01.17.2013 - Garance Genicot

Suicide and Property Rights in India

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson

IFPRI

January 17,20132

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 1 / 49

Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.

Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves theirbargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.

→ frequent justification for policies targeting women.

In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options→ affects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 2 / 49

Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.

Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves theirbargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.

→ frequent justification for policies targeting women.

In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options→ affects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 2 / 49

Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.

Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves theirbargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.

→ frequent justification for policies targeting women.

In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options→ affects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 2 / 49

Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.

Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves theirbargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.

→ frequent justification for policies targeting women.

In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options→ affects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 2 / 49

Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.

Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves theirbargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.

→ frequent justification for policies targeting women.

In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options→ affects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 2 / 49

Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.

Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves theirbargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.

→ frequent justification for policies targeting women.

In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options→ affects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 2 / 49

However, female empowerment can increase intra-household conflict

by challenging traditional roles & more need for negotiation.

Large sociological literature on female empowerment and suicides:

Durkheim (1897)

Stack (1986) - US labor participation

Pampel (1998) - cross country

Das Gupta et al (2000) - China marriage law (1950)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 3 / 49

However, female empowerment can increase intra-household conflict

by challenging traditional roles & more need for negotiation.

Large sociological literature on female empowerment and suicides:

Durkheim (1897)

Stack (1986) - US labor participation

Pampel (1998) - cross country

Das Gupta et al (2000) - China marriage law (1950)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 3 / 49

However, female empowerment can increase intra-household conflict

by challenging traditional roles & more need for negotiation.

Large sociological literature on female empowerment and suicides:

Durkheim (1897)

Stack (1986) - US labor participation

Pampel (1998) - cross country

Das Gupta et al (2000) - China marriage law (1950)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 3 / 49

Conflicting information on domestic violence and women’sempowerment

Panda and Agarwal (2005) - India: lower violence for women withgreater economic resources, such as land or employment.

Eswaran and Malhorta (2010) - India: employed women report violencemore frequently.

Bobonis et al. (2006)- Progresa: less physical but more emotionalabuse for recipient households, and more likely to separate.

Luke and Munshi (2011) - Indian tea plantation: violence increaseswith female income.

Hjort and Villanger (2012) – Ethiopia, randomized job offers, 13 % (34%) increase in physical ( emotional ) violence when women get job.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 4 / 49

This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male andfemale suicide rates in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act &

state reforms to agricultural land rights.

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 5 / 49

This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male andfemale suicide rates in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act

&

state reforms to agricultural land rights.

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 5 / 49

This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male andfemale suicide rates in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act &

state reforms to agricultural land rights.

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 5 / 49

This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male andfemale suicide rates in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act &

state reforms to agricultural land rights.

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 5 / 49

This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male andfemale suicide rates in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act &

state reforms to agricultural land rights.

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 5 / 49

These changes have been shown to matter:

Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’slikelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.

Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investmentof women in NFHS data.

Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.

Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause ofsuicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conflict as an explanation.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 6 / 49

These changes have been shown to matter:

Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’slikelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.

Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investmentof women in NFHS data.

Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.

Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause ofsuicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conflict as an explanation.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 6 / 49

These changes have been shown to matter:

Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’slikelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.

Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investmentof women in NFHS data.

Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.

Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause ofsuicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conflict as an explanation.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 6 / 49

These changes have been shown to matter:

Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’slikelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.

Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investmentof women in NFHS data.

Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.

Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause ofsuicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conflict as an explanation.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 6 / 49

These changes have been shown to matter:

Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’slikelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.

Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investmentof women in NFHS data.

Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.

Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause ofsuicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conflict as an explanation.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 6 / 49

These changes have been shown to matter:

Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’slikelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.

Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investmentof women in NFHS data.

Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.

Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause ofsuicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conflict as an explanation.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 6 / 49

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conflict is anintrinsic part of bargaining

Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat ofseparation/’separate spheres’.

add 2 crucial elements:

asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)

rejecting offer initiates conflict.

At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 7 / 49

Not to say that promoting women’s rights is bad:

Deiniger et al (2010), Roy (2010), Rosenblum (2010).

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 8 / 49

Outline of the Talk.

Inheritance Law

Suicides

Estimation

Results

Model

Other possible explanations

Conclusion

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 9 / 49

India Inheritance Law

Hindu Succession Act 1956 governs Hindus property rights

applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists & Jains.

applies to all states but J&K

In the absence of will, ’separate’ property is divided equally between sonsand daughters.

But it does NOT apply to:

property stemming from tenancy right

joint property:

sons are automatic coparceners in joint family propertydaughter have rights only to father’s separate property

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 10 / 49

India Inheritance Law

Hindu Succession Act 1956 governs Hindus property rights

applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists & Jains.

applies to all states but J&K

In the absence of will, ’separate’ property is divided equally between sonsand daughters.

