INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, BUSINESS, AND ADMINISTRATION

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1, 2010

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Group Decision Making:

The Potential for Groupthink

Fred C. Lunenburg Sam Houston State University

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ABSTRACT

One dysfunction of highly cohesive groups that has received considerable attention

is a phenomenon known as groupthink. Essentially, groupthink is the tendency of

cohesive groups to reach consensus on issues without offering, seeking, or

considering alternative viewpoints. As a result, groupthink has been blamed for

decision making fiascoes in politics, the military, as well as in business. In this

article, I discuss some famous examples of political and military fiascoes associated

with groupthink, some symptoms of groupthink, and ways to avoid groupthink

when making group decisions.

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Many decisions in organizations are made by groups, teams, or committees

(Gunnarsson, 2010). Does that mean that group decisions are preferable to those made by

an individual? Let’s begin by looking briefly at the benefits of group decision making

(Robbins & Judge, 2011). Groups generate more complete information and knowledge.

They offer increased diversity of views. Decisions made by groups lead to increased

acceptance of the decision.

In spite of the benefits noted, group decisions have their weaknesses. One

dysfunction of decision making that has received a considerable amount of attention from

researchers is a phenomenon called groupthink (Brownstein, 2003; Chapman, 2006; Choi

& Kim, 1999; Eaton, 2001; Esser, 1998; Fuller & Aldag, 1998; Harvey, 1974: Hogg &

Hains, 1998; Janis, 1972, 1982, 1988; Jones & Roelofsma, 2000; Kerr & Tindale, 2004;

Leana, 1985; Levine, Higgins, & Choi, 2000; Longley & Pruitt, 1980; Moorhead &

Montanari, 1986; Neck & Moorhead, 1995; Park, 1990, 2000; Schafer, 2011; Schultz &

Bloch, 2006; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998; Whyte, 1989).

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Groupthink

Irving Janis coined the term groupthink, which happens when in-group pressures

lead to a deterioration in mental efficiency, poor tasting of reality, and lax moral

judgment (Janis, 1982). It tends to occur in highly cohesive groups in which the group

members’ desire for consensus becomes more important than evaluating problems and

solutions realistically.

Janis observed that sometimes groups of highly qualified and experienced people

make very poor decisions. The decision made by President John F. Kennedy and his

advisers to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1960; the decision made by

President Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisers between 1964 and 1967 to escalate the war

in Vietnam; the decision made by President Richard M. Nixon and his advisers to cover

up the Watergate break-in in 1972; the decision made by NASA in 1986 to launch the

Challenger space shuttle (which exploded after takeoff, killing all seven crew members);

the decision made by NASA in 2003 to launch the space shuttle Columbia (which

exploded over Texas upon reentering the earth’s atmosphere, killing all seven crew

members) – all these decisions were influenced by groupthink (Esser & Linoerfer, 1989;

Hirokawa, Gournan, & Martz, 1988; Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Levine, Higgins, & Choi,

2000; Maier, 2002; McAvoy & Butler, 2007; Moorhead, Ference, & Neck, 1991;

Schafer, 2011; Schultz & Bloch, 2006; Schwartz & Ward, 2003).

Janis’s analyses of groupthink focused primarily on political and military

decisions, but the potential for groupthink in any organization is likely as well

(Finkelstein, 2003; Miller, 1990; Tasa & Whyte, 2005). For example, when a group of

employees collectively decides to go on strike, the decision may be a product of

groupthink (Carrell, 2010).

Symptoms of Groupthink

Janis identified eight symptoms of groupthink:

Invulnerability.

Most or all group members develop an illusion of invulnerability, which causes

them to become overly optimistic and take extreme risks.

Rationalization.

Group members collectively rationalize in order to discount warnings that might

lead them to reconcile their assumptions before they commit themselves to their past

policy decisions.

Morality.

Group members develop an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality,

inclining the members to ignore ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.

FRED C. LUNENBURG

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Stereotyping.

Group members develop stereotyped views of opposition leaders as too evil to

warrant genuine attempts to negotiate or as too weak and stupid to counter whatever risky

attempts are made to defeat their purposes.

Pressure.

Group members apply direct pressure on any member who expresses strong

arguments against any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, making

clear that this type of dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members.

Self-Censorship.

Group members censor themselves from any deviations from the apparent group

consensus, reflecting each member’s inclination to minimize the importance of his or her

doubts and counterarguments.

Unanimity.

Group members perceive a shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments

conforming to the majority view (partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations,

augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent).

Mindguards.

Some group members appoint themselves to protect the group from adverse

information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and

morality of their decision.

The likelihood that groupthink will emerge is greatest when: (a) the group is

cohesive (b) the group becomes insulated from qualified outsiders, and (c) the leader

promotes his own favored solution (Janis, 1982). In suggesting ways of avoiding

groupthink, Janis hopes to reduce cohesiveness and open up decision activity in various

ways. One way is to select ad hoc groups to solve problems; in this way, the members do

not already belong to a cohesive group. Another approach is to have higher-level

administrators set the parameters of the decision. Still another method is to assign

different groups to work on the same problem. And, finally, different group decision-

making techniques can be used to limit the effects of groupthink and other problems

inherent in shared decision making.

How to Avoid Groupthink

Nine suggestions for avoiding groupthink are the following (Janis, 1982):

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, BUSINESS, AND ADMINISTRATION

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1. The leader of a policy-forming group should assign the role of critical evaluator to

each member, encouraging the group to give high priority to airing objections and

doubts.

2. The leaders in an organization’s hierarchy, when assigning a policy-planning

mission to a group, should be impartial instead of stating their preferences and

expectations at the outset.

3. The organization should routinely follow the administrative practice of setting up

several independent policy-planning and evaluation groups to work on the same

policy question, each carrying out its deliberations under a different leader.

4. Through the period when the feasibility and effectiveness of policy alternatives

are being surveyed, the policy-making group should from time to time divide into

two or more subgroups to meet separately, under different chairpersons, and then

come together to reconcile their differences.

5. Each member of the policy-making group should periodically discuss the group’s

deliberations with trusted associates in her own unit of the organization and report

their transactions back to the group.

6. One or more outside experts or qualified colleagues within the organization who

are not core members of the policy-making group should be invited to each

meeting on a staggered basis and should be encouraged to challenge the views of

the cores members.

7. At each meeting devoted to evaluating policy alternatives, at least one member

should be assigned the role of devil’s advocate, expressing as many objections to

each policy alternative as possible.

8. Whenever the policy issue involves relations with a rival organization, a sizable

block of time should be spent surveying all warning signals from the rivals and

constructing alternative scenarios of the rivals’ intentions.

9. After reaching a preliminary consensus about what seems to be the best policy

alternative, the policy-making group should hold a second-chance meeting at

which the members are expected to express as vividly as they can all their residual

doubts and to rethink the entire issue before making a definitive choice.

Conclusion

One dysfunction of highly cohesive groups that has received considerable

attention is a phenomenon known as groupthink. Essentially, groupthink is the tendency

of cohesive groups to reach consensus on issues without offering, seeking, or considering

alternative viewpoints. As a result, groupthink has been blamed for decision making

fiascoes in politics, the military, as well as in business. Several examples of these

political and military fiascoes have been discussed in this article.

FRED C. LUNENBURG

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