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by Paolo Bragatto INAIL – Ricerca, Certificazione e Verifica - Centro Ricerca
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1/14
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New Models and New
Technologies for an Integrated
Risk Management in Complex
Environments
Paolo Bragatto
INAIL – Ricerca, Certificazione e Verifica
Centro Ricerca
Monteporzio Catone (RM) ITALIA
2/14
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A very short introduction
• Why the Workers Compensation Authority in this
conference?
• INAIL is not just compensation but a global protection
system for all workers in Italy. INAIL objectives include
also the rehabilitation of work accident victims, the
reduction of accident at works, …..
• Research Certification Area is in charge of
• research on prevention and safety at work,
• control and verification of work equipment,
installations and establishments.
• The Safety of major industrial plants and infrastructures,
involve both workers (employed, contractors) and local
communities, as well as land and environment. Safety
issues cannot be “cut with a knife”!
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Summary
• Safety and Risk in modern Industries
• How and why the concepts of risks (and safety) are
changing
• May Science and technologies make our communities
safer?
• From Fundamentals to Practice (a few examples from
INAIL research area)
• Suggestions for Practitioners and Regulators
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Fundamentals: Safety
• SAFETY or RISK?
• Since the birth of industry, SAFETY was a keyword (e.g.
the first code for pressure equipment safe design and
operation in UK in 1854).
• Typical command & control approach – safety based.
For each sector codes and rules addressing design,
construction and service phases. Public Inspector bodies
to enforce regulations.
• Stregth of C&C approach: effective, complete, objective
• Weakness of C&C approach: rigid, separate, inadequate
both for complex systems (with interferences) and for
very dynamic (fast growing) industries
• Operators’ responsibility: compliance with codes, rules
and regulations
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From Safety to Risk
• In industries, the word RISK entered just with nuclear
power plant, 1950/60.
• A few severe chemical accidents (Seveso, Flixborough)
in the 70s demonstrated the C&C Safety Based
approach inadequate for major accident hazard.
• Integrated approach. Equipment & plant safety with
human & organizational system, land use planning, …
• Operators must manage risks in an integrated and
dynamic way, following essential safety requirements,
adopting management systems
Seveso (I)
Luglio 1976
Flixborough (UK)
Giugno 1974
Beek (NL)
Novembre 1975
Bhopal (India)
Dicembre 1984
Basel (CH)
Novembre 1986
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Risk Management in Major Accident Hazard
• The risk management approach in EU Directives for
Major Accident Control
• Seveso I 1985, Seveso II 1996,
• Seveso II Amendement 2003, Seveso III 2012.
• Seveso Keystones:
Mandatory Safety Management System
Audit program organized by Competent Authorities
Shared Knowledge About Accident
Integration with Land Use Planning
Enschede (NL)
May 2000
Toulouse (F)
Sep. 2001
Buncefield (UK)
Dec. 2005
Baia Mare (RO)
Jan 2000
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Risk Management in Occupational Safety
• Risk Assessment shyly entered Occupational Safety
legislation with EU Directive 89/391, implemented in
D.Lgs 626/94 on occupational Safety & Health
• In Italy the “revolution” with D.Lgs 81/08, which stressed
“risk assessment documents”.
• Furthermore Safety Management Systems are highly
promoted. (premium discounts, incentives, responsibility
exemption..)
No more deaths
at work!
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Traditional Risk definition
Risk =
probability of occurrence of harm x severity of that harm
ISO GUIDE 51 Safety ed. 1999
Corollaries:
• Risk is a number
• Phenomenon has to be well known, so both severity
and likelihood may be evaluated in a quantitative way.
• Thresholds for Risk acceptability
• Inherent safety is an Utopia
• Risk Separation (e.g. Occupational, Major Accident,
Natural)
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Societal Risk in a Nutshell
Popolation
Database
Weather
Database
Accident
Math. Models
Equipment
Reliability
Impact
Scenarios
Number of Fatalities
Expecte
d
F
requencie
s
1 10 100 1000
10
-9
1
0-8
10
-7
10
-6
1
0-5
10
-4
10
-3
Risk Map
FN Curves
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Risk Based Approach: Success Stories C
anvey I
sla
nd
UK
19
78
Rijm
on
d N
L
19
80
Ravenna
IT 1
98
7
In the 80’s Pioneer studies on Area
Risks, aimed to address decisions
about new installations, based on
Societal Risk and FN curves
approach. After these studies major
European Industrial areas has been
well managed until today.
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Epochal Disasters
Safety (Occupational,
Industrial, Transport) and
Security may be definitely
separate?
Inherent Safety, why not?
Concequences of financial
actions are known?
Just Probability to measure
Uncertainty ?