But it does NOT apply to:

property stemming from tenancy right

joint property:

sons are automatic coparceners in joint family propertydaughter have rights only to father’s separate property

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 10 / 49

India Inheritance Law

Hindu Succession Act 1956 governs Hindus property rights

applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists & Jains.

applies to all states but J&K

In the absence of will, ’separate’ property is divided equally between sonsand daughters.

But it does NOT apply to:

property stemming from tenancy right

joint property:

sons are automatic coparceners in joint family propertydaughter have rights only to father’s separate property

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 10 / 49

India Inheritance Law

Hindu Succession Act 1956 governs Hindus property rights

applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists & Jains.

applies to all states but J&K

In the absence of will, ’separate’ property is divided equally between sonsand daughters.

But it does NOT apply to:

property stemming from tenancy right

joint property:

sons are automatic coparceners in joint family propertydaughter have rights only to father’s separate property

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 10 / 49

India Inheritance Law

Hindu Succession Act 1956 governs Hindus property rights

applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists & Jains.

applies to all states but J&K

In the absence of will, ’separate’ property is divided equally between sonsand daughters.

But it does NOT apply to:

property stemming from tenancy right

joint property:

sons are automatic coparceners in joint family propertydaughter have rights only to father’s separate property

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 10 / 49

An Example

  Father 1/3

Daughter Son 1 1/3 

Son 2 1/3

  Father deceased

Daughter 1/3 * 1/3 = 1/9 

Son 1 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

Son 2 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 11 / 49

An Example

  Father 1/3

Daughter Son 1 1/3 

Son 2 1/3

  Father deceased

Daughter 1/3 * 1/3 = 1/9 

Son 1 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

Son 2 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 11 / 49

Amendments

Some state amendments for equal inheritance of joint property.

Kerela in 1975;

Andhra Pradesh in 1986;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005:

brings all agricultural land on par with other property;

includes all daughters, especially married daughters, as coparceners injoint family property.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 12 / 49

Amendments

Some state amendments for equal inheritance of joint property.

Kerela in 1975;

Andhra Pradesh in 1986;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005:

brings all agricultural land on par with other property;

includes all daughters, especially married daughters, as coparceners injoint family property.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 12 / 49

Amendments

Some state amendments for equal inheritance of joint property.

Kerela in 1975;

Andhra Pradesh in 1986;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005:

brings all agricultural land on par with other property;

includes all daughters, especially married daughters, as coparceners injoint family property.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 12 / 49

Amendments

Some state amendments for equal inheritance of joint property.

Kerela in 1975;

Andhra Pradesh in 1986;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005:

brings all agricultural land on par with other property;

includes all daughters, especially married daughters, as coparceners injoint family property.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 12 / 49

Amendments

Some state amendments for equal inheritance of joint property.

Kerela in 1975;

Andhra Pradesh in 1986;

Tamil Nadu in 1989;

Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005:

brings all agricultural land on par with other property;

includes all daughters, especially married daughters, as coparceners injoint family property.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 12 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Suicides in IndiaOfficial data from the National Crime Records Bureau

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married

main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44

(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).

Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lowersocio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 13 / 49

Annual Suicide Rates by State.0

5.1

.15

.2.2

5A

P

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

0.0

5.1

.15

.2A

S

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

0.0

2.0

4.0

6B

I

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

.04.

06.0

8.1

.12

GU

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

0.0

5.1

.15

HA

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

.1.1

5.2

.25

.3K

A

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

KE

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

0.0

5.1

.15

MP

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

.05

.1.1

5.2

MA

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

.05

.1.1

5O

R

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

0.0

5.1

PU

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

0.0

2.04

.06.

08R

A

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

.05

.1.1

5.2

.25

TN

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

.02.

04.0

6.08

.1U

P

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

.1.1

2.14.1

6.18.

2W

B

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

Suicides Rates

female male

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 14 / 49

Variable Mean Std devFemale Suicide Rate 0.07 0.048Male Suicide Rates 0.104 0.085Amendment 0.163 0.369Legal Hindus, pop share 0.827 0.154Muslims, pop share 0.152 0.173Schedule Tribes, pop share 0.074 0.074Schedule Castes, pop share 0.151 0.058Real State Domestic Product pc (log) 7.144 0.456Rural food product p.c. 0.307 0.273Yield 30.283 17.982Food Shock 0.261 0.439Flood 0.118 0.323Drought 0.113 0.317Rainfall 335.826 256.696Health Expenditure, rel to State income 0.012 0.005Development Expenditure, rel to State income 0.109 0.041Education Expenditure, rel to State income 0.035 0.012Bank per capita 0.057 0.027Urban Population Share 0.234 0.083Seats won by State Parties 0.114 0.232Seats won by Congress 0.418 0.259Seats won by Hard Left 0.085 0.15Seats won by Soft Left 0.02 0.049

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 15 / 49

Estimation

OLS

S ist = β0 + β1Xst + β2Ast + λs + γt + εst (1)

where

S ist is the suicide rate of females (i = F ) or males (i = M)

Ast = 1 if state s, in year t, has already passed an Amendment Act.

