicallyconcernedwithinquiriesintoparticularpasteventsinwhichthehypothesesaredefinedinadvancebylawwhatlawyerscallmateriality.Moreoverrecordsofcasesareartificiallyconstructedunitsextractedfrommorecomplexand


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diffusecontexts.Forexample,acriminaltrialmaybejustoneeventinalong-drawnoutfeudorotherconflict.These(p.89) elementsparticularity,pastness,materiality,andindividuationofcasesdifferentiatethiskindoflegalmaterialfrommanyotherinquiriesinwhichreasoningfromevidenceisinvolved.

Inadjudicationthereisafurtherfactor,thedutyoftheadjudicatortocometoafirmdecision.Judgesdetermine,historiansandscientistsconclude(orsitonthefence).Thispressurefordecisionhasledthelawtodevelopimportantideasaboutpresumptions,burdensofproofandstandardsofproofasaidstodecision.Thesecanbequitesuggestiveinotherdecisioncontexts.61

Thushistorianssharewithlawyersaconcernwithparticularpastevents,buthistorianslacktheconceptofmaterialitythatidentifiesinadvancethehypothesestobeprovedordisprovedandthathelpstoformulateandanchordisputedissuesoffactinadvancewithprecisionandspecificity.Historiansareofteninvolvednotonlyinestablishingwhathappenedbutalsoexplainingwhyithappenedtypicallyamoredifficultandmoreinterestingproblem.62Furthermore,historiansareofteninterestedinquestionsthatgobeyondestablishingandexplainingaparticularevent.Forexample,agreatdealofthevastliteratureabouttheSacco-Vanzetticaseassumestheirinnocenceinordertoexplorewiderangingquestionsaboutthepolitical,socialandlegalcontextofthetime.63

Detectives,likeadjudicators,aretypicallyalsoconcernedwithparticularpasteventsespeciallywhodunitkindsofquestionsandtheirinquiriesmaybeguidedbylegalcategoriessuchasmurder,manslaughterandaccident.Butlikehistorians,scientists,andmanyotherinquirers,theyhavetoconstructhypothesesaswellastestthem.Thetypicaldecidedcaseisnotagoodvehicleforlearningaboutordevelopingskillinabductionandimaginativereasoningaspartoftheprocessofinvestigation.64

Intelligenceanalysts,nowmuchinthenews,areofteninvolvedwithpredictingfuturepossibilitiesandprobabilitiesinachangingcontextwiththecontinuingprospectoffurtherinformation.Sometimestheyareaskedtomakespecificpredictionsforexample,whatisthelikelihoodofanattackonaparticulartargetinaparticulartimeperiod?buttheyarealsooftenconcernedwithmoreopen-endedpossibilitiesbasedonjudgementsaboutcapabilities(p.90) andintentions.Moreover,theyarealsoconcernedwithbuildingupgeneralintelligencepicturesofnetworks,scenarios,andplots.Asthepost-11Septemberpost-mortemshavemadeclear,itisusuallymucheasierafteraneventtoidentifybitsofinformationthatwouldhavebeenusefulhadtheybeenspottedandselectedassignificant.65

Theprototypicalinquiryinthephysicalsciencesisconcernedwiththeformulationandtestingofgeneralhypotheses,whichinteraliaformasolidbasisforprediction.Theclassicproblemofinductionconcernsthedifficultyofjustifyinganinferentialstepfromparticularpremisestoageneralconclusion.Inthiscontext,theestablishmentandinterpretationofparticularsisoftentreatedasunproblematic.66Ontheotherhand,theparadigmaticadjudicativeinquiryisconcernedwithestablishingparticularsoftenthemoststraightforwardpartofageneralscientificinquiry.Ofcourse,whereapplicationof


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generalscientificprinciplestoparticularinstancesisinvolved,forexampleinmedicaldiagnosisorforensicpathology,theanalogytofact-findinginadjudicationissomewhatcloser.

Itwould,ofcourse,berashtosaythatlawyershaveiteasyinrespectofevidenceandinference,justbecauseparticularinquiriesmayoftenbeeasierthangeneralones,andbecauseofaidstodecisionsuchasmateriality,burdensofproof,andpresumptions.Disputedtrialsareoftendisputedbecausetheevidenceisespeciallyproblematicotherwisetherewouldbeaguiltypleaorasettlement.Causesclbresareoftencelebratedbecausethereisanunsolvedmystery.Moreimportant,evidencescholarshavebecomemoresensitivetotheobviousfactthatthecontestedtrialisonlyonelegalcontextamongmany.Problemsofevidenceandinferenceariseinmanyotherlegalcontextsincludinginvestigation,negotiation,mediation,anticipatingfuturecontingencies(asindraftingcontracts),andlaw-making,wheresomeoftheelementsofmateriality,predictability,pastness,andindividuationofcasesareabsent.

Thisoverviewofthedevelopmentofthestudyofevidenceinlawasamultidisciplinaryenterprise,hassomeimplicationsfortheideaofageneralfieldofevidence.Iwouldemphasisefourinparticular:

(p.91) 1.Foratleast250yearsEvidencehasbeenaspecialisedfocusofattentioninlegalscholarshipaswellaslegalpractice.Ithasarichliteratureofprimaryandsecondarysources.Thereareconcepts,rules,devicesandcontroversiesthatarepeculiartolaw,butitisgenerallyrecognisedthatthestudyofevidenceinlawisamultidisciplinaryfield,involvingborrowingsbylawyers,inputsbynon-lawyers,interdisciplinarycollaborationandongoingcontroversiesnotconfinedtolaw.672.Someoftheproblems,debates,anddisagreementscentringonlegalprocessasanarenahaveechoesinothercontexts:forexample,Baconiansv.Pascaliansinrespectofprobabilitiesandproof;utilitarianismv.deontology;holismandatomism;narrativeandargument;cognitivismv.scepticism;andempiricismv.anti-foundationalism.3.Someoftheconceptsanddevicesdevelopedinlegalcontextshavebeenpickeduporarepotentiallysuggestiveinothercontexts.Forexample,thedangersoftryingtoestablishformalrulesorhierarchiesaboutweightinrespectofevidence;conceptssuchaspresumptions,burdensofproof,standardsofproof(orstandardsforotherdecisions);assessingthecredibilityofwitnessesanddocuments;theroleofbackgroundgeneralisationsaswarrantsininferentialreasoning;andmethodsofmarshallinglargebodiesofevidenceandstructuringcomplexargumentsbasedonsuchevidence.4.Contestedtrialshaveattractedagreatdealofattention.Inthatcontextthefocusisoninquiriesaboutparticularpasteventsinrespectofsharplyposedissuesdefinedinadvancebylawandgovernedbyformalrulesofprocedureandexclusionofevidence.Thisisonlyonetypeofinquiryinvolvedinlegalprocesses.WithinageneralfieldofEvidencedistinctionsneedtobemadeanddeveloped


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betweenpast-directedandfuture-directedinquiries,hypothesisformationandhypothesistesting,concernwithestablishingthetruthaboutparticulareventsandaboutgeneralpropositions,preciselyformulatedandmoreopen-endedinquiries,andrule-governedandinformalinquiries.Eveninlawthecontestedlegaltrialtypicallyinvolvesonlyonetypeofinquiryamongmanykindsthatinvolveinferentialreasoningfromevidence.Agenuinelymultidisciplinaryfieldofevidencewouldneedtodifferentiatebetweendifferentkindsandcontextsofinquiries.

