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THE DIFFERENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN
PATRIMONIAL AND FEUDAL SOCIETIES
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
of
The University of Guelph
BY
MARK MCKERROW
In partial fuffilment of requirements
For the degree of
Master of Arts
April, 1999
O Mark McKerrow, 1999
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ABSTRACT
THE DIFFERENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN PATRIMONLAL AND FEUDAL SOCETIES
Mark Wayne McKerrow University of Guelph, 1999
Advisor: Professor J. 1. (Hans) Bakker
This thesis deals with the role that feudalism plays in the emergence of capitalism.
In contrast to explanations emphasizing the nse of capitalism after the collapse of
feudalism, the emphasis here is on the development of capitalism within feudal societies.
These early capitdist developments are conceived of as managed estates ernploying free
labour. After defending and outlining the logic of the comparative method, two feudd
cases - Japan (1600-1868) and England (1 1004348) - are compared to two patrimonial
cases - The Ottoman Empire (1450-1700) and China (1368-1644). A neo-Webenan list
of preconditions for capitalism is used to direct the cornparison.
It is found that al1 four cases possess the preconditions necessary for capitalist
agnculnird conceived of as managed estates. While the preconditions have not led to
managed estates in the patrimonial cases to the extent they did in the feudal cases, the
reasons for this do not seem to be related to the feudal-patrimonial distinction.
In The Ottoman Empire managed estates are discouraged by the central
govemment's policy of maintaining a landholding class of independent cultivators - a
policy not inherent to patrimonial societies - which Iimits available labour for managed
estates. In Ming China a combination of population pressure and the requirements of wet
nce production, which made sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy economicdy
rational, served to discourage rnanaged estates.
The comparative method is discussed in light of the findings, and is found to be a
valuable approach if properly employed. The value of the use of negative cases is
stressed. The necessity of introducing new cases to test existing explmations and
possible caveats of cornparison are discussed.
1
Acknowledgements
1 would like to thank my advisor .J. 1. (Hans) Bakker for his encouragement and
support during my undergraduate and graduate programs in sociology. I would ais0 like
to th& Frans Schryer and Stan Barrett who were on my thesis cornmittee and both
offered vaiuable criticism and support during my graduate program.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Historical Comparative Sociology ................................................. 6
Chapter 3: Approaches to the Developrnent of Capitalism ................................... 12
Chapter 4: The Preconditions for Capitalism ........................................................ 25
Chapter 5: Categorizing the Cases ........................................................................ 38
Chapter 6: Presence/Absence of the Preconditions for Capitdism ....................... 69
Chapter 7: Causes of the Differential Development of Capitalist Agriculture .... -90
Chapter 8: Discussion ............................................................................................ 94
Chapter 9: Conclusions ....................................................................................... 100
Chapter 1:
Introduction
A Comparative Method
The use of the comparative rnethod in histoncal sociology has been criticized.
These cnticisms often seem to be leveled at evolutionary approaches and atternpts to
develop nomothetic explanations, which are not inherent to the comparative method.
When applied correctly the comparative method cm be a vaiuable research method. A
systematic application of both Mills' Method of Agreement - which compares cases with
positive outcomes - and Method of Difference - which compares positive cases to
negative cases - is usefül provided the conditions necessary for a reasonable comparison
are met, and the possible caveats of a comparative method are realized and dealt with.
Most explanations of the development of capitalism do not employ the
comparative method. or do not employ it adequately. While some explanations include
several Western European countries as positive cases, rnost do not include Japan. Those
that do include Japan generally do not include negative cases. When contrasting cases
have been introduced, it is normally only by way of brief historicai exarnples (often out
of context) to support the argument. Nothing is included to demonstrate possible
weaknesses of the argument.
The aim of this thesis is to employ both positive and negative cases in a
comparative study of the development of capitalism in feudal societies. To this end 1 will
look at two cases that are considered to have endogenously developed (a measure of)
capitalism within a feudal penod and compare them with two cases that developed
endopnous capitalism to a lesser degree wNhin a patrimonial penod. While 1 do not
address the transition fiom pre-modem to modem econornic conditions, 1 do argue that
understanding the reasons for the presence of capitalism within feudal penods and the
demh of capitalism within patrimonial petiods is a valuable step in the process of
understanding the emergence of modem capitalism.
The feudal cases, characterized by political decentralization or "parcellization of
sovereignty", are England fiom 1 100 to 1348 and Tokugawa Japan ( 1600-1868). The
patrimonial cases, characterized by political centralization, are the Ottoman Empire
focussing on 1450-1700 and Ming China (1368-1644). Most discussions of the
emergence of capitaiism in England involve the period from 1500 to 1750. This is
reasonable because it precedes (what is cornmonly thought of as) the emergence of
modem capitalism. However, England developed a dynamic economy from 1100 to
1348, and had relations best described as capitalist.
Neo-Weberian Approach
One approach (associated with Marx and Marxists) in understanding the
development of capitalism out of feudalism, involves the collapse of feudalism due to an
inherent crisis in its structure. This crisis leads to the emergence of capitalist relations of
production where there were none before.' A second approach, associated with Weber,
involves the gradual rise of capitalist relations within a society that is not predominately
capitalist. This project adopts the latter conception. The notion of a "crisis of feudalism"
is questionable on ernpirical grounds. Hilton (1976) argues the factors that make up
capitalism c m be quantified, resulting in the possibility of having societies containing
varying levels of capitalism. Bntnell (1993a) applies this thinking to England 1100-
1300. and finds that, on balance, this period in England's history was more capitalist than
the penod M O - 1500, which commonly represents the cnsis period and the introduction
of capitalist relations in Marxist analysis.
A revision of Weber's multi-causal explanation of the development of capitalism
will be used for the cornparison. Weber's multi-causal explanation is outlined in The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitolism, and is discussed at length in General
Economic History. Unlike the mono-causal "economic ethos" explanation that is often
attributed to Weber (erroneously 1 believe) the inulti-causal explanation includes, in
addition to an econornic ethos, other conditions - such as free labour, calculable
economic conditions that allow long-term economic planning, and technology to "free-up
labour" - that are necessary for the emergence of modem capitalism. However. Weber's
preconditions were developed inductively from the histov of Western Europe, and they
are of limited value in a comparative study that includes Japan.
Randall Collins (1997) has revised Weber's preconditions in order to enable him
to explain capitalist developments in other times and at other places. Collins uses his
revision to explain the development of what he believes is the initial step in the
development of capitalism: capitdist agriculture. Collins conceives capitalist agriculture
as managed estates employing free labour and labour saving techniques. This capitalist
agriculture, he claims, is found first within mona~tic econornies where the preconditions
for capitalism are first met. He f'urther argues that the "spilling over" of these productive
capitalist rnonastic econornies have caused capitalist booms in the secular society.
1 According to Gotleib (1984) Marx did not discuss the crisis of feudalism in detail and did not advocate an economic determinist approach. He suggests others may have applied an economic detenninist approach to emulate Marx's analysis of capitalism.
1 follow Collins' emphasis on the importance of capitalist agriculture in the
deveiopment of capitalism by focussing on the development of managed estates. 1
explore the possibility that the differential development of capitalist agriculture in feudal
and patrimonial societies is caused by the presence of the preconditions in the feudal
cases and absence of the preconditions in the patrimonial cases. In other words, I will
attempt to determine if feudaiism provides a setting in which the preconditions for
capitalist agriculture are possibie, while patrimonialism provides a setting that prevents
the preconditions. However, 1 further revise Collins' revision- Most sigificantly, 1
argue that an economic ethos is not a necessary or useful part of an explanation of the
development of capitalism and omit the economic ethos requirement altogether.
Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 2 discuses the assumptions, logic and value of a comparative historical
approach. Chapter 3 reviews aiternate approaches to the development of capitalisrn,
including those that focus on a transition within feudalism, those that focus on a
transition from feudalism, and those that ignore the role of feudalism. Chapter 4 outlines
Weber's multi-causal explanation for the development of capitalism, Collins' revision of
this model, and my further revisions. In Chapter 5, feudalism, patrïmonialism and
capitalism are operationalized in order to divide the societies into positive (feudal
societies with capitalist agriculture) and negative (patrimonial societies without capitalist
agriculture) cases. The finding of the cornparison in Chapter 6 is that the preconditions
for capitaiist agriculture are present in both positive and negative cases. This finding is
discussed in light of the traditional belief that kudal and patrimonial societies differ
widely on market freedom and the conditions that allow the ability t o make long-term
economic plans. Chapter 7 explores possible causes for the differential developrnent of
managed estates in the cases despite the presence of the preconditions in al1 of them. It is
found that different conditions within the societies - such as the requirements of wet rice
cultivation, population pressure, and goals of the central bureaucracy - worked to make
rnanaged estates econornically irrational in the patrimonial societies. It is concluded,
however, that these differences are not related to the feudai-patrimonial distinction.
Chapter 8 discusses the value of and possible problems associated with histoncal
comparative sociology. Chapter 9 summarizes the findings and discusses future research
possibilities.
Chapter 2:
Historical Comparative Sociology
Requirements for Cornparison
The whole notion of the comparability of societies has been criticized. A problem
arises when a characteristic that is shared by separate societies is explained in terms of
sirnilar intemal developments when it has in fact spread by diffusion from one society to
another or from another society to both societies. The problem of interaction c m also
occur when trying to explain dissirnilar characteristics of societies. This problem has
been emphasized by world-system adherents who point out that countries do not become
economically advanced or backward independently; instead, their development is tied to
their interaction with other countries.
The problem in both cases is that interaction between the cases has been
overlooked. In response to this problem some have emphasized the need to demonstrate
that there is no interaction between the cases in order to permit comparison. This is
demanding too much. It is not necessary to demonstrate that two societies being
compared do not affect one another in any way. It must only be the case that they do not
affect one another in such a way that the characteristic being attributed to interna1
developments should not, in fact, be attributed to interaction. For exarnple, Japan and
China are being compared with the aim of explainhg economic developments thïough
endogenous political and social conditions. This may seem unreasonable to those who
demand cultural isolation because these countries are known for their interaction. For
example, Japan h a adopted and adapted much from Chinese art and architecture.
However, these cannot be seen to be the common cause of economic developments in
both China and Japan. It is also unreasonable to claim that the trade relationship between
Japan and China could be responsible for the differential developments of these
countries. Trade between two societies is not enough to elirninate comparability; the
trade must be demonstrated to be the cause of economic outcornes.
Control in Comparison
When developing a causal explanation you attempt to explain variation with
variation. Control is introduced to increase the certainty that the variation you are
attnbuting cause to is in fact causing the variation you are trying to explain. Both
variation and control are achieved in different manners when using different approaches.
In social science experimentation variation is attained through manipulation of the
independent variable; control of extraneous factors is (often) achieved though
randornization, which is supposed to distribute other variabIes evenly among both the
expenmental and control groups.
Sometimes variation cannot be achieved through manipulation due to practical or
ethical considerations. In non-experimental research information is taken from subjects
where the variation has already occurred in the independent (and often the dependent)
variable. Control of extraneous factors must be achieved statistically. A problem with
this technique is the requirement that you need to know the variables you should control
for, and that you need to gain information on these variables in advance.
In comparative historical sociology, manipulation is impossible. Information
must be taken from cases in which the variation in both the independent and dependent
variables has already occurred. Control may be achieved in two ways: the Method of
Agreement, and the Method of Difference, as discussed in Mills7 A System of Logic.
Both are methods of elimination:
The Method of Agreement stands on the ground that whatever can be eliminated is not
connected with the phenomenon by any law. The Method of Difference has for its
foundation, that whatever cannot be eliminated is connected with the phenomenon by Law.
(Mill, 1930: 256).
The Method of Agreement consists of comparing cases that share the outcome or
quality of interest as well as a crucial sirnilarity, believed to be the cause of the outcome.
Mill illustrates this method with the cornparison of two cases. In one case the
antecedents A, B. C, are followed by the consequences a, 6, c, while in the other case the
antecedents A, D, E are followed by the consequences a, d, e. Mill concIudes A is
causally connected with a, while B, C, D, and E are not. In other words, control of
extraneous factors is attained on those variables that are not comrnon to both cases.
Mill points out that a shortcoming of this method is that one cannot be certain if A
is causally related to a, or rnerely precedes it "as day precedes night or night day" (Mill,
1930: 255). This uncertainty is due to the fact that we cannot be certain A is the only
unconditional antecedent of a; i.e. there may be an unconsidered or unrecognized
antecedent of a that is the cause.
Mill says that an axiom of the Method of Agreement is that "Whatever
circumstance cm be excluded, without prejudice to the phenomenon, or c m be absent
notwithstanding its presence, is not connected with it in the way of causation" (Mill,
1930: 255). This axiom, however, rules out the possibility of multiple causation: the
possibility that a variable not shared by the cases is responsible for a, and that there are
multiple causes for the same outcome. For exarnple, B and D may be causes of n (or A
and D etc.). Furthermore, an interaction of factors rnay be necessary to produce a. For
example, A and B or A and D rnay be necessary to produce a. If this is the case, the
finding that A is a cause is reasonable, but the finding that B and D are not is not.
The Method of Difference involves comparing cases that have the outcorne of
interest (positive cases) with cases that do not (negative cases). The finding that the
positive cases share a common element the negative cases lack suggests the element
shared among the positive cases is the cause of the outcome- Mill illustrates this method
by cornparing a positive case with the antecedents A, B, C and consequences a, b, c, to a
negative case with the antecedents B, C, and consequences b, c. From bis, Mill
concludes A is the cause of a; either A alone or A in conjunction with some other
circumstances present.
Again, this method suffers from the inâbility to explore al1 antecedents of the
positive outcome, and cannot determine if A is causally related to a or rnerely precedes it.
An axiom of this method is that "Whatever antecedent cannot be excluded
without preventing the phenomena, is the cause, or a condition of that phenomena" (Mill,
1934: 256). One of the problems with the use of this method is that it is often assumed
that those antecedents that are present both when the consequence occurs and when it
does not are not causally related to the outcome of interest. In other words it is assumed
that a constant cannot explain variation. However, it is possible for an element shared by
the positive and negative cases is responsible for the positive outcome in the positive
case. A common element rnay be responsible for the different outcornes due to different
circumstances. Referring back to the exarnple, B may have been the cause of a, but rnay
have completely different effects in the absence of A.
In addition to the problem of contextuai effects obscuring the role of a constant as
the cause of differential outcornes, Barrett (1992: 27) points out that the cumulative
effects of variables may obscure the role a constant may play as a cause of a different
outcome between cases. A condition necessary, possibly even of prirnary importance, for
explaining an outcome may be present in both positive and negative cases, but may not
have the sarne effect in both cases due an unshared factor. For exarnple, B may be the
prirnary cause of a, but be in itself insufficient to cause it, while A is only the additional
push necessary to bring about a.
WhiIe a lirnited number of cases require non-statistical methods to attain control
there is no sirnilar rzplacement for statisticd significance. The goal of achieving
statistical significance is to increase the certainty that the relationship between the
variables is not a rnere coincidence. You want to have enough cases to be certain that an
apparent relationship could not have occurred by chance. This certainty cannot be
achieved to the sarne degree in historical sociology because of the lack of cases. In the
present study, there are only two positive cases. It could easily be the case, statistically
speaking, that the relationship between feudalism and the emergence of capitalism is
mere coincidence - they could have nothing to do with one another. Perhaps if there
were more cases of feudalism they would not al1 develop into capitalism. However, those
engaging in historical comparative sociology realize that correlation is in itself not
compelling, and thus concentrate on explaining the "internai mechanisms of change",
which make the belief in a causal relationship more reasonable.
Why Compare Societies?
I mentioned previously that some consider the use of control in historical research
problematic. In addition to the empirical considerations mentioned above, some adhere
to an axiomatic position that denies a priori the possibility of usefully comparing
societies; instead, each society is seen to be unique because each society is the result of
unique circumstances. I disagree with this position. While 1 do not advocate the search
for nomothetic laws, I do hold that similar social structures will have similar dynarnics
leading to similar outcomes.
Chapter 3:
Approaches to the Development of Capitaiism
There are a variety of explanations for the development of capitalism. Some
employ feudalism as the sole cause, some include feudalism as an important elernent, and
some do not include it at dl. A variety of these explanations are reviewed here. It is
found that these explanations are problematic because they do not incorporate the
Japanese case or do not introduce negative cases for control.
Marxian Approaches
Maurice Dobb (1963) emphasized features internai to feudalism when explaining
the "cnsis of feudalism". He argued that, due to a game of conspicuous consumption,
lords continuously increased the level of exploitation of the serfs. This encouraged serfs
to leave the land. Lords were then forced to abandon feudal relations for profit-oriented
production for exchange or sale or lease of land to rich peasants.
Sanderson (1994) points out that such an explanation is problematic because other
agrarian societies that have ernphasized conspicuous consumption have existed that did
not continually increase the exploitation of serfs.
Sweezy (1976) argues that feudalism does not contain intrinsic elements
necessary for a change in productive relations. An extrinsic element - international trade
- was the necessary impetus to the move towards capitalism. The developrnent of market
relations and cities arose with international trade. There was a move away from feudal
relations when peasants fled to the cities, and lords saw the possibility for wealth in the
new market relations.
This argument is countered by the historical evidence that trade and cities
developed within the feudal system (i.e. they were not the effects of an extemal
influence), and that the response to the growth of trade was different in different areas
(e-g. changes from dues to rent in England took place in the areas furthest from towns,
and Eastern Europe ernployed serfdom as a response to increased grain trade). There is
also no reason why lords could not simply squeeze more out of serfs when faced with
markets. In addition, Sweezy's trade-onented explanation does not account for the
expansion-crisis-growth pattern found in European feudalism.
