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List of accepted papers (June 3rd)1 European Integration and Employment, The Need for Fiscal Policies Coordination
Auteurs
GATTI Donatella du MODEM dgatti@u-paris10,frMARETTE Stephan du INRA-INAPG marette@inapg.inra.fr
2 Strategies on international fiscal competition for foreign direct investment in a model with impurepublic inputs
AuteursSAUER Christoph du University of Goettingen csauer@gwdg,de
3 Tax Evasion and Social Interactions-Experimental EvidenceAuteurs
VILLEVAL Marie-Claire du GATE villeval@gate,cnrs,fr
4 Are you a doctor or a quack ? Provision of quality and self-regulation in a market for professionalservices
Auteurs
SESTINI Roberta du University of Rome "La sestini@dis,uniroma1,it
5 Many-to-one matching when the colleagues do matterAuteurs
REVILLA APARICIO Pablo du Universidad Pablo de prevapa@dee,upo,es
6 Testable implications of asymmetric information models of insuranceAuteurs
SALANIE Bernard du CREST salanie@ensae.fr
7 Tax optimization under tax evasion : the role of penalty constraints Game Theory
Auteurs
VASIN Alexander du Moscow State University vasin@cs,msu,suVASINA Polina du Moscow State University
9 Economies allowing large clubs and multiple club memberships ; some preliminary resultsAuteurs
ALLOUCH Nizar du University of Warwick ecsfn@csv.warwick.ac.ukWOODERS Myrna du University of Warwick M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk
10 Technology adoption with production externalitiesAuteurs
COLOMBO Luca du Istituto di Economia e lcolombo@mi.unicatt.it
12 Privatisations as price reforms : an analysis of consumers' welfare change in the UK
Auteurs
BRAU Rinaldo du University of Cagliari brau@unica.it
FLORIO Massimo du Dipartimento di
13 Media, Society and PoliticsAuteurs
ANDINA DIAZ Ascension du Universidad de Alicante aandina@merlin,fae,ua,es
14 Age Related Optimal Income Taxation
Auteurs
BLOMQUIST Sören du Uppsala University soren.blomquist@nek.uu.se
MICHELETTO Luca du Università Bocconi luca.micheletto@uni-bocconi.it
15 Environmental taxation, tax competition and harmonizationAuteurs
CREMER Helmut du IDEI - GREMAQ helmut@cict.fr
GAHVARI Firouz du University of Illinois fgahvari@uiuc.edu
16 Lobbying pour la politique commerciale : le cas de l'UE
Political Economy
Auteurs
SENEMEK Nuri du MEDEE - Université de nuri.senemek@univ-lille1,fr
17 How to win a decision in a federation
Auteurs
JEHIEL Philippe du CERAS jehiel@mail.enpc.fr
18 Increasing Longetivity and Funding of EducationAuteurs
GRADSTEIN Mark du Ben Gurion University grade@bgumail.bgu.ac.il
KAGANOVICH Michael du Indiana University
19 Using the Supply Schedule to EnhanceAuteurs
GILLI Mario du University of mario.gilli@unimib.it
20 Is fiscal co-operation always sustainable when regions di er in size ?Auteurs
TAUGOURDEAU Emmanuelle du EUREQUA taugour@univ-paris1,fr
21 The experimental approach to the voluntary provision of public goodsAuteurs
FINOCCHIARO CASTRO Massimo du University of Catania cmfino@unict.it
22 Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule ? : an exploratory panel studyAuteurs
KARA Ayça E.G. du Turkish Academy of aycakara@ixir.com
SERTEL Murat R, du Turkish Academy of
23 Risk aversion and risk perception under asymmetric information : a measuring based on data of car insurance contracts.
Auteurs
LEPINE Nathalie du GRAPE nathlepine@aol,com
24 Are Reallocation Models Right ?Auteurs
KALLAI Ella du Alpha Bank Romania research @alphabank.ro
25 Using revenue contests in yardstick regulationAuteurs
ZENG_NOBUZ E. Unal du Boiaziçi University zenginob@boun.edu.tr
26 Money, power and thye nucleolus Game Theory
Auteurs
MONTERO Maria du University of Dortmund maria,montero@wiso,uni-dortmund,de
27 Comparison of three collective choice procedures by two complexities
Auteurs
JOHNSON Mark R. du M,J, Neeley School of M.Johnson3@tcu,edu
28 Rational expectation can preclude tradeable emission permitsAuteurs
MATSUHISA Takashi du Ibararaki mathisa@ge.ibaraki-ct.ac.jp
29 Optimal taxation and factor mobility in an overlapping generations economyAuteurs
CEBREIRO-GOMEZ Ana du University of Essex acebr@essex.ac.uk
30 Size difference as an obtacle to horizontal tax cooperation between localgovernmentsAuteurs
MORER Myriam du L.I.B.R.E. myr.mor@netcourrier.com
32 Partisan monetary policy delegation in a supra-national federal state under a majority vote systemAuteurs
FRANCK Raphaël du Université Paris IIGENNEQUIN Audrey du LAEP audrey.gennequin@libertysurf.fr
33 Federalism, devolution, and optimal regional grants : an asymmetric information approachAuteurs
GRECO Luciano du Università degli Studi di Luciano.Greco@decon.unipd.it
34 Rattrapage technologique , recherche de rente et convergence économiqueAuteurs
SOUISSI-KACHOURI Najah du L.I.E.I. najah.souissi@fsegt.rnu.tn
35 International environmental agreements - The role of foresightAuteurs
DIAMANTOUDI Effrosyni du University of Rochester faye@econ.au.dk
36 Decentralization, yardstick competition, and the quality of public goods
Auteurs
BARANKAY Iwan du University of Warwick i.barankay@warwick.ac.uk
37 Product choice, taxation and switching costs : an application to car productionAuteurs
MYLES Gareth D. du University of Exeter G.D.Myles@exeter.ac.uk
38 How bad is bad taxation ? Disintermediation and illiquidity in a bank account debits tax modelAuteurs
ALBUQUERQUE Pedro H. du University of Wisconsin - pedrohalbuquerque@yahoo.com
39 Optimal assignment of liabilities
Auteurs
GONZALEZ Patrick du CIRANO - GREEN - pgon@ecn.ulaval.ca
40 Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxationAuteurs
CREMER Helmut du IDEI - GREMAQ helmut@cict.frLOZACHMEUR Jean-Marie du CREPPPESTIAU Pierre du CREPP
41 The theory of the distributive branch of public economicsAuteurs
KOLM Serge-Christophe du E.H.E.S.S.
