Download pdf - Parliamentary Procedures in Presidential and Parliamentary … · Parliamentary procedures in presidential and parliamentary systems 1 Introduction The Westminster system of Great

Parliamentary procedures in presidential andparliamentary systems

Simone Wegmann∗

Département de science politique et relations internationalesUniversité de Genève

Paper prepared for presentation at the7th ECPR General ConferenceBordeaux, September 4-7, 2013

First version: July 2013, this version: August 24, 2013

Abstract

In research on democracy a general distinction is drawn between the agendas ofdemocratic transition and democratic stability. The explanatory factors in order toexplain democratic stability in recent analyses are varied. Among the most promi-nent hypothesis is the one about parliamentary or presidential systems to favorstable democracy. But, the literature shows rather conflicting results on whetherparliamentary or presidential systems favor stability. What has to be taken into con-sideration, however, is the fact that the United States of America and Great Britainare among the few countries that come close to the ideal types of parliamentarismand presidentialism, respectively. Categorizing a country as either parliamentaryor presidential does not account for much of the differences neither within parlia-mentary nor within presidential systems. In this paper I argue that parliamentaryprocedures account for some of the conflicting results in the literature about parlia-mentarism/ presidentialism and democratic stability. Rather than focusing on thedifferent executive-legislative relations in parliamentary and presidential systems Iconcentrate on the different legislative rights and resources of legislative actors. Ipresent new data on parliamentary procedures which allows for a more detailed lookat and comparison of parliaments in both presidential and parliamentary systemsaround the world. First results show considerable differences of parliamentary andpresidential systems when it comes to their parliamentary procedures which mighthelp explain some of the rather conflicting results in the literature.

∗ Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences économiqueset sociales; Université de Genève; 40 Boulevard du Pont d’Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; email:[email protected]

Parliamentary procedures in presidential and parliamentary systems

1 Introduction

The Westminster system of Great Britain and the presidential system of the UnitedStates of America are considered what approximates the ideal types of a parliamentaryand a presidential system, respectively. Based on Shugart (2006, 348–349) a presidentialsystem includes a popularly elected president as "chief executive" that directs the cabinetand has some constitutionally granted law-making authority. The terms of the chiefexecutive and the legislative assembly are fixed and not subject to mutual confidence.A parliamentary system is characterized by an executive authority consisting of a primeminister and a cabinet that arises out of the legislative assembly. The executive is atall times subject to potential dismissal via a vote of "no confidence" by a majority ofthe legislative assembly. The ideal type of a parliamentary system is one in which thelegislative agenda is controlled by the government whereas the prototype of a presidentialsystem is one in which independent legislators act based on their individual electoralneeds as follows from the separation of power between the executive and the legislature(Cheibub, 2007; Cheibub and Limongi, 2002, 169–170).

However, this distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism "do[es] notnecessarily tell us where power really resides" (Fish, 2006, 6). The allocation of power todifferent groups is crucial in economic models of democratization and democratic stabil-ity. Such power determines the degree of influence these different groups can take and,consequently, it determines the degree of benefit these groups can get from a particularpolitical system. As different groups have different political interests they will acceptdemocracy if the system does not pose a threat to their interests. But, democracy doesnot contribute significantly to the welfare of the majority if the elite has too much power.Such a political system will either result in a revolution by the majority or repression bythe minority (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 34–35). Hence, successful democracy seemsto depend upon a stable balance of power between different groups in society.

Different authors highlight the importance of electoral losers for the survival of demo-cratic regimes. Przeworski (1991, 15) states that the central question is why electorallosers comply with the outcome of elections and continue to accept the democratic insti-tutions whereas Riker (1983, 62) states that "the dynamics of politics is in the hands ofthe losers". Similarly, Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan and Listhaug (2005, 1–2) high-light that "... the attitudes and behaviors of losers determine whether the [democratic]game will go on in the first place and whether it will continue to be played in the longrun". Apart from the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems thesearguments about the importance of losers’ consent and the influence of power of different

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groups for democratic survival might add to the explanation of democratic stability.Hence, rather than considering the distinction between parliamentary and presidential

systems, focusing on the difference in legislative power of actors might help explaining thedemocratic stability of different regimes. Legislative procedures influence the structure ofdecision-making as well as the weight of individual legislators in policy decisions (Cheibuband Limongi, 2002, 168). Therefore, this paper presents a first comparison of presiden-tial and parliamentary systems when it comes to different legislative powers of actors.More specifically, the paper presents data on rights of different actors to introduce bills,shows some differences and similarities in agenda setting power of the executive betweenparliamentary and presidential systems, and analyses the veto power of the executive.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section two briefly reviews thetheoretical literature and argues in more detail why moving beyond the parliamentary-presidential distinction is important. Section three discusses the data collection. Sectionfour presents a first comparison of legislative power in parliamentary, semi-presidentialand presidential systems. Section five draws on these insights to make suggestions inwhich direction the empirical literature should evolve.

2 Beyond the parliamentarism - presidentialism dis-tinction

Parliamentary and presidential systems show different structures of their executive- leg-islative relationship. Whereas the former shows a hierarchical structure of the executive-legislative relationship, the latter shows a transactional one. In a hierarchical setting,the authority of one institution is derived from another institution. Contrary, in atransactional setting, the authority of the two institutions are derived independently(Shugart, 2006, 344).

