Simu jul dec 12-a

A330 SIMULATOR LOFT # 1 JULY-DECEMBER 2012

FLT WX PERFORMANCES

FLIGHT A

A MAD-HAV DIVERT LIS/OPO MAD: 280/12 4500M OVCST 50012/8 1003

LIS: 250/10 5000M OVCST 700 19/17 1017

OPO: VRBL 3 2000M HZ SCT CB 250016/12 1015

PACK REGUL FAULT AT DISPATCHMEL CHECK

NORMAL STARTAND T.O.

SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKEDUE TO ELECRICAL SMOKECONDUCTING TO ELEC EMER CONFIG

DIVERSION TO ENROUTE ALTERNATE?

ILS APPR. OVERWEIGHT LDG.

ZFM 168.0 FUEL 64.7 CGZFM 30%

PACK REGUL FAULT AT DISPATCH MEL CHECK

SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE DUE TO ELECTRICAL SMOKE CONDUCTING TO ELEC

EMER CONFIG

VENT EXTRACT FAULT ON GROUNDAFTER ENG. START. RESET AEVC

DISPATCH WITH ENGINE BLEED AIR 1 U/S

TCAS WITH TCAS VOICE FAULTTCAS WITH TCAS VOICE FAULT

DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE?

ICING CONDITIONS APPROACH

OVERWEIGHT LANDING OVERWEIGHT LDG

FLIGHT B

ENG BLEED 2 LEAK AT CRUISE

AIR DUAL BLEED FAULT

LEMD/LEMD

FL ZFM 150 FUEL32.0ZFM CG 30%

MANUAL FLIGHT TRAINING JULY/DECEMBER 2012

A/P OFF SESSION

ENG FLAMEOUT WITHDAMAGE AFTER V1

IMMEDIATE VMC LDG.FOLLOWING ENG. FAILON T.O.

N-1 GO AROUND ON FINAL

VISUAL TRAFFICPATTERN LDG.

XWIND VISUAL LANDINGS(REPOSITION IN DOWNWINDAFTER LDG.)

XWIND LANDINGS, GRADUALLYUP TO XWIND LIMIT

RWY WET CROSSWIND LANDINGS

REPOSITION IN FLIGHTFORCE FCTL ALTN LAW(IR 1+3 FAULT , PFD’s & ND’S CONFIGURE)

STALL RECOVERYPRACTICEHIGH/MEDIUM/LOWALTITUDES

RAW DATAILS APROACH

ENG FLAMEOUT WITH DAMAGE AFTER V1

INMEDIATE VMC LDG. FOLOWING ENG FAIL ON T.O

XWIND LANDINGS, GRADUALLY UP TO XWIND

STALL RECOVERY PRACTICE HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW

ALTITUDES

A330 JAR-FCL 1240 CHECK JULY-DEC 2012 /CAE MOTOR RR-T772B/GE CF6-80E1

FLT LOAD SHEET & PERFORMANCES

ZFM 150 ZFWCG 30% FUEL 30.0/ 60.0 (FLIGHTS C&D)CONF 2 DRY ZERO WIND TOGA 1--/--/-- CONF 2 DRY ZERO WIND F 1--/--/--

FLIGHT A FLIGHT B FLIGHT C FLIGHT D

MAD-MAD

T.O RWY 36LSID LDG RWY 33L/33R

T.O RVR 125M//LDG RVR 200/125/100

280/12 G25 RA 4000M OVC800MS1/MS5 1022 RWY WET

APU BLEED FAIL

LOW VIS. T.O,125M RVR

ENG FIREEXTING. FIRST AGENT

LOW VIS T.O.

ENG FAIL AT V2

AUTO RELIGHT/ENG RELIGHT INFLIGHT

LOW GO AROUNDACFT. TOUCHES RUNWAY

CAT3 B ILS APP

CAT3A ILS APPAUTOLAND

SIDE STICK FAULT(PITCH FAULT)AT ROTATION-RESTORE-

WING BLEED LEAK

SEVERE ICING CONDITIONS

CARGO SMOKE

VOR DME APPROACH

G/A VISUAL PATTERNTRAFFIC CONDITIONS

SMOKE CONTINUES AFTER LANDINGPAX. EVAC.

ENG. FIRE AT ROTATIONEXTING. FIRST AGENT

MEDIUM TO SEVERE TURBULENCE ILS APPROACH

AIRCRAFT UPSETIN FINAL APPROACH(SEVERE WINDSHEAR)

RUNWAY CHANGE

A/P FAILMANUAL APPROACHAND LANDING

LOV VIS T.O SIDE STICK FAULT (PITCH FAULT) AT

ROTATION

CARGO SMOKE

SMOKE CONTINUES AFTER LANDING. PAX

CAT 3 B ILS APP

FLIGHT TO SLCB DIVERTED FROMSLVRSLCB Wx CALM 9999 OVCST 150010/04 1026

FL 180 , CLEARED TO VAREB PORKIAPPROACH RWY 32 ILS 4 Rwy 32/ DESCENT LIMA VOR DME 3 Rwy 32

ZFM 158 FUEL7.0ZFM CG 30%

ILS 4 Rwy 32

GO AROUND ATDA (9400’)

ENGINE FAILAFTER G/A

PROCEED BACKTO PORKI

VOR DME 3 Rwy 32

GO AROUND AT MDA (9400’)

ENG FAIL AT G/A

VOR DME 3 Rwy 32

LANDING

COCHABAMBA

OVERWEIGHT LANDING

BRIEF INST

Siempre que tengamos que realizar un aterrizaje con un peso superior a nuestra MLM debemos realizar el procedimiento de “OVERWEIGHT LANDING”.

(MLM 182t para GE – 180t para RR).

Dicho procedimiento lo podremos encontrar en el QRH. Apartado ABN/EMER PROC sección MISCELLANEUS página 80.06

La aeronave está certificada para aterrizar en automático hasta el peso máximo al aterrizaje.

(MLM 182t para GE – 180t para RR).

De todas formas se han realizado vuelos de prueba satisfactorios con pesos de hasta 229t. Por lo que está aprobada para realizar aterrizajes automáticos hasta dicho peso.

Configuración FULL es el calaje recomendado para optimizar las performances al aterrizaje. Por lo tanto, siempre y cuando ECAM o algún abnormal no nos indique lo contrario seleccionaremos FULL.

Si vamos a aterrizar con el flap en FULL antes debemos comprobar que nuestro peso esté por debajo del peso máximo para go around con conf. 3.Para ello analizamos la tabla que se encuentra al final de la abnormal procedure.

Esta tabla nos indica el peso máximo que es capaz de soportar un solo motor en caso de go around con conf. 3.En el caso de que nuestro peso sea superior deberemos realizar la aproximación con conf. 3.

En caso de go around con overweight y nuestro calaje sea distinto a Full entonces pasaremos los flaps a 1+F. Veamos unos ejemplosAterrizaje con flap full (ej. Emergencia médica) … flap 3 en pull upAterrizaje con flap 3 (ej. Fallo de motor) ……….. flap 1+F en pull upAterrizaje con flap 2 (ej. Rudder Jam) ……………. flap 1+F en pull up

Se recomienda apagar los packs o alimentarlos con el APU. Esto nos dará una potencia extra a la hora de tener que realizar un “go around”

También se nos recomienda reducir la velocidad a VLS una vez tengamos la toma asegurada, estemos sobre el umbral de pista y aterrizando en manual. En caso de aterrizaje automático mantendremos VLS + 5.Intentaremos una toma lo más suave posible.

Una vez realizada la toma emplearemos la máxima reversa y si es posible no aplicaremos los frenos a tope para poder disfrutar de toda la pista y evitar altas temperaturas de los mismos. Recordamos que podemos esperar una deflación de los neumáticos a temperaturas a partir de 800 grados.

FIN INST

OVERWEIGHT LANDINGInstructores.

Disponemos de información adicional para el overweight landing en el FCTM, apartado Abnormal Operations y en la sección Miscellaneus. Página AO-090 4/5.

VEAMOSLA CON UN POCO MÁS DE DETALLE.

Debemos tener en cuenta que la decisión de realizar JETTISON es cuestión del comandante. Es importante analizar la situación de emergencia, longitud de pista, condición de la aeronave etc.Nuestra función será comprobar que se estudian y analizan las distintas situaciones y que se toma la decisión correcta.

Para pesos muy altos podemos tener problemas para ensuciar el avión, al poder estar la velocidad de green dot por encima de VFE para CONF 1. En este caso seleccionaremos VFE NEXT – 5KT, pero nunca por debajo de VLS, y una vez en esta velocidad seleccionamos CONF 1.Para poder sacar flap 2, es posible que tengamos un “flap relief”

Sabemos que, si ECAM no nos dice lo contrario, la configuración deseada será CONF FULL. Siempre que empleemos esta configuración debemos comprobar la tabla que nos aparece en el QRH. Si nuestro peso está por encima del “maximum weight for go around” debemos emplear CONF 3 para el aterrizaje.

El approach climb gradient que nos ofrece el QRH comparado con el del FCOM puede variar dependiendo del QNH.

Tabla para GO AROUND en CONF 3 que se nos presenta en el QRH.

Tabla para GO AROUND en CONF 3 que se nos presenta en el FCOM.

Los pesos de “Maximum Brake Energy” y de “Maximum Tire Speed”nunca serán limitativos para un overweight.Si la toma es superior a 360 ft/min es obligatorio reportarlo y se deberá realizar una inspeccion de mantenimiento.