42 Political formations under alternative decision rules Political Economy
Auteurs
HAFER Catherine du New York University catherine.hafer@nyu.edu
43 Which acceptable agreements are equilibria ? Game Theory
Auteurs
THORON Sylvie du GREQAM thoron@ehess.cnrs-mrs.fr
44 On a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition and a reallocation principleAuteurs
CARLIER Guillaume du Université Montesquieu - carlier@montesquieu.u-bordeaux.
45 Tax relief mechanisms and the least taxed path for circulating income within a multinationalAuteurs
GERARD Marcel du ARPEGE/FUCAM gerard(viz.gillard)@fucam.ac.be
46 &-Maxmin expected utilityAuteurs
KOPYLOV Igor du University of Rochester igoz@troi.cc.rochester.edu
47 Transboundary pollution, asymmetric information and social welfareAuteurs
BEN YOUSSEL Slim du Université de Tunis El slim.benyoussef@gnet
48 Privatization and investments : crowding-out effect vs financial diversificationAuteurs
GIRMENS Guillaume du EPEE ggirmens@univ-evry.frGUILLARD Michel du EPEE
49 Tax competition and revenue equalizationAuteurs
BUCOVETSKY Sam du York University msmart@groucho.economic.utoronto.ca
SMART Michael du STICERD msmart@chass.utoronto.ca
50 Prize dissipation in large contests with small entry costs
Auteurs
CORNES Richard du University of Nottingham Richard.Cornes@nottingham.ac.uHARTLEY Roger du Keele University r.hartley@keele.ac.uk
51 Drèze's criterion in a multi-periods economy with stock marketsAuteurs
BONNISSEAU Jean-Marc du CERMSEM Jean-Marc.bonnisseauLACHIRI Oussama du CERMSEM lachiri@univ-paris1,fr
52 Bureaucratic bias and inefficiencies of local public expenditures : a theoretical and empiricalinquiry in a democratic context
AuteursLEPRINCE Mathieu du CREREG matthieu.leprince@univ-rennes1,f
53 Fiscal federalism and bargaining over transfers
Auteurs
LUCAS Vander du IRES lucas@ires.ucl.ac.be
54 Price and quality regulation with multi-dimensional heterogeneity
Auteurs
de VILLEMEUR Etienne B. du IDEI - GREMAQ etienne.deVillemeur@univ-tlse1.f
55 Majority voting on budgets Political Economy
Auteurs
LAFFOND Gilbert du CNAM laffond@cnam.frLAINE Jean du CREST-LSM jlaine@ensai.fr
56 Should prime ministers be elected ? Political Economy
Auteurs
VERONESE Barbara du STICERD B.Veronese@lse.ac.uk
57 On the effects of regulating price discrimination by a price capped firmAuteurs
IOZZI Alberto du University of Roma "To Alberto.Iozzi@UniRoma2.it
59 Industry concentration and the financing of product quality regulationsAuteurs
CRESPI John M. du Kansas State University
60 A model of energy supply according to consumers'demandsAuteurs
POSPELOVA Irina du Computing Center of irina@ccas.ru
61 On the efficiency of employment subsidies in limiting the effects of labour market rigiditiesAuteurs
REMY Véronique du LAEP remy@univ-paris1,fr
62 Decomposable poverty measures when households differ in sizeAuteurs
EBERT Udo du University of Oldenburg ebert@uni-oldenburg.de
63 Aggregate games and public economicsAuteurs
CORNES Richard du University of Nottingham Richard.Cornes@nottingham.ac.uHARTLEY Roger du Keele University r.hartley@keele.ac.uk
65 Coalitions, agreements and efficiencyAuteurs
XUE Licun du University of Aarhus lxue@econ.dk
66 Taxation and the Drafting of Public EmployeesAuteurs
JERISON Michael du SUNY ALBANY m.jerison@albany.edu
67 Jeux Sans Frontières revisited : a new study of tax comptetition when transportation cost is
Tax Competition Tax competition
Auteurs
KHOSHYARAN Megan du Catholic University of megan.lebacque@econ.kuleuven.ac.be
68 Dynamic club formation with coordinationAuteurs
ARNOLD Tone du University of Hohenheim tone@uni-hohenheim.deWOODERS Myrna du University of Warwick M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk
69 Evolution & Voting : how nature makes us public spirited Political Economy
Auteurs
CONLEY John du University of Illinois jpconley@uiuc.eduWOODERS Myrna du University of Warwick M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk
70 Boundary behaviour of equilibria for linear exchange economiesAuteurs
BONNISSEAU Jean-Marc du CERMSEM Jean-Marc.bonnisseauFLORIG Michael du CERMSEM florig@univ-paris1,fr
71 On the inverse problem for semivalues of TU games Game Theory
Auteurs
DRAGAN Irinel du University of Texas dragan@uta.edu
72 Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized condorcet winners Political Economy
Auteurs
SERTEL Murat R, du Turkish Academy of
73 Liability rules versus regulation for environmentally risky venturesAuteurs
MARTIMORT David du IDEI - GREMAQ
74 Crime and PovertyAuteurs
WANG Ping du Vanderbit University ping.wang@vanderbilt.edu
75 Electoral Goals and Centre-StateTransfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India
Political Economy
Auteurs
DHILLON Amrita du University of Warwick A.Dhillon@warwick.ac.uk
77 Internet, Literacy and Earnigs InequalityAuteurs
TRANNOY Alain du Tilburg University trannoy@paris.u-cergy.fr
78 Tax incentives for private life annuities and the social security reform : effects on consumption andon adverse selection
AuteursPECH Suzanne du University of Linz susanne.pech@jku.at
79 Income distribution and the public-private mix in health care provision : the latin american caseAuteurs
MACEIRA Daniel du University of Buenos daniel_maceira@arnet.com.ar
80 Do elections always motivate incumbents ? Experimentation vs. Career concerns
