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2006 1: 151JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENTSonia Bouffard and David Carment

The Sri Lanka Peace Process: A Critical Review

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The Sri Lanka Peace Process: A Critical Review � 151

Journal of South Asian Development 1:2 (2006)SSSSSagagagagage Pe Pe Pe Pe Pububububublicatlicatlicatlicatlicatioioioioionsnsnsnsns New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London

DOI: 10.1177/097317410600100201

The Sri Lanka Peace Process: A Critical Review

SONIA BOUFFARD

DAVID CARMENT

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa

Canada

AAAAAbstbstbstbstbstrrrrraaaaaccccctttttIn the wake of a new wave of violence in Sri Lanka and the classification by numerousWestern countries of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a terrorist organisa-tion, many wonder if the agreement mediated by Norway between the government ofSri Lanka and the LTTE has any long-term chance of success. This review will analyse thedifferent strategies and proposals elaborated in previous agreements and peace talks de-signed to end the conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil minority,with the purpose of identifying whether the current ceasefire agreement has a chance oflasting and leading to a peaceful and durable resolution of the conflict. The changingnature of the Tamils’ requests and the government’s proposals from the independence ofCeylon until the present will be considered, along with the causes of their evolution, thereasons why certain proposals were accepted or rejected, and the major obstacles pre-venting a successful agreement from being reached. The study of the 1957, 1965, 1984,1985, 1987, 1989 and 1995 failing agreements, as well as the changing context in whichthey were abandoned or modified, will lead to the conclusion that the United Nationsshould take on a bigger role in the peace process if it wants the ceasefire to be successfullyimplemented and lead to a permanent peace. The United Nations could enhance its roleby pressuring both sides to increase the pace and the commitment to negotiation, by ac-cepting to monitor the ceasefire, or by announcing retribution for both sides in case ofnon-compliance. In the absence of UN involvement, the current ceasefire will not onlyhave little chance of evolving into long-lasting peace for Sri Lanka, but could also exacer-bate the conflict by allowing both parties to regroup and increase their fighting capabilities.

INTRODUCTION

Since independence, Sri Lanka’s protracted conflict has been witness to numerouspeace negotiations. Many proposals have been suggested and studied over the

years, but no long-lasting agreement has been reached. Although a ceasefire wasnegotiated in 2002, its implementation has yet to be completed and respected by

at UNIV CALIFORNIA SANTA BARBARA on November 24, 2014sad.sagepub.comDownloaded from


152 � Sonia Bouffard and David Carment

both sides. What can we learn from all these failing peace accords? What are themain obstacles to a permanent settlement of the conflict, and what are the provi-sions that could ensure success? In reviewing the peace process in Sri Lanka, weconclude that the United Nations could play a more significant role in the reso-lution of the conflict and act as a guarantor for the current ceasefire in order tocreate the necessary conditions for the negotiation of a permanent and positive peacein Sri Lanka.

This review begins with an overview of the political and social context ofSri Lanka’s colonisation and identifies some of the basic problems that arose whenthe country gained its independence from Britain. We then review the failed negoti-ations between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil representatives in 1957, 1965,1984, 1985, 1987, 1989 and 1995. We identify the minimal conditions acceptableto both sides, the reasons why the proposals were first considered and then rejected,and the forces that acted as polarising factors during the processes. In the finalsection we identify the necessary requirements for lasting peace in Sri Lanka andthe likely success of the 2002 the ceasefire agreement.

According to Taras and Ganguly (2002), the relationship between Sinhalese andTamils is not only an example of peaceful coexistence but also traditional rivalry.Due to centralised colonial administration, the problematic issues between thetwo sides—political, religious, cultural, linguistic and economic—were held incheck by the British administration. When Sri Lanka became independent andthe Sinhalese majority obtained political power, these issues became the basis forfirst political mobilisation, then armed conflict.

First, political arrangements of ethnic groups and their degree of influence overthe state and its decision makers are determined in part by historical experience.One characteristic of the historical experience is the self-perception that the Sinhaleseare a threatened people—they, not the Tamils of Sri Lanka, should be regardedasthe minority. Surrounded by an overwhelming Hindu Tamil majority in the region—over 52 million, including South India—the Sinhalese have, over time, developed a‘reverse psychology’ of superiority. The perceived threat was reinforced by the factthat Tamils became disproportionately represented in the colonial administrationas well as in the legal, medical and engineering professions. Enticed to learn Englishby the Northern and Eastern Provinces’ unfertile land, the Tamils were more suitablefor administrative posts. Although they were not occupying a majority of the pos-itions, they continued to be over-represented in the colonial administration untilindependence (De Silva 1986: 90).1

Second, the Sinhalese have had a 2,500-year history of political and religiousaffairs in which the sacred Sinhalese Buddhist texts describe the southern states ofIndia as the main oppressors of the Sinhalese people (The Dipavamsa 1959). Theidentity of India as an external and threatening force is the most salient aspect ofhistorical relations between India and Sri Lanka. This perception is reinforced byIndia’s continuing status as the greatest of the powers within South Asia.




Third, like India, the political system in Sri Lanka is elitist and personalised.The politics of Sri Lanka belong to a select few—members of either a ‘plantocracy’or English-educated political elite. In the early years of mass politics, transferpayment schemes and the state patronage system of the Sri Lankan governmentdid not translate into the kind of participatory democracy that commonly is asso-ciated with welfare states (Moore 1985). Decision making remained highly cen-tralised and controlled by an elite group of Colombo-based politicians (ibid.). Inother words, due to the fragile nature of democracy, ethnic tensions were manipu-lated by the Western-educated elite.

Fourth, and finally, the Sri Lankan political system continues to exhibit aspectsof institutional incompleteness. An illustration is the transformation of theSri Lankan constitution over the past 25 years. These changes reinforced the powersof the president and the unitary political system, while, more recently, attemptshave been made to devolve power to provincial councils. The failure of devolu-tion to take hold after the death of President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993and the subsequent election of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) meant thatregional politics remains subservient to that of Colombo. In sum, the unitary natureof the state has two implications: First, politics is direct; leaders are selected on thebasis of their willingness to protect the group and appeal to voters on that basis.Second, a unitary state implies lack of flexibility in finding solutions related toautonomy.

Historical and social elements combined to create a centralised system basedon identity politics that proved to be ill-prepared for the political mobilisationof Sri Lanka’s minority Tamils. Despite inheriting a legal and constitutionalsystem that emphasised individual rights and liberties, democracy quickly be-come equated with quotas, applied both in the government and higher education(De Silva 1993; McGowan 1992). Inter-ethnic elite interests converged initiallyduring the 1920s, but that goal then had a simple and unifying character: to endcolonisation. Subsequent elite interests became fragmented along ethnic lines,especially after 1956, when ethnic nationalists swept into power on promises torestore Sinhalese pre-eminence.

The tension between both groups emerged when the British decided to giveCeylon its independence in 1948. The drafting of Sri Lanka’s first constitutionpolarised the Sinhalese and the Tamils, who espoused different views on the futurepolitical system. The Sinhalese enounced their desire for political, economic andsocial control. The constitution of 1948 denied citizenship to Tamils of Indianorigin, which reduced the percentage of Tamils on the island and decreased thenumber of Tamil representatives in Parliament (Manogaran 1987: 40).2 In 1956the Official Language Act declared Sinhala to be the only official language ofSri Lanka, thus replacing English as the language of administration. In 1972 thenew constitution conferred official status to Buddhism, the religion of the majorityof Sinhalese. This was followed by some changes in the university’s admission pol-icy, which lowered the standards of admission for the Sinhalese in order to increase




the percentage admitted. Sharp discrimination against Tamil university applicantsin 1977 substantially reduced the proportion of Tamils in many universities. Whilethe proportion of Tamils admitted to science-based disciplines reached 35 percent in 1970, it dropped to 19 per cent by 1975 (De Silva 1979 in Shastri 1997:148). Student riots occurred in the same year (Kearney 1985).