Landing distances computation

From normal to overweight landing

Philippe TODINIPerformance Programs Manager

Presented by:

Landing distances computationApril 2007 Page 24

ContentReminder on the different landing

distances

Regulatory landing distances

Operational landing distances

Normal landing distance computation

Overweight landing distance computation

Impact on performance software

distances

Regulatory landing distances• For Airbus FBW aircraft, the Flight

Manual makes a reference to the PEP-FM module for calculation of all low speed performance, including landing distances

• The actual landing distances (ALD) are certified on :

AIRBUSA318/A319/A320/A321AIRCRAFTFLIGHT MANUAL

dry runway state for FAA regulation

dry and contaminated runway states for EASA regulation

• The first type of landing distance is the actual (or unfactored) landing distance

Regulatory landing distances• Furthermore, required landing distances (RLD)

are provided by the PEP-FM module – The RLD is a factored landing distance, based on the

ALD, used for dispatch of the aircraft– The factor depends on the runway state

Wetrunway RLD wet = 1.15 x RLD dry15%

RLD conta = max of (ALD conta x 1.15 or RLD wet)

ALD contaminated

RLD conta15%Contarunway

RLD dry = ALD/ 0.6

ALD dry

Dryrunway

Operational landing distances• The PEP-FM module has the capability to calculate other

landing distances, for operational purposes only :

– Landing distance with Autobrake

– Landing distance with Autoland

• These distances are not subject to approval from the Airworthiness Authorities, but are useful for the pilots

•They are published in the FCOM and the QRH

distances

Normal landing distance computation• The calculation assumptions are based on JAR/FAR

25.125 subpart B

Distance measured between a point 50ft above the runway threshold,

the aircraft being at a calibrated airspeed not lower than VLS,and the point where the aircraft comes to a complete stop

Normal landing distance computation• Conditions of calculation (dry runway):

– Standard temperature (ISA)

– Correction factors on the wind (50% of headwind, 150% of tailwind)

– Non excessive vertical speed (Vz < 480ft/min)

– Level, smooth, hard-surfaced runway

– Brakes application after main gear touchdown

– Most adverse landing CG

– No thrust reversers, but spoilers can be used when they are safe and reliable

distances

Overweight landing distance computation• Reminder : An overweight landing is a landing at a weight

higher than the maximum structural landing weight

• A specific operating procedure is described in the FCOM

• 2 main elements differ from the standard landing procedure

Overweight landing distance computation• These 2 elements have an effect on the landing distance

Brakes application

Vz = 480 ft/min

Vz = 240 ft/min

ΔTbraking (1s)

Nosewheel touchdown

Normal

Overweight

Comparison normal/overweight landing

Normal Overweight

480 ft/minVz 240 ft/min

After main geartouchdown

After nose geartouchdown

Brakes application

Most forward at landing

Most forwardat takeoff

Center of gravity

NoneReversers effect

Available

Procedure

Calculation assumptions

Overweight landing - Results

• 2 types of overweight landing distances can be calculated with PEP-FM

Actual Landing Distance– Same regulatory assumptions as for normal landing– Approved on dry runway only (without thrust reversers effect)

Operational Landing Distance– Not approved, but provides results on wet and contaminated runway

states (with thrust reversers effect if needed)Both can be combined with in-flight failure coefficients

A380-841/842 - landing distance

300000 350000 400000 450000 500000 550000 600000

Aircraft weight [kg]

Normal procedure

Overweight procedure

Overweight landing - Results• Example of calculation (sea level), ALD function of weight

Δ ALD due to the overweight landing procedure

ContentReminder on the different landing distances

Impact on performance software PEP

Impact on performance software - PEP• PEP – FM (Flight Manual) module

– New option “Overweight landing” available in

• Landing distance

• Operational landing distance

New option “Overweight landing” available in

– Point optimization

– Chart optimization

Impact on performance software - PEP• PEP – FM (Flight Manual) module

– New option “Overweight landing” available in

• Landing distance

• Operational landing distance

• PEP – TLO (Takeoff and Landing Optimization) moduleChanges the constraint on the

landing distance :ALD < LDA

(instead of RLD < LDA)

Impact on performance software - OIS• OIS – Landing module

– A landing weight above the MLW triggers the activation of the overweight mode

Conclusion• A new type of calculation is available in Airbus software :

overweight landing distance• It takes into account a longer flare and a delayed braking action,

which leads to longer landing distances

• Certified on dry runway, operational results are available for the

other runway states

• Already available for A380 (in PEP and OIS), will be progressively

extended to the other FBW aircraft (in PEP and LPC)

Proprietary document. By taking delivery of this Presentation (hereafter “Presentation”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following. No other property rights are granted by the delivery of this Presentation than the right to read it, for the sole purpose of information. This Presentation, its content, illustrations and photos shall not be modified nor reproduced without prior written consent of Airbus S.A.S. This Presentation and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed to any third party subject to payment or not. This Presentation may contain market-sensitive or other information that is correct at the time of going to press. This information involves a number of factors which could change over time, affecting the true public representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information contained in this document or with respect to the information described herein. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer or form part of any contract. They are based on Airbus information and are expressed in good faith but no warranty or representation is given as to their accuracy. When additional information is required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to provide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume no liability for any damage in connection with the use of this Presentation and the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. This licence is governed by French law and exclusive jurisdiction is given to the courts and tribunals of Toulouse (France) without prejudice to the right of Airbus to bring proceedings for infringement of copyright or any other intellectual property right in any other court of competent jurisdiction.

Consejos Prácticos

El mayor problema que suelen tener las tripulaciones con el “overweight” es en el momento del pull up.

Están acostumbrados a realizar el overweight con el fallo de motor, y rara vez con, por ejemplo, una incapacitación. Por lo que en general desconocen el sentido de la tabla “GO AROUND IN CONF 3”.El briefing debería estar orientado hacia esto último y realizar ejercicios en el simulador.También suelen olvidarse de seleccionar VLS con la toma asegurada sobre el umbral de pista, así como quitar los packs o alimentarlos con el APU.

SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE

BRIEF INST SIM

Recall on the Smoke Procedure

SMOKE /FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE

“AVIONICS SMOKE” ECAM Alert

Crew (cockpit or cabin) perception without ECAM Alert

Any other SmokeECAM warning

Smoke Procedure Lay out

LAND ASAP•APPLY IMMEDIATELY :

- VENT EXTRACT ......................................................... OVRD

- CAB FANS ……………………………………………… OFF

- GALLEY ....………….................................................... OFF

- SIGNS ...................…………......................…................. ON

- CKPT/CABIN COM …………………….…….. ESTABLISH

- CREW OXY MASKS ………………….. ON/100%/EMERG

• IF SMOKE SOURCE IMMEDIALTELY OBVIOUS ACCESSIBLE AND EXTINGUISHABLE:

- FAULTY EQUIPMENT…………………..……ISOLATE

• IF SMOKE SOURCE NOT IMMEDIALTELY ISOLATED:

-DIVERSION ……………………………………..INITIATE

-DESCENT (FL 100/MEA)……………………….INITIATE

•IF AIR COND SMOKE SUSPECTED :-APU BLEED.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………..OFF

-PACK 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………..……….OFF

-SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL………………………………………………………………………...……………….………CONSIDER

·IF CAB EQUIPMENT SMOKE SUSPECTED :-EMER EXIT LT…………………………….………………………………………………………...………………………………………...….ON

-COMMERCIAL…………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………….OFF

-SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL…………………………………………………..……………………...……………………….CONSIDER

·IF SMOKE SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED AND STILL CONTINUES OR AVNCS:ELECTRICAL SMOKE SUSPECTED:AC BUS 1-1 + 1-2 can be shed as follows :

AC BUS 2-3 + 3-4 can be shed as follows :

TO SET ELEC EMER CONFIG :-EMER ELEC PWR……………………………………………………………………………………...……………………..…………....MAN ON

-WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL :

-ELEC EMER CONFIGAPPLY ECAM PROCEDURE WITHOUT PERFORMING THE GEN RESET.

•At ANY TIME, of the procedure, if SMOKE/FUMES becomes the GREATEST THREAT :

- SMOKE / FUMES REMOVAL ……………..CONSIDER

- ELEC EMER CONFIG…………...………….CONSIDER

•At ANY TIME of the procedure, if situation becomes UNMANAGEABLE:

- IMMEDIATE LANDING…………...………...CONSIDER

SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE

Electrical EmergencyConfiguration

SMOKE SOURCEResearch/Isolation

“AT ANY TIME” items

Immediate actions

Diversion / Descent

Smoke Procedure Lay Out

Electrical Shedding

If unsuccessfull: consider elec emer config

“ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY CONFIGURATION SUMMARY”

Los “SUMMARIES” siempre los realiza el PNF.

Se inician cuando hemos terminado de realizar las ECAM ACTIONS y hemos leído completamente STATUS.

ECAM ACTIONS

COMPLETED

OK. ELEC EMER CONFIG SUMMARY PROCEDURE

PF PNF

Lo primero que necesitamos saber, es la distancia requerida a la toma. Para así poder elegir el aeropuerto alternativo más idóneo.

PF PNF

Por lo tanto el PNF se irá a la parte final del SUMMARY, y desde allí calculará la distancia que necesitamos.

PF PNF

Bien, ya sabemos la distancia requerida y podemos decidir a que aeropuerto proceder. Lo siguiente que necesitamos es saber la

velocidad de aproximación. Para ello el PNF la comprobará en la tabla de la parte de CRUISE del SUMMARY.

