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Escaping the “Polluter Pays” Trap: Financing Wastewater Treatment on
the Tijuana-San Diego Border
Itay FischhendlerDepartment of Geography, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem
Introduction•Addressing transboundary hazards require dividing the cost of pollution prevention•The solution often suggested is the “polluter pays principle” (PPP)
PPP means that the polluter should be the one to bear the cost of measures to prevent pollution.
•The PPP is endorsed by many international organizations and agreements
Among them:Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentThe European Union NAFTA Rio de Janeiro Declaration Agenda 21World Summit on Sustainable Development
Introduction (Cont)
The rationale behind it:- economic efficiency - environmental effectiveness- fairness
The problem:cost-sharing arrangements other than PPP are often adopted instead
Research aim:To explain the gap between theory and reality
Theoretical background
Infeasibility Ambiguity Unfairness Lack of property
rights
Lack of international
law
Barriers forPPP
Research hypothesis Cost-sharing principle
offset
Effect onAsymmetries
ignores
EffectiveWastewatertreatment
Ineffective wastewater treatment
Research MethodCycle II Cycle III
The evolution of cost-sharing, and its underlying reasons, of thepollution abaitment regime along Tijuana and San Diego
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
?
1958 2004time
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operation
Equally pays
Polluter pays
1938Years
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Point Loma TP
Years
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEqually pays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant
1958
Polluter pays
1938
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Emergency connection
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEquallypays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant1958 1965
Emergency connection
1938 YearsCost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Emergency connection
International WastewaterTreatment Plant
Ocean Outfall
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Emergency connection
International WastewaterTreatment Plant
Ocean Outfall
San Antonio TP
Proposed Rio Almar
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEquallypays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant
1958 1965
Emergency connection
1985
Tijuana wastewater
plant1938 Years
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Emergency connection
International WastewaterTreatment Plant
Ocean Outfall
Proposed Rio Almar
San Antonio TP
Defensive measures
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEquallypays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant
1958 1965
Emergency connection
1985
Tijuana wastewater
plant
Defensive measures
19871938
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Emergency connection
International WastewaterTreatment Plant
Ocean Outfall
Proposed Rio Almar
San Antonio TP
Defensive measures
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEquallypays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant
1958 1965
Emergency connection
1985
Tijuana wastewater
plant
Defensive measures
1987
International wastewater plant
1938 1996
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Emergency connection
International WastewaterTreatment Plant
Ocean Outfall
Proposed Rio Almar
San Antonio TP
Defensive measures
Conveyance system
1938
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEquallypays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant
1958 1965
Emergency connection
1985
Tijuana wastewater
plant
Defensive measures
1987 1996
International wastewater plant
1997
Conveyance system and
improve existing wastewater
system
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Treatment plant
Pump station
Collection system
Emergency connection
International WastewaterTreatment Plant
Ocean Outfall
Proposed Rio Almar
San Antonio TP
Defensive measures
Conveyance system
Proposed Bagaagua
1938
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEquallypays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant
1958 1965
Emergency connection
1985
Tijuana wastewater
plant
Defensive measures
1987 1996
International wastewater plant
1997
Conveyance system and
improve existing system
2004
Rehabilitation of Tijuana collection
system
Tijuana master plant and
Bajaagua project
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Cycle i Cycle II Cycle III
1938
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary
pays
outfall construction
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
outfall operationEquallypays
Tijuana early wastewater
plant
1958 1965
Emergency connection
1985
Tijuana wastewater
plant
Defensive measures
1987 1996
International wastewater plant
1997
Conveyance system and
improve existing system
2004
Rehabilitation of Tijuana collection
system
Tijuana master plant and
Bajaagua project
Cost-burden evolution of wastewater infrastructure along the San Diego/Tijuana border
Research hypothesis Cost-sharing principle
offset
Effect onAsymmetries
ignores
EffectiveWastewatertreatment
Ineffective wastewater treatment
----PPPEarly wastewater plant -Wastewater plant
Operationalcapacities
Willingness to pay
Ability to pay
Power asymmetry
Effect of cost-burden principle on Tijuana/San Diego asymmetries
Cost-burden principle
Agreementsigned
Projects built and programs adopted
1938
Polluter pays
Ability to pay & beneficiary pays
Cos
t-bu
rden
pri
ncip
le
Equally pays
1958
Tijuana early Wastewater
system
Emergency connection
1965 1985
TijuanaPlant
defense measures
1987 1996
InternationalWastewater
plantConveyance system
Rehabilitation of Tijuana collection
system
Tijuana master plant and Bajaagua project
2004
+---Soft version of PPP
Minute 222- Emergency connection
++++ Polluter pays the difference
Minute 283, 296
- IWTP
++-+ Equally paidNAFTA side agreement;
conveyance system; improve existing system; rehabilitation of tijuana collection system
+-+-beneficiary pays
- Bajaagua project- Tijuana Master plan
conclusions•To understand the choice of the cost-burden principle there is need to lookbeyond the traditional debate on what principle is efficient, fair and normative
•It requires focusing on how the principles affect the asymmetries and thus correspond with effectiveness differently
•It is the PPP that was to provide ineffective wastewater treatment since it ignored the existing political and economic asymmetries
•This is why the PPP was replaced with other principles that better addressed the asymmetries in in power, willingness and ability to pay and operationalcapacities.
LowHighMilitary, economic and political power
Power balance
LowHighAbility to enforce pretreatment
LowHighAvailability of technology
Operational capacities
LowHighEconomic capacities
LowHighUser fee collectionAbility to pay
LowHighWater qualitystandards
UpstreamDownstreamLocationWillingness to pay
TijuanaSan DiegoIndicatorsPollution control asymmetries
Pollution control asymmetries between San Diego and Tijuana
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