Guy Bois attempts to explain why such a cycle of crises leads to increasing levels
of capitalist relations. Each cnsis leads the lords to perceive their traditional methods of
sustaining their hegemony as ineffective, and this leads them to increase the use of hired
labour and production for exchange (Gottlieb, 1984: 10). Bois' explanation, however,
fails to explain the development of capitalist agriculture in England pnor to its
development in France, when France had been feudal longer than England.
To account for the difference between England and France Brenner introduces the
importance of the political relationship between the Crown and the peasants. In France,
the monarchy used the strategy of keeping the peasants free, which enabled them to
maintain their land, while in England the peasants were relatively weak, and lost their
land to the aristocracy, who leased the land to agicultural capitalists.
Perry Anderson also includes political considerations. He argues the explanation
of historical change should not be restricted to economic causes, and that it is not useful
to isolate the economic realm in pre-capitalist societies in which economic production,
political power and juridical power are fused. If economic relations alone were important
in explauùng the rise of capitalism in Europe then other societies with large land
ownership, small peasant production, economic coercion, and limited comrnodity
production should have developed capitalisrn. Anderson adds that the political dimension
of the "parcellization of sovereignty" was necessary for the ernergence of capitalism.
Parcellization of sovereignty led, most irnportantly, to the development of autonomous
towns, which encouraged production. Anderson descnbes the crisis of (western)
feudalism, which is necessary to d o w changes in the political-economic system.
increased population on limited quality land led to the use of marginal land. The
resulting reduction of pasturage led to a reduction in per capita output (due to use of
marginal land and less fertilizer) which in tum led to famine. Famine led to a labour
shortage that led to restrictions on lords' demands. This led to the leasing out of land to
capitalist agriculturists because this became economically more rational.
In Eastern Europe where land abundance could not dlow for the causal chain to
begin, the explanation for the eastern variant of the Absolutist State must be found
elsewhere. For Anderson, the pressure of the powerfùl Western Absolutist States is
primarily responsible for the development of the Eastern AbsoIutist State. The rnilitarily
powemil western countries forced the East to keep up. A key distinction between the
eastern and western versions of the absolutist States is the econornic efficiency and
development of towns within the West. These differences are largely responsible for the
earlier emergence of capitalism in the West. While there were towns in the East they
were not as large and were controlled by landed aristocracy. In contrast, the western
cities were an alternative for the serfs in the West, and this caused the concessions the
lords eventually had to grant the producing class.
The above explanations are not acceptable because they do not account for
Tokugawa Japan, which is d so feudal. iapan never experienced a demographic crisis,
did not have truly autonomous cities, and was isolated from foreign uade during the
Tokugawa period, FoIlowing Brenner, Yarnarnura ( 1979) argues that Japan's agrarian
landholding patterns led to the sarne consequences as the enclosures in England.
However, Brenner's explanation of the rise of capitalism does not fit the England 1 100-
1350 case that did not experience anything Like enclosures that resulted in a large class of
dispossessed cultivators.
However, some explanations do incorporate the Japanese case, and argue that it is
has the sarne dynamics as Western European countries.
Social Evolutionary Explanations
Stephen Sanderson (1994) rejects explanations of the development of capitalism
that do not account for both the European and Japanese cases. He lists five relevant
similarities between the European States to first develop capitalism (England and the
Netherlands) and lapan: size, which facilitated communication and reduced political
expenses; geography, which facilitated maritime transportation; climate, which reduced
the possibility of entering into peripheral economic relationships (due to agricu1tura.I
potential); demography, which pressured increased agricultural production; and political
structure (1994: 39-42).
Arnong these factors political structure - narnely feudalism - which leads to the
freedom of merchants, is seen as the most important. UnIike Weber, Sanderson does not
see the requirement of historically unlikely conditions for the emergence of capitalism-
Instead, he sees the emergence of capitalism as inevitable. Once trade reached a "critical
mass" capitalisrn resulted. The expansion of trade and the freedom of merchants have
been advancing for 4500 years, since the beginning of agarian societies. Capitalism
emerged in Japan and Northwest Europe first because thek political systems allowed
merchants freedom that other pre-capitalist political systems did not.
Sanderson's approach incorporates the Japanese case; however, it fdters in the
face of evidence from the negative cases. This will be disclissed later (Chapter 8) after
the negative cases have been introduced,
Sanderson's approach has been criticized for its social evolutionary perspective.
This approach has been influentid in the history of sociology. August Comte argued for
the study of societies as integrated wholes. These whoIes should be studied with the aim
of arriving at laws:
The conception of invariable naturd laws. the foundation of every idea of order, will have
the same philosophical efficacy here as elsewhere, as soon as it was suffrciently generalized
to be applied to social phenomenon, thenceforth referred, like al1 other phenornena to such
laws (Comte in Allahar, 1995: 59).
Comte developed the Law of Three Stages, which States that al1 societies p a s
through three successive stages: theological, metaphysical, and positivistic. The third
stage is required for rational progress because it promotes peaceful economic activity.
Spencer also believed in a nomothetic evolutionary development of societies.
While the compounding of societies influences their development, societies are seen to
develop into industrialized nations endogenously; less developed societies simply need
more time to develop into industrialized societies.
While social evolutionary theones posit the development of an economically
advanced society from a less advanced society. they had largely been presented as
descriptions of advanced and less advanced societies until Rostow (1962) attempted to
overcome this limitation. In The Stages of Economic Growth (1962) he presented the
intermediate stages a Society passes through on its way to development. Ali societies
begin with the stage of traditiondism, pass through stages where the preconditions for
increased production and economic take-off occur, and result in the fifth stage of "high
mass consumption".
This theory is problematic. As Frank points out, "No underdeveloped country has
ever managed to take off out of its underdevelopment following Rostow's stages" (Frank,
in Allahar, 1995: 76). The theory is ahistorical: it ignores the significantly different paths
developed nations have taken, and implies that developed countries have a history of
development while underdeveloped countries have no history.
Allaha. argues that evolutionary theoi-ies act to free developed nations from any
responsibility they may have had for the lack of development of other areas, as well as
discouraging developed nations from interfenng in the "natural path" undeveloped
nations are on (Allahar, 1995: 77-78). More historically oriented development theorists
known as (structural) dependency theorists have attacked these theories. They charged
that underdeveloprnent better describes many less developed countries. They are not in a
natural state, but one developed through interaction with other, more developed, nations.
World-systems theory has developed in response to the evolutionary approach and
the problems associated with treating cases as independent entities. Despite not
focussing on the feudalism to capitdism argument, they are discussed because of their
influence and the challenge they pose to the "non-interactive" comparative approach
taken here.
World-Systems Theory
Emanuel Wallerstein descnbes his attempt to find a suitable unit of analysis for
studying social change as one of the starting points for his work in world-systems theory.
He came to realize that dealing with cases in isolation did not capture the forces acting to
change politically defined nations. Instead, it was necessary to deal with the larger
system of which various nations were a part: the modem world-system. Because
countries are part of the same system it is of little vaiue to compare them in isolation to
determine the causal factors responsible for their outcomes. He sees what are believed to
be internal developments as the result of interaction with other countnes. Because there
is only one modem world-system there is nothing to compare it to, and it is only possible
to understand the system by exploring its history.
According to Wailerstein's system, countries fail into one of four categories: core,
periphery, serni-periphery, and externai. Core states are those that have the mosi highly
skilled labour force, are the most highly industrialized, have the least coercive forms of
labour, and have the strongest govemments. The periphery has the least skilled
workforce, is the least industrialized, has the most coercive forrns of labour, and has the
weakest govemments. The core states import labour intensive raw materials and export
technology intensive finis hed produc ts. The serni-perip hery includes those countries
attempting to attain core status, which are often the rniddlemen in core-periphery
relations and relationships. Extemal areas are those that have not been incorporated into
the system.
The modem world-system is heId together economically. This is in contrast to
previous systems, such as the Roman Empire, which were held together politically.
Econornically based systems allow a more efficient flow of wealth to the few and away
from the many. The type of system unity - political versus economic - is not merely of
classificatory importance. "Capitalism has been able to flourish precisely because the
(modem) world-economy has had within its bounds not one but a multiplicity of political
systems." (Wailerstein, 1974: 348). Political disunity is as crucial to the modem world-
system as political unity was to previous systems. This disunity allows capitalists to
maneuver more fkeely. "Capitalisrn is based on the constant absorption of economic loss
by political entities, while economic gain is distributed to 'private' hands" (Wallerstein,
1974: 348). This is only possible because the economy operates beyond the control of
any single polity. The differential strength of the polities within the system allows the
effective operation of transnational economic entities (Wallerstein, 1974: - 354).
However, at least some strong States are required to protect the core's interests.
While he is opposed to cornparisons that assume isolated development,
Wallerstein compares different roles countries have in and with the world system to
explain economic differences between politically defined entities. For example, he
explains the differential development of Poland and Russia by the different timing of
their entry into the world-system. By entering the system earlier than Russia, Poland was
transformed into a peripheral state while Russia, with its later entry, developed into a
semi-peripheral state.
Wallerstein presents his theory in opposition to those theories of the development
of capitalism that focus on the isolated development of a country. Therefore, it may
appear that an explanation of the emergence of capitalism that emphasizes a country's
political system and the development of necessary conditions such as Weber's approach
would be in opposition to Wallerstein's explmation. This is not necessarily the case.
Firstly, Wallerstein's world-systems have "a beginning and an end", indicating separate
regions, now part of the world-system, have a history pnor to their involvement in the
system. This pnor history may help to explain why some couniries have become core
States while others have become periphery, or semi-periphery (a point recognized by
Wallentein). Also, while Wallerstein may de-emphasize endogenous explanations, they
are not logically excluded by the assertion that interaction with other counuies is a
determinant of econornic outcome.
Eric Wolf aiso advocates a focus on interaction in explaining social development.
According to Wolf in his Europe and the People Wirltout History (1983)' the division of
political economy into separate disciplines with strictly demarcated boundaries has
naturally led to treating cases in isolation. Sociology developed as the study of social
order and its principal question was "What created order in society?" Wolf argues that
explanations in sociology focused on shared noms and the transition to heterogeneous
beliefs, which were seen as intemal developments. Anthropology has developed sirnilar
problems. There are recognized difficulties in distinguishing separate cases from
members of the same group, with emphasis oscillating between evolutionism and
diffusion.
Wolf s anthropological siudy of the development of capitalism fills in covering
tems such as "periphery" with anthropological detail from a Marxist perspective. He
emphasizes the "development of material relations, rnoving simultaneously on the level
of the encompassing system and on the micro level." (Wolf, 1982: 23). In other words,
Wolf is attempting to fil1 in the work of Wallerstein and Frank by including the effects
the world system has on the "micro populations snidied 6y ethnologists and
anthropologists" (Wolf, 1982: 23).
Wolf discusses the connections between different geographical and cultural areas
at 1400, and argues that vade routes are responsible for cultural diffusion, and that
conquests result in the combination of cultures. He argues it is unreasonable to assume
cultural isolation even prior to European expansion.
This may be acceptable as far as some culturai characteristics go; however, it is
one thing to say that the cultures have adopted and adapted characteristics and another to
argue that economic and political systems do not have intemal dynamics operating
independently of outside influences. Wolf does not convincingly demonstrate that
endogenous developments are not also important in the econornic realm.
Janet Abu-Lughod's world-system approach posits Wallerstein's modem world-
system neglects its own origins and concentrates too heavily on Europe. She argues a
global world-system was active as early as 1250 C.E. with Asia, especially China, as the
core, and Europe in a peripheral position. The decline of China's economy during the
Ming Dynasty, coinciding with a strengthening of trade networks between the
Mediterranean and Northwest Europe, led to the nse of the West. It was not intemal
characteristics of the West that caused its increase in economic activity, but the working
of the worid-system, and the decline of the East, which weakened ties and trading routes
between China and the Mediterranean.
Frank ( 199 1 a, 199 1 b), following traditional world-system theories, argues that
there is a worId econornic system, and that countries' fortunes are tied to their
participation in this system. Drastically different fiom traditional theories, Frank
maintains the system has operated for 5,000 years in a qualitatively uniform rnanner.
Frank daims that al1 of the characteristics Wallerstein used to differentiate the post-1500
world-system from the pre-1500 world can be found pnor to 1500. In response to
Wallerstein's claim that the dijfeerentia specifica of the modern worId system is the
ceaseless accumulation of capital Frank retorts that "...accumulation played a central if
not the central role in the world system far beyond Europe and long before 1500 ..."
(Frank. 1991a: 173 emphasis in original). He recognizes no qualitative shift in the 16"
century, only a quantitative shift of capital accumulation patterns to the favour of Europe.
hsularity
Although not normally considered a sociologicd variable, insularity must be
rnentioned: it is difficult not to notice the two positive cases are both islands of
approximately the sarne size, while neither of the negative cases are islands. LMacFarlane
(1997) dealing with the problem of how both England and Japan escaped the "Malthsian
Trap", finds insularity to be a major determinant of economic development. "If Japan
and England had not both been large islands, it seems inconceivable that they would have
developed in such an unusual way." (1997: 388). Insularity, he ciaims, gave both
England and Japan a respite from prolonged rnilitary effort, which reduced taxes, which
in tum encouraged merchants and trade. Insularity also allowed both to escape a
destruction of their politicai and econornic systems.
The importance of insuiarïty on the development of capitaiism is beyond the
scope of this thesis. It is sufficient to say that it is not a necessary (e-g. France developed
capitalism and is not an island) or sufficient (e-g. Ceylon is a large island that did not
develop capitaiism) condition for the development of capitalism.
Weberian
Much of the work around Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spint of
Capitalism deals with the various ways his thesis can and should be interpreted. Turner
(1974) presents a useful typology of interpretations of Weber's theses regarding the
emergence of capitdism- The first is idealistic determinism, which holds that Weber
contended that certain Protestant beliefs caused capitalism. It is difficult to maintain that
Weber adhered to this approach. Weber, in the Protestant Ethic, says the theory that the
reformation caused the emergence of modem capitalism would be "foolish and
doctrinaire" (Weber, 1976: 91). The second interpretation is that the- asceticism of
Protestantism was a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism, which is only
part of a larger multi-causai model, which includes other factors such as free labour and
technology. This interpretation is supported by the introduction to the Protestant Ethic,
and is expounded at length in General Economic History. The third interpretation, based
more on Weber's methodological work than on his empincal studies. is that Weber was
not deding with causal variables, but trying to describe affinities between social
meanings: the way in which certain ideas and social processes "seek each other out" in
history. The fouah interpretation is that Weber sought to elaborate Marx's econornic
materialism with a "political and military materialism".
The interpretation of Weber's work as a rnulti-causal model, which stipulates that
certain preconditions must be met to allow the development of capitalism, is employed
here. While it is not reasonable to use the preconditions as Weber presents them to
explain capitalism in Japan and in England before the Reformation, the preconditions c m
be altered to allow their use in times and at places for which Weber had not developed
them.
Chapter 4:
The Preconditions for Capitalism
Weber's Preconditions
Weber defines capitalism as the provision of human needs Y b y pnvate
businesses seeking profit" (Weber, 1961: 207-208). By this definition capitalism has
existed in various places and at various times in societies that would not be considered
capitalist. What he was interested in is not isolated capitalism - working within a larger.
non-capitalist economy - but, capitaiisrn as the "leading and continued rational
econornic system. Weber's argument in General Economic Histop is that certain
conditions must be present for this type of capitalism to exist, and that these conditions in
tum required conditions and so on.
Weber's conditions for capitalism:
Private approprintion of al2 the means of production. This rneans that land,
buildings, and material must be available for sale as private property. This enables ai1
significant means of production to be under a single management structure so that
decisions of maximal efficiency can be made.
Labour that is free tu work in response to demnnd.
Trading that is not limited by irrational restricrions. Trading must be free of
class monopolies on consumption of certain products (e.g. certain types of dress). Also,
limitations on long-distance trading, such as warfare and robbery, must be minirnized.
Calculable law in adjudication and public administration. Examples include
pnvate property rights over the factors of production and the transferability of these
rights through financial institutions, formal freedom for labourers, and legally protected
markets. Calculable law is necessary to encourage and allow long term planning. The
importance of the presence this precondition becomes apparent when one considers its
absence; long term planning is not reasonable when the confiscation of property is a
possibility, or conditions upon which the plans were devised are subject to unpredictable
change.
Commercialization of economic life. Stock companies were important because
they removed important economic transactions - such as forced loans for war expenses
that were usuaily without interest and frequently not repaid - from compulsory law, and
put them into the realm of voluntary economic interests (Weber, 196 1: 280). They are
also important because they allowed expensive projects to be undertaken privately
(Weber, 196 1 : 28 1).
hd~rstrial technigue. Industriai techniques, such as the use of the steam engine
and mechanical looms, removed natural barriers to production, freed up labour, and
helped to remove the econornic sphere from traditional constraints (196 1 : 305-6).
Econornic ethic. The econornic ethic is most clearly understood through its
contrast: the "dualistic" ethic of many pre-modem societies. This dualistic ethic stresses
fairness within one's group - be it kinship, caste, class etc. - and ruthless and unfair
dealings with outsiders. Both of these attitudes discourage capitalism. The attitude taken
towards in-group members discourages gain at another's expense and encourages
traditional exchanges, while the attitude taken towards outsiders discourages long-term
gain, a necessary part of modem capitalism. A non-dualistic ethic prornotes the equal
treatment of al1 people in business dealings, which are driven by the desire to maintain
long-term business relationships that will yield long-term econornic gains.