PF PNF

Ahora el PF ya tiene todos los datos que necesita para poder preparar la aproximación. Por lo tanto, cede el control al PNF que

en ese momento pasa a ser PF.

PF PNF

Voy a preparar la aproximación. YOU HAVE

CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

I HAVE CONTROLS AND

COMMUNICATIONS

Es en este momento, cuando el PNF le lee la parte de “CRUISE” del SUMMARY al PF. Para recordarle los puntos importantes que se

deben tener en cuenta en crucero.

Una vez el PNF ha terminado de preparar la aproximación, nos dará el briefing. Será como siempre excepto, que nos leerá la parte de

LANDING y GO AROUND del SUMMARY.

Ya está todo claro por lo que el PNF toma los mandos, pasando a ser PF

OK. I HAVE CONTROLS YOU HAVE COMMUNICATIONS

YOU HAVE CONTROLS AND I HAVE COMMUNICATIONS

Iniciamos el descenso como siempre. Al llegar a FL100 pedimos la “APPROACH CHECKLIST” normal. Cuando terminemos de realizar la APPROACH CHECKLIST, el PNF leerá y hará la parte de APPROACH

del SUMMARY.

PF PNF

Durante la aproximación el PNF le recordará al PF que es lo que tendremos a la hora de la toma y que nos ocurre en caso de go

around leyendo la parte correspondiente del SUMMARY.

PF PNF

FIN INST

SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKEINSTRUCTORES

Update on SMOKE procedureReview of enhancements on paper and ECAM procedures

A320 Family – A330/A340 Operational Liaison Meeting 2008

Introduction (1/2) – Main Enhancements

• On Single Aisle aircraft: Removal of electrical shedding– Because in specific conditions, electrical shedding may lead to an

unrecoverable normal electrical configuration for landing

On Long Range aircraft: Enhancement of ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure

With future ECAM, display of a specific procedure taking into account the smoke detection when the flight crew sets the Elec Emer Config following smoke detection in avionic bay:

- no generators reset- restore generators before landing- set generators to off when aircraft is stopped

Introduction (1/2)

• Training is not significantly affected since:– The Smoke paper Procedure template and philosophy remain

unchanged

– Smoke Paper Procedure is not a memory item

4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements

3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA

Contents

5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure

2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure

6 Conclusion

1 Introduction

Contents

6 Conclusion

1 Introduction

Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR)

SMOKE /FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE

“AVIONICS SMOKE” ECAM Alert

Crew (cockpit or cabin) perception without ECAM Alert

Any other SmokeECAM warning

Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR)

LAND ASAP•APPLY IMMEDIATELY :

- VENT EXTRACT ......................................................... OVRD

- CAB FANS ……………………………………………… OFF

- GALLEY ....………….................................................... OFF

- SIGNS ...................…………......................…................. ON

- CKPT/CABIN COM …………………….…….. ESTABLISH

- CREW OXY MASKS ………………….. ON/100%/EMERG

• IF SMOKE SOURCE IMMEDIALTELY OBVIOUS ACCESSIBLE AND EXTINGUISHABLE:

- FAULTY EQUIPMENT…………………..……ISOLATE

• IF SMOKE SOURCE NOT IMMEDIALTELY ISOLATED:

-DIVERSION ……………………………………..INITIATE

-DESCENT (FL 100/MEA)……………………….INITIATE

•IF AIR COND SMOKE SUSPECTED :-APU BLEED.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………..OFF

-PACK 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………..……….OFF

-SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL………………………………………………………………………...……………….………CONSIDER

·IF CAB EQUIPMENT SMOKE SUSPECTED :-EMER EXIT LT…………………………….………………………………………………………...………………………………………...….ON

-COMMERCIAL…………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………….OFF

-SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL…………………………………………………..……………………...……………………….CONSIDER

·IF SMOKE SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED AND STILL CONTINUES OR AVNCS:ELECTRICAL SMOKE SUSPECTED:AC BUS 1-1 + 1-2 can be shed as follows :

AC BUS 2-3 + 3-4 can be shed as follows :

TO SET ELEC EMER CONFIG :-EMER ELEC PWR……………………………………………………………………………………...……………………..…………....MAN ON

-WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL :

-ELEC EMER CONFIGAPPLY ECAM PROCEDURE WITHOUT PERFORMING THE GEN RESET.

•At ANY TIME, of the procedure, if SMOKE/FUMES becomes the GREATEST THREAT :

- SMOKE / FUMES REMOVAL ……………..CONSIDER

- ELEC EMER CONFIG…………...………….CONSIDER

•At ANY TIME of the procedure, if situation becomes UNMANAGEABLE:

- IMMEDIATE LANDING…………...………...CONSIDER

SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE

Electrical EmergencyConfiguration

SMOKE SOURCEResearch/Isolation

“AT ANY TIME” items

Immediate actions

Diversion / Descent

Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR) – SA example

Electrical Shedding

If unsuccessfull: consider elec emer config

3 Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA

Contents

6 Conclusion

1 Introduction

Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA If:

Electrical shedding procedure applied on both sides, and,At least one battery in charge during the shedding

The electrical shedding leads to the permanent loss of DC 1, DC 2 and DC BAT bus bars

DC 1, DC 2 and DC BAT bus bars cannot be recovered for landing

Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA

IDG 1 IDG 2

BAT 1 BAT 2

GEN 1 GEN 2

AC 1 AC 2

TR 2TR 1

DC 2DC 1

DC BAT

If TR is inop andopposite DC bus bar is

powered

TR definitively lost

AC ESS

DC ESS

•TR is MONitored thanks to opposite DC bus bar

TR1 MON

TR2 MON

IDG 1 IDG 2

BAT 1 BAT 2

GEN 1 GEN 2

TR 2TR 1

DC BAT

DC 2DC 1

• BUS TIE to OFF

• AC ESS FEED to ALTN

Electrical Shedding Procedure:

AC ESS

DC ESS

AC 1 AC 2

IDG 1 IDG 2

BAT 1 BAT 2

GEN 1 GEN 2

TR 2TR 1

DC BAT

DC 2DC 1

AC ESS

DC ESS

AC 1 AC 2

• BUS TIE to OFF

Þ AC 1 bus bar inop

Þ TR 1 definitively lost

Þ DC 1 supplied by DC 2

• GEN 1 to OFF

IDG 1 IDG 2

BAT 1 BAT 2

GEN 1 GEN 2

TR 2TR 1

DC BAT

DC 2DC 1Þ AC 1 bus bar inop

Þ TR 1 definitively lost

Þ DC 1 supplied by DC 2

• BUS TIE to OFF

• GEN 1 to OFF

If smoke continues:

• GEN 1 back to ON

• AC ESS FEED to NORM

AC ESS

DC ESS

AC 1 AC 2

IDG 1 IDG 2

BAT 1 BAT 2

GEN 1 GEN 2

TR 2TR 1

DC BAT

DC 2DC 1

AC ESS

DC ESS

AC 1 AC 2

If BAT in charge before setting GEN 2 to OFF:

TR 2 monitoring is available for a while (DC1 avail) leading to the lost of TR 2

Þ DC1/2/BAT bus bars remain supplied by batteries during a confirmation time

Þ AC 2 bus bar inop

Þ TR 2 is inop

• GEN 2 to OFF

IDG 1 IDG 2

BAT 1 BAT 2

GEN 1 GEN 2

TR 2TR 1

DC BAT

DC 2DC 1

AC ESS

DC ESS

AC 1 AC 2

After the confirmation time, DC 1/2/BAT bus barsare no longer supplied by

batteries, and TR 2 is definitively lost

IDG 1 IDG 2

BAT 1 BAT 2

GEN 1 GEN 2

TR 2TR 1

DC BAT

DC 2DC 1

AC ESS

DC ESS

AC 1 AC 2

After the confirmation time, DC 1/2/BAT bus barsare no longer supplied by

batteries, and TR 2 is definitively lost

DC 1/2/BAT bus bars not recoverable for landing

If smoke continues:

- GEN 2 back to ON

- Consider elec emer config

Analysis performed with Airbus Flight Test pilots, Training pilots, and Design Office

Keeping or Removing the electrical shedding?

Balance between advantages and drawbacks…

Keeping the electrical shedding

- In some cases, possibility to isolate the smoke source without setting elec emer config

- Normal electrical configuration may be unrecoverable for landing

Keeping the electrical shedding

- In some cases, possibility to isolate the smoke source without setting elec emer config

- Normal electrical configuration may be unrecoverable for landing

Removing the electrical shedding

- Normal electrical configuration always recoverable for landing-Straight forward procedure

- No possibility to isolate the smoke source while keeping a less degraded configuration than elec emer config

It is preferable to keep the normal electrical configuration recoverable for landing:

FCOM/QRH updated since June 08.

Electrical shedding is kept on Long Range aircraft because:

• Normal electrical configuration always recoverable for landing (TR cannot be lost when applying the electrical shedding procedure).

• More degraded configuration in Elec Emer Config than on A320 Family.

