View
219
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
1/100
Air PowerThe Agile Air ForceEdited by Neville Parton
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
2/100
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
3/100
Contents
Foreword Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy 5
Introduction Group Captain Neville Parton 7
DevelopingAgileAirmenAir Vice-Marshal Peter Dye 11
TheTheoryOfAgility Group Captain John Jupp 17
AgilityAHistoricalPerspective Mr Seb Cox 37
TheLuftwaffesAgility:AnassessmentofRelevantConceptsandPracticesDr Joel Hayward 45
PerspectiveoftheChiefofStaffoftheUnitedStatesAirForce
General T. Michael Moseley 55
AgilityinaSmallAirForceBrigader Morten H Lunde 67
AgilityintheLogisticsArenaAir Commodore Simon Bollom 75
ParadoxesandProblemsofAirpowerDr Phillip S. Meilinger 81
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
4/100
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
5/100
The Agile Air Force
Fwd by cAS
Agilityhasbecomesomethingofabuzz-wordinthedefencecommunity,andlikemanysuch
termsneedstobetreatedwithadegreeofcautioninorderforthephrasenottobecomeall
thingstoallmen.Thatwaspartoftherationalebehindmydecisiontofocusthe2006CASAir
PowerConferenceonthesubjectofagilitytotaketheopportunitytoexplorewhattheterm
reallymeansintermsofdevelopingatrulyagileAirForceforthe21stCentury.Ofcourse,being
agileisnothingnewforAirForces.FromtheverystarttheRoyalAirForcedemonstratedAir
Powersabilitytodelivereffectsrapidlytopartsofthebattlespacethatwerebeyondthereachof
eithertheRoyalNavyortheArmy.AirForceshavealsobeenveryquicktoharnesstechnology,
andadapttheirwaysofoperatingtosuitchangesinthesecurityenvironment;thishasbeen
particularly apparent in recent years, where capabilities designed for high intensity warghting
operationshavebeenadaptedtosuitthedemandsofthecounter-insurgencycampaignsbeingfought in Iraq andAfghanistan.This did not come aboutwithout considerable effort, and a
willingnesstolearnandexperiment,bothofwhicharekeyelementsintheagilityequation.
Theexploitationoftechnologyhasbeenat theheartofAirPowerdevelopmentoverthe
past 100 years but the greatest difculty, paradoxically, has not been in the development of
newtechnologies,butconceptualisinghowtheyshouldbeusedtomaximumeffect.Therefore,
whilsttechnologyoffersrealopportunitiesforwideningtheutilityofsystemsacrossarangeof
scenariosand,increasingly,providesscopeforgreaterincrementalcapabilityenhancement,itis
theagilityofourpeopleinthewaytheythinkandbehavethatsetstheframeworkforhow
weoperateourequipmentandexploitnewtechnology.Iseethisasthemainpurposeofour
AirPowerConferences.Toprovide-inconjunctionwithotheraspectsofourAirPowerandAir
WarfareeducationandtrainingtheenvironmentinwhichwecanthinkanddiscussAirPower
issues,inordertodevelopnewideasandconceptsforthefuture.
The papers contained in this publication, which cover the main areas discussed at the
Conference, do not dene absolutely what is meant by either agility or an agile air force. They
do,however,containsomethought-provokingideasthatIwouldcommendtoanyonewithan
interestindevelopingtheagilityoftheRoyalAirForce,whichis,ofcourse,oneofthekeytenets
oftheRoyalAirForceStrategy.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
6/100
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
7/100
cAS Air PoWer coNFereNce 2006 iNTroDUcTioN
gup captan Nv Patn
The2006CASAirPowerConference,asoutlinedintheForewordbyCAS,providedan
opportunityforsharedthinkinganddebateonwhatthetermagileairforceactuallymeansfor
theRoyalAirForceatthebeginningofthe21stCentury.Indeed,inthisregarditfollowedina
longlineofCASAirPowerConferences,which,fromtheverystart,haveenjoyedacommon
purposenamelytoassistindeveloping aspiritofintellectual rigour anddebatewithin the
RAF.Byprovidingaplatformwherepractitioners,theoreticiansandhistorianscouldpresentand
discussabroadrangeofairpowerrelatedtopicswithadegreeofrelevanthistoricalcontext,that
intenthasbeenachieved.Howeverasattendanceatsucheventsisalwayslimited,thispublication
is intended to allow those who were unable to benet rst hand from the presentations given
bythespeakers,andthereby,hopefully,toencouragethethinkinganddebatetocontinue.For
suchadocument,themainpurposeoftheintroductionistooutlinethecontentsofthepapers,thusallowingreaderstorapidlyidentifythoseareasofgreatestinteresttothem.Howeverit
alsoallowstheopportunitytoexplainwhyparticulartopicswerechosen,inordertoaddtothe
coherenceofthepieceasawhole.
Oneofthemain reasonsforchoosingthesubjectareaof agility forthe conferencewas
that,ifthereisasingleproblemthatisatpresentasgenerictomilitaryorganisationsasitisto
business, it isthebuzzwordbandwagon.Themoveto soundbitepoliticshasresulted inmuch
moreemphasisbeingplaceduponterminology,andinanumberofquartersunlessyouusethe
righttermsyouarelikelynottobetakenseriously.Termssuchasthecomprehensiveapproach,
ortheentirelexiconofeffects-basedelementsEBO,EBA,EBParefrequentlyusedwithout
anycommonconceptualframeworkandofcourse,inanumberofcases,whatworkswellasa
strategic level concept becomes much more difcult when it has to be turned into operational
oreventacticallevelrealities.Agilitycouldwithoutdoubtbeseenasoneofthoseterms,and
hence the aim of the conferencewas toprovide a numberofdifferent perspectiveson the
subjectofagility,lookingbothwithintheRAFandwithout,inordertoensureagreatercommon
understandingofwhatbeingapartofanagileairforcemeansforthosewhoservewithinthem.
That was the aim, and you will nd that the papers which follow explore a variety of the different
dimensions inherent in the term agility with considerable insight, thereby fullling the original
remitandallowingyoutoexplorethepresentersideasindetail.Itisworthnotingthatwiththeexceptionofthekeynoteaddress,almostallofthepaperswerepresentedinpairs,andhenceare
consideredinthesamemannerinthisreview.
Anappositeplacetostartis,ofcourse,withanappreciationofthefactthatinordertohave
an agile organisation you need to have agile people, and the rst two papers, on Developing Agile
Airmen, andThe Theory of Agility,byAir-ViceMarshalPeterDyeandGroupCaptainJohnJupp
respectively,providesomeusefulperspectivesonthisparticulararea.Theformerbroughtout
theimportanceofteachingpeoplehowtothinkratherthanwhatto think, and the difculty in
achievingtherightbalancebetweeneducationandtraining.Thelatterexploredvariousaspects
ofagility,rangingfromtheneedforemotionalintelligencetothecapacitytodealwithambiguity,
andthenprovidedanumberofcasestudiestodemonstratehowtheabilitytoimproviseand
innovatebothhallmarksofagilityareactuallybeingworkedoutwithintheService.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
8/100
However agility is very denitely not a new phenomenon within the RAF, as the paper by
SebCox,theHeadoftheAirHistoricalBranch,cogentlyillustrates.Hishistoricalanalysisof
theperiodfromtheformationoftheRFCandRNASthroughtotheendoftheSecondWorld
Warisrepletewithexamples,bothgoodandbad,andstronglymakesthecasethatitisnotjust
enoughtohaveagileindividualstheorganisationhastobeequallyresponsiveorproblemswill
arise.DrJoelHaywardexaminesanalternateperspective,lookingattheagilitythattheLuftwaffe
displayed in terms of supporting the German Army throughout the rst 4 years of World War
2.ItisclearthatmuchoftheoperationaladvantagethattheGermanArmyenjoyedthroughout
this period resulted fromtheway that the Luftwaffe could rapidlyadapt tomeet its needs,
andcertainlytherearelessonsherethatshouldnotbeforgotten.TogetherbothSebandJoels
organisationsarehelpingtheRAFtoreshapeitselfintermsofthrough-lifeeducationofallour
people,particularlywithregardtounderstandingourpast,aswellasourpresent,andhowto
derive from both of these lessons for the future essential if we are to produce warghters who
arewellmotivated,highlytrainedandaboveallagileakeystrategicpriority.
Aninterestingaspectofagilityisthatthereisnosuchthingasanaturallyagileairforce,and
certainly size is not a key indicator as is amply demonstrated by the next pair of papers. In the rst
theChiefofStaffoftheUSAF,GeneralMoseley,exploreswhatagilitymeansfromtheperspective
oftheworldslargestairforce.Mostoftheareasthatheconsidershavetremendousresonance
intermsofaspectsthattheRAFisalsoengagedinexamining,althoughthenagain,giventhelong
historyofmutualco-operationandclosesupport,perhapsthisisnotreallysosurprising.But
theemphasisondevelopingpeopleandleaningsystemsarequiteclearlyseenasfundamentalto
developingtheUSAFfortomorrow.Attheotherendofthespectrum,BrigaderLundefromthe
RoyalNorwegianAirForce(RNoAF)providesauniqueunderstandingofjusthowtheRNoAF
completelyreinventeditselfinthespaceof6years,anddespiteastrengthofonly1600personnel
inlightblueuniform,isabletoprovidedeployableairtransport,supporthelicopter,airdefence,
strike/attack,ground-basedairdefence,andcommandandcontrolelementsworld-wide.Healso
pointstoapossiblemodelforEuropeinthefuture,intheshapeoftheEPAFExpeditionaryAir
Wing (EEAW), which provides signicant agility by leveraging across national boundaries.
Howeveragility, as alreadypointedout, requiresmore than justa goodfront of house,
andAirCommodoreBollomspaperconsidersthepartthattheleanapproachhastoplayin
termsofincreasingagilitywithin thelogisticsarea.Thispresentsa strongdefenceforleaning,
andappositelypointsoutthatsimplyhavingfatina logisticssystemdoesnotequalresiliencewhatisimportantishavingthecapacitytodealwiththeunexpected.Theapplicationofthe
same approach to the procurement of modications also makes for interesting reading, and in
particularthepartthatthisapproachcanplayinmakingtheintroductionofnewcapabilitiesboth
quickerandmoreaffordable.ItishearteningtoknowthatDLOandDPAIPTsaremanaging
toproduceinnovativesupportarrangementsthatproducegreaterlevelsofavailabilityatthe
frontlineatlowercostandyetstillmanagetoprovideagilityintermsofmeetingoperational
demand.
The nal paper comes from the one of the best-known contemporary writers on air power,
intheshapeofUSAFColonel(retired)PhilMeilinger,whohasmemorablybeendescribedas
theClausewitzof theAir.Thisprovides,amongstotherelements,atimelyreminderofwhat
airpowerbringstothejointbattle,andespeciallythefactthatthisisnotafreegoodgaining
airsuperioritycostsandinourcase,asfortheUSAF,thatincludesconvincingdoubtersin
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
9/100
peacetimeoftheneedtospendtoensurecapabilitywhenitcomestowar.Italsoclearlypoints
totheneedformentalagilityonallourpartsifwearetocopewiththechangesinwarfarethat
areoccurring,andtobeabletounderstand,andmoreimportantlyexplain,someoftheparadoxes
thatairpowerpresents.Thisofcourseaccordswithanotherofourstrategicpriorities,thatof
improvingourabilitytoclearlyarticulatethecontributionthatairpoweringeneral,andtheRAF
inparticular,makestoUKdefence.
