45883197 Enemy Jungle Tactics for Platoon Leaders Handbook Vietnam

THIS WCUMENT Is NOT CLASSIFIED; HOWEVER, THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREPlTED IN THE SAME MRNNES AS PERSONAL LETTERS OR PAPERS.

FOREWORD

This handbook i s an attempt t o f a m i l i a r i z e platoon leaders aperet- in6 i n t h e Jungle with t h e c m o n t a c t i c s employed by t h e enemy in t h e jungle. The information i s ~eneral i n nbture and wes derived from i n t e r - v i e s with knowledgeable platoon leaders who were forced t o l e a r n many O f t h e s e oft-repeated t a c t i c s t h r o w h experience. It i s hoped t h a t t h i s handbook w i l l provide e r n e understandinq of t h e s e enemy t a c t i c s and equip t h e platoon leader t o make more i n t e l l i g e n t assessments of s i t u a t i o n s he is l i k e l y t o encounter.

@d.&.U + PHILLIP R . DAVIDSON, JR. BriRadier General, USA Assis tan t Chief Of S t a f f . J2

12 October 1967

DISTRIBUTION : JP-12 52-16 ( L i s t R : 01 less 2; 3 1 p lus 1 2 ; 52 plus 2). PLUS :

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1 c665 2-H301 1-K655

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1-C669 2-H5OO l-NO05 l L C t t 1 1-Ii350 ~ - K W

. . TARLE OF COFl ’ETE

I . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1 . OFFEXSIYE TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A . General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . When Ambushes Can Be Expected . . . . . . . . C Planning Ambushes

D . Ambush Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E . Ambush Tactics and Formations . . . . . . . .

I11 . DEFENSIVE TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . Characteristics Of Field Fortifications . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

c . Camoufle.ge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D . Fortified hemy Base Canp . . . . . . . . . . . .

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TABLE OF COmE!iTS (Cant)

IV . WITHDRAWAL TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . Gencrsl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bi Types of Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V . MIRES lupD BM)BEXAPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . Boobytraps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C . Enemy Marking of Danger Areas . . . . . . . . . . D . Illustrated Examples or Mine and Boobytrap Markinqs

V I . CDACLUSIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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WAT A ?SA?OOV LFADER SYOULD KNOP AAO'S: THE ENEMY'S J'JiGLE TACTICS

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. ,The purpose of t h i s handbook is t o a e s c r i b e t h e juwle t a c t i c s , t e c h n i q u e s , and dece?'.ions which hove been iised over 8nd over q e i n by t h e ennnv, o f ten with n l a m i n e success. It is honed t h a t Paowledge of t h e s e "%-repeated t s c t i c s w i l l h e l p t h e small u n i t leader t o make a more i n t e l l i R e n t BSsP5Sment Of t h e enmy s i t u a t i o n by b e t t e r understand- i n g what t o expec t rrm t h e enemy durini: bo th movement a n d meeting en- gagements i n t h e junclp.

8. The t e r r a i n of South Vietn,m renaes frm ruRRed mountain o e a k s , 2500 meters h i g h , t o mmshy p l a i n s belov sea l e v e l . Much of t h i s t e r - r a i n i s covered w i t r dense r a i n f o r e s t s t h a t have become t h e t r a d i t i o n a l refwe m e a s f a r Vc forces. Two d i s t i n c t tynes of junale are found i n South Y i e t n m : t h e mult icanopied f o r e s t i i i t l i d e n s e underRrowth, ~POYB- l e n t i n the mountainous regions: end t h e manprove s ~ m p s , p e c u l i a r t o t h e Del ta snd c o a s t a l areas. more common aieaa vtere rugged junnle may b e found. )

(The map on p-e 2 d e p i c t s Some o r t h e

1. Ic I , 11, a n d TI1 torrs T a c t i c a l Zones, typical Jungle t e r - rain consists of a rulticanapied forest with dense underRrovth. Gener- a l l y , t h e t r e e s are ?5 t o 10 meters hiqh. Trees are two t o t h r e e meters a p a r t , and t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e ground and f i r s t f o l i a t i o n is 5 t o 1 0 mters. Tree diemeters vary from 40 t o 150 c e n t i m e t e r s (16 t o 57 i n - c h e s ) . The undergrowth Consis t s of moss.es, Terns, v i n e s , bushes , b r i a r s .

