(10) admission

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<ul><li><p>Admission &amp; Confession (Section 17 31 of EA 1950)Section 17 of EA 1950: Admission and confession defined. (Pengakuan dan pengakuan salah ditakrifkan)(1) An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons and under the circumstances hereinafter mentioned. (Pengakuan ialah pernyataan, lisan atau dokumen, yang menyarankan sesuatu kesimpulan mengenai sesuatu fakta isu atau mengenai sesuatu fakta relevan, dan yang dibuat oleh mana-mana orang dan dalam hal keadaan yang tersebut kemudian daripada ini).</p><p>(2) A confession is an admission made at any time by a person accused of an offence, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that offence. (Pengakuan salah ialah pengakuan yang dibuat pada bilabila masa oleh seseorang yang dituduh atas suatu kesalahan, menyatakan atau menyarankan kesimpulan bahawa dia telah melakukan kesalahan itu). </p></li><li><p>Admission &amp; confession (Section 17 31 of EA 1950)Meaning of the word statement in the section</p><p>Basically, the word statement refers to something that is stated. It need not be communicated to anyone.(The appellant was heard of muttering to himself that he had finished the deceased)Per Subba Rao J in Sahoo v State of UP AIR 1966 SC 40 that: A scrutiny of the provisions of sections 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act discloses, as one learned author puts it, that statement is a genus (kind/type), admission is the species (categories) and confession is the sub-species (sub-categories). Shortly stated, a confession is a statement made by an accused admitting its guilt. What does the expression statement mean? The dictionary meaning of the word statement is the act of stating, reciting or presenting verbally or on paper. The term statement therefore includes both oral and written statements. Is it also necessary ingredient of the term that it shall be communicated to another? The dictionary meaning of the term does not warrant any such extension.</p></li><li><p>Admission &amp; confession (Section 17 31 of EA 1950)Meaning of the word statement in the section</p><p>Admission and confession are exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Evidence Act places them in the category or relevant evidence presumably on the ground that, as they are declarations against the interest of the person making them, they are probably true. </p><p>The probative value of an admission or a confession does not depend upon its communication to another, though, just like any other piece of evidence, it can be admitted in evidence only on proof. This proof in the case of oral admission or confession can be offered only by witnesses who heard the admission or confession, as the case may be. </p><p>The following illustration pertaining to a written confession brings out the said idea; A kills B; enters in his diary that he killed him, puts it in his drawer and absconds. When he places his act on record, he does not communicate to another; indeed, he does not have any intention of communicating it to a third party. Even so, at the trial the said statement of the accused can certainly be proved as a confession made by him. If that be so in the aces of a statement in writing, there cannot be any difference in principle in the case of an oral statement. Both must stand on the same footing.</p></li><li><p>Admission &amp; confession (Section 17 31 of EA 1950)What is admission?</p><p>Section 17 (1) relates to informal admission whilst section 58 of the Act deals with the formal admissions. </p><p>Section 18 to 20 relate to the circumstances in which statements made by different categories of persons may amount to admissions. Section 21 relates to the relevancy of admissions.</p><p>Section 22 and 23 provide exceptions to the admissibility of admissions. The effect of admissions is governed by section 31 of the Act. </p><p>According to section 17 (1) an admission is a statement of fact, whether oral or documentary, made by a party to a case which adversely affects his own interest. The essentials of an admission under section 17 (1) appear to be as follows: 1. It must be a statement. 2. It may be either oral or contained in document e.g. letters, dispositions, affidavits, plaints, written statements, deeds and others. 3. It should suggest an inference as to fact in issue or relevant fact. 4. It may be one of the persons mentioned in the Act (See section 18, 19 and 20 of EA) 5. It is to be made under the circumstances provided in the Act (See sections 20 to 23 of the Act).</p></li><li><p>ContinueWhat is admission?