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8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
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Brains in a Vat: Different PerspectivesAuthor(s): Yuval SteinitzReviewed work(s):Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 175 (Apr., 1994), pp. 213-222Published by: Wiley-Blackwellfor The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219742.
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2/11
ON
MCDOWELL ON THE CONTENT
OF
PERCEPTUAL
EXPERIENCE
213
in
giving
n
exposition
fone of thehorns f
thedilemma.One hornof the
dilemma
is
that
f
we
take consciousness o be
inseparable
rom he
norm-governed
otion f
self-consciousnessnd from
eflective
nd
self-critical
ttitudes owards
neself,
hen
it does seemhardto acceptthatDennett'sframework,nwhichconscious ontents
are
a
selection f thecontents hat
go
to and
fro
between
ubsystems,
ill
capture
ll
of
the
phenomena;
ut
by
the same token
frog's
isual
xperience
will
not
count
s
contentfulnd
conscious,
s McDowell
claims t does.
But,
on the other
horn,
f
we
shrink he
phenomenon
f consciousness o exclude
self-consciousness
nd
thereby
include
he
experience
f unself-consciousreatures uch
as
frogs
s
conscious,
hen
it seems
o
me
the
dual
strategyadopted
of(l)
generalizing
ennett's dea
of
ccess
relations,
nd
(2)
defusing
McDowell's
epistemological
larms
which motivatehis
criticismf
Dennett
provides
quite dequate
defence
f
Dennett
gainst
McDowell.
Columbia
niversit
BRAINS IN
A
VAT: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
BY YUVAL
STEINITZ
In his
Brains
n a
Vat" Putnam
rgues
with
reat
anachegainst ntological,
xternal-
world
cepticism. ltimately,
owever,
is
arguments
re
uncompelling.
n
fact,
hey
seem
disingenuous
n
places.
This
paper
has two
parts.
n
the first
argue
that
even
if
Putnam's
inguistic
arguments
re
enough
o
convince modern
inguistic
ceptic
like
Putnam
himself),
they
re
certainly
nsufficient
o
win
over an old-school
ontological ceptic'
that
is,
a
sceptic
who sees
ontology
s
a
field f
philosophy
more fundamental
han the
theoryf referencelikeDescartes t the outset fhisMeditations).s
I
shallexplain,
Putnam's
reliance n causal
semantics
o achieve
his
anti-sceptical
esultwould
beg
the central
uestion
gainst
ertain
inds f
sceptics.
n the
second
part
argue
that
Putnam's
arguments
re not
sufficient
o
win
over
his
own
camp
of
linguistic
philosophers,
ot
venwhen
hiscausal semantics
s
taken
or
ranted.
is
arguments,
if
valid,
might
ndercut
he
possibility
f
what
shall call
a
comprehensiveceptical
scenario,
but
they
have
little o
say
about the
possibility
f what shall call
partial
sceptical
cenarios.
Before
presentingmy
criticism,
et me
briefly
ummarizePutnam's
linguistic'
argumentgainst
xternal-world
cepticism.
utnam
rgues
hat
ceptical ropositionslike I ama brain n a vat'
henceforth
IV),
that
s,
brain
ubjected
oa
sophisticated
computer
which
performs
omprehensive
imulation
f
reality,
re
self-refuting.
H.
Putnam,
Reason,
Truth nd
HistoryCambridge
UP,
1981),
pp.
1-21;
see also the
related
discussion
pp.
49-74.
All
page
references
re to this book.
?
The
Editors
f
The
Philosophicaluarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
3/11
214
YUVAL STEINITZ
His
argument
s
as follows:
n
order
for his
proposition
o
acquire
its
presumed
realistic
meaning,
he
ermsbrain' nd
vat' must
efer
o realbrains
nd vats.
However,
according
o causal
semantics,
word can
refer o an
object
only
f that
object
s
somehowcausallyconnectedwith theutterance r thought f the word. Thus in
order
for he word
vat'
to refer o
an
actual
vat,
and
not
to
refer o a 'vat in
the
image'
(p.
15),
or
be a mere cluster
f
random,
meaninglessmarkings,
here
must
be
some causal connection
etween he
perception
f some
actual
vat and the
fact
that
the word vat'
was
written,
aid
or
conceived.
Returning
ow
to the
BIV
proposition:
f
the
speaker
s a
genuine
BIV,
then t s
impossible
hathe should
ever have
observed he vat
he
is
in,
or
any
vat,
brain
or
computer
whatsoever.
hus the word vat'
in
his
usage
does not refer o real
vats,
but
only
to 'vats
n
the
mage',
and
the
entire
roposition
ails o
refer.
f,
on
the
otherhand, the speaker
s
not a
BIV,
then his
proposition
as
reference,
ut
is
obviously
alse.Hence
the
proposition
I
am a BIV' either
ails o
refer
r is false.
