Modal Logic Epistemic Logic - Stanford AI...

Modal LogicEpistemic Logic

Eric Pacuit

University of Maryland, College Parkai.stanford.edu/∼epacuit

April 19, 2012

Modal Logic 1/37

Epistemology

Cognitive

Science

Philosophical

Dynamic

Epistemic/Doxastic

Game Theory

CS: Multiagent

Systems

CS: Distributed

Algorithms

Logics of

Rational AgencyEpistemic

Foundations of

Game Theory

Modal Logic 2/37

Epistemology

Cognitive

Science

Philosophical

Dynamic

Epistemic/Doxastic

Game Theory

CS: Multiagent

Systems

CS: Distributed

Algorithms

Logics of

Foundations of

Game Theory

Modal Logic 2/37

Epistemology

Cognitive

Science

Philosophical

Dynamic

Epistemic/Doxastic

Game Theory

CS: Multiagent

Systems

CS: Distributed

Algorithms

Logics of

Foundations of

Game Theory

Modal Logic 2/37

Epistemology

Cognitive

Science

Philosophical

Dynamic

Epistemic/Doxastic

Game Theory

CS: Multiagent

Systems

CS: Distributed

Algorithms

Logics of

Foundations of

Game Theory

Modal Logic 2/37

Epistemology

Cognitive

Science

Philosophical

Dynamic

Epistemic/Doxastic

Game Theory

CS: Multiagent

Systems

CS: Distributed

Algorithms

Logics of

Foundations of

Game Theory

Modal Logic 2/37

Foundations of Epistemic Logic

David Lewis Jakko Hintikka Robert Aumann

Larry Moss Johan van Benthem Alexandru Baltag

Modal Logic 3/37

Foundations of Epistemic Logic

Modal Logic 4/37

Single-Agent Epistemic Logic

Let KP informally mean “the agent knows that P (is true)”.

K (P → Q): “Ann knows that P implies Q”

KP ∨ ¬KP: “either Ann does or does not know P”

KP ∨ K¬P: “Ann knows whether P is true”

LP: “P is an epistemic possibility”

KLP: “Ann knows that she thinks P ispossible”

Modal Logic 5/37

ExampleSuppose there are three cards:1, 2 and 3.

Ann is dealt one of the cards,one of the cards is placed facedown on the table and the thirdcard is put back in the deck.

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

What are the relevant states?

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

What are the relevant states?

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

Ann receives card 3 and card 1is put on the table

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

What information does Annhave?

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

Suppose Hi is intended tomean “Ann has card i”

Ti is intended to mean “card iis on the table”

Eg., V (H1) = {w1,w2}

(1, 2)

(1, 3)

(2, 3)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(3, 2)

Modal Logic 6/37

Suppose Hi is intended tomean “Ann has card i”

Ti is intended to mean “card iis on the table”

Eg., V (H1) = {w1,w2}

Modal Logic 6/37

Modal Logic 7/37

Suppose that Ann receives card1 and card 2 is on the table.

Modal Logic 7/37

M,w1 |= KH1

Modal Logic 7/37

M,w1 |= KH1

Modal Logic 7/37

M,w1 |= KH1

M,w1 |= K¬T1

Modal Logic 7/37

M,w1 |= LT2

Modal Logic 7/37

M,w1 |= K (T2 ∨ T3)

Modal Logic 7/37

Multiagent Epistemic Logic

Many of the examples we are interested in involve more than oneagent!

KAP means “Ann knows P”

KBP means “Bob knows P”

I KAKBϕ: “Ann knows that Bob knows ϕ”

I KA(KBϕ ∨ KB¬ϕ): “Ann knows that Bob knows whether ϕ

I ¬KBKAKB(ϕ): “Bob does not know that Ann knows thatBob knows that ϕ”

Modal Logic 8/37

Modal Logic 9/37

Ann is dealt one of the cards,Bob is given one of the cardsand the third card is put backin the deck.

Suppose that Ann receives card1 and Bob receives card 2.

Modal Logic 9/37

M,w1 |= KB(KAA1 ∨ KA¬A1)

Modal Logic 9/37

Single-Agent Epistemic Logic: The Language

ϕ is a formula of Epistemic Logic (L) if it is of the form

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

Modal Logic 10/37

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

I p ∈ At is an atomic fact.