• Mission profile is different (A340 vs A320)

Contents

6 Conclusion

1 Introduction

ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements

• On Single Aisle aircraft, with current FWC Std:– The ECAM displays 2 different ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure depending on if smoke is detected or not in the avionic bay:

Smoke Detected: The AVIONICS SMOKE ECAM caution is displayedThe ECAM does not request to reset generators. It is relevant. The ECAM requests to restore generators before L/G extension

Smoke NOT Detected: No « avionic smoke » ECAM caution displayedThe ECAM requests to reset generators (ELEC EMER CONFIG warning for main generators loss case) – Disregard it

ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements On Long Range aircraft, with current FWC Std:

When in Elec Emer Config following smoke in avionic bay (detected or not detected), the ECAM displays the same ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure as in case of generators loss

Smoke NOT Detected and Smoke Detected: -The ECAM requests to reset generators – Disregard it

ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure On Long Range aircraft, with future FWC Std T2/L11:

Single Aisle aircraft definition is reported on Long Range aircraft, and enhanced compared to Single Aisle aircraft

Smoke Detected:-The ECAM does not request to reset generators. It is relevant- The ECAM requests to:

- Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement)

- Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement)

Smoke NOT Detected: -The ECAM requests to reset generators – Disregard it

ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure EnhancementsSmoke Detected:

-The ECAM does not request to reset generators

-The ECAM does not request to reset generators- The ECAM requests to:

To minimize smoke reactivation:- Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG (instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION)

-The ECAM does not request to reset generators- The ECAM requests to:

- Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement)- Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement)

To minimize smoke reactivation:- Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG (instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION)- WHEN A/C IS STOPPED, set ALL GEN to OFF

ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements On Long Range aircraft, with future FWC Std T2/L11:

Single Aisle aircraft definition is reported on Long Range aircraft, and enhanced compared to Single Aisle aircraft

Smoke Detected:-The ECAM does not request to reset generators- The ECAM requests to:

- Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement)

To minimize smoke reactivation:- Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG (instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION)- WHEN A/C IS STOPPED, set ALL GEN to OFF

Smoke NOT Detected: -The ECAM requests to reset generators

ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements

• Enhancements introduced on Long Range aircraft with FWC Standards T2/L11 are reported on Single Aisle aircraft with FWC Standard F5:

Restore generators « 3 MIN OR 2000 FT AAL BEFORE LANDING » instead of « BEFORE L/G EXTENSION »

Set all generators to OFF, WHEN A/C IS STOPPED

Contents

6 Conclusion

1 Introduction

FCOM: Enhancement on Smoke Paper Procedure

Smoke not detected:

- Do not reset gen

- Restore gen before landing (wording function of FWC Std)

The 2 cases « Smoke detected » and « Smoke not detected » in avionic bay are clearly identified in the Smoke paper procedure:

FCOM: Enhancement on Smoke Paper Procedure

Smoke detected:

- Apply ECAM

The 2 cases « Smoke detected » and « Smoke not detected » in avionic bay are clearly identified in the Smoke paper procedure:

Smoke not detected:

- Do not reset gen

- Restore gen before landing (wording function of FWC Std)

Contents

6 Conclusion

1 Introduction

ConclusionElectrical Shedding

Single Aisle

Removed: To recover normal elec config for landing, Straight forward procedure

Long Range

Kept because: Normal elec config recoverable More degraded config in Elec Emer Config, than on SALR mission profile

ConclusionElectrical Shedding

ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM Procedure, when smoke detected

Single Aisle

Removed: To recover normal elec config for landing, Straight forward procedure

Enhancement (FWC F5): Restore generators 3MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION Set all generators to OFF when aircraft is stopped

Long Range

Kept because: Normal elec config recoverable More degraded config in Elec Emer Config, than on SALR mission profile

New specific ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM Procedure (FWC T2/L11): No generators reset Restore generators 3MIN/2000FT before landing Set all generators to OFF when aircraft is stopped

- ECAM significantly enhanced, particularly on Long

Range aircraft

- No significant impact on training (no memory item)

- Smoke Paper Procedure template and philosophy

unchanged

SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKEPANELES DEL SIMULADOR

Antes de activar el “Smoke Generator” del simulador debemos avisar al personal de mantenimiento para que inutilicen las alarmas y sistemas de emergencia.

En la pantalla principal (MASTER INDEX) seleccionamos “SERVICES”

Una vez aquí seleccionamos “SMOKE GENERATOR”. Comenzará a parpadear, en cuanto termine estará listo para ser utilizado. Tarda unos cinco minutos en estar listo.

Una vez que tengamos listo el “smoke Generator” seleccionamos “MALFUNCTIONS”

Dentro de “MALFUNCTIONS” nos vamos al apartado “ATA 26 FIRE PROTECTION / SMOKE”

Aquí escogeremos la emergencia “Avionic Smoke”, y que termine en un “electrical emergency configuration”

SIMBRIEF INST

TRAFFIC!!! TRAFFIC!!!

TCAS I HAVE CONTROLS

CLIMB!!! CLIMB NOW!!!

AUTOPILOT OFF, FLIGHT DIRECTORS OFF MADRID AEA123 TCAS

RESOLUTION

CLEAR OF CONFLICT

FLIGHT DIRECTORS ON, AUTOPILOT ON MADRID AEA123 FLXXX

RESUME

OLM FBW 2006

TCAS Recommendations

Presented by

Yves LEMELLEDirector of A320/A330/A340 Operational Standards

TCAS Recommendations 127OLM FBW 2006

Each year, numerous reports reveal that mid-air collisions are avoided by a whisker.

Air Traffic Controllers (on ground) strive to avoid such events.

The onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)was developed to prevent mid-air collision, particularlyin case Air Traffic Controller guidance is incorrect.

TCAS II has become mandatory:–Since 1986, in the US–Since 2000, in Europe

TCAS II has a worldwide ICAO mandate as January 1st, 2003.

Background

4 Future TCAS Developments

3 Recurrent TCAS Questions

2 Review of TCAS Events

Resolution Advisory

Contents

5 Conclusion

Resolution Advisory

• TCAS calculates two types of Resolution Advisories (RA):

– Preventive Advisory ( “MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED –

MONITOR”)• Red sector appears on V/S scale, the V/S

needle is in the grey area.• The red square is displayed on the

Navigation Display.• No pilot action on the sidestick (maintain

the current vertical speed).

BackgroundAP1

TCAS calculates two types of Resolution Advisories (RA):

Corrective Advisory:– The vertical speed needle is in the red area.– The red square is displayed on the Navigation

Display

Resolution AdvisoryBackground

Follow aural warnings.

Follow vertical speed green sector on the PFD.

Resolution Advisory

• Corrective Advisory (e.g. “DESCENT, DESCENT”):

– TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:

– Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with 0.25g in climb or descent until +/-1500 ft/min is reached

– V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.

Background

Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within 5 seconds

Vertical miss distance

Resolution Advisory

• Corrective Advisory

Background

(Closest Point of Approach)

« DESCENT, DESCENT »

Generally:– Deviation caused by a RA maneuver is between 300 and 500 ft– Vertical miss distance at the Closest Point of Approach is around 400 ft

Do not overreact

Do not disregard a weakening RA

It could create another conflict with another aircraft

(Closest Point of Approach)

Relative altitude

« DESCENT, DESCENT »

• Corrective Advisory

Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds

Additional Corrective Advisory (E.g.: “INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT”)

TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:

Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with 0.35g in climb or descent until +/-2500 ft/min is reached

V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.

Resolution Advisory

Contents

5 Conclusion

Review of TCAS Events …

Simultaneousvertical and horizontalcrossing at less than 1 NM

AIRCRAFT 1

AIRCRAFT 2

AIRCRAFT 3

AIRCRAFT 2 descendFL 60.

Event N° 1 : ATC avoiding instruction opposite to RA

« CLIMB, CLIMB » RA

« DESCEND, DESCEND » RA

« INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT » RA

Review of TCAS Events …FCOM 3.04.34

Review of TCAS Events …Event N°2 : Misinterpretation of “Adjust Vertical Speed” RA

Minimum crossing margin:

300 feet, 0.8 NM

AIRCRAFT 1

FL 270

FL 260« ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED,ADJUST » RA

AIRCRAFT 2

Review of TCAS Events …FCOM 1.34.80

Review of TCAS Events …

« DESCEND, DESCEND » RA

AIRCRAFT 2 Descendto FL 350.

AIRCRAFT 1 passes slightly below AIRCRAFT 2, with no lateral separation !!!

FL 370

Order incorrectly interpreted by AIRCRAFT 1

Event N°3 : Inefficient visual avoiding maneuver

AIRCRAFT 2

AIRCRAFT 1

Review of TCAS Events …• Do not base the maneuver on visual acquisition of the intruder:

FCOM 3.04.34 :

Review of TCAS Events …ATC versus TCAS information:

• ATC Radar:– An update rate of several seconds (from 4 to 10).– Altitude data in 100-foot increments.– Sudden vertical maneuvers are not immediately displayed.

TCAS Information is:

- Updated 4 to 10 times faster

- 4 times more accurate

Additional information

TCAS: Interrogates all surrounded transponders every second. Mode S-equipped aircraft provide TCAS information in 25-foot increments.

Review of TCAS Events …Visual acquisition limitations:

• At high altitudes, it is difficult to assess:– The range– The heading– The relative height

Additional information …

At low altitudes, it is difficult to assess : Whether the aircraft is climbing or descending.

The traffic in contact MAY NOT BE the one that causes the RA to trigger.

Review of TCAS Events …Lessons learnt

- Always follow TCAS RA orders:- In the correct direction- Even if it is in contradiction the ATC instruction- Even at max ceiling altitude

- Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to the green sector.

- Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in case of RA orders.

Resolution Advisory

Contents

5 Conclusion

New change in TCAS procedureCurrent QRH

AP/ FD ……… OFF

Only for corrective RA

New change in TCAS procedureFuture QRH (July

AP/ FD …..OFF

for any RA

Recurrent TCAS Questions …

• Performing an emergency descent in a busy airspace increases the risk of generating traffic conflict.