A vast literature exists on the influence of these two types of executive-legislative re-lationships on regime stability. This literature, however, shows rather conflicting resultson whether parliamentary or presidential systems favor more regime stability. On the onehand, the comparison of parliamentary and presidential systems by Stephan and Skach(1993; 1994) shows several features of parliamentary systems making them more stablethan presidential ones. These include, amongst others, a greater "propensity of govern-ments to have majorities to implement their programs"; a "greater ability to rule in amultiparty setting" and "greater tendency to provide long party or government careers,

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which add loyalty and experience to political society" (Stepan and Skach, 1993, 22). Sim-ilarly, Linz (1994), Lijphart (1994; 2008), and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi(1996) argue that parliamentary systems are more likely to lead to stable democracies thanpresidential systems. Or, put differently, that "presidentialism seems to involve greaterrisk for stable democratic politics than contemporary parliamentarism" (Linz, 1994, 70).

On the other hand, several scholars show more stability for presidential democra-cies than for parliamentary ones. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a, 449), for example,show that presidential systems are probable to function better "where presidencies haveweak legislative powers, parties are at least moderately disciplined, and party systemsare not highly fragmented" (see as well Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b) and Power andGasiorowski (1997) who do not find any support for this thesis). Hence, especially pres-idential systems in combination with some other features, as for example multipartysystems (Mainwaring, 1993, 210–222), are less likely to lead to stable democracy. Simi-larly, Cheibub and Limongi (2002) and Cheibub (2007) argue that presidential systemsper se are not less likely to be stable democracies but presidential systems "have existedin countries where the environment is inhospitable for any kind of democratic regime"(Cheibub, 2007, 136).

Different approaches suggest alternative ways to classify countries into regime types.First, Tsebelis’ veto player approach does not focus on the well-known institutional fea-tures of the presidentialism-parliamentarism dichotomy. With reference to presidential-ism, for example, Tsebelis (1995, 305) mentions that not all presidents can be consideredas veto players since not in every presidential system does the president have veto pow-ers (Tsebelis, 2000, 457). Hence Tsebelis’ approach goes beyond the usual differentiationbetween parliamentarism and presidentialism or between different party systems. Whatis more important is the number of veto players as well as their ideological distance fromone another (Tsebelis, 1999, 591). This is why Tsebelis (1995, 315) argues that similarfeatures of policy stability are possible across different regime types.

Second, Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) Parliamentary Power Index (PPI)1 shows not neces-sarily higher degrees of parliamentary power in parliamentary systems than in presidentialones. Accordingly, the distinction between parliamentarism and presidentialism does notautomatically indicate different levels of parliamentary power (Fish, 2006, 6). However,

1The PPI includes 32 items addressing four dimension of legislative power: (1) the legislature’sinfluence over the executive; (2) the legislature’s institutional autonomy; (3) special powers; and(4) the legislature’s institutional capacity (Fish and Kroenig, 2009)). The PPI-score is calculatedby dividing the total number of affirmative answers by the total number of items in the surveywhich leads to a PPI ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating the most powerful legislatures (Fishand Kroenig, 2009, 13).

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according to the authors of the PPI, stronger parliaments are associated with strongerdemocracies (see Fish, 2006, and Fish and Kroenig, 2006). For example, Mexico, theUnited States of America, and Uzbekistan are all characterized as presidential systems.However, this categorization does not tell anything about their stability. For the periodfrom 1990 to 2010 Freedom House (2011) indicates three negative and one positive changefor Uzbekistan and three negative but four positive changes for Mexico. The United Statesof America is the most stable country showing no changes during this period. The UnitedStates of America show a PPI of 0.63 whereas the other two countries show lower levelsof parliamentary power. However, with a PPI of 0.44, Mexico has a stronger parliamentthan Uzbekistan (with a PPI of 0.28).

Tsebelis’ veto player approach or Fish and Kroenig’s PPI are two examples of classi-fications that go beyond the usual parliamentary-presidential distinction. However, whatfollows from democratic elections is two groups in society, on the one hand those who wonthe elections and, on the other hand, those voters who lost the election. Following, not allvoters are equally satisfied with the election outcome and, hence, not all voters expressthe same degree of political legitimacy of the government. Therefore, what results fromelections and the different levels of political legitimacy expressed by winners and losers isa winner-loser gap, assuming that winners attribute more legitimacy to the governmentand the democracy in general than losers do (see Anderson et al., 2005). But, as empha-sized in the introduction of this paper, democratic survival does not only depend on thepolicy of the winners but also on the consent of losers (Anderson et al., 2005, 1-2).

In a democratic regime, conflicting interests among different groups of individuals arealways present. The more politically powerful a group is, the bigger the benefits it getsfrom government policies and actions. Therefore, politically more powerful groups arelikely to be more satisfied with the democratic regime. Political power here refers to "dejure political power" which is the power "allocated by political institutions" (Acemogluand Robinson, 2006, 21)2. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 118) emphasize for non-democratic countries, "(...) elites typically live in fear of being replaced by different socialgroups or by other individuals within the same group". Therefore, the authors argue, fora nondemocratic regime to survive it is crucial to ensure that there is no group beingdissatisfied to the extent that it might overthrow the regime. Linking this argument tothe literature about electoral winners and losers highlights that the existence of highlydissatisfied groups is not only dangerous for nondemocratic regimes but for democratic

2Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 21) distinguish two types of power, de jure political power and defacto political power. De facto political power refers to "(...) what a group can do to other groups and thesociety at large by using force" whereas de jure political power refers to the power "allocated by politicalinstitutions".