λs and γt are state and year fixed effects.

Xst are cultural and economic controls.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 16 / 49

Table 1 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - OLS

Variable Female Female FemaleAmendment 0.03 (0.003)*** 0.02 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.003)

Cultur Ctrls NO YES YESEcon Ctrls NO NO YES

Observations 603 569 489

R2

0.91 0.92 0.94

Variable Male Male MaleAmendment 0.06 (0.007)*** 0.05 (0.007)*** 0.03 (0.007)***

Cultur Ctrls NO YES YESEcon Ctrls NO NO YES

Observations 603 569 489

R2

0.89 0.89 0.92

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 17 / 49

Table 2 - Relative Suicide Rate and Female Inheritance - OLSVariable Female-Male Female-Male Female-Male

Amendment -0.03 (0.004)*** -0.03 (0.005)*** -0.02 (0.005)***

Cultural Controls NO YES YESEconomic Controls NO NO YES

Observations 603 569 489

R2

0.85 0.85 0.88

Variable Female/Male Female/Male Female/MaleAmendment -0.09 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.05 (0.02)***

Cultural Controls NO YES YESEconomic Controls NO NO YES

Observations 603 569 489

R2

0.54 0.56 0.64

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 18 / 49

Suicide Rates with Years of Amendment- OLS Estimations

Variable Female Male Female-Male Female/Male

Years of Amend. 0.002 (0.0002)*** 0.006 (0.0005)*** -0.005 (0.0003)*** -0.006 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls YES YES YES YES

Economic Controls YES YES YES YES

Observations 531 531 531 531

R2

0.94 0.93 0.91 0.62

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 19 / 49

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Exclude Bihar, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

Add state specific time trends.

Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greateror equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.

Cluster standard errors by state.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 20 / 49

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Exclude Bihar, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

Add state specific time trends.

Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greateror equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.

Cluster standard errors by state.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 20 / 49

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Exclude Bihar, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

Add state specific time trends.

Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greateror equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.

Cluster standard errors by state.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 20 / 49

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Exclude Bihar, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

Add state specific time trends.

Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greateror equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.

Cluster standard errors by state.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 20 / 49

Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Exclude Bihar, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

Add state specific time trends.

Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greateror equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.

Cluster standard errors by state.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 20 / 49

Table 3 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - Placebo

Variable Female Suicide Male Suicide Ratio

Amendment 0.01 (0.003)** 0.03 (0.008)*** -0.07 (0.02)***

Amendment -10 years 0.004 (0.003) -0.006 (0.006) -0.02 (0.03)

Cultural Controls YES YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES YES

Observations 520 520 520

R2

0.94 0.92 0.64

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 21 / 49

Estimation

S ist = α0+α1Xst+α1Lst+α1FLs∗Lst+α1Tst+α1FTs∗Tst+δs+θt+εst (2)

Lst - cumulative state-level landholding reforms, Besley & Burgess 00

FLs - degree to which landholding reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FLs = 0 no daughter recognized; FLs = 1 only married daughtersrecognized; FLs = 2 all daughters recognized.

Tst - cumulative state-level tenancy reforms, BB 00,

FTs - degree to which tenancy reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FTs = 0 only male heirs; FTs = 1 daughters and sisters are recognized butvery low; FTs = 2 personal law applies.

δs & θt are state and year fixed effects.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 22 / 49

Estimation

S ist = α0+α1Xst+α1Lst+α1FLs∗Lst+α1Tst+α1FTs∗Tst+δs+θt+εst (2)

Lst - cumulative state-level landholding reforms, Besley & Burgess 00

FLs - degree to which landholding reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FLs = 0 no daughter recognized; FLs = 1 only married daughtersrecognized; FLs = 2 all daughters recognized.

Tst - cumulative state-level tenancy reforms, BB 00,

FTs - degree to which tenancy reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FTs = 0 only male heirs; FTs = 1 daughters and sisters are recognized butvery low; FTs = 2 personal law applies.