(p.92) PartIII.Movingbeyondlaw

(a)FromcontestedtrialstototallegalprocessesWehaveseenthattheclassicalwritersonevidenceinlaw,includingThayerandWigmore,talkedofjudicialevidenceandtreatedthecontestedjurytrialasthestandardcase.However,sincetheSecondWorldWarithasincreasinglybeenrecognisedthatthisfocusisunrealistic:contestedjurytrialsareasmallproportionofalltrialsand,moreimportantly,onlyasmallproportionofformallegalproceedingseverreachthestageofacontestedtrial:mostcivilcasesgetsettledoutofcourtorareabandoned;mostcriminalcasesendwithaguiltypleaorchargesbeingdropped;andmanydisputesaredirectedtoadministrativetribunalsorarbitrationorareresolvedbyalternativemeans,suchasmediationandconciliation.68Bothcivilandcriminallitigationarenowwidelyconceivedintermsofatotalprocessmodel,whichstartswithsomeevent,claim,ordispute,proceedsthroughvariouspre-trialstagesand,ifacaseeverarrivesincourt,issucceededbyfurtherpost-trialdecisions,suchassanctioning,appeals,paroledecisions,andsoon.Suchprocessesarenotnecessarilyunilinear.Theyinvolvecomplexsequencesofdecisionsandeventsallofwhichareworthyofattention.Informationthatisconventionallytalkedofasevidenceisrelevanttomostoftheimportantdecisions,butinvariedways.Thus,aplaintiffdecidingwhethertopursueaclaim,oraprosecutordecidingwhetherornottoprosecute,oraparoleboardorsimilarbodydecidingonwhetheraprisonerconstitutesacontinuingthreattosocietyallhavetoweighevidenceandpotentialevidencefromdifferentstandpointsinvariedcontexts.ThustheLawofEvidencedoesnotonlyaffectcontestedtrials;itcastsalongshadowoverpre-trialandpost-trialdecisionsandoverawidevarietyofadjudicativetribunalsandquasi-judicialbodies.

Thisextensionoffocusnaturallyassociatesarangeofotherprofessionalsmostobviouslydetectivesandotherinvestigators,butalsoprobationofficersandsocialworkers(forexampleinlookingoutforsexualabuse).ThustheLawofEvidenceandthePrinciplesofProofareanimportantconcernofmanyparticipantsinadditiontolawyersinawidevarietyofcontexts.Thisraisesimportantquestionsaboutthegeneralityandtransferabilityofconcepts,methods,andmodesofreasoningaboutevidencethatdevelopedwithinarelativelynarrowlegalframework.

(p.93) (b)DavidSchumAmajormoveinthedirectionofconstructingEvidenceasanintegratedfieldorfocusofattentionwasthepublicationofDavidSchumsEvidentialFoundationsofProbabilistic


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Reasoningin1994.69Schum,whowastrainedinpsychologyandstatistics,haddoneimportantworkinintelligenceanalysisforthesecurityservices,buthistwovolumeworkonEvidenceandInferencefortheIntelligenceAnalysthadreceivedalmostnorecognition,perhapsbecauseofitsformidablesizeanderudition.70InEvidentialFoundationsSchumsetouttosynthesisebasicinsightsandideasaboutevidenceandinferenceacrossseveraldisciplines,includinglaw,philosophy,logic,probabilitytheory,semiotics,artificialintelligence,psychology,andhistory.Thecentralthemeisthatsimilarproblemsariseinmanypracticalandacademiccontextsinsituationswhereconclusionsanddecisionsarereachedonthebasisofincompleteinformation.Responsestotheseproblemshavevariedbetweendisciplinesandtheexperienceandattemptedsolutionsinonedisciplinemaybeilluminatingforothers.Hearguedthatthecomplexityofinferentialtaskshasoftenbeenunderestimatedinsomedisciplines,butinthecrucibleoflitigationlawyershaveroutinelyhadtowrestlewithmanyofthesecomplexities.SchumwasparticularlyimpressedwithWigmore,andadaptedhischartmethodforapplicationinanumberofothercontexts,especiallyintelligenceanalysisandpoliceinvestigation.HearguesthatWigmoreanticipatedbymanyyearsmoderndevelopmentsinsuchareasasBayesnets,butmoreimportantlyprovidedanunrivalledapproachtomarshallingandanalysingcomplexmassesofevidence.71

Schumsworkwasonestarting-pointfortheUCLprogrammeandforanunusualprojectthatprecededit.72In1994TerryAndersonandIwerepartofagroupoflawyersstudyingforensicexpertiseattheNetherlandsInstituteforAdvancedStudy(NIAS),theDutchequivalentoftheStanfordCenterforAdvancedStudyintheBehavioralSciences(CASBS).AsFellowsoftheNIASwewereexpectedtointeractwithourcolleaguesinotherspecialistthemegroups.Theotherprojectswere:(a)historyofDutchpoliticalconcepts;(b)theatreiconographythatistheuseofworksofartasevidenceintheatre(p.94) history;(c)magicandreligioninancientAssyria;(d)socialdilemmas.Inaddition,therewereseveralFellowsworkingonindividualprojects.Atfirstsightthesetopicsseemedratheresotericanddiverse.ButonreflectionitseemedtousthatmostoftheFellowsofNIASinthatyearcouldfairlybesaidtohavesharedmethodologicalproblemsaboutevidenceandinference.SoAndersonandIdecidedtothrowdownachallengetoourcolleaguestorunajointseminarontheseproblems.Thestarting-pointwaswhatcametobeknownasTwiningshypothesis:

Notwithstandingdifferencesin(i)theobjectivesofourparticularinquiries;(ii)thenatureandextentoftheavailablesourcematerial;(iii)thecultureofourrespectivedisciplines(includingitshistory,conventions,stateofdevelopmentetc.);(iv)nationalbackgrounds;(v)othercontextualfactors,allofourprojectsinvolve,aspartoftheenterprise,drawinginferencesfromevidencetotesthypothesesandjustifyconclusionsandthatthelogicofthiskindofinquiryisgovernedbythesameprinciples.73

ThiswasframedindeliberatelyprovocativetermsandIexpectedittobechallenged,subverted,ormodifiedandrefinedinthecourseofdiscussion.However,ratherthanproducingageneralanalysisofmethodologicalissues,theseminarresultedinaseriesof


