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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.
ADAM BURDEN, LARRY RILEY VINCENT ROBINSON, TAMIKA MILLER and TARA LAZIER,
Plaintiffs,
v. THE CITY OF OPA LOCKA, FLORIDA,
A political subdivision of the State of Florida; and
CHERYL CASON, in her official capacity as
Chief of Police for the City of Opa Locka,
Florida, and in her individual capacity; and
CLARENCE PATTERSON, in his official
Capacity as City Manager for the City of Opa
Locka, Florida and in his individual capacity.
Defendants.
________________________________________________/
COMPLAINT and JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff(s) ADAM BURDEN(BURDEN), LARRY RILEY(RILEY), VINCENT
ROBINSON(ROBINSON), TAMIKA MILLER(MILLER) and TARA LAZIER(LAZIER) , by and
through his undersigned counsel, hereby sues Defendants THE CITY OF OPA LOCKA (CITY),
FLORIDA, A political subdivision of the State of Florida; and CHERYL CASON (CHIEF) , in her
official capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Opa Locka, Florida, and in her individual capacity;
and CLARENCE PATTERSON (PATTERSON) , in his official Capacity as City Manager for the
City of Opa Locka, Florida and in his individual capacity and alleges the following:
INTRODUCTION
1. This is a claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking damages in excess of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs; for overtime compensation and other relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §216(b); for violation of the FMLA and for violation of
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”.
2. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the Constitutional claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, this Court is vested with jurisdiction to order an injunction, award front
pay, back pay, order reinstatement, or provide any other equitable relief as may be proper, as well as
awarding compensatory damages, attorney's fees and court costs, expenses, pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest, and any other legal and/or equitable relief deemed appropriate by this Court;
Jurisdiction for the FMLA claims is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1331 and by 29 U.S.C.
§261(a)(2); Jurisdiction over the FLSA is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1337 and by 29 U.S.C. §216(b);
3. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Florida claim(s) pursuant to 29
U.S.C. §1367 and original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1343(b)
4. Venue is proper in this Court because the CITY maintains offices, does business, and
is located within Opa Locka, Florida, Miami-Dade County, Florida. In addition, venue is appropriate
within this Federal District and Division because the injury was sustained, and the conduct and cause
of action which gives rise to the instant suit occurred within Miami-Dade County, Florida.
5. Plaintiff BURDEN is an adult male individual who resides in Florida and is a
"person" under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and an employee entitled to bring such action. At all times material
hereto, BURDEN served as a Police Officer within the City of Opa Locka Police Department
("OLPD"), i.e. the CITY.
6. Plaintiff RILEY is an adult male individual who resides in Florida and is a "person"
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and an employee entitled to bring such action. At all times material hereto,
RILEY served as a Police Officer within the City of Opa Locka Police Department ("OLPD"), i.e.
the CITY.
7. Plaintiff ROBINSON is an adult male individual who resides in Florida and is a
"person" under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and an employee entitled to bring such action. At all times material
hereto, ROBINSON served as a Police Officer within the City of Opa Locka Police Department
("OLPD"), i.e. the CITY.
8. Plaintiff MILLER is an adult female individual who resides in Florida and is a
"person" under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and an employee entitled to bring such action. At all times material
hereto, MILLER served as a “Crime Analyst” within the City of Opa Locka Police Department
("OLPD"), i.e. the CITY.
9. Plaintiff LAZIER is an adult male individual who resides in Florida and is a "person"
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and an employee entitled to bring such action. At all times material hereto,
LAZIER served as a Police Officer within the City of Opa Locka Police Department ("OLPD"), i.e.
the CITY.
10. Defendant CITY is a municipal subdivision of the State of Florida and, at all times
material hereto, was and is the public employer of Plaintiff(S) . Further, Defendant CITY was and is
an "employer" and an entity subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983
11. At all times relevant hereto, CITY , is and at all times mentioned herein was an
employer within the meaning of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
12. All conditions precdent to the maintenance of this action by all Plaintiffs have occurred
or have been waived, performed or excused.
COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
13. On Jaunary 27th
, 2011 the Human Resources director for the City of Opa Locka started
conducting a fact finding within the City of Opa Locka Police Department at the direction
of the City Manager, as a result of claims, concerns and comments as to the dissatisfaction
or cocnerns within the Police Department.
14. Each of the Plaintiffs participated in the fact finding inquiry, being interviewed with
the understanding that all comments and information was being provided confidentially.
15. A report was issued on February 28th
, 2011 in which numerous serious incidents were
revealed as to the everyday operations of the “Department”, which appeared to be systemic
in nature and of great public concern.