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countries as well. Being dependent on the consent of electoral losers, a democratic regimehas to guarantee that these losers are not dissatisfied to the degree that they prefer tooverthrow the regime. Hence, more de jure political power of electoral losers leads to moresatifsaction of this group and contributes to the stability of the democratic regime.

Such de jure political power is determined by institutional rules. In the absence ofrules regulating plenary time in parliament, for example, we find a "legislative state ofnature" where "every member has an equal probability of being recognized to make amotion at any stage of the legislative process" and that everyone who wishes to speak cando so without limits of debate (Cox, 2006, 143). Such a legislative state of nature wouldlead to an impassable plenary bottleneck. What results is a necessity of regulating plenarytime which, in turn, results in "(...) the universal creation of offices endowed with specialagenda-setting powers. Thus, while legislators are everywhere equal in voting power, theyare everywhere unequal in agenda-setting power" (Cox, 2006, 142). Hence, the chances ofmembers of parliament (MPs) to influence the decision making process depends on theparliamentary procedures which determine their legislative power to do so (Cheibub andLimongi, 2002, 168). This applies not only to electoral winners but as well, and maybemore importantly, to electoral losers.

Therefore, a political system should not only be characterized by the way governmentsare formed. First, because not all countries clearly match the ideal type of a parliamentarysystem with a legislative agenda controlled by the government or a presidential systemwith a separation of power between the executive and the legislature. There is muchdifference, for example, in the degree of legislative powers granted to the president inpresidential systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Similarly, the difference in the frequencyof coalition governments between parliamentary and presidential systems is not as largeas one would expect if presidentialism did not provide any incentives for such coalitionformation. As Cheibub and Limongi (2002, 165) show, the "distribution of seats heldby the party of the president and the prime minister is similar under the two regimes".Second, because such a classification does not consider the central role of electoral losers forthe survival of democracies. According to Diamond (1999, 104), for example "... a concreteway that institutional design can mitigate the obstacles to democratic consolidation is bydiscouraging politically significant groups from becoming disloyal or even equivocal intheir commitment to the system." Following Anderson et al. (2005), figure 1 summarizesthe potential of parliamentary procedures creating a politically more legitimate regimethat is more probable to survive than a less legitimate one.

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election t1

winner

looser equality

inclusiveparliamentary

procedures

acceptance

acceptance

+

-

+

+

winner-loosergap of political

legitimacyelection t2

Figure 1: The Mediating Role of Parliamentary Power

Inclusive political institutions can be understood as institutions that allocate de jurepolitical power to different groups (compare Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 173), therebyincluding these groups into the legislative process. Such minority rights define the degreeof political equality in a country. Hence, rather than considering the distinction betweenparliamentary and presidential systems, the paper focuses on legislative power of differentactors and therefore accounts for political power of losers. Legislative procedures influencethe structure of decision-making as well as the weight of individual legislators in policydecisions (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002, 168). More inclusive parliamentary proceduresthat attribute more de jure political power to electoral losers lead to more equality betweenwinners and losers of elections which might make losers more likely to consent to thedemocratic system. Therefore, a closer look at parliaments and at how power insideparliament is distributed among different actors might contribute to the explanation ofdemocratic survival. The next section presents an overview of the first step of a datacollection effort of such parliamentary power.

3 Data

To generate information on legislative power official documents of parliamentary cham-bers and national constitutions are considered3. This paper focuses on three different

3Part of the data is provided by the project "Understanding Roll Call Votes and its Consequences"which is under the direction of Prof. Simon Hug at the University of Geneva and funded through theSwiss National Science Foundation (Grant-No 100012-129737; see Hug, Wegmann and Wüest (2012)).

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aspects of parliamentary procedures. First, based on Mattson (1995, 455) and Taylor(2006, 326), on rights of individual MPs and citizens to introduce bills as through billintroduction influence in the decision-making process is possible. Second, on agenda set-ting power as the degree to which government business is given priority varies amongparliamentary chambers. Third, on veto power as a crucial aspect that reduces the powerof the legislature.

First, the paper assesses the right of individual MPs and citizens to introduce legisla-tive bills or initiatives. To prevent the introduction of bills that lack substantial supportsome parliaments require a specific number of MPs supporting a bill in order to introduceit (Mattson, 1995, 457). This considerably reduces the power of individual MPs. Thepaper shows constraints on individual MPs’ power to initiate bills by looking at whethera number of MPs is required for bill introduction. The introduction of legislative bills orinitiatives allows for the influence of the legislative decision-making process. When MPsor citizens are allowed to introduce bills or citizen initiatives legislative power is not onlyrestricted to electoral winners but gives some power to electoral losers as well.

Second, even if individual MPs and citizens are entitled to introduce legislative billsthe government might control legislation if it can influence the parliamentary agenda(Mattson, 1995, 459-461). The paper shows the influence of the executive on the legisla-tive agenda by looking at whether the government controls the parliamentary agenda orwhether governmental priorities have to be taken into account. Government control ofthe agenda indicates power of electoral winners whereas less government influence on thelegislative agenda might indicate some more power or influence of electoral losers.

Third, veto power is a crucial aspect that reduces the power of the legislature ingeneral and the capacity of electoral losers to influence the decision-making process inparticular. In a first step, the paper looks at whether an executive has constitutionalveto power over laws passed by the legislature. Data on executive veto power is providedby "The Institutions and Elections Project" (Regan and Clark, 2013) and is updated formissing data by referring to official documents of parliamentary chambers and nationalconstitutions. In a second step, the data shows whether the legislature can override thisexecutive veto.