9/11/2001
9/17/2011
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Very recent Disasters
Spain
Sept. 2013
Santiago
High Speed
Train
Russia
February 2013
Cheliabinsk
Meteorite
Disaster
Japan
Heartquacke
+Tsunami +
Nuclear
April 2011
USA
April 2010
Deepwater
Offshore
Disaster
Thailand
Nov. 2011
Flooded
Automotive
District
Italy
Viareggio
LPG Train
Accident
July 2009
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Very recent Disasters
May 2013
Genoa
Jolly Nero
Cargo Ship
Tragedy
July 2013
Pescara
Fireworks
Factory
Disaster
May 2012
Emilia
Harthquacke
Jan. 2012
Costa
Concordia
Disaster
Jan. 2012
Tresana
Gas
pipiline
Feb. 2012
Italy
Big Snow
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• Known Known Risks Safety • Awareness - Conscious Competence
• Unknown Known Risks Aleatory Uncertainties • Lack of information - Awareness
• Known Unknown Risks Epistemic Uncertainties • Lack of Knowledge
• Unknown Unknown Risks The Black Swan • Lack of Awareness
KK – UU model
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Risk =
effect of uncertainty on the achievement of objective
ISO 31000 Risk definition
ISO GUIDE 73 Risk Management Vocabulary 2009
ISO 31000 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines 2009
ISO 31010 Risk Management Risk Assesment Technicques 2009
Coming soon …
ISO 31014 Risk Management Guidance for implementation of ISO 31000
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Occupational
Safety
Equipment
Reliability
Industrial
Safety matter
Unplanned
Interruption Injury at work
Major
Accident uncertainties
Satisfy users
& shareholders
Safe working
ambient
Positive perception
by local community objectives
Equipment
verification
Safety Report +
Safety Audits Activity
Equipment
control
Risk = effect of uncertainty on the achievement of objective
D.Lgs 81/2008 Dir. 96/82/CE Legislation
Risk Management at Industrial Plant
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System
Mana-gement
Integrated
Equipment
verification
Safety Report +
Safety Audits
Equipment
control
D.Lgs 81/2008
Dir. 96/82/CE
Authorization
Safety Report
Periodical Audit
(VVF,ARPA,INAIL)
Art 71 D.Lgs 81/08
DM 11/4/11
(INAIL, ASL, + soggetti abilitati )
Plant Integrated Management System
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Systems mngmnt
Complex Risk management
Inte
rnet -
Cyber
Space
Tra
de &
Logis
tic
Goods T
ransport
In
frastr
uctu
res
Health S
tructu
re –
Patient
Safe
ty
Grid
Land &
Environm
ent
Pow
er
& P
rocess I
ndustr
y
Occupational S
afe
ty &
Health
M
obili
ty
Citiz
en S
afe
ty &
Health
safety
security
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Does Science make us safer?
Genoa 2009 & 2012 Science and Technology make the work Safer?
Genoa 2013 Science and Technology make our communities safer?
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2009 Risk Definiton Uncertainty – Risk
More Information less Risk (if Knowledgeis complete)
More Knowledge less Risk (if Knowledge is lacking)
Shannon 1949 Uncertainty > Information Entropy
De Finetti 1970 Probability does not esiste
If you make work (aquire information/ make inspection) you
reduce risk
If you make research (increase Knowledge) you reduce risk
Science and Risk
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TIME
Ris
k / E
ntr
opy
Information Degradation
Inspectio
n
Equipment
Critical Structures
Degradation
Mechanism
Risk based Inspections =
Knowledge Based Inspections
Risk Based Inspection
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Risk Research vs Preacution Principle
Precautionary principle adopted in Europe in situation of
scientific uncertainty.
“fundamentalist” application of preacutionary principle could
stop all innovations in Europe, thus it is essential investigate
safety at very early stages, before industrial applications
Research essential for susbstainable economic growth in
Europe include:
Safety of Nanomaterials and Nanotechnologies
Safety of Green technologies
Safety of Advanced biotechnologies
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Disappearing Knowledge
The relentless effect of Entropy Law:
Experience underestimated, is forgotten
Knowledge, hidden in official documents, is covered by dust,
then dies and it’s lost forever
Revive continuously Safety Knowledge to prevent accident
Involve experienced Personnel in developing Safety System
Learn from experience, including accident, near misses, and
positive histories.
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Sharing Information or Knowledge
Information
management
Experience
Knowledge
Management Safety - Secuity
Management
System
Information
management
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Example from INAIL research “Safe contractors
2.2
Operator contracts a work
to a maintenance company.
Contractor firms’
safety manager
knows well the
task related
hazard (e.g. falls
from height, cuts) Protective equipment
to be selected in wide
range according to
the CEN standard
Contractor worker
who must be
provided with the
full equipment (goggles, face-shield,
masks, gloves, boots,
earmuffs, safety
helmets…
The Operator must provide
safety info’s to the contractors
(permit to work)
The Operator safety
manager knows the
environment related hazards,
including major accidents
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Onto DPI: appropriate PPE choice
for maintenance within a large
industrial park,
DUVRI art.26 81/08
“Ontology” an artificial
intelligence method has been
used for organizing
knowledge and inferring
decisions about contractors
safety
Knowledge
Ontology
Sharing Knowledge to make Decisions
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Example from INAIL research “NearMisses”
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Public Domain
Knowledge
Sharing & Reviving Knowledge
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Knowledge Based
Thanks for your attention !
Risk management