16. In particular, Plaitiffs made the inquiring body aware of Officers within the Police
Department being:
a. Concerned about favortism.
b. Officers not being reprimanded for violations of the code of conduct.
c. Complaints which are filed are not investigated or followed-up on with the
complaining officer.
d. Information about assignments is not disseminated in writing.
e. Officer are afraid to file a greivance for fear of reprisal.
f. Senior officers are not given consideration for promotion in a fair process
or with any transparency.
g. Rumors are not dealt with in a professional manner and at times invades
officers personal lives, with phone calls being placed to officers homes and to
family memebrs.
h. The department is interfered with politically and influenced by such
politics into making decisions.
i. Officers ordered to change patrol logs, evidence and arrest records.
j. Officers ordered to pay for traffic tickets issued to politically connected
persons.
k. Property stolen or removed from Police custody.
17. Subseuqent to the February 28th
, 2011 report each of the Plaintiffs were retaliated
against by the CHIEF as is delineated for each Plaintiff below.
COUNT I
42 U.S.C. §1983 &
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”
ADAM BURDEN
18. Plaintiff BURDEN was hired as Deputy Chief of the Opa Locka Police Department in
January 2010.
19. Plaintiff BURDEN participated in the “Confidfential Inquiry” referenced in 13 above.
20. Subsequent to his participation, but prior to the written report being issued the CHIEF
started rumors that BURDEN was engaging in romantic interactions with an employee of
the Department.
21. On February 15th
, 2011 the CHIEF was involved in an automobile accident while in a
CITY owned vehicle. The CHIEF failed to follow CITY and Department procedures and
did not report the accident properly. Instead, the CHIEF attempted to get the vehicle
repaired while not revealing the occurrence.
22. As Deputy Chief, BURDEN reported the CHIEF’s non compliance with CITY and
Department procedures as well as the circumstances surrounding the actions taken after the
accident by the CHIEF, to the City Manager, Clarence Patterson.
23. The City Manager then suspended the CHIEF.
24. The CHIEF returned to active duty from suspension on or about March 20th
, 2011.
25. On March 21st, 2011 the CHIEF via a memo to the City Manager requested that
BURDEN be relieved of duty due to “recent circumstances”, effective immediately.
26. On March 22, 2011 the City Manager terminated BURDEN’s employment with the
City Police Department.
27. Such termination was in retaliation for BURDEN “blowing the whistle” on the CHIEF
in violation of Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.
28. All of the foregoing retaliatory actions have been taken, against BURDEN because of
his truthful testimony in the confidential inquiry, as well as for "blowing the whistle" on a
matter of public concerns; namely, the CHIEF’s failure to follow CITY and Department
procedures.
29. At all times material hereto, the CITY, through its authorized agents and employees
(most notably, CHIEF) were and are aware that retaliation for speaking out on matters of
public concern is prohibited under the First Amendment and Florida Statutes 112.3187
“Whistle-blower’s Act.
30. No legitimate business reasons existed under the CITY's policies, past practices,
procedures and/or supervisory instructions to justify the retaliation against BURDEN with
the “loss of confidence” based allegations lodged against BURDEN being a mere pretext
for retaliation.
31. Plaintiff BURDEN would not have been the subject of retaliation in the form of a
hostile work environment, and the other retaliatory conduct complained of herein,
specifically his termination but for his constitutionally protected speech activities
32. No legitimate governmental interest was served by denial of BURDEN's free speech
rights.
33. The conduct complained of herein was taken under color of the laws of the State of
Florida.
34. The persons who engaged in the conduct of which BURDEN complains, (primarily
CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON, were of such position and authority so that their acts
may fairly be said to constitute the official expressions of the CITY's custom, policy or
usage. In fact, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON were the final policy and ultimate
decision makers for the CITY's police department and CITY, respectively, in terms of
policy and personnel matters.
35. As a result of the conduct by the CITY, through the deliberate and willful actions of
primarily CHIEF CASON in retaliation for BURDEN's exercise of his constitutionally
protected right to freedom of speech, BURDEN has been subjected to deprivation of his rights
as secured and protected to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States, and has been thereby damaged.
36. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the CITY's actions, BURDEN has
suffered past and future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, embarrassment,
humiliation, inconvenience and mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of dignity,
emotional distress and other non-pecuniary losses and intangible injuries, specifically through
actions of the CITY"s agents and employees, BURDEN has been tangibly harmed concerning
the terms and conditions of his employment, which damages include loss of pay and benefits;
damage to his chosen career path, including the damage by being required to spend money in
an effort to secure other employment; loss of retirement and pension benefits, damage to his
reputation, both as a person and as a public servant, damage by loss of dignity; as well as
severe emotional anguish and distress.