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and wasses f rm one t o t h r e e meters high. The bushes are two t o t h r e e meters high, and vines and briars wind around t h e t r e e s , extending up t o t h e t r e e canopy. A s e leva t ion i n c r e a s e s , t h e dens i ty of undergrouth de- creases. and R ~ S S i s most brevnlen t . f o r e a t s of bamboo which are v i r t u a l l y impossible t o t r a v e l through u i t d - out f irst c u t t i n e a trail .

A t e l e v s t i o n s higher than 1200 meters, an undergrowth of mbss Throughout South V i e t n a m ere many s c s t t e z e d

2. I n I V Corns TaCtiCsl Zone, t h e t e r r a i n i s subjec t t o c o a s t a l f looding. Mangrove t i d a l svamps are very preva len t . The m q r o v e t i d a l swmp is a very dense everoreen f o r e s t wowing i n c o a s t a l areas flooded by t h e d a i l y t i d e . The he ight of t h e t r e e s ranees Prm 2 t o 18 meters, a v e r q i n g about 5 meters. They nolmally have a double-lwyered canopy, with t h e younger t r e e s formin8 t h e lower canopy. Throughout t h e e n t i r e mangrove f o r e s t area t h e r e are many vines vhich h-ng d o v f rm t h e t r e e s and twine among than . The undergrowth c m o n l y Consists of marsh grass, reeds, rushes , and palm bushes, usual ly about two meters high.

3 . S m e Of t h e f i e r c e s t encounters involving company and platoan- s i z e d a c t i o n s have Occurred i n jungle t e r r a i n . why t h e s e ewe4anents have of ten been c o s t l y for f r i e n d l y forces:

There are s e v e r a l reasons

a. The f i g h t , on t h e averwe, becanes jo ined a t ranges be- tween 12 and 20 meters, vhich are t o o c lose t o afford any real advantage t o our crew-served weapons.

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b. Marking smoke, for (LIZ' and artillery support. cannot be used e f r ec t ive ly where the t o p canopy of t h e Jungle is 15 t o 20 meters high or of t r i p l e thickness.

C . Over-eagerness, often r e su l t i ng from periods o t fruit- less Sewch, cau8es small u n i t l eaders t o a s sau l t enemy pos i t inns with- out stopping t o anslyze the s i t u a t i o n and t o use all ava i l ab le firepower in coordination with good Schemes Of maneuver.

d. Supporting fires, t o avoid s t r i k i n g f r i end ly POsitiOm, must d l o w t o o wide I margin of error t o influence t h e ac t ion .

e. Mortars are of no use unless they c m be based where overhead clearance is avrrilable.

f. The advance of reinforcements i a Often e r r a t i c . ponderous. and exhausting.

g. A i r medical evacuation is omen d i f f i c u l t .

C. VCINYA juna le warfare c a l l 8 for repeated use of mbushee. mines, and boobytraps. which have often been used by t h e enmy i n t h e pas t . i l l u s t r a t i o n s covered in t h e handbook are not an a t t m p t t o cover t h e g m u t of cnsny jungle t a c t i c s . s i b l e , t o a t t enp t in a s ing le publ ica t ion .

This handbook poin ts ou t those t a c t i c s and techniques The examples and

This would be imprac t ica l , if' not impos- The handbook is only an

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attempt t o provide sane conclusions concarnine enemy jungle t a c t i c s based on r e p o r t s provided by those small u n i t leaders who have encountered them i n Fast operations.

11. OFFWSIYE TACTICS.

A. C e m . The ambush has been t h e most f requent ly and succe~s- f u l l y used enemy offens ive t a c t i c i n j w l e t e r r a i n . Jungle ambushes we normally e s t a b l i s h e d on n a t u r a l rou tes of movement Such as trails and Streams. They are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y short, v i o l e n t ac t ions fol- lowe l by a rap id withdrawal.