The paper includes all countries for which documents are available and that areclassified as either presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary systems by Cheibub,Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). This data on parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presiden-tial systems comes from the "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited" dataset (Cheibub,Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). The paper includes as well South Africa and Montenegro.Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) did not classify these two countries as democra-

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cies as they violate the alternation rule.4 However, several other classifications5 considerthese two countries to be democratic. Information on unicameral and bicameral systemsas well as the number of seats in each parliamentary chamber is provided by the PARLINEdatabase on national parliaments of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013). The datasetpresented in this paper is not representative as it is largely based on availability of doc-uments in either English, French, German, or Italian. At the moment the dataset coversthe lower chambers of 95 countries all over the world. Due to some missing information,however, the sample size varies slightly between the different aspects of parliamentaryrights considered. Table 5 of the appendix presents all included countries.

4 Legislative rights in parliamentary and presidentialsystems

The next part focuses on the three different aspects of parliamentary procedures discussedin the previous section. The first part shows the right of bill introduction in parliamentary,semi-presidential, and presidential systems. The second part presents the influence of theexecutive on the legislative agenda. The third part highlights executive veto power. Table5 of the appendix shows an overview with all the countries considered. Furthermore, thetable shows the parliamentary chamber and the total number of seats in the chamber andwhether the country has a second chamber (which is not considered in this paper).

4.1 Bill introduction

Table 1 shows an overview of bill introduction rights for parliamentary, semi-presidential,and presidential systems for the different regions, respectively. The column "total" showsthe total of countries considered. There are 86 countries in this sample, 45 parliamen-tary systems, 23 semi-presidential systems, and 18 presidential systems, respectively. Thecolumn "MPs" indicates the number of countries where individual MPs have the right tointroduce bills. The column "MP restriction" indicates the number of countries where aminimum number or percentage of MPs is required for bill introduction. Column "cit-izens" shows the number of countries where citizens have rights of popular initiatives,referendum, or bill introduction.

4"An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent tooffice must have taken place." (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, 69)

5See for example Freedom House (2011); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2012).

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Table 1 shows that in all countries MPs are allowed to introduce bills. However, re-quirements for a minimum number or percentage of MPs for bill introduction are muchmore frequent in parliamentary systems. 15.6% (seven countries out of 45) of parlia-mentary systems6 have such numerical requirements whereas only one semi-presidentialsystem (Poland) and one presidential systems (South Korea) require a minimum num-ber of MPs for bill introduction, corresponding to 4.3% and 5.6%, respectively. Lookingmore closely at the regional distributions shows that such numerical requirements for billintroduction are only found in Asia and Europe, but not in the other regions. In Asia,however, almost as many presidential systems (25%) as parliamentary systems (28.6%)require a minimum number or percentage of MPs for bill introduction.

Table 1: Bill introduction

total MPs MP restriction citizens

Total parliamentary 45 100% (45) 15.6% (7) 20% (9)semi-presidential 23 100% (23) 4.3% (1) 47.8% (11)presidential 18 100% (18) 5.6% (1) 22.2% (4)

Africa parliamentary 2 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential 4 100% (4) 0% (0) 0% (0)presidential 9 100% (9) 0% (0) 0% (0)

Americas parliamentary 8 100% (8) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential - - - -presidential 4 100% (4) 0% (0) 50% (2)

Asia parliamentary 7 100% (7) 28.6% (2) 14.3% (1)semi-presidential 5 100% (5) 0% (0) 40% (2)presidential 4 100% (4) 25% (1) 25% (1)

Europe parliamentary 19 100% (19) 26.3% (5) 42.1% (8)semi-presidential 15 100% (15) 6.7% (1) 60% (9)presidential 1 100% (1) 0% (0) 100% (1)

Oceania parliamentary 9 100% (9) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential - - - -presidential - - - -

A closer look at the countries that include numerical restrictions for MPs to introducebills reveals some interesting aspects. Only one out of the nine chambers that require aminimum number of MPs for bill introduction has fewer than 100 members. This countryis Andorra with a chamber of 28 members and requiring a minimum of three MPs tointroduce a bill. Latvia has a chamber of 100 members requiring 5 MPs to introduce a

6Andorra, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, and Thailand

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bill and Norway has a chamber of 169 members requiring 10 MPs to introduce a bill. Theremaining six chambers7 all have 300 members or more. However, some of the biggestchambers do not require a minimum number or percentage of MPs for bill introduction.Among them are for example India with 545 members, Indonesia with 560 members,Nepal with 601 members, and Turkey with 550 members.

The column "citizens" of table 1 shows that there are 24 countries (27.9% of the totalsample) allowing their citizens to introduce bills, legislative initiatives or referendums.The percentage is highest among semi-presidential systems. Almost half of them (47.8%,eleven8 out of 23) allow citizen initiatives or citizen bill introduction compared to 20% ofparliamentary regimes9 and 22.2% of presidential regimes10, respectively. Looking moreclosely at the regional distributions shows that none of the African or Oceanian countriesallow for such citizen participation whereas the highest percentage can be found in Europe.More than half of the European countries (51.4%, 18 out of 35) allow citizen initiativesor bill introduction compared to 25% (four out of 16) of Asian countries and 16.7% (twoout of twelve) American countries.