But
if
t fails o
refer o the vat
containing
he
brain, .e.,
if
t
refers
o mental
images
rather
han
to real
objects,
hen t is also false
p.
15).
For what
it would
(actually)
ell he
assumedBIV
is that
he is
a
BIV in the
mage,
whilewhat
he would
(actually)
e is a
BIV
in
reality.
o
it
is
necessarily
alse.
Taken
together,
he two
parts
of this
paper
place
Putnam
n
a
dilemma.
On the
one
hand,
as the
ceptical
cenario
e.g.,
he
BIV
story)
s renderedmore
comprehensive,
it becomes
increasingly ecessary,
rom
he
sceptic'sperspective,
o
discard the
realistic,
ausal
theory
f reference
pon
whichPutnam's
nti-sceptical
rgument
s
based. On the otherhand,as the
sceptical
cenario s renderedmore
partial,
ndirect
causal connections
with xternal
eality,
hich re sufficient
orrealistic
eference,
become
increasingly
lausible.
I. THE
ONTOLOGIST'S
PERSPECTIVE
The BIV
hypothesis
s an
updated
version
f
the
sceptical
rguments resented
n
Descartes' first
Meditation,
hatthe
entireworld
might
e
only
a self-made
igment
of
his
magination,
r rather
fiction
enerated y
an evil
genius.
The first
ine
of
defence or he
sceptic
houldbe to stress he
disjunctive
atureof this laim:
I
cannotknow
whether
a)
I
am
a
bodily
person
who
perceives
ndependent
eal-
ity,
r
b)
everything
s
only
dream
n
my
mind.
Adapting
his
formulation
o
the BIV
hypothesis,
he
sceptical
disjunction
an be
formulatedhus:
I
cannotknow
whether
a)
I
am
a
bodily
person
who
perceives ndependent
eal-
ity,
r
b)
I
am
a BIV.
An unprejudiced onsideration,hescepticwillargue,willfind he twodisjuncts o
be
equally
plausible.
There can
be
no reasonfor
referring
ne overthe
other,
ince
any possible xperience
would
be
compatible
withboth.
Does this
mphasis
n the
disjunctive
ature f
scepticism
ose
a new
challenge
fromPutnam's
perspective?
t
first
lance
it seems
not. Putnam could
elegantly
?
The Editors f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
4/11
BRAINS
IN
A
VAT
215
tackle
the
above
disjunction
much as he
responded
o the BIV
proposition
lone:
he
might
rgue
that,
or
BIV,
the
disjunction
I
am a
bodily
erson
or
a
BIV'
fails
to
acquire
ts ssumedreference
nd
meaning
because,
for
BIV,
theterms
body',
'brain', computer' nd 'vat' failto refer. t follows hat fthescepticaldisjunction
is
meaningful
n
the
presupposed
ommon
sense, .e.,
if it
acquires
its
assumed
reference
o a real
body,
brain,
computer
nd
vat,
rather han
referring
o
purely
mental
ntities,
hen
disjunct a)
mustbe true.
But
here, contend,
we can see how from n
old-stylentologist'serspective,
.g.,
from he
perspective
f
a Cartesian
for whom
ontology
s
the most
fundamental
philosophical
ield,
utnam's
rgument
ndeed
begs
the
question. eing
philosopher
of
anguage
t
heart,
utnamdecidesthe
question
f
the
theory
f reference efore
decidingmajor ontological
ssues,
uch as
the
existence
f an
external,
erceivable
world.As Casati and
Dokic2
rieflyemarked,
utnam
resupposes 'meta-language'which s
inappropriate
or real
BIV,
and
only
hen ddresses he
sceptical
isjunction.
It turns ut that
his
apparent
efutation
f the
BIV
propositions
ests
pon
the
prior
assumption
hat he
speaker
s,
after
ll,
a
bodily
erson
who has a
direct
erceptual
contact
with
eality,
r
thathe at least
acitly
elieveshimselfo be such
a
person,
r,
alternatively,
hathe at least
tacitly
elieves
most
members
f
his
society
o
be such
persons.3
or
it
s
only
by relying
n such realistic
resuppositions
or
on some nternal
realistic
resuppositions,
s
argued
by
Dell'
Utri4),
hatthe assumedcausal
theory
f
referenceecomes
cceptable.
And
suchrealistic
remises
o indeed
beg
the
question.