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casestudiesdealingwithasomewhatbizarrerangeoftopics:alawyerandanAssyriologistanalysedtheevidencerelatingtothedateofthedeathoftheSumerianlanguage;aShakespearescholarandajuristexploredthedifferencesintheirapproachestoabodyoflovelettersthatwerethemainevidenceinacauseclbre;apoliticaltheorist,aneconomichistorian,atheatreiconographer,andamusicologistcontributedindividualcasestudiesintheirparticularfieldsinlightofourdiscussions.DavidSchumthencontributedageneralintroductiontothevolumethatresulted,drawingoutsomecommonthemes.74

Noattemptwasmadetobuildagrandtheoryofevidenceandinferenceindeedtheorientationofthisgroupwasstrikinglyparticularistic.75Thisexercise(p.95) wasverymuchanexperimentalfirststepintreatingEvidenceasamultidisciplinarysubjectinitsownright.DavidSchumdevelopedhissubstanceblindapproachfurtherinthecontextofthisproject.Thisformedonestarting-pointoftheUCLprogrammeseveralyearslater,butasweshallseethisapproachranintoacertainamountofoppositionatthatstage.

(c)Evidence,generalculture,andpublicaffairs:asubjectwhosetimehascome?Quiteindependentlyoftheseacademicactivitiesduringthepastdecadeorso,evidencehasrecentlybecomeamuchmoresustainedfocusofattentionbothinthenewsmediaandwhatmightbecalledgeneralculture.Ofcourse,historicalpuzzlesandunsolvedmysterieshavebeenastapleofpopularculture;thedetectivestoryhashelditsplacesinceVictoriantimes;andSherlockHolmesisstillthesecularpatronsaintofevidencers.WhatisnewisthatevidentiaryissuesareattainingahighprofilebecauseoftheconvergenceofanumberofdevelopmentssuchasresearchonDNAprofiling,otheradvancesinpoliceinvestigation,thesearchforweaponsofmassdestructioninIraq,post9/11intelligenceanalysis,evidence-basedpolicy,evidence-basedmedicineandsoon.Tocitejustafewexamples:perhapsbecauseofadvancesinourunderstandingofDNA,forensicscientistshavestartedtorivallawyersandspiesascharactersinworksoffiction(e.g.thrillersbyPatriciaCornwellandtheforensicanthropologist,KathyReichs)andintelevisiondramas,soapoperas,anddocumentaries.EvidentiaryissueshavebeencentraltonewsaboutIraq:theeffortsoftheweaponsinspectors,ColinPowellsaddresstotheSecurityCouncil,controversiesaboutthereliabilityoftheintelligencereliedonbyBushandBlair,andtheHutton,Butler,andChilcotinquiriesinEnglandhaveallcapturedheadlines.76Dopetestingofathletes,TruthCommissions,andproblemsofprovinggenocideareinthenews.Insomecountries,therehavebeendebatesaboutevidence-basedpolicyandevidence-basedmedicine.In2009theDarwinCentenarysparkedanewroundofpubliccontroversyabouttheimplicationsofevolutionarytheoryforCreationism,theoriginsoftheuniverse,andreligiouseducation.Andin2009debatesaboutthescientificevidenceforglobalwarmingheatedup.

(p.96) Perhapsthemostobviousexampleofthecentralityofevidentiaryissuesincontemporarylifehasbeenthepost-mortemsontheeventsof11September2001:onestandardlinegoesthattheintelligenceserviceshadenoughinformationtopredicttheevent,butlackedtheskillstoanalyseit.Theydidnothavethecapacitytojointhedotsormethodsforidentifyingassignificantafewtriflesfromthemassesofdatathatflow


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intodifferentagenciesfromavarietyofsources.77

AnarticleinTheNewYorkerinFebruary2003reportedinterviewswithleadingfiguresintheCIAandthePentagonwhowereconcernedwithimprovingintelligenceanalysisintheaftermathof11September2001,78includingDonaldRumsfeld,GeorgeTenet,andRobertGates.Thestarting-pointofthearticlewasajudgementthatAmericanintelligenceagenciesdidnotpossesstheanalyticdepthortherightmethodsofanalysisaccuratelytoassess[possiblethreats].79Thediagnosisandtheprescriptionswereexpressedlargelyintermsthatarefamiliartostudentsofevidenceandinference:thedangersofhypothesis-driveninquiries;theneedtodistinguishbetweenconstructingahypothesisandtestingitagainsttheavailabledataandbetweengatheringandinterpretingdata;thedifferentproblemsthatarisefromasurfeitofinformationandabsenceofevidence;thedifferencebetweenambiguityandincompleteness;thevalueofalternativeinterpretationsofambiguousevidence;thedangersofmirrorimaging,thatisprojectingofAmericanvaluesandbeliefsontoAmericasadversariesandrivals;atendencytoconfusetheunfamiliarwiththeimprobable;therelationshipbetweencalculusofriskandthresholdsofcredibility;thelikelihoodofpoliticalbiasenteringintojudgementswherethesituationisuncertain.Thoughthevocabularyissometimesdifferent,alloftheseideasshouldbefamiliartostudentsofevidenceandinference;mostofthemhavebeenexploredinthewritingsofWigmoreandSchum.

ResistanceandscepticismThisisonejuristspersonalinterpretationofthebackgroundtotheUCLEvidenceProgramme.Whenitstarted,Ihadassumedthatthemainfocuswouldbeonexploringtheextenttowhichthereareconcepts,principlesandmethodsrelatingtoevidenceandinferencethatcouldbedevelopedandappliedbroadlyacrossmanydisciplines.Iexpectedthatscholarswithdifferent(p.97) specialismscouldbothcontributetoandlearnfromsuchanenterprise.DavidSchumssubstanceblindapproachtoevidenceassetoutinEvidentialFoundationsofProbabilisticReasoningseemedonepromisingstarting-point,butnottheonlyone.80Inshort,Ihadassumedthatthiswouldbeamulti-disciplinaryenterprisebringingtogethertheperspectives,concepts,insights,knowledgeandexperienceofindividualsfrommanydifferentbackgroundstoexchangeexperiencesandtoexplorequestionsaboutevidenceatafairlygenerallevel.

IwasnotsurprisedthattheproposedtitleTowardsanIntegratedScienceofEvidenceprovokedsomeresistance.Ihadmyselfopposedtheuseofscienceinthiscontextandthoughtthephrasingwastoostrong,forreasonssetoutbelow.ButIwassurprisedatthehostilityexpressedtotheideaofasubstanceblindapproachandtotheveryideaofacommonenterprise.ThepurposeofthissectionistotrytoidentifysomeofthemainreasonsforresistanceandhostilitytotheenterpriseasIhadconceivedit.