The background conditions for these conditions include a bureaucratic state, and
citizenship rights. The bureaucratic state is necessary primarily for the development of
caiculable law. To develop thorough bureaucratization a formalistic code based on
citizenship is necessary.
The ultimate conditions are those conditions that are the preconditions for
bureaucracy and citizenship. As preconditions for bureaucracy Weber Lists literate
administrators, transportation and communication technology, writing and record keeping
implements, coinage, and centrally supplied weapons. As preconditions for citizenship,
he includes a self-supplied, disciplined arrny, and a religious tradition consistent with the
idea of citizenship and arnenable to city-centered worship. These were necessary for the
development of citizenship because citizenship originated through the banding together
of warriors into cities in medieval Europe, for mutual protection. The cities developed
and enforced their own laws that applied equally to al1 members of the city.
Weber's causal chah Ieads from conditions favorable to bureaucratization and a
rnilitary and religious combination favorable to the development of cities with
citizenship, through to the conditions necessary for long-term, large-scale capitalism.
Collins' Revision of Weber
It is clear that Weber was not developing a mode1 for the emergence of
capitalisrns; instead, he was trying to describe the historical development of capitalisrn in
the West. Randall Collins, however, believes that Weber's explanation is valuable for
understanding capitalistic developments sirnilar to modem capitalism at different times
and in different places. He modifies Weber's explanation to make it more easily
applicable to non-European cases (Collins, 1986: 26-34).
Collins rernains tnie to many of Weber's preconditions and conditions necessary
for the emergence of capitalism. However, he modifies the technoiogy requirement; he
argues technology is required for its cdculability, not its effrciency, thereby eliminating
the need for extensive mechanization. He later changes the technology requirement again
arguing that non-technological innovations in rice cultivation are aIso significant. He
omits the requirement of the commercialization of economic life at the outset.
Collins applies the causal chain to situations where he believes capitalism
emerged but has gone unrecognized primarily because of its association with
monasteries, normaily thought of as non-capitaiist (especially by Weber).
The first case is within the reformed monasteries - especidly the Cistercians - of
the high-middle ages in Europe. Citing indicators of capitalist econornics, such as the
increased interest in rnechanization, Collins reasons that a form of capitalisrn was
operating during this time. He finds it developing first, not throughout society, but within
certain monastic orders. Using the Cistercian Order as an example, he shows that the
monasteries employed rational cdculation, mechanization of parts of the production
process, and were essentially engaged in a capitalist enterprise.
It is argued this was possible because the conditions necessary for capitalism were
met. The Cistercian Order was able to acquire land, and manage their operations as they
desired because they did not allow thernselves to become dependent on the surrounding
aristocracy. They constituted something of a mobile labour forcs because they were
willing and able to move to areas and into endeavors that provided the greatest economic
retum. Celibacy prevented the melding of personal with institutional rights and
properties. Canon Law and the Papal Cuna provided the legal frarnework which allowed
calculability and, to an extent, equality that prevented the authontarian tendencies of
bureaucrac y.
Collins claims this capitalist surge, due to the spillover of monastic capitalism
into the secular economy, was actually the first instance of capitalism (in Europe); the
capitalism associated with the Reformation is actually the second cycle of capitalism
rnistaken for the f ~ s t ,
Collins next applies the chain to Buddhist monasteries in China. After dispelling
the rnisconception that Buddhism was not important in China's history and that China has
been econornically backward throughout its history, Collins outlines the similar role
reformed Buddhist monastenes played in the development of a capitalist enclave in
Medieval China. The monasteries were able to develop capitalism because the
preconditions were met within their economy: land was donated to the monasteries, they
had a supply of labour, they were free to plan efficient enterprises, and the Vinaya or
monastic laws made the monasteries a self-goveming group with intemal citizenship.
In Collins' more recent article (1997), where he applies the mode1 to the Japanese
case, he claims there have been only three types of economic structures in worid history:
1. kinship organized networks.
2. agrarian-coercive societies in which a military class appropriates the land and extracts
the surplus.
3. capitalist market economies with a dynamic of self-transforming growth.
He adds that self-transfomiing capitalism has historically gone through three key
phases:
A) a small leading sector within agrarian coercive societies sets the capitalist dynamic in
motion.
B) market structures make agricultural production dynamic.
C) industrial revolution sets off the expansion of n ~ n a ~ c u l t u r a l production (Collins,
1997: 843).
The mode1 is then applied to dernonstrate that the Buddhist temples of Medieval
Japan developed a capitalist economy. The temples controlled land, labour and capital,
and they were able to manage them with efficiency. Labour was relatively free to move
where it was needed within the rnonastic organization, and land and wedth were donated
by the aristocracy as a way of demonstrating wealth and piety (Collins, 1997: 855).
Various sects within Buddhism supplied the economic ethic. There was a general
moving away from ostentatious temple display and magic in the "reformation" of
Buddhist monasteries circa 1175. Some forrns of Zen stressed work as a meditative
practice; Soto Zen preached an attitude of concentration in normal activities rather than
an escape from the world.
Monasteries also supplied the bureaucratic legalism and property rights necessary
for capitalist planning. The monasteries had an interna1 code and "full-scale bureaucratic
structure" (1997: 858). Monk annies were able to enforce property rights.
Confiscation of monastery land during the reunification secularized the capitalism
of the monastenes. The Tokugawa penod is best seen as "füll fledged agicultural
capitalism" (1997: 860). Those who stress the Meiji Restoration as a period of
unprecedented appearance of capitalism in Japan are misled by the non-industrial nature
of Tokugawa Japan's capitalism (1997: 86 1).
He adds that religious organizations are a likely place for the leading capitalist
group to emerge. They are protected by secular mlers, mobilize resources and social
energy from al1 sectors of society, receive land and other contributions, and have some
autonomy within otherwise conservative agarian coercive economies (1997: 849).
Collins claims the capitalizations of the wider econornies in Japan circa 1600 and
England circa 1250 are the result of a "spilling ove? of the methods of the monasteries
into secular society. He places his emphasis on dernonstrating that the preconditions and
conditions for capitalism are met within the monastic economy, and pays less attentiori to
the presence of the preconditions and conditions in the wider society into which the
effects are supposed to spill. The interest here is an examination of the presence of the
preconditions in the wider society, and the value of the feudal-patrimonial distinction in
understanding their presence or absence.
Further Revision of the Preconditions
1 have further revised Collins' revision. While originally intending to include it, 1
have omitted the precondition of an "econornic ethos". Because this is a major deviation
from a Weberian approach 1 shall discuss my reasoning at length.
Initialfy it was my belief that ideas were important in explaining the development
of capitalism. Based on this belief 1 looked for belief systems - religious, social etc. -
that appeared to have a relationship with an 'economic ethos'. 1 was looking for ideas
that could promote the development and working of capitalisrn, or ideas that could easily
be converted - possibly secularized - into ideas that could promote the development and
working of capitalism. There is an inherent problem in looking for such ideas: "if one is
bent on tracing sirnilar motifs in thought to their ultimate origins, it is always possible to
find 'precursors' for every idea" (Mannheim, 1968: 60fn). To resolve this problem 1
decided to accept only those ideas that seemed, undeniably, to be strong supports for an
economic ethos such as teachings of the value of work and reinvestment.
As I read the matenal on Japan 1 found that this restriction was quite acceptable -
every idea undeniably promoted an economic ethos. In some cases the job was done for
me: the ideas and beliefs presented were followed by a statement indicating that this idea
or belief may have been in part responsible for Japan's rapid economic success because
of its affinity with capitaiist ideals. It becarne obvious that the project of looking for
ideas to explain Japan's econornic development had been done many times over and with
great success. The probIem now seemed more acute: not only was 1 biased by the
interpretation delivered by the authors, 1 felt 1 was not receiving an adequate account of
ideas that were possibly opposed to the developrnent of an economic ethos. The material
on the other cases was often sirnilar: the ideas that could be used to account for current
economic development were highlighted.
It seemed as though a process of elimination had been carried out. Given space
restraints, greater space had been given to those ideas that were useful in explaining
economic development, while ideas that were not were downplayed. Should I employ
the sarne technique and focus on ideas consistent with an econornic ethos in Japan and
England, and focus on ideas opposing and economic ethos in the Ottoman Empire and
Ming China? Iudging from the econornic developments these ideas would seem to have
had the greatest impact in the respective counuies.
This approach is wholly inappropriate. It is not reasonable to make the
assumption that the ideas consistent with an economic ethos had the greatest effect in the
cases in which capitalism emerged and ideas inconsistent with an economic ethos had the
greatest effect in the cases in which capitalism did not emerge. Economic development is
to be explained; it is not to do the explaining. It is circular reasoning to use the economic
developrnent of a society to select which beliefs had a greater effect in that society and
then use these beiiefs to explain econornic development.
Upon considering the problem further 1 believe there are two problems associated
with the approach of looking for antecedents to the rise of capitalism in belief systems.
The first problem is the variety of relationships that cm be argued to exist between old
ideas and new socially transforming ideas. The relationships employed are of three
types:
1. The belief system has a straightforward effect on econornic developrnent. In
other words there is a prima facie relationship between the belief systems and
econornic development. This approach is oiten used to account for the Iack of
econornic developrnent in Islarnic societies.
2. The belief system, seemingly unrelated to econornic development, has an
effect on economic development. This approach is demonstrated by Bellah's
explanation of the nse of capitalism in Japan (Bellah, 1957).
3. The belief system, although apparently inconsistent with econornic
development, had the unintended consequence of promoting economic
development. For exarnple, Weber argues that elements of Protestantism,
apparently opposed to gain for gain's sake, resulted in economic development
in the West.
Sometimes these approaches are used in conjunction. Collins (1997) argues that
some Buddhist ideals had unanticipated results, while others had straightforward results.
The problem is, given these options, it is possible to explain any economic development
with any set of beliefs-
The second problem, d u d e d to above, is that many ideas and beliefs exist
simultaneously in large societies such as Japan, China, The Ottoman Empire, and
England. Some of these ideas will be consistent with an econo,mic ethos and some will
not. How does it corne to be that some ideas are more influential than others, knowing
that it is not reasonable to explain the selection of an idea out of a group of ideas by the
result of this selection (econornic development)? There are two straightforward
explanations to the selection. The first is that an ethic promoting capitalisrn expanded its
influence through a successful 'survivai of the fittest' contest against other ideas. The
success of those having a capitalist spirit could have led others to adopt such a spirit
themselves. The second is that a capitalist spirit is merely superstructure that has either
ernerged, or has been selected (or transformed) due to the structure of the economic base.
If either of these explanations is correct, then a search for an antecedent to the rise of
capitalism in belief systems is unwarranted. If ideas are mere superstructure, then they
are the effect, not the cause of capitalism. If they have won a survival of the fittest
contest, they are still part of the cause, but finding thern will not be a useful explanation if
they exist in al1 societies. Both of these explanations are anticipated and rejected by
Weber in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
"One c m easily see", States Weber, "the limits of the concept of selection as a
means of historicai explanation. In order that a manner of life so well adapted.. .should
be selected at dl,..-it had to originate somewhere, and not in isolated individuals alone,
but as a way of life cornmon to whole groups of men. This origin is what reaily needs
explanation" (1976: 55). Furthermore, he argues that an econornic ethos cannot be easily
understood as superstructure, which developed to meet the ideological needs of the
economic base. To the contrary "The spirit of capitalism.. .had to fight its way to
supremacy against a whole world of hostile forces" (1976: 56). Furthermore, in the
United States "...the spirit of capitalism ... was present before the capitalistic order"
(1976: 55).
The important point is that for Weber, the first step is to explain the development
of unprecedented ideas (hard work, thrift, and reinvestment) from other ideas (Protestant
beliefs). This is important to recoajpize because the Protestant Erhic and the Spirit of
Capitalism is often portrayed as an example of the sociology of knowledge; however, it
more accurately employs the aims and techniques of the history of ideas. The sociology
of knowledge attempts to explain relationships between knowledge and social factors
(e.g. class), whereas the history of ideas seeks to "...understand how new beliefs and
intellectual fashions are introduced and diffused ..." (Lovejoy, 1960: 20, emphasis in
original) by employing explanations on the level of ideas. It is important to be clear what
your purpose is when trying to explain using ideas. If you are trying to explain
unprecedented ideas, then it may be reasonable to emphasize existing ideas. However, if
you are trying to explairi the selection of an idea out of a group of ideas then you need
sornething to explain the selection, not the idea.
I disagree that the "spirit of capitalism" meets the criteria of an unprecedented
idea. Samuelsson indicates examples of nearly identical spirits existing in 1450 France
(Samuelsson, 1961: 63-66). 1 also argue against Weber's claim that the capitalist spirit is
not a manifestation of widely held motives of personal gain/greed/avarice etc. Weber
argues these motives have always existed, but have never led to modem capitalism;
instead, adventure capitalism, booty capitalism, and piracy resulted. 1 believe that these
pre-capitaiist economic enterprises and modem capitalism are not the result of a
fundarnentally different ethos. Instead, they are different manifestations of essentially the
same ethos under different sociai conditions. The reason for the different results is that
social structural conditions rnust be present to allow for capitalist techniques to be
employed profitably.
1 propose that an understanding of the role of ideas in the development of
capitalism is not one of cause but of effect. Socid conditions allow for the development
of capitalist processes and techniques; specific ideas and ideals consistent with capitalisrn
are then selected on the basis of their compatibility. Iust as, through a process of
elimination, authors look for and stress ideas consistent with econornic development at
the expense of other ideas, people looked through this sarne group of ideas in an attempt
to justify new behaviors. It is a platitude to Say that people look to justify their actions
with established beliefs.
It has been suggested that ideas and material causes of capitalism are dialectically
related; ideas are the principle movers at one time and material causes at another. One is
not the independent variable and the other the dependent; the interplay between the two is
the cause of change. While this approach may be valuable in many instances 1 do not
believe that ideas other than a desire for wealth are necessary for the explanation of the
rise of capitalism. While it may be possible to find societies that demonstrate that a
desire for wedth is not an inherent human trait, 1 believe a desire for wealth is present in
sufficient supply in al1 of the cases considered here.
The precondition of cdculability should also be discussed at this point. Weber's
requirement is for a conception of law that does not exist in pre-modem societies to the
extent that it does for the period to which Weber's preconditions are intended to apply.
Collins deals with this by inserting, wherever possible, laws that apply to monasteries. In
the case of England, Canon Law provides the cdculability required for investment in
agriculture. Collins' approach to finding calculabilty in pre-Tokugawa Japan is
somewhat different. Here cdculability is supplied through the ability of the monasteries
to defend their interests. It is not supplied by the belief in abstract principles, but by the
strength of amies. The meaning of calculability employed here is sirnilar to that used by
Collins in that it accepts calculable conditions irrespective of their cause. Calculability is
a situation in which producers can plan for the future due to a stability in social relations
in which confiscation and arbitrary behavior of officiais is not a pressing concem. It is
not important if it is supplied by abstract principles or force or anything else; it is only
important that it be supplied.
To surnrnarize, the preconditions for capitalist agriculture, conceived as managed
estates, are:
Free labour
Lnnd market
Markets free from control
Econornic calculabilis)
Entrepreneurid organization of the rneans of production
Chapter 5:
Categorizing the Cases
Not d l people agree that traditional societies can be meaningfully ancilor usefully
divided into feudal and patrimonial societies. Sorne of the alternate ways of categorizing
traditional societies as well as criticisrns of the feudal-patrimonial distinction will be
discussed before tuming to the development of working definitions of feudalism and
patrimonialism.
Alternatives to and Criticisms of the Feudal-Patrimonial Distinction
Eisenstadt (1963) classifies empires by qualities of their political systems. His
criteria for classification are:
1. The extent to which political activities are organized into roles, and the extent to
which the political roles are separate from other roles.
2. The extent to which the political role holders are organized into groups that do not
correspond to traditional groups.
3. The nature of the political goals: what the goals are, who determines them, etc.
4. Type of authority legitimation (Eisenstadt, 1963: 8-9).
Using different intersections of these qualities, he finds seven different types of
societies. One of these, Historical Bureaucratie Empires (HBEs), is the topic of his The
Political Systems of Empires (1963). One of the features of HBEs that distinguishes them
from other types of societies is that their political sphere has a limited autonomy ( 1963:
19); the political sphere is partly separate from other organizations.
Another feature is the source of the restrictions on activity within the political
sphere, In traditional societies activity within the political sphere is restricted primarily
by tradition; in modem societies it is restricted primxily by the interests and operation of
the non-political spheres. In HBE activity within the political sphere is restricted equally
by both.
After delineating the conditions necessary for the development and perpetuation
of HBEs Eisenstadt discusses the transformations HBEs rnay make into other types of
societies. He argues HBEs do not always follow the sarne developmental path. It is not
always the case that an HBE transforms into a more highly differentiated society. It may
also become a more traditional "pre-bureaucratic society" (e.g. his patrimonial or feudai).
I do not think it is usef'ul to evaluate Eisenstadt's classification system, or any
other classification system, apart from the purposes for which it is being used. Even i f ,
as Hamilton (1985) suggests, Eisenstadt believes that he has captured a reai group (or
seven reai groups) it is of little value to discuss the "reality" of concepts. Instead,
classification systems should be judged according to their usefulness in explanation. I
have chosen not to employ Eisenstadt's classification system, not because it does not
make meaningful distinctions between societies, but because 1 do not think it is useful for
explaining capitalism. Eisenstadt's classification may be useful for explaining some
things - such as the political decisions and struggles that go on within some pre-modem
societies - but it does not seem valuable for studying the emergence of capitalism because
it has no predictive power: some HBE developed capitalism while others did not.