Along with the various policies aimed at confirming the dominating status ofthe Sinhalese majority, an attempt to manipulate Tamil ethnic identity was car-ried out. As early as 1933, but more importantly after independence, the govern-ment gave subsidies to peasants who would farm in the Dry Zone, which coveredthe Northern and the Eastern Provinces, and where the Tamils represented 68 percent of the population (Manogaran 1987: 6). Although the peasant colonisationpolicy’s aim was originally to alleviate the population density in the Wet Zone byimproving the irrigation system and giving land to a number of allotees in the DryZone, it can be argued that it was also used by the government to assimilate theTamils. Under the governmental colonisation policy, only a small number of Tamils(2,879 out of 16,532 in 1953) were given subsidies (ibid.: 91), while the Sinhaleseproportion of the population in the districts of Amparai, Batticaloa, Polonnaruwa,Trincolmalee and Anuradhapura increased from 33 per cent to 51 per cent bet-ween 1946 and 1971, mostly due to the migration of Sinhalese settlers (Moore1985: 96). The result was a dilution of the Tamil majority in the Northern andEastern Provinces and an even further reduction of Tamil parliamentary representa-tion. Such discriminatory laws became the source of tension between the two groups.

Sri Lanka’s protracted ethnic conflict can also be traced to the political mobilisa-tion of the Tamil minority in the early 1940s. In 1948 the main issue regardingethnic politics became the amount of power minorities would have in affectingdecisions taken at the centre. During the formative years of Sri Lanka’s independ-ence, Tamil political organisation became subdivided into two basic groups:(a) leadership that represented the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils, known asthe Tamil Congress (which until 1948 had worked closely with the United NationalParty, UNP); and (b) the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), which representedthe interests of Tamil plantation workers who, by 1946, formed over half of theTamil population of the island. Together, the Tamils formed a large enoughelectorate to gain representation for their sub-groups in the legislature.

Under the leadership of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, in 1949 a breakaway group ofTamil Congress members formed the Ceylon Tamil State or Federal Party, withthe aim of ‘creating an organisation for the attainment of the freedom of the Tamilspeaking people of Ceylon’ (Kodikara 1982: 195). The Federal Party asserted itsinterest in four basic issues:

1. Establishment of one or more Tamil linguistic states operating as a federat-ing unit or units enjoying wide autonomous and residuary powers withina federal state in Sri Lanka;

2. Restoration of the Tamil language to its rightful place enjoying absolute par-ity of status with Sinhala as an official language of Sri Lanka;




3. Conferment of full civil rights to all Tamil-speaking people; and4. Cessation of colonisation of traditionally Tamil-speaking areas with Sinhalese

people (Kodikara 1985).

According to the Federal Party, the call for autonomy (which in 1949 had notbecome a demand for a separate state) represented a workable scheme because,apart from Indian Tamils concentrated in Kandy and a small percentage of othersscattered throughout the island, the bulk of the Tamil population inhabited theNorthern and Eastern Provinces.3

EARLY AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS PROCESSES

The 1957 Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact

In 1957 the Federal Party representing the Tamils and its leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam,negotiated the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact with Bandaranaike, the lead-er of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party representing the Sinhalese. The pact wasexceptional because both leaders demonstrated a strong desire to come to an agree-ment. While the Tamils departed from the initial idea of an autonomous linguisticstate, Prime Minister Bandaranaike offered them limited concessions on the issueof peasant colonisation and agreed to a system of autonomous regional councilsfor the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Although Sinhala would have remainedthe sole official language, the Tamil language would be recognised as the languageof a national minority as well as the language of administration in the Northernand Eastern Provinces; the Northern Province would form a single region servedby one regional council, and the Eastern Province would be organised into one ormore regional councils with elected council members possessing authority on vari-ous portfolios, including colonisation schemes. Regional councils would be granteda power of taxation and would receive money transfers from the central govern-ment. The Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact is the closest the two groups havecome to formal agreement.

Unfortunately, the accord became an object of criticism for the parliamentaryopposition as well as the Buddhist clergy, who took advantage of the immaturedemocratic system and rendered it impossible to sign for the prime minister. Inorder to guarantee that the implementation of the pact would not nullify the 1956Official Language Act, Bandaranaike issued an order requiring all vehicles’ licenceplates to display the Sinhalese characters SRI, which sparked a series of protests bythe Tamils as well as eventual confrontation between the two groups (Manogaran1987: 153). Pressure from both sides prevented the agreement from being enactedinto law. The agreement thus failed.

The 1965 Senanayake–Chelvanayakam Pact

The negotiation of a second pact was initiated on 24 March 1965 when Bandaranaikewas unable to gather enough support to be returned to the office of prime minister




in the 1965 elections. A minority government was elected under the United NationalParty and its members sought an alliance with the Federal Party, which created fa-vourable circumstances for the negotiation of the Senanayake–Chelvanayakam Pact.

The new Pact promised a quick implementation of the Tamil Language (SpecialProvision) Act and an amendment to provide for legal proceedings in the Northernand Eastern Provinces to be conducted in the Tamil language, which would havebeen known as the Courts Act. The Pact also addressed the creation of districtcouncils, but unlike the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact’s regional councils,these would not be granted autonomy and legislative powers. The document didnot explicitly describe the areas of authority for the councils, and was vagueabout their power. On the colonisation issue, the Pact did set a few guidelines forthe attribution of land, but did not provide the district council with a final say onthe colonisation schemes. Compared to the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact,it was a disappointing agreement for the Tamil minority. It did not guarantee theprotection of their culture, nor did it grant them regional autonomy.

The provisions of the Pact were translated into two Bills: (a) the Tamil Language(Special Provisions) Regulations Bill,4 passed in 1966 and still remaining in effect,which allowed the use of the Tamil national language for the administration ofthe Northern and Eastern Provinces; and (b) the District Council Draft Bill,5 intro-duced in 1968, but passed only 12 years later due to a change of government in1970 (De Silva 1986: 316). The weak nature of the Senanayake–ChelvanayakamPact and the delay in implementing the provision on the district councils increasedthe insecurity of the Tamil minority. This opened the door for a radicalisation ofdemands and an escalation of tensions. The Tamil demand for a federalist system,a constitutional recognition of their language, and the reduction of economic dis-parity between the two groups remained constant until 1972.

Ethnic Tensions to Armed Conflict

Until the mid-1970s Tamil nationalism was expressed through demonstrationsand civil protest. However, after that time, ‘the nature of Sri Lankan Tamil national-ism acquired its present day secessionist dimension’ (Kearney 1985, in Taras andGanguly 2002: 188–189). In other words, the demand for autonomy evolved intothe issue of separation (Taras and Ganguly 2002). Faced with diminishing employ-ment opportunities, young Tamils turned their backs to the moderate and accom-modating Federal Party and created other political organisations with more ambitiousand radical goals.

In 1972 a new constitution was adopted reaffirming the sole official languagestatus of Sinhala and granting a special status to Buddhism. The new constitutionalso eliminated the Section 18(2) of the Soulbury Constitution, which had pro-hibited the adoption of discriminatory laws, by specifying that all laws should bein the interest of national unity and integrity. Although the new constitution in-cluded a Bill of Rights, its scope was not wide-ranging. The reaction was strong




among the Tamil minority who decided to boycott the Assembly and began cam-paigning more vigorously for regional autonomy.

In the early 1970s the Tamil United Front (TUF) was created in an attempt tocoordinate the efforts of many political parties, including the Tamil Congress andthe Federal Party, and to adopt strategies that would yield better results for pro-tecting their rights. When the TUF began to campaign for an independent state,it changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The TULF won18 seats in the 1977 general elections and represented Tamil interests in Parlia-ment until October 1983, when 16 TULF legislators refused to support the SixthAmendment of the Constitution and resigned.