4.2 Agenda power

Table 2 shows the priority of executive business on the legislative agenda. The column"total" shows the total number of countries considered. A total of 56 countries is included,29 parliamentary systems, 19 semi-presidential systems, and 8 presidential systems, re-spectively. The column "never" indicates the total number of countries where the standingorders of the parliamentary chamber do not mention priority of government business overother business. The column "always" shows the number of countries in which governmentbusiness always has priority over other business. The columns "on certain days only"and "Gov. can ask for priority" indicate the total number of countries in which there arecertain days with government priority and the total number of countries in which thegovernment can ask priority on the legislative agenda, respectively.

Table 2 shows more executive priority on the legislative agenda for parliamentarysystems, except for Africa where the only parliamentary system (Mauritius) does notmention any government priority. Only 38% (eleven out of 29) of parliamentary systems

7Germany, 620 members; Japan, 480 members; Poland, 460 members; South Korea, 300 members;Spain, 350 members; and Thailand, 500 members

8Austria, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Ro-mania, Serbia

9Albania, Andorra, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Thailand10Argentina, Costa Rica, Philippines, Switzerland

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do not mention priority of government business compared to 79% (15 out of 19) of semi-presidential systems and 50% (four out of eight) of presidential systems, respectively. Theonly two countries (Barbados and Belize) in which government business always has priorityover other business are parliamentary systems. The majority of the parliamentary systems(44.8%) that allow some degree of executive priority on the legislative agenda schedulecertain days or hours on the agenda when government business has priority. In 10.3% ofparliamentary systems (Andorra, Italy, Turkey) the government can ask for priority of itsown business.

Table 2: Executive agenda priority

on certain Gov can asktotal never always days only for priority

Total parliamentary 29 38% (11) 6.9% (2) 44.8% (13) 10.3% (3)semi-presidential 19 79% (15) 0% (0) 5.3% (1) 15.8% (3)presidential 8 50% (4) 0% (0) 25% (2) 25% (2)

Africa parliamentary 1 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential 3 33.3% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 66.7% (2)presidential 4 25% (1) 0% (0) 25% (1) 50% (2)

Americas parliamentary 5 0% (0) 40% (2) 60% (3) 0% (0)semi-presidential - - - - -presidential 1 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)

Asia parliamentary 4 25% (1) 0% (0) 50% (2) 25% (1)semi-presidential 3 66.7% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 33.3% (1)presidential 2 50% (1) 0% (0) 50% (1) 0% (0)

Europe parliamentary 13 69.2% (9) 0% (0) 15.4% (2) 15.4% (2)semi-presidential 13 92.3% (12) 0% (0) 7.7% (1) 0% (0)presidential 1 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)

Oceania parliamentary 6 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (6) 0% (0)semi-presidential - - - - -presidential - - - - -

However, more influence on the legislative agenda in parliamentary systems does notmean that no presidential system allows their executives’ business to have priority onthe legislative agenda. In five semi-presidential or presidential systems the executive canask for priority of its own business.11 In the other three semi-presidential or presidentialcountries that allow priority on the legislative agenda schedule certain days or hours on

11Semi-presidential systems: Kyrgyzstan, and Madagascar, Niger ; presidential systems: Burundi andMalawi.

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the agenda when government business has priority.12

Looking at the regional distribution shows less executive priority on the legislativeagenda in Europe than in other regions. In 22 out of 27 countries (81.5%) the standingorders of the parliamentary chamber do not mention priority of government business overother business. This percentage is smaller for the other regions. In Africa three outof eight countries (37.5%) do not mention priority of government business over otherbusiness whereas in Asia four out of nine (44.4%) do not mention such priority. In theAmericas only one country (16.7%) does not mention priority of government business andin Oceania no country does not mention such priority.

4.3 Executive veto power

Table 3 shows whether the executive of a given country does have the power to veto adecision by parliament. The table shows an overview of executive veto rights for par-liamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential systems for the whole sample and for thedifferent regions, respectively. The column "total" shows the total of countries considered.There are 89 countries in this sample, 47 parliamentary systems, 23 semi-presidentialsystems, and 19 presidential systems. The column "executive veto power" indicates thenumber of countries where the executive has the right to veto a parliamentary decision.

Table 3 shows that executive veto rights are not only common in presidential systems,but also in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. In 85.1% (40 out of 47) ofparliamentary systems the executive does have veto power, compared to 91.3% (21 outof 23) of semi-presidential systems and 84.2% (16 out of 19) of presidential systems,respectively. Overall, in a vast majority of all countries, regardless of the system, theexecutive has the right to veto legislative decisions. However, looking at the regionaldistribution shows that only in Africa the executive always has veto power.

Tabel 4.A presents some more details about the executive veto and the possibility ofthe legislature to override such a veto. The column "executive veto" shows the numberof countries considered in this table. Only countries with an executive veto for whichdetailed information about the veto power is available are considered13. The column"executive shall assent" shows the number of countries for which a formal veto right existsbut the parliamentary rules or the constitution state that the executive shall assent toa legislative decision without the option of not assenting to it. The column "executiveveto only on unconst." indicates the number of countries for which the executive can only

12Semi-presidential system: Ireland; presidential systems: Kenya and Sri Lanka.13The reason why the sample size in table 3 and tables 4.A and 4.B is not the same.

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veto a law when it is unconstitutional. Column "legislative can override executive veto"indicates the number of countries where the legislature can override a veto.