δs & θt are state and year fixed effects.Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 22 / 49

Table 4 - Suicides and Land Reforms - OLSVariable Female Female Female

Landholding Acts -0.07 (0.008)*** -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.07 (0.01)***Tenancy Acts -0.01 (0.005)*** -0.009 (0.005)** -0.01 (0.004)***Female*Landhld Acts 0.03 (0.004)*** 0.03 (0.005)*** 0.03 (0.005)***Female*Tenancy Acts 0.007 (0.003)*** 0.005 (0.003)** 0.006 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls NO YES NOEconomic Controls NO NO YES

R2

0.90 0.90 0.93

Variable Male Male MaleLandholding Acts -0.15 (0.02)*** -0.15 (0.02)*** -0.11 (0.02)***Tenancy Acts -0.03 (0.007)*** -0.03 (0.009)*** -0.02 (0.008)***Female*Landhld Acts 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)***Female*Tenancy Acts 0.02 (0.004)*** 0.02 (0.005)*** 0.01 (0.005)***

Cultural Controls NO YES YESEconomic Controls NO NO YESObservations 360 354 306

R2

0.91 0.92 0.94Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 23 / 49

Table 5 - Relative Suicide Rate and Female Reforms - OLS

Variable Female-Male Female-Male Female-Male

Landholding Acts 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.02)***Tenancy Acts 0.01 (0.005)*** 0.02 (0.006)*** 0.01 (0.006)**Female*Land Acts -0.03 (0.008)*** -0.04 (0.008)*** -0.02 (0.008)***Female*Ten Acts -0.009 (0.003)*** -0.01 (0.003)*** -0.008 (0.003)***

Variable Female/Male Female/Male Female/MaleLandholding Acts 0.19 (0.05)*** 0.36 (0.08)*** 0.14 (0.09)Tenancy Acts 0.20 (0.07)*** 0.22 (0.07)*** 0.13 (0.06)**Female*Landhold. Acts -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.07 (0.04)*Female*Tenancy Acts -0.09 (0.04)*** -0.09 (0.04)*** -0.06 (0.03)*

Cultural Controls NO YES YESEconomic Controls NO NO YES

Observations 472 466 403

R2

0.88 0.88 0.92

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 24 / 49

Estimation

Unobservables could determine both suicides and property legislation.

→ Follow BB (2000) & instrument for these legislations using lagged seatshares

Ast = γ0 + γ1Xst + γ2Zst−1 + ϕs + ψt + ηst

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 25 / 49

Estimation

Unobservables could determine both suicides and property legislation.

→ Follow BB (2000) & instrument for these legislations using lagged seatshares

Ast = γ0 + γ1Xst + γ2Zst−1 + ϕs + ψt + ηst

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 25 / 49

Estimation

Unobservables could determine both suicides and property legislation.

→ Follow BB (2000) & instrument for these legislations using lagged seatshares

Ast = γ0 + γ1Xst + γ2Zst−1 + ϕs + ψt + ηst

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 25 / 49

Table 6 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - IV-2SLS

VarsFirst-Stage

AmendmentFemaleSuicides

MaleSuicides

Female/MaleSuicides

Amend. 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** -0.45 (0.13)***

Hard Left -0.12 (0.17)Soft Left -0.67 (0.16)***State Part 0.33 (0.12)***Congress 0.13 (0.07)**

Cult Ctls YES YES YES YESEcon Ctls YES YES YES YES

F-stat 9.76

Obs. 486 485 485 485

R2

0.68 0.91 0.89 0.62

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 26 / 49

Estimation

For land and tenancy reforms, need to instrument both cumulativeindexes of reforms: Lst , and Tst and interaction with female orientedpolicy indices, FLs ∗ Lst and FTs ∗ Tst .

→ following Angrist and Pischke (2009), first estimate :

Lst = δ0 + δ1Xst + δ2Zst−1 + πs + σt + µst

then use predicted values, Lst & interaction with female policy index,FLs ∗ Lst as instruments in 2 first-stage estimations of Lst & FLs ∗ Lst in2SLS procedure:

Lst = λ0 + λ1Xst + λ2Lst + λ3FLs ∗ Lst + τs + χt + ιst

FLs ∗ Lst = ρ0 + ρ1Xst + ρ2Lst + ρ3FLs ∗ Lst + ωs + δt + ζst

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 27 / 49

Estimation

For land and tenancy reforms, need to instrument both cumulativeindexes of reforms: Lst , and Tst and interaction with female orientedpolicy indices, FLs ∗ Lst and FTs ∗ Tst .