Factors outside of the government’s direct control contributed to theadvancement of student militancy. An often-overlooked factor from that era is theworld sympathy evoked by riots, deaths, human rights violations and a growingTamil refugee problem from 1977 onward. The immediate effect of the violencetook the form of terror created among Sri Lankan civilians (especially Tamils) anda subsequent increase in support from south India for the separatist cause. Violencebetween the two ethnic groups escalated with the creation of numerous small or-ganisations. These included the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO),the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) formed in London, whichsplit in 1980 to create the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF),6

the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Terrorist acts became more frequent, most often characterised by the murderof pro-government Tamils or influential Sinhalese politicians. The police forces,which had always included a percentage of Sinhalese and Tamil officers, were placedin a difficult situation, the Tamils wishing to avoid repressive acts against theirown, and the Sinhalese finding themselves in an obvious point of opposition.The result was an erosion in the rule of law and an increase in the criminality rate(De Silva 1986: 269). Communal riots occurred in 1977 and 1983, and involvedthe destruction of property and commerce, including the destruction of Tamil-owned businesses by government-financed mobs (Manogaran and Pfaffenberger1994: 11). By 1983 the guerrilla groups were well trained, well equipped and largeenough to pose a threat to the national army (ibid.: 351). Shortly thereafter, theLTTE became the only Tamil insurgency movement after removing effectively otherrival groups such as TELO and PLOTE in bloody internecine fighting between 1986and 1989.

The government reacted to the violence and acts of terrorism in two ways: byattempting to co-opt the ethnic elite, and by putting in place strong control pol-icies. On the one hand Articles 19 and 20 of the Republican Constitution of 1978gave the Tamil language a new ‘national language’ status, which allowed it to beused in a number of administrative and educational circumstances. It also eliminatedthe provision that had made university admission standards distinct for Sinhaleseand Tamils. In an effort to co-opt the ethnic elite, the then president Jayewardene,




also offered many top-level positions to Tamil civil servants, including that of min-ister of justice. There was hope that these concessions would permit negotiationwith the Tamils and de-escalate violence.

On the other hand the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism (TemporaryProvision) Bill, which allowed for the implementation of rigorous regulations,generally imposed through the declaration of a state of emergency, in the prov-inces affected by communal violence (De Silva 1986: 331). The government alsoamended the constitution, specifying that, ‘No person shall, directly or indirectly,in or outside of Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advo-cate the establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka’ (Article 2,Republican Constitution of 1978). This provision outlawed the LTTE as well asother separatist organisations and enabled the government to arrest, dispossess ordepose any member of Tamil separatist groups. The mix of co-optation and controlpolicies was insufficient to put an end to the violence and even less able to end theconflict.

India’s Mediated All-Party Conference

Formal negotiations between the government and the representatives of the Tamilminority did not reopen until 1984, but the lack of trust engendered throughviolence coupled with strict coercive measures made the negotiations onerous.In July 1983 the Indian government chose to become an intermediary betweenthe Sri Lankan government (UNP) and the TULF. The Indian decision to inter-vene followed in the wake of post-election riots between Sinhalese and Tamils on24 and 25 July 1983. At this time the demand for separation over regional autonomycame into play as a tactic by Sri Lanka’s Tamil leadership.7

The transition of Tamil demands from regional autonomy to a separate state,along with the beginnings of Sri Lanka’s deepening conflict, can be identified withthe material and ideological support that the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)government of Tamil Nadu provided to the separatists and the direct interven-tion of the Indian government in Sri Lanka’s domestic affairs. India’s leader, IndiraGandhi, recognised Tamil separatist demands as affecting India’s own interests,specifically with regard to the great number of Tamils fleeing to India, but alsodue to the influence that the ethnic conflict had on similar insurgencies in India.8

The stated interest of India’s leaders was to prevent Sri Lanka’s internal strife fromescalating to a degree that might lead to involvement of extra-regional powers(Kodikara 1990, 1993; Taras and Ganguly 2002).

During the 1983 riots, Sri Lanka’s president, Junius Jayewardene, had soughtmilitary assistance from the United States, Britain, Pakistan and Bangladesh tomeet the growing insurgency (Rao 1988). On 5 August 1983, in a statement designedto placate Sri Lankan concerns, Indira Gandhi addressed the Indian Parliamentand asserted that India ‘does not pose any threat to Sri Lanka nor do we wantto interfere in its internal affairs. We want the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka tobe preserved’ (Parliamentary Debates, Lok Sabha, 5 August 1983, quoted in




ibid.: 421). Following the speech, the Indian government asserted its regional pre-eminence by pronouncing the ‘Indira Doctrine’. It said that:

India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region,unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by any outside power.If external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should lookfirst within the region for help. (Quoted in Rao 1985: 63)

In response to this announcement by the Indian government, PresidentJ.H. Jayewardene warned that if Sri Lanka perceived a threat from India it wouldturn to the United States, Britain and others for military aid. Sri Lankan sourcesrevealed that the president did in fact worry about an Indian invasion (Manor andSegal 1985; Hindu, 19 August 1983). Yet only several weeks later, PresidentJayewardene agreed to prepare the groundwork for a settlement between theSri Lankan government and the TULF to be negotiated through the good offices ofthe Indian government.

The proposals that emerged from the discussion in India prior to the All-PartyConference known as the Annexure C included the creation of regional councilsempowered to enact laws on certain subjects such as the maintenance of law andorder, administration of justice, social and economic development of the region,cultural matters and land policy. The document also included provisions for theelection of council chief ministers, the ability for the councils to levy taxes andmobilise resources, settlement schemes to be based on ethnic proportions, andthe armed forces (Annexure C: Tamil Times, October 1984). These proposals weresubmitted to debate during the 1984 All-Party Conference (APC) in India. Pressuredby both the Buddhist clergy and a few extremist parties, who felt that too manyadvantages were given to the Tamils, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) with-drew its support for the proposal. The SLFP then modified its proposal to the lessmeaningful concept of district development councils (DDCs) that granted onlylimited autonomy to the Tamils (President Proposals to All Party Conference: TamilTimes, October 1984).

The TULF, the sole representative of the Tamils, rejected the proposal, claim-ing that it had not addressed the preservation of territorial integrity in Tamil areas,the procedure for selecting allottees for colonisation schemes in Tamil provincesand the procedure for financing major projects (Why TULF Rejected President’sProposal: Tamil Times, January 1985). The APC clearly demonstrated the politicalconstraints faced by the government and the rigidity of Tamil requests.

The 1985 Thimpu Talks

On 29 March 1985 the Indian coastguard intercepted a boat carrying guns andexplosives to Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka (Kodikara 1987). The Indian governmentalso applied pressure on the government of Tamil Nadu to remove Tamil militantsfrom their training bases. With India taking the diplomatic initiative, two rounds




of talks took place at Thimpu, Bhutan, in July and August 1985. The talks in-cluded the heads of the five major militant and political organisations, the LTTE,TELO, EROS, TELA, EPRLF, TULF and PLOTE, and the governments of Indiaand Sri Lanka.

The government submitted an offer that was almost identical to the one thathad been rejected at the 1984 APC. In response, the Tamil coalition submitted fourproposals: (a) the recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality;(b) the recognition of a Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity;(c) the recognition of the right to self-determination; and (d) the recognitionof the Tamils right to full citizenship and democratic rights (Loganathan 2001).The government reacted to these four proposals by affirming that taken at facevalue the proposals endangered the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. As its offer,the government reiterated the concept of district development councils.

The talks collapsed after two rounds of negotiations. Minimal demands fromthe Tamils had increased sharply, while governmental offers were stagnant. Thenegotiations ended in failure at least in part, because the Sri Lankan government—while advocating peaceful negotiations—had increased its attacks on the Tamilguerrillas. These military measures pushed moderate Tamils into militant organ-isations. Refusal by the Sri Lankan government to agree to the Tamil demand tomerge the Northern and Eastern Provinces proved equally damaging. Jayewardeneonce again approached the United States to come to Sri Lanka’s aid in solvingthe ethnic crisis. But the United States responded by informing him that it had cutthe annual aid package to Sri Lanka in half, due partly to an effective Tamil lobbyin Washington (Hindu, 6 June 1986). In voicing his unhappiness with the Americanresponse, Jayewardene said, ‘I am very happy that I have been abandoned. I do nottrust a single power’ (South, September 1987: 36).