• “It is raining”• “The talk is at 2PM”• “The card on the table is a 7 of Hearts”

Modal Logic 10/37

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

I The usual propositional language (L0)

Modal Logic 10/37

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

I Kϕ is intended to mean “The agent knows that ϕ is true”.

Modal Logic 10/37

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

I Kϕ is intended to mean “The agent knows that ϕ is true”.

I The usual definitions for →,∨,↔ apply

I Define Lϕ as ¬K¬ϕ

Modal Logic 10/37

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

K (p → q): “Ann knows that p implies q”

Kp ∨ ¬Kp:

Kp ∨ K¬p:

Modal Logic 10/37

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

Kp ∨ ¬Kp: “either Ann does or does not know p”

Kp ∨ K¬p: “Ann knows whether p is true”

Modal Logic 10/37

ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

Kp ∨ ¬Kp: “either Ann does or does not know p”

Kp ∨ K¬p: “Ann knows whether p is true”

Lϕ: “ϕ is an epistemic possibility”

KLϕ: “Ann knows that she thinks ϕ ispossible”

Modal Logic 10/37

Single-Agent Epistemic Logic: Kripke Models

M = 〈W ,R,V 〉

I W 6= ∅ is the set of all relevant scenarios (states of affairs,possible worlds)

I R ⊆W ×W is the epistemic accessibility relation:wRv provided “state v is epistemically accessible for the agentfrom state w”

I V : At→ ℘(W ) is a valuation function assigning atomicsentences to states

Modal Logic 11/37

M,w |= ϕ means “ϕ is a correct description of some aspect of thescenario w”

“An agent is informed that ϕ is true if ϕ is true throughout theagent’s current range of possibilities”.

M,w |= Kiϕ:

I wRiv if “everything i knows in state w is true in v

I wRiv if “agent i has the same experiences and memories inboth w and v”

I wRiv if “agent i has cannot rule-out v (given her evidenceand observations)”

I wRiv if “agent i is in the same local state in w and v”

I wRiv if “agent i has the same information in w and v”

Modal Logic 12/37

M,w |= Kiϕ:

Modal Logic 12/37

M,w |= Kiϕ:

Modal Logic 12/37

M,w |= Kiϕ:

Modal Logic 12/37

Logical Omniscience

Fact: ϕ is valid then Kϕ is valid

Modal Logic 13/37

Logical Omniscience

Fact: Kϕ ∧ Kψ → K (ϕ ∧ ψ) is valid on all Kripke frames

Modal Logic 13/37

Logical Omniscience

Fact: If ϕ→ ψ is valid then Kϕ→ Kψ is valid

Modal Logic 13/37

Logical Omniscience

Fact: K (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ) is valid on all Kripke frames.

Modal Logic 13/37

Logical Omniscience

Fact: ϕ↔ ψ is valid then Kϕ↔ Kψ is valid

Modal Logic 13/37

Modal Formula Property Philosophical Assumption

K (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ) — Logical OmniscienceKϕ→ ϕ Reflexive Truth

Kϕ→ KKϕ Transitive Positive Introspection¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ Euclidean Negative Introspection

¬K⊥ Serial Consistency

Modal Logic 14/37

K (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ) — Logical Omniscience

Kϕ→ ϕ Reflexive TruthKϕ→ KKϕ Transitive Positive Introspection¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ Euclidean Negative Introspection

Modal Logic 14/37

Kϕ→ KKϕ Transitive Positive Introspection

¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ Euclidean Negative Introspection¬K⊥ Serial Consistency

Modal Logic 14/37

Unawareness

Why would an agent not know some fact ϕ? (i.e., why would¬Kiϕ be true?)

I The agent may or may not believe ϕ, but has not ruled out allthe ¬ϕ-worlds

I The agent may believe ϕ and ruled-out the ¬ϕ-worlds, butthis was based on “bad” evidence, or was not justified, or theagent was “epistemically lucky” (eg., Gettier cases),...

I The agent has not yet entertained possibilities relevant to thetruth of ϕ (the agent is unaware of ϕ).