37. Plaintiff is entitled to and seeks an award of attorney's fees for bringing this action,
as part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff BURDEN respectfully prays:
(a) that he be awarded compensatory damages in excess of $75,000.00 against the
Defendants, CITY, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON , jointly and severally, in
both CHIEF CASONS' and PATTERSON'S official and individual capacities
including, but not limited to: for past and future lost compensation caused by the
loss of any salary or merit increases; for damage to his career; for damages for
severe mental anguish and suffering; for damage to BURDEN's reputation as an
individual and as a public employee; and for other direct and consequential
damages suffered by Plaintiff as the direct and proximate result of all of the
Defendants' actions in violation of Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional
right to free association;
(b) that he be awarded prejudgment interest;
(c) that a Final Order be entered directing that all disciplinary actions, negative
comments, and claims of performance deficiencies against BURDEN and forming
a matter of public record be expunged, or declared to have been improperly issued,
to the extent permissible by Florida law;
(d) that BURDEN be awarded front pay and benefits for a reasonable time, within the
discretion of this Court, in lieu of reinstatement, should BURDEN be terminated
prior to trial and if determined that reinstatement is impossible or impractical;
(e) that BURDEN be awarded costs of this action, including reasonable attorney's
fees as apart of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§1988; and
(f) that BURDEN be awarded such other legal and/or equitable relief as may be
deemed appropriate by this Court.
COUNT II
42 U.S.C. §1983 &
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”
LARRY RILEY
38. Plaintiff Larry Riley was hired by the City of Opa Locka Police Department in January
2010 as a Captain in charge of the “Internal Affairs” Department.
39. Plaintiff RILEY participated in the “Confidfential Inquiry” referenced in 13 above.
40. Prior to the RILEY participating in the “Inquiry”, RILEY brought to the attention of
the CHIEF and others in the City political hiearchy potential crimminal activity of a code
enforcement officer. RILEY had been asked to investigate a number of large code
enforcement fines levied against a local business.
41. Upon conducting his investigation, RILEY found that the Code enforcement officer
may have been engaging in questionable activity.
42. Subequent to RILEY participating in the “Inquiry”, RILEY was informed in no
uncertain terms to “drop” the investigation he was previously assigned.
43. On April 13th
, 2011, RILEY was terminated from his employment with the CITY at the
CHIEF’s request.
44. All of the foregoing retaliatory actions have been taken, against RILEY because of his
truthful testimony in the confidential inquiry, as well as for "blowing the whistle" on a
matter of public concerns; namely, the investigation of the code enforcement officer.
45. At all times material hereto, the CITY, through its authorized agents and employees
(most notably, CHIEF) were and are aware that retaliation for speaking out on matters of
public concern is prohibited under the First Amendment and Florida Statutes 112.3187
“Whistle-blower’s Act.
46. No legitimate business reasons existed under the CITY's policies, past practices,
procedures and/or supervisory instructions to justify the retaliation against RILEY with the
“loss of confidence” based allegations lodged against RILEY being a mere pretext for
retaliation.
47. Plaintiff RILEY would not have been the subject of retaliation in the form of a hostile
work environment, and the other retaliatory conduct complained of herein, including his
termination but for his constitutionally protected speech activities
48. No legitimate governmental interest was served by denial of RILEY 's free speech
rights.
49. The conduct complained of herein was taken under color of the laws of the State of
Florida.
50. The persons who engaged in the conduct of which RILEY complains, (primarily
CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON, were of such position and authority so that their acts
may fairly be said to constitute the official expressions of the CITY's custom, policy or
usage. In fact, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON were the final policy and ultimate
decision makers for the CITY's police department and CITY, respectively, in terms of
policy and personnel matters.
51. As a result of the conduct by the CITY, through the deliberate and willful actions of
primarily CHIEF CASON in retaliation for RILEY's exercise of his constitutionally
protected right to freedom of speech, RILEY has been subjected to deprivation of his
rights as secured and protected to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, and has been thereby damaged.
52. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the CITY's actions, RILEY has
suffered past and future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, embarrassment,
humiliation, inconvenience and mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of dignity,
emotional distress and other non-pecuniary losses and intangible injuries, specifically
through actions of the CITY"s agents and employees, RILEY has been tangibly harmed
concerning the terms and conditions of his employment, which damages include loss of
pay and benefits; damage to his chosen career path, including the damage by being required
to spend money in an effort to secure other employment; loss of retirement and pension
benefits, damage to his reputation, both as a person and as a public servant, damage by loss
of dignity; as well as severe emotional anguish and distress.