→ following Angrist and Pischke (2009), first estimate :

Lst = δ0 + δ1Xst + δ2Zst−1 + πs + σt + µst

then use predicted values, Lst & interaction with female policy index,FLs ∗ Lst as instruments in 2 first-stage estimations of Lst & FLs ∗ Lst in2SLS procedure:

Lst = λ0 + λ1Xst + λ2Lst + λ3FLs ∗ Lst + τs + χt + ιst

FLs ∗ Lst = ρ0 + ρ1Xst + ρ2Lst + ρ3FLs ∗ Lst + ωs + δt + ζst

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 27 / 49

Table 7 - Suicides and Female Landholding Acts - IV-2SLS

VariableFirst-Stage

LandholdingFirst-Stage

LandholdingFirst-Stage

Female*LandholdingHard Left 3.20 (0.65)***Soft Left -3.03 (0.50)***State Parties -0.87 (0.18)**Congress -0.17 (0.11)

Landholding -0.58 (0.18)*** -0.86 (0.45)**

Female* Landholding 0.53 (0.07)*** 0.95 (0.17)***

Cult Ctls YES YES YESEcon Ctls YES YES YES

F-stat on Instr 30.25 45.7 23.4

Observations 441 441 380

R2

0.92 0.94 0.92

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 28 / 49

Table 8 - Suicides and Female Landholding Acts - IV-2SLS

VariableFemaleSuicides

MaleSuicides

Female/MaleSuicides

Landholding Acts -0.07 (0.04)* -0.19 (0.07)*** 0.72 (0.45)Female*Landholding Acts 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** -0.27 (0.18)

Cult Ctls YES YES YESEcon Ctls YES YES YES

Observations 380 380 380

R2

0.91 0.91 0.88

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 29 / 49

Table 9 - Suicides and Female Tenancy Acts- IV-2SLS Estimations

VariableFirst-Stage

TenancyFirst-Stage

TenancyFirst-Stage

Female*TenancyHard Left 5.35 (0.97)***Soft Left 1.60 (2.05)State Parties -0.21 (0.24)

Tenancy 1.82 (0.33)*** 2.76 (0.71)***

Female* Tenancy -0.45 (0.14)*** -0.43 (0.31)

Cultural Controls YES YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES YES

F-stat on Instruments 10.8 17.8 13.6

Observations 333 310 310

R2

0.91 0.92 0.91

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 30 / 49

Table 10 - Suicides and Female Tenancy Acts - IV-2SLS

Variable Female Suicides Male SuicidesFemale-Male

SuicidesTenancy Acts -0.02 (0.008)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.008)***Female*Tenancy Acts 0.01 (0.005)** 0.02 (0.008)*** -0.01 (0.005)**

Cult Ctls YES YES YESEcon Ctls YES YES YES

Observations 310 310 310

R2

0.93 0.93 0.92

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 31 / 49

Due to Conflict?

We can use the suicide rate by ”cause”.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 32 / 49

Table 11 - Suicide Rates from Family Conflict and Female Inheritance- OLSEstimations

Variable Female MaleAmendment 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES

Obs. 439 439

R2

0.86 0.85

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 33 / 49

Table 12 - Proportion of Total Suicides from Family Conflict and FemaleInheritance- OLS Estimations

VariableFemale

(All Suicides)Male

(All Suicides)Amendment 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)***

Cultural Controls YES YESEconomic Controls YES YES

Observations 438 438

R2

0.58 0.61

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 34 / 49

Domestic Violence

National Family Health Surveys of India: married women aged 15-49.

Two measures:Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) thinks that wife

beating (by her husband) is justified under any of a number ofcircumstances (mean around 0.5)

Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) has been beaten byher husband (mean around 0.25)

estimateYis = ψ0 + ψ1Xis + ψ2Ais + αs + εis (3)

where Xis include: education, age, occupation of wives & husbands; caste& religion of wives; rural/urban; and hhd durable good ownership.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 35 / 49

Domestic Violence

National Family Health Surveys of India: married women aged 15-49.

Two measures:Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) thinks that wife

beating (by her husband) is justified under any of a number ofcircumstances (mean around 0.5)

Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) has been beaten byher husband (mean around 0.25)

estimateYis = ψ0 + ψ1Xis + ψ2Ais + αs + εis (3)

where Xis include: education, age, occupation of wives & husbands; caste& religion of wives; rural/urban; and hhd durable good ownership.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 35 / 49

Domestic Violence

National Family Health Surveys of India: married women aged 15-49.

Two measures:Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) thinks that wife

beating (by her husband) is justified under any of a number ofcircumstances (mean around 0.5)

Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) has been beaten byher husband (mean around 0.25)

estimateYis = ψ0 + ψ1Xis + ψ2Ais + αs + εis (3)

where Xis include: education, age, occupation of wives & husbands; caste& religion of wives; rural/urban; and hhd durable good ownership.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 35 / 49

Domestic Violence

National Family Health Surveys of India: married women aged 15-49.