Modal Logic 15/37

Unawareness

Modal Logic 15/37

Unawareness

Modal Logic 15/37

Unawareness

Modal Logic 15/37

Can we model unawareness in state-space models?

E. Dekel, B. Lipman and A. Rustichini. Standard State-Space Models PrecludeUnawareness. Econometrica, 55:1, pp. 159 - 173 (1998).

Modal Logic 16/37

Can we model unawareness in state-space models?

E. Dekel, B. Lipman and A. Rustichini. Standard State-Space Models PrecludeUnawareness. Econometrica, 55:1, pp. 159 - 173 (1998).

Modal Logic 16/37

Sherlock Holmes

While Watson never reports it, Sherlock Holmes oncenoted an even more curious incident, that of the dog thatbarked and the cat that howled in the night.

WhenWatson objected that the dog did not bark and the catdid not Howl, Holmes replied “that is the curious incidentto which I refer.” Holmes knew that this meant that noone, neither man nor dog, had intruded on the premisesthe previous night. For had a man intruded, the dogwould have barked. Had a dog intruded, the cat wouldhave howled. Hence the lack of either of these twosignals means that there could not have been a human orcanine intruder.

Modal Logic 17/37

Sherlock Holmes

While Watson never reports it, Sherlock Holmes oncenoted an even more curious incident, that of the dog thatbarked and the cat that howled in the night. WhenWatson objected that the dog did not bark and the catdid not Howl, Holmes replied “that is the curious incidentto which I refer.”

Holmes knew that this meant that noone, neither man nor dog, had intruded on the premisesthe previous night. For had a man intruded, the dogwould have barked. Had a dog intruded, the cat wouldhave howled. Hence the lack of either of these twosignals means that there could not have been a human orcanine intruder.

Modal Logic 17/37

Sherlock Holmes

While Watson never reports it, Sherlock Holmes oncenoted an even more curious incident, that of the dog thatbarked and the cat that howled in the night. WhenWatson objected that the dog did not bark and the catdid not Howl, Holmes replied “that is the curious incidentto which I refer.” Holmes knew that this meant that noone, neither man nor dog, had intruded on the premisesthe previous night.

For had a man intruded, the dogwould have barked. Had a dog intruded, the cat wouldhave howled. Hence the lack of either of these twosignals means that there could not have been a human orcanine intruder.

Modal Logic 17/37

Sherlock Holmes

While Watson never reports it, Sherlock Holmes oncenoted an even more curious incident, that of the dog thatbarked and the cat that howled in the night. WhenWatson objected that the dog did not bark and the catdid not Howl, Holmes replied “that is the curious incidentto which I refer.” Holmes knew that this meant that noone, neither man nor dog, had intruded on the premisesthe previous night. For had a man intruded, the dogwould have barked. Had a dog intruded, the cat wouldhave howled. Hence the lack of either of these twosignals means that there could not have been a human orcanine intruder.

Modal Logic 17/37

Modeling Watson’s Unawareness

dw2 cw3

Modal Logic 18/37

I Let E = {w2} be the event that there was anintruder.

K (E ) = {w2} (at w2, Watson knows there isa human intruder) and −K (E ) = {w1,w3}K (−K (E )) = {w3} (at w3, Watson knowsthat she does not know E ), and−K (−K (E )) = {w1,w2}−K (E ) ∩ −K (−K (E )) = {w1} and, in fact,⋂∞

i=1(−K )i (E ) = {w1}

dw2 cw3

Modal Logic 18/37

I K (E ) = {w2} (at w2, Watson knows there isa human intruder) and −K (E ) = {w1,w3}K (−K (E )) = {w3} (at w3, Watson knowsthat she does not know E ), and−K (−K (E )) = {w1,w2}−K (E ) ∩ −K (−K (E )) = {w1} and, in fact,⋂∞

i=1(−K )i (E ) = {w1}

dw2 cw3

Modal Logic 18/37

I K (E ) = {w2} (at w2, Watson knows there isa human intruder) and −K (E ) = {w1,w3}