Takenasawhole,thesepapersprovideauniqueopportunitytoexploretheconceptof
agilityintermsofitsapplicationacrossthespectrumofairpower,andallofthemprovidefood
forthought.AsCAShasnotedinhisforeword,whilsttheydonotrepresenteitheracomplete
oruniqueviewofagilityinthisregard,theydorepresentausefulresourceforanyonewithan
interestinairpower.Andthisisoneoftheareasthatwedoneedtoconcentrateon,asevidenced
inanumberofthepapersenhancingourabilitytoexplainwhatairpoweris,anddoes,toa
broadrangeofaudiencesandperhapsmostcrucially,inlanguagethattheyunderstand.Being
abletodothiseffectivelywillcertainlyrequireaconsiderabledegreeofmentalagility,andthecontentsofthispublicationareintendedtoaidindevelopingthatparticularaspectenjoy!
GroupCaptainNevilleParton
DirectorofDefenceStudies(RoyalAirForce)
DefenceAcademy,Shrivenham,2007
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
10/100
10
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
11/100
oansatn
indvduacutu
F 1
11
DeVeloPiNg Agile AirMeN
A V-Masa Pt Dy
IntroductionThere is a temptation at conferences, focussed as they must be on a specic, topical theme,
todramatizeonesargumentsifnottocreateasenseofurgency.So,beforeIgoanyfurther,
IshouldmakeitclearthatIdonotbelieveweareatacross-roads,somehowcaughtbetween
thenon-agilepastandtheagilefuture.Infact,theRoyalAirForcehasalwaysbeenagileinthe
waythatitemployspeopleandinthewaythatindividualsrespondtochangeandtheunique
demandsofoperations.However,weliveinanincreasinglydynamicenvironmentwheretheonly
certainthingaboutthefutureisthattherewillbelesscertainty.Increasedagilitythereforewill
bethefoundationforcontinuedoperationalsuccess.But,howdoweachievethis-atboththe
corporateandindividuallevel?Myintentiontodayistosetthescene,toindicatewhereweareandhowwemightmeetthechallengeinthefuture.
Definitions (and some Questions)So, what denes the agile airman? Implicitly, you might expect me to include the characteristics
ofagilityinpeoplealertness,liveliness,suppleness,etc.Youwillnotbesurprised,therefore,to
nd I dene agility as the sum of the personal qualities that deliver: adaptability, robustness,
exibility and responsiveness. We can all visualise these characteristics, but, are these natural
(innate)orcantheybecreatedanddeveloped?Iftheycanbecreatedanddeveloped(whichafter
allismytopic),isthisbestachievedthroughhardcompetenciesoris itmoreaboutmindset,
aboutapproachandaboutattitude?Inshort,arewetalkingabouteducationratherthantraining?
But is it sufcient just to have agile individuals, in other words what needs to be in place to allow
anagileairmantoactinanagilefashiondowehavetheenablingstructuresandculture?In
factcanpeoplebeimplicitlyagilebutpreventedbystructuresfromexercisingthisagilityor
perhapsweshouldseektomakestructuresagile,inordertoallowthemtocarrythelessagile
amongstus?
Tohelpconceptualisetheseissues,Iofferthe
followingmodel(Fig 1)thatsuggeststhereare
3elementsinDevelopingtheAgileAirman:
I will return to this model in due course, but for the present it is sufcient to say that these
arenotdiscreteelementsandthatagilityarisesfromtheircomplexinteraction.
So where have we come from?Thisisnotintendedtobeadetailedhistoricalanalysis-afterall,youwillgetaprofessional
viewlaterthisafternoon.However,itcanbearguedthattheRAFwasatitsmostagileinthe
late1920swhenwewereofaroughlysimilarsize(35,000uniformedpersonnel).Trenchard
recognisedthathehad to invest for the future and provide solid foundations onwhich the
Servicecouldlaterbuild.Budgetarypressures,thejealousiesoftheotherServicesandthelackof
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
12/100
12
anovertmilitarythreattoUK,forcedTrenchardtobefrugalbutdidnotstophimbeingversatile
and opportunistic - placing key people inkey posts - and putting substantial resources into
trainingandeducation.Developingandsustainingastrongethos/espritwascentraltohisthinking.
ThelessonsIdrawfromthisarethatyouneedtoinvestforthefuture(inorganisation,culture
andtheindividual),avoidshort-termism,anddecideonyourvitalground.
TheRAFinWW2wasverylarge(over1millionstrong)whichwasinitselfatestament
tothesuccessofTrenchardsstrategy.TheRAF,andairpoweringeneral,wascrucialtoAllied
successonland,atseaandintheair-ineverytheatreofoperations.However,withexpansion
cameaverylargestaffandarguablyaprice-tagthatwasunaffordable.Infact,theRAFwassolarge
in1944thattheArmystartedtorunoutofmanpower.ThefurtherlessonsthatIdrawarethat
sizeprovidesanagilityallofitsown,resiliencecanbeassuredthroughredundancy,anddiversity
providesanaturalagility;butitcomesataprice.
But, less anyonethinkthat the late 1920sorWW2werewithout problems, I have twoquotations for you to ponder. The rst is from the Director of Academic Studies at Cranwell in
1920:
The officer of the R.A.F., I used to say, has got to be a quite different product from anArmy or a Naval officer. The time has passed when an officer could afford to narrow hisinterests down to his sport and his immediate job. Youve got to cultivate a liberality ofmind, a breadth of outlook, a tolerance and an all-pervading enthusiasm for every side oflife at least as big as that of the head of a great business firm. The sole use of this subject,
which we call English for want of a better name, is to develop your individuality if you haveone, or to bring one to birth if you havent.1
AttheendoftheyearhereceivedthefollowingcommunicationfromtheAirCouncil.
Sir,
1. I am commanded by the Air Council to inform you that certain aspects of theinstruction lately given to the Cadets of the R.A.F. College, Cranwell, were broughtto their notice by the Air Officer Commanding.
2. The Council viewed with considerable apprehension the type and method ofinstruction disclosed and in consequence instructed the A.O.C. to call for yourexplanation, which they have now received.
3. This explanation has been carefully considered by the Air Council, who are forcedto the conclusion that you have adopted methods of instruction which cannotbe justified even by the widest interpretation of the duties entrusted to you, and
which are not compatible with the ordinary obligations binding on a member ofthe teaching profession. Some of these methods were moreover, in their opinion,peculiarly unsuitable to an Officers Training Establishment such as Cranwell.
4. I am to say therefore that the Council regret that they have no option but to call uponyou to resign your appointment, such resignation to take effect as terminating yourconnection with the College before the commencement of the next term.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
13/100
1
I am sir,Your obedient servant,
W. F. Nicholson.
Ineffecthewassackedforteachingthecadetshowtothinkratherthanwhattothink.The
second quotation is from a retired senior ofcer writing in 1941:
I have often wondered why some senior officers in the services show all the symptoms ofmental paralysis after the age forty-five or so. It is not because the level of intelligence ofcandidates for commissions is markedly below the average of educated members of thecommunity. On the contrary, the severe competition for entrance to some branches of theservice secures some of the best brains in the country; but as the years roll on the criticalfaculty seems to become atrophied, and it is interesting now to be able to be able to discussthe phenomenon without being called for ones reasons in writing by ones immediate
superior.
If a junior officer puts forward a suggestion the implication is that a senior officer mighthave thought of it, and didnt think of it.
The attitude therefore tends to be that the proposal has been thoroughly considered bywiser and more experienced heads and rejected for good and sufficient reasons.After being squashed a sufficient number of times according to his tenacity, the juniorofficer ceases to put forward unwelcome suggestions, and by the time he in turn achievesseniority he has usually absorbed the attitude of his erstwhile superiors.2
The ofcer who wrote these words was Lord Dowding.
Where are we now?BeforeItrytoanswerthisquestion,itmightbeworthwonderingwhetherwecanidentify
aperiodwhenwewereatourleastagile?WasitperhapsduringtheColdWar?Orduring
thesubsequenttransition?Anobjectiveassessmentisprobablybeyondus,sinceitislargely
event-drivenandowesmoretohindsightthananinnate,measurablequality.WhatIthinkwecan
say(returningtomymodel)isthat-toachieveagility-organisation,cultureandtheindividual
must be aligned. Since the 1990s, there have been some very signicant shifts in RAF posture,
equipment, basing,manpower, structuresandtraining, andweare only partway throughthe
changeprocess:
Organisation.In1990theRAFwasstillorganisedfortheColdWar,and,although,theService
has contracted signicantly since then, the shape (that is: basing; Branch and Trade structures;
personnelprocesses;trainingregimes;Headquarters;etc)haveremainedessentiallythesame.For
example,onlyinthelastyearhastheExpeditionaryAirWingconcepthasgainedmomentum.
Culture.TheColdWarcreateditsownculture.Fixedbases,largenumbersofnon-deployable
personnel,monolithicHeadquarters,rigidpatternsoftrainingandemploymentallproducedatransactionalmentalityepitomisedbythehostilitytowardseducationandtheprevalentview
thatifitcouldnotbemeasuredithadnovalue.
1.Mais,AllTheDaysofMyLife,pages83-117,Hutchinson,London,19372.Dowding,TwelveLegionsofAngels,pages55-60,Eyre&Spottiswoode,London,1941
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
14/100
1
Individual.RAFpersonnelofthe1990sweretheproductoftheColdWar.Theassociatedmindsets
andattitudeswereheavilyingrainedandhavestillnotentirelydisappearedinfacttheymay
neveruntilmygenerationretires.WhileoneofourgreatestconcernsposttheColdWarwas
the perceived erosion of values (frequently identied with contractorisation and civilianisation),
wesingularlyfailedtodevelopacommonunderstandingofwhatconstitutedRAFethos(thevital
lightbluethread).
Ofcourse,weshouldnotforgetthat,overthesameperiod,theRAFparticipatedinaseries
ofsuccessfulcampaigns.But,wedidsorelyingonexistingpatternsofbehaviourandwiththe
equipmenttomatch.Agileindividualswereabletoprovideoperationalagilitybutthiswasinspite
oftheorganisationandtheprevalentculture,notbecauseof.