Also in November of 1986, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) met in Bangalore. The major objective of this meeting was to seek a modusvivendi between Tamil insistence on the merger of the Northern and Eastern Prov-inces, and Sinhalese opposition to it. The so-called ‘December 19th Proposals’ calledfor administrative linkages between the two provinces and devolution of powerto these provinces.9 Both sides agreed to the proposals. The perception of theSri Lankan government, however, remained that it would continue to pursue a mili-tary solution against the militants while using the proposals as a negotiatingposition for further talks.

By the beginning of 1987 the dominant Tamil rebel group, the LTTE, begancarrying out a plan to take over civil administration in the north, which it alreadyhad under its military control. At the same time, the Sri Lankan governmentimposed a blockade on supplies of fuel and other essential commodities to theJaffna peninsula while simultaneously picking up military action in the north andeast (Hindu, 3, 10, 11 February 1987).

Within weeks of the Sri Lankan effort to eliminate the Tamil rebels, the govern-ment of India warned the Sri Lankan government against taking further militaryaction against the insurgents. In a message delivered to President Jayewardene on




10 February 1987, Gandhi warned Sri Lanka that India had suspended its goodoffices and demanded that Colombo: (a) lift the economic blockade of Jaffna; and(b) affirm its commitment to the ‘December 19th Proposals’. ‘If these steps werenot taken and the military option was continued,’ Gandhi concluded, the fighting‘will be prolonged’, and the ‘situation will escalate’ (Hindu, 12 February 1987: A1).Jayewardene reacted immediately to this threat. He issued two warnings to the LTTE,suggesting that: (a) hostilities should cease in the north and the east; and (b) thelifting of the embargo would be conditional upon observance of a 10-day ceasefire.When the LTTE violated the ceasefire, the Sri Lankan army launched a full-scalemilitary campaign involving over 3,000 troops in a land, air and sea assault on theJaffna peninsula. At the end of April 1987 the battle for Jaffna had begun. By May,despite the failure to round up the leaders of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army enjoyedunprecedented success against the Tigers (Pfaffenberger 1988).

The 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord

In the midst of violent interactions between the Sri Lankan government and theTamil guerrillas, two years of negotiations between the Indian and Sri Lankangovernments were conducted. The TULF was consulted, but other Tamil organisa-tions were left aside during the negotiations of the Delhi Accord, which culminatedwith its signing on 30 August 1985. Although not endorsed by any of the Tamil or-ganisations because of the LTTE’s strong opposition to it, the draft accord becamethe basis for the negotiation between the two governments and eventually tookthe form of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.

Serious discontent with the Accord produced an attempt on Jayewardene’s life on18 August 1987 within the grounds of Sri Lanka’s Parliament. Speculation at thetime lay with the Sinhalese left, possibly the Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna (JVP).The attack seemed to galvanise the president’s decision making; Jayewardene be-lieved he had little alternative to forging ahead in collaboration with India to endthe conflict. Retreat became unthinkable.

In the Accord the Sri Lankan government acknowledged the multi-ethnic andmultilingual nature of the state, the Northern and Eastern Provinces as a singleprovincial unit with a provincial council, a referendum in the Eastern Province,the liberation of some political prisoners, and the return of refugees. In order tosecure the island from terrorist attacks, India agreed to cooperate by providingmilitary assistance to the government of Sri Lanka by sending a detachment ofIndian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) composed of 16,000 to 19,000 men respon-sible for decommissioning Tamil weapons and monitoring the ceasefire. Indiaalso promised to limit collaboration between Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils.

Jayewardene, who believed that he had limited options after failing to get Westernhelp against India, signed the Accord with Gandhi in Colombo on 29 July 1987.The Accord embodied the principles of the ‘December 19th Proposals’. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord represented a major disappointment for both Sri Lankan Tamilsand Sinhalese. Despite the fact that the ultimate emphasis was on the territorial




integrity of Sri Lanka, the Accord stopped short of guaranteeing devolution ofauthority and the rights sought by the Tamils. Some high-ranking Sinhalese offi-cials also had very deep reservations about the Accord (Taras and Ganguly 2002).The Tamil militants, specifically the LTTE, did not sign the Accord, but agreedto a ceasefire (ibid.). When flown to India to give its agreement on the Accord,the LTTE was reluctant to agree to lay down its arms within 72 hours of the signingof the Accord, but was eventually convinced by the Tamil Nadu chief minister,M.G. Ramachandran (De Silva and Samarasinghe 1993: 165).

As part of the agreement, India was committed to disarm the LTTE by force ifnecessary. A problem was that the Accord was between India and Sri Lanka, andno Tamil political organisation was a party to the agreement. The Tamils had agreedto a ceasefire but still perceived the Accord as unfavourable because it did not securethe independence of the Northern and Eastern Province. Although the LTTE didcooperate for several days and did lay down part of its weaponry, clashes with otherTamil organisations persisted, and violence did not decrease substantially. In orderto secure the result of a future referendum, the LTTE also continued to terrorisethe Sinhalese population of the Eastern Provinces. These actions forced the IPKFto act against the LTTE as it had agreed to do in the Accord (ibid. 1993: 139).

Given the fact that the India had taken over from the Sri Lankan army in thenorth and east, New Delhi had a surprisingly optimistic view of recent events. ForIndia, unlike Sri Lanka, no time pressure existed to complete the Accord. Thegovernment of India expected a settlement with the LTTE within six weeks. Dur-ing that period the IPKF would have departed. From the Sri Lankan perspective,Indian support for the LTTE, overt or covert, looked like affirmation of the onlygroup capable of forcing Colombo into political compromises. Although the gov-ernment of India did not support Tamil Eelam (that is, independence), it couldnot easily endure assaults on the Sri Lankan Tamil community, which ultimatelywould compromise its legitimacy within south India. Sri Lanka viewed Indianboldness as guarantor of peace as a step beyond good offices. The Indian decisionto take on the LTTE derived from the belief that: (a) the Indian army could meetany LTTE challenges; and (b) the LTTE did not have widespread support amongthe eastern Tamils. The Indian government believed at this time that the Sri LankanTamil community still welcomed the IPKF.

However, the IPKF soon found itself in the same position that the Sri Lankanarmy had been in a year earlier, fighting the LTTE forcefully without the capabilitiesto win an easy victory. The lack of historical, political and geographical knowledgeabout Sri Lanka, as well as the language barrier often resulted in Indian soldiersfiring at innocent civilians, thus decreasing the popular support for the intervention(Hennayake 1989: 412). Instead of calming the conflict, the Indian interventionresulted in an escalation of violence and a steady increase of terrorism (Matthews1988: 229). Not surprisingly, the withdrawal of the IPKF became a central point inthe negotiations that followed.

In hindsight, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord cannot be viewed as successful. Tarasand Ganguly (2002: 201–2) argue that ‘it brought about an intensification and trans-formation of the conflict; the conflict now was not only between the LTTE and the




Sri Lankan forces but also within the Sinhalese community between the JVP andthe government’. Additionally, by the early 1990s the conflict between Sri LankanTamils and Muslims in the eastern part of Sri Lanka became part of an alreadyvery complex conflict structure (ibid.).

The 1989 and 1995 Negotiations

The rise to power of President Ranasinghe Premadasa signalled an escalation inverbal hostilities between Sri Lanka and India.10 For example, at the 10 January 1989installation ceremony of the president at the nation’s most sacred Buddhist shrine,the Temple of the Tooth (in the former Royal Capital of Kandy) surrounded byBuddhist monks, Premadasa announced that his priority would be to resolveSri Lanka’s conflict. He asked the JVP to rejoin the political process. On relationswith India he sounded the following nationalist note: ‘Whatever the cost, I willnot surrender an inch of Sri Lankan territory. Whatever the cost I will not sur-render a shred of our sovereignty. We should not and will not create situationsthat provoke or invite intervention’ (South, February 1989: 12).