JasonDaviessanalysisofinterdisciplinarityishelpfulinidentifyingsomeofthedifferentexpectationsandagendasthatsomeparticipantsmayhavebroughttotheprogramme,apartfromtheobviousfactthatsubstantialfundswereavailable.81Somenodoubtjoinedinthehopeoflearningaboutconcepts,methodsorinsightsthatmighthelptoilluminate


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specificintractableproblemsintheirownfield;somehadconcernsaboutparticularconceptsorissues(e.g.causation)thatmightbeilluminatedbyinterdisciplinaryexchangesatalessgenerallevelthantheconstructionofascienceorfield;somewereattractedbytheopportunitytoexplorequestionsaboutevidencewithintheirowndisciplineorareaofspecialisation;thetermevidencemayhavehadquitedifferentassociationsforsomefromtheconceptionsharedbytheinstigatorsoftheprogramme(seebelow);somecamewiththeirownindividualagendasorwithnoveryclearideasaboutwhattoexpect.Theoutcomewasthatalooselyknitevidencecommunitywasestablishedwitharichvarietyofinteractions.Someinterestingspecificprojectswerepursued,butitismyimpressionthatthegeneraltendenciesweremorecentrifugalthancentripetal.82Inshortthemainbenefitswerewhatparticipantstookbacktotheirown(p.98) specialismsratherthansignificantadvancesinacommonenterprise.Mypersonalexpectationsweredisappointed,butasDaviesmakesclear,thisisfarfromsayingthattheprogrammewasafailure;butthecriteriaofsuccessareelusive.83

IstillthinkthatEvidencedeservessustainedattentionasamultidiscipli-naryfieldorsubject,ifnotascience,andIwanttoexploresomepossibleintellectualreasonsforresistancetotheidea.Anyonewhohasbeeninvolvedinsustainedinterdisciplinaryworkislikelytoencounteroneormoreobstaclestocommunicationandcooperation.Someareintellectual,butothers,realenoughpsychologically,arenotintellectuallyinteresting.Forexample,onescounterpartsfromotherdisciplinesmaybedauntedbytheprospectofenteringintoanewfieldorreadingalotofunfamiliarliterature;theymaybedefensiveabouttheirownterritoryorchallengestotheirexpertiseorauthority;ortheymayassumethattheyaretheretoteachandhavenothingtolearnfromthenatives;ortheymayjustfinditdifficulttothinkoutsidetheirindividualboxes.Theethnographyofknowledgeisrepletewithstoriesoftheterritorialbehaviourofdifferentacademictribes.84Theseattitudesillustratesomeofthepracticalobstaclestosustainedinterdisciplinarywork.HereIammoreconcernedwithintellectualresistancetotheideaofamultidisciplinaryfieldofEvidence.

Thereareotherformsofresistancethatcanbeputaside.Someonemayjustnotbeinterestedinthesubjectofevidenceasthetermisusedhere;ortheymaybescepticalaboutthevalue,orrelevancetotheirconcerns,ofageneralfieldofEvidence;ortheymaythinkthattheconceptoruseofevidenceintheirspecialismisunproblematic.Sometimes,suchattitudesarequitelegitimateandpresentachallengetoproponentsofascienceorfieldofEvidencetoshowthatitismoreinterestingorrelevantorproblematicthanitmayappeartobetotheresister.

Ishalladdressthemoreintellectualformsofresistanceunderthefollowingheads:

(a)Suspicionsofscientismandempiricism;(b)Varietiesofscepticism;(c)Differentconceptionsofevidence.(d)Strongviewsontheautonomyofdisciplines.

(p.99) (a)Suspicionsofscientismandempiricism


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Aswasnotedabove,thesuggestionthattheUCLprogrammeshouldbecalledTowardsanIntegratedScienceofEvidenceprovokedquitewidespreadhostility.Althoughitwasemphasisedthatsciencewasbeingusedinthiscontexttomeannothingmorethansystematicstudy,suspicionremained.Thisisunderstandable:insomequarterssciencehasacquiredstrongnegativeassociations,whicharebroadlyexpressedbythepejorativetermscientism.85Forexample,itissometimesassumedthatinquiriesinthehumanitiesandsocialsciencesshouldbemodelledonthenaturalsciences;thatonlymeasurablequantitativedataaremeaningful;thatpoliciesandproblemsinvolvingvaluechoicescanberesolvedempirically;86thatevidence-basedmedicinehadbecomeadogmawhichsometimeswentfarbeyondthesensibleclaimthatdoctorsshouldtrytorelyonthebestinformationavailable;87thatthelabelscientificisoftenusedtogivespuriousauthorityorapoliticaladvantagetobogusclaimsthatsatisfynoneofthestandardsofwell-groundedempiricalsciences.SusanHaacksumsupthedangersofhonorificuseoftheterm:

Scientifichasbecomeanall-purposetermofepistemicpraisemeaningstrong,reliable,goodInviewoftheimpressivesuccessesofthenaturalsciences,thishonorificusageisunderstandableenough.Butitisthoroughlyunfortunate.Itobscurestheotherwiseobviousfactthatnotallandnotonlypractitionersof(p.100) disciplinesclassifiedassciencesarehonest,thorough,successfulinquirers;whenplentyofscientistsarelazy,incompetent,unimaginative,unluckyordishonest,whileplentyofhistorians,journalists,detectivesetc.aregoodinquirers.Ittemptsusintoafruitlesspreoccupationwiththeproblemofdemarcatingrealsciencefrompretenders.Itencouragestoothoughtlesslyuncriticalanattitudetothedisciplinesclassifiedassciences,whichinturnprovokesenvyofthosedisciplines,andencouragesakindofscientisminappropriatemimicry,bypractitionersofotherdisciplines,ofthemanner,thetechnicalterminology,themathematics,etc.,ofthenaturalsciences.Anditprovokesresentmentofthedisciplinessoclassified,whichencouragesanti-scientificattitudes.88

ThewordingofthetitleoftheUCLprojectcreatedfurtherdifficulty.Towardssuggestedtosomeaspecificgoaltobeachieved.Scienceraisedthehacklesofthosewhoaresuspiciousofscientism.Butitwasalsoambiguous:didanintegratedsciencemeananewdisciplineorsomethinglessambitiouslikeafocusofattentionoraflexibleframeworkormapforindicatingconnectionsbetweendifferentlinesofinquiry?Ordiditmeanageneraltheoryofevidence?Ifthelatter,whatkindofquestionswoulditaddress?

