Current State-of-the- Art in Technology for Nuclear Security · PDF fileArt in Technology for...

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Current State-of-the-Art in Technology for

Nuclear Security

H. Tagziria, Project Leader, (NDA for Nuclear Safeguards, Security, Non-Proliferation and Decommissioning) Nuclear Security Unit (G.II.7) Nuclear Safety and Security Directorate

GICNT - Magic Maggiore Workshop 28-30th March 2017, Ispra

HT29.03.17

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Content

• Overview of the main detector categories for nuclear security

• Challenges for the detection of radiation

• The assessment programme of current state of the art in

radiation detection technologies (ITRAP+10)

• Recent progress in Technology

• Variations in the N42.42 format for communication

• Conclusions

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Purpose of a Radiation Detection System

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Detect

Locate

Identify

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Instrument Types

Detection and identification instruments come in many types for use in different operational environments •Portable: handheld and backpack •Fixed: radiation portal monitor •Mobile: over land, airborne and seaborne

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Handheld and RPM Functional Categories

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PRIMARY APPLICATION

SECONDARY APPLICATION

Detect Locate Identify

PRD (pagers)

RID

Survey Instrument

RPM Limited, profile

PRD = Personal Radiation Detector RID = Radionuclide Identification Device RPM= Radiation Portal Monitor

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Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD)

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• alerts to the presence of radiation (light, sound , vibration) • small thus detection more difficult and requiring more time • some with spectrometric capability

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Radionuclide Identification Devices (RID)

Used to collect and analyze energy spectra to identify an isotope and confirm an alarm is a threat or innocent

CsI(Tl), LaBr (about 3% resolution) or NaI (about 8%) for gamma ; He3, LiZnS; BZnS, LiI(Eu) .. for neutrons

Potential communication capabilities: ANSI N42.42 compliant, USB, Bluetooth; WiFi; satellite phone via USB, 3G and web interface

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Pedestrian

Rail

Truck

Airport (conveyor belt)

Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)

Detect and alarm in the presence of gamma and neutron radiation; some capable of isotope identification

Used for high-volume screening, can screen hundreds of items per hour; large thus efficient ;

Genrally made of PVT (plastic) a cheap commodity

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Mobile Detection System (MDS) • Along undesignated points of entry/exit and interior • Political/Sporting/Special events and boundaries where fixed equipment installations are impractical, unauthorized or unwanted

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Radiation Detection Challenges •False alarms (no radiation, e.g. electronic noise, ..) •Innocent alarms (e.g. NORM*, medical, industrial, ..) Likelihood of detection depends on: Size of detector Speed Distance Time Background Levels Real Alarms: caused by the presence of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control (illegal)

10 *NORM= Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material

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Radiation Detection Challenges (2) To make detection and identification more difficult sources can be: • Masked by legitimate radiation • Shielded by intervening material

Detector

Shielding Background Radiation

Material out of regulatory control

Legitimate use of radiation

Masking

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About 170 commercialised instruments from EU and US tested 2011-2013: Phase I (JRC – US DNDO) •Against IEC/ANSI standards and IAEA NSS1 recommendations •Similar test procedures and test equipment At: EC JRC Ispra (all except mobile, done in Phase 2) DNDO - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (RID) DNDO: Savannah River National Laboratory and Global Testing Laboratory (PRD) DNDO - Oak Ridge National Laboratory (RPM) See report and ESARDA 2017

ITRAP+10: I l l ic it Traff icking Radiation

Detection Assessment Programme

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Standards Radiological Tests • False alarm • Time to alarm • Response to gammas/neutrons • Accuracy • Over-range • Neutron indication in the presence of photons • Radionuclide identification: including SNM, industrial, medical, and NORM sources.

•Performance for masking and shielding scenarios •...

2 April 2017

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ITRAP Testing Facility at the JRC in Ispra

For Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM)

Static tests for handheld devices

Dynamic tests with sources on - 27 m long coveyor/rail - 0.02 to 3. m/s - Standards = 8 km/hr (vehicles) 1.2 m/s (pedestrians) - 10 to 300 cm Height - with/without moderator

For Handheld Devices

neutron irradiator

gamma irradiator

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RPMs & SRPMs Tested at JRC Ispra

8 different models of RPMs & sRPMs were tested within ITRAP+10, SCINTILLA and/or CBORD (EU funded Projects) New technologies included: • PVT with categorization capabilities,

• 6LiZnS neutron detector,

• PVT Neutron/gamma discrimination capabilities

• NaI based spectroscopic RPM

• He-4 based technologies

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Conclusions (Phase 1)

• None of the instruments tested under ITRAP+10 passed the complete set of tests.