At high-level talks in September 1989 an agreement between India and Sri Lankaprovided for an observer group consisting of the Sri Lankan Army Commanderand the Indian Commander of IPKF to report on violations of the ceasefire andreport consequential action. The agreement furthermore specified that therewould be a phased handover from the IPKF to Sri Lankan forces in the north andeast supervised by provincial councils, the government of Sri Lanka and the govern-ment of India. Shortly after the January 1989 election, Premadasa initiated newtalks with the LTTE in an attempt to negotiate a ceasefire and solve the problemof permanent unrest across the island. Both parties agreed that the Indian PeaceKeeping Force would withdraw within a year. In May 1989 both parties also agreedto discuss the disabilities faced by the Tamil-speaking people and human rightsissues arising from the occupation by the IPKF, the disruption of economic activ-ity of the civilian population such as agriculture, fishing, industry and trade, state-sponsored colonisation, conscription of youth, the building-up of the CivilianVolunteer Force and their training by the Indian Peace Keeping Force, and the needto seek a negotiated political settlement, taking into consideration the aspirationsof the Tamil-speaking people (Tamil Nation, no date).

Premadasa, having won only 50.43 per cent of the vote, was incapable of mak-ing constitutional changes (this required a two-thirds approval), and was unableto repeal the sixth Amendment as requested by the LTTE. As a result, the Tamilsabandoned the little commitment they had made to reach a settlement, continuedto affirm their desire for Tamil Eelam, and renamed their provincial council theTamil National Assembly.

By the beginning of 1990, the political situation in Sri Lanka stood on shakyground. The anti-Accord sentiment among the Sinhalese opposition remainedstrong and India’s frequent miscalculations continued to bedevil its military oper-ations in the north and east. Premadasa remained suspicious of Indian intentions.




JVP opposition in the south was effectively quelled by February 1990, but notwithout a cost. Although beginning a phased pull-out, Indian troops remainedentrenched in the north. Over the next 13 months of talks in Colombo, Premadasamade significant concessions to the Tigers.

In June 1990, four months after the Indian troops completed their withdrawal,civil war broke out again in the north and the councils were abolished. By 1991India had moved formally out of the picture. India suffered at least one seriousside effect from the conflict; Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on 21 May 1991.Opposition leaders, dedicated to complete Indian withdrawal from the conflict,succeeded him.

Throughout 1991 and 1992 a multi-party parliamentary committee began toconsider ways to offer Tamils alternatives to supporting the Tigers. A plan wasdevised with the proviso that the Northern and Eastern Provinces would not merge.More power would be devolved to the north and the east to protect minorityMuslims living in the region. The plan was contingent on Tamil agreement toabandon merging the north and the east. The agreement generated significanthope among the participants for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

President Premadasa’s assassination on 1 May 1993, possibly by Tamil Tigers,came as a significant blow to the various initiatives in progress. In less than a two-week period assassins had erased the country’s president and the only otherman to challenge him, opposition leader Lalith Athulathmudali. Assassinated on23 May 1993, Ahulathmudali, former UNP member, had led a failed impeach-ment in August 1991 against his rival, accusing the president of abuse of power.He then formed the Democratic United National Front and, under Sri Lanka’scouncil system, could have had power equal to that of the president (Asiaweek,12 May 1993).

In November 1993 the LTTE seized the government military base close to Jaffnaand only after several days of intense fighting could government forces manage torecover it. Indeed, from 1990 onwards the LTTE gradually increased its power inmost of the Jaffna Peninsula and in 1995 the LTTE governed Jaffna as a de facto state.

Presidential elections were held in August 1994 and this resulted in a coalition ofSLFP-led parties coming to power under the leadership of Chandrika Kumaratunga.The electoral victory of Kumaratunga brought new hope to the country as she hadexpressed a strong commitment to negotiate an end to the conflict between theSinhalese and the Tamils during her electoral campaign.

On 8 January 1995 negotiations resumed when the LTTE agreed to a ceasefireand to further talks in Jaffna. The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed atruce and began to negotiate even though the LTTE refused to enter into substan-tive political discussion before an end to the economic embargo was secured. Thenew government of Chandrika Kumaratunga refused the LTTE’s demands to liftthe economic embargo and the ban on fishing in Tamil territory before the end ofthe violence. In response, the LTTE would not negotiate before these conditions




were met. On 19 April 1995 an LTTE attack on government installations put anend to the truce. The increasing violence and attacks from both sides led the primeminister to affirm that negotiations with the LTTE would be temporarily suspended.

In August 1995, as a concrete step towards peace, the government of Sri Lankaproposed a plan for devolution of power. DeVotta (2002) argues that Kumaratungahad for a long time seen the 1978 constitution as a major impediment to solvingthe ethnic problem since it rendered any structural change impossible. Althoughshe sent reform proposals to Parliament about new constitutional schemes andnew electoral laws, Kumaratunga could not get the response she wanted. The ideabehind the proposals was that such change would eventually provide the two-thirds majority needed to enact constitutional changes and pass devolutionarymeasures. However, due to opposition from both sides, she failed to put togetherthe needed two-thirds majority in Parliament. Instead, the president abandonedconstitutional reform proposals and called for new elections (Shastri 2002).

In December 1995 government forces regained control of Jaffna and cleared thepeninsula of LTTE fighters. According to De Silva (1993) this was the first time forover a decade that government forces had claimed control over this area. Eventuallythe LTTE had to withdraw from the city of Jaffna and moved southward. In themeantime, the LTTE continued its campaign of suicide bombings, including aJanuary 1998 assault on Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist temple that killed 13 people.

The 1995 negotiation included many rounds of talks, but never resulted in apeace agreement. There was reluctance to move from a cessation of hostility to amonitored ceasefire and to agree on a set of confidence-building measures to berespected by both parties as preconditions to a new phase of negotiation. The lackof trust had become a serious challenge for any successful negotiation and onemore obstacle preventing a peaceful solution to the conflict (Shastri 1997).

MAJOR OBSTACLES TO PAST NEGOTIATIONS

Over the past six decades several factors have influenced the numerous peace talkscausing them to collapse, often after a good start and an initial proposal that couldhave been accepted by both sides. In some instances extremist elements on bothsides made an agreement impossible because of the pressure they put on their res-pective representatives. This happened during the negotiations of 1957 when theBuddhist clergy pressurised the government to abandon the negotiation of theBandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact.

In other cases governments were constrained by political pressures, and wereforced to act in ways that would either guarantee their immediate survival or a fu-ture electoral victory. Sri Lanka’s heads of government, needing extra politicalsupport, were sometimes inclined to propose a solution to the conflict, as happenedin 1965 under the Senanayake–Chelvanayakam Pact. On many more occasionspolitical forces acted in a constraining manner and prevented the government




from demonstrating goodwill or negotiating an acceptable solution, as happenedto Premadasa in 1989. The political system featuring two major opposing politicalparties also acted as a detrimental force to negotiation. Compromises given to theTamils inevitably were taken as objects of criticism by the opposition, and in turnrestrained the freedom of the governing party to negotiate in good faith.

Repeated unsuccessful negotiations have also acted as a negative force on thesettlement of the conflict by pushing the parties to abandon negotiations out ofdisinterest or exhaustion. In particular, the rhetoric of the Tamil leadership becamemore radical, moving from advocacy for a federal system (by the Federal Party), toa need for regional autonomy (by the Tamil United Front) to complete independ-ence (by the Tamil United Liberation Front and the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam). The government also became more rigid and never really accepted theterms of the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact after 1957. The power of the re-gional councils was further reduced in each subsequent proposal, and it drewfurther away from what the Tamils were ready to accept. The inability of the govern-ment to identify proposals that met the minimal requirements laid out by theTamils led to the failure of the 1984 and 1985 negotiations. Repeated acts of seem-ingly random violence by the Tamil rebels polarised the two sides. Initially, Tamilviolence came to be legitimised by the inaction and intransigence of the govern-ment. Eventually, the violence of the separatists served as strong justification forpolice repression.