Of course
Putnam
might espond
hat,
rom is
inguisticerspective,
his
begging
ofthequestion' s no liabilityt all,but rather signof thevalidity f hisargument.
For,
s Geach
remarks,5
t
s
the
mark f validdeductive
rgument
hat ts onclusion
is
mplied
y
ts
premises.
ut fPutnam's
rgument
s
ntended
o convince
sceptical
ontologist,
e should
recognize
hat the above
'question-begging'
ill,
for such
a
sceptic,
ntirely
ndercut
he force f his
arguments.
or the
ontologist
maintains,
as
I
shall soon
explain
in
greater
detail,
that
choosing
a
theory
f reference
s
conditioned
y
one's
chosen
ontology,
nd not
vice
ersa.
Consider,
for
xample,
he above
sceptical
disjunction.
he Cartesian
pproach
sees thisdoubt about
the natureof
man,
which
may
be
compressed
nto
the well-
knownconundrum What am I?', as a key ssue ofphilosophy. shallnow argue
that his
undamental
cepticism,
hichPutnam laims o
have
rendered
mpossible,
2
R. Casati
andJ.
Dokic,
'Brains in a
Vat,
Language
and
Meta-Language',
Analysis
1
(1991), pp.
91-3.
3
On the social
background
of Putnam's
linguistic rgument
ee
Massimo Dell'
Utri,
'Choosing Conceptions
of Realism:
the
Case
of
the
Brains
in
a
Vat',
Mind
99
(1990), pp.
79-90
(cf. p.
83).
4 Dell'
Utri
p.
90.
His
reconstruction
uggests
hat
Putnam's
argument
gainst
scepti-
cism
presupposes
nternal
ealism. have
opted,
however,
o
agree
with
Brueckner,
Brains
in
a
Vat',
Journal fPhilosophy
3
(1986), pp.
148-67,
note
2,
that this
argument
hould
be sharplydistinguished romPutnam's internalrealismas expressedin the restof the
book
(all
the
more so
since Brueckner's
nterpretation
as confirmed
y
Putnam
himself).
I was thus
surprised
o
discover
n
Realismwith
HumanFace
(Harvard
UP,
1992),
ch.
7,
that
Putnam reiterates
his BIV
argument
s an outcome of internal
realism.
contend,
however,
that
my argument
gainst
Putnam
works
against
both
interpretations.
5
P.
Geach,
Reason
nd
ArgumentOxford
UP,
1976),
p.
18.
?
The Editors
f
The
Philosophicaluarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
5/11
216
YUVAL
STEINITZ
assumesthat
any
decisions
oncerning
he
right heory
f reference re
absolutely
dependentupon
decisions
about central
ontological
ssues.
Therefore,
rom
the
ontologist's oint
of
view,
the
ontological
ssues nvolvedhave
clear
recedence.
Putnammight till esist yclaiminghat inceontological cepticstateheir iews
and
argue
for
them,
he
question
of
whether
hey
ssert
nything
whether heir
wordshave real
meaning
nd reference must
n
some
sense
be
prior
o whether
what
they ay
is
true.
This,
I
believe,
s
partially
rue
about
meaning,
but
it
must be
wrong
about
reference. s
Quine
emphasized,
reasonable
heory
f referencemust llow us to
say
what there
s
not. And
since
therecan be no
reference
o
what there s
not,
anyone
who
denies
the
existence
f the external
world
or
who deniesthe existence
of
ghosts,
nicorns,
tc.)
mustnot be disturbed
y
the
obvious fact hat
his
words
'external
world',ghosts'
nd unicorns'
o not
refer. his
seems n ine
with utnam's
own
argument,
or
hough
e accusesthe
BIV-sceptic
f
being
ncapable
of
referring
to the real vat which contains
him
according
o
his
story,
e
does not accuse
him
of
being ncapable
of
referring
o
anything
hose existence e
denies,
.g.,
his
hands,
his
friends,
tc.
(and
we shall see
in
the
imagineddialogue
below where
t
would
lead him
f
he
did).
Coming
back to the
ontologist's
oint
of
view,
think
he best
way
to illustrate
the
significance
he above differencef
approach might
cquire
is
by
considering
Berkeley's
mpirical
dealism.
Obviously,
he
theory
f reference erived
rom
n
ontological
tance such as
Berkeley's
s
incompatible
with
Putnam'srealistic ausal
theory
freference.
Indeed,
both
Berkeley
nd Putnamwere
ooking
or
way
to
escape
the
cepticism
Descartes
unfolds
n the
first
hapters
f
the Meditations.ut
Berkeley
reaches
a
differentolution.