Eric Wolf uses Marx's concept of the mode of production to highlight the social
relationships of labour within societies. He defines production as a "cornplex set of
mutually dependent relations arnong nature, work, social labour and social organization"
(Wolf, 1982: 74). Modes of production are the major recumng ways production is
organized. Instead of adopting Marx's modes, Wolf recognizes that M m ' s system may
not be historically accurate or usefd for al1 projects. He adopts the capitalist mode of
production (discussed later) and develops the tributary and the kin-ordered modes.
The tributary mode of production is characterized by the accumulation of surplus
wealth by an elite employing non-economic coercion. The labourers are dlowed access
to the means of production, but they are constrained through a relationship of ruled to
d e r , which includes a forced payment of a portion of their production to the d e r . This
mode of production consists of a continuum with cornplete centralization of power at one
end and fragmentation of power at the other. These extremes correspond to what Marx
refers to as the "Asiatic mode of production" and the "feudal mode of production"
respective1 y.
Wolf argues that ciassification systems that distinguish between centralization of
power and decentralization of power are ideologically biased. Feudalism gives a short
p e k d of European history a greater status and a quality of purity (a pure form of a social
type) that is unwarranted, while the Asiatic mode of production serves to highlight the
division of the free West and the un-free East. Wolf emphasizes these are actually
variants of the same mode of production, and he downplays the importance of political
centralization.
To distinguish between the capitalist and tributary modes of production he adds
that the trading that occurred dunng the tributary mode was based on buying low and
selling dear, which included alliance with powers that would prevent an open market. It
relied on political and rnilitary power to "seize zones of supply", ensure monopolies, etc.
In the kinship mode of production much of the social labour is embedded in
padcular social relationships, such as relationships of affinity and consanguinity. A
leader c m only accumulate so much power within the kinship system because others can
check his power through similar efforts at intermarriage and the accumulation of
dependents. Chiefs who want to break through the limitations of the kinship network
must secure an independent power either by altering some of his resources to the
mechanisms of another mode of production or by entenng relationships with another
mode of production. To do so he must acquire new forms of political domination.
These are not intended to exhaust the possible modes that have existed; instead,
they are developed because they are parsimonious in understanding the spread of
capitalism and the effect it has on societies with other types of economic systems.
It is unusual that Wolf is hostile to the feudal-patrimonial distinction because he
States elsewhere that there can be many possible divisions, and that the choice of
divisions should be made on the value they have for dealing with a given problem. The
refusa1 to admit a meaningful difference between feudalism and patrimonialism seems
questionable when Wolf himself contrasts the differences between Europe on the one
hand and China and India on the other. He points out the different role merchants had in
societies with different levels of political centralization, and how this ultirnately had an
effect on econornic development.
Wolf is not alone in denying the value of the feudal-patrimonial distinction.
Frank denies the value or scientific merit of feudalism:
... is it still sensible to hold on for dear life to the supposedly scientific histoi-ical
categories of . . ,feudalism, capitalism, socialism - or, indeed any such "scientifically
defined "modes of production" or ideologicdly defined "systems" and "isrns"? 1
beIieve NOT! (Frank, 1991b: 24).
Instead, he believes that feudalism, capitalism, and socialism are "ideological
modes". Those who support socialism employ the concepts of feudalism and capitalism
because they make the possibility of a fûrther transition to sociaiism more plausible.
Supporters of capitalism use them because they allow them to distinguish between
capitalist and socialist countrïes. Rather than argue for a new set of modes Frank claims
that there have been no hindarnental transitions from one mode to another, and argues
that a continuous process of accumulation underlies ai1 periods-
FeudaIism
Others do recognize the value of the feudal concept. In the classic work
Ferldalisrn in History Strayer and Coulborn (1965) define feudalism as a politicai system.
It is not an economic or social system although it shapes both of these. The essential
relationship in a feudal society is that between vassal and lord: political power is
embedded in personal rather than insûtutional relationships. Strayer adds that a
definition of feudahm must exclude non-feudal societies:
To obtain a usable concept of feudalism we must eIiminate extraneous factors and
aspects which are common to rnany types of society; feudalism is not synonymous
with aristocracy; feudalism is not a necessary concomitant of the great estate worked
by dependents or senile labor; feudalism is not merely the relationships between
lord and man, because this existed in a non-feuda1 society. It is only when rights of
govemrnenr are attached ro lordships and fiefs thar ive can speak offully developed
feudalisrn. (1965: 16 emphasis added).
Perry Anderson (1974a; 1974b) delineates modes of production - e.g. slave,
primitive, feudd - and political organization types - e.g. absolutist state - and the crises
that cause their downfall and allow the emergence of a new mode of production/political
organization.
The slave mode of production depends on geographical expansion to acquire
slaves, because slave populations do not perpetuate their population (to the required
extent) through reproduction. The crisis of the slave mode of production is reached when
geographical expansion is prevented, Anderson argues that this crisis is one of the
leading causes of the internal collapse of the Western Roman Empire.
The primitive mode of production is exemplified by the Germanic Tribes outside
of the boundaries of the Roman Empire. It includes communal ownership of land and a
warrior aristocracy. The Germanic Tribes were able to overtake the Western Roman
Empire while it was in decline but still intact. As a result a synthesis of the two modes of
production was produced.
This synthesis was the feudal mode of production, which in its pure form
consisted of serfdom, manoraiism, extra-economic coercion of peasant by lords, vassal
hierarchy and "parcellization of sovereignty". The extent to which the pure type was
developed depended on the proper mixture of Roman (slave mode of production) and
Germanic (primitive mode of production) hentage. The Carolingian Empire developed
pure feudalism because it had equal Roman and Germanic influences. Feudalism
developed differently, and later, in the northwest (Scandinavia) where there was no
Roman influence. Feudalism was imponed in the East and was delayed because of
constant invasions from Asia.
Weber's Patrimonial and Feudal Ideal Types
One of Weber's best-known concepts is the ideal type. In the Methodology of the
Social Sciences Weber says:
An ideal type is forrned by the one sided accentzratiorz of one or more points of view
and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and
occasionally absent concrere individual phenomenon, which are arranged according
to those one sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct
(Weber, 1949: 49 emphasis in onginai).
Weber developed different kinds of ideal types and indicated that ideal types had
different uses ( B q e r , 1976; Watkins, 1973). Regarding the ideal type, in the
Methodology of the Social Sciences Weber states that "Its hnction is the cornparison with
empincal reality in order to establish its divergences or sirnilarities" (1949: 43).
However, in Econamy and Sociev Weber likens the use of ideal types to making
calculations in a vacuum in the natural sciences: the results only approximate what
actually wilI happen in practical situations (or real situations in social science) (Weber,
1968: 20). For the purposes of classifying the cases, 1 am interested in employing
Weber's feudal and patrimonial ideal types in the manner advocated in the Methodology
of the Social Sciences. In other words as what Watkins (1973) cails 'holistic concepts',
which are supposed to give a bird's eye view of a whole social situation for the purpose
of comparing actual societies to.
While Weber's patrimonial ideal type will be less familiar to most than his feudal
ideal type it has been widely used in describing and studying pre-modern societies. For
example, Bakker argues that, despite disputations from Geertz, patrimonialism more
closely approximates the pre-colonial Indic civilization of Southeast Asia than other
influential models (Bakker, 1988), and that patrïmonialism helps to understand the
process of bureaucratization and attitudes toward mlers in Indonesia. The patrimonial
ideal type is valuable when you are dealing with feudalism and are ernploying the
comparative method; pavimonialism provides control through contrast while allowing
comparability through resembiance.
To understand Weber's feudal and patrimonial ideal types, and their relation to
one another, they must first be situated within his broader frarnework. Weber lists three
main types of authority: rationd, traditionai, and charismatic. Traditionai authority is
legitimated through the belief in the "virtue of the sanctity of age-old d e s and powers"
(Weber, 1978: 226). Rulers are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed
because of their traditional status. "Personal loyalty, not the official's impersonal duty,
determines the relations of the administrative staff to the master." ( 1978: 226-7). Within
such a society obedience is owed not only to tradition but also to the decisions of the
d e r . This may lead to a conflict when the ruler's decisions significantly differ from
accepted tradition (1978: 227). Weber delineates the types of societies characterized by
traditional authority. The first group is comprÏsed of societies in which the d e r has no
persond administrative staff. It includes Gerontocracy (rule by elders), and
Patriachalism (rule through inheritance) (1978: 23 1).
The categorization for those traditionai societies with an administrative staff is not
so clear. At one time they are divided into Patrimoniaiism (in which the administrative
staff and military personal are persond instruments of ruler) and Estate-Type domination
(in which administrative staff has appropriated particular powers and economic assets
from the ruler). At another time a similar division of Prebendalism (involving the
maintenance of retainers by benefices) and Feudalism (involving the maintenance of
retainers by fiefs) is presented. In a later section (although written earlier
chronologically) the division is Patrimonialism and FeudaIisrn.
1 feel that the best classification system is mentioned only briefly by Weber
(1978: 1086). In it patnmonialism is the narne given to al1 traditional societies with an
administrative staff. These societies form a continuum of the centralization of power. At
one end - patriarchal patrimonialism - the power is concentrated in the rufer. At the other
end - feudalism - power is spread out arnong a ruling group with independent power.
Weber did not intend for Patrimonialism to be seen in opposition to feudalism; feudalism
is actuaily a variant of patnmonialism, which should be contrasted with patriarchal
patrimoniaiism. Bakker (1987, 1988) employs a similar schema of Patrimoniai-
Prebendalism and Patrimonial-Feudalism, which emphasizes the fact that the two systems
are variants of a type, and are not somehow "opposites". However, Bendix's (1962)
patrimonialisrn-feudalism schema will be used because. while somewhat misleadinp, it
employs the most familiar terminology.
Having decided on a tenninology it is now necessary to fil1 out the two ideal
types. One important distinction between feudalism and patrimonialism is the form of
support of the "administrative staff' (1978: 235). Support by means of a fief is
associated with feudalism while support by means of a benefice is associated with
patrimonialism.
Both fiefs and benefices are granted for the return of services. The fief is usually
land and the services are usuaily rnilitary, although neither is necessarily the case. Fiefs
may be granted for religious services as well. Nthough they may not start out as such
fiefs become hereditary on the condition that the heir meets certain requirements.
Requirements for holding a fief always include a high status, such as a knightly status.
The relationship between fief holder and granter is one of mutual obligation; the holder is
required to fulfill his obligations to the lord while the Iord is not pennitted to retract the
fief without faiiure to fblfill obligations on the part of the vassal. The vassal has
sovereignty over his fief, with limited exceptions such as the personal presence of the
lord or an agent of the lord. A vassal may divide part of his fief into smdler fiefs and
s a n t them to sub-vassals, a process known as sub-infeudation. The vassal and sub-
vassal have the same relationship as the lord and vassal while the sub-vassal and the lord
are not expected to have obligations to one another.
A benefice rnay take many forrns: ailowances in kind or in money (stipends), the
right to the use of land, the appropriation of taxes, etc. Benefices are not hereditary in
principle, although benefice holders fight for and sometimes achieve this right. Benefice
holders may come from a variety of backgrounds, with many originally being slaves or
persona1 dependents of the d e r . In place of the mutual obligations and the irrevocability
on the part of the Iord, a benefice entails a defined task or set of tasks the benefice holder
is responsible for while the d e r has no obligations to him. A benefice holder may be
deprived of his benefice at any time for any reason.
The benefice-fief distinction is of paramount importance because it is related to
the distribution of power. With the granting of fiefs power becornes decentralized. Each
vassal has his own rnilitary force answerable to him, not to the lord. While each vassal's
rnilitary force may be less than the lord's, the possibility of the vassals protecting one
another against the lord made the lord's rule precarious and dependent on the support of
the vassals. The granting of benefices does not entail the decentralization of power
because benefice holders are unable to develop an independent power base.
Related to "concentration of powei' is the arbitrariness of mle under a
patrimonial system versus the stereotyped mle under a feudd system. While restricted by
tradition, tradition in a patrimonial society usually includes an arbitrariness of rule. In
addition, the d e r is able to have his rulings enforced in new matters where tradition has
not been established. In contras, feudalism is more stereotyped with less room for
arbitrary decisions on the part of the lord; unwritten codes become rigid with the lord
unable to change them to his advantage.
The feudal-patrimonial classification does not allow for a problem-free
classification of societies. Dunng the Norman and Angevin reigns England displayed
tendencies of both feudalism and patrimonialism, with shifts dong the continuum. While
it had the components of vassalage, fiefs, sub-infeudation, etc., at times the king was able
to remove fiefs, and maneuver unchallenged. Dunng the r e i p of King Henry II,
mercenary annies took the place of knightly armies supplied by the barons, which gave
the king a freedom of action out of place with the feudal ideal type model. Similarly, the
Tokugawa shoguns could remove the daïmyos (vassals) or switch their positions. The
grants given the samurai (sub-vassals) by the daimyo were more like benefices than fiefs.
Ideal types, however, are not intended to divide societies into those that have d l
the characteristics of feudalism and none of the characteristics of patrimonialisrn (or vice-
versa); no society will fit neatly on one end of the feudal-patrimonial continuum. Nor
will any society be correctly located on only the patrimonial-feudal continuum. Actual
societies will be charactenzed by an intersection of different ideal types. For example, al1
cases considered here contain facets of the modem bureaucracy ided type. As ideal
types, patrimoniaiism and feudalism are not expected to represent any actud case;
Weber's ideai types are one-sided exaggerations of histoncal reality that do not occur in
their pure form.
The Patrimonial-Feudalism Distinction and Capitalism
Weber believed that patrimonialism discouraged the emergence of capitalism.
The arbitrariness of patrimonial mle, especially regarding economic innovations, served
to discourage the development of capitdism, with its requirement of calculability and
predictability (1968: 1094). Traditionalkm sets Iimits on formal rules; the ruler does not
want to becorne restricted by forrnalized rules. Officiais7 interests were in maintaining
order, and their stable salaries put them in opposition to the acquisitive nature of
entrepreneurs (1978: 1094). Patrimonial rulers granted monopolies for fees or for a share
in the revenue (1978: 239). Lastly, patrimonial rule is associated with welfare state
policies that pacify the subjects (1975: 240).
Feudalism also had characteristics that discouraged capitalism. The personal
bonds and knightly style of life were in opposition to the relationships and lifestyles
inherent in capitalism (1978: 1005). The fief was not salable (1978: 1 100). When
venturing into the production of goods, lords tried to impede competing cities through
extra-econornic means (1975: 1101). Despite these hindrances Weber adds that
feudalism may allow a gradua1 development of capitalism because there is less
opportunity for the powerful to gain al1 the wedth, allowing the excess to flow into the
hands of the bourgeoisie ( 1978: 1 102).
FeudaIism as Decentralized Political Authority
Despite the fact that patrimonialism and feudalism are often represented as
opposites they are not intended to be categories into which societies fit or do not.
However, for the purposes of this thesis, feudalism and patrimonialism must be
operationalized in order to classify the cases.
Patrimonialism and feudalism are multi-faceted concepts. There is, as this
chapter illustrates, little agreement on the definition of feudalism (and hence what should
be included under patnrnonialisrn). For the purposes of classification I will focus on
what 1 believe is the single most important aspect of the feudal-patrimonial distinction:
political decentralization. Those cases with highly centralized political power will be
classified as patrimonial, while those cases in which political power is decentralized, or
in which there is a "parcellization of sovereignty" in Anderson's terms, will be
designated as feudal.
While they did not commit such a gross simplification of historkai reality by
focussing exclusively on the decentralization of political mhority Strayer, Anderson and
Weber al1 emphasize this element. Weber's comments indicate that he believed this was
one of the most important variables in explaining the differentid development of the
West and the East. Furthemore, many of the other elements can be seen as corollarïes of
this single elernent. '
Capitalism
Different definitions of capitaiism have been forwarded. Sorne ernphasize trade.
Some deny the importance of trade and concentrate on ownership of the means of
production. Others deny both and focus on efficient production.
Marxian definitions of capitalist mode of production include the following
components: capitalists control the means of production; labourers are denied
independent access to the rneans of production; labourers must sel1 their labour to the
capitalists; and the maxirnization of surplus vdue is attained through accumulation and a
constant improvement of the methods of production, including labour organization and
technology (Wolf, 1982: 78). By necessity the capitalist mode of production includes a
division of classes between those in possession of the means of production and those
without possession. Capitalism is to be distinguished from other accumulations of wealth
by the active use of wealth in production and the control of the means of production.
Capitalism shall be defined here as an econornic system in which there is a drive
towards eflcient techniqries in production. Efficient techniques are defined as those
resulting in a greater output in product per input of labour. IncIuded under this definition
are efficiency-oriented techniques that do not require capital investment. Such drives
towards efficiency are first found in agriculture. Here the focus is on the managed estates
that efficiently organize land and labour, and employ Iabour saving techniques.
The Mancian criterion of feedback of profits into the means of production is not
seen as a necessary component of capitalism. While it may be cornmon in
' This is not to say decentralization of political authority causes feudalism. On the contrary. feudalism is seen to be the result o f military requirements when warfare involves combat techniques requiring ski11 and expensive weaponry
industrialization, agriculture often relies more on inexpensive techniques than on capital
reinvestrnent
This definition allows for the development of capitalisrn, or capitalist encIaves, in
periods not known as capitalist.