In sum, Sri Lanka’s protracted domestic conflict was sustained by two reinforcingfactors. Without continuous and sincere mediation in concert with meaningfulinternational effort little hope existed that Sri Lanka’s conflict would be resolved(De Silva and Samarasinghe 1993). Writing in 1998, a Minorities at Risk assessmentobserved:

The LTTE vowed to continue its military campaign; at the end of 1995, itlaunched a number of assaults against military targets and moderate Tamilleaders who support the President’s devolution plan. The Tigers are a well-equipped force that is highly disciplined and determined. Therefore, it is unlikelythat the Tamil separatist campaign will wither away. A more likely scenario isa lower-level of violence as the Tigers regroup to continue their rebellion.(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about.asp)

By 2000, unfortunately, it seems that little had changed; terrorism and fightingcontinued to be the main characteristics of Sri Lankan politics. The interventionby India as a potential mediator following the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord broughtabout escalation of the conflict instead of a de-escalation. The decision to sign anAccord without consulting the LTTE and without having any Tamil political organ-isation as a party to the Accord was a grave mistake. With the LTTE not bound toany obligations and India having agreed to disarm the LTTE by force if necessary,confrontation and failure was inevitable. A summary of negotiation attempts andtheir outcomes is provided in Table 1.




TTTT Tabababab ab

le 1

le 1

le 1

le 1

le 1

CCCC Con

flic

onfl

icon

flic

onfl

icon

flic

t M

t Mt M

t M

t M

anag

anag

anag

anag

anag

eeee e me

me

me

me

me n

t n

t nt

nt

nt TTTT T

ecececec ech

niq

ues

Uh

niq

ues

Uh

niq

ues

Uh

niq

ues

Uh

niq

ues

Ussss s eeee e

d D

d Dd D

d D d D

ur

ur

ur

ur

ur i

ng

the

Sin

g th

e S

ing

the

Sin

g th

e S

ing

the

S rrrr ri Li Li

Li L i

Lan

ka C

anka

Can

ka C

anka

Can

ka C

onfl

icon

flic

onfl

icon

flic

onfl

ictttt t

Thi

rdM

anag

emen

tD

ate

Act

ors

part

yA

gree

men

tO

ffer

Out

com

est

rate

gy

1957

GoS

L (

Sri

Lan

kaFe

dera

l P

arty

Ban

dar

anai

ke–

Au

ton

omou

sPo

liti

cal

pre

ssu

reA

ttem

pt

toFr

eedo

m P

arty

Che

lvan

ayak

amre

gion

al c

oun

cils

and

extr

emis

ts o

nn

egot

iate

ahe

aded

by

Pac

tan

d re

cogn

itio

nbo

th s

ides

for

cepa

rtic

ipat

ory

Ban

dar

anai

ke)

of t

he

Tam

ilpa

rtie

s to

aba

nd

onsy

stem

lan

guag

en

egot

iati

ons

1965

GoS

L (U

nit

edFe

dera

l P

arty

Sen

anay

ake–

Cre

atio

n o

f19

66 T

amil

Att

emp

t to

Nat

ion

al P

arty

Che

lvan

ayak

amdi

stri

ct c

oun

cils

Lan

guag

e B

ill

neg

otia

te a

head

ed b

yP

act

and

the

Tam

ilan

d in

tro

duct

ion

part

icip

ator

ySe

nan

ayak

e)L

angu

age

Act

of t

he

Dis

tric

tsy

stem

Cou

nci

l D

raft

Bil

l

1972

–G

oSL

TU

F, T

UL

F,N

o n

egot

iati

onM

ix o

f co

erci

onE

scal

atio

n o

fC

ontr

ol a

nd

1983

TE

LO

,an

d co

-opt

atio

nvi

olen

ce a

nd

co-o

ptat

ion

ER

OS,

LT

TE

pol

icie

s (i

.e.,

tran

sfor

mat

ion

of

Tam

il la

ngu

age

the

rela

tion

s fr

oman

d te

rror

ism

eth

nic

ten

sion

s to

Bil

ls)

an e

thn

ic c

onfl

ict

1984

GoS

L (

Un

ited

TU

LF

Ind

ia19

84 A

ll-P

arty

Dev

elop

men

t of

Hal

ted

beca

use

Th

ird

-par

tyN

atio

nal

Par

tyC

onfe

ren

cedi

stri

ct d

evel

op-

of e

xtre

mis

tm

edia

tion

un

der

men

t co

un

cils

pres

sure

an

dJ.

R.

Jaya

war

den

e)vi

olen

ce

(Tab

le 1

con

td.)




Thi

rdM

anag

emen

tD

ate

Act

ors

part

yA

gree

men

tO

ffer

Out

com

est

rate

gy

1985

GoS

L (

Un

ited

Eel

amIn

dia

Th

impu

Tal

ksD

evel

opm

ent

ofA

ban

don

ed b

ecau

seT

hir

d-p

arty

Nat

ion

al P

arty

Nat

ion

aldi

stri

ct d

evel

op-

of t

he

impo

ssib

ility

med

iati

onu

nd

erL

iber

atio

nm

ent

cou

nci

lsto

rec

onci

le h

igh

J.R

. Ja

yaw

arde

ne)

Fron

t as

an

dem

ands

an

d lo

wu

mbr

ella

offe

rsor

gan

isat

ion

1987

GoS

L (

Un

ited

TU

LF

Ind

iaIn

do-

Sri

Lan

kan

Tem

por

ary

mer

geIn

terv

enti

on b

yT

hir

d-p

arty

Nat

ion

al P

arty

Acc

ord

of t

he

Nor

ther

n a

nd

the

IPK

F, i

ncr

ease

inte

rven

tion

un

der

Eas

tern

Pro

vin

ces

of v

iole

nce

an

dJa

yaw

arde

ne)

liber

atio

n o

fim

pos

sibi

lity

topr

ison

ers,

ret

urn

of

impl

emen

t ot

her

refu

gees

clau

ses

of t

he

acco

rd

1989

GoS

L (

Un

ited

LTT

EP

rem

adas

a–W

ith

draw

al o

fA

ban

do

ned

Neg

otia

tion

of

Nat

ion

al P

arty

LTT

E t

alks

the

IPK

F, c

ease

fire

,be

cau

se o

f G

oSL

a ce

asef

ire

un

der

wit

hdr

awal

of

the

inab

ility

to

amen

dP

rem

adas

a)Si

xth

Am

endm

ent

the

con

stit

uti

on

1995

GoS

L (P

eopl

eLT

TE

PA–L

TT

E T

alks

En

d of

hos

tilit

ies

and

Aba

ndo

ned

bec

ause

Neg

otia

tion

of

Alli

ance

un

der

econ

omic

em

barg

oof

a la

ck o

f tr

ust

a ce

asef

ire

Ku

mar

atu

nga

)

2002

GoS

L (

Peo

ple

LTT

EN

orw

ayM

emor

and

um

of

Mod

alit

ies

of t

he

Stal

emat

e be

cau

seT

hir

d-p

arty

Alli

ance

un

der

Un

der

stan

din

gce

asef

ire

and

seri

esof

a la

ck o

fm

edia

tion

Ku

mar

atu

nga

)of

con

fid

ence

-co

mm

itm

ent

and

build

ing

mea

sure

sre

surg

ing

viol

ence

(Tab

le 1

con

td.)




CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

In 2000 the Norwegians sent Erik Solheim, a special adviser to Norway’s foreignministry, to Sri Lanka in hopes of reinitiating the peace talks between the LTTEand the government of Sri Lanka. In December of that year the LTTE agreed to aone-month unilateral ceasefire to prove its commitment to negotiation, but theSri Lankan government refused to do the same and to withdraw its military troopsfrom the Northern Province before talks to end the war had begun. That decisiondelayed the beginning of the peace negotiations by a year.

In February 2001 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was prepared bythe Norwegian envoy. It outlined the modality of the peace talks to be initiatedbetween the LTTE and the government and was signed in February of 2002, aftera year of negotiation on the terms of the ceasefire. The MOU clarified the modalitiesof the ceasefire and specified a set of confidence-building measures that both partieshad to undertake in order to maximise the chances of success. Substantial progresswas made following the signing of the document; the decommissioning of weaponswas initiated, the Jaffna region was linked back with the rest of Sri Lanka throughregular passenger flights, and the government lifted the ban on the LTTE.