• This fact implies that:

» The standards need to be updated to meet the limitations of the actual technology.

» In some cases Instruments need to be improved

• Vast amount of test data available for improvement of detector technology and revision of standards

• Testing against standards assesses well for detectors performance

even if testing is under controlled conditions.

See report, poster and ESARDA 2017 paper for details

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Month Alarms/Day Operations/day (Truck) Alarm rate

Jan 108 10232 1.1% Feb 118 10811 1.1% Mar 148 11374 1.3% Apr 144 11062 1.3% May 165 13271 1.2% Jun 156 11887 1.3% Jul 195 14187 1.4% Aug 206 15260 1.4%

Innocent (nuisance) Alarm Rates RPMs (PVT) at PORT of Antwerp (Be, 2005)

Data collected (2359 alarms) at Antwerp from June to Nov 2013 with systems developped within the SCINTILLA Eu FP7 project: • RPM with PVT NORM identification: 80% reduction in nuisance alarms • Spectroscopic RPM (with NaI identification): 98% reduction. 8800 alarms (normal PVT RPM N42.35 compliant) would be reduced to 1400 and 100 respectively While still able to reliabily identify threat and medical sources

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ITRAP+10 Phase II (2014-2017)

•Exploit test results from Phase I ; • Provide feedback to standardisation organisations

• Test mobile & transportable detectors against ANSI and IEC standards • Build testing capacity in EU Member States a. Test at JRC-Ispra of PRD, RID, sRPM including new technologies b. Provide testing procedures to participating laboratories c. Round robin exercise to follow (test and compare to JRC results)

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Testing of mobile and transportable detectors at the JRC-ITU Ispra ITRAP Phase 2

• 6 mobile systems • 3 transportable • From 6 EU companies • All 3He free alternatives • In most demanding

conditions foreseen by the standards

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Testing of mobile detection systems: Conclusions

• None of the instruments fully passed all the tests:

standards &/or instruments to be improved

• Feedback to standards committees

• A step towards standardisation and certification, promoting innovation and competition

• For details, see ITRAP report, poster and ESARDA 2017 paper

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Testing of Detector Detectors for the Round Robin & Capacity Building ITRAP+10 Phase 2

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ITRAP+10: Data Collection System

Lots of pictures, spectra, and data in general have been collected during the extensive testing campaign. 8 different databases have been created to accurately record any single piece of information that could help to analyse the results. The Data Collection System developed by DNDO has been implemented in JRC Ispra to deal with the collection and management of the data within ITRAP+10. N42.42 file format with conversion software

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N42.42 format validator Requirement of the standards: N42.42 file format But still many variations in N42.42 as experienced in ITRAP and Scintilla projects Present site for validator: https://secwww.jhuapl.edu/n42/Account/LogOn

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Spectra from 2 different RIDs with differences in N42.42

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Conclusions • No single detector technology or category

• fits all puposes (not to be confused with «does not fit the purpose» which fortunately

is not the case as these are two totally different statements)

• passes all standards tests which implies that either the technology or

(and) the standards need to be improved

• Assessment within ITRAP+10 of all families contributed to R&D

of detection technology and to standardisation

• Major progress made within projects such as SCINTILLA (FP7)

and C-BORD (H2020); EU consortia projects: industry, research

centers and universities, end users..)

• New He-3 free technologies now available and tested

• See posters

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Conclusions (2) • Good progress with communication tools and formats but

much more needs be done.

• Most are N42.42 compliant but variations can create difficulties

• Newest detectors able to communicate with: USB, Bluetooth; WiFi;

satellite phone via USB, 3G and web interface…

• See e.g http://www.pageone.co.uk/services/999eye; allows viewing

live footage securely streamed from eye witnesses (or FLO) at

the scene to a control desk

• many new technologies

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Conclusions (3)

However detection by instrument must be an integral part of:

1. an adequate Nuclear Security Detection Architecture with

all its fundamentals

2. and a Nuclear Security Culture which must be established

and/or enhanced

3. as was highly recommended by nuclear security summits.

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hamid.tagziria@jrc.ec.europa.eu

JRC- NSSD,

Nuclear Security Unit Ispra (Italy)

Questions ?

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