Table 3: Executive veto power

executivetotal veto power

Total parliamentary 47 85.1% (40)semi-presidential 23 91.3% (21)presidential 19 84.2% (16)

Africa parliamentary 1 100% (1)semi-presidential 4 100% (4)presidential 9 100% (9)

Americas parliamentary 11 81.8% (9)semi-presidential - -presidential 4 75% (3)

Asia parliamentary 6 100% (6)semi-presidential 5 100% (5)presidential 4 75% (3)

Europe parliamentary 20 85% (17)semi-presidential 14 85.7% (12)presidential 1 0% (0)

Oceania parliamentary 9 77.8% (7)semi-presidential - -presidential 1 100% (1)

Table 4.A shows that all the countries for which a formal veto power of the executiveexists but the parliamentary rules or the constitution does not mention an option of notassenting to a bill are parliamentary systems. Nearly one third (32%, eight out of 25) of allparliamentary systems considered in table 4.A show such a pattern.14 Similarly, three outof the four countries for which the executive only holds veto power for unconstitutionalbills are parliamentary systems and one is a semi-presidential system.15

Table 4.B shows some details about required majorities to override executive vetos.The table shows a total of 49 countries with a legislature that can override an executiveveto, 15 of them are parliamentary, 18 are semi-presidential, and 16 are presidential,respectively. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of countries where a quorum isneeded to vote on whether to override an executive veto and the total number of cases.16

14Antigua and Barbuda, Denmark, Japan, Malta, Solomon Islands, Spain, Tuvalu, United Kingdom.15Parliamentary systems: Andorra, Kiribati, and Vanuatu; semi-presidential system: Croatia.16For example, looking a the total of parliamentary systems (first row) in 12 countries a majority of

50% is needed, two out of these 12 countries need a quorum for this vote to be valid. In one country atwo-third majority is needed to override an executive veto and in this country a quorum is needed for

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Table 4.A Details on executive veto powerexecutive executive legislative

executive shall veto only can overrideveto assent on unconst. executive veto

Total parliamentary 25 32% (8) 12% (3) 56% (14)semi-presidential 19 0% (0) 5.3% (1) 94.7% (18)presidential 16 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (16)

Africa parliamentary 1 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (1)semi-presidential 2 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (2)presidential 9 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (9)

Americas parliamentary 1 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential - - - -presidential 3 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (3)

Asia parliamentary 6 16.7% (1) 0% (0) 83.3% (5)semi-presidential 5 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (5)presidential 3 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (3)

Europe parliamentary 12 33.3% (4) 8.3% (1) 58.3% (7)semi-presidential 12 0% (0) 8.3% (1) 91.7% (11)presidential 0 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)

Oceania parliamentary 5 40% (2) 40% (2) 20% (1)semi-presidential - - - -presidential 1 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (1)

Table 4.B Legislatures’ power to override executive vetooverride veto by ... majority

total 1/2 2/3 3/4 3/5

Total parliamentary 15 80% (2/12) 6.7% (1/1) 6.7% (1/1) 0% (0)semi-presidential 18 72.2% (7/13) 11% (1/2) 0% (0) 16.7% (3/3)presidential 16 25% (3/4) 68.8% (9/11) 6.3% (1/1) 0% (0)

Africa parliamentary 2 100% (0/2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential 2 50% (1/1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 50% (1/1)presidential 9 33.3% (2/3) 55.6% (4/5) 11% (1/1) 0% (0)

Americas parliamentary 0 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential - - - - -presidential 3 0% (0) 100% (2/3) 0% (0) 0% (0)

Asia parliamentary 5 80% (0/4) 20% (1/1) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential 5 40% (1/2) 40% (1/2) 0% (0) 20% (1/1)presidential 3 33.3% (1/1) 66.6% (2/2) 0% (0) 0% (0)

Europe parliamentary 7 71.4% (2/5) 0% (0) 14.3% (1/1) 0% (0)semi-presidential 11 90.9% (5/10) 0% (0) 0% (0) 9.1% (1/1)presidential 0 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)

Oceania parliamentary 1 100% (0/1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)semi-presidential - - - - -presidential 1 0% (0) 100% (1/1) 0% (0) 0% (0)

14


A closer look at the different majorities to override the executive veto shows differencesfor parliamentary and presidential systems. While for most parliamentary systems (80%,twelve out of 15) a simple majority is required to override an executive veto, for mostpresidential systems (68.8%, 11 out of 16, respectively) a two-thrid majority is required.

However, there are some countries that do not fit into this pattern. Latvia and Thai-land, both parliamentary systems, require more than a simple majority to override anexecutive veto. In Thailand a two-third majority is needed whereas in Latvia a three-fourths majority is required to override the veto. Benin, Comoros, Malawi, and theRepublic of the Maldives, all presidential systems, do not require more than 50% of votesto override an executive veto. Whereas in Malawi no quorum is required, Benin, Comoros,and the Republic of the Maldives require a quorum to override the executive veto.

Looking at the regional distribution shows a tendency for simple majorities in Euro-pean countries while in Asian and African countries requirements for different majoritiesare more evenly distributed. Out of the 18 European countries only two require morethan fifty percent of votes to override the executive veto. Latvia, a parliamentary sys-tem, requires a three-fourths majority and Poland, a semi-presidential system, requiresthree-fifths majority to override the executive veto.