53. Plaintiff is entitled to and seeks an award of attorney's fees for bringing this action, as
part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff RILEY respectfully prays:
(a) that he be awarded compensatory damages in excess of $75,000.00 against the
Defendants, CITY, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON , jointly and severally, in
both CHIEF CASONS' and PATTERSON'S official and individual capacities
including, but not limited to: for past and future lost compensation caused by the
loss of any salary or merit increases; for damage to his career; for damages for
severe mental anguish and suffering; for damage to RILEY's reputation as an
individual and as a public employee; and for other direct and consequential
damages suffered by Plaintiff as the direct and proximate result of all of the
Defendants' actions in violation of Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional
right to free association;
(g) that he be awarded prejudgment interest;
(h) that a Final Order be entered directing that all disciplinary actions, negative
comments, and claims of performance deficiencies against RILEY and forming a
matter of public record be expunged, or declared to have been improperly issued,
to the extent permissible by Florida law;
(i) that RILEY be awarded front pay and benefits for a reasonable time, within the
discretion of this Court, in lieu of reinstatement, should RILEY be terminated
prior to trial and if determined that reinstatement is impossible or impractical;
(j) that RILEY be awarded costs of this action, including reasonable attorney's fees
as apart of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§1988; and
(k) that RILEY be awarded such other legal and/or equitable relief as may be
deemed appropriate by this Court.
COUNT III
42 U.S.C. §1983 &
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”
VINCENT ROBINSON
54. Plaintiff ROBINSON has been a police officer employed by the City of Opa Locka
Police Department in excess of 15 years.
55. At the current time ROBINSON holds the rank of Major within the Police Department.
56. Plaintiff ROBINSON participated in the “Confidfential Inquiry” referenced in 13
above.
57. Subsequent to participating in the “Inquiry”, the CHIEF stripped ROBINSON of the
title “Operations” and reassigned ROBINSON to a community based unit which at the time
was slated for disbandment due to lack of renewed funding by the City of Opa Locka
Commission.
58. At the same time, the CHIEF moved ROBINSON’s physical offices to a building
outside of the main Police Department, with no provision of essential support, including no
computer resources.
59. Access to the new building was shutdown for ROBINSON for a porlonged period of
time.
60. The CHIEF placed ROBINSON on night patrol.
61. ROBSINON filed written complaints with the City complaining of the above conduct.
62. Subsequent to ROBINSON’s written complaints and subsequent to the “inquiry
report”, the CHIEF has changed ROBINSON’s assigments on a weekly basis and has
refused to put such reassigments in writing.
63. The CHIEF since the “inquiry report” has stated in the presence of other officers, that
ROBINSON was spreading lies about the CHIEF, specifically allegations in the
confidential inquiry that ROBINSON was ordered to pay for traffic citation ticket given to
relatives of persosns connected to the police department or with political connection.
64. ROBINSON has been subjected to a hostile work envirnoment due to his participation
in the “Inquiry” and in carrying out his job requirements as Major.
65. Such stress has caused ROBINSON to take medically necessary time away from
employment under the FMLA.
66. All of the foregoing retaliatory actions have been taken, against ROBINSON because
of his truthful testimony in the confidential inquiry, as well as for "blowing the whistle" on
a matter of public concerns.
67. At all times material hereto, the CITY, through its authorized agents and employees
(most notably, CHIEF) were and are aware that retaliation for speaking out on matters of
public concern is prohibited under the First Amendment and Florida Statutes 112.3187
“Whistle-blower’s Act.
68. No legitimate business reasons existed under the CITY's policies, past practices,
procedures and/or supervisory instructions to justify the retaliation against ROBINSON
with the “loss of confidence” based allegations lodged against ROBINSON being a mere
pretext for retaliation.
69. The conduct complained of herein was taken under color of the laws of the State of
Florida.
70. The persons who engaged in the conduct of which ROBINSON complains, (primarily
CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON, were of such position and authority so that their acts
may fairly be said to constitute the official expressions of the CITY's custom, policy or
usage. In fact, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON were the final policy and ultimate
decision makers for the CITY's police department and CITY, respectively, in terms of
policy and personnel matters.
71.
72. Plaintiff ROBINSON would not have been the subject of retaliation in the form of a
hostile work environment, and the other retaliatory conduct complained of herein but for
her constitutionally protected speech activities
73. No legitimate governmental interest was served by denial of ROBSINON's
free speech rights.