</p><p>In the case of MA Clyde v Wong Ah Mei (1970) 2 MLJ 163, the respondent had claimed damages in respect of the death of one Soon Ah as a result of his being knocked down by a car driven by the appellant. The learned trial judge found in favour of the respondent, as he held that the bicycle on which the deceased was riding was knocked down from behind by the appellant's car. He held that the onus to explain why the collision took place was with the appellant and as the appellant had chosen not to give evidence, he gave judgment against her. A report made by the appellant to the police about the accident was admitted in evidence and on appeal it was argued inter alia that the evidence had been wrongly admitted. </p><p>Held, dismissing the appeal:(3)the report of the appellant in this case was a first information report and was admissible under sections 17, 18 and 21 of the Evidence Ordinance, 1950. </p></li><li><p>Admission &amp; confession (Section 17 31 of EA 1950)</p></li><li><p>Admission &amp; confession (Section 17 31 of EA 1950)What is confession?</p><p>S.17 (2) defines a confession.</p><p>S.24, 25 and 26 of the Act set out the circumstances under which confessions are to be excluded.</p><p>S.28 and 29 describe the situations in which a confession becomes relevant despite section 24.</p><p>S.27 of the Act relates to facts discovered in consequence of information received. The confession of a co-accused is governed by section 30. </p><p>According to Sir James Stephens, there are two categories of statement which can amount to confessions. (1) a plenary confession which refers to a full and direct acknowledgement of guilt. For example, I killed Ricky.</p><p> (2) Second, non-plenary confession which is not full ad direct acknowledgement of guilt but is an incriminating statement, for example I am the owner of the gun which caused the death.</p></li><li><p>Continue</p><p>Our s.17 (2) of EA 1950 contains two categories of the confession namely: (1) the plenary confession and (2) non-plenary confession. </p><p>Our definition then can be split into two parts i.e. (1) A confession is an admission made at any time by a person accused of an offence a) Stating that he committed that offence (Plenary confession) and</p><p> (2) Suggesting that he committed that offense (Non-plenary confession). Plenary means complete, full, or entirely.</p><p>Distinction between admissions and confessions</p><p>In R v Wong Ah Kin, Burton Ag CJ observed that:</p><p> The Evidence Ordinance defines an admission and a confession, a confession being included under the general definition of admissions. And then under section 21 it makes admissions relevant. The effect of that is that all confessions are relevant and can be proved unless they are excluded by some other section of the Ordinance or by some other rule of law not perhaps contained in the Ordinance. </p></li><li><p>ContinueDistinction between admissions and confessions</p><p>A confession is a statement made by an accused person which is sought to be proved against him in a criminal proceeding to establish the commission of an offence by him; while an admission usually relates to a civil transaction and comprises all statements amounting to admissions as defined in section 18.</p><p>A confession if deliberately and voluntarily made may be accepted as conclusive in itself of the matters confessed; an admission is not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but may operate as an estoppel.</p><p>A confession always goes against the person making it; an admission may be used on behalf of the person making it under the Exceptions provided in section 21.</p><p>The confession of one of two or more accused jointly tried for the same offence can be taken into consideration against the co-accused (Section 30). But an admission by one of several defendants in a suit is no evidence against another defendant. </p></li><li><p>AdmissionConfessionConfessionConfessionConfessionConfessionAdmissionAdmissionConfession</p></li><li><p>ContinueMeaning of confession: The Anandagoda objective test</p><p>As stated earlier, our section 17 (2) of EA 1950 contains two categories of the confession namely the plenary confession and non-plenary confession. Our definition then can be split into two parts i.e. A confession is an admission made at any time by a person accused of an offence: a) Stating that he committed that offence (Plenary confession) and b) Suggesting that he committed that offense (Non-plenary confession). </p><p>In so far as (a) is concerned, there is no difficulty. If a person accused of an offence states expressly that he committed the offence of which he is charged, clearly it is a confession. </p><p>In so far as (b) is concerned, Indian authorities do not seem to accept it. The Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v E AIR 1939 PC 47 did not accept the (b) part of the definition of confession. It stated that: Moreover a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a confession. </p></li><li><p>ContinueHowever, any doubt about the inferential aspect of the statement constituting a confession in the (b) part of the definition was laid to rest by the Privy Council in the Sri Lankan case of Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] 1 MLJ 289 where the appellant with two others were tried together with conspiracy to murder and with the murder of the deceased, One Adeline, by running her over with a car. The appellant was found guilty of murder. </p><p>The facts are as follows late at night on March 14, 1959, the dead body of a woman was discovered