He
maintains hat hebestmethod
f
overcoming cepticism
s
to
neutralize t
by
giving
up
realism
and then
re-adjusting
he
theory
f reference
accordingly.6
e would thus laim thatwords uch as
'brain',
vat', etc.,
houldnot
be conceived s
denoting
bjective
bjects
hich re
independent
f
any
perceiver,
or
as
denoting
ubjectivebjects,
.e.,
objects
whichowe their
xistence,
iz.,
heir
nternal
reality,
o the
inguistic
ractice
f
any particular
ociety,
ut rather s
referring
o
the commonperceptionsfGod and man,perceptions rojected yGod onto His
creatures'minds.
If
Berkeley's
ebuttal f
cepticism
s
nternally
oherent,
henPutnam's
rgument,
claiming ny
surrender f realism o
be
self-refuting,
s
not
responsive
o it.
Putnam,
quite
surprisingly,
oes
not endeavour to demonstrate hat
dealistic
r
solipsistic
approaches
annotbe
accompaniedby compatible
heories
freference
hich
make
their xternal-world
cepticism
elf-coherent.7
These
considerations
uggest
hatthere s
another nd indeed
a
major
difficulty
withPutnam's
and
Dell'
Utri's)
responses
o
traditional
cepticism:
he
IVsto?y
oes
6
Principles
f
Human
Knowledge,
ecs
87-90.
7
A transcendental
rgument
or
hat
purpose
is set forth
y
Kant,
who
asserts hat
our
concept
of
self-identity
cquires
its
meaningonly gainst
the assumed
background
f
exter-
nal
reality:Critiquef
PureReason
B
276.
This view
actually mplies
thatthe
Cogito
s
already
sufficiento confute xternal-world
cepticism.
? The Editors f
The
Philosophicaluarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
6/11
BRAINS
IN
A
VAT
217
not onstitute
n
adequate
ersion
f
ld,
xternal-world
cepticism.
utnam laims
that
real
BIV is
incapable
of
expressing
cepticism
ecause his
words fail to refer.
Or,
as
suggested y
Dell' Utri's
reconstruction,
n
actual BIV
would not have the
internal)
realisticanguage required or xpressing isfears nd doubts.But what forcedoes
thisclaim
have
against, ay,
an
idealistic
olipsist,
ho claims
the entireworld
to
exist
n
his
mind,
without
ssuming
single
external
ntity?
uch
a
solipsist
an
think f
himself,
.e.,
his
soul,
as the
only
thing
hat
exists,
without
ontradicting
himself
y
appealing
to
realistic
anguage.
Thus
Putnam's
rgument
gainst
xternal-world
cepticism
as
well as Dell'
Utri's
version
f
it)
is a bit
tricky:
he
representative
ceptic
s held
to doubt
everything
outsidehis
mind,
xcept
his
brain,
vat and
computer,
hich
do
lie
outsidehis
mind.
He is then
found
ncapable
of
forming
irect r
indirect
erceptual
onnections ith
those solated slandsofexternal ealityeft ehind.And thisrenders isscepticism
self-refuting.
This
shows that Putnam's
refutation f
external-world
cepticism
s
heavily
dependent
upon,
and hence
limited
o,
a
specially
ooled
sceptical
hypothesis,
n
which
here
s
an
external
eceivinggent.
here
this
deceiving gent
s
furtherssumed
to be
of
a
materialistic
ature,
.g.,
the
vat-computer
ystem,
utnam an
argue
that
it has to be
perceptually
onnected o the
sceptic,
n
orderto be
referredo.
Now,
in
order o see
more
clearlywhy
Putnam's
rgument
s
entirely
neffective
gainst
ther,
more
conclusive
xpressions
f external-world
r material
cepticism,
onsider he
resultswerehe to try o apply tto Berkeley'sdealism:
Berkeley:
ll
there
s are
souls and
ideas.
Putnam:
his is
self-refuting.
ndeed,
any
external-world
cepticism
s
self-refuting,
as I
have
demonstrated
n
the
case of
BIV,
for
f
t s
true,
hen he
ceptic's
words and ideas fail
to refer o
those
material,
xternal
objects
which
constitute is
deluding
nvironment.
o
if
we are brains n
a
vat,
we
cannot
say
or think
hat
we
are.
Berkeley:
ut
my
tory
s
different
n
my tory
here re no
material,
xternal
bjects,
and hence
no
causal connectionwith
such
objects
s
necessary
or their
description.
[Putnam
would do
well
to end the discussion
t
this
uncture.