Political Economy
Auteurs
LE BORGNE Eric du University of Warwick eleborgne@imf.orgLOCKWOOD Ben du University of Warwick b,lockwood@warwick.ac.uk
81 Phantom bidding versus shill bidding : incentives to manipulate the auction outcomeAuteurs
KOSMOPOULOU Georgia du University of Oklahoma georgiak@ou.edu
83 Decentralization of Asset ownership in transition economiesAuteurs
LE Hong Nhat du CIEM nhatlh@fetp.vnn.vn
84 On-the-job-training effects on working time and wage responses to changes in the social securitypayroll tax
AuteursALVAREZ-ALBELO Carmen du Universidad de la Laguna calbelo@ull.es
86 Star-shapedness of Richter-Aumann integral on a measure space with atoms : Theory andeconomic applications
Game Theory
Auteursd'AGATA Antonio du University of Catania adagata@lex.unict.it
87 Decentralisation and poverty alleviation in AsiaAuteurs
GAIHA Raghav du University of Delhi rdg@bol.net.in
88 Appropriate redistributions and the second welfare theorem when equilibrium is not uniqueAuteurs
BRYANT Tony du Macquarie University tbryant@efs.mq.edu.au
90 A tax design from the principle of the maximum guaranteed happiness
Auteurs
MULLAT J.E. du Byvej 269 joseph_mullat@datalaudering.co
91 Tax competition and spatial competition : easing cross-border trading under different tax rules
Auteurs
HAMILTON Jonathan du University of Florida hamilton@ufl.edu
92 Detecting abnormal pricing in international trade : the RUSSIA-USA case
Auteurs
de BOYRIE Maria E, du Florida International deboyrie@fiu.edu
93 Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricingAuteurs
PAGE Franck du University of Alabama fpage@cba.ua.edu
94 In search of the uncovered setAuteurs
SENED Itai du Washington University in sened@artsci.wustl.edu
95 Provision point mechanisms and over provision of public goodsAuteurs
MORELLI Massimo du Ohio State University morelli@ias.edu
96 Sustainable transportation system : a system dynamics approachAuteurs
YEVDOKIMOV Yuri V. du University of New yuri@unb.ca
97 Will the public sector be loo large in an economy with club goods ? Public Goods
Auteurs
FRASER Clive D du University of Leicester cdf2@le.ac.uk
99 Regular distributive social systemsAuteurs
MERCIER-YTHIER Jean du GREQAM Jean.MERCIER-YTHIER@wanadoo.fr
100 Fifty years after samuelson's "the pure theory of public expenditure" : what are we left with ?
Public Goods
Auteurs
PICKHARDT Michael du Bergische University pic@wiwi.uni-wuppertal.de
101 The role of the WTO in the transfer of policy knowledge on trade and competition
Auteurs
MORRISSEY Oliver du University of Nottingham oliver.morrissey@nottingham.ac.NELSON Douglas R. du Tulane University dnelson@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu
102 Externality policy reform : a general-equilibrium analysis
Auteurs
RUSSEL Robert du University of California, rcubed@mail.ucr.edu
103 Tax evasion and the source of income : an experimental study in Albania and the Netherlands
Auteurs
GERXHANI Klarita du Tinbergen Institute klarita@fee.uva.nlSCHRAM Arthur du CREED
105 Evolution of social behavior : individual and group selection models
Auteurs
BERGSTROM Theodore C. du University of California, tedb@econ.ucsb.edu
106 Institutional device and welfare in a monetary union : a partisan analysisAuteurs
AARON-CUREAU Corinne du LAEP aaron@univ-paris1,fr
108 Systemic game theory : westerian approach
Auteurs
POPP Alexandru du Concordia University awpopp@hotmail.com
109 A managed service economy with an equilibrium for marketable services
Auteurs
RUYS Pieter H.M. du University of Maastricht P.H.M.Ruys@kub.nl
110 Population aging and retirement age
Auteurs
LACOMBA Juan Antonio du University of Granada jlacomba@ugr.es
111 Learning in elections and voter turnoutAuteurs
DHILLON Amrita du University of Warwick A.Dhillon@warwick.ac.uk
DMICHELIS Stefano du University of Warwick stefano@core.ucl.ac.be
112 Exhaustible resources and secondary materials a macroeconomic analysisAuteurs
Di VITA Giuseppe du University of Catania gdivita @lex.unict.it
113 Tax Spillovers under separate accounting and formula apportionmentAuteurs
BO NIELSEN Soren du Copenhagen Business sbn.eco@cbs.dk
114 The existence of strategic voting Political Economy
Auteurs
REBACK Randall du University of Michigan reback@umich.edu
115 Stat-ups, Venture capitalists and the capital gains taxAuteurs
KEUSCHNIGG Christian du University of St Gallen christian.keuschnigg@unisg.ch
116 Debt policy in a competitive two-sector overlapping generations model
Auteurs
SEN Partha du Delhi School of senp@isid.ac.in
117 Price competition with information disparities in a vertically
Auteurs
CAVALIERE Alberto du Università degli Studi di cavalier@unipv,it
118 Consumer Activitism and the Regulation of Socially Responsible GoodsAuteurs
USUREL Catalin du Oxford University catalin.usurel@merton.ox.ac.uk
119 Are spanish governments really averse to inequlity ? A normative analysis using the 1999 reform ofthe spanish tax-benefit system as a natural experiment
AuteursSPADARO Amedeo du Universitat de les Iles amedeo.spadaro@uib.es
120 Bidding among friends and enemies
Auteurs
ETTINGER David du CERAS david.ettinger@enpc.fr
122 Optimal unemployment benefits and non-linear income taxation in a matching model with wagebargaining