I K (−K (E )) = {w3} (at w3, Watson knowsthat she does not know E ), and−K (−K (E )) = {w1,w2}−K (E ) ∩ −K (−K (E )) = {w1} and, in fact,⋂∞

i=1(−K )i (E ) = {w1}

dw2 cw3

Modal Logic 18/37

I K (E ) = {w2} (at w2, Watson knows there isa human intruder) and −K (E ) = {w1,w3}

I K (−K (E )) = {w3} (at w3, Watson knowsthat she does not know E ), and−K (−K (E )) = {w1,w2}

I −K (E ) ∩ −K (−K (E )) = {w1} and, in fact,⋂∞i=1(−K )i (E ) = {w1}

dw2 cw3

Modal Logic 18/37

I E = {w2}I K (E ) = {w2}, −K (E ) = {w1,w3}I K (−K (E )) = {w3} ,−K (−K (E )) = {w1,w2}

I −K (E ) ∩ −K (−K (E )) = {w1},⋂∞i=1(−K )i (E ) = {w1}

dw2 cw3

Let U(F ) =⋂∞

i=1(−K )i (F ). Then,I U(∅) = U(W ) = U({w1}) = U({w2,w3}) = ∅I U(E ) = U({w3}) = U({w1,w3}) = U({w1,w2} = {w1}

Then, U(E ) = {w1} and U(U(E )) = U({w1}) = ∅Modal Logic 18/37

I E = {w2}I K (E ) = {w2}, −K (E ) = {w1,w3}I K (−K (E )) = {w3} ,−K (−K (E )) = {w1,w2}

I −K (E ) ∩ −K (−K (E )) = {w1},⋂∞i=1(−K )i (E ) = {w1}

dw2 cw3

Let U(F ) =⋂∞

i=1(−K )i (F ). Then,I U(∅) = U(W ) = U({w1}) = U({w2,w3}) = ∅I U(E ) = U({w3}) = U({w1,w3}) = U({w1,w2} = {w1}

Then, U(E ) = {w1} and U(U(E )) = U({w1}) = ∅Modal Logic 18/37

Properties of Unawareness

1. Uϕ→ (¬Kϕ ∧ ¬K¬Kϕ)

2. ¬KUϕ

3. Uϕ→ UUϕ

Theorem. In any logic where U satisfies the above axiomschemes, we have

1. If K satisfies Necessitation (from ϕ infer Kϕ), then for allformulas ϕ, ¬Uϕ is derivable (the agent is aware ofeverything); and

2. If K satisfies Monotonicity (from ϕ→ ψ infer Kϕ→ Kψ),then for all ϕ and ψ, Uϕ→ ¬Kψ is derivable (if the agent isunaware of something then the agent does not knowanything).

Modal Logic 19/37

1. Uϕ→ (¬Kϕ ∧ ¬K¬Kϕ)

2. ¬KUϕ

3. Uϕ→ UUϕ

Modal Logic 19/37

1. Uϕ→ (¬Kϕ ∧ ¬K¬Kϕ)

2. ¬KUϕ

3. Uϕ→ UUϕ

Modal Logic 19/37

1. Uϕ→ (¬Kϕ ∧ ¬K¬Kϕ)

2. ¬KUϕ

3. Uϕ→ UUϕ

Modal Logic 19/37

B. Schipper. Online Bibliography on Models of Unawareness. http://www.

econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm.

J. Halpern. Alternative semantics for unawareness. Games and Economic Be-havior, 37, 321-339, 2001.

Modal Logic 20/37

Multi-agent Epistemic Logic

The Language: ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ

Kripke Models: M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 and w ∈W

Truth: M,w |= ϕ is defined as follows:

I M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p) (with p ∈ At)

I M,w |= ¬ϕ if M,w 6|= ϕ

I M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ if M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ

I M,w |= Kϕ if for each v ∈W , if wRv , then M, v |= ϕ

Modal Logic 21/37

The Language: ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kiϕ with i ∈ A

Kripke Models: M = 〈W , {Ri}i∈A,V 〉 and w ∈W

I M,w |= ¬ϕ if M,w 6|= ϕ

I M,w |= Kiϕ if for each v ∈W , if wRiv , then M, v |= ϕ

Modal Logic 21/37

I KaKbϕ: “Ann knows that Bob knows ϕ”

I Ka(Kbϕ ∨ Kb¬ϕ): “Ann knows that Bob knows whether ϕ

I ¬KbKaKb(ϕ): “Bob does not know that Ann knows that Bobknows that ϕ”

Modal Logic 21/37

Modal Logic 22/37

Modal Logic 23/37

Ann does not know that P, but she believes that ¬Pis true to degree r .

