Download pdf - Sookman TCLG Year in Review 2011

8/6/2019 Sookman TCLG Year in Review 2011

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/sookman-tclg-year-in-review-2011 1/42

McCarthy Tétrault LLP / mccarthy.ca 11

McCarthy Tétrault Advance™ Building Capabilities for Growth

Toronto Computer Lawyers GroupThe Year in Review: Developments in

Computer, Internet and

E-Commerce Law (2010-2011)

June 15, 2011

Barry B. Sookman

[email protected]




Privacy




Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance , 2011 ONCA 3

¬ “Personal information” is defined in s. 2(1) of the Act. It“means information about an identifiable individual.”

¬ “This is a very elastic definition, and should be interpreted inthat fashion to give effect to the purpose of the Act. Therecan be no doubt that financial information pertaining to adebtor, collected and used by a financial institution in the

course of a mortgage transaction – including the particularsof, and the balance owing on the debtor’s mortgage – is“information about an identifiable individual.” Currentmortgage balances are not information that is publicly

available.”




Leon’s Furniture Limited v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2011 ABCA 94

¬ The “identifiable individual” term has two components. Firstly, the individualmust be “identifiable”. Generic and statistical information is thereby excluded,and the personal information (here the relevant number) must have some

precise connection to one individual. Secondly, the information must relate toan individual. Information that relates to objects or property is, on the face ofthe definition, not included. The key to the definition is the word “identifiable”.

¬ “Further, to be “personal” in any reasonable sense the information must bedirectly related to the individual; the definition does not cover indirect orcollateral information. Information that relates to an object or property does notbecome information “about” an individual, just because some individual mayown or use that property.”

¬ Driver’s licence numbers are PI but licence plate numbers are not.

¬ “The respondent [Privacy Commissioner] is not empowered to direct anorganization to change the way it does business, just because the respondentthinks he has identified a better way. So long as the business is beingconducted reasonably, it does not matter that there might also be other

reasonable ways of conducting the business.”




State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Privacy Commissioner of Canada , 2010 FC 736

¬ Is the collection of evidence by an insurer acting for one of its insured in thedefence of a third party tort action a “commercial activity” within the meaningof PIPEDA?

¬ “I conclude that, on a proper construction of PIPEDA, if the primary activity orconduct at hand, in this case the collection of evidence on a plaintiff by anindividual defendant in order to mount a defence to a civil tort action, is not acommercial activity contemplated by PIPEDA, then that activity or conduct

remains exempt from PIPEDA even if third parties are retained by anindividual to carry out that activity or conduct on his or her behalf. The primarycharacterization of the activity or conduct in issue is thus the dominant factorin assessing the commercial character of that activity or conduct underPIPEDA, not the incidental relationship between the one who seeks to carry

out the activity or conduct and third parties. In this case, the insurer-insured and attorney-client relationships are simply incidental to the primarynon-commercial activity or conduct at issue, namely the collection of evidenceby the defendant Ms. Vetter in order to defend herself in the civil tort action

brought against her by Mr. Gaudet.”




Nammo v. TransUnion of Canada Inc ., 2010 FC 1284

¬ “TransUnion’s suggestion that a breach may be found only if anorganization’s accuracy practices fall below industry standards isalso untenable.” “There is no defence of practical necessity set out

in PIPEDA.”

¬ “PIPEDA does not require that personal information be completelyaccurate, complete, and up-to-date; rather, it requires that personalinformation be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date “as is

necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used.” Thus, it isthe use that the information is put to that dictates the degree ofaccuracy, completeness, and currency the information must have...Informed, reliable and objective decisions require that the

information on which the decisions are based meets a highstandard of accuracy, completeness and currency.”




Damage Awards Under PIPEDA

¬ Nammo v. TransUnion of Canada Inc ., 2010 FC 1284“In Vancouver (City) v Ward , 2010 SCC 27, the Supreme Court...addressed the different goals of awarding damages fora Charter breach; these include compensation, for which loss isrelevant, but also vindication and deterrence, for which loss is not adeterminative factor.”