AuteursLEHMANN Etienne du EUREQUA lehmann@univ-paris1,frVAN DER LINDEN Bruno du IRES vanderlinden@ires.ucl.ac.be
123 Arbitrage with incomplete markets and asymmetric information
Auteurs
CORNET Bernard du CERMSEM cornet@univ-paris1,frde BOISDEFFRE Lionel du University of Cambridge lionel,de,boisdeffre@wanadou.fr
124 Endogenous population and environmental qualityAuteurs
NGUYEN Van Phu du BETA-THEME nvphu@cournot.u-strasbg.fr
125 Efficicency , equilibrium, and core of an exchange economy with bads and infinitely manyAuteurs
HARA Chiaki du University of Cambridge ch201@econ.cam.ac.uk
127 Strategic power revisitedAuteurs
WIDGREN Mika du Turku School of mika.widgren@tukkk.fi
128 Lobbying and rent-seeking for public goods in a fiscally centralized system Political Economy
Auteurs
CHEIKBOSSIAN Guillaume du GREMAQ guillaume.cheikbossian@univ-tlse1.fr
129 An ascending vickrey auction for heterogeneous objectsAuteurs
SCHUMMER James du Kellogg School of schummer@nwu.edu
130 Voluntary matching grands
Auteurs
HINDRIKS Jean du CORE hindriks@pops1.core.ucl.ac.be
131 Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening
Auteurs
SHAPIRO Joel du Universitat Pompeu joel.shapiro@econ.upf.es
132 Two cheers for the EITC
Auteurs
BECKMANN Klaus du Universität Passau beckmann@public-economics.co
133 On optimal redistributive capital taxationAuteurs
REINHORN Leslie du University of Durham reinhorn@hotmail.com
134 Efficiency management of product durability and recyclability under utilitarian and chichilniskypreferences
AuteursRUNKEL Marco du University of Munich marco.runkel@lrz.uni-muenchen.
de
135 Does centralization affect the number and size of lobbies ?
Political Economy
Auteurs
REDOANO Michaela du University of Warwick ecrfu@dredd.csv.warwick.ac.uk
136 Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity Matching
Auteurs
BURANI Nadia du Universitad Carlos III de nburani@eco.uc3m.es
137 On the effects of dynamic horizontal mergers
Auteurs
BENCHEKROUN Hassan du University of Florida benchekr@fau.edu
138 Bargaining power in stationaly parallelogram games Game Theory
Auteurs
KIBRIS Ozgür du University of Illinois ozgur@sabanciuniv.eduTAUB Bart du University of Illinois
139 Non-Welfarist Approaches to Inequality Measurement
Auteurs
CHATEAUNEUF Alain du CERMSEM chateaun@univ-paris1,frMOYES Patrick du Université Montesquieu - moyes@montesquieu.u-bordeaux
141 Evolutionary rent seeking
Auteurs
POSSAJENNIKOV Alex du Universität Mannheim possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.
142 Optimal taxation to form altruistic preferences in an economy with public goods
Auteurs
PEREZ-MARTI Felipe du I.E.S.A. felipe.perez@iesa.edu.ve
143 Human capital and competition effect
Matching
Auteurs
L'HOIR Mathieu du TEAM lhoir@univ-paris1.fr
144 Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion
Auteurs
BORCK Rainald du kpmg Rborck@kpmg.com
145 On the optimal timing of implicit social security taxes over the life cycle
Auteurs
WERDING Martin du CESifo werding@ifo.de
146 Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries Tax Competition
Auteurs
van YPERSELE Tanguy du CORE-UCL tanguy@fundp.ac.be
147 A dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking
Auteurs
SADIRAJ Vjollca du CREED vjollca@fee.uva.nl
148 Contests over public goods : evolutionary stability and the free-rider problem
Auteurs
LEININGER Wolfgang du University of Dortmund mik-wole@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
149 Quantifying the impact of immigration on the spanish welfare state
Auteurs
COLLADO Dolores du Universidad de Alicante collado@merlin.fae.ua.esVALERA BLANES Quadalupe du Universidad Pablo de gvalbla@dee.upo.es
150 Independant authorities : the reasons for their existence within a political economy context
Auteurs
RIZZO Ilde du Università di Catania rizzor@mbox.unict.it
151 Taxation policy in a duopoly vertically differentiated in environnmental quality
Auteurs
LOMBARDINI-RIIPINE Chiara du FPPE chiara.lombardini-riipinen@helsinki.fi
152 Network formation and coordination : bargaining the division of link costs
Auteurs
MELENDEZ-JIMENEZ Miguel A. du Universidad de Alicante melendez@merlin.fae.ua.es
153 Stategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries
Auteurs
POUYET Jérôme du CERAS pouyet@enpc.fr
156 Why joining a common market ? The politicial economy of international factor mobility in amulti-country setting
AuteursFACCHINI Giovanni du University of Illinois facchini@uiuc.edu
157 Partial privatization and firm performance : Evidence from India
Auteurs
GUPTA Nandini du University of Michigan nandinig@umich.edu
159 Tax competition in a European-Style fiscal union with decentralized leadership
Tax Competition
Auteurs
KOTHENBURGER Marko du University of Munich mkoethen@ces.vwl.uni-muenchen.de
160 Achievement vs. Aptitude : the incentive-screening tradeoff in Colle admissions
Auteurs
HARBAUGH Rick du Claremont McKenna rick.harbaugh@claremontmckenna.edu
162 Technological path dependence of institutions : the case of property rights as a unique solution insupergames with payoffs shocks
Game Theory
AuteursNIEVA Ricardo du University of Minnesota rnieva@binghamton.edu
163 Optimality of a welfare system with heterogeneous preferences and endogenous stigma
Auteurs
JACQUET Laurence du IRES jacquet@ires.ucl.ac.be
164 Monitoring and privacy : when private information is a public good