For were he to
press
his
point,
he
would be
forced
o
argue
thatthe
existence
f an
external,
bjective
referent
s
a
necessary
ondition
not
ust
for
reference
ut for
meaningfulness
oo.
He would
have to do this
n
orderto extend
his
linguistic rgument
o
Berkeley's
idealism,
hat
s,
n
order o
doubtthe
meaningfulness
f
Berkeley's
ntirely
egative
existential
ropositions
bout
an
objective,
xternal
reality.
But such a view has
unwelcome
ntological
onsequences.]
Putnam: his iswrong oo.True,your tory oes not contain nyexternal,material
objects.
But have
you
not
ust spoken
about
such
objects,
while
denying
their
ery
xistence?
hus,
according
o
my
ausal
theory
f
meaning,
here
mustbe some
ausal,
perceptual
onnection etween
your
wordsor ideas of
material
bjects
nd
at least one
exemplar
f such an
object,
n
orderfor
? The Editors f
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Philosophical
yarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
7/11
218
YUVAL
STEINITZ
your
wordsto
acquire
their
revalent
meanings, hough
you
believe them
to have no
referencet all. So either
here
re
material
bjects
r
there re
not. If
there
re,
your
external-world
cepticism
s
false.
f
there re
not,
thenyoucould notsayand meanthatthere re not.
Berkeley:
now
see
the true
nature
of
your argument.
our
demand for a
causal
connection ith he
object
we
speak
bout,
or
at
east
for causal
connection
with ther
bjects
of
the same
kind,
s none other
han a
disguised
ersion
of
the ancientParmenidean
doctrine hat It cannot
be said that
anything
is
not'.8
ndeed,
you
ostensibly
lter
t
by claiming
hat It cannot be
said
that
anything
s
causally
unconnected'.But since
therecan be no
causal
connectionwithwhat
there s
not,
your
demand boils down to
the
same
ontological
onsequences,
hat
s,
the nflated
ntology
f
objects
or
at
least
kinds fobjects) hat ssuesfrom he old riddleofnon-being.9
In
the last few
pages
we have
seen
why
Putnam's
anti-sceptical
rgument
s
ineffective
gainstwidely
omprehensive
ceptical
cenarioswhich
ermit
o external
reality
solipsism),
r at least
no material
reality idealism).
Let us summarize
he
discussion o
far
by
stressing
wo
major
points:
1.
Putnam
rgues
hat
ceptical
ssertions
uch
as
'Reality
s an
all-encompassing
dream',
r
I
am a
BIV',
are
self-refuting,
nd
triumphantly
laims
hat
e
has revealed
a
substantial
nconsistency
n
ontologicalcepticism.
ut have
uggested
hat utnam's
satisfaction
ould be
warranted
nly
f his
realistic ausal
theory
f
reference ere
true ome hatmay. have alsodemonstratedhatPutnammight indtquitedifficult
to force
stubborn
ntological
ceptic
o
accept
his causal
theory
f
reference
n
the
first
lace.
For the
ontological
oubtsraised
by
such a
sceptic
re
not
restrictedo
ontology.
ather,
hey pread
to
the
prevalent
ausal
semantics
s
well.
Note, then,
hat
he
contradictionhatPutnam
laimed
o
have
revealed,
etween
thecausal
theory
f
reference
n
the one
hand,
and some
major
sceptical
rguments
on
the
other,
would not
mmediately
in over
a
true
ntological
ceptic.
n
fact,
his
contradiction
might
only
serve to
emphasize
how extensive he
ramificationsf
traditional
ntological
cepticism
eally
re.
2. nstead f eing rue omewhatmay, nd nstead fbeingnelementaryypothesis
or
an axiom
about the
theory
f
reference,
utnam's
ausal
theory
f
references
clearly ependent
pon
an
implicit ntological
tance: ither
pon
external
ealism,
s
suggested y
Brueckner,
r
upon
internal
ealism,
s
suggested y
Dell'
Utri.
Well,
why
hould
not
Putnam
dopt
one of
these
conceptions
f
realism'
as
Dell'
Utri
puts
t)
as his
premise?
ake,
for
nstance,
nternal ealism: s
it not
possible,
t
least
n
principle,
hat
this
theory
s
indeed
necessary
or
thinking
nd
referring,
s
Putnam nd
Dell' Utri
suggest?'0
8See M. Furth,Elements ofEleatic Ontology',Journal f he istoryf hilosophy(1968),
p.
116.
9
These
unwelcome
onsequences
f
Putnam's
rgument
were
first
ointed
ut n
Philosophia
16
(1986)
by
P.
Tichy,
Putnam on
Brains
n a
Vat',
pp.