¬ “In my view, the same reasoning applies to a breach of PIPEDA, which

is quasi-constitutional legislation.... Applying the Supreme Court’sreasoning in Ward to PIPEDA applications before this Court indicatesthat both the question of whether damages should be awarded and thequestion of the quantum of damages should be answered with regardto whether awarding damages would further the general objects of

PIPEDA and uphold the values it embodies. Furthermore, deterringfuture breaches and the seriousness or egregiousness of the breachwould be factors to consider.”







Can claims be brought for losses arising fromprivacy breaches?

¬ In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation 4 A.3d 492(Sup, Ct. Me. 2010) (Data breach where customer data was stolen. No claim fortime spent to avoid foreseeable harm w/o physical harm, economic loss, or identitytheft.) Also, Paul v Providence Health System 240 P.3d 1110 (2010)

¬ Doe 1 v. AOL LLC 719 F.Supp.2d 1102 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (Data breach. “the Court ispersuaded that Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to demonstrate standing forpurposes of seeking injunctive relief. The Complaint alleges that AOL engages in apractice and policy of storing search queries containing confidential information, and

that it has taken no steps to ensure that such information is not disclosed again inthe future.”)

¬ LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc. 2011 WL 1661532 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 28, 2011)(Collecting browsing histories. “Ultimately, the Court probably would decline to saythat it is categorically impossible for Plaintiffs to allege some property interest thatwas compromised by Defendant's alleged practices.”

¬ Claridge v. RockYou, Inc . 2011 WL 1361588 (N.D.cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (Databreach. “although the court has doubts about plaintiff's ultimate ability to prove hisdamages theory in this case, the court finds plaintiff's allegations of harm sufficient

at this stage to allege a generalized injury in fact.”)




Jones v. Tsige , 2011 ONSC 1475

¬ The central issue in this case is whether there is a tort for invasion ofprivacy.

¬ “While it is certainly the case that in Euteneier , the plaintiff was notsuing on the basis of an intentional tort, the extent to which privacyrights are enforceable at law was squarely before the court forpurposes of determining the content of the duty of care owed by thepolice to the plaintiff while in custody. In my view, the inescapable

conclusion, put quite plainly by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 63of that decision, is that 'there is no “free standing' right to...privacy...at common law.””

¬ “I would also note that this is not an area of law that requires “judge-

made” rights and obligations. Statutory schemes that governprivacy issues are, for the most part, carefully nuanced anddesigned to balance practical concerns and needs in an industry-specific fashion.”




CTB v. News Group Newspapers Ltd & Anor [2011]EWHC 1326 (QB)

¬ “Mr Spearman argues ...that in effect privacy injunctions (and no doubt other formsof injunction also) have ceased to serve any useful purpose in the age of theInternet. Not only can information be put out on various networks from within this jurisdiction, but it can obviously be done also by anyone who wishes in other

jurisdictions.”

¬ ”Should the court buckle every time one of its orders meets widespreaddisobedience or defiance?”

¬ ”the law nowadays is required to protect information in respect of which there is

a reasonable expectation of privacy...” “It is fairly obvious that wall-to-wallexcoriation in national newspapers, whether tabloid or "broadsheet", is likely to besignificantly more intrusive and distressing for those concerned than the availabilityof information on the Internet or in foreign journals to those, however many, whotake the trouble to look it up. Moreover, with each exposure of personal information

or allegations, whether by way of visual images or verbally, there is a new intrusionand occasion for distress or embarrassment. Mr Tomlinson argues accordingly that"the dam has not burst". For so long as the court is in a position to prevent some ofthat intrusion and distress, depending upon the individual circumstances, it may beappropriate to maintain that degree of protection. The analogy with King Canute to

some extent, therefore, breaks down.”




City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon , 130 S. Ct. 2619

Do employees have reasonable expectations of privacy in work owneddevices?