Publics Goods
Auteurs
DODDS Stefan du Queen's University doddss@qed.econ.queensu.ca
165 Poverty, inequality and private sector participation in developing infrastructureAuteurs
KHITARISHVILI Tamar du University of Minnesota khit0001@tc.umn.edu
166 Determinants of public spending in developing countries. Evidence from countries of the M.E.N.A.region
AuteursBASSI Sonia du LAEP bassi@univ-paris1.fr
167 Short-term vs. Long term delegation contracts in repeated trust games
Game Theory
Auteurs
MERZONI Guido du ISEIS merzoni@mi.unicatt.it
168 The organisation of organ transplants : a spatial approachAuteurs
ZANOLA Roberto du University of Easter zanola@al.unipmn.it
169 Does more health care lead to more social security ?Auteurs
GALASSO Vincenzo du Università Bocconi vincenzo.galasso@uni-bocconi.it
170 On the optimality of joint taxation with household productionAuteurs
JACOBSEN KLEVEN Henrik du University of Heinrik.Kleven@econ.ku.dk
172 Fiscal policy, economic integration and unemploymentAuteurs
EGGERT Wolfgang du University of Wolfgang.Eggert@uni-konstanz.d
173 Auction design without commitment
Auteurs
VARTIAINEN Hannu du Yrjö Jahnsson Foundationhannu.vartiainen@yjs.fi
174 The Looting Auteurs
CAMPOS Nauro F. du University of Newcastle n.f. campos@ncl.ac.uk
175 Election on retirement age
Auteurs
LACOMBA Juan Antonio du University of Granada jlacomba@ugr.es
176 Efficiency in the degree of compromise : a new axiom for social choiceAuteurs
OZKAL-SANVER Ipek du Istanbul Bilgi University isanver@bilgi.edu.tr
177 Electoral Goals and Centre-StateTransfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India
AuteursBUENROSTRO Lucia du University of Warwick L.Buenrostro@warwick.ac.uk
178 Yardstick competition and political agency problemsAuteurs
HINDRIKS Jean du CORE hindriks@pops1.core.ucl.ac.be
179 Financial wealth of households and activities of the european financial intermediairiesAuteurs
BOUTILLIER Michel du MODEM mic.bou@wanadoo.fr
180 Social insurance and redistribution with moral hazard and adverse selectionAuteurs
MARCHAND Maurice du University of Warwick mmarchand@core.ucl.ac.be
181 The one object optimal auction and the desirability of exclusionAuteurs
KLINGER MONTEIRO Paulo du EPGE/FGV PKLM@fgv.br
182 Unique cores in general matching Matching
Auteurs
PAPAI Szilvia du Mendoza College of spapai@nd.edu
183 Capital tax competition and strategic firms
Auteurs
CUFF Katherine du Mc Master University cuffk@mcmail.cis.mcmaster.ca
184 An analysis of the effects of technology licensing on trade policyAuteurs
SAHA Souresh du National University of ecsss@nus.edu.sg
185 A dynamic resource management problemAuteurs
MEINHARDT Holger du University of Karsruhe hme@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de
186 Gradualism in tax treaties with irreversible foreign direct investment
Auteurs
DAVIES Ron du University of Oregon rdavies@oregon.uoregon.edu
187 Globalization and tax policy
Auteurs
NEUMANN Rebecca du University of Wisconsin - rneumann@csd.uwm.edu
188 Hidden information problems in the design off amily allowances
Auteurs
LUPORINI Annalisa du Università di Trieste annalisa.luporini@econ.trieste.it
190 Exclusion and cooperation in social network experimentsAuteurs
RIEDL Arno du CREED riedl@fee.uva.nl
191 Is targeted tax competition less harmful than its remedies ?Auteurs
JANEBA Eckhard du University of Colorado Eckhard.Janeba@Colorado.EDU
192 Tax enforcement for heterogeneous firmsAuteurs
VASIN Alexander du Moscow State University vasin@cs,msu,suVASINA Polina du Moscow State University
193 Could do better : the effectiveness of incentives for schoolsAuteurs
DE FRAJA Gianni du York University gd4@york.ac.uk
195 Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rulesAuteurs
ERDEM Orhan du Boiaziçi University oerdem@bilgi.edu.tr
198 Forming stable coalitions : the process matters
Auteurs
KILGOUR Marc du Wilfrid Laurier mkilgour@wlu.ca
199 Small states, large unitary states, and federationsAuteurs
WREDE Matthias du Aachen University of matthias.wrede@sowi.uni-bamberg.de
200 The majority rule is the maximally decisive member of the family of anonymous, neutral, paretooptimal and weakly monotonic aggregation rules
AuteursASAN Göksel du Istanbul Bilgi University gasan@bilgi.edu.tr
201 Comparison of urban equilibria : the conflict between efficiency and equity in the choice of thecentral city's majority
AuteursDE BARTOLOME Charles A.M. du University of Colorado debartol@spot.colorado.edu
202 Local provision of education with opting-out the role of housing marketsAuteurs
MARTINEZ MORA Francisco du University of Granada fmmora@ugr.es
203 Existence and characterization of Markovian equilibrium in infinite horizon models with manyagents and public policy
AuteursDATTA Manjira du Arizona State UniversityREFFETT Kevin du Arizona State University kevin.reffett@asu.edu
204 Efficiency of policy choice and political auctionAuteurs
UENG Shyh-Fang du Academia Sinica us21@gate.sinica.edu.tw
205 Equalization and tax competition : theory and evidence
Auteurs
RIZZO Leonzio du STICERD l.rizzo@lse.ac.uk
206 Informational neighborhood effects and the organization of the city
Auteurs
MOIZEAU Fabien du EUREQUA fmoizeau@univ-paris1,fr
207 Search and taxation in a model of underground economicAuteurs
BALESTRINO Alessandro du University of Pisa and