144-5,
and
by
F.B.
Farrell,
Putnam
and the
Vat-People', p.
154.
'0
Putnam
ch.
3;
Dell' Utri
sec. V.
?
The Editors f
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Philosophical
uarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
8/11
BRAINS IN
A
VAT
219
This is not
to
the
point
here.
Assuming
hat
xternal ealism
nd
internal
ealism
are
false,
then Putnam's
causal semantics
oes
too.
In
that
case,
Putnam's
anti-
sceptical
rgument,
nd Dell' Utri's
reconstruction
f
it,
go
as
well.
Assuming,
n
the otherhand,thatone oftheseontological tanceshappensto be true, hentheir
arguments
gainst cepticism
re valid but useless. or
if
external r internal
ealism
is
true,
hen all forms f
external-world
cepticism, .g.,
the
BIV
story,
olipsism,
Idealism,
the Evil Genius
story,
tc.,
are
nstantlyalsfied
y
this
ery
ssumption.
he
question
has been
explicitly
egged
at
the
outset.
There
is no
need
for
Putnam's
BIV
reference
tory.
II.
A
BIV
PERSPECTIVE
In the firstartof thispaper I showed hatPutnam's rguments ineffectivegainst
old-style
ntological cepticism.
his is
because
scepticism
f
this
ort
might
ecome
so
comprehensive
hat t
must
nfluence
he
heory
freference
referred
y
the
ceptic.
In
the
following
ages
I
shall
evaluate he force
f Putnam's
rgumentsgainst
more
moderate
ceptic,
who
considers
single
BIV
placed
in
a
real,
rich
material
surrounding,
nd who
happens
o take
or
ranted
utnam's ausal
theory
f
reference.
Must he
accept,
underthose
ssumptions,
utnam's olution
f
BIV-scepticism?
Putnam
resents
heBIV
hypothesis
s a
story
bout
a
mad scientist ho
performs
the
experiment.
he
following
tory rovides
reasonable
equel,
n
the
sense that
itdoes notcontradictny major physical rinciples r the aws of ogic. tspurpose
is
to show
hat hehermetic
eparation
etween
BIV,
on
theone
hand,
nd
objective
reality,
n
the
other,
might
ot be
as
air-tight
s
Putnam
maintains. t would
follow
that ven
f
sceptical
IV were o
accept
Putnam's ealistic ausal
theory
f
reference
(as
no
CartesianBIV
would),
till
here
might
e
circumstances
n
which
his
assertion
'I
am a
BIV'
would
acquire
ts
ssumedrealistic
eference,
nd
hence be
meaningful
and
succeed
n
referring
n
the
ordinary
ense.
Imagine
a brain
n
a
vat named Alex.
Apart
from
he
unfortunate
act
hathis
nerve-endings
re
connected o a
computer,
Alex is a normal
person
n
all
other
respects.
ike most
people,
Alex
does not
belong
to the
category
f thosewho
waste
their imeon
philosophical
meditations.oubts suchas 'Am I a BIV?' have never
enteredhis
mind.
One
day
it occurs to
the
mad scientist o
documenthis
sensational
xperiment.
He
buys
video
camera,
films he
BIV
system
nd the
computer
ontrolling
t,
and
that
very
vening
creens hefilm or
his
friends.
uddenly
he
realizes hathis
circle
of
friends
ncludes,
n
some
weird
ense,
Alex as
well.
t
would be
unfair,
e
thinks,
to
prevent
Alex from
eeing
hefilm:
After
ll,
haven't hurthim
enough
by
putting
him
nto
the vat?'
But how
could Alex watch
he
film?
nd
how
could
he be
prevented
rom
ealizing
thathe himselfsthefilm's ero,whichmighteopardizesomepsychologicalspects
of the
experiment?
In
order
to
accomplish
his,
he
mad
scientist
ecides that t
would
be
best
f
the
computer
made Alex
meet
him
omewhere,
fter
whichhe
would nvite
im
to
watch
the
film
t his home.
Since
the
film
hows
nothing
bout
the
way
the
brain
was
?
The Editors
f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
9/11
220
YUVAL
STEINITZ
removedfrom
ts
body
and
put
into the
vat,
there s
no
reason for
Alex to
realize
that
he
is
looking
t
himself.
And so
it was.
The
computer
erformed
perfect
imulation f a
party
t which
the mad scientistnvitedAlex tohis home.Therehe showedhimthefilmboutthe
BIV.
(Obviously
our
amazed hero
watched the film
through
the
electrodes
permanently
ttached
to his
visual
nerves,
ust
as
he
saw
all
the
other
things
hat
constituted is
world.)
