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New Models and New

Technologies for an Integrated

Risk Management in Complex

Environments

Paolo Bragatto

INAIL – Ricerca, Certificazione e Verifica

Centro Ricerca

Monteporzio Catone (RM) ITALIA

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A very short introduction

• Why the Workers Compensation Authority in this

conference?

• INAIL is not just compensation but a global protection

system for all workers in Italy. INAIL objectives include

also the rehabilitation of work accident victims, the

reduction of accident at works, …..

• Research Certification Area is in charge of

• research on prevention and safety at work,

• control and verification of work equipment,

installations and establishments.

• The Safety of major industrial plants and infrastructures,

involve both workers (employed, contractors) and local

communities, as well as land and environment. Safety

issues cannot be “cut with a knife”!

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Summary

• Safety and Risk in modern Industries

• How and why the concepts of risks (and safety) are

changing

• May Science and technologies make our communities

safer?

• From Fundamentals to Practice (a few examples from

INAIL research area)

• Suggestions for Practitioners and Regulators

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Fundamentals: Safety

• SAFETY or RISK?

• Since the birth of industry, SAFETY was a keyword (e.g.

the first code for pressure equipment safe design and

operation in UK in 1854).

• Typical command & control approach – safety based.

For each sector codes and rules addressing design,

construction and service phases. Public Inspector bodies

to enforce regulations.

• Stregth of C&C approach: effective, complete, objective

• Weakness of C&C approach: rigid, separate, inadequate

both for complex systems (with interferences) and for

very dynamic (fast growing) industries

• Operators’ responsibility: compliance with codes, rules

and regulations

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From Safety to Risk

• In industries, the word RISK entered just with nuclear

power plant, 1950/60.

• A few severe chemical accidents (Seveso, Flixborough)

in the 70s demonstrated the C&C Safety Based

approach inadequate for major accident hazard.

• Integrated approach. Equipment & plant safety with

human & organizational system, land use planning, …

• Operators must manage risks in an integrated and

dynamic way, following essential safety requirements,

adopting management systems

Seveso (I)

Luglio 1976

Flixborough (UK)

Giugno 1974

Beek (NL)

Novembre 1975

Bhopal (India)

Dicembre 1984

Basel (CH)

Novembre 1986

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Risk Management in Major Accident Hazard

• The risk management approach in EU Directives for

Major Accident Control

• Seveso I 1985, Seveso II 1996,

• Seveso II Amendement 2003, Seveso III 2012.

• Seveso Keystones:

Mandatory Safety Management System

Audit program organized by Competent Authorities

Shared Knowledge About Accident

Integration with Land Use Planning

Enschede (NL)

May 2000

Toulouse (F)

Sep. 2001

Buncefield (UK)

Dec. 2005

Baia Mare (RO)

Jan 2000

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Risk Management in Occupational Safety

• Risk Assessment shyly entered Occupational Safety

legislation with EU Directive 89/391, implemented in

D.Lgs 626/94 on occupational Safety & Health

• In Italy the “revolution” with D.Lgs 81/08, which stressed

“risk assessment documents”.

• Furthermore Safety Management Systems are highly

promoted. (premium discounts, incentives, responsibility

exemption..)

No more deaths

at work!

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Traditional Risk definition

Risk =

probability of occurrence of harm x severity of that harm

ISO GUIDE 51 Safety ed. 1999

Corollaries:

• Risk is a number

• Phenomenon has to be well known, so both severity

and likelihood may be evaluated in a quantitative way.

• Thresholds for Risk acceptability

• Inherent safety is an Utopia

• Risk Separation (e.g. Occupational, Major Accident,

Natural)

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Societal Risk in a Nutshell

Popolation

Database

Weather

Database

Accident

Math. Models

Equipment

Reliability

Impact

Scenarios

Number of Fatalities

Expecte

d

F

requencie

s

1 10 100 1000

10

-9

1

0-8

10

-7

10

-6

1

0-5

10

-4

10

-3

Risk Map

FN Curves

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Risk Based Approach: Success Stories C

anvey I

sla

nd

UK

19

78

Rijm

on

d N

L

19

80

Ravenna

IT 1

98

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In the 80’s Pioneer studies on Area

Risks, aimed to address decisions

about new installations, based on

Societal Risk and FN curves

approach. After these studies major

European Industrial areas has been

well managed until today.

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Epochal Disasters

Safety (Occupational,

Industrial, Transport) and

Security may be definitely

separate?

Inherent Safety, why not?

Concequences of financial

actions are known?

Just Probability to measure

Uncertainty ?