• Temporarily reducing the rate of descent is not a concern.

• A “CLIMB, CLIMB” RA order is not always requested:– An “ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST” RA

can be triggered (decrease the V/S).

Emergency Descent :

Should we select TA not to reduce the rate of descent?

Airbus recommend RA mode.

Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent …

ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST

DESCEND, DESCEND

Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent …

Recurrent TCAS Questions …• In case one engine fails, the TCAS must be set to TA mode to comply

with AC 20-131:

After an engine failure, aircraft performance is degraded.

When TA is selected: Affected aircraft is not requested to perform an RA maneuver.

Engine Failure

Recurrent TCAS Questions …• The ECAM’s ENG SHUT DOWN Procedure requests

the crew to select TA TCAS mode.

Engine Failure …

– To avoid entering in angle of attack protection at low altitude. In addition, subsequent loss of altitude could lead to reversal RA orders.

– To have a common procedure for all aircraft– If the intruder is TCAS-equipped:

• The intruder TCAS will detect that you are in TA mode.• The intruder TCAS will perform an RA maneuver.

Airbus recommends the selection of TA mode, in case of an engine failure.

Engine Failure …

• AC 20-131A defines the maneuvers that the aircraft must be able to perform.

• In particular, the aircraft must prove that it can respond to a TCAS RA CLIMB order, even whenit is at its maximum altitude.

Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude

Time (s)

V/S (feet/minute)

Speed (knots)

Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude …

Time (s)

Recurrent TCAS Questions …• These graphs show that the aircraft can follow:

–A “CLIMB, CLIMB” TCAS RA order (1500 feet/minute)–An “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB” TCAS RA order

(2500 feet/minute).

• Always below VMO/MMO and above VLS:–A330 aircraft, at 41000 feet, initial speed is M 0.82 (243

knots)The maximum weight is 177 tons.

–The Final Speed is 228 knots(Buffet Speed is 212 knots at 42000 feet)

RA climb orders can be followed.

Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode,when the aircraft is at its maximum ceiling altitude.

Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude …

Resolution Advisory

Contents

5 Conclusion

Future TCAS Developments• Overreaction:

–Most vertical deviations for each aircraft (following aTCAS RA order) are often greater than 300 feet.

– Very large altitude changes often lead to conflict with other aircraft in a busy airspace.

– Due to excessive pilot reaction, uncomfortable load factors are reached.

• Cases of reaction in the wrong sense.

Background

Future TCAS Developments …– Keep the current Vertical Speed indicator

• Allow to check the result of pilot action on V/S raw data• Constitute a back up indication

– Display must be reactive enough to avoid any over-reaction• Fast interpretation is necessary

– RA order with AP engaged• Procedure should be intuitive

Developments status

Future TCAS Developments … Concept: new AFS “TCAS RA” longitudinal mode that would allow an

automatic reaction. Symbology: no specific symbology (except new mode on FMA), the FD

follows the TCAS order and the pilot cross-checks the VSI raw data.

Law: new AFS “TCAS” law, based on V/S law with increased authority

Outer loop TCAS law

Inner loop

V/S target NZ

Computation of

the V/S targetControl surfaces deflection orders

TCAS Computer

Developments status…

SPEED NAVTCAS APFDATHR

Future TCAS Developments …

• AP/FD behaviour in case of TCAS RA alert:

– If AP/FD not engaged:• Automatic engagement of FD in TCAS mode

– If AP Off but FD already engaged:• Automatic reversion of FD to TCAS mode

– If AP already engaged:• Automatic reversion of AP to TCAS mode

Future TCAS Developments …: example of Corrective RAALT CRZSPEED NAV AP1

1FD2ATHR

SPEED NAV AP11FD2ATHR

V/S-1000

“Clear Of Conflict”

“Climb, Climb”

SPEED NAV AP11FD2

“Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust”

Future TCAS Developments …

• Expected definition for flight test by second half of 2008

Resolution Advisory

Contents

5 Conclusion

Conclusion

Some improvements are being developed to further assist pilots in effectively responding to TCAS warnings.

- Always follow TCAS RA orders:- In the correct direction- Even if it is in contradiction the ATC instruction- Even at max ceiling altitude

- Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to the green sector.

- Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in case of RA orders.

Upcoming FOBN« Response to TCAS Alerts »

Conclusion

Eurocontrol ACAS II Bulletin

http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa

EUROCONTROL is publishing a series of ACAS II Bulletins, each with a different safety related theme.

TCAS VOICE FAULT SIMULADOR

Seleccionamos la opción TCAS / desde el MASTER INDEX

Solo para el SIM I

Este fallo consiste en que el TCAS carece de aviso acústicoNo tendremos ningún aviso ECAM.Debemos emplearlo cuando los dos alumnos estén despistados por ejemplo cargando la aproximación.Recordamos “allways one head up at all time”.

Es la página 2 de los fallos de navegación

AIR DUAL BLEED FAULT

BRIEF SIMINST

MEL ITEMS

MEL OPERATIONALPROCEDURES

DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure Current ECAM alerts give appropriate procedures in the case of Dual Bleed

failures

However, A QRH procedure has been created to handle a dual bleed loss

To improve airline operations

By means of Anticipated descent before CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT triggering Attempt to recover the lastly lost BLEED System (when possible) Use of the APU Bleed (when possible)

This QRH Procedure Covers a wide range of Dual Bleed failures Is technically too complex to be put on the ECAM

APUAPU

PACK 1

ENG 1 BLEEDENG 1 BLEED

PACK 2

DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure

IPIP HPHP

• Scenario of the reported events

AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT

- ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF

- X BLEED…………OPEN

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

- X BLEED…………OPEN?

X-BLEEDOPEN

If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a :LEAK on side 1 (2)ENG 1 (2) FIRE

Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed open

In all other cases

X-BLEED CLOSED

X-BLEEDOPEN

X-BLEED CLOSED

In all other cases

INITIATE DESCENT

In all other cases :

X BLEED OPEN

Both packs available

Attempt recovery of the lastly lost bleed system

One pack inoperative,

Bleed Recovery unsuccessful

If ENG 1 BLEED lost first

X BLEED OPEN

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

PACK 1 OFF reduces demand

ENG 2 BLEED ON

INITIATE DESCENT

ENG 2 BLEED ON

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT

X BLEED OPEN

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

ENG 1 BLEED ON

INITIATE DESCENT

ENG 1 BLEED ON

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

Bleed Recovery unsuccessful or

One pack inoperative

Failures of the lastly lost bleed systemother than due to excessive demand

INITIATE DESCENT

X BLEED OPEN

DESCEND to FL

for APU BLEED use

APUBLEEDON

APU BLEEDAPUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

Recovery unsuccessful,

Using the QRH procedure in the case of Dual Bleed Loss

• Typical scenario of reported Dual Bleed Loss events

– Loss of first BLEED system (overheat or overpressure)

– X-BLEED valve open (as per ECAM procedure)

– 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration

– Loss of second BLEED system (due to excessive demand)

• As failure is not due to LEAK on side 1 (2) ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed open

both PACKs are available

Attempt recovery of the lastly lost BLEED System

Continue flight to destination

– If unsuccessful

Continue descent to appropriate FL for APU BLEED use

– If successful

INITIATE DESCENT

ConclusionTo prevent DUAL BLEED loss events

Technical precautionary measures are available

Preventive Maintenance actions

Component modifications

If a DUAL BLEED Loss occurs

Applying the DUAL BLEED FAULT QRH procedure may avoid

In-Flight Turn Back

Emergency Descent and potential PAX Oxygen mask deployment

AIR DUAL BLEED FAULTINSTRUCTORES

DUAL BLEED LOSS ON SINGLE AISLE- Meeting 2008

A330 DUAL BLEED LOSS- Rome 2011

A330/A340 BLEED AIR SYSTEM- Bangkok 2012

DUAL BLEED LOSS on Single AisleUsing the QRH procedure

A320 Family – A330/A340 Operational Liaison Meeting 2008

3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure

2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan

Contents

4 Conclusion

1 In-Service events

Contents

4 Conclusion

1 In-Service events

In-Service events description Nearly all reported events

Single Aisle family bleed overheat after one engine bleed system failure

Loss of the remaining bleed system due to overheat

Typical event description First Engine Bleed system failure ECAM procedure application

– X-BLEED open– 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration

Most common operational consequence In-Flight Turn Back Emergency descent

Normal Bleed System Operation

Fan Air Valve (FAV) provides cold fan air to the PRECOOLER

Normal Operation

upon signal from theTemperature Control Thermostat (TCT)

FAVFAV

BLEEDVALVEBLEEDVALVE

PRECOOLERPRECOOLER

TCTTCT

Bleed System Failure – Identified cause

1 BLEED / 2 PACKs operation

Increase of bleed air temperature

FAV actuation system fails to compensate

•TCT drift

FAVFAV

BLEEDVALVEBLEEDVALVE

PRECOOLERPRECOOLER

• Hidden failure in the FAV actuation system

•TCT drift•Sense line leakage•TCT drift•Sense line leakage•FAV cover leakage

Contents

4 Conclusion

1 In-Service events

Temperature Control Thermostat filter cleaning at 6,000 FH mandatory TCT: Filter cleaning Mandatory MPD task

New procedures to identify Fan Air Valve malfunction AMM: Improved FAV leak check procedure (new tooling)

Dual Bleed Loss – Action Plan

Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS) customized Report Approach developed by Airbus with the cooperation of A320 operators Define parameters, thresholds and logic for alerts triggering Monitoring of the BLEED system Preventive troubleshooting can be launched before BLEED failure

……………………………………………Available Feb. 2007

………………Available Feb. 2007

Dual Bleed Loss – Action Plan Component modification to ensure appropriate FAV operation

Temperature Control Thermostat (Standard 342B05) Optimization of temperature function reactivity

Fan Air Valve Improvement to avoid early leakage

Temperature Limitation Thermostat Temperature limitation function shifting at 270°C

…………………………………………VSB 341-36-06

Available Nov. 2007

………………………SB 36-1061 (VSB 342-36-08)

Available May 2008

………………….…………VSB 6730F-36-01 & VSB 6730-36-03

Available Aug. 2007

Additional details are available in TFU 36.11.00.059, OIT 999.0061/08, RIL 916.0468/08

Contents

4 Conclusion

1 In-Service events

DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure Current ECAM alerts give appropriate procedures in the case of Dual Bleed

failures

However, A QRH procedure has been created to handle a dual bleed loss

To improve airline operations

By means of Anticipated descent before CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT triggering Attempt to recover the lastly lost BLEED System (when possible) Use of the APU Bleed (when possible)

This QRH Procedure Covers a wide range of Dual Bleed failures Is technically too complex to be put on the ECAM

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

- X BLEED…………OPEN?