In October 2000 the general elections had generated more violence than ever.The People’s Alliance (PA) had gained 107 seats to the UNP’s 89. Two extremistSinhalese parties, five minority parties and independent groups had captured atotal of 29 seats (DeVotta 2002). Since at least 113 seats are necessary for any partyto operate as majority in the Parliament, the PA had established an alliance with asmall minority party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). Nevertheless, dueto failures in peace talks and an inability to solve economic problems, the PA lostits credibility, and the December 2001 elections produced a victory for the UnitedNational Party (UNP) (Shastri 2002). When the president realised that the UNPcould not carry a no-confidence motion, to save her minority government fromdefeat in July 2001 Kumaratunga suspended Parliament for two months. Soonafter the suspension, the LTTE launched an attack on the country’s only airport andits adjacent air force base, destroying 13 military and civilian aircraft (DeVotta 2002).Led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, the new cabinet responded favourablyto a unilateral ceasefire declared by the Tigers. In February 2002 both sides signeda permanent ceasefire agreement with the hope of ending the destructive ethnicconflict. In a couple of months the main highways linking the Jaffna peninsula withthe rest of Sri Lanka reopened after 12 years.

In August 2002, with the sponsorship of the Norwegian government, talks tookplace in Thailand on 16–18 September. Both the government and the Tamil Tigersexpressed their optimism and hope for a solution to the conflict. The Tigers droppedtheir demand for a separate state and opted for regional autonomy within a demo-cratic Sri Lanka. During the second rounds of talks in October 2002, prisoners ofwar were exchanged, and in December the LTTE dropped its demand for territorial




independence when it agreed to a power sharing system that would respect theunity and integrity of Sri Lanka.

However, in April of 2003 the LTTE withdrew from the peace negotiations. In aletter to Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, the LTTE’s chief negotiator AntonBalasingham justified the decision in these terms:

The exclusion of the LTTE from a critical aid conference in Washington, the non-implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in the truce document,the continuous suffering and hardship experienced by hundreds of thousandsof internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive Sinhala military occupation ofTamil cities and civilian settlements, the distortion and marginalisation of theextreme conditions of poverty and deprivation of the Tamils of the northeastin the macro-economic policies and strategies of the government have seriouslyundermined the confidence of the Tamil people and the LTTE leadership in thenegotiating process. Under these circumstances the LTTE leadership has decidedto suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being. (LTTE ChiefNegotiator Anton Balasingham’s first letter suspending negotiations, http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/peace2005/Insidepage/Proposals/docs/P210403A.asp)

Although this decision led to the stalemate of the formal peace process and theinterruption of formal rounds of talks, the respect of the ceasefire negotiated in2002 allowed the informal process to remain active and the two parties to remainconcerned and in constant communication. The ceasefire was able to survive ayear of political instability in 2004, the horror that the tsunami left behind when itstruck South Asia in December 2004, and even allowed the Sri Lankan governmentand the LTTE to share the billions of dollars in aid that was given by theinternational community after the catastrophe.

Lately, a resurgence of violence has raised the fear of a return to open hostilities.Throughout the spring and summer of 2006, riots and explosions in the north-east, allegedly caused by the LTTE, have killed more than 120 people. Suicide bombershave committed several attacks, including one on the army headquarters inColombo, to which the military responded with air strikes against the rebels, killingor forcing the displacement of many civilians (BBC News, 27 April 2006). Althoughthe parties renewed talks during a meeting in Geneva in February 2006, violencehas entered yet another phase of escalation.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The last six years of discussion between the Sinhalese and Tamils have demonstratedvarious key problems. First, both parties are still influenced by extremist elementswithin their ranks, preventing them from compromising, and forcing them to adopta rigid stance. The LTTE is known for its brutality towards moderate Tamils




(Manogaran and Pfaffenberger 1994: 16). This brutality prevents the majority ofthe population from openly agreeing with a given settlement. There is little doubtthat the conflict has become institutionalised, with the LTTE holding the balanceof power. Militant groups benefiting economically or politically from the conflictdo not see an advantage in ending the conflict. For them the short-term advantageof the war outweighs the long-term advantage of stability because they often donot bear the cost of the conflict directly (De Silva and Samarasinghe 1993: 184).The Tamil diaspora also play a major role in the conflict by financing part of thefighting and reinforcing cultural identity, thus enticing both sides to adopt morerigid positions.

Second, the unstable political climate in Sri Lanka, as well as the conflict withother factions such as the Muslims who represent about 7 per cent of the population(Manogaran 1987: 6), makes it difficult for the government to make long-termcommitments to peace. It has been suggested that Sri Lanka is not a mature demo-cracy since it has always functioned in a setting of ethnic tension or conflict.

Third, both parties have announced their willingness to negotiate, but neitherhas demonstrated a clear commitment to reach a final peace solution. Both sides,on numerous occasions, have breached some of the conditions attached to theceasefire.

Finally, Tamils’ demands have escalated. The recognition and protection of theTamil language and culture, a guarantee of autonomy in the Northern and EasternProvinces, and the granting of citizenship to Tamils of Indian origin are now min-imal requirements for a sustained peace.

These recurrent obstacles to peace have been identified in the failed peace pro-cesses of 1985, 1987, 1989 and 1995. Given the difficulty in simultaneously addressingthese four impediments in combination with the absence of meaningful third-party involvement, the ceasefire is likely to fail. Both parties will regroup, find newstrategies and sources of money, and begin fighting in a stronger position thanbefore the ceasefire.

The case of Sri Lanka is interesting because many of the widely available solutionsfor resolving ethnic conflict have been applied without success. Prior to 1957 manypolicies were aimed at securing the domination of the Sinhalese and attemptingto manipulate the Tamil ethnic identity. The 1957 and 1965 Pacts were two attemptsto establish a participatory system, and the period between 1965 and 1972 wasfinally characterised by a series of co-optation and control policies by the Sri Lankangovernment. Based on this framework (Byman 2002), it can be concluded that thegovernment has used many of the available methods suggested, leaving partitionand foreign intervention as the only two potential solutions to this particular con-flict that have not been fully implemented.

Although suggested and utilised on few occasions, the use of partition hasremained controversial within the international community and can hardly beperceived as a solution that might be approved and implemented peacefully to




solve the conflict in Sri Lanka. Even though the principle of self-determination ismentioned twice in the United Nation Charter (Articles 1 and 55), partition andsecession are still regarded as a ‘breakdown in modernization and state-buildingand as a major crisis rather than as a legitimate alternative option that could besought if others fail, as an option that could resolve deep-seated and seemingly in-tractable conflict of interests between groups’ (Heraclides 1990: 6). State leadersoften defend their reticence towards partition with arguments including, but notrestricted to, the fear of the domino theory, the fear of indefinite divisibility, theeffect that it might have on democratic system, and the danger of giving birth tocountries too small to be self-sufficient economically (ibid.: 28). A strong debateamong scholars also continues as to whether partition is a guarantee for peace.Kaufman (2001) affirms that the horrors occurring during ethnic conflicts preventany settlement from lasting due to the desire of vengeance that persists and deter-mines the nature of the relations between the groups in conflict, making separationthe only durable solution. On the other hand, Carment and Rowlands (2004) arguethat separation has yielded no better results in the few cases where it was supportedas a resolution for ethnic conflict and should not be advocated in all cases.

In the case of Sri Lanka partition could potentially be a difficult task to manage.While the Northern Province are populated by a majority of Tamils, the diverseethnic composition of the Eastern Provinces, which was reinforced by the peasantcolonisation policy, feature a high percentage of Sinhalese and Muslim. Partition, ifit were to occur, would thus involve the displacement of many thousands of Sinhaleseand Muslims toward Sinhalese-controlled territory. Considering that the UnitedStates’ official policy toward Sri Lanka clearly states its support for the country’sunity and territorial integrity (US Department of State 2005), and that the govern-ments of the United States, Canada and many other Western countries have desig-nated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organisation, it can be argued that the rebelswould not benefit from the necessary support to make partition a feasible option.

