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Network topology and payment system resilience - first results Kimmo Soramäki 1 Walt Beyeler 2 Morten L. Bech 3 Robert J. Glass 2 1 Helsinki Univ. of Technology / European Central Bank 2 Sandia National Laboratories 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Bank of Finland Simulation Seminar and Workshop 23 August 2006 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective institutions

Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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The presentation looks at the impact of network topology on the resilience of disturbed interbank payment systems.

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Page 1: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

Network topology and payment system resilience

- first results

Kimmo Soramäki1

Walt Beyeler2

Morten L. Bech3

Robert J. Glass2

1Helsinki Univ. of Technology / European Central Bank

2Sandia National Laboratories

3Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Bank of Finland Simulation Seminar and Workshop

23 August 2006

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective institutions

Page 2: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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Research problem and approach

• How does the topology of the payment network affect its resilience?

• Devise a simple model to test the impact of topology:

1. stochastic instruction arrival process2. “prototypical” topologies of interbank relationships3. simple reflexive bank behavior, and4. single disrupted bank

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• Each bank has a given level of customer deposits (Di)• Each unit of deposits has the same probability of been

transformed into a payment instruction

• where λi is the initial rate

• When a bank receives a payment its deposits increase-> the instructions arrival increases

• When a bank sends a payment its deposits decrease-> the instructions arrival decreases

1. Stochastic instruction arrival process

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2. “Prototypical” topologies of interbank relationshipsHomogeneous deposit distribution

Heterogeneous deposit distribution

lattice complete random

random scale-free

400 banks, 8*400 links

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2.1 Network statisticsaverage degree

Degreerange

average path length

lattice 8 8 6.7

random – homogeneous

8 8 3.1

complete 399 399 1

random – heterogeneous

8 1 – 19 3.1

scale-free 8 1 – 225 2.6

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2.2 Real networks…

Source: The Topology of Interbank Payment Flowshttp://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr243.pdf

Fedwire has a scale-free network topology

i.e. it has a power law degree distribution, where

Page 7: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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3. Simple reflexive bank behavior

Bank i Bank i

Payment system

1 Agent instructs bank to send a payment

2 Depositor account is debited

Di Dj

5 Payment account is credited

4 Payment account is debited

Productive Agent Productive Agent

6 Depositor account is credited

Qi

3 Payment is settled or queued

Bi > 0 Qj

7 Queued payment, if any, is released

Qj > 0

Bi Bj

Central bank

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4. Single disrupted bank

• An “operational incident”

• Other banks are not aware: the bank can receive, but cannot send payments

• The single bank acts as a liquidity sink. Eventually all liquidity is at the failing bank and no payments can be settled

• We examine the liquidity absorption rate and system throughput in the time period until all liquidity is at the failing bank

Example: queues in a lattice network, 10,000 nodes, low liquidity

before:

after:

Page 9: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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Steady state performance

Steady state performance is varies under the alternative network topologies

time

queu

e

steady state

Low liquidity

High liquidity

time

queu

es

Page 10: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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0

25,000

50,000

75,000

100,000

125,000

1 10 100

1,00

0

10,0

00

100,

000

1,00

0,00

0

total liquidity

que

ues

Queues in steady state

Shorter average path length

Shorter average path length, higher degree heterogeneity

Shortest average path length

High average path length, uniform degree distribution

Page 11: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

1 10 100

1,00

0

10,0

00

100,

000

1,00

0,00

0

total liquidity

que

ues

Queues in steady state: scale free network

Highest degree heterogeneity

-> higher degree heterogeneity and a longeraverage path lengthincrease the level of queues in the steady state

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Liquidity absorption rate

The amount of liquidity absorbed by the failing bank

by each instruction arriving to the system

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0.00%

0.10%

0.20%

0.30%

0.40%

0.50%10 10

0

1,00

0

10,0

00

100,

000

1,00

0,00

0

liquidity

liq. a

bsor

ptio

n ra

te

Liquidity absorption rate

Shorter average path length

Shortest average path length

Higher degree heterogeneity, larger failing bank

High average path length, uniform degree distribution

Page 14: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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Liquidity absorption rate: scale free network

Highest degree heterogeneity, largest failing bank

Higher degree heterogeneity/ larger failing bank and a shorteraverage path length increase the speed of liquidity absorption

0.00%

1.00%

2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

5.00%10 10

0

1,00

0

10,0

00

100,

000

1,00

0,00

0

liquidity

liq. a

bsor

ptio

n ra

te

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Throughput

The fraction of arriving instructions that the bank can settle in a given time interval

(the remaining being queued)

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25%

50%

75%

100%

10 100

1,00

0

10,0

00

100,

000

1,00

0,00

0

liquidity

thro

ughp

ut

Throughput

Shorter average path length

Shortest average path length

Higher degree heterogeneity, larger failing bank

High average path length, uniform degree distribution

Page 17: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

10 100

1,00

0

10,0

00

100,

000

1,00

0,00

0

liquidity

thro

ughp

ut

Highest degree heterogeneity, largest failing bank

Throughput: scale-free network

Throughput decreases with increased degree heterogeneity and the removal of larger banks

Page 18: Network Topology and Payment System Resiliency

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Summary

• First investigation into the impact of topology in “payment system” type of network dynamics

• Topology matters– both for normal performance and– for performance under stress– efficient topologies are not necessarily less resilient

• Next steps– Investigate alternative times for other banks’ knowledge of failure

and failure resumption times– Impact of the existence of a market?– Perturbations in market?– Build behavior for banks