Two measures:Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) thinks that wife

beating (by her husband) is justified under any of a number ofcircumstances (mean around 0.5)

Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) has been beaten byher husband (mean around 0.25)

estimateYis = ψ0 + ψ1Xis + ψ2Ais + αs + εis (3)

where Xis include: education, age, occupation of wives & husbands; caste& religion of wives; rural/urban; and hhd durable good ownership.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 35 / 49

Table 13 - Domestic Violence and Female Inheritance (1998 NFHS-2) - ProbitEstimations

VariableWife Beating

JustifiedWife

BeatenYears Amendment 0.01 (0.003)*** 0.03 (0.005)**

Individual Controls YES YESHousehold Controls YES YES

Clustering at State Level YES YES

Observations 70673 70673

R2

0.12 0.07

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 36 / 49

Table 14 - Domestic Violence and Female Inheritance (2005 NFHS-3) - ProbitEstimations

VariableWife Beating

JustifiedWife

BeatenYears Amendment 0.008 (0.005)* 0.03 (0.004)**

Individual Controls YES YESHousehold Controls YES YES

Clustering at State Level YES YES

Observations 47095 47095

R2

0.09 0.07

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 37 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Model of Intra-household bargaining.

Surplus generated under cooperation.

Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.

Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.

→ bargaining failure occurs

Rejecting offers initiate conflict.

conflict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 38 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Consistent with the main views in psychology on suicide: Leenars(1996), Schneidman (1985).

suicide often linked to events involving loss or conflict in existinginterpersonal relationships.

it is not just the stress or pain but the inability to cope

unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wantsa way out

cognitive constriction (ie, rigidity in thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnelvision, etc.) is common.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 39 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Consistent with the main views in psychology on suicide: Leenars(1996), Schneidman (1985).

suicide often linked to events involving loss or conflict in existinginterpersonal relationships.

it is not just the stress or pain but the inability to cope

unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wantsa way out

cognitive constriction (ie, rigidity in thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnelvision, etc.) is common.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 39 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Consistent with the main views in psychology on suicide: Leenars(1996), Schneidman (1985).

suicide often linked to events involving loss or conflict in existinginterpersonal relationships.

it is not just the stress or pain but the inability to cope

unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wantsa way out

cognitive constriction (ie, rigidity in thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnelvision, etc.) is common.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 39 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Consistent with the main views in psychology on suicide: Leenars(1996), Schneidman (1985).

suicide often linked to events involving loss or conflict in existinginterpersonal relationships.

it is not just the stress or pain but the inability to cope

unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wantsa way out

cognitive constriction (ie, rigidity in thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnelvision, etc.) is common.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 39 / 49

Main Elements of the Model

Consistent with the main views in psychology on suicide: Leenars(1996), Schneidman (1985).

suicide often linked to events involving loss or conflict in existinginterpersonal relationships.

it is not just the stress or pain but the inability to cope

unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wantsa way out

cognitive constriction (ie, rigidity in thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnelvision, etc.) is common.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 39 / 49

PreferencesPreferences depend on the status of the marriage.

If the marriage is intact

V h(Ih + Iw , x , θh) & V w (Ih + Iw , x , θw )

Ij for j ∈ {h,w} represent the resources of the husband & wife

x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within thehousehold.

θj for j ∈ {h,w} are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfactionwith the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

Uh(Ih) & Uw (Iw ).

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 40 / 49

PreferencesPreferences depend on the status of the marriage.

If the marriage is intact

V h(Ih + Iw , x , θh) & V w (Ih + Iw , x , θw )

Ij for j ∈ {h,w} represent the resources of the husband & wife

x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within thehousehold.

θj for j ∈ {h,w} are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfactionwith the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

Uh(Ih) & Uw (Iw ).

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 40 / 49

PreferencesPreferences depend on the status of the marriage.

If the marriage is intact

V h(Ih + Iw , x , θh) & V w (Ih + Iw , x , θw )

Ij for j ∈ {h,w} represent the resources of the husband & wife

x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within thehousehold.

θj for j ∈ {h,w} are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfactionwith the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

Uh(Ih) & Uw (Iw ).

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 40 / 49

PreferencesPreferences depend on the status of the marriage.

If the marriage is intact

V h(Ih + Iw , x , θh) & V w (Ih + Iw , x , θw )

Ij for j ∈ {h,w} represent the resources of the husband & wife

x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within thehousehold.

θj for j ∈ {h,w} are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfactionwith the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

Uh(Ih) & Uw (Iw ).

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 40 / 49

PreferencesPreferences depend on the status of the marriage.

If the marriage is intact

V h(Ih + Iw , x , θh) & V w (Ih + Iw , x , θw )

Ij for j ∈ {h,w} represent the resources of the husband & wife

x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within thehousehold.

θj for j ∈ {h,w} are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfactionwith the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

Uh(Ih) & Uw (Iw ).

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 40 / 49

PreferencesPreferences depend on the status of the marriage.

If the marriage is intact

V h(Ih + Iw , x , θh) & V w (Ih + Iw , x , θw )

Ij for j ∈ {h,w} represent the resources of the husband & wife

x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within thehousehold.