Nevertheless,
few
days
ater t
occurred o Alex
for he
first ime n
his
life o
raise a
sceptical
uestion:
Might
be a
BIV
myself?'.
After
urning
hisdoubt
over
n
his
mind
day
and
night,
e
finally
went to
the
library
obviously
simulated
ibrary)
o
read an
essay
ntitled
Brains
n
a
Vat'. On
page
50 he
came
upon
the
following
onclusion:
So,
if
we are
Brains
n
a
Vat,
we
cannotthink hatwe are'. 'That poorbrain saw in thefilm', hought lex. Even
if
t
had
suspected
ts
true
predicament,
hat
very
hought
n its
part
would be self-
refuting.'
nd
so he
sighed
n
relief.
The moral:
Alex
considered
he
possibility
f
being
a
BIV,
and
conceived the
concepts
brain'
nd vat'
n
his
mind,
s a
result f
ome
causal,
perceptual
onnection
with
he real
vat
containing
im.
Hence his
words
nd doubts
eem to
acquire
their
assumed
reference
nd
meaning.
Does
the fact
hathis
observation
ook
place
by
means
of a
film
rojected
rom
a
computer
memory,
nd
transmittedo hisbrain
via
electrodes,
revent
he
fulfilment
oftherequired ausal connection?
Putnam,
uite
urprisingly,
laims hat
tdoes.
Here he
sharply
iffersrom
ripke,
another
roponent
f the
causal
theory
f
reference,
ho
argues
hat ven
the
most
indirect nd
heavily
mediated
causal
connection
s
sufficientor
the
establishment
of full
eferential
elations
etween
he
concepts
r
names
and the
objects,
hrough
what he calls
a
causal
(historical)
hain'."
According
o
Kripke,
blind man can
refer
o
light,
ven
though
he
has
never een
it,
or
anything
imilar o
it.
Thus,
if
Alex
opted
for
the
Kripkean
nterpretation
f
the
causal
theory
f
reference,
e
would be
'allowed' to
refer o
vats
and
computers,
ven
though
he
grasped
their
concepts hrough
iscourse
with computer, n thecondition,fcourse, hat hose
concepts
were
programmed
nto the
computer
y
someone
whose
concepts
of vat
and
computer
o
refer.
Putnam
pp. 11-12),
n
contrast,
ismisses he
referential
alue
of such
very
weak
causal
connections:12
Although
he
machine does
not
perceive
pples,
fields,
or
steeples,
ts
creator-
designers
id.
There is
some
ausal
connection
etween he
machine
nd
the real-
world
apples,
etc.,
via
the
perceptual
xperience
nd
knowledge
f
the
creator-
designers.
ut such a
weak
connection
an
hardly
uffice
or
reference.
"
S.
Kripke, Naming
nd
Necessity
Oxford:
Basil
Blackwell,
1980),
p.
139.
12
Putnam's
position
here
concerning
the
insufficiency
f
such weak
connections con-
trasts
not
only
with
Kripke's,
but also
with
his own
earlier
writing
on
this
topic:
cf.
'Explanation
and
Reference',
reprinted
n
his
Mind,
Language
nd
Reality
Cambridge
UP,
1975),
p.
202.
?
The Editors f
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Philosophical
uarterly,
994.
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10/11
BRAINS IN A VAT
221
And he
ustifies
hiswith
he
following rgument:
The machine s
utterly
nsensitive
o the
ontinuedxistence f
pples,
fields,
teeples,
etc.
Even if ll these
hings
eased
o
exist,
he machinewould still iscourse
ust
as
happily n the sameway.That is whythe machinecannotbe regarded s refer-
ring
t all.
But thisview
s indeed
very
odd.
It
implies
hatwhen we read
in
a book
about
penguins
n
Antarctica,
we should
claim
that
the
word
penguin
annot refer o real
penguins,
s thewritten
ord and the
book
are no less nsensitivehanthe
computer
to the
continuedexistence
of
penguins.
s
the
assumption
hat this book
might
continue o be read
'just
as
happily
n
the same
way',
even
if
penguins
ceased
to
exist',
nough
to
disqualify
he
book's referentialalue? And if
o,
then
what would
be the reference f the entry penguin' in the insensitive 930 editionof the
Encyclopaedia
ritannica?
Putnam
might
rgue
thatthe
book could
in
principle
e re-edited nd
updated,
and
that
he 1930
edition ould be
replaced
by
the
2030
edition.But
then,
n
exactly
the same
way,
the
mad scientist
onducting
he
BIV
experiment
ould
update
the
computer
memory
oncerning
he
extinctions,
hould
theyunfortunately
ccur,
of
penguins, pples,
or
steeples.
