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Innovation, Transformation, and War
US COIN Operations in Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2007
By James A. Russell
Figure 3-1
CAMP
GANNON
CAMP AL QAIM
TOA (Sept 10) DISPOSITION
KHE SAHN
LIMA
3/6(-)
INDIA
sqd(+)
DISPOSITION POST STEEL CURTAIN
(Nov 12)
COP SOUTH
CAMP GANNON
CHAPULTEPEC
CAMP AL QAIM
CHOSIN
AAV
LIMA
AAV
KILO
WHISKEY
LIMA
GUAM
TF 36
LAR
TINIAN
KHE SAHN
AAV
TARAWA
INDIA
LIMA
BEIRUT
HUE CITYLAR
SAIPAN
BELLEAU WOOD
TRIPOLI
WHISKEY
IWO JIMA
KILO
LAR
GUADALCANAL
INDIA
COP NORTH
CO 4-14
The disposition of US forces in the Al Qaim region in September 2005 (left) and the spreading out of those forces (right) following the deployment of the 3-6 Marines in the fall of 2005.
Figure 3-2
UNK
Major Tribes Of Al Qaim Region
T1 VillageT1 Village
JughayfaJughayfa
: Abu Mahal
: Al Tahi
: Al Jeshamy
: Al Salmani
: Al Hardani
: Karbuli
: Mixed
Tribal breakdown in Western Anbar in late 2005.
Figure 3-3
STRATEGIC to TACTICAL LOOSTRATEGIC to TACTICAL LOO
Security
Transition
Governance
Economic
Development
Communicating
SECURITY
GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
•CF PRESENCE
•IA CAPABILITY
•IP CAPABILITY
•AIF SUPPRESSION
•ATMOSPHERICS
•JUDICIAL SYSTEM
•POLICE STATIONS
•LOCAL LEADER ENGAGEMENT
•CIVIC INFRASTRUCTURE
•POINT OF ENTRY
•PHOSPHATE PLANT
•CEMENT FACTORY
•CAG/PRDC INITIATIVES
STRATEGIC EFFECTS:
Terrorists defeated and Insurgents neutralized.
Representative government that promotes national unity.
Strengthened rule of law.
Meet basic needs.
Economic reforms spur development.
International support for Iraq increased.
Enhanced understanding of Coalition efforts.
Wedge driven.
Capable ISF assume security lead.
NESTED
Logical lines of operations, or LOOs, developed by 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment in the spring of 2006.
Figure 3-4
3. Economic Development
Sad
ah
Husa
yba
Kar
abila
h
Jura
y’Ji
bU
bay
di
Ram
ana
2. Governance
1. Security
LINES OF OPERATIONBY REGION
Zel
la
C. IP Capability
A. CF Presence
1. Security
Sad
ah
Hu
sayb
ah
Kara
bilah
Ju
ray’Jib
Ubaydi
LINES OF SECURITY
B. IA Capability
D. AIF Suppression
E. Atmospherics
Ram
ana
Zella
C. Local Ldr Engagement
A. Judicial System
2. Governance
Sad
ah
Husa
ybah
Kar
abila
h
Jura
y’Ji
bU
bay
di
LINES OF GOVERNANCE
B. Police Stations
D. Civic Infrastructure
Ram
ana
Zel
la
A. POE (closed)
3. Economic Development
Sad
ah
Hu
sayb
ah
Kara
bilah
Ju
ray’Jib
Ubaydi
B. Super Phosphate Plant
LINES OF ECONOMIC DEV
E. CAG/PRDC Initiatives
C. Cement Factory
Ram
ana
Zella
D. Agriculture
1-7 analyses of the towns in its area of operations according to its LOOs.
Figure 3-5
Project METROProject METRO
Phoenix PD
Investigative
Database
LAPD
Law
Enforcement
TTPs &
X-IED
Lockheed Martin
Tactical Surveillance
Equipment
1stBN, 7thMAR
Law Enforcement-
COIN Operations
Investigative Database: CopLink
Summary of the major elements of “Project Metro” used by 1-7 in adapting law enforcement techniques to its mission in the Al Qaim region.