How do we develop agility?WeneedlooknofurtherthantheChiefoftheAirStaffsStrategicPriorities.Thekeyelements
(detailedinRAFStrategy2006)forthenext5-10yearsrequirethatwe:
- Maintainandfurtherdevelopanagile,adaptableandcapableexpeditionaryService
- Ensureourstructures,organisationandprocessesdeliverrapidandaccuratedecision
makingattherightlevel
- Developasustainablemanningandpersonnelstrategythatsupportsourexpeditionary
capabilityandtakesaccountoftheprevailingsocialenvironment
Agilityiseitherstatedorimpliedinalloftheabove.Sodowejustrecruitnaturallyagile
people?Itmaybeunreasonabletoexpectpeopletobeagileinourtermswhenwerecruit
thembutshouldwenotseekoutthecharacteristicsinindividualsthatwillenableagility?But,
doweknowwhatthesecharacteristicsare?Innovationandimaginationwouldfeaturehighlyon
mylistbutaretheysoimportantthatwewouldcompromiseon,say,pilotskillsoranengineering
degreebecauseanindividualisregardedaspotentiallyagile?
Intermsofpersonalitytypes(MyersBriggs)doweencourageselfassured,outgoingtypes,
ordoweseekabalancewiththemoreintrospectivelyinclined?Ofcourse,thispresumesthat
thereissuchathingasanagilepersonality.Frankly,weneedtodosomemorethinkingaboutthequalitiesandcharacteristicsweseek.Canwemakepeoplemoreagile?Ihavetosaythatyou
will need to look very hard to nd the words innovation and imagination in any of our training
syllabuses.TheDefenceSystemsApproachtoTrainingdoesnotseemtoencouragethem,yet
thesequalitiesmustunderpinatrulyagileorganisation.Istherenotadangerthatmuchofour
training actually stulties innovation and imagination, so reducing natural agility?
Anyway,cantrainingmakeindividualsmoreagile?Or,isitmorelikelytobeeducationthat
makes people more agile? Training is the acquisition of competence to achieve specic tasks.
Education lies higher up the taxonomy and ismore todowith the developmentofmental
processesandattitudes.Wemightchoosetoassociatementalagilitywithanagilementalityor
perhaps,moreaccurately,apotentiallyagilementality.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
15/100
1
ProgressTherearesignsthatwearemovingintherightdirection;forinstancechangestoRecruit
TrainingandIOTarenowlargelyinplace,withtheconceptualbuildingblocksforagility(how
tothinknotwhattothink),principlesofmissioncommandandanenhancededucationelement
being integral to these courses. At the same time the Review of Ofcer and Airmen Development
(ROAD)recognisesthatweneedtobuildcoherentlyontheseinitialfoundationsinaprogressive,
inclusive manner. The early ndings conrm that there needs to be a greater emphasis on
increasingthethough-lifetrainingandeducationof individuals.Furthermoretheneedforlean
thinkinghasaneffectacrosstheentirespectrumofagility.Notonlydoesitinvolvechangesto
organisationandprocessbutitdemandsstrongleadershipandanenablingculturethatisnot
afraidofchallenge.Itsimpactonindividuals,ontheirsenseofempowerment,onwhereownership
lies and on enhanced self-condence is signicant. Lean is as much about cultural change as it is
aboutprocessaccelerationandeliminatingwaste.
Althoughsubstantialprogresshasbeenmade,therearesomeoutstandingissues.ChangesintrainingdeliveryarrangementsnotablytheMilitaryFlyingTrainingSystemandDefenceTraining
RationalisationprogrammesmaypotentiallyweakenServiceethos.Ontheotherhand,the
creationoftheCOS(Trg)appointment,withendtoendresponsibilitiesforallRAFindividual
training,isawelcomedevelopmentthatwillgoalongwaytobringcoherencetoanincreasingly
diversetrainingenvironment.
However, are we really condent that we have done all we can to permit/oblige people to
bemore agile?TheapplicationofLean, incoverage, coherenceandsustained impact, is not
yet where we want it to be. Our Cold War operational posture, with a larger but less exible
force,hasgone,butmuchofthepersonnelstructureremains.Quitesimply,wehavetoomany
trades and branches. We have relatively inexible personnel policies. We also do not have a truly
responsivemanpowerplanningprocesses.TherecentMCSGstudyhaslookedatalltheseissues
andproposedawayahead.Therewillbeatrainingandeducationbillassociatedwithagilityit
isunlikelybeafreegoodbutequally,wecannotaffordnottoreleasetheinnatepotential(and
agility)inallourpeople.Wemustalsocreateacultureinwhichpeoplefeelencouraged,andare
supported,inbeingagile.
ThisisverymuchattheheartofMissionCommand,butdowehavetherightstructures?Are
westillstuckintheColdWarinorganisationalterms?Infact,canorganisationsbeagileoraretheymerelyadaptable?Arethereorganisationalcharacteristicsthatencourageagility?Dowe
need atter structures but, if we do, are they compatible with our military hierarchy? Can agility
trulyexistwithinatraditionalcommandchain?Whilecentralised,highleveldecision-makingmay
suppressanindividualsinnateagility,isthereversetrue?Forexample,bydecentralisingmanpower
controlwecertainlymadestationsmoreagilebutultimatelywemayhavecompromisedagility
attheorganisationallevel.
Keeping People AgileAgility requires energy. It has tness implications for the brain as well as the body. But like
physical tness, it is susceptible to disuse and subsequent atrophy. Loss of agility in individuals is
recoverablebutitrequiresitsownexerciseprogramme,timeandopportunity.Lookingtothe
future,itseemsinevitablethattherewillbefurthercontractionwithevergreaterbudgetary
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
16/100
innt
Fa
Paand
Fnt
i-dspnd
Unstutud
F 2 T Futu Stat
ru-bund
cumbsm
Unmanatv
Unspnsv
Dmat
Inexible
1
pressuresandcontinuingoperationaldemands.Agilityisboththekeytomeetingthesechallenges
andthebasisforourcontinuedrelevance,justasagilitywasessentialtooursurvivalinthelate
1920s.
Coherence and AssuranceHowcanwe tell ifwearesucceeding?Howdowemeasuretheagilityofindividuals (or
organisations)?ThePeopleCampaignPlanhasanimportantroleinthisrespect.Thereisclearlya
greatdealofeffortunderwaytoimproveagilitybutitisvitalthatwemaintaincoherenceacross
and through the personnel agendas; balancing competing priorities and assessing the people
implicationsinallthatwedo.But,bearinginmindwhatIhavealreadysaid,perhapsthereshould
beanEducationStrategywovenintothePeopleCampaignPlan?
ConclusionsHoweveragilewehavebeeninthepast,weneedtodevelopgreateragilityifwearetocope
withthefuture.Muchhasbeendonetosetinplacethehardinfrastructureforanagileairforcebutlessfortheenablingcultureandpeoplepolicies.CASsStrategicPrioritiesprovidethehooks
fordeliveringagileairmentogetherwiththenecessarypermissivestructuresandprocesses.Ifwe
areagreedastothenatureofindividualagility,andwewishtodevelopagileairmen,weneedto
acknowledgethatimplicitagilityexistsatanindividuallevelinallourpeople,andseekevidence
ofagilityduringtherecruitmentandtrainingprocesses.Wemustnurtureouragiletalent;being
carefulnottotrainoutagilityinfavourofconformity,andrewardagilitythroughtheassessment
processandincorporateitaspartofcareerdevelopment.Wealsoneedtoenhanceindividual
agility througheducation (mental agility produces anagilementality!) and ofcourse provide
theopportunitiestoexercisetheseagiletalentsalthoughinourcurrentoperationalclimate
such occasions are not difcult to nd. It is also up to us to create adaptable organisations that
permit,encourageandobligepeopletobeagileratherthanprecludethemfrombeingso,and
nally, we need to nd some way to assess our overall agility, if we want to know whether we
aresucceeding
IamconsciousthatmuchofwhatIdonehasbeentoposequestions.Thatishowitshould
be at these events. However, I offer this nal model (Fig 2)ofwhatIbelievewearetryingtoachieve.Ontherightisthenon-agileAirForce(ontheleftiswherewealsodontwanttobe).
Thechallengeishowtomoveourorganisation,cultureandindividualstotheleftbutnotsofar
totheleftthatweloseagilityinaconfusedmassofinitiativesandchangeprogrammes.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
17/100
1
The Agile AirMANThe TheorY oF AgiliTY
gup captan Jn Jupp
TheChiefoftheAirStaffhassaidthatAgilityisattheheartofourcapability;thatweneed
tokeeppacewithchangeintellectuallyandthatwemustmakesurethatwearejustasagileand
adaptableasourequipment1.HewentontosaythatIraqandAfghanistanhavebothemphasised
thecomplex,ambiguousnatureofthemodernbattlespace.TheFASOC2seekstoshowthatAir
Powersdistinctiveattributes,oneofwhichisagility,arethemesforitsfuturedevelopment.So
whatisitthatismeantbyagilitywhenitisappliedtopeople?Weseemtounderstanditwhen
itisappliedtomachinesandintuitivelywethinkthatagilepeopleinthissensearenotthose
gymnastsamongstus.Itissomeintellectualormentalability.TheFASOCdescribesitasthe
abilitytouseandadaptstructures,processesandequipmentininnovativewaystoachievethe
desiredeffects3.ButwhatdoesitmeanwhenitisattachedtotheepithetAirman.
The Airmans Perspective
TheAirmansPerspectivehasbeentoutedsincetheinceptionoftheRAFandhasitsgenesis
in the fact that the airman literally had a view of the whole battleeld as he ew above it.
Hitherto only gallant men with rope and axe had struggled to attain summits to whose
height we rose daily, unmindful of the privilege. From this exalted eminence we surveyed
the earth The war below us was a spectacle. We aided it and abetted it, admiring
the tenacity of men who fought to take the next trench thirty yards away. But such
objectives could not thrill us, who, when we raised our eyes, could see objective after
objective receding fty, sixty, seventy miles beyond4.
Because the air is ubiquitous, extends over everything, and the sphere of inuence of the
airmanismuchgreaterthanthatofthesoldierorsailor,theairmansviewofthebattlespacehas
always tended to the operational rather than the tactical. Todays airman has a tactical inuence
withinabout150milesradiusofhisorheraircraftbutiswellawarethathemaybetasked
intoanotherareawithtotallydifferentdynamicsandpossiblyintoadifferentrolewithinthe
samesortie.He isoperating in4 dimensions5.Theairmanneedstheoperationalviewofthebattlespace to cope with this change. Those that support the ying effort need the same broad
view.InOperationTELICforexample,theRAFwasdeployedto9differentairbasesin7different
countriesandoperatedoverthesouthern2/3rdsofIraqwhileithadtobeintimatelyaware
ofwhatwas happening in theNorthofthe country. Supportingorganisations needed tobe
awareof all of this activity spread overa hugegeographical areaaswell as the other Joint
Forcecomponentsandtheirrequirements.Afterall,theaircomponentwasoften(thoughnot
exclusively) a supporting component and soneeded tounderstand the entirety of the Joint
Forcesbusiness.
1AnInterviewwithChiefoftheAirStaffRoyalAirForceinTheJournaloftheJPACC,Edition32006.2FutureAirandSpaceOperationalConcept.3FASOC,TheBeacon.4SagittariusRising,CaptainCecilLewis,PeterDavisLondon1936.5FASOC,SupportingEssay1,TheAirmansPerspective.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
18/100
1
SomuchfortheAirman(usedheretomeanallthosewhodealwithAirPowerfromanair
marshal to an SAC), but what of agility? An MOD paper, The Agile Commander denes agility as
adaptability7,responsiveness8, exibility9androbustness10.