θj for j ∈ {h,w} are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfactionwith the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

Uh(Ih) & Uw (Iw ).

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 40 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Timing

Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.

Husband makes an offer x .

Wife accepts or rejects.

If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .

If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conflict within thehousehold:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .

then they separate and enjoy utilities Uh and Uw .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 41 / 49

Decisions

Assume that an offer has been rejected

Costs of conflict κh and κw are realized

j stays alive if κj ≤ U j(Ij) for j ∈ {w , h}

this assumes that cost of conflict and cost of dealing the spouse’ssuicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j(Ij), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j ’s expected utility if the wife rejects an offer

E j(Ij) ≡ Fj [Uj(Ij)]U j(Ij)−

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 42 / 49

Decisions

Assume that an offer has been rejected

Costs of conflict κh and κw are realized

j stays alive if κj ≤ U j(Ij) for j ∈ {w , h}

this assumes that cost of conflict and cost of dealing the spouse’ssuicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j(Ij), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j ’s expected utility if the wife rejects an offer

E j(Ij) ≡ Fj [Uj(Ij)]U j(Ij)−

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 42 / 49

Decisions

Assume that an offer has been rejected

Costs of conflict κh and κw are realized

j stays alive if κj ≤ U j(Ij) for j ∈ {w , h}

this assumes that cost of conflict and cost of dealing the spouse’ssuicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j(Ij), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j ’s expected utility if the wife rejects an offer

E j(Ij) ≡ Fj [Uj(Ij)]U j(Ij)−

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 42 / 49

Decisions

Assume that an offer has been rejected

Costs of conflict κh and κw are realized

j stays alive if κj ≤ U j(Ij) for j ∈ {w , h}

this assumes that cost of conflict and cost of dealing the spouse’ssuicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j(Ij), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j ’s expected utility if the wife rejects an offer

E j(Ij) ≡ Fj [Uj(Ij)]U j(Ij)−

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 42 / 49

Decisions

Assume that an offer has been rejected

Costs of conflict κh and κw are realized

j stays alive if κj ≤ U j(Ij) for j ∈ {w , h}

this assumes that cost of conflict and cost of dealing the spouse’ssuicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j(Ij), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j ’s expected utility if the wife rejects an offer

E j(Ij) ≡ Fj [Uj(Ij)]U j(Ij)−

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 42 / 49

Decisions

Assume that an offer has been rejected

Costs of conflict κh and κw are realized

j stays alive if κj ≤ U j(Ij) for j ∈ {w , h}

this assumes that cost of conflict and cost of dealing the spouse’ssuicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j(Ij), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j ’s expected utility if the wife rejects an offer

E j(Ij) ≡ Fj [Uj(Ij)]U j(Ij)−

∫ U j (Ij )

0κdFj(κ)

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 42 / 49

Wife accepts offer x if

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

→ Gw [θ(x)] is the probability that an offer x is rejected.

Husband chooses an offer x that maximizes his expected utility[1− Gw [θ(x)]

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

].

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 43 / 49

Wife accepts offer x if

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

→ Gw [θ(x)] is the probability that an offer x is rejected.

Husband chooses an offer x that maximizes his expected utility[1− Gw [θ(x)]

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

].

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 43 / 49

Wife accepts offer x if

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

→ Gw [θ(x)] is the probability that an offer x is rejected.

Husband chooses an offer x that maximizes his expected utility[1− Gw [θ(x)]

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

].

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 43 / 49

Wife accepts offer x if

V w (I , x , θw ) ≥ Ew (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih.

→ threshold θ(x)

→ Gw [θ(x)] is the probability that an offer x is rejected.

Husband chooses an offer x that maximizes his expected utility[1− Gw [θ(x)]

]V h(I , x , θh) + Gw [θ(x)]

[Eh(Ih)

].

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 43 / 49

Pro-women Redistribution

Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in Iw that is exactlycompensated by a decrease in I h.

Suicides rates are the expected probability of conflict times thelikelihood of suicide in case of conflict.

→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-womenredistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.

Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders isambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 44 / 49

Pro-women Redistribution

Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in Iw that is exactlycompensated by a decrease in I h.

Suicides rates are the expected probability of conflict times thelikelihood of suicide in case of conflict.

→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-womenredistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.

Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders isambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 44 / 49

Pro-women Redistribution

Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in Iw that is exactlycompensated by a decrease in I h.

Suicides rates are the expected probability of conflict times thelikelihood of suicide in case of conflict.

→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-womenredistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.

Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders isambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 44 / 49

Pro-women Redistribution

Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in Iw that is exactlycompensated by a decrease in I h.

Suicides rates are the expected probability of conflict times thelikelihood of suicide in case of conflict.

→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-womenredistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.

Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders isambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 44 / 49

Pro-women Redistribution

Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in Iw that is exactlycompensated by a decrease in I h.