208 Can private giving promote economic segregationAuteurs
SLIVINSKI Al du University of Western
209 Formation of buyer-seller trade networks in a quality-differentiated product marketAuteurs
WANG Ping du Vanderbit University ping.wang@vanderbilt.eduWATTS Alison du Southern Illinois wattsa@siu.edu
210 Monk business : an example of the dynamics of organizationsAuteurs
CORCHON Luis C. du Universitad Carlos III de lcorchon@eco.uc3m.es
211 Strongly stable networksAuteurs
van den NOUWELAND Anne du University of Oregon annev@oregon.uoregon.edu
212 Regulation under financial constraintsAuteurs
GAUTIER Axel du Universität Bonn Axel.Gautier@wiwi.uni-bonn.de
214 "Regional constitution" and environmental risksAuteurs
CALLENS Stéphane du Université de Brest Callens@univ-brest.fr
215 The inefficiency of firm-augmenting public input vs. The inapplicability of provision rules
Auteurs
COLOMBIER Carsten du Federal Department of carstenco@web.de
216 Privately contributing to public goods over time - an experimental study -Auteurs
LEVATI Maria Vittoria du Max-Planck Institute levati@mpiew-jena.mpg.de
217 In search for yardstick competition : property tax rates and electoral behavior in italian cities Public Goods Floriana Cerniglia, Federico Revelli
Auteurs
BORDIGNON Massimo du CESifo mbordig@mi.unicatt.it
218 The optimal supply of public goods and distortionary taxes Public Goods
Auteurs
JONES Chris du The Australian National chrismjones@ozemail.com.au
219 Rivalry, Exclusion and CoalitionsAuteurs
SANCHEZ-PAGES Santiago du Universitat Autonoma de ssanchez@idea.uab.es
220 Net public goodsAuteurs
CAVE Jonathan du University of Warwick cave@rand.org
221 Substitulability of capital, investment costs, and foreign aidAuteurs
TURNOVSKY Stephen J. du University of Washington sturn@u.washington.edu
222 Privatization in a regulated market, open to foreign competitionAuteurs
SEPAHVAND Mehrdad du University of Nottingham lexms2@nottingham.ac.uk
223 On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competion with policy-motivated candidatesAuteurs
CASAMATTA Georges du GREMAQ georges.casamatta@univ-tlse1.fr
224 Auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector
Auteurs
FEARON Gervan du York University
225 A positive theory of the convergence to low inflation ratesAuteurs
d'ARTIGUES Agnès du CREDEN ada@sceco.univ-montp1.frVIGNOLO Thierry du LAMETA vignolo@lameta.univ-montp1.fr
226 Productive education or a marketable degree ?Auteurs
CAMERA Gabriele du Purdue University Gcamera@mgmt.purdue.edu
227 Optimal taxation and imperfect labor marketAuteurs
HARITON Cyril du GREMAQPIASER Gwenaël du CORE-UCL gwenael.piaser@online.fr
228 Voluntary contribution to a public good : strategic learning of boundedly rational agentsAuteurs
CLEMENS Christiane du University of Hannover clemens@vwl.uni-hannover.de
229 Anarchy, State, Paretopia : demand for the Nozickian minimal state
Auteurs
RUBINCIK-PESSACH Anna du University of Colorado Anna.Rubincik@colorado.edu
230 A principal-agent building block for the study of decentralization and integrationAuteurs
WEINSCHELBAUM Federico du CEDI fweinsch@udesa.edu.ar
231 Optimal audit policy and heterogenous agents
Auteurs
RATTO Marisa du University of Bristol M.L.Ratto@bristol.ac.ukVERGE Thibaud du University of Bristol
232 Substitutes? Complements and equilibrium in two-sided market models Matching
Auteurs
KOSHEVOY Gleb du Universitaet zu Koeln Gleb.koshevoy@uni-koeln.de
234 Why public plans have taken on more risk than private plans ?OrThe mischief of the exclusive benefit rule
AuteursARONSON Richard du Lehig UniversityDEARDEN James A. du Lehig University jad8@lehigh.edu
236 Legislative bargaining under weighted votingAuteurs
SNYDER James M du Massachusetts Institute of millett@MIT.EDU
237 Optimization of investment decision processes
Auteurs
PICKL Stefan du Z.A.I.K. pickl@zpr.uni-koeln.de
238 Threshold incomes public goods and pareto improving free riding conditions
Public Goods
Auteurs
RYAN M.J. du hullM.J.Ryan@hull.ac.uk
239 The avoidable excess burden of broad-based U.S. taxesAuteurs
TIDEMAN Nicolaus du Virginia Tech ntideman@vt.edu
240 Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation
Auteurs
JESKE Karsten du Federal Reserve Bank of karsten.jeske@atl.frb.org
241 Campaign contribution with swing votersAuteurs
DIX Manfred du Tulane University mdix@tulane.edu
243 Intra-national labour market adjustment in the CEE : some stylised factsAuteurs
HUBER Peter du Austrian Institute for huber@wifo.ac.at
244 Optimum Currency area theory and correlation of shocks between the accession-candidate countries and the EMU
AuteursHORVATH Julius du Central European
245 On the way of EMU enlargement towards CEECs : what is the appropriate exchange rate regime ?Auteurs
MAUREL Mathilde du ROSES maurelm@univ-paris1.fr
246 Does EU enlarged towards Eastern countries constitute and OCA (Optimal Currency Area) ?Auteurs
MAUREL Mathilde du ROSES maurelm@univ-paris1.fr
247 EU enlargement and industrial relocation within the CEECsAuteurs
CROZET Mathieu du TEAM crozet@univ-paris1.frKOENIG-SOUBEYRAN Pamina du CREST pks@ensae.fr
248 How different is Eastern Europe ? Structure adn determinants of location choices by French firmsin Eastern and Western Europe
AuteursDISDIER Anne-Célia du TEAM adisdier@univ-paris1,frMAYER Thierry du TEAM tmayer@univ-paris1,fr