X-BLEEDOPEN

In all other cases

X-BLEED CLOSED

X-BLEEDOPEN

X-BLEED CLOSED

In all other cases

INITIATE DESCENT

X BLEED OPEN

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

ENG 2 BLEED ON

INITIATE DESCENT

ENG 2 BLEED ON

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

X BLEED OPEN

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

ENG 1 BLEED ON

INITIATE DESCENT

ENG 1 BLEED ON

APUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

Bleed Recovery unsuccessful or

Failures of the lastly lost bleed systemother than due to excessive demand

INITIATE DESCENT

X BLEED OPEN

DESCEND to FL

for APU BLEED use

APUBLEEDON

APU BLEEDAPUAPU

PACK 1

PACK 2

IPIP HPHP

Recovery unsuccessful,

• Typical scenario of reported Dual Bleed Loss events

– Loss of first BLEED system (overheat or overpressure)

– X-BLEED valve open (as per ECAM procedure)

– 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration

– Loss of second BLEED system (due to excessive demand)

Using the QRH procedure in the case of Dual Bleed Loss• As failure is not due to

LEAK on side 1 (2) ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed open

both PACKs are available

Attempt recovery of the lastly lost BLEED System

Continue flight to destination

– If unsuccessful

Continue descent to appropriate FL for APU BLEED use

– If successful

INITIATE DESCENT

Contents

4 Conclusion

1 In-Service events

ConclusionTo prevent DUAL BLEED loss events

Technical precautionary measures are available

Component modifications

If a DUAL BLEED Loss occurs

Applying the DUAL BLEED FAULT QRH procedure may avoid

In-Flight Turn Back

Emergency Descent and potential PAX Oxygen mask deployment

By taking delivery of this Presentation (hereafter “Presentation”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following. No other property rights are granted by the delivery of this Presentation than the right to read it, for the sole purpose of information. This Presentation, its content, illustrations and photos shall not be modified nor reproduced without prior written consent of Airbus S.A.S. This Presentation and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed to any third party subject to payment or not. This Presentation may contain market-sensitive or other information that is correct at the time of going to press. This information involves a number of factors which could change over time, affecting the true public representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information contained in this document or with respect to the information described herein. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer or form part of any contract. They are based on Airbus information and are expressed in good faith but no warranty or representation is given as to their accuracy. When additional information is required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to provide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume no liability for any damage in connection with the use of this Presentation and the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. This licence is governed by French law and exclusive jurisdiction is given to the courts and tribunals of Toulouse (France) without prejudice to the right of Airbus to bring proceedings for infringement of copyright or any other intellectual property right in any other court of competent jurisdiction.

AIR DUAL BLEED FAULTSIMULADOR

1.- Debemos estar a FL3502.-Autorizamos a FL330 y pedimos que aceleren. En cuanto bajan del 60% de potencia, aproximadamente, se abren las HP valves. En este momento introducimos el fallo.

Explicación del fallo.

INMEDIATE VMC LANDING FOLLOWING ENG.FAIL

BRIEF SIM

El “inmediate VMC landing after engine fail”, siempre es decisión del comandante.Las condiciones meteorológicas deben ser de buena visibilidad.Debemos estar en un campo conocido.Debemos estar seguros que la longitud de pista es suficiente.Un ejemplo claro de un “VMC landing after engine fail”, es en un despegue donde nos hemos encontrado una bandada de pájaros. Se nos ha parado un motor, y tenemos serias dudas de la integridad del restante.Otro ejemplo sería fallo de motor con pesos muy bajos y en campos muy conocidos.

INMEDIATE VMC LANDING FOLLOWING ENG.FAIL

Simulador

Para poner el BIRD STRIKE seleccionamos WEATHER.Está en la primera página. Tarda unos 40 nudos en aparecer

Ponemos el fallo de motor que más nos guste

Para crear estrés adicional y facilitar la toma de decisión estoleamos el otro motor

ENG FAIL

SEQUENCE

FLYTHE

AIRCRAFT

“I HAVE CONTROL AND COMOEB & ECAM ACTIONS”

OP CLIMBMCTCONTINUE ECAM ACTIONS

STOPECAM ACTIONS AT EO ACC ALT & ENG SECURED

FLY THE AIRCRAFT

• CANCEL WARNING• GEAR UP• CONSIDER TOGA• PITCH ADJUST,BETA TARGET• CONSIDER A/P

CONSIDER TOGA

• PILOT’S DISCRETION• TOGA REQUIRES MORE RUDDER INPUT

PITCH ADJUST,BETA TARGET

PITCH ADJUST- FOLLOW SRS , MONITOR SPEED

BETA TARGET

ECAM ACTIONS

ENG SECURED

• NO DAMAGE.- ENG MASTER OFF• DAMAGE.- ENG FIRE PB PUSHED & ONE SQUIB

DISCHARGED• FIRE-. - ENG FIRE PB PUSHED & TWO SQUIBS

DISCHARGED

ENG RELIGHT

BRIEF INST

Instructores

STALL RECOVERY PROCEDURE

SIMINSTBRIEF

FIN SIMINST

STALL RECOVERY PROCEDUREINSTRUCTORES

STALL RECOVERY PROCEDURESIMULADOR

Para poder estar en “Alternate law” debemos desconectar 2 ADR

Ahora debemos reconfigurar las pantallas para copiar la información del ADR bueno.

Evacuación de Emergencia

EMERGENCIAS EN DESPEGUES Y ATERRIZAJES

• El procedimiento de evacuación de emergencia consiste en una serie de normas y situaciones, establecidas de forma lógica y ordenada, que permitan facilitar la rápida salida de los pasajeros de un avión después de haber sufrido un accidente en el que la permanencia en su interior, suponga un grave riesgo para las vidas humanas.

• En una situación de emergencia la seguridad de los pasajeros dependerá de la calma, el equilibrio y la eficacia de la Tripulación.

Condiciones para una evacuación.

• Una vez esté el avión parado con motores parados:

1. Orden del Cmte. “EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE!/ ¡EVACUAR, EVACUAR, EVACUAR”

2. Observar fuego o humo que de evidencia de que está ardiendo el avión (en el interior o exterior)

3. Observar daños estructurales que afecten la seguridad de los pasajeros.

4. Ver iniciar la evacuación en otra área del avión.5. Un amerizaje.6. Una Emergencia Prevista.

PREPARAR LA EVACUACION.

COORDINAREMOS CON LA TRIPULACIÓN DE CABINA EL PROCEDIMIENTO A SEGUIR:

• EMERGENCIA PREVISTA.• EMERGENCIA IMPREVISTA.• ATERRIZAJE INSEGURO.

Una vez iniciada la evacuación NO DEBE INTERRUMPIRSE.

Pueden producirse en tierra incidentes por los cuales sea necesario que el Comandante tome la decisión de realizar un Desalojo Controlado de Urgencia.Ej. Aviso bomba, salida de pista…

Emergencia Prevista: Planificamos el aterrizaje de emergencia. Damos seis puntos en un briefing al SB: 1. Tipo emergencia2. Estimated Time of Arrival.3. Lugar de aterrizaje.4. Señal de protección.5. Instrucciones especiales.6. Confirmación de la evacuación con el Comandante.Emergencia Imprevista: Se tendrá la cabina asegurada por procedimiento y evacuaremos tan pronto sea posible.Aterrizaje inseguro: En un principio no se requerirá evacuación. Se informará de Tipo de

emergencia, ETA, Coordinación.

EMERGENCY EVACUATION 1Applicable to: EC-LMN, EC-LNH, EC-LQO, EC-LQP

Apply this procedure when considering an emergency evacuation. Carefully analyze the situation before deciding to evacuate passengers. However do not waste valuable time.

AIRCRAFT/PARKING BRK ……………………..........................................................STOP/ON ATC (VHF1)......................................................................................................NOTIFY Notify ATC of the nature of the emergency, and state intentions. Only VHF1 is available on batteries. CABIN CREW (PA)..............................................................................................ALERT Make a short and precise announcement to warn that an emergency evacuation may be required.

ΔP (only if MAN CAB PR has been used)..................................CHECK ZERO If ΔP is not at zero, MODE SEL on MAN and V/S CTL FULL UP, to fully open the outflow valves.