Now that the definitions have been operationalized, the cases must be classified.
THE OTTOMAN EMP- (1450-1700)
Patrimonial or Feudal?
Initially, the Ottoman Empire appears, undeniably, to be a patrimonial state.
Weber's discussion of sultanism as a specid exaggerated form of patrimoniaiism would
seem to be based in part on the Ottoman Empire's highest political-religious position of
sultan. However, the Ottoman Empire is counted as feudal by sorne, because it inchdes
important distinguishing characteristics of feudalism. In the early phases of the Empire,
rulers from conquered territories were made into vassals of the sultan; later, mounted
warriors, who made up a large portion of the Empire's rnilitary, were granted fiefs for
military service. However, the Ottoman Empire did eventually develop into a
patrimonial state with highly centralized political authority.
In the early period of the Ottoman Empire, especially during periods of rapid
expansion by Orkharn (r. 1326- 1362) and Murad 1 (r. 1362- 1389), rulers of conquered
territories were made vassais, and were required to participate in Ottoman campaigns.
With the accession of Bayezid 1 'The Thunderbolt" (r. 1389-1402) the powerful Beys of
Anatolia rose up in revolt. However, Beyezid's ability to put down their revolts
dernonstrated the power of the Sultan to control core areas. While Beyezid attempted
centralization, his successor, Mohammed 1 (r. 1413- 142 1) had to renirn land and greater
freedom of action to Anatollian States. This early period, while not properly feudal, is
also not properly patrimonial. Shifts in the nature of the central politicai apparatus and its
military support during the reign of Mohammed II the Conqueror (r. 145 1-1481) changed
the Ottoman Empire into a patrimonial state proper. Some historians place the "reai"
begînnings of the Empire at the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, when Mohammed II
gained much of the power and prestige necessary to centralize authority.
The most important single innovation of the Ottoman sultans in developing
centralized power was the ghularn - a group of slaves personally dependent on the
sultan.3 Only non-Muslim, non-Turkish people were eligible. The ghufarn were mostly
children of dhimmis (Chrisuans living within the Ottoman Empire) although they could
be acquired as gifts or by purchase. Al1 ghulam were converted to Islam. The most
promising received a palace education, which included military, religious and statecraft
training. The most able of these became govemors of provinces (sanjak-begi); govemor-
generals of several provinces (beglerbegi); viziers, holding a seat in the Diwan; or the
Grand Vizier. Those not chosen for a palace education were sent to Anatolia for labour.
Most of these eventually went to IstanbuI to become jannisaries, (househoid soldiers).
Also among the palace pard were the "Sipahis of the Porte", a non-feudal, mounted
regiment. While the majority were of non-Muslim origin, it was possible for a Muslim
bom to belong to the Sipahis of the porte.' It was during the reign of Bayezid 1 (r. 1389-
1402) that members of the ghulnm came to dorninate administration. The ghulam
numbered approximately 7000 during his reign (Inalcik, 1976: 28).
Slaves should not be confused with the image of slaves as the lowest strata of society. The position of jannisary, while initially resisted by the parents of eligible children, eventually came to be sought aftcr due to its prestige and monetary rewards. ?t later became possible for Muslirn-boni to belong to the jannisaries.
The reai push towards centralized power came from Mohommed II "She
Conqueror". He successfully repressed an uprising of the jannisaries, and subsequently
expelled many jannimries from the corps. He increased their pay, ass iped their
commander from among their ranks, improved their weapons, and increased their number
from 5,000 to 10,000 (Inalcik, 1976: 46). This reformed corps, personally responsible to
the sultan, was able to overpower any opponent in the imperial domains or the marches.
The jannisan-es were responsible for garrisoning conquered castles and ensuring the
sultan's orders were obeyed.
After his successful capture of Constantinople (1453) Mohornrned II disrnissed
his Grand Vizer, began to appoint his own slaves to this position, and enlarged its
responsibilities. Governors, timar holders, taxation off~cers and executive officers
responsible for applying the sultan's decrees were also mostly of ghularn origin. The
Shnri'n (the traditional source of Islarnic social, political and economic laws) proclaimed
the administration of justice to be the domain of the ulema (the highest religious council),
but the execution of justice fell into the hands of the sultan's personal dependents. While
the Grand Vizier supervised the administration of both finance and justice, he was not
pennitted to give direct orders to the commander of the janissaries, thus preventing him
from acquiring the whole range of state power. The sultan also held the authority to
develop new laws without the intervention or supervision of Shari'a jurists, and
Mohammed II reacted forcibly to attempts at intervention on the part of the rilema
(Inalcik, 1976: 48). Mohammed II was the first sultan to clairn leadership based on three
traditions: Turkish, whose history dictated that a member of the Tnbe of Kayi shall be
chosen ruler of the marches; Islamic, which dictates that a great Ghazi shall lead the
jihad; and Byzantine (Inalcik, 1976: 4 1-42).
Future sultans were rarely as strong as Mohammed II was; however, the
centralized state he developed was not successhilly challenged from within the empire
during the period under consideration. This claim may seem strange given the histoncal
reality of the weakness of some future sultans. Episodes illustrating such weaknesses
include the assassination of sultans with ttieir subsequent replacement by those who hold
the favour of the jannisaries; the "sultanate of the womrn", a period where, through
palace intrigue, real power was held by the sultans' "mothers in Law"; and the reign of the
Kupriii Grand Viziers who held virtually absolute power. These episodes ail demonstrate
that some of the patrimonial criteria Weber developed are not met by the case of the
Ottoman Empire. However, these are not examples of threats to centrdized power, but
shifts in who holds the power, the centralization of which remained largely unthreatened..
Most claims that the Ottoman Empire was feudal center on the sipczhis (note that
the sipahis and the "Sipahis of the PorteJ' are not the sarne, although both are mounted
forces). This is a group of mounted warriors, far more numerous than the household
forces, who received a timar (land gant) and were required to go on campaigns and
supply their own rnilitary equipment. Furthemore, if they were granted additionai land
for outstanding performance, they were required to supply other mounted soldiers (jebeli)
for campaigns. What makes this land tenure system non-feudal is that the sipahis'
relationship with the peasants was strictly defined by the Porte (Ottoman central
govemment). Despite these important differences, the fiefs were in practice heritable
within Iimits. However, the inheritance of a tirnar did not usually involve inhentance of
the same timar held by the father. This discouraged the development of a power base
upon which de facto sovereignty could be based (Moutafchieva, 1988: 37).
An important division in timars also prevented political decentralization. There
were three grades of h a r , with the largest going to high oficials such as govemor-
generals. Whiie these larger fiefs involved usufruct and the requirement of supplying
mounted warriors (jebelï), they were strictly not heritable; the fief went with the
appointment, not with the holder of the office.
To sumrnarize, there is no sovereignty apart from the centra1 niler's sovereignty.
Furthemore, this sovereignty could not be won by force because the design of the
political system maintained political centralization and resisted the centrifugai forces of
enfeofment.
Endogenous Capitalism?
Gocek (1996) argues the dernise of the Ottoman Empire was directly related to
indigenous bourgeoisie forces, but her account cannot be interpreted as an endogenous
development of capitdism. The introduction of enlightenment thought led to
disenchantment with the political structure; secret societies were developed by
intellectuals to promote rational government reforms. This, in conjunction with new
nationalist rnovements, was responsible the development of the Turkish nation state. It
cannot be said this was endogenously developed capitalism: clearIy the ideas and ideals
were imported from Europe. Most importantly the capitalization occurred long after the
period we are interested in here.
To the contrary agricultural technique remained largely traditional during the
period 1450-1700.
MING CHINA
Patrimonial or Feudal?
China's dynasties have been characterized by varying degrees of politicai
centralization; the Ming Dynasty may be considered the epitome of politicd
centralization whiie the Chou Dynasty may be regarded as feudai. Despite fluctuations,
since the first unification of China under the Ch'in Dynasty China's politicd system has
been highly centralized. The Ming dynasty has been chosen from arnong these politically
centralized dynasties because it confoms closely to many of the facets of Weber's ideal-
type patrimonial society. With the emphasis on political centralization it rernains an
exemplar of a patrimonial society. Furthemore, the Ming Dynasty is a long period in
which economic development could occur free from interference of political upheaval.
A challenge can be made to this selection: an "econornic revolution" occurred
during the period 700-1 100 (Elvin, 1973), which involved an increase in trade, and the
development of capitalistic production techniques. Collins' (1986) argues this is an
exarnple of capitalism, similar in cause to the capitalism that emerged in England 1100-
1348. Certainly, if this is the case, then we have a counter example to the daim that
capitalism emerges only from feudalism. This issue cannot be dealt with here. It is
noteworthy, however, that this economic revolution did not continue during the highly
centralized Ming Dynasty.
The Ming Dynasty has many similarities with the Ottoman Empire. Like the
Ottoman Empire, the centralization of the Ming Dynasty was contnved largely under a
single ruler. Like the Ottoman Empire the degree of centralization waxed and waned
with political events and the personal ability of the rulers. The Ming also had periods and
institutions similar to those of the Ottoman Empire that could lead to a (mistaken)
categorization of the Ming as a feudal society, but also like the Ottoman Empire the
centralization was never senously challenged.
The Ming Dynasty was founded by Zhu Yuanzhang in 1368. Zhu Yuarizhang,
after consolidating his power in the Yangtze River region, was able to easily dislodge the
Mongul mlers of the Yuan Dynasty. Government and taxation systems were reorganized
to achieve centraiization. To accomplish centralization he resorted to a tyrannical nile
and political purges. It is estimated that no less than 100,000 people were killed as a
result of his trials; victims included high officiais, army officers and other notables.
Centralization was possible due to a sirnplified organization of the economy.
Taxes were assessed, whenever possible, in kind. Furthemore, the payment had to be
delivered by the taxpayers, under the supervision of village leaders, to designated
warehouses, which were sometimes in far-off locations. Many functions of the
government were supported directly through taxation - local cornmunities were required
to supply office attendants, jail keepers, etc. Many official posts were not paid: the
positions were filled as payrnent of taxes. The strong centralization and simplification
was in part a reaction to the failure of the Sung Dynasty to resist foreign domination,
which was believed to be due to its economic organization (Huang, 1988: 153).
Following Zhu Yuanzhanp's reign there was a succession dispute (1398-1402), in
which the designated heir (Zhu Yuanzhang's grqdson) was challenged by the heir's
uncle. During this period there was a spilt in power between factions favoring each side -
of the dispute. However, this short penod of limited political decentrdization does not
chalIenge the categorization of the Ming Dynasty as patrimonial.
Like the Ottoman Empire, the Ming Dynasty had a landholding military class.
The population was divided into rnilitary and civil registrations. The military house holds
were to pay Iower taxes, and, where possible, be given grants of land. Furthemore,
rnilitary responsibilities were hereditary. However, this group, often remiss in their
military readiness, did not develop into an independent power. They did not have
sovereignty in their land, and they were not given large areas of productive land or the
ability to enfeof sub-vassals, which may have enabled them to attain de facto sovereignty.
The nobility were given stipends, not fiefs, and held their positions at the pleasure
of the emperors (Hucker, 1970: 13).
Endogenous Capitalism?
It may seem unreasonable to use China as a case that did not develop capitalism
endogenously because some scholars contend that China would have developed
capitalism if it was not for foreign interference at a crucial point in its history. A growth
in trade and marketing systems was developing in the Yangtze region in the Qing
Dynasty. Market towns developed that employed wage labour, and whose elite were
merchants. Water transport already existed to support trade and fiscal institutions
employing letters of credit and bills of exchange were developed. However, Fairbanks
(1992) argues these developments could not Iead to capitalism because of rural conditions
in China; the farm household had so little land that they had to be partly comrnerciaiized
to exist. Factory labour could not compete with the low labour costs of this system.
Huang adds with regards to the thesis China would have developed capitalism
indigenously that "China was nowhere close to such an eventuality" (Huang, 1988: 198).
Few innovations in agicultural technique were introduced during the Ming
Dynasty (Perkins, 1969: 56). Those that were, such as the human-drawn plough, were of
a labour intensive nature. In fact, there was a trend towards less efficient agricultural
techniques, including the use of inferior farm implements, because of their lower cost.
TOKUGAWA JAPAN
Patrimonial or Feudal?
Japanese feudalism is often associated with the Tokugawa penod (1600-1868).
However, Japanese feudalism existed pnor to the Tokugawa era, during the Muromachi
and Sengoku Eras.
The Development of Feudalism
The development of feudalism in Japan began in the Kamakura Period, but the
Kamakura Penod is not properly feudai. The acquisition of shoen land by Bnk~fir
(central military govemment) officiais led to the development of feudalism in the
Muromachi and Sengoku ~ e r i o d s . ~
At the beginning of the Kamakura Penod the shogun vassalized shrrgo
(provincial-level cornmanders of rnilitary forces) and tater jito (land stewards of an
3state). Despite these feudal elements it would be unreasonabIe to cal1 the Kamakura era
5 One issue regarding the relationship between feudalisrn and capitalism is the paradox between warfare and economic growh. Warfare is seen by many to be both a part of feudalism and a deterrent to economic development. However, Tokugawa feudalism was relatively free frorn war. Even in medieval perïods, warfare in Japan was "not in fact especially deadly or destructive. The damage done by warfare to the true econornic foundation of the country, its nce fields and its forests, was almost negligible" (Sanson, 1964: 18 1). Feudal warfare in Europe was not as destructive as may be imagined. The relative absence of the productive cIass in warfare allowed production to continue nearly unabated, and codes of chivalry and heavy armor Iimited casualties arnong the rufing class.
The shoen is a scattered g o u p of land holdings owned by local notables (kaibatsa ryoshu) but given to aristocratic proprietors (Ryoke) for tax exemptions. The proprietors were in no way feudal vassals: they were not warriors, and resided in Kyoto (away from their potential source of power) potential. They held land without obligation of any service to the shogun
feudal in the sense of political decentralization because the shugo and jito had no political
authority apart from the Bakufu,
Shugo were able to develop independent power through additions to their duties
such as the enforcement of land-related disputes - they were able to not enforce decisions
perceived to be disadvantageous to themselves, and could demand payrnent from
successful litigants for enforcement services (Akira, 1990: 241) - and the collection of
hanrei (a nce tax) - which he could use to reimburse warriors for their military expenses
during the Nambokucho disturbance7. Shugo later acquired control over haif of the shoen
land under their jurisdiction, and were able to develop vassal relationships with local
w ~ o r s through grants of this land. The shugo developed wealth through rniscellaneous
taxation and serni-legd extractions. The position of shugo becarne heritable, which
allowed the development of strong vassal relationships and local power.
During the Muromachi Period the shugo took complete control of the provinces
and installed permanent administration complete with strongholds and fortifications.
They resided in Kyoto, while deputy shrigo directly governed the provinces from the
shugosho (the governing office).
Like the shugo, the jito were not intended to be an independent holders of power.
However, the jito increased the area of land under their personal control to half the land
they were responsible for. They acquired contiguous landholdings, militarized upper-
dass peasants, and adopted the practice of single heir inheritance of iandholdings.
Through these processes the jito becarne regional overlords. Shugo were generally more
powerful than jito, and were able to vassalize them.
' A perïod beginning of the Muromachi era when there were rwo rival courts.
During the Murornachi era the Bakufi had considerable control over the shugo.
The shugo were required to reside in Kyoto; this was both a sign of the shogun7s power
and a deterrent to the development of power by the shrrgo. After the Onin War (1467-
1477) the power of the shogun was drastically reduced, and the requirement to reside in
Kyoto could not be enforced. The shugo returned to their domains, where they increased
their power and personai authority. War spread to the countryside where it lasted for
about 100 years. During this time, known as the Sengoku f eriod ( 1477- 1570): there was
continuous threat and practice of gekokujo, the overthrow of superior persons by inferïor
persons. The powerfui regiond lords of this era, the Sengoku dairnyo, were far more
independent, economically and politically, than the shugo daimyo had been, and they
began to fight one another for regional hegemony.
Tokugawa Feudalism
Japan was largely unified around 1570 by Oda Nobunaga. Toyotomi Hideyoshi
furthered the process of unification. Tokugawa Ieyasu consolidated central power by
defeating his rivals at the Battle of Sekigahara. By 1615 Ieyasu had regranted land he
had either won from his opponents or gained through lack of heir to his supportersg.
Approximately one-quarter of the land and important cities such as Edo and Osaka were
under direct Bak~lfir control. Virtudly al1 of the remaining land was divided into hans
(fiefs), each one being granted to one of approximately 250 daimyo. The emperor's
prestige was enhanced for legitimacy, but his powers were even further reduced (Hall,
1978: 168). Each daimyo had sovereignty within his han, but was required to maintain
The Onin war was a baronial dispute that was fought in Kyoto because of a shogunal succession dispute. The war lasted for ten years, and engaged over 200,000 soldiers at one time. When it was through Kyoto was destroyed.
law and order. The shogun did not directly tax the daimyo, but could make regular
extractions. The daimyo in tum granted privileges to samurai. the daimyoPs military
class sub-vassais.
There are significant differences between the feudalism of Tohgawa Japan and
the feudalism of England 1100-1348. The shoguns were more powerful and more
controlling of their vassals than the English Kings were. The relationship between the
daimyo and the shogun emphasized the dnimyo's responsibilities over the sho,w's
responsibilities. The power of the shogun was maintained, as well as demonstrated, by
the sankin-kotai system, which required the vassals to leave their hans and reside in Edo
for a designated period of time and leave their farnilies in Edo upon their retum. 'O This
discouraged the daimyo from encroaching on the shogun's prerogatives. The shogun was
also able to reassign daïmyos to different hans.