8 . When Ambushes Can Ye ixpected. Enemy ambushes have been con- ducted a t all hours of t h e * and n i g h t ; however. as would be expected, tile majority of embushes occur during dayl ignt hours. Almast 1/3 of all enew YmbusLLeB occur a w i n g t h e naming iiours. at which t i m e r r i e n a l y troops arc m v i q out frm t h e i r base c m p s t o conduct d a i l y operations. Often triey nave set up anlbushes behind f r i e n d l y p a t r o l s after they have l e f t tileir p a t r o l bases. t h e i r rou tes and were caught i n ambushes at times when p a t r o l members were t i r e d Bnd s e c u r i t y was lax.

There have been C ~ S ~ S i n which p a t r o l s r e t r a c e d

C. Planning ilmbushes..

1. The enemy uses g r e a t pa t ience i n studyin8 f r i e n a l y movement methods and techniques. iie is quick t o d e t e c t any p a t t e r n Of r e g u l a r i t y i n f r i e n d l y a c t i v i t y . >

2. The dense jungle undergrowth found i n some areas, combined with t h e dark shadow of t h e canopy. l i m i t s wound observation t o f i v e meters ; some enemy smbushes have been i n i t i a t e d a t j u s t t h a t d i s tance . Excellent f i r e a i s c i p l i n e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e case of NVA units. h8s r e s u l t e d i n f r i e n d l y elejnents walking wi th in p o i n t - b l e d ranqe OP enemy small B ~ S . The enemy i n i t i a t e s t h e ac t ion as close as p o s r i b l e i i n or- der t o reduce t h e f i r e Super ior i ty and a i r power of f r i e n d l y forces .

D. Ambush Indicators, Rssed on observation and experience of small u n i t l e a d e r s , t h e following l i s t of i n d i c a t o r s has been compiled t o a s s i s t platoon l e a d e r s i n determining t h e l i k e l i h o o d of mhush s i t e s i n t h e i r area of opera t inns :

1. Tied-down brush.

2. Vi l lages with no peoplb present . They m w conceal smbushes,

It m w be a f i r i n g l a n e for an ambush s i t e .

b u t it should be remembered t h a t t h e presence of c i v i l i a n s i n an area does not preclude t h e p o s e i b i l i t y of ambush. appear as "innocent" c i v i l i a n s i n order t o deceive friendly m m m d e r 8 i n t o th inking t h e area is f r e e of VC.

The VC often make themselves

3. L a r ~ e herds or c a t t l e and well-tended crops i n a sparsely populated area.

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4. An uusua l mount O f w t i Y i t y i n a spec i f i c area. Act iv i t i e s which should be noted are reports of unknwn =its i n t h e area and s ight - ings of VC reconnaissance elements.

5. A steady de l ivery of small m s f i r e from one pos i t ion . While th i s m q appear t o be aimed at checking or delaying movement, it may ac tua l ly be designed t o encourwe pursu i t .

Sniper fire. The enemy will use snipers t o draw f r i end ly 6 . forces i n t o smblish pos i t ions . and,upan pursu i t by t h e f r i end ly force , they w i l l f a l l bacX and draw t h e force i n t o an ambush.

The sn ipers w i l l f i r e harassinE rounds;

E. &bush Tact ics and Formations. The enemy has used Yawing t a c t i c s A few examples will il- and formations "hen i n i t i a t i n g offensive actions.

l u s t r a t e some O f t h e more c m o n t a c t i c s which the enemy has successfu l ly enployed agains t Friendly forces i n t h e Jungle. It should be ranenbered, however, t h a t t hese formations and techniques w i l l very rrecording t o t h e t e r r a i n , mission, and enemy un i t s involved.

1, Lure end Ambush.

The "lure and ambush" i s a commonly used enemy t a c t i c . c i p l e i s to &a" t h e a t t e n t i o n of f r i e n d l y forces and lure them i n t o pre- pared pos i t ions . movement i n Jungle terrain . I n one ins tance , 8 f r i e n d l y platoon was p a t r o l l i n g near War Zone C. around poin t it entered a keyhole-shaped Jungle clearing, about 150 meters from t r e e l i n e t o t r e e l i n e . The p a t r o l en tered t h e c lear inq i n R column formation. men the head Of t h e column was two-thirds of t h e w a y BCIIOSS

t h e c l e a r i n g , t h e poin t m a n s p o t t e d three enemy Soldiers with backs turned. They stood 15 meters t o t h e left f r o n t of t h e column and 10 meters s h o r t of t h e t r e e l i n e . Without t u r n i n g , t h e y dar ted away toward t h e j u n g l e , and the l e a d files Of t h e p a t r o l tu rned to yursue. The t.arnin.3 of t h e column spread it n e a t l y i n front Of t h e k i l l i n g zone of an ambush, which wee deployed j u s t i n s i d e t h e t r e e l i n e .