Figure 3-6
Insurgent attack trends against 1-7 Marines in al Qaim region December 2005-July 2006.
Figure 3-7
Well-trained and Disciplined US Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and MarinesC
om
bat O
peratio
ns
(LOO
: Security)
Civil-M
ilitary Op
eration
s(LO
O: G
overnance & E
conomic D
evelopment)
Iraqi S
ecurity F
orces
(LOO
: Security &
Transition)
Info
rmatio
n O
peratio
ns
(LOO
: Com
munication)
Stable & Secure Environment in AO SABER
Functioning Local Governments
& Economies
Sovereign Iraq
Force Protection at COPs Rawah, Anah (and BP Reyanah) , and North
COIN METHODOLOGY:
Counterinsurgency methodology developed by 4-14 during its deployment in Anbar in the fall of 2005.
Figure 3-8
The 4-14 intelligence-operations target fusion cycle used in Anbar in 2005-2006.
Figure 3-9
Details of 4-14 cache find in Anbar, February 2006.
Figure 3-10
NON-LETHAL EFFECTS
EOFSEP – OCT: 4
NOV – MAR: 1
VOTINGNational Referendum: 1389
National Elections
Rawah: 4264Ramana: 4850
TIPSInternet Cafes, TCPs,
HandbillsRawhtips@yahoo.com
Anahtips@yahoo.com
FALSE
CAMERASReduced attacks vic Govt Bldg
SEP – DEC: 6
JAN – MAR: 0
IP SCREENINGRawah: 54 Candidates
31 Qualified
FLASH CMOCSRawah, Hassah,Anah, ReyanahMOST WANTED
POSTERS
Internet Cafes
TCPs
Posters
TEAM GOODWILL
2000 Blankets,
School Supplies,
Heaters, Meals,
Water
RAWAH GOVERNANCEFunctioning City Council,
Recognized Mayor
Iraqi Police Chief
Provincial Council Rep
ANAH GOVERNANCEFunctioning City Council,
Recognized Mayor
Provincial Council Rep
DISTRIBUTED
2,000 RADIOS
864 AM
Summary of 4-14 non-lethal activities during its COIN operations in Anbar.
Figure 4-1
States contributing units to the 2/28 Brigade Combat Team during its deployment to Anbar in 2005 and 2006.
Figure 4-2
Major 2/28 bases in and around Ramadi in 2005-2006.
Figure 4-3
Ready First!AS OF 3 MAR 07
UNCLASSIFIED
3
16th EN 2-3 FA
1-37AR 2-37AR 1-36IN 501st SPT
1ST BRIGADE HQ
RFCT SUBORDINATE UNITS
1-9 IN
FT Carson, CO
1/6 Marines
Camp Lejeune, NC
1-77AR
The major combat elements of the 1/1 Brigade Combat Team (left) and their scheme of deployment in and around Ramadi in 2006-2007.