ItispossiblethattheuseofthetermintegratedandSchumssubstanceblindapproachtoevidencewereperceivedtobeanattempttoimposeamonolithicgeneraltheoryofevidenceforalldisciplines.Inmyview,thesefearswerenotrealised:Schumsgoalsweremoremodestthanthisandtheoperationoftheprogrammewasflexibleandopen-ended.Infactwhentheoriesofevidencearediscussedonefindsawiderangeofviewsabouttheagendasofquestionsthatsuchatheoryshouldaddress.89

Anotherpossiblesourceofresistancewassuspicionofempiricism,notleastinrelation


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tothesocialsciences.Questionsabouttheepistemologicalfoundationsofanyinquiry,whetherempiricalinquiriescanbevaluefree,the(p.101) relationshipbetweenconceptualanalysisandsocialfacts,andtheextenttowhichallknowledgeisconstructedareroutinelycontestedinmanydifferentdisciplinarycontexts.ThelatePeterLiptonneatlysurveyedthebattleground:

Therearealmostasmanyempiricismsasthereareempiricists,butwhattheseviewsorapproacheshaveincommonisanemphasisontheimportanceofexperiencetotheformationofconceptsandtotheacquisitionofknowledge.Thefoiltoempiricismisrationalism,whichemphasizesinsteadtheimportanceofthoughtandknowledgeofmaterialthatisinsomesenseindependentofexperience.Therangeofempiricistpositionsisvast,fromtheshockingviewthatallwecanthinkorknowaboutareoursensationstothemundaneclaimsthatexperienceplayssomeroleintheformationofsomeofourconceptsandinthejustificationofsomeofourbeliefs.Empiricismofsomeformmayseembothobviouslycorrectandobviouslythecorrectphilosophyforscienceonthegroundsthatitisclearthatonecanonlyfindoutabouttheworldbyobservingit;butthisinnocuouslookingthoughthasbeendisputed,andinanycasemanyformsofempiricismgobeyonditintheirclaims.Itisalsounclearwhetherempiricismultimatelysupportsorunderminesclaimstoscientificknowledge.90

Hereitshouldsufficetomaketwosimplepoints:First,thestudyofevidenceisconcernedwithempiricalinquiriesandisempiricistinthatloosesense.Buttobeinterestedinthesubjectinvolvesnocommitmenttoanyparticularversionofempiricismortoanyversionatall.MostparticipantsintheUCLprogrammeprobablysubscribetoatleastthemundaneclaimsreferredtobyLipton,somemaygofurtherinthedirectionoftheshockingview.Second,afieldorsubjectorsciencewithevidenceasitsfocalpointcannotbutinvolveengagementwithphilosophicalissuessurroundingempiricismandepistemology.Inshort,evidenceasasubjectispotentiallyanarenaofprofoundphilosophicalcontestation.ThisisonereasonforbeingwaryofanyaspirationstoasingleoverarchingGrandTheoryofEvidence.

(b)Varietiesofscepticism91Closelyrelatedtosuspicionofempiricismarestrongversionsofepistemologicalscepticismthatcanbeinterpretedaschallengingtheveryideaofevidenceasasubjectworthstudying.92Asimpleversiongoesasfollows:theconceptofevidenceasinterpretedhereassumesacognitivistepistemologyacceptanceofsomeempiricalconceptionoftruthandtheideathattruthcan(p.102) bepursuedbyrationalmeans.Ifeitheroftheseassumptionsisrejected,thentheveryideaofascienceofevidenceisadelusion.Thatisprobablycorrect.Mostdiscourseaboutevidenceproceedsonthebasisofsomecognitivistassumptions.Fundamentalproblemsofepistemologyariseinrelationtoevidenceasasubject,notonlyinrelationtoconfrontingvariousformsofscepticism,butalsoinclarifyingwhichversionofcognitivismorempiricismisassumedbyagivenaccountofevidence.Ofcourse,formanypracticalpurposes,somecommonsenseformofempiricismmaysuffice,93butageneralfieldofevidenceneedstoaddressits


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epistemologicalfoundations.However,toarguethatevidenceisaworthwhilefocusofattentionasafieldorsubjectinvolvesnocommitmenttoaparticulartheoryofevidenceanymorethantreatingepistemologyasasubjectinvolvescommitmenttoaparticulartheoryofknowledge.

Aspecialchallengeispresentedbysomevarietiesofpostmodernismthatarecurrentlyinfashion.WithintheUCLprogrammesomeoftheparticipantswereattractedbyoneormoreoftheseversionsormoregenerallybythepostmodernmood.Someofourscientificallymindedcolleaguesdismissedpostmodernismoutofhandasafashionableanddangerousdelusion.94Otherswereambivalent.Especiallyinterestingweresomeindividualswhoseemedtobereactingagainstexcessesofscientismintheirownacademicsubcultures.

Postmodernismmeansmanythingsinamultiplicityofcontexts.Theissuesaretoocomplextopursuehere,butitmayhelptodrawattentiontoadistinctionthatIhavefoundusefulinprobingmyownambivalencesaboutpostmodernisminlegalcontexts:postmodernismasaformofepistemologicalscepticismorstrongrelativism(irrationalistpostmodernism)andimaginativepostmodernismasaperspectivethatemphasisescomplexity,multipleperspectives,difficultiesofdescription,andtheroleofimaginationininquirywithoutabandoningabasiccognitivism.ThefirstisexemplifiedbyRichardRorty;thesecondbyItaloCalvinosMrPalomarandMarcoPoloinhiswonderfulfictionalevocationsoftheelusivenessofreality.95

InRortysanti-foundationalism,truthisamatterofconsensusorsolidaritywithinaparticularepistemiccommunity:Thereisnothingtobesaidabouteithertruthorrationalityapartfromdescriptionsofthefamiliarprocedures(p.103) ofjustificationwhichagivensocietyoursuses.96Ifcorrect,thiswouldclearlyunderminetheveryideaofanempiricalscienceorfieldofevidence,asinterpretedhere.97Calvino,ontheotherhand,acceptsthatthatthereisaworldindependentofoursenses,butemphasisesthecomplexitiesofthatworldandtheimmensedifficultiesofdescribingandunderstandingit.98Thatisquitecompatiblewithacognitivistpositionandinquiriesthatseektodeveloptrueconclusionsbasedonevidence.

IamattractedbyCalvinosemphasisontheelusivenessofreality,butIstronglydisagreewithRortysscepticalepistemologyasinterpretedhere.Ialsodisagreewithcolleagueswhosweepinglydismissallpostmodernismasdiscredited,99butIacceptacognitivistepistemology(muchinfluencedbymycolleagueSusanHaack).100ForthenotinsignificantnumberofcolleagueswhoareattractedbyRortythestudyofevidencepresentsachallenge:IsitpossibletoreconcileRortyianscepticismwithtakingthestudyofevidenceseriously?

(c)DifferentconceptionsofevidenceSofarIhaveassumedaparticularusageofthetermevidenceinthecontextofempiricalinquiries.Inthisusageevidenceisawordofrelationusedinthecontextofargument(AisevidenceofB).Inthatcontextinformationhasa(p.104) potentialroleasrelevantevidenceifittendstosupportortendstonegate,directlyorindirectly,ahypothesisor


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probandumorotherpropositionoffact.101Onedrawsinferencesfromevidenceinordertoproveordisproveapropositionoffact.Theframeworkisargument,theprocessisproof,theengineisinferentialreasoningfrominformation.102

Ofcourse,thetermevidencehasanumberofotherassociations,dependingoncontext.Hereitisusefultodistinguishbetweenwhatcountsasinformationinthecontextofinferentialreasoning,particularusagesthatarebroaderandnarrowerthanthatoutlinedabove,andideas,suchasmodels,thatarecloselyassociatedwithevidence,butwhichpresupposeacoreideaofevidenceyetbecomelooselyconflatedwithit.