¬ “Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and informationtransmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what

society accepts as proper behavior. As one amici brief notes, manyemployers expect or at least tolerate personal use of such equipment byemployees because it often increases worker efficiency.”

¬ ”Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive thatsome persons may consider them to be essential means or necessaryinstruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That mightstrengthen the case for an expectation of privacy... And employerpolicies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable

expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that suchpolicies are clearly communicated.”

¬ “A broad holding concerning employees' privacy expectations vis-à-visemployer-provided technological equipment might have implications for

future cases that cannot be predicted.”




R. v. Cole , 2011 ONCA 218

“I conclude that the appellant had a reasonableexpectation of privacy from state intrusion in thepersonal use of his work computer and in thecontents of his personal files on its hard drive.

However, his expectation of privacy was modified. Hehad no expectation of privacy with respect to accessto his hard drive by his employer’s technician for the

limited purpose of maintaining the technical integrityof the school’s information network and the laptop.”




Sparks v. Dubé , 2011 NBQB 40

¬ Court made a preservation order and injunction compellingErica Sparks: 1) to preserve the entire contents of her personal webpage(s) on Facebook, and 2) to participate in making copies.

¬ Plaintiff’s lawyer was ordered to contact the plaintiff and, withoutdisclosing the nature of the subject matter schedule a meeting withher at a location convenient to access and download data from theInternet and reduce it to usable form.

¬ Upon meeting with the plaintiff the solicitor had to apprise her of theterms and conditions of the order.

¬ Immediately upon disclosure of the terms and conditions of theorder the plaintiff, in the presence of the solicitor, was required tocreate permanent tangible records of her web page(s) on Facebook.

¬ Order made ex parte !




Bill C-28 Fighting Internet and Wireless Spam Act

¬ FISA will impede start-up businesses from launching in Canada.

¬ FISA will impede Canadian businesses from developing new marketingmodels over the Internet.

¬ FISA will deter suppliers of service providers, including outsourcing and cloudservice providers, from operating with or maintaining facilities in Canada.

¬ FISA will deter foreign businesses from offering their products to Canadiansvia the Internet, mobile and other communications networks.

¬ FISA will impose costs and restrictions on Canadian businesses that theircompetitors outside Canada will not have to bear.

¬ FISA contains very strong incentives for Canadian businesses to confesswrong-doing, even in cases of questionable or trivial conduct, thereby

tarnishing the reputation of legitimate businesses in circumstances where theoffending conduct is not significant.

¬ FISA will chill legitimate commercial speech and thereby underminefundamental values protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See

Rethinking FISA, http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/05/25/rethinking-fisa/

http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/05/25/rethinking-fisa/






New UK Cookie Regulations¬ Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations put into place on May 26, 2011 to

implement EU “Cookie Directive”.

¬ 6 (1) Subject to paragraph (4), a person shall not store or gain access to informationstored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user unless the requirements ofparagraph (2) are met.

¬ (2) The requirements are that the subscriber or user of that terminal equipment (a) isprovided with clear and comprehensive information about the purposes of the storage of, oraccess to, that information; and (b) has given his or her consent.

¬ (3) Where an electronic communications network is used by the same person to store oraccess information in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user on more than one

occasion, it is sufficient for the purposes of this regulation that the requirements ofparagraph (2) are met in respect of the initial use.

¬ “(3A) For the purposes of paragraph (2), consent may be signified by a subscriber whoamends or sets controls on the internet browser which the subscriber uses or by using

another application or programme to signify consent.¬ (4) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the technical storage of, or access to, information (a)

for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over anelectronic communications network; or (b) where such storage or access is strictlynecessary for the provision of an information society service requested by the subscriber

or user.




New UK Cookie Regulations

¬ ICO Guidelines @ http://ow.ly/5gJnT

¬ Organizations have 12 months to phase in the new system, but areexpected to take steps to comply within this period.