Figure 4-4
Ready First!AS OF 3 MAR 07
UNCLASSIFIED
6
SHABAN
ALBU THIYAB
ALBU RISHA
ALBU SHILB, JULIB
ALBU
ALI JASSIM
ALBU
THIYAB
ALBU FARAJ
ALBU MARAI
ALBU AETHA
MIXED
MIXED
JANABI
SODA
GHANAM
MAHAL
HAIABSA
ALBU HAZIMALBU FAHAD
TAHA
BALI
KALIFAH
RUBAIT
MAWRISHBAYL
ALBU
AJUR
TAHA
ALBU
AJUR
HAZIM
HUSAYN
THALAL
TRIBAL COOPERATION JUN 06
ALBU OBAIDALBU
FAHAD
FADHAWAI
ALBU ASSAF
LAKE
HABANIYAHALBU
FAHAD
CHILIB
AWI
ALWAN ALBU ALWAN
ALBU JABBAR
Ready First!AS OF 3 MAR 07
UNCLASSIFIED
8
ALBU ASSAF
SHABAN
ALBU THIYAB
ALBU RISHA
ALBU SHILB,
JULIB
ALBU FARAJ
ALBU AETHA
ALWAN
MIXED
MIXED
JANABI
ALBU JABBAR
SODA
ALBU OBAIDALBU
FAHAD
GHANAM
MAHAL
HAIABSA
ALBU HAZIMALBU FAHAD
TAHA
BALI
ALBU ALWAN
KALIFAH
RUBAIT
MAWRISHBAYL
ALBU
AJUR
TAHA
ALBU
AJUR
HAZIM
HUSAYN
THALAL
TRIBAL COOPERATION JAN 07
FADHAWAI
Al Anbar Awakening50 Sheikhs – Tribal Council
First OBJ = Defeat AQIZ
2nd = Work in Rule of Law
Provide 90+ % IP Recruits
Tribes turn on AQIZLocal nationals start
killing known terrorists
on our target lists
Sheikh Albu Ali Jasim
Murdered by AQIZ
21 AUG 06
Albu Soda FightSheikh Jasim Mohammed
Stops all IDF on Corregidor
AQIZ attacked on 25NOV06
LAKE
HABANIYAHALBU MARAI
ALBU
ALI JASSIM
ALBU
THIYAB
ALBU
FAHAD
CHILIB
AWI
The growth of tribal support during 1/1’s deployment in and around Ramadi from June 2006-2007. Green areas represent tribal support; yellow partial support, and red non-supportive
Figure 4-5
The progression of 1-37’s operations in south central Ramadi is shown in these graphics from left to right as the battalion expanded its control over insurgent neighborhoods in the summer and fall of 2006.
Figure 4-6
5/12/2008 12:35
PM
Seize : COP Construction
NAI 5
OBJ OMAHA
II
G
G
..G
G
G
GI
DTG:SECRET//REL USA AND MCFIOVERLORD CONPLAN JUNO
1-37C
I
1-37B
I
C
1-37B
I
Decisive Point: when barriers
and fighting positions at the
COP are complete enough to
defeat a complex AIF attack.
Key Tasks:• Seize the buildings that will
comprise the COP
• Secure the area around the COP
and the route to it IOT prevent AIF
from disrupting construction.
Maintain that security until the OP
is capable of defeating a complex
AIF attack without reinforcement.
• Rapidly move construction and
barrier materials to the COP using
multiple secure routes.
• Quickly emplace barriers and
install life support required to
sustain a PLT (+)
Endstate: TF has established a
defensible COP with a secure
route connecting it to existing
TF ASRs.
5/12/2008 12:36
PM
Seize : COP Planning HPTs
• Reconnaissance & site selection
• Engineer estimate
• Transportation requirement estimate
• Prioritization of engineer effort
• Transportation & security plan
• Construction/transportation timeline
• Supervision of loading and download
• Construction
• Layered security & surveillance
The 1-37 combat outpost construction standard operating procedure used in the fall of 2006 in Ramadi.
Figure 4-7
The 1-37 “Census Loop” that related census activivties to ongoing operations.
Figure 4-8
Ready to Fight Since 1917 1
Combined TF 1/6 Current Disposition
IPIP
IPIP
IPIP
IPIP
IPIP
IPIPIP
IPIP
Iraqi Police Station (Enduring)
District Police Substation
District or Provincial IP Detachment
District Police Neighborhood Watch OP
Area of Police Control / Influence
IPIPIP
IPIPIP
IPIPIP
…2-1/7
…2-1/7
…2-1/7
…2-1/7
…2-1/7
…2-1/7
I
I I
2 1/7
I
B 6
I
C 6
II
1 6
B
MOHAWK
6
I
MOHAWK
6
I
6
I
A
C
B
B
IPIPIP
I
A 6
I
I
TF 1-9 INTF 1-77 AR
TF 2/5 MAR
TF 3-69 AR
...
