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Contras

Nicaragua: Contras

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Civil war in Nicaragua US aid Cold War

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Page 1: Nicaragua: Contras

Contras

Page 2: Nicaragua: Contras

Background

• Somoza: overthrown 1979

• When Somoza leaves, the National Guard of Nicaragua crumbles

• Sandinistas in power

Page 3: Nicaragua: Contras

Contras:• Various rebel groups fighting against the Sandinista

government of Nicaragua

• Active 1979–1990

• Operate in almost all rural areas of Nicaragua

• Force of 23,000 troops

• Rebel fighters usually referred to themselves as comandos

Page 4: Nicaragua: Contras

FDN• Fuerza Democrática

Nicaragüense

• The earliest and largest Contra groups (1981)

• Under the command of Colonel Enrique Bermúdez (ex NG)

Page 5: Nicaragua: Contras

Contras• FDN merged with:

• 15th of September Legion, which comprised mostly former members of Somoza's National Guard

• Nicaraguan Democratic Union, an organization of émigrés from the business and professional classes.

• MILPAS movement, bands led by disenchanted former MAP-ML guerrillas.

Page 6: Nicaragua: Contras

Legión Quince de Septiembre

• Formed by Officers of the defeated NNG against the FSLN

• Based in Guatemala City

• Lead by Colonel Enrique Bermúdez

• The Legion staged kidnappings and bank robberies, called "special operations", in Guatemala and El Salvador.

• Local leftist guerrillas were already doing this

• Argentina and Reagan provided assistance and pressured union with UDN

Page 7: Nicaragua: Contras

UDN• Unión Democrática Nicaragüense

• founded in late 1980 by José Francisco Cardenal (FL)

• Armed Branch: FARN, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Nicaragüenses

• Supported by the anti-Sandinista Reagan Administration and Argentina's military junta

Page 8: Nicaragua: Contras

UDN-FARN

• UDN unites with FDN

• Those who disliked this union remained in the now UDN-FARN

• under the command of Fernando Chamorro

Page 9: Nicaragua: Contras

Fernando "el negro" Chamorro Rappaccioli

• (1933—September 6, 1994)

• Nicaraguan rebel fighting both the Somoza and Sandinista regimes

Page 10: Nicaragua: Contras

Chamorro opposed to Somoza Regime

• In 1977, after his friend Edén Pastora rejoined FSLN, Chamorro met with Sandinista strategist Humberto Ortega and agreed to cooperate in the fight against Somoza

• Captured by the National Guard

Page 11: Nicaragua: Contras

Chamorro opposed to Sandinista Regime

• Goes into exile July '81

• Joins UDN where his brother was a key figure

• opposed to the UDN's decision in August 1981 to merge with the former National Guardsmen

• El Negro and FARN formed with the ARDE (Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática) against the EPS from the South, while FDN and YATAMA fought the Northern front, from Honduras.

• Retires after the ARDE is absorbed by the Unidad Nicaragüense de Opocición

Page 12: Nicaragua: Contras

MILPAS• Originally Milicias Populares Anti-Somocistas

• Fighting alongside FSLN

• after Somoza Debayle is overthrown, unsatisfied members revived it as Milicias Populares Anti-Sandinistas

• Associated with the Frente Obrero and MAP-ML

• Merged into FDN in '85 and many MILPAS vets. were heads of regional commands

Page 13: Nicaragua: Contras

U.S. Support

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U.S. Support of the Contras

• Virtually, all the different Contra groups were united as the Nicaraguan Resistance

• Carter and the U.S. gov. started aiding the Contras in their early stages, both military and financially

• April 1982, the CIA assumed direct operational control of the Contra war (T. Walker, 1987)

Page 15: Nicaragua: Contras

• The U.S. government viewed the leftist Sandinistas as undemocratic

• opposed its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union

• Reagan accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aiding leftist guerrillas in El Salvador

• His administration and the U.S. media labeled the Sandinistas as undemocratic despite the 1984 Nicaraguan elections were declared fair by foreign observers

Page 16: Nicaragua: Contras

"The United States has played a very large role in financing, training,

arming, and advising the contras over a long period. The contras only

became capable of carrying out significant (para)military operations as a result of this support." As seen

at: Gill 1989, p. 329

Page 17: Nicaragua: Contras

Cases of the Sandinista government repression included:

• it's censorship of La Prensa, a pro-Contra newspaper financed by the CIA

• estimated 4,000 political prisoners charged with either aiding the Contras or being former members of the National Guard

(Human Rights Watch, 1986)

Page 18: Nicaragua: Contras

No more excuses...