Flexible Responsive
The words responsive and exible are dened by reference to change, whether that be
changingcircumstancesorwholesalechange.Thissortofchangeisendemiconoperations,no
plan survives rst contact with the enemy let alone the change that any military action brings
aboutphysicallyandmentallyonthoseinvolved.Allleadersneedtobeabletochange,toadapt
todifferentcircumstanceswithoutnecessarilyhavingtheadviceordirectionoftheirsuperiors
exceptforcommandintent.(IntheRAF,leadershipisnecessaryatanyandeveryrankascanbe
seenfromthestoriesfromSACsandNCOsbelow).Butleaderscannotbeagilewithoutknowing
thecommonpurpose;knowingtheintentallowsspeedofaction.Militaryactionisdesignedto
bringaboutmassivechangeontheenemywithinashortperiodoftime,yettheenemywillneedtobedealtwithassoonasmilitaryactionisover.Leadingformeradversariesthroughthechange
intheaftermathofoperationspeaceenforcement,peacekeepingornationbuilding,willneed
some considerable skill in this area calling on all the robustness, exibility, responsiveness and
adaptabilitythatourleadersofallranksarecapableof.
Mentally Agile
InnovationinadaptingprocessestomeetthedemandsofamodernexpeditionaryAirForce
willbevital.Butthoseourprocesseshaveevolvedtoensurethatpifallsencounteredbyour
predecessorsdonotcatchusout;ourchangesmustensurethatthosepifallsarestillavoided,if,
ofcourse,theyarestillrelevant.Therefore,knowledgeoftheprocessanditspurposearealso
vital.Putanotherway,westopbecomingacandoairforceatourperil,thoughweneedto
acknowledge that we cannot do it all, all the time. The need for exibility and responsiveness on
operationsisaxiomatic,buttheseattributesarelinkedtotheleadershipofchangenomatter
whatthecircumstances.Change,largeandsmall,isnowapermanentpartofourlivesastheRAF
determinedlymeetsthechallengeofremainingrelevantinaworldthatitselfisrapidlychanging
politically, economically, socially and technically. RAF leaders need a exible and responsive
approach,bothseeingtheneedsoftheirownorganisationandrecognising,andevenanticipating,
theneedsofthehigherorganisationforwhichtheywork11
.Whetheronoperationsornot,within the uncertaintyofchange there areopportunities thatcan be graspedby thoseagile
enoughtoseethem.Theempowermentofpersonnelwithintheleaningprocessisapowerful
exampleofthis.
6 D CBM/J9 Capping Paper: Agile Command Capability: Future Command in the Joint Battlespace and its Implications for CapabilityDevelopment.
7AdaptableAbletoadjustorbealteredfornewconditions.Acclimatize,adjust,attune,becomehardened,getusedto,reconcile,alter,amend,
change,transform.8Responsiverespondingreadilyandwithenthusiasm.Alert,alive,aware,interested,open,perceptive,receptive,sensitive.9Flexibleabletochangeorbechanged,toadapttodifferentcircumstances.Accommodating,adaptable,cooperative,open-minded,responsive,willing.
10Robust Able to withstand difcult conditions, strong and healthy, determined and forceful. Athletic, brawny, t, hale and hearty, powerful,strong,tough,vigorous.
11TheAttributesforRAFLeadersFlexibleandResponsiveexpandsonthisandcanbeaccessedfromtheRAFLeadershipCentrewebsitehttp://www.cranwell.raf.r.mil.uk/live/RAF_Leadership_Centre/Index.htm
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
19/100
1
Innovationisoftenalliedwiththinking-out-of-the-box,butwhatdoesitmeantothinkout
of the box, and what is the box in the rst place? The box is those beliefs and values that are
builtupthroughlifeandexperience.Theboxisthosethingsthathaveofteninthepastensured
successandthatwethereforetaketoournextappointmentasgivensthatwedonothaveto
re-examine.Unfortunatelyforus,thisisnotalwaysthecaseandwhathasworkedconsistently
wellinthepastwillnotalwaysdoso inthefuture.However,tobeabletoquestionthesorts
of beliefs involved here requires serious reection or the confrontation of those beliefs by an
externalsource.Becauseofthis,itisnecessarytoconsiderseriouslyalltheideasthatarebrought
to the table no matter how extraordinary they may seem at rst. It demands that we areWn
t Tak rsksandtoknowourselvesandotherstobeemtnay intnt.Thereis
tension inbetweenthepromptsof intellectandourexperience. Experienceenablespattern
recognition,whichspeedsupresponsebutcanbetheenemyofinnovation.Adevelopedintellect
allowsfortheadaptationofexperiencetochangecontext.Harnessingintellectandexperience
offers a route to intuitive decision making that combines and balances risk, benet and speed.
Mentally and Physically Robust
Adaptability can be taken as another word for exibility but some of its connotations take the
concepts further. While its denition is being able to adjust or be altered for new conditions12the
synonymsforadaptableincludebecomehardened,reconcileandtransform.Thereareideasof
robustnessandempathyherethatmustbeexamined.Anadaptableleadermustbeabletochange
thenatureofthebusinessinhand.Hemust,atthesametime,beabletoreconciledifferent
demandsandopportunities.Perhapsthismaybereconcilingtheintentofthecommanderwith
thesituationonthegroundorthecomplexitiesofapeacekeepingmission.Thiswillrequire
emtna intn. Clearly, whenever judgement is being used, the leader must act
ethically.
Robustnessisanecessityforallmilitaryleadersastheymustbeabletowithstandthephysical
rigoursofoperationswithoutlosingtheirmentalcapacity.Thephysicalrigoursofoperations
are not the only physical demands on a leader. Any leader in any sphere can nd the demands
ontheirtimewearing,theymayhavetobeconstantlyavailabletogivedirection,toreassure
theirteamormembersoftheirwiderorganisationandfeelingsofconstantresponsibilitycan
bedraining.Thepressuresof leadership can be very stressful and are often faced alone. Inoperations these problems can be increased tenfold. A leader who is not t, or physically robust,
willnotlongsurvivehisorhertenureingoodhealth.Thementalsideofrobustnessdemands
the determination tocarry things through, the forcefulness toget results.A leadermustbe
vigorous and powerful in pursuing the aims and yet exible and adaptable enough to know when
tochangedirection.EmotionalIntelligencetounderstandthepeoplewithwhomhe isdealing
willbeessentialwhetherthosepeoplearewithinhisorherteamorexternalagencies.Political
12OxfordDictionaryandThesaurus200113SeetheAttributesforRAFLeadersEmotionalIntelligenceandPoliticalAstuteness
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
20/100
20
astutenesswillalsobeessential13.
Able to Handle Ambiguity
Onoperations,theremaynotbemuchtimefordecisionstobemade;awayfromoperations
considerabletimemaybeavailable.Eitherwaytheagileairmanwillneedsounddecisionmaking
skillsandtheabilitytoactswiftlywhentheoccasiondemands.Certainlytoknowwhenadecision
needstobemade.Also,inpeaceorwar,militaryaffairsarecomplexandoftenshroudedin
ambiguity. The ability to handle ambiguity is clearly linked to exibility and responsiveness, mental
agilityandthewillingnesstotakerisks.Itisalsovitalinbeingpoliticallyastute.Theoperational
frictionthatcausesthefogofwarisreasonablywellunderstood;itcreatesambiguity.Thepace
andcomplexityofmodernwarfarecanalsocreateambiguityofitsown.Considerthebattlespace
of the Gulf War in 2003; warghting, peacekeeping and peace support operations were being
carriedoutinonebattlespace.TheUSMChasdescribedthisasthe3-blockwar.Thiscancreate
immenseambiguityforaleaderwhohastoworkwithinthemoralframeworkexpectedofhis
forcesineachofthosetypesofoperation,andtheycanbeverydifferentwithverydifferentimperatives.Certainlydecisionswillrarelybeclear-cutinsuchasituation.Equally,politics,whether
international or national, within a large organisation or in the ofce, are seldom straightforward.
Aleadermuststeerapaththroughtheshadesofgreythatismorallyacceptableandwillgain
the support of his or her team. A leader can process out ambiguity, nd his or her way through
itorexploitit14.Exploitingambiguityrequiresstrongleadershipandworksbestinsituations
where there is leadership without authority. Joint, and particularly, multinational operations t
this model perfectly. In peacetime, the model ts in many situations where differing start points,
opinionsandhistoriesmeanthatgroupsworkingtogethermaynothaveidenticalendsinmind.
Yettherecanbecommonalitiesthatshouldbeexploitedbyourleaders.Therehasbeensome
researchinthisarea15 that shows that dening and agreeing the means of advance rather than
thegoalsorendstobeachievedhasmoreeffectonproductivity;itisessentialthatthisistaken
in the inter-organisational eld rather than the intra-organisational one. While this may seem
contrary to the tenets of mission command where a commander is to dene what he wants to
beachievedbutnothow,itmustberememberedthathemustalsoexplainwysomethingisto
beachievedandthiswhyismoreimportantthanthewhat.Itistheintentthatiskeyandthe
actionsofsubordinatesmustalwaysbein-linewiththat.
Inthepoliticalworld,theNorthernIrelandPeaceProcessprovidesaninsightintoexploiting
ambiguity. Dening clearly what decommissioning meant would have held apart the parties totheagreementinintractablepositionsthatwouldnothaveallowedanyadvance.Byleavingthe
endstatesomewhatvague,bothsideswereabletomovetowardsagoalbymeansthatwere
agreedtobeagoodthingbybothsides.Eventually,theyarrivedatapositionwheretheywere
bothcontentandpeacecouldbeareality.
Mission Command
Clearly,ifagilityistobeleveragedtheremustberoomformanoeuvrebyallRAFleaders.
ThephilosophyofMissionCommandallowsthisfreedom.MissionCommandwasdevisedas
anArmytactictoovercometheimpossibilityofacommanderbeingabletocommunicatewith
13SeetheAttributesforRAFLeadersEmotionalIntelligenceandPoliticalAstuteness14SeetheAttributesforRAFLeadersAbletoHandleAmbiguity.15Inter-organisationalPerformance,LJBourgeois
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
21/100
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
22/100
22
processesthatwehaveinplace.Butweneedtobemastersoftheprocessesandtobeableto
adaptthemtochangingcircumstances.Somestoriesofourpeoplesexperiencesonoperations
andelsewherefollow;theyamplydemonstratetheneedtoimprovisewithintheframeworks
and encourage as much innovation as we can in ourselves and others; to be exible, adaptable,
responsiveandrobust.
Thereismuchinlanguageandhowvariouspeopleinterpretit.However,theAttributesfor
RAFLeaders21coverallthisgroundandtheyhavebeenhighlightedwheretheyapplyinthetheory
above.CombinedwiththeneedtoembodytheRAFCoreValuesandactethically,thephilosophy
ofMissionCommandandFollowership,knowledgeofandefforttobehaveinaccordancewith
theAttributesforRAFLeadersshouldenhanceagilityintheService.
