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Boston AWS Meetup Group AWS Security Threats Aaron C. Newman Founder, CloudCheckr [email protected] October 21, 2013

Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

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Page 1: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Boston AWS Meetup Group

AWS Security Threats

Aaron C. NewmanFounder, CloudCheckr

[email protected]

October 21, 2013

Page 2: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Agenda:

• Overview of Public Cloud Security

• Attacks from AWS

• Using Search Engines to Attack AWS

• Economic Denial of Sustainability Attacks

• Attacks on AWS

Page 3: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Overview of Public Cloud Security

Page 4: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

State of Cloud Security

• 15 years ago– The datacenter as an island, external access mediated– Security issues rarely understood– Security tools immature

• The data center opened up– Suppliers, customers, partners could connect directly to your datacenter– Robust solutions adopted, ranging from DLP, IDS, IPS, SEIM, VA

• Move to the cloud– Perimeter security is officially dead, data can be accessed from anywhere– Cloud provider security tools are immature

Survey of 100 hackers at Defcon 2012 96% of the respondents think that the cloud creates new opportunities for hacking

86% believe that “cloud vendors aren’t doing enough to address cyber-security issues.”

Page 5: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Cloud Threats

• Cloud Provider– Disgruntled employees– Natural disasters– Theft of physical equipment– Cloud provider hacked

• External Threats– Hackers (LulzSec, Anonymous)– Governments

• Stuxnet (US government targets Iran)• Operation Aurora (Chinese government targets Rackspace/others)

• Internal Threats (still your biggest threat)

– Developers, cloud admins, users

Page 6: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Thinking Like a Hacker

• Large Attack surface– Single successful attack can net many security

compromises– Clouds provide homogeneous environments

• To defend against the hacker– Think like the hacker– Go home and figure out how YOU would hack into your

account– Then plug the holes– Defense-in-depth

Page 7: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Attacks using AWS

Page 8: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Using Clouds to Break Encryption

• Clouds provide inexpensive ways to do massively parallel processing• Perfect for cracking encryption keys

• July 2012 Defcon - Cryptohaze Cloud Cracking• Open source Cryptohaze tool suite implements network-clustered GPU accelerated

password cracking (both brute force & rainbow tables)

• AWS Cluster GPU Instances crack SHA1• Quote from German Thomas Roth • “able to crack all hashes from [the 560 character SHA1 hash] with a password

length from one to six in only 49 minutes (one hour costs $2.10 [£1.30] by the way),“

• Researcher uses AWS cloud to crack Wi-Fi passwords• Cloud Cracking Suite (CCS) released on Jan 2012 at Black Hat security conference• Crack a WPA-PSK handshake at a speed of 400,000 attempted passwords per

second using eight GPU-based AWS instances

Page 9: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Major Attacks from the Cloud

• Dark clouds or black clouds• How do you shut down a hacker on the cloud?• Cloud not only cheap – provides anonymity

• Amazon cloud used in PlayStation Network hack• http://www.zdnet.com/amazon-cloud-used-in-playstation-network-hack-40100224

54/

• Hackers rent AWS EC2 instances under an alias

• Amazon S3 hosts banking trojan• Kaspersky Lab reports S3 hosts the command and

control channels for SpyEye banking trojan

Page 10: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Using Search Engines

to Attack AWS

Page 11: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Public Cloud Search Engine Attacks

Demo:

Search Diggity (Code Search, NotInMyBackyard)

AKA Google Hacking

Page 12: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Economic Denial of

Sustainability Attacks

Page 13: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

EDoS Attacks

• Variation of Distributed Denial of Service Attack– Goal is not to overload and crash an application – Instead to cause the server hosting costs to overwhelm

the victim’s budget

“the infrastructure allows scaling of service beyond the economic means of the vendor

to pay their cloud-based service bills”-http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com

Page 14: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Worst Case Scenario – AWS CloudFront

• http://www.reviewmylife.co.uk/blog/2011/05/19/amazon-cloudfront-and-s3-maximum-cost/

• Author calculated maximum possible charge– Used default limit of 1000 requests per second and

1000 megabits per second– At the end of 30 days a maximum of 324TB of data

could have been downloaded (theoretically)– $42,000 per month for a single edge location– CloudFront has 30 edge locations

Page 15: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Stories and Lessons Learned

• Anecdotes from burned users– Personal website hacked by file sharers– Received bill for $10,000

• Note: AWS only charges for data out– All data transfer in is at $0.000 per GB– Mitigates costs – if you don’t respond to requests, doesn’t cost

you anything

• Use pre-paid credit cards or credit card with appropriate credit limit– Not sure if this limits your liability legally

Page 16: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Solutions?

• Amazon limits/caps have been “in the works” since 2006– Each year Amazon talks about intention of releasing

the feature

• May 2012 – Amazon announces Billing Alerts– http://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2012/

05/10/announcing-aws-billing-alerts/– Helps alert you when this starts happening to you– Could still be a costly few hours

Page 17: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Attacks on AWS

Page 18: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Password Attacks

• Brute forcing of accounts and passwords– Often no password lockout, just keep hammering away– RDS (Oracle, MySQL, and SQL Server), AWS accounts

• Example: Enumerating AWS account numbers– https://queue.amazonaws.com/<12 digit numbers here>/a?

Action=SendMessage– Response tells you if the account exists

• Old school attacks on an OS sitting in cloud– Typically secure defaults– Much more heterogeneous

Page 19: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Easily Guessed Passwords

• Need to guess username also if you don’t already know– Social engineering, research to make good guesses

• Passwords can be “guessed”– Attacking a single account with 100k passwords– Attacking many accounts with a few very common passwords– People leave test/test or password same as username

• Password dictionaries– http://www.openwall.com/passwords/wordlists/– The wordlists are intended primarily for use with password

crackers …

Page 20: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Vulnerabilities in RDS

• MySQL versions– Many vulnerable version– Make sure you are using the last release– Link to the issues

• RDS security groups should always be restricted to specific trusted networks

Page 21: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Misconfigured Security Settings

• Scanning Amazon S3 to identify publicly accessible buckets– http://cloudcheckr.com/2012/05/aws-s3-buckets-buck

et-finder/

• Open source tool – Bucket Finder– script launches a dictionary attack on the names of S3

buckets and interrogates the bucket for a list of public and private files

– Creates an EDoS

Page 22: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Demo:

Bucket Finder

Page 23: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

5 Prevention Strategies

• Keep a close handle on what you are running in the cloud

• Educate yourself on how the cloud works

• Stay Patched– Stay on top of all the security alerts and bulletins

• Defense in Depth

• Multiple Levels of Security– Regularly perform audits and penetration tests on your cloud– Encryption of data-in-motion / data-at-rest / data-in-use– Monitor cloud activity log files

Page 24: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

What is CloudCheckr?

CloudCheckr provides visibility into AWS

• Cost Optimization, Allocation, Reporting• Resource Utilization• > 250 Best Practice Checks• Trending Analysis• Change Monitoring

Page 25: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Questions?

Questions on:• Clouds• Security

Page 26: Cloud security : Boston AWS user group

Thank You for Attending

Enter promo code BOSTON for a free 30 day trial

of www.cloudcheckr.com

Aaron Newman is the Founder of CloudCheckr (www.cloudcheckr.com)

Please contact me with additional questions at:[email protected]