The b a s i c pr in-

Meny v a r i a t i o n s Of t h i s t a c t i c have been noted dur inq

Several hundred meters s h o r t of i t s turn-

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2. >Shaped Ambush.

, 3 W W ' "

e 4 8 1 ,

movement \ 88.a"lti"P, element

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In t h e &Shaped ambush, t h e long axis is normally posit ioned in B tree- line and p a r a l l e l t o a road or trail. enables t h e VC/NVA t o mass a heavy concentration of fire both on t h e flank and dovn t h e length of L mOvinR colmn. adds f l e x i b i l i t y t o t h i s type of mbush. Reserves can be used t c rein- force e i t h e r axis of t h e ambush, as a maneuvering elcmcnt in envclopiw f r iendly forces , and as a blocking force t o cut of f withdrawal routes o r t o ambush friendly re inforcments .

Deployment in an "L" formation

Bmployment of reserves

AW 3 . V-Shaped Ambush.

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AW 3 J f i 12 B

c c

The V-shaped mbuah is vevally posi t ioned along a t r a i l or path. matic weapons are placed a t t h e vertex and dow each side of t h e "V." This fornation enables t h e enemy to p l e z e 8 heavy volme of fire on both flanks and d w n t h e length of an approaching colman. often been pos i t ioned i n front of t h e autonatic weapons t o repel any attempt t o r o l l up t h e flanks or break through t h e ambush.

Auto-

Claymore mines h w e

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4. U-Shaped Ambush.

AW

> u u u u I c c C c

A8 with the Ir and V-shaped ambushes, the "U" formation i s 81so encountered during movement on J u n ~ l e t r a i l s . to the front Of the mbush s i t e i n order t o 5.81 Off withdrawal from the trap. Claymores are also employed with t h i s ambush formnticn.

The enemy places automatic wea~ons w e l l

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111. DEFWSIYE TACTICS.

A. e. 1. The enemy generally avoids t h e defense because he cannot v i th -

Stand f r i end ly firepower.. Hwe~er , he has tenaciously defended wlner*blc u n i t s , bases, and i n s t a l l a t i o n s fo r shor t periods of time. The enemy ire- parea extensive defensive pos i t ions throughout h i s operational are-. De- fenses a re prepared aloog trails and o ther avenues of approach. Boobytraps M d mines are often incorporated i n t o these defensive pos i t ions , particu- l a r l y in base camp a r e ~ b .

2. The enemy can move i n t o M m e a and prepare bunkers and trench- l i n e s Overnight. t i ons throughout daylight hours, and then he withdraws in mall ~ r o u p s over crrrefully planned escape routes during t h e hours of darkness. If cut o f f , he occupies one Of maw other f o r t i f i e d (veas and resumes defensive t a c t i c s .

I f contacted, he attempt8 t o hold these f o r t i f i e d posi-

B. Charac te r i s t ics of Field For t i f ice t ione . Increasingly, t h e enemy is employing extensive f i e l d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s in conjunction v i t h h i s opera- t i ons . artillery snd air s t r ikes . These f o r t i f i c a t i o n s are ChRf.(LCtei-iEed by:

VCIlwA so ld i e r s a r e enthuSiaStie diggers because they f e a r f r iendly

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1. Defense in depth.

2. Extensive use of cmouflaqe.

3 . Mutually supporting defensive networks.

4. Restricted avenues of approach.

5. Escape routes

6. Use Of boobytraps, mines, and obstacles.

7 . Use O f tunnels, bunkers, cmunication trenches, and foxholes.

C. Camouflsge. Fortified areas almost alw&vvs present the greatest difficulties to friendly forces. is the enwy more Skilled than in the deceptive cmoufla&k, of fortified base camps, supply caches, and villwes. to work in his favor; trees, shrubs, end earth are reshaped to conceal bunkers and trench lines. The density of the forest pre- vents observation f r w the air, and the thick undersrowth hinders ground forces f r m adequate observation of enemy base camps until after the camp has been discovered.