CAOC COMMAND22 IN OP IRAQI FREEDOM
AmodernUSCAOCisclearlynotyetfullyNEC,butsomepartsofitarequitecloseandperhapsgiveusanindicationofthechallengesaheadasNECmatures.Inparticular,thevolumes
of information available (literally at theclickof amouse) are immense, especiallywhenair
operationsonthescaleofOpIRAQIFREEDOMaretakingplace.Thedelegationofdecision
makingwasthusthekeytomaintaininganysenseoftempoessentiallyMssn cmmand
workingwithinthevariouslevelsoftheCAOC(aswellofcourseasinthecockpitsofaircraft).
Oneofthekeyfunctionsofcommandinthisenvironmentiseffectiveriskmanagementwillthe
resultsbeworththerisk,eithertoourownforcesorintermsofundesiredeffects(collateral
damage,casualtiesetc)?Whiletherewereclearguidelinesforcertaindecisionsforinstance
theCFACChimselfretainedtheapprovalforCSARpackagesintoallbutlowriskareaswealso
delegatedwhereverpossible.
Ambiguityaboundsinsuchanenvironment,andthetimeavailabletotrytogainthebest
possibleinformationtoreachadecisionwillbedifferentinalmosteverycase.Theinformation
management challenges, both across the CAOC and in ones own working area, can be
considerable!However,eveninthemosttimecriticalmoments,itisprobablyworthtakingafew
secondstopersonallycheckoneor2facts!IrealisedfairlyearlyonthatIhadsentsomemissions
into high threat areas to attack high value targets and they had failed to nd anything. On further
investigationIfoundthattheintelligenceonmanyofthetimesensitivetargets(SSMs,SAMsetc)
wasbasedonimagery,andthatitsometimestookupto1214hourstointerprettheimagery,giventhevolumebeingproduced.Clearly,withmostIraqimobilesystemsbeingmovedevery
fewhours,therewaslittlepointintaskinganaircraftintoahighthreatenvironment(suchasthe
Baghdadarea)toattackoneifitwasalmostcertainthatithadmovedinthemeanwhile!Butof
coursethedecisionwasnotalwaysasstraightforward;whatifthetargetwaspotentialWMD,
andtheISRwasonlyafewhoursold,howmuchrisktotaketotrytoattackit..?especiallyif
ELINThasjustreportedpossibleactiveSAMradarcloseby?andyourSEADaircrafthave
justdepartedtheareafortheirAAR?.and..etc!Interestinglyenough,othershadnotmade
thisconnectionandwerecontinuingtosearchfortargetslongaftertheyhadalmostcertainly
moved.ItisprobablyjustaswellthattheBaghdadSuperMEZturnedoutnottobequitethe
20AirTaskingOrder.21Warghter, courageous, Emotionally Intelligent, Flexible and Responsive, Willing to take Risks, Mentally Agile/Physically Robust, Able to HandleAmbiguity,PoliticallyandGloballyAstute,TechnologicallyCompetent.Abletoleadtomorrowsrecruit.Anexplanationoftheseattributescanbefoundathttp://www.raf.mod.uk/leadershipcentre/
22FromaninterviewwithAVMNickolsonhistimeasoneoftheCAOCDirectorsduringOpIraqiFreedom.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
23/100
2
threatthatwethoughtitwasatthetime!
Althoughsleepwasinquiteshortsupply,physicalrobustnesswasprobablynotthemost
essentialrequirementofthejob;theenvironmentwasprettycomfortable,withairconditioning,
goodfoodanddrink and adecentbed.But thementalrobustness requiredwasperhapsfar
greaterthanIhadeverimagined.Thepressureofconstantlyhavingtomakedecisionsonwhich
other(sometimesmany)peoplesliveswereatstakewasmentallydrainingtoadegreethatIhad
neverbeforeexperienced.Unlikemanybeforeme,Iwasfortunatethatthislevelofstressreally
onlylastedforacoupleofweeks.
And considerable robustness was also required in dealings with others at times. In the rst
fewdaystheB52aircraftwereoperatingaloneinNIraq(becauseoftheTurkishdecisionnotto
allowusbasing)withouteitherairdefenceor,moreimportantly,SEADsupport.B52commanders
telephonedtheCAOCtoexpresstheirconsiderableconcernsthatthelevelofrisktotheir
crewsduring theseoperationswasnotbeingproperlyconsidered.Apart fromtheir surprise
at dealing with a British ofcer over the issue, it was difcult explaining to them that we wereverywellawareoftherisksandhadconsideredthemextremelycarefully,butthatthepotential
strategic signicance of not sending them (they were the only support we could provide to the
Kurdsatthatstage)meantthattheriskwasworthwhileincampaignterms,evenifhigherthan
theindividualsintheircockpitsfeltwasnecessary!
Theagilityofourstructuresandprocessesisofcoursehighlydependentontheagilityof
ourpeople.Despitesomeveryablepersonnel,maturedoctrine,andstrongjointandAirC2
processes,theCAOCwasprobablynotasagileasitcouldhavebeeninmanyways.Thiswas
mainlyintheachievementofasmoothtransitionofworkbetweenthevariousdivisions(Strat/
Plans,Ops,ISR,Mobility);asaresult,ourfeedbackloopswerenotalwayscomplete(particularly
inareassuchasBDA)andoverallagilitysuffered.Thecauses?Probablyamixtureofsomepeople
whodidnotunderstandtheprocesseswellenough(training)andsomewho,althoughtheywere
well trained, did not have the agility of mind needed in a fast-moving high intensity ght. That we
succeededwasmainlybecausewehadplentyofassetsandtheCombatOpsdivisionprovedto
be the most exible and agile I have ever seen (in large part due to some outstanding embedded
RAFpersonnel);thisundoubtedlymaskedalackofagilityelsewhereandtheseamsbetweenthe
CAOCsdivisions.Thelesson?IthinkthatyourpeoplemustbebothproperlytrainedinAirC2
andhavetheagilityofmindtocopewithambiguityandtheunexpected;eitheroneontheirown
is just not sufcient!
A DOB COMMANDER23
Basedonmyexperiencesasa StnCdrpreparingforcesforexpeditionaryoperations,and
thensubsequentlyas aDOBCommander, thekeyenablerstoanagileairman are:mindset;
preparation; exibility and adaptability; and empowerment.
Therightmindsetistorecognisethatexpeditionaryoperationsarenotanaberrationin
day-to-dayroutine:theyarewhatwedoandtheagile,expeditionaryairmankeenlywantstobe
involved.Hedoesnotrecognisethetermout-ofarea,becausehisorherprimaryoperatingarea
isawayfromhomebase.Similarly,hedoesnotacceptthetermMainOperatingBase,because
thenaturalstateofoperationsisnotathomebasebutondeployment.AttheDOB,theright
23FromAirCdreHillier,DOBCommanderatAlUdiedonOpTELIC.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
24/100
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
25/100
2
Allies,someactivitieshavevaluesimplybecausetheyhelpbuildandsustaintheCoalition:for
manyofthe6000USAFpersonnelatmyDOB,Isuspectoneoftheirstrongestmemoriesofthe
UK presence at Al Udeid was the capabilities of 12 rst-rate RAF chefs!
TheagileairmanoperatingwithanexpeditionaryspiritisrequirednotonlyattheDOB,
butatallpointsinthereachbackprocess:everyoneisdoingdeployedoperations,regardlessof
theirphysicallocationandneedstoadapttheprocessestoachievetherequiredresults.Aircrew
pistolammunitionwasremovedfromanATaircraften-routetotheDOBbecauseithadnot
beenproperlydemanded:InitialOperatingCapabilitywasdelayedasaresult.Doubtlessthereare
arguments from both sides on this specic issue, but the point is that decisions need to be taken
withafullunderstandingoftheoperationalimperative,notjustwithanarrowfocusonprocess.
Finally,agilitygetsfrustratedwithoutproperempowerment.Riskownershipliesbestwith
the person best placed tomanage it. Judgingaircraft explosive safety distancerequirements
from3000milesawayintheUK,withoutanyrecognitionoftheimpactoncoalitionpartnerarrangements, frustrates properownership ofdecisions. Somepersonnel are just not up to
thejob:theprocessofremovingthemneedstobeswiftandwithaproperbalancebetween
sensitivitytotheindividualandtheneedtogetthejobdone.WhenaDOBcommandersays
hedoesnotneedmorepersonnelorequipment,trusthisorherjudgement;holdhimorher
responsibleifitsubsequentlygoeswrong.
A DOB COMMANDER24
Thedoctrine,SOPsandmanualsaregreatwhenthingsaregoingasexpected.Youneedagility
whenyoumoveoffthebeatenpath.TheoperationalsecurityissuesthatsurroundedmyDOB
preventedmefromdoingaproperrecce;henceIwasoff-pistefromsquareone.Ididmanagea
visittoanexerciseatthebase,whichamountedtoaclandestinerecceofsorts,butmanypeople
vitaltoareccecouldnotgo.Severelylimitedonnumbers,ItookthepersonIthoughtmost
vitalmyRAFRegimentForceProtectionspecialist.ItmeantthatIhadtolookatotherways
ofgaininginformation,likespendingconsiderablymoretimethanusualtalkingtokeyEmbassy
staff.Atthisstage,thereweremanyissuesthatrequiredtactandperseverance;forexample,
STCA5repeatedlyputamediahandlingteamonmyparty,despitemytakingitoffseveraltimes,
explainingthatmyhostswouldnotallowthemediawithin30milesofthebase.Themessageis,
inthespiritofMssn cmmand, trust the DOB Cdr's judgement. He can always be red ifhegotitwrong.
Onorder,Ideployedwiththeset-upteamandcommencedworktomeetthetimelines.Iwas
taskedtobereadyforopsatmaximumrate,within14days.Thiswastoinclude2aircrafttypes
andthenecessaryforceprotection.Thiswasachieved.Unfortunately,ourhostsdidnotwantthe
Harrierstoarriveuntilitwasabsolutelycertainthathostilitieswereinevitable.Hence,wecould
notgetdiplomaticclearanceforthemtoarriveandIhad22daysfromdeclarationofopenfor
businesswithnoaircraft.Thisrequiredinnovativeleadershiptopreventpeoplefromgoingoffthe
boil.WithnoHarriersuntilfurthernotice,IproposedanearlyentryfortheCanberraPR9during
avisitbytheCombinedForcesAirComponentCommander.Itwasaclassiceveryone'sawinner
solution: the Coalition could use imagery from the aircraft for genuine operational benet; our
24FromaninterviewwithAirCdreKirkpatrick,DOBCommanderonOpTELIC.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
26/100
2
hostscoulduseitfortheirpurposesandmypeoplewouldhavesomethingtodotomaintain
their interest.Ourhostswereconcernedabouttheobviousdifferencein silhouettebetween
Harriersandtheiraircraft,mindfulthatthepresenceofthenewaircraftwouldnotbelostonthe
locals. I asked if the Harriers could arrive at night. Our hosts were surprised that we ew at night
andwentawaytothinkaboutit.Theycamebackwiththeoffertogettheminthefollowingnight
therebyprovidinganagilitychallengeforus,whichwemet.
