Technology and changing nature of warfare

April 1915: Poison gas first used in the Battle of Ypres Sept 1916: First ude of massed tanks, Battle of Cambrai 1921: Tests for ariel bombings of ships Feb 1945: Bombing of Dresden March 1945: Fire bombing of Tokyo Aug 6 & 8, 1945: Hiroshima & Nagasaki 1954: US adopts the policy of massive retaliation 1957: Soviets test ICBM 1991: Precision guided weapns used extensively in the first Gulf War 2007: Estonia targeted by Russian Cyberattack

Technology and changing nature of warfare

August 6, 1945: 0815 hrs

Technology and changing nature of warfare

Post 1648, war became an instrument of European statecraft Clausewitz was a spokesman for this perspective but a strong opponent of

absolute war. Believed in ‘political’ control over war & peace; generals shouldn’t be given that power (WW1 proved his fears correct)

‘Wars should be a means for forceful bargaining, not ends in themselves’.

On the road to total war: The World Wars: First massive (scary) demonstartion of technology

Technology and changing nature of warfare

Technology and changing nature of warfare

Technology and the Cold War 1940s-50s: Focus on improving aircrafts like B-29, B-36, B-52 1960s: ICBMs and miniaturization of nuclear weapns that could carry megaton

of TNT. This made states’ hard shell of impermeability to be redundant Antiballistic missile systems: proposed by US in 1967, but became focus in

1983 as SDI or starwars Chemical weapons: nerve agents, blood agents, choke agents, blistering

agents (Iran-Iraq war, Saddam against Kurds, Tokyo subway in 1995, anthrax in US in 2007, Assad’s regime, ISIS)

Deterrence the act of making someone decide not to do something: the act of preventing a

particular act or behavior from happening politics: the policy of developing a lot of military power so that other countries

will not attack your country. It is a strategic interaction that relies on threats, usually military retaliation, that constitutes commitments to use force in the event of an aggression

It assumes that actors are rational enough to weigh the likely costs and benefits. The goal is to convince the adversary that the costs of attacking will exceed its benefits

Generally cheaper than defense unless the threat needs to be carried out.

Elements of deterrence ‘The 3 Cs’: Communication, capability, and credibility Sometimes, actors confront adversaries over relatively insignificant issues just

to enhance credibility (US in Korea in 1950; 70% for America’s involvement in Vietnam was to enhance other commitments)

Doesn’t require absolute certainty, but some probability. (Russian roulette) Might not be actually carried out (even if the adversary doesn’t heed to the

warning): ‘This seeming paradox reflects the difference between what is rational to threaten and commit oneself to do in advance – ex ante – and what is rational to do if the threat fails – ex post’ (Edward Rhodes)

Deterrence works if the threats are credible, but too much credibility can be dangerous

Cold War & deterrence128,000 N-warheads (1945-2002)

Assumed 4 forms: General, Immediate, Primary, Extended Strategy of ‘Massive retaliation’ (1954) by the US: Became redundant once

USSR had ICBMs in 1957 First-strike capability & Second-strike capability (Albert Wohlstetter) SLBMs: Submarine-launched ballistic missiles 1960s: MAD since both sides had a second strike capability; led to an era of

arms control Flexible response: 1970s: ‘if allies were attacked, NATO would respond in a

‘balanced and proportional way’ short of a nuclear war. Use N weapons eventually if the adversary continued to increase the conflict..

Question: Is Nuclear deterrence relevant today/in contemporary times?

Technology and changing nature of warfare

The era of Smart Weapons: accurate, lethal; reduces casualties; boots on the ground against guerilla/terrorist tactics?

1991 Persian Gulf War, Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34373214

Technology and changing nature of warfare

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf

http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf http://

nationalinterest.org/feature/american-nuclear-strategy-the-case-minimal-deterrence-policy-11755

Activity: Read the above articles and summarize their main points. (1 hour in-class)