ENG MASTER (ALL)...............................................................................OFF Associated LP and HP valves close.

FIRE Pushbuttons (ALL: ENG and APU)..............................................PUSH AGENTS (ENG and APU)...............................................................AS RQRD The use of agents is required if the ENG FIRE or APU FIRE displayed.

If Evacuation required: EVACUATION................................................................................INITIATE Notify the cabin crew about the emergency encountered and the intentions. Press the EVAC COMMAND pb.

If Evacuation not required: CABIN CREW and PASSENGERS (PA)................................................NOTIFY

• Se recomienda hacer la evacuación sin abandonar la pista. Al ser esta mucho mas ancha que la rodadura, facilitaremos así el total acceso al avión de los servivios de emergencia.

• Ordenaremos la evacuación sin indicar por donde realizarla, (derecha o izquierda) ya que son los TCP´s quienes dispondrán de la puerta operativa mas conveniente para completarla.

• Comprobaremos que la Presión Diferencial sea CERO.En modo automático los CPC se encargarán de ello pero será en MAN PRESS MODE cuando seremos nosotros los encargados de que Delta P sea cero!

CARGO SMOKE

BRIEF SIM

INDICE

• 1.- Descripción del sistema• 2.- Información operativa.• 3.- Ecam

DESCRIPCION DEL SISTEMA

PARTES DEL SISTEMA

• DOS CAVIDADES EN LA BODEGA DELANTERA.• DOS CAVIDADES EN LA BODEGA TRASERA Y

UNA EN EL BULK.• CADA CAVIDAD CON DOS DETECTORES DE

HUMO Y UN SPRAY NOZZLE.• UN SDCU (SMOKE DETECTION CONTROL UNIT)

QUE DA INFORMACION AL FWC PARA EL AVISO EN CABINA.

DISTRIBUCION DE LOS DETECTORES

DESCRIPCION DE LOS DETECTORES

COMO FUNCIONA EL SISTEMA

INFO OPERATIVA

CARGO SMOKE

PANELES DEL SIMULADOR

En el “MALFUNCTION INDEX” seleccionamos “FIRE PROTECTION/SMOKE”

En el menú “FIRE PROTECTION/SMOKE” seleccionamos “CARGO SMOKE”

SIDE STICK FAULT

SIDESTICK LOGIC

‐ Two sidestick controllers are used for pitch and roll manual control. One is on the CAPT's latera console, the other is on the FO's lateral console.The two controllers are springloaded to neutral, and are not mechanically coupled.Each controller independently sends electrical signals to the flight control computers.

SIDESTICKSSidesticks, one on each lateral console, are used for manual pitch and roll control. They are springloaded to neutral. When the autopilot is engaged, a solenoid-operated detent locks both sidesticks in the neutral position. If the pilot applies a force above a given threshold (5 daN in pitch, 3.5 daN in roll), the autopilot disengages and the sidestick unlocks and the deflection is sent as command to the computers.

The hand grip includes 2 pushbuttons: ‐ Autopilot disconnect/sidestick priority pushbutton ‐ Push-to-talk button

Sidestick priority logic

‐ When only one pilot operates the sidestick, his demand is sent to the computers. ‐ When the other pilot operates his sidestick, in the same or opposite direction, both pilots

inputs are algebraically-added. The addition is limited to single-stick maximum deflection.

Note: In the event of simultaneous input on both sidesticks (2 °deflection of the neutral position in any direction) the two green SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights, on the glareshield, come on and the “DUAL INPUT” voice message activates.

A pilot can deactivate the other sidestick, and take full control by pressing and keepingpressed his takeover pushbutton.For latching the priority condition, it is recommended that the takeover pushbutton bepressed for more than 40 s . The takeover pushbutton can then be released without losingpriority.However a deactivated sidestick can be reactivated at any time, by momentarily pressingeither takeover pushbutton on either stick.If both pilots press their takeover pushbuttons, the last pilot to press their pushbutton willhave priority.Note: If an autopilot is engaged, any action on a takeover pushbutton will disengage it.

In a Priority Situation

‐ A red light will come on, in front of the pilot whose stick is deactivated.

‐ A green light will come on, in front of the pilot who has taken control, if the other sidestick is not in the neutral position (to indicate a potential and unwanted control demand).

Note: If one stick is deactivated on ground, at takeoff thrust application, the takeoff«CONFIG» warning is triggered.

SIDE STICK PRIORITY

Arrow red lt : ‐ Illuminates in front of the pilot losing authority.

‐ Extinguishes if he has recovered his authority, ie: • If the other take-over pushbutton is released prior priority condition is latched, or • If he has used his take-over pushbutton to cancel a latched priority situation.

Sidestick priority audio: a "PRIORITY LEFT" or "PRIORITY RIGHT” audio voice message is given each time priority is taken.

L (R) SIDESTICK FAULTTransducers on pitch or roll axis are failed on one sidestick.

FCOM PRO ABN- Abnormal and Emergency Procedures.

F/CTL L (R) SIDESTICK FAULT

L2 Crew awareness

SIDESTICK/RUDDER PEDALS STIFF

Even if the autopilot is disengaged, the sidesticks and/or the rudder pedals may be stiff. This may affect either: ‐ Both sidesticks (CAPT and F/O) at the same time, but not the rudder pedals, or ‐ One sidestick and the rudder pedals at the same time.

The piloting technique remains the same: The aircraft remains responsive. However, the flight crew should keep in mind that they may need to use extra force on the sidesticks and/or the rudder pedals.The extra force required to move the controls out of the neutral position is moderate.This extra force does not significantly affect the handling of the aircraft.If sidesticks and/or rudder pedals are stiff after autopilot disengagement, apply the following procedure:

AP DISENGAGEMENT.....................................................................................CONFIRM

Confirm autopilot disengagement by checking that either: ‐ The FMA no longer displays the AP1(2) indication, or ‐ The AP lights on the FCU are off, or ‐ The ECAM displays the AP1(2) OFF red message, or ‐ The cavalry charge audio alert has triggered.

CONSIDER TRANSFERRING CONTROL TO PNFIf the PNF's sidestick is not affected.

FOR DECRAB, ROLLOUT, OR ENGINE FAILURE:BE PREPARED TO APPLY EXTRA FORCE ON RUDDER PEDALNot applicable if both sidesticks are stiff.

FINFIN

LOW VISIBILITY TAKE OFF

• RVR < 400 mts• IF ALTN AIRPORT REQ: >Within 1 hour >ETOPS approved time or 2

hours ( if etops > 120 mins) (@ 1 eng inop speed )• Air Europa crews are allowed 125 mts ( Only authorized operators)

UNDER U.S. OPS SPEC

(Foreign Operations Specifications)

• STD Take Off Minimuns are defined: RVR 5.000 (≤ 2 eng a/c) RVR 2.400 (a/c > 2 eng)

“When a take off minimum is not published, the foreign air carrier may use the applicable standard takeoff minimum and any lower than standard takeoff minimuns described in these operations specifications” [Air Europa US Ops Spec]

* A copy of this US OPS SPEC is onboard all A-330´s

RVR REQUIREMENTS

OPS ≥ RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TDZ RVR is controlling, if available

MID RVR may be substituted for an

available TDZ RVR

OPS < RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TWO OPERATING RVR REQ

ALL available RVR REQ

When a FAR END RVR is avail, is not controlling, and not to be used as one of the two req RVR

The Foreign Operator may use lower than STD Take Off minimum

• If Vis ¼ sm or RVR 1600, at least ONE avail

Other markings or lighting provide adequate visual ref to ident. rwy sfc and maintain lateral ctl during T.O.

• If TDZ RVR 1200, MID RVR 1200, & Roll Out RVR 1000, may be used, provided RVR Equip is avail + 1 of the following:

• Daylight RCLM or HIRL or CL

• Night Time HIRL or CL

• CL or HIRL+ RCLM

• If TDZ RVR 500, MID RVR 500, & Roll Out RVR 500, may be used, provided ALL RVR Equip is avail and:

• HIRL + CL

500 ft = 150 mts

1000 ft = 300 mts

Take Off ALTN

• INCORPORAR C-055

All Weather OpsLow Visibility Procedures

CAT II / III

BRIEF INST

All Weather OpsLow Visibility Procedures

CAT II / IIIInstructores

LOW VISIBILITY TAKE OFF

• RVR < 400 mts• IF ALTN AIRPORT REQ: >Within 1 hour >ETOPS approved time or 2

hours ( if etops > 120 mins) (@ 1 eng inop speed )• Air Europa crews are allowed 125 mts ( Only authorized operators)

UNDER U.S. OPS SPEC

(Foreign Operations Specifications)

• STD Take Off Minimuns are defined: RVR 5.000 (≤ 2 eng a/c) RVR 2.400 (a/c > 2 eng)

“When a take off minimum is not published, the foreign air carrier may use the applicable standard takeoff minimum and any lower than standard takeoff minimuns described in these operations specifications” [Air Europa US Ops Spec]

* A copy of this US OPS SPEC is onboard all A-330´s

RVR REQUIREMENTS

OPS ≥ RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TDZ RVR is controlling, if available

MID RVR may be substituted for an

available TDZ RVR

OPS < RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TWO OPERATING RVR REQ

ALL available RVR REQ

When a FAR END RVR is avail, is not controlling, and not to be used as one of the two req RVR

• If Vis ¼ sm or RVR 1600, at least ONE avail

Other markings or lighting provide adequate visual ref to ident. rwy sfc and maintain lateral ctl during T.O.