Forme,mycentreofgravitywastoensurethatnosmalltacticalincidentonbaseresulted
inunintendedstrategicconsequences,withthepossibilityofmissionfailure.Iwasdetermined
tomaintainthegoodwillofourhosts.Thisinvolvedspendingmanymorehoursthanfelthealthy
in smoke lled rooms, drinking endless cups of sweet tea. It was important to me that the Host
BaseCommanderheldusinhigherregardthantheUSAFdetachment.
I did not foresee that I would nd myself standing in the middle of an aireld on a mobile
phone, speaking to a commercial Belgian Boeing 737 captain. Mentioning no identiable locations,loads,ortypes,IassistedhiminunderstandingtheTerminalApproachChart(TAP)whichhad
beenfaxedtohim; thiswasalmost illegiblebeforeitwassent itasit hadbeenphotocopied
somanytimes,butitwastheonlyoneavailable.Hewantedreassurancethatitwasgenuine,
"because it didn't look right". He wanted me to read the gures out to him so that he could ink
themin.IntheendIreassuredhimthatIwasalsoapilotandIwasstandinginthemiddleofthe
aireld, with atness for a goodly number of miles around, and that he would have to hunt for
an obstacle with vertical extent to be able to hit it. He led a copy of the TAP for his company's
recordsandturnedupabout8hourslaterwithourDOBGuardForce.
Oneparticularlyagilemomentforoneofmyteaminvolvedthelocalcontractcateringstaff.
AhighproportionofthelocalsatourlocationwerePalestinian.Thiswasboundtoleadtothe
oddtensiongiventheAmerican/Britishpresence,especiallyifhostilitieshadcommenced.Iwas
concernedattheriskofourfoodbeingsabotaged.Relationshipswiththelocalsgottensewhen
the rst action got underway. The US response was to send down some HUMVEEs containing
verylargeguardsinsunglassesheavilyarmed,completewithknives.IaskedmySqnLdrRAFRegt
ofcer to go down there and sort things out. He checked in his personal weapon and went to his
tenttochangeintosportskit.HeinvitedtheAmericanstoclearoff,thenwenttothekitchensto
drinkteawiththecaterers,whilstwatchingSkyNewsshowingBaghdadbeingbombed.Amazingly,
hegotthecatererstocalmdownandgobacktowork.
One pieceofBranch bashfulness affected meconsiderably and demanded agility. Having
deployed 2 hand-picked Air Trafc Controllers, each current on Harrier operations, one a
qualied Tactical Air Trafc Controller, it came as a surprise that they were ordered by their
BranchsponsoratHQSTCthattheywere,undernocircumstances,tocontrolaircraft.Ihadnot
realisedthattheOpsSpt(ATC)BranchwastheonlyoneinourServicetohaveitsutilitylinked
topostcode.Ipointedoutthatthepilotswerenotfamiliarwiththelocality(orWesternIraq),
thatweallhadtodriveonthewrongsideoftheroadandthatadegreeofadaptabilitycould
reasonablybeexpected.ItookthesituationasfarasIcouldwithStrikeCommand(viatheUK
Air Component HQ) but Strike ATC would not budge. Unless the controllers were qualied at
my particular aireld by RAF ATC examiners (who also did not know the aireld) they could not
controlandwehadnowayofqualifyingthem.IapproachedtheUSAFDetachmentcommander
andaskediftheyhadacoursetoqualifytheircontrollersontheirdeployedset-up.Theydid.He
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
27/100
2
agreedthatmycontrollerscouldenrolonthecoursetobefamiliarisedwiththeequipmentand
procedures,butthatIshouldbeinnodoubtthattheyriskedfailureifnotuptothemark.Iwas
unsurprised when both passed with ying colours and became lynch pins in the combined ATC
successes.
I insisted thatwehadourRAFRegtSO1 in theUSAF ground defence cell.Agilitywas
certainlyneeded inthisarea.Wehadlocaltroopspatrollingoutsidethewireonourbehalf. I
wasconcernedaboutthepotentialforablue-on-blue.ItnearlyhappenedwhenUSguardssaw
movementatnightwhichtheywereunsureofandwhichmadethemwanttoengage.MyRAF
RegtSO1heardthebeginningsofthe'goat'fromhispositionintheopsroom.ExcitedAmerican
voicesfromaUSArmyPatriotBatterywereradioingtheUSAF-controlledgrounddefencecell,
reportingsuspiciousactivityjustoutsidethewire.Theywantedpermissiontoengage.TheRAF
Regt SO1 took charge of the network, got an assurance that no one was being red upon and
broadcastthattherewasnoreasontoengage.Hehadcorrectlydeducedthattheobserved
movementswerelocaltroopsactingonourbehalf.Hisinterventionpreventedacatastrophicblueonblue.
ToallprospectiveDOBCommanderswho,likeme,harbouredthenotionthattheywere
going to lead the ying ops from the front in the cockpit - a message: that is not your job.
Yourprimaryjobistoestablishandmaintainanetworkofharmoniousrelationshipsbetween
yourDetachmentandyourhost,coalitionpartners,theEmbassy,yourAirComponentHQ,and
betweenallsub-elementsofyourDOB.Bysodoing,youwillcreatethenecessaryconditions
toletthesquadronsgetonanddothebusinessofcreatingprecisecampaigneffectsusingair
power.
THE COMMANDER COMBAT OPS WITHIN THE CAOC25
AstheSO1inchargeofCombatOps,itisvitaltohavetherightteamaroundyou.They
needtobecompetentbutalsotoworkasateamandtheiragilityisvitaltotheagilityofthe
organisation.Alsoitisvitalforagilitythatwehadthefullsupportofoursuperiors,atleast2up.
ForTELICwehadawork-upculminatinginafullBLUEFLAGatShawAFB,SouthCarolinato
createacohesiveteambutevensoafewpeoplehadtobereplacedbecausetheywerenotupto
thecandospiritthatwasnecessarytomakeitwork.IlikenedtheCAOCtoanorchestrawith
the various sections fullling various roles and the Chief of Combat Ops being the conductor;eachindividualmaybeasuperbplayerbuttheconductorhastomakethemworkasateam
togetthemtomakea goodsound.Onefalsenoteruinseverything;notnecessarilyfromthe
orchestraofcourse,itcouldevenbeamobilephoneintheaudience.Whenthebombdropped
inthemarketplaceonTELICitmadeabadnote.
InTELIC,oneexampleofagility,andthelackofit,wasknownasthebridgetoofar.There
wasabridgeinthewesterndesertthatneededtakingdownandwetaskedsomeF16sagainst
it.WhentheygotthereitwasobscuredbycloudsotheyusedJDAMinGPSmode.Whenwe
gottheBDAthebridgewasstillintactsoweairbornere-taskedsomemoreassetswhoalso
usedJDAMinGPSmode.AfterthatBDAwehadtodoitagain.InallwesentF16s,F15sand
F14sagainstthatbridgeandnonehitit.ThefourthtimewesentGR4s.Theygottherewith
25FromaninterviewwithWgCdrHyslop.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
28/100
2
bridgenotobscuredandsawthatthecoordinatestheyhadbeengivenwereslightlywrongso
usedEnhancedPavewayinthelasermodeandtookthebridgeout.Agreatpieceofagilitythat
enhancedtheBritishreputationintheCAOCforweeks!Buttherewasalackofagilityinthe
CAOCastheBDAshowedalltheUSAFJDAMimpactstobeinthesameplaceawayfromthe
bridge,thisshouldhavebeenpickedup,thecoordinatescorrectedandthebridgetakenout
soonerwithoutwastingsomucheffort.
InIncirlikduringNorthernWatchIwastheDCFACCandwehadTornadosin therecce
role with us. All the coalition aircraft were red on most days mostly by AAA. The Iraqis seemed
to have a cycle where new gun crews came along and genuinely tried to re at our aircraft.
However,theysoonlearnedwhatourresponsewaslikeandtoaimprogressivelyfurtherbehind
theaircraftandactwithalotlessfervour.Oneguncrew,however,discoveredthatiftheirgun
wasnexttoavillagewewouldnotretaliatebecauseoftheROEconcerningcollateraldamage.So
theyalwaysplacedtheirgunnexttoresidentialbuildingsandgenuinelytriedtoshootdownour
aircraftallthetime;andtheyweregettinguncomfortablyclose.Werealisedthattheonlyattackwe could make with sufcient accuracy to meet the ROE but also with the likelihood of damage
tothetargetwashighanglestrafe.Wediscoveredthattherewere3USpilotswhohadbeen
trained in strafe all ghter school graduates and got them together to plan the attack. That
day our rogue gun crew did re on our aircraft and got an unexpected response from us high
anglestrafe.Weonlydiditoncebecauseofthegreaterriskassociatedwiththeattack,butwe
onlyneededtodoitoncetocreatethedeterrenteffectwerequired.
THE REGT SQN COMMANDER26
When51SqnRAFRegtarrivedbackatitshome,RAFLossiemouth,inDecember2002after
4monthsonOPRESINATE(SOUTH)weexpectedtohaveayearawayfromoperations.No51
SqnRAFRegtwasnewlyre-formedandmanpowerwas76all-rankspriortoincrementalfunding
allowingthemanpowerceilingtoreach164all-ranks.LikeoursisterFieldsqnsoftheRAFRegt,
51SqnwasequippedasLandRover-bornespecialistinfantryforISTAR-basedtasksandwiththe
ability to react and hit any aggressors against our air assets in ight-strength. This all sounds very
effective,buttherealitywasthatthe76-manSqnhaslimitedutilityasitwasusedtooperating
onlyatsection(8-man)strength.
OnChristmasEve2002IfoundmyselfbeingbriefedatRAFHoningtonontheSqnsemergencydeploymenttoKuwaitandthenIraqinsupportoftheJointHelicopterForce.Inordertogive
me a full-Sqns-worth of manpower my two ights were augmented with two ights from 63 Sqn
RAFRegt,otherwiseknownastheQueensColourSquadron(QCS),basedatRAFUxbridge.In
additionIwouldreceive15Auxiliaries(10%ofthetotal)totopuptheSqnstrength.TheSqnwas
tobereadytodeployinshortorder,infactthemainbodydeployedinearlyMarch2003.The
challengewastounitethetwohalvesoftheSqnundermySqnHQ,(whilstbased600milesapart
intheUK),andtraintoastandardtobeabletooperateinIraqinsupportoftheJHF.TheJHFwas
notanorganisationwithwhich51SqnRAFRegthadtrainedbeforeandsoIwasunfamiliarwith
theirSOPs.Equipmentissuessuchasvehicles,weapons,nightvisionaidsandcommunications
had to be matched to the skills level of individuals. QCS had no vehicle eet so our 40-odd Land
Rovers and trailers had to be put on trains south for them. Range qualication shoots had to
beundertakeninavarietyofweaponssystemsassumingthatwecouldbooktherangesatno-
26FromWgCdrBeckley,OC51RAFRegtSqn,OpTELIC.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
29/100
2
notice.Nottheidealpreparationforwar!