Modal Logic 24/37

r1− r

Modal Logic 24/37

Combining Logics of Knowledge and Belief

M = 〈W , {∼i}i∈A, {Ri}i∈A,V 〉 where

I W 6= ∅ is a set of states;

I each ∼i is an equivalence relation on W ;

I each Ri is a serial, transitive, Euclidean relation on W ; and

I V is a valuation function.

What is the relationship between knowledge (Ki ) and believe (Bi )?

I Each Ki is S5

I Each Bi is KD45

I Kiϕ→ Biϕ? “knowledge implies belief”

I Biϕ→ BiKiϕ? “positive certainty”

I Biϕ→ KiBiϕ?

Modal Logic 25/37

I Each Ki is S5

I Each Bi is KD45

I Biϕ→ KiBiϕ?

Modal Logic 25/37

I Each Ki is S5

I Each Bi is KD45

I Biϕ→ KiBiϕ?

Modal Logic 25/37

I Each Ki is S5

I Each Bi is KD45

I Biϕ→ KiBiϕ?

Modal Logic 25/37

I Each Ki is S5

I Each Bi is KD45

I Biϕ→ KiBiϕ?

Modal Logic 25/37

I Each Ki is S5

I Each Bi is KD45

I Biϕ→ KiBiϕ?

Modal Logic 25/37

An Issue

I Suppose that p is something you are certain of (you believe itwith probability one), but is false: ¬p ∧ Bp

I Assuming 1. B satisfies KD45, 2. K satisfies S5, 3.knowledge implies believe and 4. positive certainty leads to acontradiction.

I Bp → BKp

I ¬p → ¬Kp → K¬Kp → B¬Kp

I So, BKp ∧ B¬Kp also holds, but this contradictionsBϕ→ ¬B¬ϕ.

Modal Logic 26/37

An Issue

I Bp → BKp

Modal Logic 26/37

An Issue

I Bp → BKp

Modal Logic 26/37

An Issue

I Bp → BKp

I ¬p → ¬Kp

→ K¬Kp → B¬Kp

Modal Logic 26/37

An Issue

I Bp → BKp

I ¬p → ¬Kp → K¬Kp

→ B¬Kp

Modal Logic 26/37

An Issue

I Bp → BKp

Modal Logic 26/37

An Issue

I Bp → BKp

Modal Logic 26/37

J. Halpern. Should Knowledge Entail Belief?. Journal of Philosophical Logic,25:5, 1996, pp. 483-494.

Modal Logic 27/37

Adding Beliefs

Epistemic Models: M = 〈W , {∼i}i∈A,V 〉

I M,w |= ¬ϕ if M,w 6|= ϕ

I M,w |= Kiϕ if for each v ∈W , if w∼iv , then M, v |= ϕ

Modal Logic 28/37

Adding Beliefs

Epistemic-Doxastic Models: M = 〈W , {∼i}i∈A, {�i}i∈A,V 〉

I M,w |= ¬ϕ if M,w 6|= ϕ

Modal Logic 28/37

Adding BeliefsEpistemic-Doxastic Models: M = 〈W , {∼i}i∈A, {�i}i∈A,V 〉

Plausibility Relation: �i⊆W ×W . w �i v means

“v is at least as plausibile as w .”

Properties of �i : reflexive, transitive, complete and well-founded.

Most Plausible: For X ⊆W , let

Min�i (X ) = {v ∈W | v �i w for all w ∈ X }

Assumptions:

plausibility implies possibility: if w �i v then w ∼i v .locally-connected: if w ∼i v then either w �i v or v �i w .

Modal Logic 28/37

Properties of �i : reflexive, transitive, and well-founded.