• Congress had approved tens of millions of dollars

• The U.S. public did not support the contra aid

• Reagan's allegations of Soviet influence in Nicaragua turned out to be exaggerated

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...so• Congress cut off all funds for the contras in 1985 by

the third Boland Amendment.

• First Boland Amendment first passed 12/1982 outlawed U.S. assistance to the contras for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government, while allowing assistance for other purposes.

• 10/1984 actions by all U.S. government agencies were forbidden (not only CIA or DD)

Page 20: Nicaragua: Contras

Reagan insists• President Reagan claimed Nicaragua was "an unusual and

extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" and declared a "national emergency"

• He imposed a trade embargo to "deal with that threat"

• Nicaragua was isolated from the West, forcing the Sandinistas to rely Eastern assistance.

• Moscow declined to offer the quantity of aid it provided to close communist allies.

• After U.S. support was banned by Congress, the Reagan administration covertly continued it. These covert activities culminated in the Iran–Contra affair.

Page 21: Nicaragua: Contras

Iran-Contra affair

• Illegal covert operation

• 1984 and 1986, $34 million from third countries and $2.7 million from private sources were raised for the Contras

• It started as an attempt to free American hostages being held in Lebanon by Iranians

Page 22: Nicaragua: Contras

• Lt. Col. Oliver North was in charge of these Covert operations, along with the national Security Council

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• Iran was under an arms embargo from the United States

• The plan was to facilitate arms and weapons to Iran by shipping them to Israel

• In Israel, an arms dealer would take them to Iran and sell them to the Iranians who would pay the Israeli

• The US would resupply Israel and would receive the payment which on the most part would go to funding of the Contra rebels

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Consequences of the affairs

• Daniel Sheehan uncovers the affair, leading to a scandal

• 14 members of Reagan's administration were charged, including the Secretary of Defense, and 11 were convicted

• October 1986, military aid to the Contras is reinstalled, one month before the scandal

Page 25: Nicaragua: Contras

And yet, despite astronomical levels of military support, the United States failed to create a viable military force in Nicaragua. That's quite remarkable, if you think about it. No real guerrillas anywhere in the world have ever had resources even remotely like what the United States gave the contras. You could probably start a guerrilla insurgency in mountain regions of the US with comparable funding.

Why did the US go to such lengths in Nicaragua? The international development organisation Oxfam explained the real reasons, stating that, from its experience of working in 76 developing countries, "Nicaragua was...exceptional in the strength of that government's commitment...to improving the condition of the people and encouraging their active participation in the development process."

Excerpt from: Noam Chomsky's account of the US-backed “contra” counter-insurgency in Nicaragua against the left-wing government brought to power on the back of a popular mass movement from below.

!

Page 26: Nicaragua: Contras

Success• Contras were weakening, losing power and

strength

• October 1987, they launched a successful attack both from the northern front and the southern

• US Redeye missiles vs. Soviet Mi-24 helicopter gunships

• But Sandinista government had major National support

Page 27: Nicaragua: Contras

Success• US cuts military support

• Both sides are strongly pressured to end the conflict

• Contras agree to meet with the FSLN with support from Central American presidents and agree on piece to allow fair elections in 1990

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Aftermath• By the end of the war, over 30,000 Nicaraguans

were killed

• tens of thousands were wounded.

• Contra attacks on economic targets and the U.S. embargo devastated the country's agricultural system and infrastructural facilities — making Nicaragua the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere next to Haiti