9/11/2001

9/17/2011

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Very recent Disasters

Spain

Sept. 2013

Santiago

High Speed

Train

Russia

February 2013

Cheliabinsk

Meteorite

Disaster

Japan

Heartquacke

+Tsunami +

Nuclear

April 2011

USA

April 2010

Deepwater

Offshore

Disaster

Thailand

Nov. 2011

Flooded

Automotive

District

Italy

Viareggio

LPG Train

Accident

July 2009

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Very recent Disasters

May 2013

Genoa

Jolly Nero

Cargo Ship

Tragedy

July 2013

Pescara

Fireworks

Factory

Disaster

May 2012

Emilia

Harthquacke

Jan. 2012

Costa

Concordia

Disaster

Jan. 2012

Tresana

Gas

pipiline

Feb. 2012

Italy

Big Snow

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• Known Known Risks Safety • Awareness - Conscious Competence

• Unknown Known Risks Aleatory Uncertainties • Lack of information - Awareness

• Known Unknown Risks Epistemic Uncertainties • Lack of Knowledge

• Unknown Unknown Risks The Black Swan • Lack of Awareness

KK – UU model

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Risk =

effect of uncertainty on the achievement of objective

ISO 31000 Risk definition

ISO GUIDE 73 Risk Management Vocabulary 2009

ISO 31000 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines 2009

ISO 31010 Risk Management Risk Assesment Technicques 2009

Coming soon …

ISO 31014 Risk Management Guidance for implementation of ISO 31000

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Occupational

Safety

Equipment

Reliability

Industrial

Safety matter

Unplanned

Interruption Injury at work

Major

Accident uncertainties

Satisfy users

& shareholders

Safe working

ambient

Positive perception

by local community objectives

Equipment

verification

Safety Report +

Safety Audits Activity

Equipment

control

Risk = effect of uncertainty on the achievement of objective

D.Lgs 81/2008 Dir. 96/82/CE Legislation

Risk Management at Industrial Plant

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System

Mana-gement

Integrated

Equipment

verification

Safety Report +

Safety Audits

Equipment

control

D.Lgs 81/2008

Dir. 96/82/CE

Authorization

Safety Report

Periodical Audit

(VVF,ARPA,INAIL)

Art 71 D.Lgs 81/08

DM 11/4/11

(INAIL, ASL, + soggetti abilitati )

Plant Integrated Management System

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Systems mngmnt

Complex Risk management

Inte

rnet -

Cyber

Space

Tra

de &

Logis

tic

Goods T

ransport

In

frastr

uctu

res

Health S

tructu

re –

Patient

Safe

ty

Grid

Land &

Environm

ent

Pow

er

& P

rocess I

ndustr

y

Occupational S

afe

ty &

Health

M

obili

ty

Citiz

en S

afe

ty &

Health

safety

security

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Does Science make us safer?

Genoa 2009 & 2012 Science and Technology make the work Safer?

Genoa 2013 Science and Technology make our communities safer?

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2009 Risk Definiton Uncertainty – Risk

More Information less Risk (if Knowledgeis complete)

More Knowledge less Risk (if Knowledge is lacking)

Shannon 1949 Uncertainty > Information Entropy

De Finetti 1970 Probability does not esiste

If you make work (aquire information/ make inspection) you

reduce risk

If you make research (increase Knowledge) you reduce risk

Science and Risk

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TIME

Ris

k / E

ntr

opy

Information Degradation

Inspectio

n

Equipment

Critical Structures

Degradation

Mechanism

Risk based Inspections =

Knowledge Based Inspections

Risk Based Inspection

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Risk Research vs Preacution Principle

Precautionary principle adopted in Europe in situation of

scientific uncertainty.

“fundamentalist” application of preacutionary principle could

stop all innovations in Europe, thus it is essential investigate

safety at very early stages, before industrial applications

Research essential for susbstainable economic growth in

Europe include:

Safety of Nanomaterials and Nanotechnologies

Safety of Green technologies

Safety of Advanced biotechnologies

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Disappearing Knowledge

The relentless effect of Entropy Law:

Experience underestimated, is forgotten

Knowledge, hidden in official documents, is covered by dust,

then dies and it’s lost forever

Revive continuously Safety Knowledge to prevent accident

Involve experienced Personnel in developing Safety System

Learn from experience, including accident, near misses, and

positive histories.

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Sharing Information or Knowledge

Information

management

Experience

Knowledge

Management Safety - Secuity

Management

System

Information

management

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Example from INAIL research “Safe contractors

2.2

Operator contracts a work

to a maintenance company.

Contractor firms’

safety manager

knows well the

task related

hazard (e.g. falls

from height, cuts) Protective equipment

to be selected in wide

range according to

the CEN standard

Contractor worker

who must be

provided with the

full equipment (goggles, face-shield,

masks, gloves, boots,

earmuffs, safety

helmets…

The Operator must provide

safety info’s to the contractors

(permit to work)

The Operator safety

manager knows the

environment related hazards,

including major accidents

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Onto DPI: appropriate PPE choice

for maintenance within a large

industrial park,

DUVRI art.26 81/08

“Ontology” an artificial

intelligence method has been

used for organizing

knowledge and inferring

decisions about contractors

safety

Knowledge

Ontology

Sharing Knowledge to make Decisions

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Example from INAIL research “NearMisses”

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Public Domain

Knowledge

Sharing & Reviving Knowledge

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Knowledge Based

Thanks for your attention !

Risk management