Letmefirstdisposeofsomenotveryinterestingexamplesofdeviantusage.Inlaw,itissometimessaidthathearsayisnotevidence;thisismerelyshorthandfortherule(subjecttomanyexceptions)thathearsaymaynotbeusedoradmittedasevidenceundertheLawofEvidence.103Somethingsimilaristobefoundinsomeversionsofevidence-basedmedicine,whensomekindsofinformationnotbasedonrandomclinicaltrialsisbarredordiscouragedfrombeingusedindiagnosis:thepatientsowndiagnosis,thedoctorsimpressionisticexperiencesofsimilarcases,andintuitionarenottobetreatedasevidence.

Somepeopleareinterestedinthepropertiesandcharacteristicsofparticularmaterialsorthingsthatcanbeusedasevidence,suchasfingerprints,officialrecords,orhumanbonesorDNA.Here,thephrasetypesofevidenceispotentiallymisleading:documents,fingerprints,andDNAareusedasevidence.TosayDNAisatypeofevidenceismisleadingoutsidethecontextofitsuseinevidentiaryreasoning.Ofcourse,somescholarsareespeciallypuzzledorinterestedinmethodologicaldifficultiesofconstructinginferentialargumentsfromespeciallyelusiveorfragmentarymaterialforexample,anarchaeologisttryingtoreconstructawholebuildingfromafewfragments104oratheatrehistorianpuzzlingoverwhetherandhowapaintingdepictingaperformanceoftheCommediadelArtecanbeusedasevidenceofcostume(p.105) orgestureorotheraspectsofanactualperformance.105Theseareinterestingquestions,buttheyarenotpuzzlesabouttheconceptofevidence.

Wecanalsoputononesidelooseextensionsofthetermevidence.WetalkofsomeonegivingevidencebeforeaCommitteeoftheHouseofCommonsoroftheUSSenate.Oftensuchpresentationsonaparticularissueortopicinvolveamixtureoffacts,valuejudgements,opinionsandargumentstoadvanceapositionorview;whereasevidenceinitsprimaryusageisconfinedtofacts.Onemayusefactualinformation,amongotherthings,aspartofanargumentinsupportofapositionorproposaloronemaybedoinglittlemorethanassertinganopinion.

Economicforecastsandassessmentsofthelikelihoodsofparticulareventsoftenusemodelsthatarebasedinpartondata,butgobeyondthem.Theyareakintohypothesesthatareplausibleaccordingtoavailableevidence,inthesenseusedhere,andoftenserveasasubstituteforevidenceinargumentsthatcannotbesettledbytheavailabledata.106Theuseofmodelsineconomicsandinothercontextsdebatesaboutglobalwarming,forexample107deservetobetakenveryseriouslyinamultidisciplinaryfield


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ofevidence.

Oneofthemostinterestingusesofevidencerelatestothemuch-debatedtopicofmiracles.InCatholicdoctrinemiracles(miracula,cf.Greekterata,dynameis,semeia)arewonderfulthingswondersperformedbyasupernaturalpowerassignsofsomespecialmissionorgiftandexplicitlyascribedtoGodAmiracleissaidtobesupernaturalbecauseitseffectisbeyondtheproductivepowerofnatureandimpliessupernaturalagency.108Catholicdoctrinedistinguishessharplybetweenmiraclesasevidence,andwhatconstitutesevidenceoftheexistenceoroccurrenceofamiracle.ThemainsignificanceofmiraclesistoattestandconfirmthetruthofaDivinemissionorofadoctrinefaith,moralsortruesanctity.Miraclesareasign109However,the(p.106)existenceofmiraclesisaquestionoffactbasedonordinaryprinciplesofinferentialreasoningfromobservation:

Amiracle,likeanynaturalevent,isknownfrompersonalobservationorfromthetestimonyofothers.Inthemiraclewehavethefactitselfasanexternaloccurrenceanditsmiraculouscharacter.Themiraculouscharacterofthefactconsistsinthis:thatitsnatureandthesurroundingcircumstancesareofsuchkindthatweareforcedtoadmitnaturalforcesalonecouldnothaveproducedit,andtheonlyrationalexplanationistobehadintheinterferenceofDivineagency.Theperceptionofitsmiraculouscharacterisarationalactofthemind,andissimplytheapplicationoftheprincipleofcausalitywiththemethodsofinduction.Thegeneralrulesgoverningacceptanceoftestimonyapplytomiracles.110

Onthisinterpretation,whenapersonclaimstohaveobservedamiraclewecansubjectthetestimonytostandardtestsofwitnesscredibility:veracity(doesthewitnesssincerelybelievewhatshereports?);observationalcapacity(werethewitnesssvantagepointandsensoryabilitiessuchthatthewitnesswascapableofobservingtheeventwithhersenses?),andbias(wasthewitnesssperceptionormemorypredisposedorinfluencedtobelievethatsheobservedtheevent?).Afourthtestiswhetherthehearerbelievesthatwhatthewitnessclaimstohaveexperiencedisimpossibleorhighlyimprobable(judgedbygeneralexperienceortheknownlawsofnature).111Somescepticsaboutmiraclesrelysolelyonthefourthtest,othersonacombinationoftwoormoresuchtests.112TheCatholicpositionseemstobethatthereisoverwhelmingobservationalevidencethatmiraclesoccurandthatthisisinturnevidenceofthesupernatural.

Thisisnottheplacetoexploretheclaimsofreligiousexperienceindepth.113Sufficetonoteherethatsomesuchclaimscanbesubjectedtostandardtestsofwitnesscredibilityandaccordinglycanbeevaluatedasevidenceofthetruth,falsityorlikelihoodofsuchclaims.Butothers,suchasclaimsbasedonsupposedextrasensoryperceptionorintuitionorrevelationfalloutsidetheempiricalconceptionofevidenceasbeingbaseddirectlyorindirectlyonobservationbyoneofthefivesenses.Similarly,itisusefultodistinguish(p.107) betweenbeliefsbasedonauthority(e.g.areligioustext,thesayingsofaprophet)oronfaith(acceptanceorcommitmentnotbasedonevidence)andbeliefsbasedonempiricalevidence.Here,Ishalluseevidenceinthenarrowempiricalsense,


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butnotethatmanyclaimsaboutwhattheworldislikearebasedonothergroundsforbelief.

OneofthemoststrikingextensionsofthetermevidencerelatestooursisterprojectattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.114TheUCLprogrammeisrepresentedinthisvolumeandnearlyallofthecontributionsbearadirectrelationshiptotheideaofevidence.TheLSEprogrammeisentitledHowWellDoFactsTravel?.Itsdifferentgoalsandemphasisweresummarisedasfollows:

Itisoftenassumedthatafactisafactisafact,yetthosewhoworkacrossdisciplinaryboundariesarewellawarethatthelifeofafactisnotsosimple.Eveneverydayexperiencesuggeststhat,likegossip,factsthattravelrarelyremainstable.Ourresearchprogrammeproposestoexplorethenatureofevidencebyadoptingaconsistentresearchdesigntoanalysehowwellevidencetravelsbetweenandwithindisciplinesandtoexaminewhyevidenceconsideredacceptableinonecontextretainsorlosesitsstatusasevidenceinanother.Weaimtoestablishabodyofcaseworkonthisquestionofhowwellfactstravelandtodevelop,formoregeneraluse,theconceptualframeworksappropriatetoansweringthisquestion.115

ThemainfocusoftheLSEprojectwasonhowdatageneratedinonecontextarereceived,interpretedandusedindifferentcontexts.Theprogrammeanditsconstituentelementsexcitedinterestandadmiration,butsomeofusintheUCLprogrammewonderedwhatithadtodowithevidence.Tobesuredatageneratedinonecontextissometimesexplicitlyorimplicitlyusedasevidencetosupportsomefactualthesisorconclusion,butthisisonlyoneofmanyusesthatcanbemadeofsuchinformation.Thefocuswasonwhathappenstosupposedfactsintheprocessoftravellingratherthanonthenatureofevidenceanditsroleininferentialreasoning.Initially,Isharedsomecolleaguesdoubtsastowhetherthiswasreallyaboutevidence,butIhavechangedmy(p.108) mind,becausethepublicationsresultingfromtheLSEprogrammecanclearlybeinterpretedasasignificantcontributiontothesubjectofevidenceasIhaveinterpretedit.116Indeed,becausetheLSEprogrammewasmorecloselyintegratedthantheoneatUCL,itpromisestomakeacontributiontothissubjectatamoregenerallevelthanthemoredisparateUCLprojects:

Weexpectthesecomponentprojectstogeneratecasestudiesthatwillteachusnotjustabouthowthenatureofevidenceanditsevaluationdiffersbetweendisciplinarysites,butalsotogeneratesomegeneralsuggestionsaboutthereceiptoffacts.Arefactsinanewsitepositivelyreceivedandintegrated?Oraretheyreinterpretedtofit?Perhapstheyareinconsistentwiththenewsiteinformation,and,ifso,howisthedisputeresolved?Ordothenewfactsprovedestructive?Thesearethesensesinwhichwewillseektoassesshowwellfactstravel,thatis,understandthedifferentkindsofreceptionandstrategiesforintegrationoffacts.Tohelpusanalysethesereceptionissuesinourcases,andsotoprovidemoregeneralanswerstotheoverallquestionHowwelldofactstravel?,weadoptanumberoftheoreticalandconceptualstartingpointsfromtheexistingliteratures


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onknowledgetransfer.117

(d)Interdisciplinarity:terminologyandassumptionsabouttherelativeautonomyofdisciplinesBeforetheUCLEvidenceprogramme,Ihadtendedtouseinterdisciplinarytorefertointeractionsbetweenmembersoftwodifferentdisciplinesandmultidisciplinarytorefertointeractionswheremorethantwodisciplineswereinvolved.JasonDaviespointsoutthattheseandrelatedtermsareusedlooselyandwithoutconsistency.118Hehasarguedthatthereisaneedforamorerefinedterminologytodistinguishbetweendifferentkindsofinteractionincluding:(a)scholarsdrawingoninsightsandmethodsfromoneormoreotherdisciplinesinlookingforsolutionstointractableproblemswithintheirowndiscipline;(b)scholarsfromtwoormoredisciplinesexploringissues,conceptsandmethodsforthesakeofincreasedunderstandingforavarietypurposes,withthemainpay-offbeingilluminationforeachwithintheirowndiscipline;(c)teamsofspecialistsfromseveraldisciplineslookingforasolutiontoanextradisciplinaryproblem(e.g.buildingapowerstation,(p.109) devisingresponsestoglobalwarming)withmembersoftheteamtypicallyexportingexpertisewithoutnecessarilyimportinginsightsbackintotheirowndiscipline.119

Iamnotfamiliarwiththeacademicliteratureaboutinterdisciplinarity,120butIhavehadextensivefirst-handexperienceoftherewardsandfrustrationsofcross-disciplinaryinteractions.IhavefoundthecommentarybyStephenRowlandandJasonDaviesontheUCLprogrammeandinterdisciplinaryrelationsgenerallyilluminating,butIhaveonemajorreservationabouttheirperspective.121Lurkingbehindmuchofwhattheysayseemstobeapictureofdisciplinesassolid,largelyhomogeneous,boundedentities,likefortresscommunities,fromwhichindividualscholarssallyforthonshortexpeditionsasimporters,exporters,orexplorersonlytoreturnhomehavinggarnerednewmaterialorhavingmadesomespecialisedcontribution(inthelattercasetypicallytoapractical,extradisciplinaryproblem).Itisveryriskytolingeroutside.Thisfortressimagefitssomeacademicculturesbetterthanothers.Itstrengthensideasofdistinctdomainsofknowledgeandevenautonomousdisciplines.Suchfortressescannodoubtaccommodatewithintheirwallssomedissentanddisagreement,somesubdisciplinesandotherspecialisms,andpowerstruggleswithinandbetweendisciplines.Itcontainsacoreoftruthabouttheidentityofspecialistsandthedangersofdilettanteism.122Butitdoesnotfitalldisciplinaryculturesand,moreimportantly,itcanbeepistemicallymisleading.

Ihappentocomefromanacademicculturewhichistowardsoneendofthespectrumofboundedandunboundedsubjects.ApartfromthesubjectofEvidenceinlaw,whichIhopetohaveshownisinherentlymultidisciplinary,mymainsubjectisJurisprudence.ItissometimessaidthatLawisaparasitic(p.110) subjectandJurisprudenceisthelawyersextraversion,i.e.themainlocusoflawsinterfacewithotherdisciplines.123AswithothertheoreticalenterprisesmanyofthecentralquestionsofJurisprudencearesharedwithotherdisciplines.Forexample,thequestion:Whatisjustice?doesnotbelongexclusivelytoethicsoranalyticalphilosophyorpoliticaltheoryoreconomicsorlegaltheoryoranyotherdiscipline.124Similarly,differingconceptionsoflawhavebeenamajorbattleground


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inlegaltheory,butthesecontroversiesaretoalargeextentsharedwithanalyticalphilosophers,socialscientists,andothersinterestedinlegalphenomena.Lawasaconceptdoesnotbelongtojurists.MyconceptionofEvidenceasamultidisciplinaryfieldisratherlikethat:thereareepistemological,logical,probabilistic,conceptual,andmanyothertypesofquestionsthatarisewithinthefield,butmanyofthesequestionsdonotbelongtoanyonedisciplineinthesenseofdependingfortheirmoregeneralanswersonspecialisedmethodsandknowledgethataretheexclusivedomainofonekindofspecialism.125Moreover,notonlydoquestionsofandaboutevidenceandinferenceariseinmanyacademicdisciplinesandspheresofpractice,butourrepresentativedemocracyandtheroleofjuriesandlaymagistratesinoursystemofadministrationofjusticearepremisedonnotionsofcognitivecompetence,thatistheassumptionthatnormaladultcitizenshavetheabilitytodrawontheirsocietysgeneralstockofknowledge(general(p.111) experience)tomakesoundjudgementsbasedonordinarypracticalreasoning.Inshort,thecasecanbemadeforsayingthatconcernsaboutevidenceareapartofgeneralculture.126Ofcourse,amultidisciplinaryfieldofevidencerequiresspecialisedinputs.Butitismisleadingtoseeitintermsofinteractionsbetweenspecialistsfromsharplyseparateddomains,whohavelittleornocommonground.