¬ “At present, most browser settings are not sophisticated enough to allowyou to assume that the user has given their consent to allow your websiteto set a cookie. Also, not everyone who visits your site will do so using abrowser. They may, for example, have used an application on their mobile

device. So, for now we are advising organisations which use cookies orother means of storing information on a user’s equipment that they have togain consent some other way.“

¬ Standards may be different in other jurisdictions where company has an

“establishment”.

¬ Third-party cookies create special issues – ICO requires that users bemade aware of what is being collected and by whom.




Developments in India

¬ New privacy regs issued in April 2011 and prescribed how PI may be collectedand used by virtually all organizations in India

¬ Regs appear to apply to info of both Indian residents and foreign nationals

¬ This means that transaction or sales calls must conform to Indian standards

¬ Appears to apply to controllers, processors and intermediaries touching PI

¬ Sensitive PI involves heightened obligations, including prior consent by letter,fax, or e-mail

¬ No exceptions on basis of necessity

¬ Right to withdraw consent

¬ Officer must be nominated to deal with grievances

¬ Security control measures must be documented and may be audited

¬ Subjects have right to review and correct data

¬ Failure to comply can result in jail term of up to 3 years or fine of approx. $4,500




Contracts and Electronic

Agreements




Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc ., 2011 SCC 15

¬ Issue: whether British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act (BPCPA) renders arbitration clause void.

¬ The choice to restrict or not restrict arbitration clauses in consumercontracts is a matter for the legislature.

¬ Absent legislative intervention, the courts will generally give effect to theterms of a commercial contract freely entered into, even a contract ofadhesion, including an arbitration clause.

¬ Section 172 is clearly designed to encourage private enforcement inthe public interest. It was open to the legislature to prefer the vindicationand denunciation available through a well-publicized court action to promoteadherence to consumer standards.

¬ The legislature understood that the policy objectives of s. 172, would not bewell served by a series of isolated low-profile, private and confidentialarbitrations.

¬ All other causes of action including breach of Trade Practices Act and

common law claims subject to arbitration clause.




AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception , 2011 WL 1561956(U.S. Sup. Ct. 2011)

¬ Issue: whether AT&T’s consumer contracts requiringarbitration and precluding class arbitration were enforceableunder the US the FAA.

¬ Court reversed 9th Circuit which held such clausesunconscionable, overruling California’s Discover Bank rule.

¬ “The overarching purpose of the FAA...is to ensure theenforcement of arbitration agreements according to their termsso as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the

availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamentalattributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistentwith the FAA.”




Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., 2011 WL 339212(E.D.Pa. 2011)

¬ Validity of forum selection and arbitration clauses.

¬ “[F]or any claim related to this Agreement or our Service, excluding claims forinjunctive or other equitable relief, where the total amount sought is less than

ten thousand U.S. Dollars ($10,000 USD), either we or you may elect at anypoint in or during a dispute or proceeding to resolve the claim through bindingnonappearance-based arbitration.... [T]he arbitration shall be conducted at theoption of the party seeking relief, by telephone, online or based solely onwritten submissions.... [T]he arbitration shall not involve any personal

appearance by the parties or witnesses unless otherwise mutually agreed bythe parties ... [A]ny judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator may beentered in any court of competent jurisdiction.”

¬ Clause valid because:

¬ Either party had option to elect arbitration for claims under $10k.

¬ There was no requirement to appear in the selected venue as claims couldbe adjudicated by phone, on-line, or by written submission.

¬ The arbitrator was not a preselected mandatory arbitrator.




St-Arnaud v. Facebook Inc ., 2011 QCCS 1506¬ With respect to paragraph 3 of article 3148 C.C.Q., the grounds that a

damage was suffered in Quebec would give jurisdiction to the SuperiorCourt of Quebec even though Facebook has no link to Quebec, other thanthe fact that the website is accessible in Quebec.

¬ “You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute ("claim") you have

with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook exclusivelyin a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County.”