In no other technique

Nature is msde

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The f b r t i f i e d enemy base camp i s r o w h l y c i r c u l a r i n form with an ou te r r i m of bunkers and foxholes enclosine a complete system of l i v i n e quarters. However, t h e shepe w i l l vary according t o t h e t e r r a i n , t h e r i s e and f a l l of t h e ground, and t h e use of na tu ra l features t o r e s t r i c t a t t a c k on t h e camp t o one o r t w o avenues. Some Of t h e enemy bases, p a r t i c u l a r l y those used only f o r t r a i n i n g 07 commo-liaison, have minimum defensive works. I n a l l cases, t h e enemy i s prepared t o defend against a ground a t t ack u n t i l forced t o withdraw as a result of f r i end ly pressure.

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I V . WITHDRAWAL TACTICS.

A. General. The VC/NTA include a withdrawel plan for every offensive and defensive operat ion. r ap id withdrawals along preplanned, concealed escape rou te s . The

They c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y conduct

more ~OmmOn t a c t i c s for evasion, escape, and withdrswal include:

1. Framenting.

2. Dispersinq.

3. l i i d i w .

4 . Deceiviw.

5. Delaying.

B. Tyl, es of Withdrawal. These examples of withdrawal t a c t i c s are t y p i c a l of those encountered by small u n i t l eade r s throughout South Yietnam, p a r t i c u l a r l y in Jungle t e r r a i n .

1. Fragmenting. On one occasion an IWA regiment, dis- covered i n an area removed ircm i ts nonnel base area, was overrun and l a q e amounts of suppl ies were captured and destroyed. As 8

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r e s u l t , all t h e subsequent contact8 were with mall groups of 3 t o 1 0 men. The r m e n t s of t h e regiment had fr-ented t o e x f i l t r a t e t h e b a t t l e area toward t h e i r base camp. have been surrounded end forced t o f i g h t , t h e i r m u n i t i o n has been used up before t h e end Of one d w . These enmy u n i t s then S p l i t i n t o mall groups and attempt t o break through t h e encirclement.

Often when enmy b a t t a l i o n s

2. Dispersing. Another f a v o r i t e technique used by smell VC forces i n danger of an unfavorable. close-ranpe contact i s to drop t h e i r packs and run. Friendly forces have been i n c l i n e d t o slow p u r s u i t i n order t o inspec t t h e packs.

3. Hiding. Hiding places a v a i l a b l e t o t h e VClNVA are in- numerable, although UndeWTound loca t ions appear t o be t h e f a v o r i t e . Underground hiding places for troops and equipment ranee frm simple s p i d e r ho les t o e labora te ly reinforced rooms. t h e s e underground i n s t a l l a t i o n s are exttmnely OiiTiCult t o d e t e c t . C r i t i ca l po in ts are entrances and e x i t s , which mr\y be concealed i n ptvdens. animal pens, r i v e r banks, under piles o f Straw OF d u w , and i n or under s t r u c t u r e s .

Frm t h e surface

(see diawwo of tunnel c m p l e x , next peue.)

4. Deceiving. VC/NVA foFCeS have used deception t o draw f r i e n d l y forces away frm base C B ~ ~ S .

and then withdraw i n an attempt t o suinp t h e Al l ied d i r e c t i o n of movement away from a valuable area.

Smal l enemy u n i t s w i l l harass

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5. Delaying. The VCJNVA have made extensive use of rear guard personnel t o d e l w pursuing forces u n t i l ,withdraval o f t h e main element is accamplished. Also, ambushes designed t o slow pursuers have often been employed.

V. MINES AND BOOBYTRAE.

A . M-. hemy un i t s do Dot make extensive use of conventional antipersonnel minefields i n jungle t e r r a i n . fare doctr ine c a l l s for using nmerous i s o l a t e d mines and s m a l l groups

Their present mine war-

of mines. I 1: The V C ~ N V A r e ly heavily on t h e use of clsymore mines.

Claymores aye placed i n t r e e s , along t r a i l s , on They employ both US and C h i C a m claymores i n a l l types of s i t u a t i o n s axid engagements. perimeters of base camps and f o r t i f i e d v i l l ages , and at ambush s i t e s .