Another innovation to prevent the decentralization of power was the heino-brtrzri
system, which separated the warriors from the peasant class. Both daimyo and samurai
were required to reside in castle towns. Samrcrai, rather than being enfoeffed with land,
were granted stipends of rice.
Tokugawa Japan differs frorn European feudalism because of its strongly
centralized state. Weber indicates Tokugawa Japan is feudal, but differs from the
feudalism of Western Europe because of the power of the shogun. Rieschauer finds that
while having a feudal political structure, "Culturally, and to sorne extent economically,
Tokugawa Japan had a postfeudal rather than a strictly feudal society" (Rieschauer, 1965:
9 In addition to his supporters there were Tozoma ("outside lords") who had not actively supported Ieyasu but were too powerful and remote to easily challenge 'O Although normally descrïbed as yeariy, the times differed greatly. Daimyo from more distant hans had longer intervals between required stays at theù Edo residence
45). It could be argued that it is unreasonable to categorize Tokugawa Japan as feudal
because it contains important elements of both feudal and patrimonial ideal types.
Despite this plausible interpretation, Tokugawa Japan is classified here as feudal because
it is charactenzed by the decentraiization of politicai authority.
Endogenous Capitalism?
Japan expenenced "rapid economic growth during the 16& century" (Reischauer,
1965: 44) in part due to foreign trade, mosî notably with China. Tokugawa Japan
experienced continued economic growth, despite an almost complete lack of international
trade. Efficient agriculturai and manufacturing techniques were introduced and
developed. The daimyo and shogun were interested in agricultural improvements
because this was their main source of revenue. They instructed peasants in new
techniques, promoted Iand reclarnation and encouraged diligence (Tsuchiya, 1977: 154).
Improvements in agriculture included irrigation techniques and the increased rate of the
introduction of seed varieties. Labour saving devices such as water wheels used for
pounding -popular by middle of Tokugawa period (Tsuchiya, 1977: 155) - and "threshing
chopsticks" and the "one-thousand tooth shredder" used for threshing Cotton and
rapeseed (Toshio, 199 1: 5 14) were employed. The circulation of agricultural books such
as "The Complete Agriczclturalist" by Miyazaki Antei, and Yasasada7s "Encyclopedia of
Agricrrlr~ire" indicates the interests in productive agriculture. Landholdings were run as
managed estates for commercial crops (Yarnamura, 1978).
ENGLAND 1100-1348
PatrimoniaI or Feudal?
Despite obvious feudal characteristics there is some question of the extent of
political decentralization in England's history. At times the king appeared to have
absolute power, while the barons have been powerless to oppose him. Wallerstein has
argued that England's development into a core state was due largely to the political
centrakation of its absolutist state (Wallerstein, 1972). This absolute power of the king,
however, has only existed at certain times in England's history, and is only absolute in
cornparison to other European states, where the arïstocracy sometimes had comparativety
less power. In other words, arnong feudal states, England has more centralization of
power than some, but has much less than the patrimonial cases.
Upon defeating the Anglo-Saxons, William I "The Conqueror" was crowned King
of England. He enfeofed his supporters as barons, but left the existing political structure
largely unchanged." In 1086 he required d l vassals and their sub-vassals to swear
allegiance directly to him in the Salisbury Oath. While William was able to hold tight
control over his vassals, subsequent kings were not always so strong. The signing of the
Magna Carta by John 1 and the Provisions of Oxford by Henry III demonstrate the
strength of the combined efforts of the barons.
The barons were granted large tracts of land and were required to maintain a
military force for service to the king. The constant requirement for battle service ensured
these forces would be maintained - England was engaged in frequent rnilitary carnpaigns
in Wales, Scotiand, Ireland, and the continental territones. The barons on the Welsh
I I Anglo-saxon England could also be considered feudal (Postan, 1972), but is not of interest to us here
marches and Scottish border were especiaily war-ready. English continental temtories
held had to be defended while those temtories believed to be attainrible required baronid
support in offensive warfare.
The barons were able to constnict strong fortresses that required a months-Iong
siege by the king's forces if they were to be overtaken. In the event of a rebellion by the
vassals, the king's forces alone were demonstrated to be insufficient in resistance.
English kings were required to be wary of the interests of their vassals.
Despite the fact that, unlike Tokugawa daimyos, barons and their subvassals
officially yielded their sovereignty to their lord in his presence or the presence of his
officiais, barons and their subvassals held sovereignty in their fiefs and could govern
them free from interference.
Endogenous Capitalism?
WhiIe it is more widely agreed that England, rather than Japan, developed
capitalism endogenously, it is not as widely agreed it did so prior to 1350. English
capitaiisrn is associated with the mechanization of the textile industry and the
capitalization of agriculture that took place after the enclosures- However, like
Tokugawa Japan, Medieval England was developing capitalism. It was not industrial
capitalism, nor did it invotve al1 econornic actors, but capitaiist relations were developing
during this penod in the form of managed estates. "Around 1300 the management of
demesne involved making detailed accounts of productive and commercial operations"
(Bntnell, 1993b: 366). The 13" century saw the techniques of treatises on estate
management, which encouraging efficient organization, accurate rnethods of accounting
and yearly control of accounts by auditors, widely employed (Gimpel, 1988: 38).
The Cornparison
The positive cases are, therefore, Tokugawa Japan ( 1600- 1868) and England from
1100-1348. The negative cases are the Ottoman Empire from 1450-1700 and Ming
China (1368-1644).
England and Japan fulfil the requirements of The Method of Agreement in which
positive cases are compared. While selection is inherently limited when using historical
cases. important variables should be varied for control if possible. Ln this case the role of
foreign trade is controlled; England engaged in extensive foreign trade, while in
Tokugawa Japan there was virtually none.
The requirernents of the Method of Difference are fulfilled through cornparison of
the positive cases and the negative cases. The negative cases should be as sirnilar as
possible to the positive cases except on the crucial differences. Selection of the cases has
been guided by this requirement; both positive and negative cases alike are large,
bureaucratic, pre-modern societies.
It was discussed earlier that a problem with The Method of Difference is that
important causal variables may be overlooked because it is assumed that factors constant
between the positive and negative cases are not causaily related to the outcome of
interest; Le., it is possible that something cornrnon to both patrimonial and feudai cases is
the leading cause of capitalism, but that the feudd cases have additional factors that gives
them an extra push towards capitalism. However, it is recognized at the outset that al1 of
the cases considered here had important elements required for the development of
capitalism. The task is seen to explain the paradox of how advanced societies such as
The Ottoman Empire and China failed to develop econornically despite the presence of
68
such eiements. It is the crucial difference between the cases we are primarily interested
in.
Chapter 6:
PresenceIAbsence of the Preconditions for Capitalism
Now that the cases have been separated into patrknonial and feudal societies, it is
necessary to deternine if they do indeed differ regarding the presence of the
preconditions for capitrtlisrn-
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1450-1700)
Free Labour
The Ottoman Empire's political system is based on the free status of its agicultural
producers to prevent the developrnent of independent political power by local notables
who seek to control servile labourers. Cultivators were free to work for wage !abour. In
addition there were landless peasants, requiring an income for taxes, who could be hired
as cultivators (halcik, 1994: 15 1).
Market for Land
Almost al1 land in the Ottoman Empire was miri, or state-owned land. This land
was granted to the reaya, members of the productive class (in contrat with the askeri or
miiitary class), through a contract requiring them to cultivate the land and pay taxes and
designated dues to the state. This is known as the cip-hane system and was the most
widely employed land tenure system. Some land was given to sipahis, but this land was
generally organized in the same manner, with the reuyci paying their taxes to the sipahis.
Both timars and cifr-hane plots were iegally inahenable and indivisible, although, in
practice this was not always the case (halcik, 1994: 146).
However, not al1 miri land was parceled out to peasants. Some miri land, known
as Mukataalu land, was leased by the government under a simple contract under which a
lump sum was to be paid for tithes (Inalcik, 1994: 108). -M~ckataczlu lands changed hands,
and could be exploited however the propnetor saw fit.
Vaqfs were also outside the miri system. Vaqfs were developed to pay for certain
public projects and services. Sornetimes quality, but normally inferior land was granted
to wealthy subjects who would reclaim the land, and give part of the revenue to public
works. The Vaqfs represent another way large landholdings could be accumulated. The
fact that revenue goes to public works wouid not, in itself, discourage the introduction of
efficient techniques because of the proprietors' ability to retain surplus above the
predetermined "donation".
Free Markets
State monopolies, while privately managed, were based on government finances
(Inalcik, 1994: 6 1-62). The Porte was especially concerned with control of silver and
gold mines, which were an object of contention between Ottoman Empire and the West
(Inalcik, 1994: 58). Although private merchants were involved in the process, their
activities were directed by the Porte. In the 1470s Mohammed II put land and water
control systems suitable for rice production under central control because of the
importance of rice in campaigning.
The flow of foodstuffs into Istanbul was considered an important responsibility of
the govemment. In tirnes of shortage it would regulate prices, which involved regulating
pnces in the area of production (Faroqhi, 1994: 496). The populace and the palace troops
couid not leave the provisions for Istanbul to market forces because famine would lead to
revolts. Europe, especiaily Italy, offered higher prices for grain, but the Porte restricted
its export (Inalcik. 1994: 182). Only those selected by the state could ded in cereals
(halcik, 1969: 1 19).
This having been said, the interference by the Porte in the economy has been
exaggerated. While the Porte restricted legal exportation during times of shortage,
exportation did occur. Controls on the pnce of grain were limited by the reluctance of
producers to sel1 (Inalcik, 1994: 185). Tax exemptions and freedoms were granted to
merchants and artisans to attract them to new capitals (Inalcik, 1978~: 207). Merchants
were appreciated in Islam, and their activities were not prescrïbed or lirnited (Inalcik,
1969: 99).
CaIculabIe Law
The Sharia'a provides the knowledge of right and wrong in matters of politics,
economics, society, and religion. Weber pointed out that the Sharia 'a could, in principle,
be a basis for the developrnent of calculable law in lslarnic societies (Turner, 1974: 236).
In practice, however, the Sharia'a was not used in this way. While his legitimacy was
based on religious principles, the sultan had siyaset, political and executive power as
against his religious functions. The principle of uifgave a mler the power to make non-
Sharia'a decisions when necessary (Inalcik, 1978a: 108). This was not uncornrnon
because developrnents not anticipated in the Shnria 'a were cornmonplace (Weber, 1993:
208). Furthemore, Sharia'a legitimization was clairned, to land systems in particular,
only after they were imposed (Inalcik, 1978b: 222).
From some of Weber's writing one gets the impression there are no laws in
patrimonial societies; in the absence of custom the ruler and his retainers make personai
and unpredictable rulings. This is simply not the case. Large bureaucratic societies
cannot exist without some stability, and this is in part supplied though official decrees,
which are not reversed every day. Suleiman II ' n i e Magnificent" was also known as
"The Lawgiver". He developed kanun-names for each province that established tax rates,
rules of land possession, transference and inhentance under a timar. as well as conditions
when the laws did not apply (Inalcik, l978a).
Entrepreneurid Organizaüon of Capital
Sipahis had little control over their timars. They were entitled to the tax revenue
and certain dues (kduk), but did not have sovereignty in their property; both taxation and
dues were regulated by the Porre (Inalcik, 1994: 71). The Porre even tried to control the
actual collectors of the rent to whom the sipahis delegated collection (Inalcik, 1994: 74).
Furthemore, the sipahis demonstrated their inability to manage their own plots due to
rnilitary obligations, and, as a result, demesne was abolished in favour of adding former
demesne to rent land in 1539 (Inalcik, 1994: 1 17- 1 18).
The emphasis on free cultivators supplied with their own land was the ideal, but
not the only form of agricultural organization. Approximately ten percent of land was
outside miri system. The Vaqf represents an important departure from this model. As
previously mentioned, proprietors were not always entirely altmistic. They were
interested in securing revenue for themselves and their farnily. The portion of revenue
and public projects to be undertaken in return for the gant were established at the start,
encouraging surplus production for the benefit of the proprietor. Owners welcomed any
labour to extend arable land; labour was generally the limiting factor because most
potentid labourers had their own plots (Inalcik, 1994: 122).
The Porte generaily encouraged land reclamation to increase its tax base (Inalcik.
1994: 170). It would offer lower taxes or no tax at all for a iimited time on reclaimed
land. For exarnple, sipahis could reclaim land and not pay taxes until a new land survey
recorded the land.
Labour, land, and free markets were avaiiable for entrepreneurial organization in
a context of calculable econornic conditions. However, what has been termed capitalist
agriculture - managed estates - were not widespread.
MING CHINA
Free Labour
Wage labour is not generally associated with Ming China. This is in part due to
the belief that slavery was widespread during the Ming Dynasty. This misconception is
probably in part due to accounts of slaves willingly offenng themselves to office-holders.
In fact, owning slaves was outiawed during the Ming for al1 but office holders. This
resulted in former slaves trying to office-holders to be their new masters. In addition,
translation has led to confusion because the same word was used for what are normally
thought of as slaves, in addition to several other types of dependant labourers (Chao,
1986: 155-156).
Wage labour i i not part of the image of traditional China. However, hired
workers on a wage b a i s were common even as early as the Warring States Period (Chao,
1986: 133). During the Ming Dynasty approximately ten percent of the rural labour force
was engaged in wage labour (Chao, 1986: 140). Legal codes, recognizing a distinction
between shorter and longer-term agreements, indicate the government endorsed the use of
wage labour (Chao, 1986: 145).
Land Market
The government did own land. Some was govemment land inherited from the
Sung and Yuan Dynasties and some was confiscated from those who actively opposed
the rise of the Ming Dynasty (Heijdra, 1998: 476). However, the majority of land was
privately held. Despite the govemment's ability to confiscate land or reassign it to
princely estates, land continued to be bought and sold (Heijdra. 1988: 476). Private
contracts for, and public records of land transfers and sales indicate land was alienable
and diat this pracùce was accepted and endorsed by the govemment.
While there is some disagreement on land concentration dunng the Ming - Chao
(1981) argues land was dispersed arnong smdl and medium-sized landlords while more
traditional reports argue there was a concentration among the elite - al1 agree land was
bought and sold freely.
Free Markets for Comrnodities
The central govemment supplied itself with centrally produced goods, and
controlled al1 essential comrnodities such as salt and iron (Hucker, 1970: 31-32).
According to Hucker, merchants were involved in govemment monopolies, but a free
movement of goods was prevented. The govemment controlled the activity of merchants.
They required govemment supplied passes (as did d l citizens) to move about the country
(Hucker, 1970: 3 1). The central government "...virtually announced to the nation that
China, as a large conglomeration of village communities could be content and happy
without the complications of commerce" (Huang, 1988: 153-154). Foreign vade was
outlawed; European trade was restricted to srnall-scale activities on the south Coast until
the end of the Ming (Hucker, 1970: 22).
Many scholars see these views as exaggerations. Brook says that on balance, the
Ming Dynasty neither supported nor opposed commerce (Brook, 1998: 677). The re-
opening of the Grand Canai for the payment of rice tribute was a boon to the sale of
surplus agriculniral products and commodities produced for the market. Private use had
always been pennitted on the canal, initially at no cost, and later for toll fees. While
there were penalties for selling above market pnce or gaining a monopoly, the market
pnce was detennined by comparing prices in the market, not developed artificially by the
government (Brook, 1998: 671). The distribution of state monopolies was left in the
hands of merchants, not taken over by the state (Brook, 1998: 683).
Markets could develop wherever they were profitable (Brook, 1998: 685).
County markets increased in number and frequency throughout the Ming Dynasty, and
they were officially recognized, though not officially monitored (Brook, 1998: 68 1).
Some county markets developed into market towns, which coincided with a general shift
from marketing surplus to producing for the market (Brook, 1998: 688).
Calculability
There were Iaws and law codes in Ming China; however, most of the laws issued
by the government were directed at customs such as ancestral instruction that stressed
personal conduct. There was no concept of abstract justice, and rulings were based on
social stability. The class of those involved, and the possible social repercussions of
decisions were of paramount importance (Hucker, 1970: 71). Both officials and
emperors made legal decisions, but the emperor could overtum any decision at any time
(Hucker, 1970: 48). Fairbank remarked that "people generally avoided litigation"
(Fairbank, 1992: 183), and added that Chinese law was vertical: it was designed to
resolve conflicts between the state and the individud, not between individuals (Fairbank,
1992: 183-1 84). Statutes were irnprecise and conindictory To appeal to the letter of the
Iaw was to disregard true morality.
The idea that such arbitrariness in Chinese law has prevented economic
development is not new; Adam Smith proposed that possibly China had ". . .acquired that
full complement of riches which the nature of its laws and institutions permits it to
acquire" (Smith, 1982: 174).
Too much c m be made of the arbitrariness of law in Ming China by looking at
specific practices. Over the long run practices were remarkably stable. Precedents
carried out a great ded of weight in the tradition-oriented Confucian State. Fiscal
policies enacted at one time were assumed to be useful at later times. Even ministers
were restricted by precedent (Huang, 1969: 77-78). The Confucian frarnework was rigid
and formal and stifled innovation in governmental procedures (Huang, 1969: 124).