......
...
IPIP
IP
IP
IP
IP IPIPC
IPIP
S-3Ready to Fight Since 1917 11
1/6 AUGMENTATION TEAMS“EXPANDED PERMANENT PARTNERSHIP”
B 6
I
C 6
IA 6
I
6
I
MOHAWK
ATAT
AT
AT
AT
AT
AT
AT
HEAVY
QRF
Al Warar
QatanaWest
Ramadi
Governor’s
Security Area
17th St
Provincial
IP
Azzizziyah
Jumayah
Thalat
Sharikah
Jumhori
AT
S-3
The disposition of the different 1-6 elements and its Iraqi partners in joint security stations in central Ramadi in 2006-2007.
Figure 4-9
Removal of rubble around the government center in central Ramadi initiated by 1-6 Marines in 2006-2007.
Figure 4-10
Ready to Fight Since 1917 8
•Iraqi District Police-led
operation of more than (500)
police from (6) police
stations and 1st PSF.
•10-Hour Operation resulted
in:
-Apprehension of (45)
known / suspected
insurgents.
-Discovery of several
weapons caches including:
•Assault Rifles
•Machineguns
•Mortar/Artillery Shells
•IEDs and IED-making
materiel
•Debriefing continues. IP
are reporting an
exaggerated 100 AIF KIA.
•Atmospherics extremely
positive—Iraqi Civilians
reported AIF activity / threats
to IPs throughout operation.
IP
IP
IP
ERU
IP
Operation OKINAWA (Phase 4)
Clearance of North Central Ramadi By ISF
Cache
Government Center
Mosque Entry
Sheikh Sittar
Arab Media
Interview
Ramadi General Hospital
Visit / Screening
IP
Details of Operation Okinawa in the spring of 2007 by the ISF and 1-6 Marines.
Figure 4-11
ASR Michigan
RAMADI JCC
West Central Ramadi District
Council Meeting
Line of Operation: Governance
Who: XO 1/6 and CA Team Leader
What: First meeting of the West Central
Ramadi District Council
When: 25MAR2007
Where: Ramadi JCC
Significance:
On 25 March 2007, XO 1/6 and CAG Team
Leader met with the West-Central Ramadi
District Council. There were 15 members in
attendance for this historical first meeting.
Districts represented; Al Warar, Jamiya,
Qatana and Sharikah. After introductions
and welcome, the group discussed the
purpose of the council as well as goals,
resources, and projects. The council
president, Sa’ad Hamad Sharqi, led the
discussion with Arif Mukhaibir Sayad. The
members of the council were very
enthusiastic about ideas for improvements.
Security, education, and employment as well
as water, electricity and basic services were
identified as important issues. All agreed the
first step is to clear the streets of trash and
rubble. They voted that the first 2 projects to
stem from this council will be rubble and trash
removal. Plans were made to have this
contracted before the next meeting. Bids will
be collected, voted on, and passed to Team 1
for processing. The council shared lunch and
all agreed that this was a great step forward.
We anxiously anticipate the next gathering.
Arif Mukhaibir Sayad, vice-president of the district council discuses his vision for the
district.
The meeting covered specific agenda items formally, then broke for lunch and tea.
Details of the first Ramadi district council meeting in March 2007 convened by 1-6 Marines.
Figure 4-12
Details on the 1-6 information operations program that featured use of loudspeakers in the Ramadi neighborhoods.