lying at Timbiriwewa near the 27th mile-post on the road between Puttalam and Anuradhapura. A post-mortem examination conducted on March 16, 1959, revealed that the woman was between 20 and 25 years of age, that she had been about seven months advanced in pregnancy, and that her body bore numerous injuries consistent with her having been run over by a motor-car. The case for the prosecution was that the dead body was that of Adeline Vitharana, that her death had been caused by a motorcar being deliberately driven over her dead body at least twice, that the consequent injuries were the cause of her death. </p><p>Besides what appeared to be strong evidence, the prosecution adduced evidence by a police officer who said that the appellant made certain admissions to him while in his charge at the police station on March 22, 1959. </p></li><li><p>ContinueOn appeal the appellant submitted that the above statements were wrongly admitted in evidence because they gave rise to an inference or inferences prejudicial to the appellant, or suggested the inference that he committed the offence of which he was found guilty, and therefore constituted a confession within the meaning of section 17 (2) of the Ceylon Evidence Ordinance (Which is pari material with the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950).</p><p> Held, dismissing the appeal: the test whether a statement is a confession is an objective one, whether to the mind of a reasonable person-reading the statement at the time and in the circumstance in which it was made it can be said to amount to a statement that the accused committed the offence or which suggested the inference that he committed the offence. The statement must be looked at as a whole and it must be considered on its own terms without reference to extrinsic facts. The appropriate test in deciding whether a particular statement is a confession is whether the words of admission in the context expressly or substantially admit guilt or do they taken together in the context inferentially admit guilt?</p></li><li><p>ContinueReception of the Anandagoda objective test by the Malaysian Federal Court</p><p>The Federal Court in Lemanit v PP [1965] 2 MLJ 26 where in this case, the appellant was convicted of the offence of using an arm, to wit by causing a bomb to explode with intent to cause physical injury to persons and property. The evidence established an intent to injure property but did not establish a clear intent to injure persons. The prosecution relied on a confession made by the appellant and recorded by a magistrate. One of the principal grounds of appeal was that the statement was not a confession and should not have been admitted in evidence.</p><p>Held: (1)the failure to prove both the intents that is the intent to cause physical injury to person and property is not fatal to a conviction under section 4 of the Arms Offences Ordinance as proof of either intent would suffice and no substantial miscarriage of justice could be said to have occurred in this respect as far as the trial judge's direction to the jury was concerned;</p><p> (2)the statement made by the appellant in this case was clearly inculpatory and therefore the statement was rightly recorded and admitted in evidence as a confession. (Inculpatory evidence is a legal term used to describe evidence that shows, or tends to show, a person's involvement in an act, or evidence that can establish guilt). </p></li><li><p>ContinueReception of the Anandagoda objective test by the Malaysian Federal Court &amp; Singapore Cases</p><p>The Anandagoda objective test was again followed in Abdul Khalid Bin Abdul Hamid [1995] 1 MLJ 692.</p><p>A Series of Singapore cases which have a similar provision as the Malaysian provision i.e. section 17 (2) of the Evidence Act, further confirmed this test.</p><p>In Suradet v PP [1993] 3 SLR 265, the court held that the words suggesting the inference that he committed the offence in section 17 (2) of the Singaporean Evidence Act clearly demands a wider interpretation than that placed by the Indian Supreme Court in Pakala Narayana Swami v E. </p><p>In Tong Chee Kong v PP [1998] 2 SLR 843 it was held that for a statement to amount to a confession, it need not be of a plenary or unqualified nature; it can also be of non-plenary nature so long as the statement connected the accused in some way with the offense. </p></li><li><p>ContinueA statement that does not amount to a confession can be used as an admission.</p><p>The Privy Council in a appeal from India held in Ghulam Hussain v R [1950] LR 77 IA 65 state that a statement made under section 164 of the Code of Criminal procedure (similar to our section 115 Criminal Procedure Code) which does not amount to a confession can be used against the maker as an admission. This question has been raised in courts in India and it has been answered in the affirmative.</p><p>See Golam Mohammad Khan v The King Emperor [1924] ILR 4 Pat 327, Abdul Rahim v The King Emperor [1925] AIR Cal 926 and Muhammad Bakhsh v King Emperor [1941] AIR Sind 129. </p><p>An admission is subst...</p></li></ul>