I 2. One of t h e most common types of mines thus far encoun-

t e r e d i n jungle t e r r a i n i s made with a ChiCom hand grenade. enemy-controlled areas, these grenades are placed i n well-traveled locations and detonated e l e c t r i c a l l y . so t h a t local people c8n vslk back and fo r th Over t h e area. f r iendly troops are properly posi t ioned, t h e enemy detonates t h e grenade. Long lead wires allow t h e person detonating t h e device

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Thus, they can be control led When

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t o be well clear of the area. Grenades are sometimes buried i n groups, producing t h e s w e e f fec t as conventional antipersonnel mines.

B . Baabytraps. Ranging from a simple hole in the ground t o a com- pl ica ted devicc, t h e boobytrap i s an e f fec t ive w a y for t h e enmy t o cause cssua l t i e s and harass, delay, and confuse f r iendly forces a t l i t t l e $bSt t o t hmse lvee . The var i e ty of these weapons is l imi ted only by the imw- ina t ion of t h e designer. The sene t r i c k s t h e enemy uses t o lure victims i n t o ambush sites are used t o lure them in to boobytrapped areas.

1. Erplosive boobytraps are mployed in all phases of enemy operations frrm combat t o sabotwe. as mines using t h e e w e types of f i r i n g devices and fuzes. boobytraps are frequently used i n conJ4nction with mines a t ambush sites. The enmy employs Cmde,but e f f ec t ive t r i p wire devices alone trails a d paths, which release arrows. bamboo whips, and o ther suinginq, barbed, and club-type objects. Muddy trails m d heavy w e e t a t i o n can provide a l l t h e camouflage necessary for spike t r s p s and punji p i t s . is extremely good at disguisinR h i s t r aps . A f avor i t e enemy t a c t i c i s t o mine and boobytrap Upon returning t o these areas, friendly personnel are often caught u m w a r e by these new t r aps .

They ere f i r e d i n the same manner Non-explosive

The enmy

breas which f r i end ly elements have recent ly occupied

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2. In conducting past searches of VC villagea, base camps. and supply caches. boobytraps have often been located in the Iolloving places:

a. In or near gate* or entrances.

b. Anywhere normal work doe8 not take place (next to t r a i l s , I

I C . A t entrencea to conceded tunnels.

i n graveyards, near shrines, etc.).

d. In rubbish.

e. On propaganda boards and flags displayed in conspicuous loCati0"ns.

I.

g.

h. Uear wells.

l l c v animd pens and other cnclosu~es.

Mder dung piles and dead foliage.

3 . me enmy has also rigged weapons, UniIOmS, dead bodies. binoculam, end maqy other obJects with sxploalvve boobytraps.

C. memy Markin6 Of DanKer Areas. VC/IwA un i t s have found it neces- sary t o follow ce r t a in procedures i n markiw mined and boobytrapped areas. As y e t , no standard pa t te rn f o r markinr: these areas appears t o e x i s t ; d i f - f e r en t enemy u n i t s s e w t o have t h e i r o m techniques for markine darqer areas. The only apparent doctrine on marking mines and boobytraps i s t h a t a VC o r NVA uni t must know t h e loca t ion of mines and boobytraps within its own opera t iona l srea. Also, it must coordinate with 1 0 c d forces fo r guidance on mine and boobytrap locations when Operating i n unfamiliar areas.

D. I l l u s t r a t e d Exmoles of Mine and Boobytrap Markings. The i l l u e - t r a t i o n s contained in t h e following pegea are examples of marking of mines and boobytraps which have been discovered by f r i end ly elements. It Should be renwbered t h a t a l l markers are subJect t o being d isor ien ted by t h e e f f ec t s of rain, wind, and animbl and human movement th rowh an area. Small un i t l eaders Should insure t h a t t h e i r personnel w e thoroughly f m i - lisr with mine and boobytrap markinga. t i ons should be an t ic ipa ted a t d1 times during movement d o n g trails through jungle t e r r a i n . and all persoonel should be encouraged t o repor t any new mine and booby- t r a p markers or ind ica tors which are discovered. t h e reduction of f r i end ly mine and boobytrap casua l t ies .

Those presented i n t h e i l l u n t r a -

Many m7-e types of markers are suspected t o e x i s t ,

Doing t h i s W i l l a i d in

26

~g - . I.