74. As a result of the conduct by the CITY, through the deliberate and willful
actions of primarily CHIEF CASON in retaliation for ROBINSON's exercise of his
constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech, ROBINSON has been subjected to
deprivation of his rights as secured and protected to him by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and has been thereby damaged.
75. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the CITY's actions,
ROBINSON has suffered past and future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
embarrassment, humiliation, inconvenience and mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
loss of dignity, emotional distress and other non-pecuniary losses and intangible injuries,
specifically through actions of the CITY"s agents and employees, ROBINSON has been
tangibly harmed concerning the terms and conditions of his employment, which damages
include loss of pay and benefits; damage to his chosen career path, including the damage by
being required to spend money in an effort to secure other employment; loss of retirement and
pension benefits, damage to his reputation, both as a person and as a public servant, damage
by loss of dignity; as well as severe emotional anguish and distress.
76. Plaintiff is entitled to and seeks an award of attorney's fees for bringing this action,
as part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff ROBINSON respectfully prays:
(a) that he be awarded compensatory damages in excess of $75,000.00 against the
Defendants, CITY, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON , jointly and severally, in
both CHIEF CASONS' and PATTERSON'S official and individual capacities
including, but not limited to: for past and future lost compensation caused by the
loss of any salary or merit increases; for damage to his career; for damages for
severe mental anguish and suffering; for damage to ROBINSON's reputation as
an individual and as a public employee; and for other direct and consequential
damages suffered by Plaintiff as the direct and proximate result of all of the
Defendants' actions in violation of Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional
right to free association;
(l) that he be awarded prejudgment interest;
(m) that a Final Order be entered directing that all disciplinary actions, negative
comments, and claims of performance deficiencies against ROBINSON and
forming a matter of public record be expunged, or declared to have been
improperly issued, to the extent permissible by Florida law;
(n) that ROBINSON be awarded front pay and benefits for a reasonable time, within
the discretion of this Court, in lieu of reinstatement, should ROBINSON be
terminated prior to trial and if determined that reinstatement is impossible or
impractical;
(o) that ROBINSON be awarded costs of this action, including reasonable attorney's
fees as apart of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§1988; and
(p) that ROBINSON be awarded such other legal and/or equitable relief as may
be deemed appropriate by this Court.
COUNT IV
42 U.S.C. §1983 &
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”
Fair Labor Standards Act
TAMIKA MILLER
-A-
42 U.S.C. §1983 &
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”
77. Plaintiff MILLER is employed by the City of Opa Locka Police Department in a
civilian position as a “Crime Analyst”
78. Plaintiff MILLER participated in the “Confidfential Inquiry” referenced in 13 above.
79. Subsequent to participating in the “Inquiry”, the CHIEF reassigned MILLER to a
community based unit which at the time was slated for disbandment due to lack of renewed
funding by the City of Opa Locka Commission.
80. At the same time, the CHIEF moved MILLER’s physical offices to a building outside
of the main Police Department, with no provision of essential support, including no
computer or telephone resources.
81. Access to the new building was shutdown for MILLER for a prolonged period of time.
82. MILLER filed written complaints with the City complaining of the above conduct.
83. Subsequent to MILLER’s written complaints and subsequent to the “inquiry report”,
the CHIEF has changed MILLER’s assigments on a weekly basis and has refused to put
such reassigments in writing.
84. The CHIEF since the “inquiry report” has stated in the presence of other officers, that
MILLER was of a character not favorable to a female.
85. On or about May 23rd
, 2011, a number of Police officers appeared at MILLER’S office
along with Deputy Chief Barrett and requested MILLER sign a disiplinary form alleging
that MILLER was away from work on various dates and times, which referenced periods
taking place three (3) weeks prior.
86. The time taken away from MILLER’S employment was in connection with a State
Attorney’s subpoena, requiring MILLER to appear and give testimony in connection with
an ehtics probe of the City of Opa Locka’s Police Department by the State Attorney’s
office.
87. Such subpoena had been previously been clocked and logged in by the City of Opa
Locka’s Police court liasion officer.
88. MILLER has been subjected to a hostile work envirnoment due to her participation in
the “Inquiry” and in carrying out her job requirements, specifically complying with the
subpoena issued by the State Attorney’s office.
89. All of the foregoing retaliatory actions have been taken, against MILLER because of
her truthful testimony in the confidential inquiry, as well as for "blowing the whistle" on a
matter of public concerns; namely, an officer using a stun instrument on another officer
during horseplay and not being disciplined or investigated.