Assumptions:

Modal Logic 28/37

Assumptions:

Modal Logic 28/37

Assumptions:

1. plausibility implies possibility: if w �i v then w ∼i v .2. locally-connected: if w ∼i v then either w �i v or v �i w .

Modal Logic 28/37

Adding Beliefs

Epistemic-Doxastic Models: M = 〈W , {∼i}i∈A, {�i}i∈A,V 〉

I M,w |= ¬ϕ if M,w 6|= ϕ

I M,w |= Biϕ if for each v ∈ Min�i ([w ]i ), M, v |= ϕ[w ]i = {v | w ∼i v} is the agent’s information cell.

Modal Logic 28/37

Grades of Doxastic Strength

wv1v0 v2

Suppose that w is the current state.

Knowledge (KP)

Belief (BP)

Safe Belief (�P)

Strong Belief (BsP)

Modal Logic 29/37

wv1v0 v2

Knowledge (KP)

Belief (BP)

Robust Belief (�P)

Strong Belief (BsP)

Modal Logic 29/37

I Belief (BP)

Robust Belief (�P)

Strong Belief (BsP)

Knowledge (KP)

Modal Logic 29/37

I Belief (BP)

I Robust Belief (�P)

Strong Belief (BsP)

Knowledge (KP)

Modal Logic 29/37

I Belief (BP)

I Strong Belief (BsP)

Knowledge (KP)

Modal Logic 29/37

I Belief (BP)

I Strong Belief (BsP)

I Knowledge (KP)

Modal Logic 29/37

Conditional Beliefs

I w1 ∼ w2 ∼ w3

w1 � w2 and w2 � w1 (w1 and w2

are equi-plausbile)

w1 ≺ w3 (w1 � w3 and w3 6� w1)

w2 ≺ w3 (w2 � w3 and w3 6� w2)

{w1,w2} ⊆ Min�([wi ])

Bϕi ψ: Agent i believes ψ, given that ϕ is true.

M,w |= Bϕi ψ if for each v ∈ Min�i ([w ]i ∩ [[ϕ]]), M, v |= ϕwhere [[ϕ]] = {w | M,w |= ϕ}

Modal Logic 30/37

Conditional Beliefs

I w1 ∼ w2 ∼ w3

I w1 � w2 and w2 � w1 (w1 and w2

are equi-plausbile)

I w1 ≺ w3 (w1 � w3 and w3 6� w1)

I w2 ≺ w3 (w2 � w3 and w3 6� w2)

{w1,w2} ⊆ Min�([wi ])

Modal Logic 30/37

Conditional Beliefs

I w1 ∼ w2 ∼ w3

I w1 � w2 and w2 � w1 (w1 and w2

are equi-plausbile)

I w1 ≺ w3 (w1 � w3 and w3 6� w1)

I w2 ≺ w3 (w2 � w3 and w3 6� w2)

I {w1,w2} ⊆ Min�([wi ])

Modal Logic 30/37

Conditional Beliefs

Modal Logic 30/37

Conditional Beliefs

Modal Logic 30/37

Conditional Beliefs

Modal Logic 30/37

Example

Modal Logic 31/37

Success: Bϕi ϕ

Knowledge entails belief Kiϕ→ Bψi ϕFull introspection: Bϕi ψ → KiB

ϕi ψ and ¬Bϕi ψ → Ki¬Bϕi ψ

Cautious Monotonicity: (Bϕi α ∧ Bϕi β)→ Bϕ∧βi α

Rational Monotonicity: (Bϕi α ∧ ¬Bϕi ¬β)→ Bϕ∧βi α

Modal Logic 32/37

Rational Monotonicity, I

R. Stalnaker. Nonmonotonic consequence relations. Fundamenta Informaticae,21: 721, 1994.

Consider the three composers: Verdi, Bizet, and Satie, and supposethat we initially accept (correctly but defeasibly) that Verdi isItalian I (v), while Bizet and Satie are French (F (b) ∧ F (s)).

Modal Logic 33/37

Rational Monotonicity, I

R. Stalnaker. Nonmonotonic consequence relations. Fundamenta Informaticae,21: 721, 1994.

Consider the three composers: Verdi, Bizet, and Satie, and supposethat we initially accept (correctly but defeasibly) that Verdi isItalian I (v), while Bizet and Satie are French (F (b) ∧ F (s)).