Accounts of arbitrary action by emperors in personal-political affairs must not
lead to the judgement that prediction was not possible in the economic realm. The image
of a Chinese ruler sentencing his officials to floggings or long prison sentences for what
seern to be rninor offences (or no offences at all) are disturbing, but the image of an
emperor frequently interfering with landholding agreements is unredistic. Such matters
were attended to either on a local level by officials or on a village level by the clairnants.
Either way, custom and law assured the cdculability required for economic investment.
Entrepreneurial Organization
Despite the concentration of land, the trend was away from managed estates
because of the unavailability of cheap labour (Chao, 1983: 309). There were agricultural
management books, but they advised against managerial landlordism. Shen's Handbook
for Agrictilture, written in the 1630s, demonstrated that the net income to the Iandowner
from a managed estate would be no higher than if the land was rented out (Chao, 1982:
309) while the efforts involved in supervision of a managed estate would be greater.
Generally, because of the costs of supervision and high renting prices, closely managed
estates were not profitable and did not develop (Heijdra, 1998: 524).
Despite these trends, large-scaie agriculture was present in Ming China. Labour
and land were available for the entrepreneurid organization in a context of free markets
and calculable econornic conditions. The concentration of land by the gentry led to some
managerial landlords who employed hired labour (Heijdra, 1998: 524). However,
efficiently managed estates were the exception. They were in fact more widespread
during the Sung.
TOKUGAWA JAPAN
Free Labour
Peasants become differentiated into landlords, tenants, and employed labourers
during the Tokugawa Period (Tsuchiya, 1977: 159). Terms of labour employment ranged
from hereditary tenant to day labourer. Evidence suggests that the rnajority of non-
hereditary ag-ricultural workers worked for a season or several seasons for the sarne
landowner, but some were even shorter term (Tsuchiya, 1977: 160). These labourers
were free to work in response to dernand.
Increased free Iabour was in part a result of landholding arrangements, which
were altered near the beginning of the Tokugawa Penod. Large Landowners granted
small plots to fellow villagers who were previously landless and had worked on the plots
of the large landowners. They now had their own plots, but were stiil required to perform
agricultural labour as part of the agreement to acquire the plots granted to them. Many
abandoned or sold their plots due to an inability to maintain sustenance levels. These
practices increased during famines, whïch were cornrnon in the Tokugawa era. At other
times, rising wages for labour, due to the labour requirements of rnanufactunng and
comrnercial crops, led some to sel1 their land to seek wage work (Yamarnura, 1979: 295).
Land Market
Tokugawa laws were explicit about the non-dienation and non-divisibility of
land. However, these laws could be circumvented with terminology such as "permanent
mortgages"; the Bakr& dairnyo and sarntlrai were not particularly concemed about who
owned the land, so long as taxes were paid on it (Hall, 1978: 203). Restrictions on crops
instated near the beginning of the penod were also not enforced, which permitted
landowners to engage in commercial crops (Osarnu, 1982: 360). As mentioned above,
Iandowners were able to increase their holdings in periods of high wages (hence low land
pnces) and poor harvests.
In addition to the land market, reclaimed land could officially be made into large
holdings (Toshio, 1991: 499). These projects were actively supported by daimyo who
saw additional land as additionai tax revenue. Wealthy merchants and townsmen
eventually took part in large reclamation projects (Toshio, 199 1: 500).
Free Markets for Commodities
By the end of the Tokugawa period, as much as half "and probably nearer two
thirds of [agricultural] output was marketed in one form or another" (Crawcour in
Halliday, 1975: 9). Products from any part of Japan could be found in any large market
(Tsuchiya, 1977: 197). Transportation networks were greatly expanded during the
Tokugawa era; direct shipping routes were developed between Osaka and Edo, and the
daïmyo encouraged transportation with the development of port facilities and connections
between ports and castle towns (Nobuhiko, 1991: 543).
The heino-bunri system led to an interdependence between the feudal class and
the merchants. Stipends were paid in rice, and samurai were forbidden by custom to
engage in commerce, which made merchants necessary to commute rice stipends to cash.
Wholesaiers sold and often transported the daïmyo's rice to the national entrepots in Edo
and Osaka. Merchants were often involved in the transportation to the daïmyo's Edo
residence.
The econornic systern of Tokugawa Japan was more modern than the marketing
systems of the other cases. The Bakufu legalized the sale of futures, which was comrnon
prior to this time, in 1730. Some consider the Tokugawa rice exchange the first stock
exchange. In addition to the dependence of the feudal class on the merchants, the
inefficacy of econornic manipulation due to the complexity of the econornic system
further prevented widespread interference in the economic reaim.
Calculable Law
Chonin (town dwellers) had no rights; there was no conception of bourgeois law
in the Tokugawa Penod (Hdliday, 1975: 10). The peasantry had no politicai power.
Unlike the Ottoman Empire where the sultan defended the freedom of the peasants, the
shogun exercised central authority directly on the dairnyo, and Ieft the peasants to fend
for themselves. Merchants could be exposed to the arbitrary acts of authonties such as
the cancellation of debts, forced loans, and the sudden confiscation of property.
However, while daimyo had sovereignty over their han, they were required to
maintain law and order and run their han peacefully and efficiently. It was also in the
interests of the daimyo to not interfere with productive agriculturd projects. Their
revenue was derived directly from payment in agricultural products, yet they were not
permitted to engage in agriculture. Furtherrnore, the movement of daimyo from han to
han led to greater impartiality (Hall, 1978: 178).
The key to cdculability in the Tokugawa period was that the interests of the
producers coincided with the interests of the daimyo. Interfering with landholding
relationships was not beneficial to the daïmyo.
Entrepreneurid Organization of the Means of Production
Unlike the English case, the feudai class in Tokugawa Japan could not engage in
managerial landlordism due to the heino-burin system. Instead, the upper-class peasants
undertook managerial landlordism. Despite the relative lack of importance of economies
of scale in rice cultivation, economies of scale were important in cash crops, especially in
marketing and processing (Yarnarnura, 1979: 3 16). Wealthy landowners were able to
invest in fertilizer for Cotton, rapeseed, and tobacco, and could afford to rotate crops
(Yamamura, 1979: 294). Wealthy landowners were able to invest in agriculture because
of the tax system, operative at the beginning of the period, which took little account of
differences in wealth when assessing taxes (Toshio, 199 1: 498).
Labour, land, and free markets were available for entrepreneurid organization in
a context of calculable economic conditions. Managed estates becarne more widespread
during the Tokugawa period.
ENGLAND (1100-1348)
Free Labour
The cultivators in feudal England are known for their unfree status, not their
freedom. However, this perception obscures the variety statuses and landholding
arrangements that existed within England 1 100- 1348. Brime11 ( 199321: 368-369)
estimates that from one-fifth to one quarter of the population could be best described as
free. WhiIe large estates could rely on labour dues, smaller estates had fewer labour
requirements and were more dependent (sometimes alrnost entirely dependent) on wage
labour (Kosminski, 1956; Britnell, 1982). Postan estimates 45% of the population was
landiess or nearly landless during this period, and that many must have been. in part,
wage earners (Postan, 1966); srnallholders who had less than ten acres would have to
supplement their income, mostiy through agricultural work (Postan, 1972: 133-1 33).
Free Market for Land
Even arnong members of a manor, there was a land market for those of free status.
Large landowners gained land at the expense of srnaIl landowners who acquired debts to
moneylenders. Their land would be transferred through the moneylenders to the larger
landowners (Postan, 1972: 1 6 4 ) . Manoriai lords were able to expand their demense
through land purchase.
As Collins has indicated, monasteries were able to acquire land either through
purchase or donation. While 1 am ernphasizing the presence of the preconditions in the
wider society, this cannot be dismissed as an isolated development because the Church
owned about one third of the land in England.
Free Markets for Commodities
This period experienced a rapid growth of markets and cornmercialization (Miller
and Hatcher, 1978; Britnell, 1993a). Based on the fact that twenty percent of the
population was not engaged in agriculture and that almost al1 wooi produced was sold, it
has been estimated that approximately one third to one half of al1 labour was directed
towards the market (Britnell 1993b). Direct producers, lords, and kings were al1 involved
in the market. Irrational restrictions on trade were minimal; markets were r e l b e l y free
frorn political interference. They were privately owned and existed wherever owners
could make a profit from renting booths, supplying weights and measures, or imposing
other fees. International trade in luxuries, as well as mass cornmodities existed and was
supported by the king (Miller and Hatcher, 1995: 15).
Despite the ideology of a "just price", which would result in sufficient income for
the producer to maintain hisher social rank (Postan, 1972: 226), consistent trends or
fluctuations, especially in harvests and labour availability, resulted in pice variation
according to demand (Postan, 1972: 228).
Calculability
Britnell believes that calculability is an important element in the
cornrnercialization of England, and adds that the codification of customary law made
authority more predictable during this penod (Britnell, 1993b: 229). The period known
for the imposition of laws. For example, manorial court was held every three weeks
(Wilkinson, 1969: 6); kings, most notably Edward 1, were known for their concem for
law; and the Grand Assizes and Possessary Assizes stabilized and formalized land
ownership (Barlow, 1988: 3 14).
Law reforms extended to merchant activities: the Statute of Merchants of 1285
called for the imprisonment of a defaulting debtor until his debts had been paid
(Wilkinson, 1969: 104). In 1285 the barons demonstrated their concems for their
interests through parliamentary laws protecting lords against fraud by estate officers
(Girnpel, 1988: 38).
Entrepreneurial Organization of Capital
Lords bought land to produce for the expanding town population (Miller 1978:
18 1- 182). The shift frorn military duty to payrnent in lieu of service (scutage) - due to the
kings' increasing reliance on his core household of knights (Wilkinson, 1969: 16-17) -
increased the incentive to increase production for sale, and allowed more freedom to
enterprising individuals (Wilkinson, 1969: 18- 19). Whiie Monastic Manors varied in
their land holding arrangements, the Cistercian Order's properties were almost entirely
demesne, and were organized to meet market demands (Collins, 1986: 52-58). Land
reclamation in marshes and fens increased in the 1200s.
Labour, land, and free markets were available for the entrepreneurial organization
in a context of calculable econornic conditions. By the late 1300s many lords had
increased their dernesne with the aim of profit through efficient management. Some of
the greater estates hired land stewards to administer properties (Britnell, 1983: 22).
Lords' were increasingly employing non-feudal, highly trained assistants in the 1300's
(Miller: 1978: 190). Small estates were often even more market-oriented than Iarger
estates because the owners had to be more concerned over revenues (Britnell, 1982;
Kosrninski, 1956: 276-277)-
Market Freedom in the Patrimonial Cases
Initially it was my intention to describe the differences in the level of capitalist
production between the patrimonial and feudal cases by explaining the presence of the
preconditions necessary for capitalism in the feudai cases in terms of feudalism, and
explaining the absence of the preconditions in the patrirnoniai cases in terms of
patrimonialism. However, it has been found that the preconditions are present within al1
four cases,
This finding is unusual given the image of the difference in market freedom and
caIculability between feudal and patrimonial societies. Patrimonid societies are known
for controlling commerce and making arbitrary extractions, while commerce in feudal
societies is seen to be comparatively free from interference. The reasoning is that
patrimonial States have the incentive and ability to control trade and make extractions,
while feudal governments lack either the incentive or ability.
One of the incentives patrimonial mlers have for interfering in the economy is to
develop a "welfare state", which provides subjects with an acceptable quaiity of life.
Weber argues that patrimonial rulers' authority rests on providing a certain quality of life
to its citizens, and that the ruler and the ruled share the belief that this is an important
responsibility.
The Ottoman Empire appears to conform to the image of a welfare state.
Production was monitored by the state; too Little was thought to result in unfair high
prices for consumers while too much resulted in unfair profits for producers (InaIcik,
1994: 52). The state was especially concemed with grain production and distribution.
Only state-sponsored agents could deal in cereals. The export of ga in was limited or
outlawed dunng penods of shortage. The Porte was especially concemed with the
supply of grain to Istanbul. Grain pnces were controlled to ensure availability, which
meant that prices also had to be controlled in the area of production (Inalcik, 1994: 496).
The Ming Dynasty also appean to conform to this image. Hucker claims that the
welfare state was of an "al1 encornpassing scope" (Hucker, 1970: 67). In addition to
religious ceremonies and legal enforcement, the government restricted industriai
exploitation and gentry landlord oppression of the worst forms (Hucker, 1970: 69). The
buying and selling of public ga in at appropriate times checked inflation. These stores of
public grain were distnbuted in relief, and tax exemptions were granted during times of
need. Local officiais controlled the price of non-agricultural products (Hucker, 1970: 67-
73). However, the state began to rely heavily on the often gain-oriented and oppressive
gentry class to manage local affairs; the Ming State's reluctance to repair imgation
systems - leaving this task to the local gentry - at the end of the Dynasty deviates greatly
from the welfare state model.
Furthemore, Tokugawa Japan engaged in "welfare" practices such as the
adjustment of prices and supply of rice to Edo to prevent riots due to shortages or high
prices (Takenaka, 1969: 149). A riot occurred in Edo in 1733 in response to a rise in rice
prices (believed to be due to the plot of rice merchants, but more likely due to a shortage
in supply). The supply of cities as large Edo, Peking (and Chinese provincial capitals), or
Istanbul could not be tmsted to market forces in pre-modem societies regardless of the
"political orientation" of the mlers.
Differences between markets have been attributed to the ability of patrimonial
governments to make arbitrary extractions. Both patrimonial and feudal rulers require
revenue, a requirement that increases as bureaucracy increases. The difficulties for a
feudal d e r to make economic extractions are famously dernonstrated in England by the
case of John I who, requiring revenue for the war against France. was forced to gant
enonrious concessions to the barons who were no longer interested in the continent
(Barlow, 1988: 397-398).
The Porte acquired hnds with greater ease. In contrat to rnaking concessions for
war requirements it made demands on producers during times of war to sel1 at fixed
prices, and demands on guilds to supply artisans for cûmpaigns. Instead of allowing war
efforts to stimulate the economy it employed slave labour or forced low-wage labour and
used arbitrary taxation to raise fünds (Inalcik, 1994: 466). The govemment couid also
raise money by reallocating fief land to tax farming. something very difficult for English
or Japanese rulers.
The Ming State had an equally easy time gaining revenue and also did not require
the expansion of commerce for revenue. Interestingly, they did not take advantage of this
situation. The state voluntarily reduced its tax incorne from many sources (Huang, 19691:
109).
This explanation does not fit the Tokugawa Era. The shogun found it relatively
easy to make extractions from the daïmyo. The Bakufic did have financial difficulties, but
this is true of the central governments of a11 of the cases. Furthemore, the central
govemments of al1 cases encouraged commerce. The Ottoman Empire had always been
dependent on commerce. The Ming State's use of salt certificates to encourage private
merchants to supply northem frontier zones greatly expanded trade. Trade in Ming China
is much greater than it was once thought to be. Dilton (1989) argues this may be in part
due to the wiiiingness of historians to accept government documents produced by
Confucian officiais who wished to downplay trade-
In fact, any large state will be compelled to allow commerce for the distribution
of essential comrnodities and luxuries for the elite. Revenue is derived from merchant
activity, not from the suppression of this activity. It is only in times of necessity that
patrimonial rulers interfere with the market beyond feudal mlers.
Furthermore, much of the merchant fieedom that existed in Tokugawa Japan was
the result of the heino-brinri system, which separated the samurai from the soi1 and led to
the dependence of the feudal class on the merchants to bbclose the rural-urban gap". This
system is not inherent to feudalism; it does not exist outside of Tokugawa feudalism.
Braudel agrees the role of commerce is important. To illustrate the ability of
rulers to stifle commerce he uses the exarnpte of the ability to manipulate currency, and
suggests this ability is related to the feudal-patrimonial distinction (Braudel, 1979: 588).
Braudel argues that the strength of centralized governments allows them to impose poor
currency while weaker govemments are required to provide a higher quality currency to
ensure its use. Higher quality currency encourages commerce while poor currency stifles
it. He points to the case of the Ming Dynasty, which initially outlawed specie in private
transactions at the beginning of the Ming to ensure the use of poorly backed paper
currency. Furthermore, bronze coins minted later in the dynasty were of a poor quality:
their value was reduced as the official stamp was worn off.
The Ottoman Empire was also known for its abuse of currency. Debasements
were not uncommon in times of need. Mohomrned II began a policy of recalling coins at
only five-sixths their value and replacing them with newly minted coins. This
innovation, duplicated by succeeding sultans, arnounted to a tax of one-sixth on al1
currency in the empire. This policy continued despite cornplaints by both locai and
foreign merchants.
This situation can be contrasted with England 1 100-1348 where coins were
supplied by the centrai govemment and debasements were the exception. Tokugawa
Japan is problematic. The governent debased the currency for revenue. Furthermore,
the shift from the kandaka (a system in which payment of dues were made in coins) to
the kokudaka (a system in which payment of dues were made in nce) at the beginning of
the unification process indicates that the mlers were neither required nor inclined to
supply a reliable currency.
Furthermore, the Chinese and Ottoman cases have been exaggerated. Paper
currency was a failure in China. It was devalued over 1000 times by 1450 and the policy
of considering governrnent paper currency as the only legd tender was had to be
abandoned in the 1430's (Huang, 1969: 106). The Ottoman Empire was curtailed in its
currency abuses by janissary reaction, which was demonstrated in 1589 when they rose
in revolt over their payment in debased currency. A shortage of silver was probably the
greatest problem of the Ottoman Empire, which was overcorne by the influx of siiver
around 1580. However important quality currency is, it appears to be related to the
willingness of the merchant community to accept it and the supply of precious metals,
neither of which appear to be closely related to the feudal-patrimonial distinction.