Suicides rates are the expected probability of conflict times thelikelihood of suicide in case of conflict.

→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-womenredistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.

Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders isambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 44 / 49

Pro-women Redistribution

Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in Iw that is exactlycompensated by a decrease in I h.

Suicides rates are the expected probability of conflict times thelikelihood of suicide in case of conflict.

→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-womenredistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.

Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders isambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 44 / 49

Example with linear utility

Assume linear utilities

V w (I , x , θw ) = xbI + θw & V h(I , x , θh) = (1− x)bI + θh.

and uniform distribution of θs between 0 and θ.

When wives own nothing they’ll accept anything → husbands offerx = 0 & no conflict.

If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuationsoffer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conflictnecessarily rises over this interval.

As we keep on raising women’s share of wealth, conflict will thendecrease as women and men are becoming more equal.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 45 / 49

Example with linear utility

Assume linear utilities

V w (I , x , θw ) = xbI + θw & V h(I , x , θh) = (1− x)bI + θh.

and uniform distribution of θs between 0 and θ.

When wives own nothing they’ll accept anything → husbands offerx = 0 & no conflict.

If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuationsoffer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conflictnecessarily rises over this interval.

As we keep on raising women’s share of wealth, conflict will thendecrease as women and men are becoming more equal.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 45 / 49

Example with linear utility

Assume linear utilities

V w (I , x , θw ) = xbI + θw & V h(I , x , θh) = (1− x)bI + θh.

and uniform distribution of θs between 0 and θ.

When wives own nothing they’ll accept anything → husbands offerx = 0 & no conflict.

If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuationsoffer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conflictnecessarily rises over this interval.

As we keep on raising women’s share of wealth, conflict will thendecrease as women and men are becoming more equal.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 45 / 49

Example with linear utility

Assume linear utilities

V w (I , x , θw ) = xbI + θw & V h(I , x , θh) = (1− x)bI + θh.

and uniform distribution of θs between 0 and θ.

When wives own nothing they’ll accept anything → husbands offerx = 0 & no conflict.

If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuationsoffer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conflictnecessarily rises over this interval.

As we keep on raising women’s share of wealth, conflict will thendecrease as women and men are becoming more equal.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 45 / 49

Example with linear utility

Assume linear utilities

V w (I , x , θw ) = xbI + θw & V h(I , x , θh) = (1− x)bI + θh.

and uniform distribution of θs between 0 and θ.

When wives own nothing they’ll accept anything → husbands offerx = 0 & no conflict.

If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuationsoffer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conflictnecessarily rises over this interval.

As we keep on raising women’s share of wealth, conflict will thendecrease as women and men are becoming more equal.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 45 / 49

Example with linear utility

Let b = 1.2, θ = 50 and U j(I ) = I for j ∈ {h,w}.

Costs of conflict follow a Pareto distribution (κ = 0.5 and α = 1.1

I = 100

We progressively raise the level of resources owned by the wife Iw from1 to 99.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 46 / 49

Example with linear utility

Let b = 1.2, θ = 50 and U j(I ) = I for j ∈ {h,w}.

Costs of conflict follow a Pareto distribution (κ = 0.5 and α = 1.1

I = 100

We progressively raise the level of resources owned by the wife Iw from1 to 99.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 46 / 49

Example with linear utility

Let b = 1.2, θ = 50 and U j(I ) = I for j ∈ {h,w}.

Costs of conflict follow a Pareto distribution (κ = 0.5 and α = 1.1

I = 100

We progressively raise the level of resources owned by the wife Iw from1 to 99.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 46 / 49

Example with linear utility

Let b = 1.2, θ = 50 and U j(I ) = I for j ∈ {h,w}.

Costs of conflict follow a Pareto distribution (κ = 0.5 and α = 1.1

I = 100

We progressively raise the level of resources owned by the wife Iw from1 to 99.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 46 / 49

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 900

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

Wife Wealth

Probability of Conflict

(a) likelihood of conflict

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 900

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5x 10−3

Wife Wealth

Female Suicide RateMale Suicide Rate

(b) suicide rates

Figure: Effect of Pro-Women Redistribution

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 47 / 49

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 48 / 49

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 48 / 49

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 48 / 49

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 48 / 49

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 48 / 49

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 48 / 49

Other Possible Explanation

Brothers and Sisters

Theoretically similar

Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence

Women pushed to suicides

Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years ofher married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 48 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49

Conclusion

We study the impact of female property rights on male and femalesuicides in India.

State level variation in women’s property right generated by stateAmendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights

Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in thedifference between female and male suicide rates,

but an increase in both male and female suicides.

We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry ofinformation and conflict.

Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio

Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conflict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase ordecrease.

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 49 / 49