One parliamentary country, however, requires some other procedure to override anexecutive veto. Article 78 of the Norvegian constitution states that "[i]f the King assentsto the Bill, he appends his signature, whereby it becomes law. If he does not assent toit, he returns it to the Storting with a statement that he does not for the time beingfind it expedient to give his assent. In that case the Bill must not again be submittedto the King by the Storting then assembled." Furthermore, according to article 79 ofthe Norvegian Constitution "[i]f a Bill has been passed unaltered by two sessions of theStorting, constituted after two separate successive elections and separated from each otherby at least two intervening sessions of the Storting, without a divergent Bill having beenpassed by any Storting in the period between the first and last adoption, and it is thensubmitted to the King with a petition that His Majesty shall not refuse his assent to a Billwhich, after the most mature deliberation, the Storting considers to be beneficial, it shallbecome law even if the Royal Assent is not accorded before the Storting goes into recess."Hence, the parliament of Norway can override a veto only in the subsequent legislativeperiod.

the vote to be valid.

15


5 Conclusion

Among the most prominent hypothesis about democratic survival is the one about par-liamentary or presidential systems to favor stable democracies. This paper shows whymoving beyond this distinction between parliamentarism and presidentialisms is impor-tant. Theoretically, classifying a political system based on the way governments areformed as either parliamentary, semi-presidential, or presidential neglects much of thedifferences of political systems and concentrates on only one group in a country, the elec-toral winners. But, legislative power of losers might contribute to more legitimacy theselosers attribute to democracy which in turn helps the regime to survive. To test thisrelationship the legislative power of electoral losers has to be assessed. To this end, thepaper looks at three different legislative procedures to get a very first and basic picture ofwinners’ and losers’ power in parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential systems.Data on bill introduction, agenda setting, and veto power not only shows some differ-ences between parliamentary and presidential systems but also some similarities betweenthese categorizations as well as some regional patterns. Hence, to capture the differentdegrees of legislative power of winners and losers it is necessary to move beyond theparliametnarism-presidentialism distinction.

Power to introduce bills shows more restrictions in parliamentary systems and in Eu-rope and Asia than in other regions. Similarly, citizen rights to introduce legislative ini-tiatives do not exist in Africa and Oceania and are most frequent among semi-presidentialsystems. In parliamentary systems the government tends to have more influence on thelegislative agenda. However, some of the semi-presidential and presidential systems dogrant their executives influence on the legislative agenda. Data on veto power shows thatparliamentary systems tend to have weaker veto power than semi-presidential and pres-idential systems. In almost half of the parliamentary systems the executive shall assentto a legislative decision or veto is only possible for unconstitutional laws.

The paper shows some considerable differences and similarities of parliamtary powerbetween parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential systems. Hence, different de-grees of power, especially for electoral losers, cannot be assessed by categorizing countriesas either parliamentary, semi-presidential, or presidential. Therefore, further researchshould assess legislative power of electoral losers and analyse the relationsip betweenthese legisaltive rights and support for democracy of electoral winners and losers. Datacollection has to further concentrate on legislative power of electoral losers in differentcountries to capture a more detailed picture of such power. First, rights to introducelegislative bills have to be assessed in more detail, including other actors such as political

16


parties or committees. Second, veto power has to be assessed in more detail, includingother actors as for example second chambers or citizens. Third, a closer look at the leg-islative process of bills is necessary to assess the degree of influence of political losers.Furthermore, more countries have to be included to increase the sample size. Especiallymore American and African countries should be included in order to give a more detailedpicture of legislative power outside of Europe.

17


Appendix

Table 5 shows a list of all considered countries, their lower chamber, whether the countryhas a bicameral system or not, the region, and the system, respectively. Furthermore, thetable shows for each table whether data is available.

18


Table5:

Sample

includ

edin

table

coun

try

cham

ber

bicameral

region

system

12

34A

/B

Alban

iaKuv

endi

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xAnd

orra

Con

sellgeneral

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Antigua

andBarbu

daHou

seof

Representatives

yes

Americas

parliam

entary

xx

xArgentin

aCám

arade

Diputad

osyes

Americas

presidentia

lx

xx

Arm

enia

Azgay

inZh

ogov

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xAustralia

Hou

seof

Representatives

yes

Ocean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

xx

Austria

Nationa

lrat

yes

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

Bah

amas

Hou

seof

Assem

bly

yes

Americas

parliam

entary

xx

Barba

dos

Hou

seof

Assem

bly

yes

Americas

parliam

entary

xx

xBelgium

Cha

mbredesReprésentan

tsyes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

xBelize

Hou

seof

Representatives

yes

Americas

parliam

entary

xx

xBenin

Assem

blée

natio

nale

noAfrica

presidentia

lx

xx

Bhu

tan

Tsho

gdu

yes

Asia

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Bulgaria

Narod

nosabran

ieno

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xBurun

diInam

aNshingm

ateK

ayes

Africa

presidentia

lx

xx

xCan

ada

Hou

seof

Com

mon

syes

Americas

parliam

entary

xx

xCom

oros

Assem

blée

del’U

nion

noAfrica

presidentia

lx

xx

Costa

Rica

Asamblea

Legisla

tiva

noAmericas

presidentia

lx

xx

Croatia

HrvatskiS

abor

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xCzech

Repub

licPo

slaneckaSn

emovna

yes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Denmark

Folketinget

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xEa

stTim

orNationa

lParlia

ment

noOcean

iasemi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

Estonia

Riig

ikogu

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xFinlan

dEd

usku

nta

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xFran

ceAssem

blée

natio

nale

yes

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

Georgia

Saka

rtvelosPa

rlamenti

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xGerman

yBun

destag

yes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

xGha

naPa

rliam

ent

noAfrica

presidentia

lx

xx

Grena

daHou

seof

Representatives

yes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

19

Parliamentary procedures in presidential and parliamentary systemsco

ntin

ued

includ

edin

table

coun

try

cham

ber

bicameral

region

system

12

34A

/B

Hun

gary

Orszaggyü

les

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Icelan

dAlth

ingi

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xIndia

LokSa

bha

yes

Asia

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Indo

nesia

Dew

anPe

rwak

ilanRak

yat

noAsia

presidentia

lx

Irelan

dDailE

irean

nyes

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xItaly

Cam

eradeiD

eputati

yes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Jamaica

Hou

seof

Representatives

yes

Americas

parliam

entary

xx

xJa

pan

Shug

iinyes

Asia

parliam

entary

xx

xKenya

Nationa

lAssem

bly

yes

Africa

presidentia

lx

xx

xKiriba

tiMan

eaba

NiM

aung

atab

uno

Ocean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

xx

Kyrgy

zstan

JogorkuKenesh

noAsia

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xLa

tvia

Saeima

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Libe

riaHou

seof

Representatives

yes

Africa

presidentia

lx

xx

xLiechtenstein

Land

tag

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

Lithua

nia

Seim

asno

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xMacedon

iaSo

bran

ieno

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xMad

agascar

Antenim

ieram-P

irenena

yes

Africa

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

Malaw

iNationa

lAssem

bly

noAfrica

presidentia

lx

xx

xMaldives

Peop

le’s

Majlis

noAsia

presidentia

lx

xMali

Assem

blée

Nationa

leno

Africa

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xMalta

Il-Kam

raTa

d-Deputati

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xx

MarshallIsla

nds

Nitijela

noOcean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

Mau

ritius

Nationa

lAssem

bly

noAfrica

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Mon

golia

Ulsy

nIkhKhu

ral

noAsia

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

Mon

tenegro

Skup

stina

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

Nau

ruPa

rliam

ent

noOcean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

xNepal

Sansad

noAsia

parliam

entary

xNetherla

nds

Tweede

Kam

erderStaten-G

eneraal

yes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

New

Zealan

dHou

seof

Representatives

noOcean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

xNiger

Assem

blée

Nationa

leno

Africa

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xNigeria

Hou

seof

Representatives

yes

Africa

presidentia

lx

xx

Norway

Stortin

get

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xx

20

Parliamentary procedures in presidential and parliamentary systemsco

ntin

ued

includ

edin

table

coun

try

cham

ber

bicameral

region

system

12

34A

/B

Pakistan

Nationa

lAssem

bly

yes

Asia

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Palau

Hou

seof

Delegates

yes

Ocean

iapresidentia

lx

xPa

puaNew

Guinea

Nationa

lParlia

ment

noOcean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

Philipp

ines

Kap

ulun

ganNgMga

Kinataw

anyes

Asia

presidentia

lx

xx

Poland

Sejm

yes

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xPo

rtug

alAssam

bleiada

Repub

lica

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xRom

ania

Cam

eraDeputatilo

ryes

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xSa

nMarino

Con

siglio

gran

deegenerale

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xSenegal

Assem

blée

Nationa

leno

Africa

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xSerbia

Nardo

naSk

upstina

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xSierra

Leon

ePa

rliam

ent

noAfrica

presidentia

lx

xx

Slovak

iaNarod

narada

noEu

rope

semi-p

resid

entia

lx

xx

xSlovenia

Drzavni

Svet

yes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

xSo

lomon

Island

sNationa

lParlia

ment

noOcean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

xSo

uthAfrica

Nationa

lAssem

bly

yes

Africa

parliam

entary

xx

xSo

uthKorea

Kuk

Hoe

noAsia

presidentia

lx

xx

xSp

ain

Con

gresode

losDiputad

osyes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

xx

SriL

anka

Parliam

ent

noAsia

presidentia

lx

xx

St.K

ittsan

dNevis

Nationa

lAssem

bly

noAmericas

parliam

entary

xSt.Lucia

Hou

seof

Assem

bly

yes

Americas

parliam

entary

xSt.V

incent

andtheGrena

dines

Hou

seof

Assem

bly

noAmericas

parliam

entary

xSu

rinam

eNationa

leAssem

blee

noAmericas

presidentia

lx

xSw

eden

Riksdag

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

Switz

erland

Nationa

lrat

yes

Europe

presidentia

lx

xx

Tha

iland

Saph

aphu

than

Ratsado

nyes

Asia

parliam

entary

xx

xTr

inidad

andTo

bago

Hou

seof

Representatives

noAmericas

parliam

entary

xx

xTu

rkey

Büy

ükMillet

Meclisi

noEu

rope

parliam

entary

xx

xx

Tuvalu

Palamene

noOcean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

xx

Ukraine

Verkho

vnaRad

ano

Europe

semi-p

resid

entia

lUnitedKingd

omHou

seof

Com

mon

syes

Europe

parliam

entary

xx

xx

UnitedStates

ofAmerica

Hou

seof

Representatives

yes

Americas

presidentia

lx

xx

xVa

nuatu

Parliam

ent

noOcean

iapa

rliam

entary

xx

xx

21


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