It should also not be forgotten that the Tamils have shown a constant willingnessto settle for autonomy. Even the LTTE, while promoting its ideal independent stateof Eelam, has been open to negotiations with the government and settling for asystem that would guarantee the Tamils autonomy in the Northern and EasternProvinces. The international community should thus encourage a settlement be-fore the LTTE increases its demands for partition, which would be refused by theSri Lankan government and result in many more decades of fighting.

The ultimate solution to guaranteeing a permanent settlement to the ethnicconflict that has raged in Sri Lanka for decades is a foreign engagement that wouldfinally allow serious negotiations to take place. Although the Norway initiative hasyielded good results up to now, the negotiations could last for another decade ortwo if the international community does not carry out a stronger intervention andact as a guarantor for peace on the ground, thereby protecting civilians bearingthe immediate consequences of war and ensuring that the peace process is notundermined by spoilers.




In order for the ceasefire to lead to a permanent peace agreement, the inter-national community needs to learn the lessons apparent from the 1987 Indian in-volvement in the conflict rather than staying aside and remaining uninvolved.The United Nations, as an influential and representative world body,11 needs toput pressure on both sides and accept the position of guarantor for the peace pro-cess if it intents to end the conflict permanently. This certainly implies the necessityfor the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire and stopthe violence from recurring in order for the negotiations to be carried out in atrustworthy and calm climate. It also means assisting both parties in the negoti-ations and putting pressure on both sides to be reasonable and to come up with apeace agreement that can be implemented as soon as possible. This might requirea threat to impose sanctions on the government of Sri Lanka if it fails to negotiatein good faith, or if it is not willing to amend the constitution to guarantee theTamils minority rights and give them their fair share of autonomy in the regionwhere they are in majority. It might also imply the need to use force against theTamil extremists if they openly attempt to spoil the ceasefire or the negotiatedpeace agreement once in place. It certainly does not suggest that it will be suffi-cient to organise a few talks per year in the hope that this will evolve into a perman-ent peace.

If the international community does not want to get involved in a way thatwould guarantee the success of the ceasefire agreement, it would be wise to stopputting pressure on both sides to reach an agreement and allow them to fight thewar until one side is completely exhausted and capitulates to the other’s demands.Edward Luttwak (1999) adopts such a position, arguing that a third party shouldnot intervene in ethnic conflict, but should allow one side to win. This, he argues,would allow for the winning side to be in a better bargaining position, and thelosing side to be forced to compromise, thus increasing the chances of a successfuland lasting peace agreement after the war. In Sri Lanka this might result in thegovernment crushing the minority and going back to the solutions enumeratedearlier (control, co-optation and manipulation of ethnic identity, or, at best, a par-ticipatory system), but probably using more force to avoid the recurrence of theconflict. Or this could also result in the minority winning the war and declaringitself independent, which would lead to a partition of the Sri Lankan territory. Ifthe international community is not prepared to watch the conflict unravel for an-other few decades, it needs to take an active role in resolving it.

Understanding past agreements and accords is crucial, for they are the tools ofpolitical dialogue. Some fail while others succeed, but they all teach a series oflessons that cannot be ignored when drafting new agreements. In Sri Lanka formerstrategies and agreements contribute to the understanding of previously attemptedmeasures and the reasons they failed. The current ceasefire agreement should bedesigned and implemented to correct past mistakes. In that sense, a more activeparticipation of the UN is necessary in order to monitor the ceasefire, ensure theevolution of the peace process, and guarantee its implementation. Failure to do sowill most likely lead to another failure, and to many more decades of conflict.




NOTES

1. Sri Lanka’s population of over 18 million consists of six major ethnic groups. Censusdata indicates that about 75 per cent of Sri Lanka’s population is Sinhalese, that is,Buddhists who speak Sinhala. They originally came to the island from India and mostlylive in the southern, western and central parts of Sri Lanka. The second largest group isformed by Tamils of Sri Lankan citizenship who comprise approximately 12.2 per centof the population or more 2.23 million (the population data is drawn from 1995 UNpopulation estimates). Sri Lankan Tamils are predominantly Hindu and speak Tamil.They have traditionally occupied the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka and theyare basically split in two groups. The Jaffna Tamils are mainly descendants of tribesthat arrived on the island more than 15,000 years ago, and Indian Tamils were broughtto the island by British tea planters during the 19th and 20th centuries. They comprise5 per cent of the population. The remaining 7 per cent of the population is made up ofMoors (Tamil-speaking Muslims), Burghers (descendants of European colonists) andVeddahs. Some Muslims speak Sinhala and some others Tamil due to the location oftheir homes. Until independence the Tamils represented approximately 20 per cent ofthe population but did occupy a higher proportion of administratives posts. For example,in 1925, 35 per cent of the Sri Lankan bureaucrats were Burghers, 40 per cent wereSinhalese and 22 per cent were Tamils. In 1946 the figures had changed to 69 per centSinhalese, 31 per cent Tamils and 16 per cent Burghers.

2. The Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 restricted the status of a national of SriLanka to those who could claim it by descent or registration. The result was thedestruction of a big proportion of the left-wing groups and a distortion of the electoralbalance. When 90,000 Indians Tamils lost their voting right in 1952, the Sinhaleseparliamentary strength was increased from 67 per cent in 1947 to 73 per cent in 1952.

3. Thus, the Federal Party’s separatist demands from the beginning focused on the existenceof a definite territorial claim along existing regional boundaries. Without a Tamilmajority in any of the provinces, it is likely that opinions would have diverged onseparation as a realistic option.

4. The Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulations specified that Sinhala wouldcontinue to be the sole official language of Sri Lanka, but the Tamil language would berecognised as a national language along with English and would be used in the Northernand Eastern Provinces for the transaction of all the government and public business,for the correspondence of persons other than officials, and for local authorities.

5. The creation of district development councils (DDC) was finally carried out in 1979.The DDC were created to decentralise the administration and political power awayfrom Colombo. Elections were held in 1981 to fill the seats of the 24 DDC.

6. In contrast with the LTTE, the leaders of the EPRLF decided to participate in provincialcouncil elections.

7. The claim for a separate state during the 1950s engendered hostility from the Indiangovernment, which had taken legislative steps in its own country to placate the separatistDravidanadu movement in Tamil Nadu. India also confronted other separatist groupsand did not sympathise with the Tamil cause.

8. Between July 1983 and January 1985 the Sri Lankan government announced that356 civilians had died as a result of clashes between Tamils and Sinhalese. Monthly




totals of dead, including civilians and soldiers, numbered in the 300s from January toMarch and then jumped to 842 in June 1986. Furthermore, India could not ignore thethousands of refugees flowing into Indian territory as a result of the violence. By 1986Tamil Nadu had become the home for 1,25,000 Tamil refugees (Asiaweek, 1 June 1986).

9. The main principles of the provincial councils were intended to widen regional par-ticipation in government and devolve authority in matters of agriculture and industry,education and culture, internal law and order, and land settlement in each province.A three-tier system of authority would exist: national, provincial and local. As expected,the national government would retain widespread powers in defence, foreign affairs,state monetary policy, judiciary posts, customs, foreign trade, ports and aviation, broad-casting and citizenship. Parliament would continue to be elected by districts every sixyears on a basis of proportional representation. No change would occur in the officeof an elected presidency every six years.

10. This year also brought presidential elections. On 19 December 1988 voters could choosebetween the SLFP, led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike (who opposed the implementationof provincial councils), the UNP, led by Ranasinghe Premadasa (who had distancedhimself from Jayawardene’s arrangements with India), and the Sri Lanka MahajanParty (SLMP), led by Ossie Abeygoonasekera (supported by the TULF and favoringthe Accord).

11. Opposed to one party with specific interest in the conflict, as was India in 1987.

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