Figure 4-1314SEP06 – 03MAY07 Attacks
30 Day Weekly Avg (1)
60 Day Weekly Avg (7)
Cumulative Wkly Avg (31)
Ap
r 25 –
May 0
3
05
101520253035404550556065707580859095
100
Sep
14 -
Sep
20
Sep
28 -
Oct
04
Oct
12 -
Oct
18
Oct
26 -
No
v 0
1N
ov 0
9 -
No
v 1
5N
ov 2
3 -
No
v 2
9D
ec 0
7 -
Dec 1
3D
ec 2
1 -
Dec 27
Jan
04 -
Jan
10
Jan
18 -
Jan
24
Feb
02 -
Feb
08
Feb
16 -
Feb
22
Mar
01 -
Mar
08
Mar
15-
Mar
22
Mar
29-
Ap
r 05
Ap
r 11-
Ap
r 18
Complex Atk
VBIED
IDF
FIED
HIED
Gren
IRL
RPG
SAF
Operation
BELLEAU
WOODTOA
Operation
NEW
PROVIDENCE
(Al Warar
Substation
Build)
Operation
HUE CITY}
IP / ERU
Clear
Qatana /
Thaylat /
Shirikah
Districts
}
Operation
OKINAWA
Insurgent attack trends in the 1-6 Marines area of central
Ramadi from September 2006-April 2007.
Figure 4-13
Ready First!AS OF 3 MAR 07
UNCLASSIFIED
20
IRAQI POLICE IN RAMADIUNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
• IP RECRUITING IN JAN06 IN THE GLASS FACTORY WAS ATTACKED BY A SUICIDE BOMBER
• PREVIOUS UNIT CONTINUED IP RECRUITING IN THE GLASS FACTORY IN APRIL AND MAY06 DESPITE PREVIOUS ATTACK, RESULTING IN LIMITED SUCCESS
• JUN06 THE RFCT MOVED RECRUITING TO BLUE DIAMOND
• JUL06 RFCT HEAVY TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT BEGAN
• SEP06 TRIBAL “DONOR FATIGUE” WAITING FOR IP TRAINEES TO RETURN FROM JORDAN
• DEC06-JAN07 RFCT RECRUITED ERU RECRUITS FOR JORDAN (OVER 500)
• JAN07-FEB07 AO TOPEKA IP FORCE FORMALLY ADDS ANOTHER 740 IP (~370/SHIFT)
Rebuilding Ramadi’s police force during during 2006-2007.
Figure 4-14
Ready First!AS OF 3 MAR 07
UNCLASSIFIED
16
AIF ATTACK TRENDS IN AO TOPEKA
IRAQ STUDY GROUP INDICATES SITUATION IN IRAQ IS “GRAVE AND
DETERIORATING”; HOWEVER CONDITIONS IN RAMADI INDICATE OTHERWISE
DIRECT CONTACT (COMPLEX) ATTACK CAPABILITY IS DWINDLING
MOST COMMONLY USED WEAPON FOR AIF REMAINS IED ATTACKS. THESE,
ALTHOUGH DISRUPTIVE, ARE ALSO MOSTLY INEFFECTIVE
DOWN
67%DOWN
40%
DOWN
57%
DOWN
38%
Ready First!AS OF 3 MAR 07
UNCLASSIFIED
21
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN
LN
IP
IA
JOINT (US/IA)
US
RFCT CACHE FINDSREMOVING THE THREAT BEFORE IT CAN BE USED
IP PRESENT FORDUTY STRENGTH
1/1/7 IA & 3/1/7 IA
ASSUME BATTLE SPACE
JARAYSHI HIGHWAY
IP CHECK POINT
E. RAMADI IP STATION
ESTABLISHED
ISF HAVE DOUBLED OUR CACHE FINDS
• IRAQIS KNOW WHAT TO LOOK FOR WHEN SEARCHING FOR CACHES
• LOCALS WILL SHARE INFORMATION WITH IP BECAUSE IP ARE FROM THE LOCAL AREA
• THE INFORMANT WILL NOT BE MARKED AS A CF COLLABORATOR FOR TALKING TO IP.
• UNTRAINED IP INVESTIGATION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN CF INVESTIGATION BY VIRTUE OF
LANGUAGE/ CUSTOM BARRIER ALONEOPERATION SQUEEZE PLAY
DEC 06
Summary of insurgent activity and cache finds over the course of the 1/1 deployment in Ramadi during 2006 and 2007.
