Language and Significance in Hume's Treatise

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Language and Significance in Hume's TreatiseAuthor(s): Páll S. ÁrdalSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 779-783Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231503 .

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THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume 16, Number 4, December 1986, pp. 779-784

Language and Significance in Hume's Treatise

pAll s. Ardal Queen's University Kingston, Ontario Canada K7L 3N6

In his highly interesting 'Hume's Criterion of Significance,'1 Michael Williams makes some references to my paper 'Convention and Value.' He writes that I am 'on to something important,' but, although he claims that my conclusion is not modest enough, he fails to make clear what modesty requires. As a result, our interpretations may seem fur- ther apart than they really are. I shall attempt to draw attention to some of our agreements and differences.

Williams strongly suggests that I think that Hume, in the chapter 'Of Abstract Ideas' was primarily interested in language and only secon- darily in ideas. This is not so, for I contend that 'Hume, in this part of the Treatise, is simply not concerned with the problem of communi- cation and the social significance of language. It is the possibility of

1 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1985) 273-304

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general or abstract thoughts that he here wants to explain/2 What I wanted to stress was that Hume's views about the place of language in human life could not be understood without paying attention to the analogy Hume draws between property and meaning, and the emer- gence of artificial virtues from conventionally established human prac- tices. This view is very different from the notion that the meanings of words are private mental images and I wanted to draw attention to the fact that that view is in fact rejected by Hume in his discussion of abstract ideas in Book 1. I did not deny, but rather stressed, that images could be used in thinking general thoughts, although all im- ages are of particulars. But it must not be forgotten that Hume thought particular words could come to be responded to with understanding without particular non-verbal mental images intervening. Hume says

... in talking of government, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are com-

posed. It is however observable, that notwithstanding this imperfection we

may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects, and may perceive any repug- nance among the ideas, as well as if we had full comprehension of them. Thus if instead of saying that in war the weaker always have recourse to negotia- tion, we should say that they have always recourse to conquest, the custom which we have acquired of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposi- tion; in the same manner as one particular idea may serve us in reasoning concerning other ideas however different from it in several circumstances. (Treatise 23) 3

I completely agree with Williams that Hume thought abstract ideas impossible and that all ideas are of particulars. But, although I agree that Hume's main concern, in the discussion of abstract ideas in Book 1, is the possibility of abstract thought, the people whom I was criticis- ing attribute to Hume a theory of the meaning of words that makes ideas the meanings of words. Since ideas are taken to be images, and images are private, the meanings of words are private and communi- cation by the use of language is impossible. But Hume does not state this view in 'Of Abstract Ideas/ for he there maintains that we can think

2 'Convention and Value' in David Hume: Bicentenary Papers, ed. G.P. Morice, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1977)

3 A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Second Edi- tion with text revised and notes by P.H. Niddich, Oxford 1978

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Language and Significance in Hume's Treatise

two different thoughts by the use of the same image. The image of a figure with 999 sides is indistinguishable from the image of a figure with 1000 sides. The meaning is clearly distinguishable and different. The image of the same particular can be used to think about an in- dividual, such as a particular dog, a spaniel and the genus dog. We know that the meaning of 'Jasper,' 'spaniel' and 'dog' are different. I concluded that the different meanings were determined by the differ- ent acquired tendencies to correct yourself associated with the differ- ent terms. Hume thinks in general we do this by activating a potential for calling forth images that exist in power only. My conclusion was that Hume did not hold the view that the meanings of words are mental images.

Williams thinks I should have reached a more modest conclusion than the one I did reach. But when he articulates his own interpreta- tion he finds that general thoughts are particular ideas that have gained the power of calling up a range of relevant particular ideas. The re- strictions determining relevance are the different words. Williams finds this conclusion unpalatable because it seems that words come to de- termine the meaning of ideas and not the ideas that determine the meaning of words. It does not seem to me absurd at all that words come 'to replace ideas as the primary vehicles of thought' (Williams, 303). The quotation from Hume above points in that direction and, in

any case, the fact that a view is unacceptable does not entail that Hume did not accept it. I, it appears, should not have concluded that mean- ings are not ideas, but only that there is a tension in Hume's thought, because Hume, according to Williams, maintained that to be meaning- ful words must answer to ideas. What is it for general terms to answer to ideas of particulars? If you are giving an account of general thoughts you can perhaps dispense with reference to publicly observable sounds and scribblings. But the function of language in our social life demands a public vehicle without which communication is impossible.