He could also
program
he
computer
o
update
tself
periodically,
erhaps
ven
using
heBritannica
ear-books.
ncidentally,
hesevolumes
are
printed
nowadays
from
nformationhat
s
processed
nd
stored
n
a
computer
memory,
nd
transmitted
o
the
printer
ia electronic
mediations.
Thus we
must
opt
for
Kripke's
version,
nd
stipulate
hat the
mere fact that
sensations re
processed
nd transmitted
y
a
computer,
r
by any
artificialr non-
artificial eans
whatsoever,
annot liminate he
required
ausal connection etween
a
word
and
its
supposed
referendum,
n
the condition hat
such
a connection
does
exist n
the first
lace.
In
'a
causal
(historical)
hain' the
first
ink
s what matters:
through
t
the whole chain
should
be
perceptually
inked o
reality.
All
other
inks
need
not
be
perceptual,
ot even the ast ink
which
onveys
he
term
ight
o a
blind
man,
or
the
term
at o a BIV.
Therefore,
fAlex
suspects,
s a
result f
his
computer-
mediated
watching
f a film
or
even
as a
result f a
computer-mediatedeading
f
a
description
f
vats),
hathe
might
e a
BIV,
his doubts re
ultimately
eaningful
and
capable
of
referring.
What then
should our
sceptic
believe,
f he
suspects
his
true
predicament,
hile
assuming
he existence f a
rich
ndependent
world
of
objects
outside
of
his own
world?
Surely, being sceptical,
he
cannot
reject
the
possibility a possibility
acknowledged y
Putnam s
well)
that he
computer's
memories nd
programs
re
at
least
partly
function
f external
eality.
herefore t would
be
only
reasonable
for
him
to
hypothesizeeven
though
he can
never
verify
t)
that the
words brain'
and
'vat'
in
his
anguage
may
cquire
a
real
reference fter
ll.
I think t has become evidentby now that the onlyway to preservePutnam's
argument
gainst
BIV
scepticism
s to
adopt
a
more
rigid
version f
the
BIV
story,
one that
liminates
ny
causal
inkage
with xternal
eality
hatever.
ot
surprisingly,
indeed,
Putnam
hints t this second line
of
defence
when
he moves
to consider
strange
ossible
world
n
which
every
entient
eing
s
and
always
was
a
brain
n
?
The
Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
994.
8/9/2019 Brains in a Vat - Different Perspectives - Yuval Steinitz
11/11
222
YUVAL
STEINITZ
a vat'
(p.
14).
Such a
comprehensiveceptical
cenario,
he seems to
believe,
must
be either
elf-refuting
r false.
But this s cold comfort.
irst,
ecause treturns s to the
first
orn f
the
dilemma,
i.e., to our previousconclusion that such a comprehensiventological scepticism
necessitates
hanging
he
theory
f reference
ccordingly.
econd,
because even
if
Alex refused o
accept
this,
nd
steadfastly
eld to
Putnam'srealistic ausal
theory
of
reference,
e still ould not hakeoff
cepticism. ceptics
re also
concerned bout
partial
ceptical
cenarios. o the ctual
disjunction
lex s
facing
s
not meredouble
but
a
triple
isjunction:
(a)
I
am a
person
with
body,
perceiving
bjective eality;
(b)
I
am a BIV
controlled
y
a
computer,
ut
part
of
the'computer's
imulation
of
reality
riginates
n
the observations
f
its
programmers
or,
alternatively,
n
the observations f attached roboticsensorymechanisms),who do perceive
objective
eality;
(c)
I
am a
BIV,
and there s
nothing
lse outside
my system.
Or,
alternatively,
all scientists
nd
programmers
re themselves
IVs.)
Of
course,
Putnam
may happily
laborate
upon
the
possible
realization f the ast
comprehensive
cenario
c),
which
permits
im
on
the
condition f
neglecting
ur
previous rguments
f
section
)
to
rely
upon
his
hypothesis
hat
cepticism,
n
such
a
case,
is
self-refuting....
Yet this hould not comfort
im,
nor should t comfort
ny
BIV-sceptic.
For
as
longas disjunctb) cannot be excluded, cepticismeems to remain s plausible s
ever.
13
Tel-Aviv niversitnd Universit
f
Haifa
'3
I
would like to thank Naomi
Goldblum,
Noah
J.
Efron and Zev
Bechler
for
helpful
comments.
?
The Editors f
The
Philosophicaluarterly,
994.
Recommended