90. At all times material hereto, the CITY, through its authorized agents and employees
(most notably, CHIEF) were and are aware that retaliation for speaking out on matters of
public concern is prohibited under the First Amendment and Florida Statutes 112.3187
“Whistle-blower’s Act.
91. No legitimate business reasons existed under the CITY's policies, past practices,
procedures and/or supervisory instructions to justify the retaliation against MILLER with
the “loss of confidence” based allegations lodged against MILLER being a mere pretext
for retaliation.
92. The conduct complained of herein was taken under color of the laws of the State of
Florida.
93. The persons who engaged in the conduct of which MILLER complains, (primarily
CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON, were of such position and authority so that their acts
may fairly be said to constitute the official expressions of the CITY's custom, policy or
usage. In fact, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON were the final policy and ultimate
decision makers for the CITY's police department and CITY, respectively, in terms of
policy and personnel matters.
94. Plaintiff MILLER would not have been the subject of retaliation in the form of a
hostile work environment, and the other retaliatory conduct complained of herein but for
her constitutionally protected speech activities
95. No legitimate governmental interest was served by denial of MILLER's free speech
rights.
96. As a result of the conduct by the CITY, through the deliberate and willful actions of
primarily CHIEF CASON in retaliation for MILLER's exercise of his constitutionally protected
right to freedom of speech, MILLER has been subjected to deprivation of his rights as secured
and protected to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, and has been thereby damaged.
97. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the CITY's actions, MILLER has
suffered past and future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, embarrassment, humiliation,
inconvenience and mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of dignity, emotional distress
and other non-pecuniary losses and intangible injuries, specifically through actions of the
CITY"s agents and employees, MILLER has been tangibly harmed concerning the terms and
conditions of his employment, which damages include loss of pay and benefits; damage to his
chosen career path, including the damage by being required to spend money in an effort to secure
other employment; loss of retirement and pension benefits, damage to his reputation, both as a
person and as a public servant, damage by loss of dignity; as well as severe emotional anguish
and distress.
98. Plaintiff is entitled to and seeks an award of attorney's fees for bringing this action,
as part of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
-B-
Fair Labor Standards Act
99. Plaintiff MILLER performed non-exempt work providing labor duties for
Defendants in South Florida.
100. At all times material to this Complaint , Defednant CITY, was engaged in interstate
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined in the Act 29 U.S.C. §203(r)
and 203(s). Based upon information and belief, the annual gross sales volumes of Defednant
CITY was in excess of $500,000.00 per anum
101. MILLER is entitled to be paid time and one-half of her regular pay for each hour
worked in excess of Forty (40) hours per work week for the time period June 3rd
, 2008
through June 1st , 2011, estimated to be 36 hours each week the Plaintiff was employed
by the employer.
102. However, the Defendant CITY did not pay time and half wages for all of the overtime
hours worked by MILLER.
103. By reason of the said intentional, willful and unlawful acts of the Defendants, Plaintiff
MILLER has suffered damages plus incurring costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
104. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the Act, Plaintiff MILLER is entitled
to liquidated damges.
105. The records concerning the hours worked by, if any, MILLER are in the possession
and custody of the Defendants. The records concerning the compensation actually paid to
the Plaintiffs an all other similarly situated employees are in the possession and custody of
the Defendants
106. Plaintiffs have retained the undersigned counsel to represent them in this action, and
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), Plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred in his action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff MILLER respectfully prays:
(a) that he be awarded compensatory damages in excess of $75,000.00 against
the Defendants, CITY, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON , jointly and
severally, in both CHIEF CASONS' and PATTERSON'S official and
individual capacities including, but not limited to: for past and future lost
compensation caused by the loss of any salary or merit increases; for damage
to his career; for damages for severe mental anguish and suffering; for damage
to MILLER's reputation as an individual and as a public employee; and for
other direct and consequential damages suffered by Plaintiff as the direct and
proximate result of all of the Defendants' actions in violation of Plaintiffs
clearly established constitutional right to free association;
(b) that he be awarded prejudgment interest;
(c) that a Final Order be entered directing that all disciplinary actions, negative
comments, and claims of performance deficiencies against MILLER and forming
a matter of public record be expunged, or declared to have been improperly issued,
to the extent permissible by Florida law;
(d) that MILLER be awarded front pay and benefits for a reasonable time,
within the discretion of this Court, in lieu of reinstatement, should MILLER
be terminated prior to trial and if determined that reinstatement is impossible
or impractical;
(e) that MILLER be awarded costs of this action, including reasonable
attorney's fees as apart of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§1988; and
(f) . for payment of for the payment of all overtime hours at one and one-half
their regular rate of pay due them for the hours worked by them for which
they have not been properly compensated and liquidated damages.