It is perhaps not out of place to quote here the very last words of

my Passion and Value. Like Williams I consider it a distortion of Hume's views to claim that his main concern is with language, in the manner of logical positivism of this century.

Hume's sentimentalist account of thinking fits in well with his associationist scheme when this is applied to the explanation of our use of language. But in attributing Emotivism to Hume, one is not directly interpreting his words, but rather considering what position would be most in conformity with other

aspects of his philosophy. For Hume does not give us, in the Treatise, a the-

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ory of moral language but an account of the nature and origin of evalua- tions. If Ethics is defined as the analysis of moral discourse, Hume's Treatise does not contain much in the way of Ethics. What it does contain is an ac- count of the way in which virtue and vice have their source in human emotions.4

Williams attacks the notion that Hume's account is foundationalist. Although I do not use the term, this is precisely my main quarrel with standard interpretations of Hume. Hume was indeed a naturalist, but it does not follow that no justification is possible of such fundamental beliefs as the belief in a continuously existing world of objects. The beliefs that are based upon general features of human nature are suc- cessful. On reflection we approve of people for holding these beliefs. Naturalism is not the only alternative to foundationalism. There is also pragmatism. Our basic beliefs are unfounded in the sense that they are not based upon evidence, but go beyond it. But this does not mean, as Williams seems to think, that only causal explanations are in order, that evaluations are not possible. The following quotation from Wil- liam's paper shows him moving closer to my interpretation. 'Hume's science of the understanding will distinguish between "the principles which are permanent, irresistible and universal" and those which are "changeable weak and irregular" (Treatise 225). Common sense and good science can be traced to the former, the speculative views Hume disapproves of to the latter. In this way Hume's naturalism acquires a critical edge' (Williams 280). The criterion is perhaps not so much gener- al consensus as approval on reflection. There is not space to go here into this highly controversial issue, but it should be noted that value judgments have to be brought into the picture.

I have no quarrel at all with the view that Hume thought we use ideas of particulars to think general thoughts because abstract ideas are impossible. But more prominence could be given to the fact that Hume attributes to ideas characteristics of physical objects rather than our impressions of such objects. A house must be of determinate character, but it is not so clear that my sense impressions of the house share this determinateness. I must forbear discussion of this and many

4 Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univer- sity Press 1966) 212

5 My italics

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Language and Significance in Hume's Treatise

other interesting points in Williams's paper. It deserves to be carefully studied.

Finally, a mention of a minor point and some that may be of great- er consequence. Williams stresses that Hume calls Berkeley a great philosopher, but Hume also says that his views carry no conviction, although they admit of no refutation. My Hume is not quite as close to Berkeley as Williams's Hume. We agree on the major points that Hume in Book 1 of the Treatise is not concerned to state a theory of the meaning of language. I advisedly talk about the place Hume gives to language rather than his theory of meaning. Like Williams, I am not sold on the idea that Hume had such a theory. Although I am con- vinced that Hume's analogy between property and meaning is both interesting and important I have to admit that I may have given the impression that Hume had a more detailed theory worked out than the text justifies. The analogy between meaning and property is clear- ly there, but Hume might not have found himself in total agreement with my way of working out the implications of his suggestions. But, as I see it, judgments of virtue are taken by Hume to be passions. These are not based upon evidence and are in this sense groundless. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable and this can be understood when we bear in mind what Hume says about Reason, improperly so called, that it is nothing but a certain calm passion.

Williams helps us to see clearly the difference between giving an account of the way in which we manage to think abstract thoughts although all ideas are of particulars, and the account to be given of the place of language in social life. To understand the latter one must look at Book 3 of the Treatise. But there are no references to Books 2 and 3 in Williams's paper, and this may be responsible for his strange claim that Hume was inclined to consider talk about the self as unin- telligible. This is unfortunate, for it would, I think, strengthen Wil- liams's position to stress that, although Hume denies the intelligibility of the self as a sinple substance, the account of the passions is impos- sible without presuming an impression of oneself as an agent with desires, needs and passions.

The analogy that Hume draws between the origin of language and that of property suggests that he was not totally disinterested in lan- guage. But much more important is the fact that the analogy is im- aginative and interesting and, as a consequence, deserving of attention from philosophers.

Received August, 1985

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