Figure 5-1
172nd SBCT laydown in Ninewa, Iraq, 2005-2006.
Figure 5-2
TRANSFORMATIONAL LOE
CIVIL MILITARY/INFO OPERATIONS LOE
SECURITY LOE
FORCE SUSTAINMENT LOE
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL
1ST QTR 2nd QTR 3rd QTR
CAMPAIGN METHODOLOGY
NE2/ COP
CLEAN-UP
NE2
COP
TF2-1OVERALL
ENDSTATE1.IA BNs ABLE TO CONDUCT INDEPENDENT SECURITY OPS
2. ESSENTIAL SERVICES FUNCTIONING IN 80% OF AO
3. AQIZ/CRIMINALS NEUTRALIZED IN AO LEGION
4. POPULACE VIEW GOVT. AS
LEGITIMATE AND ABLE TO PROVIDE BASIC NEEDS
5. POPULACE SUPPORT OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY IS ERODED
HIGHER HQ TASKINGS
QUARTERLY
ENDSTATES
QUARTERLY
ENDSTATES
QUARTERLY
ENDSTATES
QUARTERLY
ENDSTATES
QUARTERLY
ENDSTATES
THREATS =
◊ QJBR
◊AAS
◊CRIMINALS
◊UNEMPLOYMENT
◊ESSENTIAL
SERVICES
◊PUK
◊KDP
◊FUEL SHORTAGE
◊ETHNIC
VIOLENCE
◊CORRUPTION
DECISIVE
OPERATION
QUARTERLY
ENDSTATES
IMN RADIO
SERVICES
REDEPLOY
LOE
ENDSTATES
LOE
ENDSTATES
LOE
ENDSTATES
CJ2906
CJ2998
CJ2789
CJ2931
CWTG
NESTED IN HIGHER
ENDSTATE
BUILT BY QTR TO LEAD TO
BN/BDE ENDSTATE
2-1 Campaign plan overview used in operations in Mosul during 2005-2006.
Figure 5-3
Early Assessment of insurgent control over Mosul Neighborhoods at outset of 172nd COIN operations. Note: AAS is Ansar Al Sunna; QJBR is Tanzim Qa“idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or Al Qaeda in Iraq—the organization of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi.
Figure 5-4
Findings of pattern analysis during October 2005 by 2-1 in Eastern Mosul
Figure 5-5
2-1 Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance plan and its changing map of battle space in November 2005
Figure 5-6
Humint generated by 2-1 following changed handling of detainee questioning from September through October 2005
Figure 5-7
26 October 2005 directed raids on Al Sharkya IED Cells by 2-1 in Mosul.
Figure 5-8
Roll-up of the “Opel Gang” by 2-1 in the Fall of 2005 in Mosul.
Figure 5-9SITEMP 20 – 27 APR
$
VBIED
C2
BATTLE ZONE
DISRUPTION ZONE
VBIED
C2
s
SUPPORT ZONE
C2 ELEMENT
SAFE HOUSE
DA CELL
FACILITATOR
INTIMIDATION CELL
SNIPER CELL
SVBIED CELL
DETAINED
HUMINT TARGET
BAD MOSQUES
MORTAR CELL
SIGINT TARGET
DEVELOPING
TARGET
TASK: NEUTRALIZE CF & ISF
WITH THE USE OF OUTSIDE
TTPs.
PURPOSE: PREVENT POPULAR
SUPPORT OF THE IZ GOV’T &
CAUSE CIVIL UNREST.
TASK: CONDUCT CATASTROPHIC
ATTACKS VS CF & ISF IN BATTLE
& DISRUPTION ZONES.
PURPOSE: NEUTRALIZE CF & ISF
CONTINUED TO SUCCESS.
TASK: MURDER CF/ISF SUPPORTERS. KIDNAP
CIVILIANS. ASSASSINATE ISF.