¬ “It is obvious that all Users agreed to be continually bound by Facebook'sTerms of Use. St-Arnaud could only gain initial access to the website by

clicking on an icon labelled "Sign Up " where immediately below it wasclearly written. By clicking Sign Up, Users indicate that they haveread and agreed to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy... Once St-Arnaud joined the website, every time he wanted to log into it, he wouldneed to either remain logged in or access the website login page, whichalways includes a link to the Terms. Moreover, every time St-Arnaud wouldaccess the website, he would find a link to the Terms at the bottom of everypage available onFacebook, including his own personal page....TheJurisdiction Clause is binding upon St-Arnaud and the Members of the

Group.”






Roling v. E*Trade Securities, LLC , 756 F. Supp. 2d1179 (N.D. Cal. 2010)

¬ Is a term in an online brokerage agreement that permits

E*TRADE to modify its fee structure at any time by postinga modified structure on its Web site and requires customersto check E*Trade's website for modifications enforceable?

¬ “In sum, E*Trade is unable to cite to any case, whether

under New York law or California law, that undercutsplaintiffs' allegation that a contractual provision that allowsa party to unilaterally change the terms of the contractwithout notice is unenforceable.”




Patco Const. Co., Inc. v. People’s United Bank ,2011 WL 2174507 (D.Me. May 27, 2011)

“In addition, by virtue of the posting online of the Modified eBankingAgreement, Patco effectively agreed to monitor its commercial accounts

daily. While Patco protests that it did not actually ever see the ModifiedeBanking Agreement and thus was never properly notified of its existenceor bound by it... the Bank reserved the right, in the Original eBankingAgreement, to modify the terms and conditions of that agreement at any

time effective upon publication...There is no dispute that Patco reviewedand agreed to the terms of the Original eBanking Agreement....The onlinepublication of the Modified eBanking Agreement hence was bindingupon Patco. See, e.g., Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc ., 575F.Supp. 2d 696, 708 (D.Md. 2008) (unilateral modification of Internet-based

service contract held effective when prior agreements permittedmodification at any time and stated that modifications would be effectiveafter they were posted for 30 days).”

36




Is violation of website terms or computer use policya criminal or civil offense?

¬ Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and States laws e.g. California Computer Crime Law , Cal. Penal Code §502.

¬ Accessing a protected computer (website) “knowingly” withoutauthorization, or exceeding authorized access to a protected computer,involves a risk of violating a number of federal and state statutes creatingpenal sanctions and private causes of action.

¬ U.S. v. Nosal 2011 WL 1585600 (9th

. Cir. Apr 28, 2011) (“under the CFAA,an employee accesses a computer in excess of his or her authorizationwhen that access violates the employer's access restrictions, which mayinclude restrictions on the employee's use of the computer or of theinformation contained in that computer.”) Also,United Stats v. Rodriguez ,628 F. 3d 1258, (11th Cir. 2010)

¬ Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc . 2010 WL 3291750 (N.D.cal.2010)(Requires something more e.g. circumvention of technical or code based

barriers.)




Distinct Fortune Ltd. v. Hyndland Investment Co. Ltd.

[2010] HKEC 2013

¬ Does SMS message satisfy HK Conveyancing and Properties Ordinance.

¬ The plaintiff submitted that the CPO should be given an updatedconstruction by making allowances for social and technological changes;that SMS was in a visible form and was a personal way ofcommunication by electronic means; that the principal function of a“signature” is to demonstrate an authenticating intention of the signor

and the sending of an SMS should constitute the signing of it by thesender.

¬ ”On the question of signature, I think the SMS is not a signeddocument... I agree with leading counsel of the defendant that there isnot even the expression of “(sd.)”. If the clicking of the send buttonwould amount to the signing of the SMS, then all SMS and emails aresigned documents. This cannot be right.”