250 The puzzle of rising regional disparities and falling migration rates during transition
Auteurs
HUBER Peter du Austrian Institute for huber@wifo.ac.at
251 Optimal taxation in a Growth model <ith public capital stock and adjustment costsAuteurs
CHEN Ben-Lon du Academia Sinica bchen@ieas.econ.sinica.edu.yw
252 Management competition as an incentive mechanism in supply relationsAuteurs
SUZUKI Yukata du Stanford University yusuzuki@stanford.edu
254 Rationalizability for social environments Game Theory
Auteurs
VANNETELBOSCH Vincent du IRES vannetelbosch@ires.ucl.ac.be
255 Ensuring quality provision in deregulated industriesAuteurs
WAUTHY X.Y. du CEREC - CORE xwauthy@fusl.ac.be
256 Corruption and the size of the public sector with renegotiation-proof delegation of public outputAuteurs
DHAMI Sanjit du University of Newcastle Sanjit.Dhami@ncl.ac.uk
257 Political uncertainty and policy innovationAuteurs
SCHWAGER Robert du Universität Mannheim schwager@zew.de
259 Welfare transfers and Intra-Household Trickle-Down : a model with evidence from the US FoodStamp Program
AuteursBREUNIG Robert du The Australian National Robert.Breunig@anu.edu.au
260 The distributional impact of subsidies to higher education - empirical evidence from GermanyAuteurs
BARBARO Salvatore du University of Goettingen sbarbar@uni-goettingen.de
261 Does altruism affect the optimal fiscal policy ?Auteurs
SANCHEZ-LOSADA Fernando du CREB fersan@eco.ub.es
262 The impact of grants on electoral outcomeAuteurs
RIZZO Leonzio du STICERD l.rizzo@lse.ac.uk
266 Quality of knowledge technology, returns to production technology and economic developmentAuteurs
LE VAN Cuong du CERMSEM levan@univ-paris1,fr
267 Existence of a competitive equilibrium in one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents andirreversible investment
AuteursLE VAN Cuong du CERMSEM levan@univ-paris1,frVAILAKIS Yiannis du IRES vailakis@ires.ucl.ac.be
268 Analyzing the take-up of means-tested benefits in FranceAuteurs
TERRACOL Antoine du TEAM Terracol@univ-paris1,fr
269 An application of "post-welfarist" theories of justice : an empirical comparison between theoreticalrights to compensaion and actual policy measuresagainst poverty
AuteursSOFER Catherine du TEAM catherine.sofer@univ-paris1.fr
270 Why cities should not be subsidizedAuteurs
FENGE Robert du CESifo fenge@ifo.de
272 Reciprocation and reinforcement learning model in the investment gameAuteurs
MEIDINGER Claude du TEAM Claude.Meidinger@univ-paris1,fr
273 Optimal selling mechanisms with costly information acquisitionAuteurs
CREMER Jacques du IDEI - GREMAQ jacques@cremeronline.com
275 Fat and HappyAuteurs
BEDNAREK Heather du St Louis University bednarhl@slu.edu
276 Polish households between transition and informal marketsAuteurs
GARDES François du CREST-LSM gardes@ensai.fr
278 Why people obey the lawAuteurs
TYRAN Jean-Robert du University of St Gallen Jean-Robert.Tyran@unisg.ch
279 Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteriesAuteurs
BRANDTS Jordi du CSIC brandts@cc.uab.es
281 Competion in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investmentAuteurs
DAVIES Ron du University of Oregon rdavies@oregon.uoregon.eduELLIS Christopher du University of Oregon
282 Equilibrium comparisons and welfare theorems when goods are normalAuteurs
QUAH John K-H du St Hugh's College john.quah@economics.ox.ac.uk
285 Can a cleaner environment be good for businessAuteurs
FUNG K.C. du University of California, kcfunf@cats.ucsc.edu
287 Endogenously Excludable Goods
Auteurs
KOLMAR Martin du University of Konstanz Martin.kolmar@uni-konstanz.de
288 Workfare in an efficiency wage modelAuteurs
MEIER Volker du CESifo meier@ifo.de
289 Price Dynamics and Shake-Outs in Electronic MarketsAuteurs
PEREIRA Pedro du Universitad Carlos III de ppereira@eco.uc3m.es
290 Unbundling the local loop time dependent rental path
Auteurs
DOGAN Paul du GREMAQ pinar.dogan@univ-tlse.fr
291 National Emergency, security Spending, and GrowthAuteurs
IHORI Toshihiro du University of Tokyo ihori@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
292 Incomplete interregional risk-sharing with complete maketsAuteurs
CONDE-RUIZ J. Ignacio du Università Bocconi iconderuiz@pop.uni-bocconi.it
293 Rejecting small gambles under expected utilityAuteurs
PALACIOS-HUERTA Ignacio du Brown University ipalacios@brown.edu
296 Influence costs in the provision of local public goods
Auteurs
BESHAROV Gregory du Duke University besharov@econ.duke.edu
297 Citizen candidacy with asymmetric informationAuteurs
CASAMATTA Georges du GREMAQ georges.casamatta@univ-tlse1.fr
298 Commodity taxation with non-linear pricing oligopolyAuteurs
BOLDRON François du CORE-UCL boldron@core.ucl.ac.be
299 Corruption and auctionsAuteurs
MENEZES Flavio M. du EPGE/FGV flavio.menezes@fgv.br
300 Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilitiesAuteurs
LESCOP Denis du CRESE dnlescop@aol.com
301 Tax competition revisitedAuteurs
BEN ZISSIMOS du University of Warwick
302 PAPER2 NOT YET RECEIVEDAuteurs
BEN CARTWRIGHT du University of Warwick
303 paper not yet received
Auteurs
GAUMONT Damien du University of California,
304 Training, Health cares and Economic Growth :
Liem Hoang-Ngoc (MATISSE, U. Paris1), Pascal Gourdel(CERMSEM, U. Paris 1),Cuong Le Van (CERMSEM,