PURPOSE: PREVENT GROWING
SUPPORT OF A UNIFIED IZ.
DEPICT AN UNSECURED
ENVIRONMENT. CAUSE ISF TO
DESERT.
TASK: RANSOM & EXTORT
WEALTHY CIVILIANS. SMUGGLE
WEAPONS. RECRUIT YOUTH.
TRANSPORT MARTYRS.
PURPOSE: ALLOW DA CELLS TO
CONTINUE OPS AGAINST CF/ISF
THROUGH FINANCING,
RECRUITMENT, & SMUGGLING.
DECISIVE OPERATION
C2, DA, INTIMIDATION CELLS
SHAPING OPERATION 1C2 & DA CELLS
SHAPING OPERATION 2C2, DA, INTIMIDATION CELLS
SUSTAINING OPERATION$, SMUGGLERS, INTIMIDATION
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
Example of a situational template, or SITEMP, used by 2-1 in the spring of 2006 during its operations in Mosul .
Figure 5-10
2-1 “Wheel of Stuff” to help guide target decision-making during its deployment.
Figure 5-11
L1
L3L2
L7
L4 L5
L6
AO LEGION ZONEsTARGETING FOCUS
TGT—LETHA COMBINED
TGT—LETHAL UNILATERAL
TGT—NON-LETHAL
PROJECTS
OTHER / CTR
CJ1119ABU AZIZ
CJ2020NE2 RUBBLE
CJ2114NE4 RUBBLE
CJ2356TRASH REMOVAL
CJ2114NE2A RUBBLE
CJ2910ABU HAJER
CJ3184GHAZI
CJ2951ABU ALI
CJ2909RCIED CELL
CJ2913ABU NOOR
CJ2912ABU AHMED
CJ1107YAHYA
CJ1108MUSTAFA 2
CJ2949ABU YOUNIS
CJ2930ABU BAKR
CJ1071ABU TAYYIB
QH2001BASAHAR
CJ2941FAREED CELL
CJ2938ABDUL SALAM
CJ2911SHEIK SBAK
QH2002YUSIF
CJ2901CIVIL RECON
CJ2900PUK/PDK COMPOUNDS
CJ2044E. TIGRIS SEC MTG
CJ2897SCHOOL PARTNER
QH2402SWT IED EMPLACE
CJ2901CIVIL RECON
CJ2907IP AWARD
CJ2100JT RADIO SHOW
CJ2121BRIDGE TCP
CJ2902SEWAGE PROJECT
QH2000SCHOOL DAMAGES
CJ2044N. TIGRIS SEC MTG
CJ2047N. TIGRIS REC MTG
CJ2043E. TIGRIS REC MTG
QH2403SWT IED EMPLACE
QH2301SWT IED EMPLACE
FIRST 3 WEEKS OF JAN 06FIRST 3 WEEKS OF JAN 06AS OF 6 JAN 06AS OF 6 JAN 06
INK SPOTINK SPOT
2-1 integrated targeting set in Mosul, January 2006.
Figure 5-12
Insurgent attack trends in eastern Mosul from November 2004-May 2006.
Figure 5-13
Growth of Company C 1-17’s area of operations in its “economy of force mission” in Mosul during the course of its deployment. Blue Stars Are Iraqi IP Stations; Green Stars Iraq Army Facilities
Figure 5-14
Standard organization of Strkyer company on left vs. the organization on right created by Company C, 1-17 during its deployment in Mosul in 2005-2006.
Figure 5-15
Example of small kill team operations by Company C, 1-17 in Mosul in May 2006.
Figure 5-16
The 4-11 Field Artillery area of operations south of Mosul.
Figure 5-17
The 4-11 integrated assessment of its area of operations. Key: red is negative; green positive; yellow is neutral
Figure 5-18SAMPLE COA DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
COA Analysis
The 4-11 “Targeting Wheel” as it applied to the economic situation in its area of operations.
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