Contract and License Issues




De Beers UK Ltd. v. Atos Origin It Services UK Ltd.[2010] EWHC 3276 (16 December 2010)

¬ “In my judgment, the demands made by Atos, particularly in the e-mail of2 June 2008, did not reflect its contractual entitlement and, in puttingthem forward, it was not undertaking to continue to perform the Contract.

For a start, what Atos was willing to do was "to complete the project on a time and materials basis at our own internal standard rates ". That is anexpression of an intention to complete the work on different terms, notupon the terms originally agreed. Second, this offer was itself subject,

amongst other things, to DB's agreement to waive any claim that it mayhave against Atos in relation to Atos's delivery to date. That also wassomething upon which Atos had no right to insist.

¬ The fact that Atos repeatedly asserted its willingness and wish to

complete the project is neither here nor there. There is a very significantdifference between being willing to complete a project, and being willingto fulfil a contract. Atos may have been genuinely prepared to do theformer, on its own terms, but that was itself inconsistent with awillingness to do the latter.”




Baidu, Inc. v. Register.com, Inc ., 2010 WL2900313 (S.D.N.Y.2010)

¬ Will limitation of liability clauses be effective to exclude damages resultingfrom cyber-attacks?

¬ “New York courts will decline to enforce a contractual limitation or waiver ofliability clause when there is wilful or grossly negligent or recklessly indifferentconduct.”

¬ Baidu alleged sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible claim of grossnegligence or recklessness:

¬ Register failed to follow its own security protocols and essentially handedover control of Baidu's account to an unauthorized Intruder, who engagedin cyber vandalism.

¬ Register failed to follow its own security protocol.

¬ “The attack by the Intruder was reasonably foreseeable—it was preciselybecause these cyber attacks are foreseeable that the security measures wereadopted... Baidu... did not waive its claims for gross negligence or

recklessness.”




Patents and Trade-marks




Amazon.com, Inc. v. Attonrey General of Canada,2010 FC 1011

¬ Commissioner had ignored “fundamental differences between the foreignand the domestic regimes” as they pertained to patents and ignored

“Canadian legal principles altogether”.¬ Commissioner has no discretion to deviate from the Canadian patent law

and its interpretation by the Courts.

¬ The Commissioner erred in adopting a policy role inconsistent with

established Canadian legal principles.

¬ The Commissioner’s reasons for excluding business method patents canno longer be a barrier to obtaining a patent for a business method inCanada.

¬ There is no requirement that eligible subject matter exhibit a “technicalcharacter” or that it support a “technical contribution”.




Microsoft Crop. V I4I Limited Partnership 564U.S. __ (2011)

¬ The Court rejects Microsoft’s contention that a defendant need only

persuade the jury of a patent invalidity defense by a preponderance ofthe evidence. There, tracing nearly a century of case law, the Courtstated, inter alia , that “there is a presumption of [patent] validity [thatis] not to be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence”.

¬ New evidence supporting an invalidity defense may carry more weightin an infringement action than evidence previously considered by thePTO.

¬ The Court is in no position to judge the comparative force of the

parties’ policy arguments as to the wisdom of the clear andconvincing-evidence standard that Congress adopted.

52




Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v.Roche Molecular Systems, Inc ., 563 U.S. ___(2011)

¬ ”Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in aninvention belong to the inventor. The question here is whether theUniversity and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980—

commonly referred to as the Bayh–Dole Act—displaces that norm andautomatically vests title to federally funded inventions in federalcontractors. We hold that it does not.”

¬ “Stanford's reading of the phrase “invention of the contractor” to mean “all

inventions made by the contractor's employees” is plausible enough in theabstract; it is often the case that whatever an employee produces in thecourse of his employment belongs to his employer. No one would claimthat an autoworker who builds a car while working in a factory owns that

car. But, as noted, patent law has always been different: We haverejected the idea that mere employment is sufficient to vest title to anemployee's invention in the employer. Against this background, acontractor's invention—an “invention of the contractor”—does notautomatically include inventions made by the contractor's employees.”