In a similar line of reasoning, the power of patrimonial states to monopolize
products or gant monopolies is also seen to stifle commerce. However, both feudal and
patrimonial cases held monopolies and pemiitted private monopolization.
The control of the markets in the Ottoman Empire and Ming China and the lack of
the ability to control markets in England have been exaggerated. It would seem that for
every exarnple indicating a significant difference between the two types of societies there
is counter-evidence suggesting that there is Iittle difference between them-
However, it must be added that market freedom and calculability are the most
problematic parts of the cornparison. One of the difficulties of comparative andysis is
comparing across cases on non-qrtantl9able variables. Despite the difficulties, an honest
atternpt is necessary to avoid preconceptions. Furthemore, it is not necessary to
demonstrate that markets were equally free in al1 cases, nor that the criteria of
calculabilty be met equally in al1 cases; instead, it need only be demonstrated that they
are not lirniting conditions in the development of managed estates.
Chapter 7:
Causes of the Differential Development
of Capitalist Agriculture
1s Patrimonialisrn a Deterrent to Managed Estates?
The conclusion that can be drawn from the cûmparison is that the feudd-
patrimonial distinction has not been valuable for explaining a difference in the
preconditions for capitalist agricultural production because the preconditions are present
in both the patrimonial cases and the feudd cases. What is different is not the presence
or absence of the preconditions, but the presence of capitalist agriculture itself. If the
preconditions are present in al1 cases what has caused the difference? Is the cause related
to the feudal-patrimonial distinction? The answers have already been outlined.
Capitalist agriculture was inherently limited in The Ottoman Empire. The Porte
maintained the autonomy of srnall cultivators against their possible dependency on local
notables. It supplied most cultivators with a plot, and required taxes to be paid directiy to
the government or to the sipahis who held the fief in which the plot was located. Even
after a period of population decline that allowed landhoiders to extend their holdings, the
Ottoman state's unwillingness to allow full dispossession of the peasants resulted in
various forms of rent by the landlords instead of managed estates (Faroqui, 1994: 448).
But is this related to patrimonialisrn? This policy is related to a strong centralized
govemment. This system was implernented to restrict the decentralization of power by
those who would control the labour of the cultivators. Brenner indicates that this
technique was used by the French monarchy to control the aristocracy while enhancinq
its own revenues by direct taxation (Brenner, 1985). As Brenner has argued for France, it
could similariy be argued for the Ottoman Empire that the strong centralized
govemment' s insistence on the freedorn of the cultivators restricted commercial
agriculture because the availability of land in the Ottoman Empire made it difficult to
secure labourers for managed estates.
However, the idea that patrimonial states discourage managed landlordism by
maintaining the autonomy of the cultivators is not supported by the Chinese case. The
central government relied heavily on gentry class involvernent in local &airs, and did
little to prevent the accumulation of land in the hands of the gentry.
Capitalist agriculture was inherently limited in China. Econornic decisions of the
landlords were responsible for the downturn in rnanaged estates. Intensity of cultivation
has a great effect on the productivity of wet rice cultivation, but intense cultivation
requires costly supervision. In addition, population pressure increased the rental value of
the land. These factors led landlords to shift away from managed estates to
sharecropping or, more cornmonly, fixed rental arrangements. This reduced the cost of
supervision by placing the benefits of intense cultivation on the cultivators. It would
appear that population pressure and the requirements of rice cultivation were responsible
for the absence of managed estates - not patrimonialism.
It could be argued that it was patrimonialism, not population pressure that
prevented the increase in managed estates in China. In other words, if China had been
feudal, and the cultivators serfs, labour costs would have been reduced thereby allowing
the development of managed estates. There are two problems with this line of reasoning.
The first is that it becarne unprofitable to have managed estates even if the workers were
paid subsistence wages. The second is that the argument relies on the enserfment of the
workers, not their freedom.
The Decision to Convert to Managed Estates
It was assumed if the preconditions for managed estates were present, then they
would emerge, and because of their comparative advantage in efficiency they would
become prevalent. However, economic factors other than labour efficiency bear on the
decision to develop managed estates.
Chayanov's theories on peasant decision making have been used to explain
landlord's decisions to use sharecroppers or fixed-rent tenants over wage labour.
Regarding labour input, sharecroppers and fixed rent tenants make different decisions
than wage earners because they make them based on different considerations." Wage
labour does not make as efficient use of labour as sharecropping or fixed rate tenantry in
an agricultural economy because wage labour does not put cultivators under decision
making conditions that encourage labour output. For example, it may become rational
for a sharecropper to work with greater diligence and for longer hours than a wage emer .
Furthemore, a sharecropper may use free farnily labour.
Martinez-Nier, in comparing the costs and benefits of wage labour and
sharecropping, reasons that wage labour results in the:
... underemployrnent of the Iabourers' family, and the underemployrnent in terms of the
effort and quality of work, which landowners are unable to profit from in a wage-labour
'' Unlike wage eamen. sharecroppers have to decide how much labour to input after subsistence needs and payments are met. After these are met, the sharecropper considers each additional input of labour more burdensome, while the output gained from each additional labour is Iess vdued. Therefore, there cornes a point where the peasant is unwilling to increase their labour output. This equilibrium point can be moved in the direction of greater work by decreasing the drudgery of the work or increasing the perceived benefits of additional output.
system .... Thus by tuming labourers into tenants, landowners are able to get extra returns
from the otherwise unemployed labour- (Martinez-Alier, 1977: 36)
He concludes that before mechanization that increased the advantages of
econornies of scale in agriculture:
.-.one would expect profit-rninded landowners to turn into rentier landlords, thus being able
to profit, at Ieast in part, from the increased labour effort of labourers turned into peasants
(cash tenants or sharecroppers). (Martinez-AIier, 1977: 38)
Bray (1983) contends that the decision to move to managed estates is highly
dependent on crop type. For example, wet nce cultivation gains far more from intensity
of cultivation than it does from an economy of scale. It has enormous potential for
increased land productivity, but these improvements are generalIy srnail-scale and labour
intensive: a skilled smallholder can increase productivity as easily as a rich landlord can
(Bray, 1983: 13). Rlustrating the supervision costs that would be associated with
managed estates she claims that "...inspecting an irrigated rice field for weeds is almost
as onerous as weeding it oneself' (Bray, 1983: 13).
Managed estates are not necessarily economically advantageous from a landlord's
point of view. As Martinez-Alier points out, prior to the mechanization of agriculture
sharecropping and fixed rate tenantry were often rational econornic decisions. As Bray
contends, the decision will be dependent on crop type. Managed estates cannot be
expected to emerge wherever the conditions allow the preconditions mode1 suggests.
Chapter 8:
Discussion
Concepts and Cornparison
One caveat cornes to rnind immediately to those opposed to historical
comparative approaches: if you set out with a goal finding something sirnilar in two
societies then you will find it in both of them. Exacerbating this problem is the perceived
assiduousness of comparative-onented researchers in aftirming their assumptions
regarding nomothetic explanations. In reading historicai comparative works I have found
two approaches to explanation that bear on this issue.
As 1 read Barrington Moore's The Social Origins of Democracy and Dicraturship
(1966) 1 found part of his approach unacceptable. He developed a list of social
conditions that should, when present, result in a specified outcome. However, as he
moved from case to case, some of his cases did not conform to his explanation. Some
cases did not have ail of the social conditions, but had the outcome that, supposedly,
could only arise from the specified conditions. Moore would explain why, despite their
apparent inconsistencies with the theory, they did not actually chdlenge it. 1 found this
to be unacceptable. If he was going to develop a list of conditions then he should not
require manipulation to make outliers fit. After al1 he only had six cases, shouldn't they
al1 fit his theory? It was designed inductively from them.
The approach of Stephen Sanderson's The Transition from Ferrdalism to
Capitnlism (1994) was aiso unsatisfactory, but for a different reason. Sanderson claims
that the difference between feudal and non-feudal societies, so far as the development of
capitalism is concemed, is that feudal societies allow merchants greater freedom. The
resulting increase in trade leads to a trading "critical mass", at which point capitalism
emerges. Unlike Moore, Sanderson does not rnodify his explanation to fit outliers. No
outliers exist. His explanation seems to fit al1 cases.
The ciifference, concerning us here, between Moore and Sanderson is that
Moore's explanation employs variables that are more narrowly defined than Sanderson's.
Moore primarily uses the strength possessed by commercializing tendencies favonng
capitaiist groups; the degree to which the foms of commercialized agriculture adopted by
the landholding elite depended on the backing of a repressive political apparatus; and the
degree to which the structure of peasant society faciiitated coordinated resistance to
exploitation. Sanderson primarily uses "merchant freedom". Actual cases do not always
confom to Moore's explanation, but with Sanderson's comparatively broad (and vague)
variable cases fit more easily.
The two authors have employed different approaches to the s m e underIying
problem of explaining sirnilarity in comparative histoncal research: different societies are
different. If you want to Say that societies are comparable the differences c m either 1) be
explained as being unimportant because the different contexts in which they operated Ied
to different results, or 2) be categorized under the sarne covenng term."
Relating to the problem of "finding what you are looking for", the above
discussion indicates the ease with which you find something has more to do with what
you are looking for than how much you want to find it. If you are looking for something
narrowly defined then you will have a difficult time finding it; if you are looking for
something to fit in a broadly defined category then you probably will find it. This raises
I 3 The use of a covering t e m is inherent in abstraction. and is therefore employed in any categorization. However, it is useful to compare the "level of abstraction" and the technique of explaining differences.
a possible problem with the preconditions for capitalism used here. How caiculable is
"calculability"? How free are "free markets"? These broadly defined attributes can
likely be found anywhere. Also, some form of free labour and some form of land
acquisition will be possible in most societies.
Here lies one of the keys to the use of the negative cases. Without them it could
have been concluded that there was an important connection between feudalism and the
development of the preconditions. By introducing negative cases, I have found that the
preconditions can be iocated in non-feudai societies as well. The Method of Difference
can demonstrate that an explanation is problematic because it fits both positive and
negative cases. not only because they may share specific processes and events, but also
because the explanation has employed variables that are so widely defined that they could
be found in almost anywhere.
The Introduction of "New" Cases
There is disagreement regarding the comparability of societies. "Historicism"
cornrnonly refers to the position that societies are not comparable because each society is
the result of a unique constdlation of events that have not occurred elsewhere.
Associated with this perspective is the belief that generalities do not apply to history;
ideographic detail and analysis of particular events and personalities properly explain
historical development. Comparïson may be employed, but for the purposes of showing
contrasts.
While in anthropology there has been ongoing debate on the comparability of
societies, sociology has embraced a comparative approach. Durkheim, Weber and Marx
were proponents of the comparative method in macro sociological analysis.
1 believe that the debate between historkism and cornparison cannot be resolved
with empincal data; the different positions are axioms of different approaches. This is
not to Say, however, that comparative-minded researchers think that anything goes. Most
comparative-oriented explanations are limited in their applicability to certain cases or
certain conditions. In sorne cases, however, I have rejected feudalism-to-capitalism
explanations developed for European feudaiism because they did not apply to the
Japanese case. Furthemore, I have used a revision of Weber's multi-causal explanation
for the development of capitalism on cases to which it was not intended to apply. I will
defend this approach by discussing the problems in restricting the applicability of
explanations.
Mono-causai explanations in history fail because a comparable society can always
be found that demonstrates the cause cannot, in itsel. account for the outcome of interest-
For example, if trade is put fonvard as the cause of capitalism, then a case c m always be
found in which there was extensive trade but in which capitalism did not develop. The
explanation could then be revised to include a cause that is present in the positive case,
but is absent in the negative case. This process can be continued until there is an
explanation that fits al1 positive cases and no negative cases. In other words, through the
process of control, historicai expIanations are made non-testable. Because d i cases have
been used to develop the explanation nothing is Ieft to test it with. 1 am not cornplainhg
- this is part of the process of induction. It is unreasonable to ask for an explanation to fit
al1 cases, yet leave some information unused to later test the explanation. However, the
problem is acute in historical sociology because of the unavailability of new
observations.
What does rernain, however, are cases left unconsidered during the development
of the exphnation. Unconsidered is an appropriate description because they certainly
were not unknown; instead, they were not considered to be appropriate cornparisons at
the time. New ways of thinking can make the applicability of unconsidered cases more
reasonable. For example, Japan has not always been thought of as having developed
capitdism endogenously because industrial techniques were imported; however, the
conceptualization of the industrial revolution as being possible only within the context of
an already capitalizing economy make it possible to include Japan as a case of
endogenously developed capitalism.
The point is that the applicability of "new" cases should rest, not on the exclusion
of cases by the original process of induction, but on the reasonableness of the
comparison, which may rely on unforeseen developments. Without the use of new cases,
inductively developed explanations are non-testable. Because explanations clairned
feudaiism was the cause, and Japan was feudd, 1 concluded they should apply to Japan-
The Feudal-Patrimonial Distinction
The finding of the precondition comparison is that the cases are similar; where
they differ, political decentralization is not the cause. But it should not be concluded that
the feudal-patrimonial categorization itself should be discarded. Some claim that the
categorization does not capture "real" differences in societies. However, as 1 mentioned
in the discussion of Eisenstadt's typology, I believe that the evaluation of categorization
systerns should not be based on their ability to capture the real similarities and differences
in societies; they should be seen as heuristic tools, not attempts to get at reality. With
respect to the realism of the feudal concept 1 foilow Coulbom and Strayer who point out
feudalisrn is,
... an abstraction derived from some of the facts of early European history, but not in itself
one of those facts. No contemporary of William the Conqueror or Godfrey of Bouillon ever
used the tem; it was invented by scholars, chiefly scholars of the eighteenth century.. ..From
its very begïnning the idea of feudalism was a high level abstraction. (Coulbom and Strayer,
1965: 3)
A categorization system should be evaluated on its abiiity to separate societies in
a manner that is useful in dealing with a particular probIem. On this account 1 have found
the feudal-patrimonial distinction to be of little use; it has not helped to explain the
differentiai development of managed estates. The distinction, however, may be usefùl for
other applications. For exarnple, while not al1 feudal societies have developed dong
similar lines, it do not see how it is reasonable to explain the rise of parliamentary
democracy in England without refemng England's feudal structure. Those who argue
that the distinction should be discarded altogether seem to ignore its proven usefulness
and the possibility of its usehlness in hture applications.
Chapter 9:
Conclusions
Despite the traditional image of the differences between feudal and patrimonial
societies regarding conditions of economic calculability and market freedom, the
cornparison revealed that the preconditions for capitalism were present in al1 four cases.
Conceptions of the differences between the patrimonial and feudal societies seem to be
exaggerated. The Ming Dpasty was more cornmercidized, and merchants had greater
freedom than is generally thought; restrictions on trade and govemment interference in
commerce have been exaggerated in the case of The Ottoman Empire. Regarding the
case of Ming China, Dilton (1989) cornments that rnisconceptions may have arisen
because historians have uncritically accepted govemment documents that were written by
Confucian officiais who had an interest in downplaying commerce and exaggerating
conformity to Confucian ideals. 1 would add a further possibility: for the purposes of
explaining the lack of capitalism in China and the Ottoman Empire factors associated
with the rise of capitalism - such as market freedom - have been downplayed in reporting
their history while elements conceived as impediments to the rise of capitalism - such as
arbitrary confiscation - have been exaggerated.
This should not lead to the conclusion that the patrimonial-feudal distinction
should be discarded. While it may not have been valuable in explaining the differential
development of managed estates an assessrnent of its value cannot be based on the
findings of this study. Nor should an assessrnent of its value be based on the possible
ideological motives behind its development and use. Instead, its value as a heuristic tool
must be evaluated for particular applications based on its usefulness in explanation in
these applications. While it does not explain managed estates it may very well be
valuable else where.
Despite the presence of the necessary preconditions in both the feudd and the
patrimonial cases, managed estates were not present to an equal extent in al1 four cases.
The requirements of wet-rice agriculture and population pressure made rnanaged estates
economically irrational for landlords in ~Ming China. The unavailability of labour, due to
the Ottoman policy of supplying potential agicultural labourers with family plots, made
managed estates unfeasible in the Ottoman Empire.
One of the assurnptions made of the preconditions mode1 of the ernergence of
managed estates is that managed estates would emerge where the preconditions were met
because landowners prefer them to other landholding arrangements. This assumption,
however, does not seem to be warranted. As Martinez-Alier (1973) points out,
landowners will often find sharecropping and fixed-rate tenantry more profitable than
employing wage labourers prior to the mechanization of agriculture; Bray (1983) adds
that the decision to develop managed estates is highly dependent crop type.
A future approach to understanding the development of capitalism could combine
the approach taken here - the emphasis on managed estates and the preconditions that
make them possible - with greater consideration given to the conditions that make
managed estates economically rational for landowners.
The comparative method has proven to be useful. It has sbown that a plausible
hypothesis - that feudalism is causally related to the development of capitalist agriculture
- is problematic. It could be countered that the logic of the comparative method failed
because the Method of Difference and Method of Agreement appeared to support the
hypothesis. However, the logic of comparison is only the first step of the comparative
method as conceived here. It was the logic of the method in addition to the process of
examining the "internai mechanisms of change", a necessary component of the
comparative method, which led to the findings. An approach that takes full advantage of
the comparative method by systematically employing the logic of comparison - both the
Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference - and examines the mechanisms of
change is valuable in historicai research.
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