• Daylight RCLM or HIRL or CL

• Night Time HIRL or CL

• CL or HIRL+ RCLM

• If TDZ RVR 500, MID RVR 500, & Roll Out RVR 500, may be used, provided ALL RVR Equip is avail and:

• HIRL + CL

500 ft = 150 mts

1000 ft = 300 mts

Take Off ALTN

• INCORPORAR C-055

CAT I APPROACH

• Minimum vis ½ sm (800 mts)

• TDZ RVR is controlling (subst by mid)

• Reduced landing minima ( as published)

CAT II / III

1000 ft US OPS SPEC

Cat II below 1.200ft (1.000ft) on CAT III facilities arpts & rwys (DGAC & Ops Spec)

CAT II

• Sufficient visual reference for a manual landing

• Equivalent level of safety by;– airborne equipment– ILS Facility

Lowest authorized RVR =1.000 ft

Lowest authorized DH = 100 ft

CAT II UNDER U.S. OPS SPEC

CAT II U.S.

• App Ban concept →“Final app segment”• When TDZ RVR report < 1800, ALL the

following equipment is required:

• ALSF I or ALSF II (SFL may be inop)• HIRL + TDZL + CL• One RVR is controlling ( RVR ≥ 1600) • Two RVR are controlling(RVR ≥ 1200) (TDZ & Roll Out) (Roll Out may be subs. by mid) (far end?)

• Crosswind ≤ 15 Kts

Air EuropaA 330

CAT III A III B

Air EuropaA 330

SOME CONCEPTS:

CAT III A IIIB

• Minimum to allow the pilot to decide whether aircraft will land in touchdown zone (CAT IIIA) and ensure safety during roll-out (CAT IIIB)

CAT III A = Fail Passive = CAT III SINGLE

CAT III B = Fail operational = CAT III DUAL

• Fail-passive automatic landing system - in the event of a failure there is no significant deviation of aeroplane trim, flight path or altitude but the landing will not be completed automatically.

• Fail-operational automatic landing system - if in the event of a failure, the approach, flare and landing can be completed by the remaining part of the automatic system.

• Decision altitude/height (DA/H) - is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go-around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety (JAA)

Decision Height

• JAA - for CAT II and CAT IIIA the visual reference to contain not less than a 3 light segment

• JAA - CAT IIIB visual reference to contain one centreline light

Alert Height

• Alert Height - height above runway based on the characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail operational automatic landing system, above which a CAT III approach would be discontinued and a missed approach initiated if a failure occurred in one of the redundant parts of the automatic landing system, or in the relevant ground equipment

Alert Height

• Go-around above Alert Height for failures (AFM) affecting fail operational system

• Below Alert Height continue except for Autoland warning

• Height evaluated during certification – A 330 = 200feet• Operators can select lower Alert Height

RVR• Runway Visual Range - range over which a pilot of

an aircraft on the centreline of the runway can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centreline

• Three basic portions of runway - the touchdown zone (TDZ), the mid-runway portion (MID) and the rollout portion or stop end

• There might be a 4th transmissometer, called “far end”

• For CAT II TDZ required• For CAT III TDZ and Mid required• For lowest weather FAA requires all (only two,

TDZ & MID in case the 3rd is inop)• For CAT III with no DH JAA require only one

• RVR is not the Slant Visual Range (SVR) seen by the pilot

RVR Minima

• Establish an RVR to to be associated with that DH to ensure required visual reference is established

• Correlation between visual segment SVR - RVR• Eye position is important• Landing lights can obscure required visual reference

in CAT III

Types of Minima

• Airfield Operating Minima - established in accordance with aerodrome OCH

• Operator Minima - Lowest minima approved by authority for use by an air operator

• Crew Minima - lowest for a crew depending on their qualification/experience

• Aircraft minima - demonstrated during aircraft certification and found in the AFM

1000 ft US OPS SPEC

Cat II below 1.200ft (1.000ft) on CAT III facilities arpts & rwys (DGAC & Ops Spec)

Cat III A: 700 ft Cat III B: 600 ft

Cat III A: 50 ft Cat III B: 0 ft

CAT III A III B U.S. OPS SPEC

Lowest RVR:

Lowest DH :

Field Length Factor: 1.15

( 200 mts )

( 175 mts )

BUT, according Air Europa Ops Specs (C 060, d. (4) )…

• “For CAT III landing minimums as low as Touchdown Zone RVR 300 ( 75 mts ) Mid RVR 300 and Roll Out RVR 300, rq:

1. The TDZ, MID & Roll Out RVR systems are normally req. And are controlling[…]

2. If one of this RVR is temp inop, ops may be continued using the two remaining RVR and both are controlling […]

LUCES DE PISTA Y APP

CAT III B

MUCHAS GRACIAS POR

VUESTRA ATENCIÓN

Aeroplane and

Equipment

• Aircraft requires CAT II/III approval• Operational approval is required• JAR AWO section 1 (Autoland), Section 2

CAT II and section 3 (CAT III)• FAA AC20-57A (autoland), AC 120-29 (CAT

II) and AC 120-28D (CAT III)

Aeroplane and Equipment Certification

Aerodrome Requirements

• Standards and Recommendations from ICAO Annex 10 (ILS) and ICAO Annex 14 (Aerodrome) are internationally accepted

• Additional requirements/variants may be found in national regulations

• Summary view of typical CAT II/III airfield

Aerodrome Requirements - Runway

• Runway length - operational requirement• Runway width - normally < 45m• Slope 1st/last quarter < 0.8%• Auto Landing - maximum 2% per 30m in area just before

threshold (60m by 200m)• Objects on runway strip - nil within 60m of centreline

(except frangible)• Taxi-holding positions not < 90m

Aerodrome Requirements Visual Aids -Aerodrome

• Markings centreline, touchdown, taxiway, taxi-holding position markings

• High intensity threshold, runway end lights, runway touchdown zone lights and runway centreline lights, taxiway centreline lights if <400m visibility, stop bars <400m visibility

Aerodrome Requirements Visual Aids - Approach

• Approach Lights required for CAT II only• Extended centreline, side row, crossbar

Aerodrome RequirementsObstacle Clearance Area

• Obstacle Clearance Altitude/Height (OCH/OCA) - lowest height above threshold (aerodrome) used in establishing compliance with appropriate obstacle clearance criteria

• Minimum DH for CAT II cannot be less than established OCH/A

• OCH/A is a function of aircraft category

Aerodrome RequirementsObstacle Clearance Area

• Obstacle Free Zone– airspace above inner approach surface, inner

transitional and balked landing surfaces and that portion of the strip

– not penetrated by obstacles except frangible mounted required for air transportation purposes

Aerodrome RequirementsILS Facility

• Three categories (Annex 10)– 60m (200ft) for CAT I– 15m (50ft) for CAT II (acceptable to be used

for CAT III with the highest minima (DH not< 50ft)

– Runway surface and along the runway for CAT III

Aerodrome RequirementsILS Facility

• ILS Critical Area - aircraft/vehicles are excluded during all ILS operations because they will cause disturbances to ILS signal

• ILS Sensitive Area - area extending beyond the critical area where movement and/or parking of aircraft and vehicles is controlled to prevent the possibility

• ILS beam to be protected by longitudinal separation

Aerodrome RequirementsRVR Measurements

• Number depend on type of operation• Generally 110 to 150m from centreline• Nominally 5m-10m in height• ICAO recommends readout of 50m increments when

RVR less than 800m and 25m increments when RVR less than 150m

• Normally ATC give Mid unless the others lower

• Title 14 CFR Part 97 (Cat II ops)• CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COCHABAMBA SLCB/CBB

BRIEF SIM

FLIGHT TO SLCB DIVERTED FROMSLVRSLCB Wx CALM 9999 OVCST 150010/04 1026

FL 180 , CLEARED TO VAREB PORKIAPPROACH RWY 32 ILS 4 Rwy 32/ DESCENT LIMA VOR DME 3 Rwy 32

ZFM 158 FUEL7.0ZFM CG 30%

ILS 4 Rwy 32

GO AROUND ATDA (8600’)

ENGINE FAILAFTER G/A

PROCEED BACKTO PORKI

VOR DME 3 Rwy 32

GO AROUND AT MDA (9350’)

ENG FAIL AT G/A

VOR DME 3 Rwy 32

LANDING

Rwy 14"NON-STD. At D6.5 CBA turn RIGHT to CLIZA. At CLIZA turn LEFT to 300°, intercept and follow R150 to CBA to CBA HP. D112.1 CBA HP: Inbound 102°, RIGHT turn.“

Rwy32"NON-STD. At D5 CBA turn LEFT to CBA HP. D112.1 CBA HP: Inbound 102°, RIGHT turn.”

CBB EFP’s

Para la aproximación ILS a la pista 32, pondremos los mínimos VOR (9350´). En caso de “GO AROUND” antes de estos mínimos, realizaremos el procedimiento de frustrada de la ficha. Si tenemos que frustrar después de estos mínimos (wind shear, avión en pista, etc..) entonces en la frustrada realizaremos el procedimiento de fallo de motor.

A330-GE FOR TRAINING ONLY

A330- 772B FOR TRAINING ONLY

Seleccionamos la opción WEATHER / desde el menú principal.

Dentro de la opción TEMPERATURE PROFILE seleccionamos la temperatura del campo.

También seleccionamos TEMP GRAD y lo modificamos a -3 grados para que la temperatura en altura sea la correcta.

Simu jul dec 12-a

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