Modal Logic 33/37

Rational Monotonicity, II

Suppose now that we are told by a reliable (but not infallible!)source of information that that Verdi and Bizet are compatriots(C (v , b)). This leads us no longer to endorse either the propositionthat Verdi is Italian (because he could be French), or that Bizet isFrench (because he could be Italian); but we would still draw thedefeasible consequence that Satie is French, since nothing that wehave learned conflicts with it.

BC(v ,b)F (s)

Modal Logic 34/37

Rational Monotonicity, III

Now consider the proposition C (v , s) that Verdi and Satie arecompatriots. Before learning that C (v , b) we would be inclined toreject the proposition C (v , s) because we accept I (v) and F (s),but after learning that Verdi and Bizet are compatriots, we can nolonger endorse I (v), and therefore no longer reject C (v , s).

¬BC(v ,b)¬C (v , s)

Modal Logic 35/37

Rational Monotonicity, IV

However, if we added C (v , s) to our stock of beliefs, we would losethe inference to F (s): in the context of C (v , b), the propositionC (v , s) is equivalent to the statement that all three composershave the same nationality. This leads us to suspend our belief inthe proposition F (s).

¬BC(v ,b)∧C(v ,s)F (s)

BC(v ,b)F (s) and ¬BC(v ,b)¬C (v , s) but ¬BC(v ,b)∧C(v ,s)F (s)

Modal Logic 36/37

Rational Monotonicity, IV

However, if we added C (v , s) to our stock of beliefs, we would losethe inference to F (s): in the context of C (v , b), the propositionC (v , s) is equivalent to the statement that all three composershave the same nationality. This leads us to suspend our belief inthe proposition F (s).

¬BC(v ,b)∧C(v ,s)F (s)

BC(v ,b)F (s) and ¬BC(v ,b)¬C (v , s) but ¬BC(v ,b)∧C(v ,s)F (s)

Modal Logic 36/37

Next: Common Knowledge

Modal Logic 37/37

Modal Logic Epistemic Logic - Stanford AI...

Documents

Modal Logic

499H Modal logic

Hardegree, Modal Logic , Chapter 03: Absolute Modal Logic ...courses.umass.edu/phil511-gmh/pdf/C03-2016.pdfHardegree, Modal Logic, Chapter 03: Absolute Modal Logic 4 of 30 Notice that

Generalized quantifiers and modal logic

Logic Puzzles and Modal Logic. Closure properties in modal logic

Introduction to Modal Logic - CMU

Book Spr2012 Web

Nottingham · ii Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Background in modal logic and guarded fragments 6 2.1 Modal logic and rst-order logic 6 2.2 Modal logic vs. rst-order logic 16 2.3 First-order

Modal Logic - Uppsala Universityhedin/TillLog/LectureNotesAL.pdf · Modal Logic (Lecture Notes for Applied Logic) Anton Hedin October 2, 2008 Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 Basic Modal

08—Modal Logic

Argumentation Theory and Modal Logic

-Modal Logic-PhDthesis_Marchignoli

LSS Modal and Temporal Logic

09 Modal Logic II - NUS Computingcs3234/slides/slides_09.color.pdf · Review of Modal Logic Some Modal Logics Natural Deduction in Modal Logic Knowledge in Multi-Agent Systems 09—Modal

A Companion to Modal Logic

Modal Logic Introductory Lecture - Stanford AI Labai.stanford.edu/~epacuit/classes/modal-spr2012/ml-lec1.pdf · Modal Logic Introductory Lecture Eric Pacuit University of Maryland,

Problems of Proof Theory in Modal Logic - Portal · Questions for a proof theory of modal logic Proof analysis in modal logic First-order modal logic Completeness for Kripke semantics

Modal Logic Introductory Lectureepacuit/classes/modal-spr2012/ml-lec1.pdfModal Logic 3/45. Dorothy Edgington’s Proof of the Existence of God X Y X !Y T T T T F F F T T F F T:G !:(P

M. Fitting - Basic Modal Logic

Modal Logic - Derivative