(g) that MILLER be awarded such other legal and/or equitable relief as may
be deemed appropriate by this Court.
COUNT III
42 U.S.C. §1983 &
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”
Fair Labor Standards Act & Family Medical Leave Act
TARA LAZIER
-A-
42 U.S.C. §1983 &
Florida Statutes 112.3187 “Whistle-blower’s Act.”
107. Plaintiff LAZIER has been a police officer employed by the City of Opa Locka Police
Department in excess of 10 years.
108. At the current time LAZIER is a police officer within the Police Department.
109. Plaintiff LAZIER participated in the “Confidfential Inquiry” referenced in 13 above.
110. Subsequent to participating in the “Inquiry”, the CHIEF reassigned LAZIER to the
“internal affairs” department and moved LAZIER’s physical office.
111. Shortly after having her office moved and while occupying her new office, LAZIER
discovered a recording device hidden within the desk of a co-worker, such device was
recording all conversations within the office.
112. LAZIER reported this incident to the Human Resources Department.
113. LAZIER was then placed on the “night” shift at the CHIEF’s direction.
114. Subsequent to participating in the “Inquiry” and subsequent to the “recording” incident,
the CHIEF reassigned LAZIER to a community based unit which at the time was slated
for disbandment due to lack of renewed funding by the City of Opa Locka Commission.
115. At the same time, the CHIEF moved LAZIER’s physical offices again to a building
outside of the main Police Department, with no provision of essential support, including no
computer or telephone resources.
116. Access to the new building was shutdown for LAZIER for a prolonged period of time.
117. LAZIER filed written complaints with the City complaining of the above conduct.
118. Subsequent to MILLER’s written complaints and subsequent to the “inquiry report”,
the CHIEF has changed MILLER’s assigments on a weekly basis and has refused to put
such reassigments in writing.
119. Subsequent to the “recording incident”, LAZIER needed to take FMLA medical leave
due to the envirnoment within the Police Department.
120. Upon LAZIER’s return form FMLA the CHIEF reassigned LAZIER once again, this
time to the Code Enforcement Department, a Department not associated with the Police
Department..
121. LAZIER has been subjected to a hostile work envirnoment due to her participation in
the “Inquiry” and in carrying out her job requirements.
122. All of the foregoing retaliatory actions have been taken, against LAZIER because of
her truthful testimony in the confidential inquiry, as well as for "blowing the whistle" on a
matter of public concerns; namely, the systemic deviations in carrying out City policy
within the Police Department.
123. At all times material hereto, the CITY, through its authorized agents and employees
(most notably, CHIEF) were and are aware that retaliation for speaking out on matters of
public concern is prohibited under the First Amendment and Florida Statutes 112.3187
“Whistle-blower’s Act.
124. No legitimate business reasons existed under the CITY's policies, past practices,
procedures and/or supervisory instructions to justify the retaliation against LAZIER with
the “loss of confidence” based allegations lodged against LAZIER being a mere pretext
for retaliation.
125. The conduct complained of herein was taken under color of the laws of the State of
Florida.
126. The persons who engaged in the conduct of which LAZIER complains, (primarily
CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON, were of such position and authority so that their acts
may fairly be said to constitute the official expressions of the CITY's custom, policy or
usage. In fact, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON were the final policy and ultimate
decision makers for the CITY's police department and CITY, respectively, in terms of
policy and personnel matters.
127.
128. Plaintiff LAZIER would not have been the subject of retaliation in the form of a
hostile work environment, and the other retaliatory conduct complained of herein but for
her constitutionally protected speech activities
129. No legitimate governmental interest was served by denial of LAZIER's free speech
rights.
130. As a result of the conduct by the CITY, through the deliberate and willful
actions of primarily CHIEF CASON in retaliation for LAZIER's exercise of his
constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech, LAZIER has been subjected to
deprivation of his rights as secured and protected to him by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and has been thereby damaged.
131. As a direct, proximate and foreseeable result of the CITY's actions, LAZIER
has suffered past and future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, embarrassment,
humiliation, inconvenience and mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of dignity,
emotional distress and other non-pecuniary losses and intangible injuries, specifically through
actions of the CITY"s agents and employees, LAZIER has been tangibly harmed concerning
the terms and conditions of his employment, which damages include loss of pay and benefits;
damage to his chosen career path, including the damage by being required to spend money in
an effort to secure other employment; loss of retirement and pension benefits, damage to his
reputation, both as a person and as a public servant, damage by loss of dignity; as well as
severe emotional anguish and distress.