54




Copyright




Upcoming in Supreme Court

Supreme Court granted leave to appeal:

¬ Tariff 22 – is a download a communication to the public.¬ Tariff 22 – is an internet preview a fair dealing for

research purposes.

¬ K-12 –fair dealing in the K-12 educational sector.




Harmony Consulting Ltd. v. G.A. Foss Transport Ltd .,2011 FC 340

¬ Computer programs that are dictated by the operating system or reflect commonprogramming practices are not original expression and will not receive copyright protection.

¬ Compilation of computer program elements can be protected by copyright.

¬ Minor fixes to a program which are not original are not protected by copyright.

¬ Program features developed using MS Access “wizard” not original or protectable.

¬ A nunc pro tunc copyright assignment does not satisfy the writing requirements forassignments where there was no original intention to transfer the copyright.

¬ Section 13(3) of (which vests copyright in works to employers) applies to officers, directorsand employees.

¬ Use of software, without more, outside the scope of a license e.g., more seats thanlicensed, is not copyright infringement.

¬ Making modifications to software which include opening a file, making changes andresaving the file is not a reproduction.

¬ Making a back-up copy does not involve making a reproduction.

¬ How many errors can one court judgment contain ?




Google v Copiepresse et al, Brussels Court ofAppeal (9th Chamber) May 5, 2011

The decision canvasses many issues including

¬ the choice of law to apply to evaluate the claims of infringement,

¬ whether Google’s caching of news articles is infringement,

¬ whether the transmission of article titles and short extracts violatesthe reproduction and communication to the public rights,

¬ whether Google News violates the moral rights of authors,

¬ whether statutory fair dealing defenses apply,

¬ whether Google can rely on implied licenses from publishers and

authors to publish Google News, and¬ whether intermediary safe harbors are available under Belgium law

for providers of these services. See, Is Google News legal?http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/05/17/is-google-news-legal/

http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/05/17/is-google-news-legal/

http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/05/17/is-google-news-legal/




Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley , 2011 WL 2223422(S.D.Fla. Jun. 7, 2011)

“We hold that publishing AJE on a website in Australia was anact tantamount to global and simultaneous publication of thework, bringing AJE within the definition of a “United Stateswork” under § 101(1)(C) and subject to § 411(a)'s registrationrequirement. Gallefoss elected to publish AJE on the Internetand the legal consequences of that decision must apply.Plaintiff was therefore required to register AJE prior to seeking judicial enforcement of its copyright rights.”

76




Slides available @ barrysookman.com andmccarthy.ca



VANCOUVERSuite 1300, 777 Dunsmuir StreetP.O. Box 10424, Pacific CentreVancouver BC V7Y 1K2Tel: 604-643-7100Fax: 604-643-7900Toll-Free: 1-877-244-7711

CALGARY

Suite 3300, 421 7th Avenue SWCalgary AB T2P 4K9Tel: 403-260-3500Fax: 403-260-3501Toll-Free: 1-877-244-7711

TORONTOBox 48, Suite 5300Toronto Dominion Bank Tower

Toronto ON M5K 1E6Tel: 416-362-1812Fax: 416-868-0673Toll-Free: 1-877-244-7711

OTTAWASuite 200, 440 Laurier Avenue WestOttawa ON K1R 7X6

Tel: 613-238-2000Fax: 613-563-9386Toll-Free: 1-877-244-7711

MONTRÉALSuite 25001000 De La Gauchetière Street WestMontréal QC H3B 0A2Tel: 514-397-4100Fax: 514-875-6246Toll-Free: 1-877-244-7711

QUÉBEC

Le Complexe St-Amable1150, rue de Claire-Fontaine, 7e étageQuébec QC G1R 5G4Tel: 418-521-3000Fax: 418-521-3099Toll-Free: 1-877-244-7711

UNITED KINGDOM & EUROPE125 Old Broad Street, 26th Floor

London EC2N 1ARUNITED KINGDOMTel: +44 (0)20 7489 5700Fax: +44 (0)20 7489 5777