- 1. Siqn "arkem.

Restricted Area Kill Zone Please Don't Go Keep Away

piGi7-1 pGiGz-1 Area i s Boobytrapped Boobytrapped Area or Zone

Various handwritten signs have been encountered warning a11 persons entering Bn area that a dawer exists i f they pass the sign. The danger area is usually 50 t o 200 meters beyond the Signs. These sidns are normally placed in enemy rear areas and are scheduled for rwoval i n the event friendly troops conduct operations i n the area.

--

2. Parallel S t i c k s Parker.

Short a t i e k s or lengths Of bamboo l a i d p a r a l l e l t o a t r a i l reportedly means t h a t t h e t r a i l i s f ree O f mines or boobytraps in I CTZ.

28

..r

3. Rock Markers on Trails.

Various rgrmations of wall mcks have been reportedly placed on t ra i l s t o serve as L varning Of mines and boobytraps ahead. These rock for- mations hevc been placed i n elrcular, pyramid, &!Id straight line patterns.

29

The VC break the top from 6 s m a l l snplinn an4 s t r i p P I ? / ~f ,: e branches frm it. Usually a mine o r boobytrap has been found 50 to 1 Y #e'.i.r: i w n t h e trail.

One branch is left on the sbplin8 snlj it r, T'.; , ~ . ~ , l , t h e trail

30

5 . Grass Marker.

I I

---- Crowinv grass is sometimes tied i n four sheeves. The sheaves farm a square w i t h sides measuring approximately t w o meters. buried or concealed i n t h e center of the square.

The mine is

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6. Red "X" Marker.

Red "X" siRns are placed &low t r a i l s leadin@ to mined &reas. siw indicates a prohibited arc& and personnel should proceed with caution 07 bv-pass t h e area. and GVN-controlled areas.

This

These s igns have been found i n both VC

32

A s t i c k or length of bsmboo broken at a ri,r,ht angle and lying across a t ra i l ha8 been used to warn of a mine 01 bwbytrap 2W to b00 metera ahead.

33

8. Stakes and Leaves Marker.

-.

These two warning signs have been reportedly used i n the sene area. One marker consists of two l a r ~ e leaves placed parallel t o each other on top of the mine or boobytrap. The Second marker consists of two short s t icks or stakes placed on the t r a i l in front of and t o the rear of the mine or boobytrap. These devices have been Used individually and in conJunction with each other.

14

9. Emboo Ma

1 This marker cons is ts O f a small piece of bamboo s ix t o eight inches long and a I m p j o i n t of bamboo which i s carved t o fit over one end of the bam- boo stick. The bamboo s t i c k is stuck i n t o the qround a t shout a b5O angle v i t h the large end of t h e device p o i n t i w toward a mine or boobytrap.

35

10. Bamboo Tripod Marker,

The bmbm tripod marker consists ot three pieces of bamboo approxhately 18 inches long, t i e d together at one end and set up in a cone shage. or another material is napped around the device near the bottm of the three legs 80 that the device will retain i t 8 cone shape. placed over boobytraps, mines, snd Wngi p i t s .

W i r e

This device i s

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VI. concLusron.

A. VClNVA Jungle t w t i c e call for repeated use of ambushes, mines, (Iod boobytraps. enemy is n master of cesourlwe and glans M ambush with p e a t a k i l l . practices deception in all forms. He may lure you i n to a village o r Chick Juwle by bai t ing you with a fer men. when your i n i t i a l ea t ina t e is light contact with B squsd attempting t o escape. the tendency i s t o pursue vig- orously. Then, when the enemy has you positioned in the t r a p , he springs it. spring it, he is almost on top of you.

They m e used both separately end i n cmbinat iom. The Be

We h o l h his fire until you BTC well into the trap,aad vhca he docs

B. J w l e warfare requires a reorientation from conventional t a c t i c s . A new approach t o t a c t i c s and operations must be developed with greater emphasis On small W i t t ac t i c s . Individual s k i l l s and t a c t i c s must be m.phasized in order t o allow mall unit leaders t o respond vI th the ut- most f l e x i b i l i t y t o t h e perplexi t ies and complications which a m char- a c t e r i s t i c of Jungle warfare. Getting t o know t h e enemy b e t t e r is the f l r a t s tep in solving +he problem.