-B-
Fair Labor Standards Act
132. Plaintiff LAZIER performed non-exempt work providing labor duties for
Defendants in South Florida.
133. At all times material to this Complaint , Defednant CITY, was engaged in interstate
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined in the Act 29 U.S.C. §203(r)
and 203(s). Based upon information and belief, the annual gross sales volumes of Defednant
CITY was in excess of $500,000.00 per anum
134. LAZIER is entitled to be paid time and one-half of her regular pay for each hour
worked in excess of Forty (40) hours per work week for the time period June 3rd
, 2008
through June 1st , 2011, estimated to be 36 hours each week the Plaintiff were employed
by the employer.
135. However, the Defendant CITY did not pay time and half wages for all of the overtime
hours worked by LAZIER.
136. By reason of the said intentional, willful and unlawful acts of the Defendants, Plaintiff
LAZIER has suffered damages plus incurring costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
137. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the Act, Plaintiff LAZIER is entitled
to liquidated damges.
138. The records concerning the hours worked by, if any, LAZIER are in the possession and
custody of the Defendants. The records concerning the compensation actually paid to the
Plaintiffs an all other similarly situated employees are in the possession and custody of the
Defendants
139. Plaintiff have retained the undersigned counsel to represent them in this action, and
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), Plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred in his action.
-C-
Violation of FMLA
140. Plaintiff LAZIER was a full-time employee who Defendant CITY employed for over one
year.
141. During the course of LAZIERs employment the Defendant CITY recognized the Family
Medical Leave Act “FMLA”.
142. Defendant’s recognized FMLA’s allowance for a 12 week leave of absence for serious
injuries such as Plaintiff’s.
143. On or about April 28, 2011 LAZIER applied for FMLA due to a serious health condition.
144. The City approved LAZIER’s leave for a period of time her physician indicated she should
be not able to work.
145. Upon LAZIER’s return to the Police Department, the CHIEF reassigned LAZIER to a
position within the Code Enforcement Department.
146. Such reassigment violates the FMLA in that LAZIER was not placed in a position equal
to her pre FMLA leave position.
147. As a result of Defendants’ actions, LAZIER has suffered irreparable injuries, including
but not limited to loss of pay, benefits and other economic losses, emotional pain and suffering,
mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, personal indignity and other intangible injuries for.
(a) that she be awarded compensatory damages in excess of $75,000.00 against
the Defendants, CITY, CHIEF CASON and PATTERSON , jointly and
severally, in both CHIEF CASONS' and PATTERSON'S official and
individual capacities including, but not limited to: for past and future lost
compensation caused by the loss of any salary or merit increases; for damage
to his career; for damages for severe mental anguish and suffering; for damage
to LAZIER's reputation as an individual and as a public employee; and for
other direct and consequential damages suffered by Plaintiff as the direct and
proximate result of all of the Defendants' actions in violation of Plaintiffs
clearly established constitutional right to free association;
(b) that he be awarded prejudgment interest;
(c) that a Final Order be entered directing that all disciplinary actions, negative
comments, and claims of performance deficiencies against LAZIER and forming
a matter of public record be expunged, or declared to have been improperly issued,
to the extent permissible by Florida law;
(d) that LAZIER be awarded front pay and benefits for a reasonable time, within
the discretion of this Court, in lieu of reinstatement, should LAZIER be
terminated prior to trial and if determined that reinstatement is impossible or
impractical;
(e) that LAZIER be awarded costs of this action, including reasonable attorney's
fees as apart of his costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§1988; and
(f) for payment of for the payment of all overtime hours at one and one-half
their regular rate of pay due them for the hours worked by them for which
they have not been properly compensated and liquidated damages.
(g) For reinstatement to the position she held prior to her FMLA leave;
(h) that LAZIER be awarded such other legal and/or equitable relief as may
be deemed appropriate by this Court.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff(s) BURDEN, RILEY, ROBINSON, MILLER and LAZIER, hereby respectfully demands trial by
jury on all issues and counts triable of right before a jury
Dated: Friday, June 03, 2011
Miramar ,Florida
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Alex J. Pearlberg
Alex J. Pearlberg
Florida Bar No. 934976
E-mail: [email protected]
Law Offices of Alex J. Pearlberg, LLC.
3350 SW 148th
Avenue
Suite 110
Miramar, Florida 33027
Telephone: 954-682-8843
Facsimile: 206-202-1821