SittingontheborderthenightbeforethegroundwarstartedIcouldseethewholeSqn
convoylaidoutinthedesertlikepiecesspreadoverthesquaresofachessboard.Theammunition
hadbeenborrowed,inthemaincourtesyofourRAFRegtcontactsatAliAlSalem.Desert
clothinghadbeenre-allocatedbetweentheSqntoensurethateveryonehadatleastoneset
ofdesertdpmclothing.OurNBCdetectorshadbeensharedoutamongstotherunitsbutwe
hadatleastthecorrectNBCclothing.GroundIntelligencehadbeengenericandlackeddetail
onourobjective,thetownofSafwan.Weweretooccupyadesertedlandingground(wherethe
IraqissurrenderedtoSchwarzkopfin1991)justnorthof theIraq/Kuwaitborder.Ihadmade
fulluseofTACIMINTWGstaffatAliAlSalemwhohadbeenabletoprovidemewithimagery
oftheexactroutethatweweretouseacrosstheborder.MyleadsectionsallhadA4bindersof
thisimagerytohelpnavigatetheway.Indeed,throughoutthenexttwomonthswehadfrequent
assistancefromTACIMINTWG,egforouroccupationofBasraairport,theimagesallowedus
to see with our eyes what awaited us and allowed us to make up aireld crash maps ready for
defenceoperations.COMBRITFORtoldmeontwooccasionsthathewasappalledthattheArmycouldnotgetimageryfromairassets.Moreagilitysomewhereinthechainwasnecessary
butitpaidtobeair-aware.
OuroperationsatSafwanwerebreadandbuttertotheRAFRegt.Workingalongsidethe
USMarinesofthe272MarineWingSupportSquadronandourownTacticalSupplyWing,Iwas
abletocoordinatethedefenceofthelandinggroundandensuredtheprotectionoftheUSand
RAFhelicoptersthatpassedthroughforFuelandAmmunition.Therewasnodoctrine,noTTPs
andnocoalitionexercisestoprepareusforthisoperation;Ijustappliedcommonsense.The
challengewas toovercomethe effortsofthe SaddamFedayeen andBaathPartyactiviststo
whom the helicopters and fuel presented a high-prole target. The obstacles were presented
bythelackofintelligencethatImentioned,(intheendwegatheredourownlocalintel),the
rapidroulementofBritishunitsassignedtooverseetheDivisionalRearArea,inwhichwewere
located,thelackofacoordinatedCIMICeffortinourareawhichannoyedtheIraqis,andthe
randomhumanitarianaideffortslargelysponsoredbytheKuwaitis.OurdefenceofSafwanwas
proved by the 100% ying sortie success rate. Our co-ordination with Div Rear HQ, PWRR and
theRMPgaveusthelinkagesweneededwithourneighbouringunits.Wewontheheartsand
mindsofthelocalfarmersandtownspeoplebyusingourmedicalandEODassetstocometo
their aid. We co-ordinated detailed food and water re-supply around the aireld and ensured the
safedeliveryofwaterfromBritishForcestankersintoSafwantown.ThepresswewelcomedandescortedaroundSafwanandthefarmingcommunities.
Within short weeks of deployment the Sqns ights had knitted together to form a capable
sqn. Not fully capable by the book by any means, but good enough for purpose. Ofcers and
NCOsusedtheirinitiativeateveryphase:procuringrationsfromtheUSForces;sectioncdrs
trainingtheirpersonnelintheeveningsandateveryvehiclehalt;designingourownVehicleCheck
Points tomeetthethreat; engineeringpersonnelmodifyingvehiclestoovercome thethreat
ofcheese-wiresdesignedtobeheadoursentries;aSqnshopinIraqsellingsuppliesboughtin
Kuwait;asatellitedishtobringtheTVnewstothetents;generatorswhichappearedfromout-
withtheServicessupplychain;thelayoutoftheSqnleaguerallowingthesectionstoliveoffof
theirLandRoversandtrailersintheopenair;hygienedrillsthatwereadheredtoandminimised
thecasualtiesfromdiarrhoeaandvomiting;asectioncdrsavingthelivesofthetwogunmenwho
red on his patrol and who were then cut down by the re from his section.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
30/100
0
Intheenditallworked.Wekeptthehelicoptersprotectedfromthegroundthreat.Itwas
messy;therewerenegligentdischarges,overturnedvehiclescausinginjury,andavehiclegothit
byamineandthecrewhadtoberescued,(justlikethetrainingvideo).Itwasnotthewaywe
hadplannedtogotowar.YetnooneonmySqndiedorsufferedseriousinjury.Theleadership
qualities imbued in the ofcer and NCO cadre enabled the Sqn to take advantage of every
opportunity in whatever situation. I like to think I was a exible leader; I probably was not as
exible as I thought I was! The important message is for commanders at all levels to listen to
andusethepersonwithexperiencetoundertakeatask;inthatwayyoumakethemostofyour
assetsandencouragepeopletocontributetothemission.
A HARRIER MISSION COMMANDER27
In2003IwenttoIraqasanexecwith3Sqn.TheAirTaskingOrdersimplyprimedusforNon
TraditionalISRwithaback-upofon-callCAS.Therewerenogiventargetsorweaponswewere
simplyaskedtocarrythebestavailable.Thetripswouldlastanythingbetween4and6hrs.
Ononemission,my third intheatre,we got airbornewith instructions togotoan ISR
missioninourareaofresponsibility.Wetankedsoastobefulloffuelforanycontingencyand
almostimmediatelytheAWACS28taskedustogotoAnNajaf,whichwasoutsideourareaof
operations![AcrossintheeasternpartofIraq]Wehadnomapsforitandhadnotconsidered
thatpartoftheoperation.OnarrivalatAnNajafwecontactedaforwardaircontrollerwho
wassomewhatupset.HewaspartofasmallteamofconventionalAmericanforcesandtheyhad
justfoundabigweaponscacheinthetown.TheyhadbeentryingtoloadsomeoftheRPGs29
ontothebackoftheirHumveeswhenthelocalmilitiahadarrivedtostopthem.Themangaveus
the standard forward air controller talk-on and nished with the non-standard comment If you
seeanythinginthetownthatisntus,youcanbombit.Wemanaged,afteracoupleofminutes
negotiation,topersuadehimtochangehismindandproposedthatwedoalittleairpresence
toseeifwecouldsplitupthebadguysandmakethemrunaway.Thenwedroppeddowntolow
levelandtacticallyairpresencedthetown.ThisgavetheAmericansalittlebitofbreathingspace
togetontheirHumveesandlegit.
Bythisstagewewereoutoffuelandsowentbacktothetankerhopingthatweweregoing
tobere-taskedbackto scud-hunting. Just beforewehadcompleted therefuelling,wewere
taskedtosupportsometroops[backintheoriginalareaofresponsibility].ItwasagainCASfortroopsincontact.Wegotourbombsawaytohelpoutthoseboysandreturnedtothetankerfor
athirdtime.Offthetankerweweretaskedrighttotheedgeofourareaofresponsibilitywhere
weareoutofcontactwithourC2soworkingprettymuchonourown.Wewerealsoverytight
forfuel.Wegotincontactwiththegroundforces,droppedanotherbombandsortedthingsout
beforereturningbacktobase.BythattimemycockpithadbeenaprettywickedplaceandIwas
inneedofabreak!
Therewasnopre-planningandonlyafewdecisionswerepre-emptedontheground.We
simplyhadtogetairbornewithamapofIraqandhopeforthebest.Everysortieinvolvedself-
assessment from the cockpit of positive identication of the target; in-cockpit application of the
27FromSqnLdrHarveySmythspresentationtotheRAFLeadershipConference2005.28AirborneWarningandControlSystem.29RocketPropelledGrenades.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
31/100
Risk/Benefit
TimeSituation
Awareness
1
Law Of Armed Conict (is this proportional, is this effect necessary?); in-cockpit evaluation of
collateraldamageandcontinuousselfassessmentoftheRulesOfEngagement.Allthishappening
in the cockpit whilst integrating with ground manoeuvring Forces, deconicting from organic res
suchasMLRS30andcontinuouslyavoidingthethreat.
Cockpitleadersarenowoperatinginaworldwherereducingthekillchain,orsensorto
shootertime,canhavestrategiceffect.Todothistheyaremakingmoreandmoredecisionsin-
cockpit,sometimeswithadegreeofcalculatedriskbecauseoftheambiguityofthefogofwar;
decisionsthatinpreviousyears,mayhavebeenmadeinaCAOCorsomeC2buildinglocated
awayfromthecontrolledchaosofthebattlespace.
THE COMMANDER WHOSE AGILITY WAS SEVERELY TESTED31
ThatwewerelikelytogotowarinIraqwasonalimiteddistributionforseveralmonths
beforeoperationTELIC.ThismeantthatIhadtore-focusourpre-deploymentactivities,withoutmaking it obvious thatOps were imminent. InmyMBA studies, case histories proved that
communicationwas a common theme in taking people toplaces theymightnot otherwise
choosetogoleadingthem.IhadtoleadthemtoaplacethatIcouldenvisagebutwithout
tellingthemanything,indeedcoveringthetruthwithmistruthsaboutprudentpreparationetc.
This period of several months was certainly a time where my ability to be self-sufcient and
robustasaleaderwereputtothetest.
ForOpTELICalltheMarhamsqncdrshadtodeploytoAliAlSalemwhichrenderedC2ad
hocatbest.Ihadtoadaptandmakedowithcommandarrangementswhichdidnotmeetwith
mycreativesubconsciousandthisdidcausemetobeunsettled.Itwasrighttosuppressmy
innerthoughtsonC2asIconsideredthearrangementsthebestcourseofactionandnothreat
tooperationalcapability.HereIbelievetherearethreedimensionstoconsiderwithinatriangle
ofvariablepressuresontheagileairmanthatshapeandpressurisehisorheractions:
With pressure to act rapidly, there can be a propensity to act before sufcient Situational
Awareness is available or without due consideration of the risk or benet of ones actions. But as
SituationalAwarenessbuildsovertimethemomenttomaketheoptimumimpactcanbelostor
thepositiveimpactreduced.Everydayinhisorhercareer,theagileairmanbalancesthetriangle
ofpressurestoactdecisively.
31FromOC9SqnonOpTELIC.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
32/100
2
DuringthecombatphaseofOpTELIC,myrolebecamemorefocusedonleadingbyexample
with time allocated to supporting my ground personnel who were working in difcult conditions.
UnderthreatofSSM32attacksandwithoutadequateNBCprotection.