U. Paris 1), Tédié Mazamba (U. Paris 2).
305 Demography, Retirement and Social SecurityAuteurs
PROFETA Paola du Università Bocconi pprofeta@pop.uni-bocconi.it
306 Pollution abatement investment when environmental regulation is uncertainAuteurs
FARZIN Y.H. du University of California, farzin@primal.ucdavis.edu
307 Existence of Social Ordering Functions which Embody Procedural Values and Consequential
Auteurs
YOSHIHARA Naoki du Hitotsubashi University yosihara@ier.hit-u.ac.jp
308 Intergenerational conflicts and the minimum wage
WIGNIOLLES Bertrand EUREQua wignioll@univ-paris1.frDECREUSE Bruno EUREQua decreuse@univ-paris1.fr
309 Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Distribution with an Endogenous Rate of Interest
CHAKRABORTY Archishman Baruch College acf3320@baruch.cuny.eduCITANNA Alessandro HEC Paris-Jouy-en-Josas citanna@hec.fr
310 Price bid and capacity choice in Electricity markets
CRETI Anna IDEI-CEA creti@aurore.cict.frCRAMPES Claude GREMAQ-IDEI crampes@cict.fr
311 Energy and Environnmental policy : strategic issues for the tax system
CRETI AnnaVILLENEUVE Bertrand CEA-IDEI-LEERNA
312 How to hire civil servants ? a Trade-off between wages and employment
BACACHE Maya ENS-Ulm-EUREQuq maya.bacache@ens.fr
313 The core in the presence of externalities
KOCZY Laszlo A. Katholieke Universiteit Leuvenlaszlo.koczy@econ.kuleuven.ac.be
314 Market structure, scale economies and industry performance
AMIR Rabah University of Manchester rabah.amir@man.ac.uk
315 Overlapping generations with incomplete market: The numeraire case
Seghir Abdelkrim CERMSEM Paris 1 seghir@univ-paris1.fr
316 Intergenerational conflicts and the minimum wage
WIGNIOLLES Bertrand EUREQua wignioll@univ-paris1.frDECREUSE Bruno EUREQua decreuse@univ-paris1.fr
317 Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Distribution with an Endogenous Rate of Interest
CHAKRABORTY Archishman Baruch College acf3320@baruch.cuny.eduCITANNA Alessandro HEC Paris-Jouy-en-Josas citanna@hec.fr
318 Price bid and capacity choice in Electricity markets
CRETI Anna IDEI-CEA creti@aurore.cict.frCRAMPES Claude GREMAQ-IDEI crampes@cict.fr
319 Energy and Environnmental policy : strategic issues for the tax system
CRETI AnnaVILLENEUVE Bertrand CEA-IDEI-LEERNA
320 How to hire civil servants ? a Trade-off between wages and employment
BACACHE Maya ENS-Ulm-EUREQuq maya.bacache@ens.fr
321 The core in the presence of externalities
KOCZY Laszlo A. Katholieke Universiteit Leuvenlaszlo.koczy@econ.kuleuven.ac.be
322 Intergenerational conflicts and the minimum wage
WIGNIOLLES Bertrand EUREQua wignioll@univ-paris1.frDECREUSE Bruno EUREQua decreuse@univ-paris1.fr
323 Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Distribution with an Endogenous Rate of Interest
CHAKRABORTY Archishman Baruch College acf3320@baruch.cuny.eduCITANNA Alessandro HEC Paris-Jouy-en-Josas citanna@hec.fr
324 Price bid and capacity choice in Electricity markets
CRETI Anna IDEI-CEA creti@aurore.cict.frCRAMPES Claude GREMAQ-IDEI crampes@cict.fr
325 Energy and Environnmental policy : strategic issues for the tax system
CRETI AnnaVILLENEUVE Bertrand CEA-IDEI-LEERNA
326 How to hire civil servants ? a Trade-off between wages and employment
BACACHE Maya ENS-Ulm-EUREQuq maya.bacache@ens.fr
327 The core in the presence of externalities
KOCZY Laszlo A. Katholieke Universiteit Leuvenlaszlo.koczy@econ.kuleuven.ac.be
328 Market Structure, scale economies and industry performance
AMIR Rabah University of Manchester rabah.amir@man.ac.uk
329 Overlapping generations with incomplete market: The numeraire case
Seghir Abdelkrim CERMSEM Paris 1 seghir@univ-paris1.fr
330 Storable Votes; Initial Experimental Results
CASSEL Alessandra, Columbia University ac186@columbia.edu PALFREY Tom, Calfornia Institute of Techology GELMAN Andrew, Dept of Statistics, Columbia)
331 The wealth effect in the new growth regime
PLIHON Dominique Centre d’Economie de Paris Nord (CEPN) Université Paris Nord TALEB Nacéra
332 Firm investment and monetary policy transmission in the Euro Area
Jean-Bernard Chatelain (Banque de France), Andrea Generale (Bank of Italy)
Ignacio Hernando (Bank of Spain), Ulf von Kalckreuth (Bank of Germany)
Philip Vermuelen (European Central Bank)
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