PartIV.ConclusionInanswertothequestion:whydoyouthinkevidencehasspecialclaimstobeagoodfocusofattention,myargumentislargelypragmatic.Alldisciplinesthathavesignificantempiricalelementsareconnectedtoasharedfamilyofproblemsaboutevidenceandinference.Apartfromitstheoreticalinterest(asacontributiontounderstanding),evidenceisofgreatpracticalimportanceinmanyspheresofdecision-makingandriskmanagement.Inparticularmulti-disciplinarystudyofevidenceshouldfocusattentiononsuchgeneralquestionsas:(i)Whatfeaturesofevidencearecommonacrossdisciplinesandwhatfeaturesarespecial?(ii)Whatconcepts,methodsandinsightsdevelopedinonedisciplinearetransferabletoothers?127(iii)Whatconceptsarenottransferable?Why?(iv)Canwedevelopgeneralconcepts,methods,andinsightsthatapplytoevidenceinallornearlyallcontexts?

Inmyview,theUCLprogrammeachievedmuchatparticularlevels,butdidnotmakemuchprogressinaddressingmoregeneralandmiddleorderquestions.Nearlyalloftheactivitiesandinteractionstookplaceatlowerlevelsofabstraction.Thereweremanyinterestingspecificactivitiesandproducts,buttheideaofasharedenterprisethatalsofocusedonsomesharedgeneralquestionswaslostsightof.Mypersonalhopeswerenotrealised.Thedevelopmentofanewsubjectisamajorundertaking.Fromtheoutsetitwasmyjudgementthatthreetofouryearswasmuchtooshortandasingleprogrammemuchtoomodesttoachievethebasicaspiration.TheUCLprogrammesucceededinconstitutinganevidencecommunitywithaconsiderablesharingofideasandexperienceamongitsvariousmembers.Thiswouldhavebeenanexcellentstarting-pointforafurther,moreintegratedphase,butunfortunately(p.112) therewasinsufficientinterestinmovingtoamoregenerallevelandnoonewasavailableandwillingtotakeovertheleadershipfromPhilipDawid,whohaddoneafinejobinkeepingtheprogramme


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togetherdespitethediversityoftheinterestsofmembersofthegroup.

So,inmyview,thereisstillaneedforareasonablyintegratedmulti-disciplinaryefforttocarrythisenterpriseforward.Thiswouldprobablyinvolvetheacceptanceofsomebroadcognitivistandempiricistworkingassumptionswiththemainfocusonmiddleorderquestions.Inthisview,thecentraltheoreticalquestionshouldbe:givensuchassumptions,howfarcanwegeneraliseaboutevidenceandinferentialreasoningacrossdisciplines,decisioncontexts,andtypesofinquiry?

Inrelationtothismorespecificquestionsneedtobeaddressed,suchas:

1.Arethereprinciplesofreasoningfromevidencethattranscendallormostscholarlydisciplines?2.Whatcountsasevidencehasvariedacrosstime,language,cultures,practicalcontexts,andacademicdisciplines.Isitpossibletoconstructananalyticconceptorframeworkofconceptsthattranscendsthesevariouscontexts?3.Arethereconcepts,methodsofreasoning,ortypesofevidencethatareuniqueorspecialinoneormoredisciplines?4.Inwhatsenseisanygiventypeofinquiryordecisioncontext-specificinrelationtoevidence?Canasubstance-blindapproachtoevidence(Schum)alsobecontext-blind?5.Arethereconceptssuchasrelevance,probability,probativeforce,andcredibility,cognitivecompetence,ancillaryevidencethatcanusefullybegivenmeaningsthattranscendall,mostorsomescholarlydisciplines?6.AreSchumscredibilityindicatorsapplicabletoquestionsabouttestimonyordocumentaryevidenceindifferentcontexts?7.Aretheregeneraltestsofauthenticityapplicabletodocumentsandphysicalobjectsthatareusedasevidence?8.Whatistherelationshipbetweennarrativeandreasoninginthecontextofargumentation?Towhatextentdoesthatrelationshipvaryaccordingtodisciplinaryandpracticalcontexts?Whatexactlyismeantbytheclaimthatstorieshelpustomakesenseoftheworld?Whatcanlegitimatelybeclaimedcanbedonebynarrativethatcannotbedonebyreasoning?9.Towhatextentandinwhatrespectscanconceptsandmethodsconcerningevidencedevelopedinonedisciplineorpracticalenvironmentbeapplied,withorwithoutmodification,tootherdisciplinesandcontexts?(p.113) 10.Whataretheuses,limitations,anddangersofformalrepresentationsofinferentialarguments(Bayessnets,Wigmorechartsetc.)?11.Whataretheusesandlimitationsofevidence-basedapproachestomedicine,policy,orotheractivities?12.Whatcanreasonablybeexpectedofcomputersandartificialintelligenceasaidstomarshallingandreasoningfromevidence?13.Whatgenerallessonscanbelearnedfromrecentdevelopmentsinhandlingevidenceinpoliceinvestigation,intelligenceanalysis,forensicscience,forensicanthropology,andotherpracticaloperations?


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14.Towhatextentshouldstudyofevidencebedrivenbyquestionsabouthowpeopleactuallydealwithevidenceratherthanhowtheyshouldthinkandactinrelationtoit?

AnsweringsuchquestionsdoesnotinvolvetryingtosetupamonolithicGrandTheoryofEvidence.Toomanyperspectivesareinvolved,thequestionsaretoovaried,andthepossibilitiesforhonestdisagreementtooextensiveforthattobeappropriate.Evenifasetofanswerscouldbeweldedintoasinglecoherenttheory,itislikelytobetooabstracttobeofmuchassistanceindealingwithparticularandpracticalquestionsthatcouldbenefitfromthedevelopmentofamultidisciplinaryfieldalocusformanykindsofinteractionand,sometimes,anarenaofcontestation.Heretheinstinctsofsomeresistersseemtometobesound.

Nor,inmyview,wouldthebestapproachbelargelytopdown.Tobesuretherealreadyexistintheliteraturegeneralconcepts,principlesandhypothesesthatarereleva

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