WhentheNo2inmyformation,oneofmycrews,werekilled,IremainedondutysothatI
couldspeakwiththeoncominggroundcrewshift(whohadseenthecrewoff)inordertoallow
themtoexploretheirfeelingsandexorcisetheirgrief.Ipartlysuppressedmyownemotional
feelingswhichIbelievedtobeinthebestinterestsofleadingthroughtheepisode.Iwasopen-
mined enough to realise that each individual affected by the event needed to react as they saw t,
butintermsofgettingonwiththejob,Iwantedtoplaceatimepressureonthemtodothatand
getbacktodoingthesuperblyprofessionaljobIrequiredofthem.Ididnotappreciatehavingto
askforthereportintotheincident2yearsaftertheeventIfeltthatitshouldhavebeenmade
availabletomeimmediatelyitwascomplete.IfeltIwaspreventedbyprocessfromfullyvoicing
myconcernsoverthefragilityofourgreatestassetourpeople.
Mypersonalexperienceandsummationisthatthefeaturesoftheagileairmanaretangible
buttheycanbeaffectedbyintangiblemeans.Inordertoretainthemalleabilityandbalance
betweenanautomatonandaspiritedleaderwhofullyunderstandsmissioncommand,thereisa
needtonurtureandprotect,bywayofappropriaterecognitionandreward(betheyintrinsicor
extrinsic).Withoutappropriatelubricationtheagileairmancanbecomebrittle.
A FG OFF SUPPLIER33
InJanuary2001theRAF,undertheauspicesof ISAFhadrestoredtheoperatingcapability
ofKabulinternationalairportsuchthatitwascapable,notonlyofprovidingtheonlylineof
communication to support ISAF but, more crucially, providing a means by which aid could ow
into Kabul. Equally, it was the means by which the ever-growing army of diplomats and ofcials
could travel with reasonable speed and security. Not surprisingly the airport attracted the
attentionofthoseopposedtotheinterimnationalgovernmentand,throughoutFebruaryand
Marchof2001,attemptsweremadetoshelltheairportusingimprovisedmortarsandrocket
launchers. On the night of 30 April, the dissidents achieved their rst success, dropping 107mm
rocketroundsontotheoperatingapronandrunway.
Whilst the post attack recovery process was underway, notication was received that twoC130 aircraft were inbound, one requiring fuel as a matter of urgency, and one to ofoad RM
Commandos.Thearrivalofthesetroopshadbeensubjecttoamyriadofdelaysandpressurewas
mounting to complete their inload. Despite an expectation that the aireld may imminently come
underfurtherattack,thedecisionwastakentolandbothaircraftundertotalblackoutforarapid,
engines running, refuel and unload an unusual procedure fraught with its own difculties. Once
the aircraft were on the ground, speed was to be of the essence and Flying Ofcer Watson, the
APOD Movements Ofcer, was responsible for co-ordinating the rapid refuelling and unloading
of both aircraft. She quickly assembled her movements team in full ghting order and led them
out onto the apron. Under her leadership the rst aircraft was refuelled and dispatched in under
thirtyminuteswithoutincident;shethenpreparedforthesecondaircraftwhichwasfollowing
on quickly behind. The Royal Marines on the second aircraft were aware that the aireld had
32Surfacetosurfacemissile.33FromLeadership:AnAnthology,RAFLeadershipCentre2005,VisionandDecisiveness,AirCdreAbbott.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
33/100
just been under attack. Disorientated by an unfamiliar, pitch black aireld and the deafening roar
ofC130engines,theMarineswereinavulnerableposition.Astheaircrafttaxiedinandthe
ramp dropped, Flying Ofcer Watson wasted no time in organising the Commandos and ensured
theirrapiddisembarkationtoanearbyshelter.Despitetherisksinvolved,andurgencyrequired,
to dispatch the aircraft for its onward journey, Flying Ofcer Watson had the forethought and
judgementtoquicklyorganisethere-loadingoftwopalletsontotheC130soasnottowaste
theoutboundsortie.
A WO FIREMAN34
My section was responsible for providing re cover at Kabul [Op FINGAL 2002], but a lot
of our time was spent on non re duties force protection and guarding issues and so on. The
setup at Kabul had a military area and a non-military side but the re section was located next
tothenon-militaryactivity.Onthedayinquestionasituationhadbeenbrewingthroughoutthat
dayasnoaircrafthadtakenoffforthepastfewdaysandacrowdofpeoplehadgatheredonthedispersalandwerebecomingveryagitated.LateoninthedaytheMinisterforTransportandhis
aidehadbeenshowntoanaircraftthatwasreadytodepartandthecrowdbecameveryrowdyin
response to this, ring into the air and shouting. They crowded round the aircraft, which already
haditsenginesrunning,andthena fewofthemmanagedtobreakintoit,attackingandkilling
theMinisterforTransportandthrowinghisbodyinthebackofataxi.Onseeingthis,hisaide
andanothermanbeganrunningawayacrossthedispersalpursuedbytherioters.Allthisactivity
wastakingplaceoutsideourareaofresponsibilityandIhadreceivedordersinthebuildupof
thesituationthatwewerenottogetinvolvedbut,astheeventsescalatedandthecrowdmoved
closertowardsus,Isawthatactionwasnecessary.
Iformedmymanpowerintoa lineandalthoughwewereonlytwelvepeople,wewereof
coursearmed,andsoimmediatelylookedquitethreatening.Atthatstageinmymindwewere
purelyactingasadeterrentandguardforourareaofresponsibility,butfairlyquicklythetwo
men who were eeing from the crowd saw us and started running towards us. I had to make a
decisionthenandthereastowhattodoand,inmyminditstoppedbeingadecisionbasedon
areasofresponsibility,andbecameamoraldecisionwherepeoplesliveswereatstake.Ishouted
orders to move forward, by this stage there was only about fty feet between the crowd and
usbutwemanagedtosurroundthetwomenandgetthemtosafety.Ithinkthesightof,albeita
smallnumber,butagroupnevertheless,ofmilitarywelldisciplinedpersonneladvancinginawellorderedmannerwasenoughtoensurethesafetyofthetwomenindanger.Thesituationhadthe
potentialtoescalatefurtherandbecomequitenastybutoncewemovedforwardinadecisive
way,shoutingordersandmakingastancewewereluckyandtheybackeddown.
A SGT ARMOURER35
Intermsofmanpower,[5131(BD)Sqn]isaroundthesizeofthegroundcrewelementof
aTornadoSqn;thatis,about105men.Ourtraditionalrolehasbeentiedcloselytothemain
operating bases, as we are responsible for keeping airelds clear and operable. For that purpose
weareequippedwitharmouredSpartanvehicles.SincetheRAFRegimentlosttheirarmoured
capabilityafewyearsagowearenowtheonlyarmouredunitwithintheRoyalAirForce.Although
34Ibid,VisionandDecisiveness,WOAndyPittock.35FromAirForceLeadership:BeyondCommand?ExposedLeadership!RAFLeadershipCentre2005.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
34/100
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
35/100
ourown,soitwasexcellentresponsibilitytodothatandImjustanSAC.
The most difcult incident I had to deal with was when we had civilians with us and we were
goingintoBasra,ledbyanArmyCaptainwhosemapreadingskillswereabitsketchy;weended
upgoingintowardsahostilevillageandofcoursealltheciviliansstartedtopanicbecausethey
didn'thaveanyweapons.Weendedupdowninaravinegoingthewrongwayuptheroad.
Thatwasquiteunnervingbutitwasourresponsibilityaspacketcommanderstomakesurethe
civilianswerealrightintheircabsbecausetheywereallshoutingandpanicking.Ineverthought
I'dbeabletodothat,buthavingbeengiventhechanceandprovingtomyselfthatIcandoit,gave
me a lot more condence and I think it's given a lot of other lower ranks more condence in
themselves.Itsmademethinkthatanyonecanbeagoodleaderputintherightposition,inthe
rightsituationandgivenachance.
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
36/100
8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.
37/100
AgiliTY A hiSToricAl PerSPecTiVe
Mr Seb Cox
I thinkthatonemajorproblemthatwe faceintryingtoconsideragilityin ahistorical
contextisthat,intermsofterminologyandjargonitisaveryrecentadditiontoourlexicon.
In times past, and not so recent past either, you would be hard pressed to nd any RAF ofcer
exceptaPEdOreferringtoagilityasapositiverequirement.
Thishistoricalconsiderationwillthereforeattempttopickuponthemessuchasadaptability,
robustness, exibility, and responsiveness at the individual and organisational levels, together with
organisationalculture.SohowdoestheRAFratehistorically?
Thestory,asonemightexpect,isfarfromconstantovertime.Attheverystartofourstory
Ithinktherearelegitimatecriticismstobemade.TheveryearlydevelopmentofairpowerintheUKwasratheruneven.Therewere,Ithinkseveralreasonsforthis.Thisstemmedinpartfrom
two factors, rst the military conservatism of the British Army and Royal Navy at the time both
weresomewhathideboundinstitutionswhichwerenotparticularlywelladaptedinstitutionally
or organisationally to adopting new, indeed potentially revolutionary, technologies. Secondly,
aeronauticsatthetimewasveryclearlyanextremelydangerouspursuit,andwasthusayoung
mansgame.Acombinationwherebyknowledgeandenthusiasmareconcentratedatajuniorrank
levelwithinapowerfullyhierarchicalandsomewhatconservativeorganisationisnotconducive
tothoughtfulandrapidprogress.IthinktheearlyhistoryoftheRFCandRNAS,particularlypre-
war, shows a number of relatively junior ofcers trying simultaneously to demonstrate the utility
ofanewtechnologywithintheframeworkofexistingmilitaryroles,notablyreconnaissance,to
some rather sceptical seniors. At the same time these self-same junior ofcers were attempting
toexploreandextendtheenvelopeofpotentialairpowerrolestodirectattacketc.andtodo
so when neither the weapons, nor frankly the aircraft, were sufciently capable. It is a difcult task
simultaneouslytobothproselytiseandmaintainarapidpaceofdevelopmentwithoutexposing
ones ank to the sceptics all too ready to pour scorn on ones efforts should they fall short in
somerespectorother.
The aviation pioneers also ran across inuences other than scepticism which were far from
benign. Thus, we nd the early structure of the Royal Flying Corps, as originally proposed by
the Standing Sub-Committee of theCommitteeof ImperialDefencewas to be amodel ofjointery, intended to have a Naval Wing, a Military Wing and a unied Central Flying School 1,but
israpidlyunderminedbyinter-servicerivalrywhichdestroysthisstructureandeventuallysees
theformationofaseparateRoyalNavalAirServicewhichgoesitsownway.Originally,theWar
Ofce had agreed that it held responsibility for the air defence of the UK, including London itself
andimportantmilitarysitessuchasRNdockyards,WoolwichArsenal,munitionsfactoriesetc.As
late as June 1914, just weeks before the outbreak of war, the War Ofce had no scheme for home
defencebutinsisted thatit remained their responsibility andthatany availableNaval aircraft
should operate under Army control. At the same time War Ofce plans called for the despatch of
allavailablesquadronstoFranceontheoutbreakofwar,andwhenwarcameinAugusttheyduly
decampedenmasseoverthehorizonleavingjustafewsecondlineaircraft,noneofwhichwere
armedwithanythingmorelethalthanthecrewspersonalweapons.Whilstthiswasanimpressive
examp
Recommended